Ten Reasons Why Anti-US Rhetoric and Flag Burning Did Not Blot the Arab Spring

By Abdelmajid Hajji

So called Arab Spring revolts have noticeably steered themselves away from US flagburning and related excessive anti-Western/imperialistic rhetoric. Flag burning, regarded by many extremists as a symbol of American oppression and relentless pursuit of selfish interests, is an extremely crude act of communication, more akin to a primeval howl than to a fulfilling two-way conversation. Tenuously protected by the freedom of speech clause, the act is abhorred by most Americans who regard it as the ultimate affront; so much so that the June 27, 2006 proposition to amend the constitution and criminalize flag desecration failed to pass by a single vote. Many observers of the Arab uprisings have seen in the absence of US flag burning, or flag desecration (which includes trampling on and tearing apart the flag, among other acts) an astonishing development in a region known to have used the tactic widely and for so long; but few reasons have been volunteered for what had prompted the change. This article will attempt to do just that, laying out ten reasons which in concert explain why the flag-burning ritual deserted the Arab public squares during the past year. Here are the ten explanations, starting from the US side of the continuum: 1. The Obama Factor: True, President Obama lost a great deal of glow in the Arab region following his inability to move forward the stalling Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Likewise, the now dangling veto sword against Palestinian statehood looks ugly in his hand. Yet, the reservoir of affection he replenished after his famous visits to Cairo and Istanbul is far from completely drained. As evidence, toss up

Obamas and George W. Bushs names in a discussion in the Arab region and watch the second name sink ten out of ten times. 2. A More Realistic US Policy towards the Middle East: Obama promised a new beginning for Americas relationship with the Islamic and Arab worlds, before and after his election. Many, on the contrary, see but a continuation of the Bush doctrine to the last Guantanamo detail (he failed to close the Camp before a self-imposed deadline). Yet, look closer and you will find that Obama tried, with some success, to steer his Arab policy away from the debilitating pull of the Israeli framing of the Arab region (i.e., Israel naming for the USA its enemies and friends in the region), and from Bushs mantra, the war on terrorism, with the Mid-East as its epicenter. Accordingly, and much to the displeasure of Israel, Hezbollah and Iran were largely tolerated in Lebanon, while Turkeys influence and reach were allowed to grow in the Middle East. Also, Obama chose to ditch convenient stability in Yemen and Syria in favor of a less tidy eventuality as the peoples quest for freedom and dignity drags on. The move to go against the leaders of these countries is all the more audacious as both Saleh and Al Assad may show an honorable record of rejecting and disrupting Al Qaida. A few of Obamas political opponents have characterized his management of the events in the Middle East as weakness. In fact, Michele Bachmann (R-Minn.) recently slammed Obama, charging that it was the Presidents weak leadership which brought the so-called Arab Spring and consequently threw Israel in the midst of its chaos. Not many agree with this extreme perspective. A more plausible reading of the situation is that the US and Obama are finally using different sets of pliers for different Arab contingencies, in lieu of one doctrine fits all. US bashers will find the nuances in Obamas approach to the Middle East and North Africa not at all helpful as they prepare to issue their blanket condemnation of the US as the Arabs perennial nemesis.

3. US Support of the Arab Spring: Wobbly and disappointingly ambiguous at the beginning, Obamas support of the Arab uprisings grew more assertive with time. In Libya, Syria, and Yemen the pushy role of the US has been widely appreciated, not only by the people in these countries who are rising against their oppressors but also by other Arabs who are cleverly utilizing this open American backing as leverage as they coax reform from reluctant regimes. The US has also been working behind the scene urging Arab monarchies from Morocco to Bahrain to make good on their promises of reform. Obamas Address to the Arab Spring last May was as much a paean to democracy as a call for Americas friends and clients in the region to play by the new rules. Affirmed Obama in this speech: Square by square, town by town, country by country, the people have risen up to demand their basic human rights. ... It will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy." Although arguably the US was drawn reluctantly to this new policy, and that its medium-range interests would be served by it, it remains a fact that the American pro-reform strategy is prized in the Arab street, and will be increasingly invoked by the protesters as stalemates form here and there. 4. Fall of the Myth of the Islamists Threat to the West: Much has been said about the possibility that the Arab spring may well turn into a winter of theocracies; with the latter ranging from the very benign to the most claustrophobic. This may or may not materialize; however, given the healthy dose of debate in and outside the region about this issue, resulting in much light shed on the political maneuvers of different Islamic parties and groups, the outcome will surprise no one. What is a trifle surprising however is that the Islamists, from Morocco to Jordan and beyond, are deliberately removing from their ideological platforms (and raised slogans) all traces of anti-US sentiment. This applies to large mainstream groups such as the Egyptian

Brotherhood, the Tunisian Ennahda Movement, or the Moroccan Justice and Development Party; as well as to fringe Salafist factions for whom much of Western civilization is still anathema. Realizing the welcome shift, the United States has proceeded to open channels of communication with many of Islamist groups who now ironically regard the USs overtures less as a liability --as it clearly was in the past-but as a feather in their cap to show and use in the ongoing jostling for power. Put differently, America is now being courted by the majority of the renascent Islamic groups, brought from the cold of years of exclusion and warmed by the ongoing revolutions. This should explain, more than any other single reason laid out here, the absence of flag burning and other anti-US discourse; in particular as the devotees of these Islamic groups nearly always outnumber the rest of the demonstrators from the other ideological stripes. 5. Fall of the Myth of the Pan-Arab Street: Another astonishing fact about the Arab uprisings is that they have been surgically nationalistic from inception to finish; owing nothing to the pan-Arab ideology that fired up the streets from the early 60s onward. Not one pan-Arab slogan was raised, despite the fact regional satellite televisions covering the revolts (Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, in particular) have been broadcasting from a largely pan-Arab perspective, and perhaps more importantly, the uprisings in different parts of the Arab region followed similar patterns, and intentionally and effectively used identical slogans. The absence of pan-Arab rhetoric is not due, as some contend, to the influential role played in the uprisings by non-Arab ethnic minorities, from Kurds in Syria to the Berbers in North Africa (with some gains for their causes, as the Amazighs, or Berbers, in Morocco saw recently some newly obtained rights enshrined in the New Moroccan Constitution). It is largely the result of various interlocking social transformations which have projected the youth to the fore,

lifting their expressions to preeminence, as befits the views of a majority, to the detriment of their parents and supreme leaders four-generations-old beliefs. True, as they speak and exchange through the Web, Arab youth reveal a surprising amount of identity assertion; but this one is far from unitary or pure, oscillating in nearly equal measure between the ethnic (Arab, but not exclusively) and the religious (mostly Muslim). The dual identity statement is at times pitted against Western cultural values, including American globalizing commercial and cultural icons; but it is rarely opposed to Americas outsized influence in the region; which their parents liked to characterize as gringo imperialism on board the Sixth Fleet. 6. No Burning Military Hotspots in the Region: Although the casualties keep amassing from the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq --far less than in the past and less from the Americans and their NATO allies than from the fighters and populations in place-- the image most Arabs have of the these conflicts is that they belong to the past, at worst they are seen as smoldering battlegrounds. When they get mentioned these days it is mostly for their humanitarian dimension. Even Obamas recent announcement of the US troops withdrawal from Iraq by years end failed to reach headline status in most local news outlets. Perhaps contributing to a gentler image of the US, the military discomfiture of the US in Iraq is interpreted by many as a defeat of American designs. For sure, the sense of outrage experienced at the wake of Abu Ghraib scandal is no longer felt by Arabs, at least outside Iraq. Therefore, there is no sufficient fuel for gigantic anti-war demonstrations in Arab capitals; usually a most propitious environment for angry US-flag burning. 7. Improved US Public Relations Initiatives in the Region: Effective public relations initiatives do not necessarily have to run parallel to current US foreign policy toward the region; but an improvement in the second certainly helps the successful execution

of the first. The all-time low for US perception in the Middle East was perhaps reached after the second Gulf war in 2003. Then President Bush was acutely aware of the negative image the US has ended up acquiring after the destruction of Baghdad and, equally significantly, as a result of the US administration apparent inability to tackle the inertia on the Israeli-Palestinian front. Consequently, several initiatives have been devised or overhauled, of which I will present the three most important. There was first the launching of a media and communication campaign in the Arab region, modeled after the decades-long communication blitzkrieg ordained for the peoples of the former Communist Block. The key tools for the recent drive to win hearts and minds have been Radio Sawa (destined for the regions youth) and Al Hurra Television, purposefully designed to counter the perturbing views and influence of Al Jazeera and hopefully win over in the act a portion of its huge viewership. The ratings have demonstrated that Radio Sawa fared far better than Al Hurra, which did not garner more than two percent of viewers in most Arab countries (with the exception of Iraq, thanks to a boost from terrestrial broadcasts). When last year many in the United States sought to abolish Al Hurra, regarded as a waste of effort and tax payers dollars, the recent events in the Middle East decided otherwise: now Al Hurra is competing and holding its own against the majors: Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, and BBC Arabic. Al Hurra has produced some surprisingly good reporting from Tahrir Square in Cairo, and Arabs were very pleased to see a US-owned and managed channel squarely plunked behind Arab revolutionaries. The two other initiatives were also delicately and cleverly targeted: public officials in all types of US agencies in the region donned their missionary caps and set out to meet and engage journalists, media syndicates, and opinion leaders, offering them free documentation, training, and exchange visits to the USA. The offensive achieved

some of its aims, although not everyone was won over: many journalists decried the initiative as a blatant attempt to bribe the Arab press. A parallel energetic campaign was also conducted in favor of professional associations, political parties, and youth and women groups in big cities as in far-flung and less privileged corners. It is safe to say that the cost and the effort did have an impact on those targeted populations, many members of which conveniently turned up as first-tier organizers and leaders in the uprisings. 8. US Power Abroad Humbled by Weak Economy at Home: As other economic giants rise, American dominance on the world arena dips. Since American military power is logically tributary to timely budgetary allocations, the brooding recession has not helped it. Furthermore, the wearied American middle class is showing no appetite for military ventures. This lackluster reality is not lost on the rest of the world; or on the Middle East, the target of most of the recent US military initiatives abroad. Therefore, the US is seen as humbler and hampered, even badgered by rising pretenders; certainly, a far cry from the arrogant power of yesteryears, often viscerally decried through flag burning sessions. 9. Arab Regimes are Refraining from Anti-US Instigations: This is no conspiracy theory canard: regimes very friendly to the US have indulged in anti-US rhetoric, overtly and covertly. There are dozens of instances where first- and second-tier officials in several Arab regimes (friendly and less friendly) fathered the best ranting articles and speeches. Understandably, these found in the vilification of US power and Western greed an expedient manner to spread confusion about the true nature of their governance. Thus, Hosni Mubarak, universally acknowledged to have been propped up by US power and a multi-billion dollar yearly donation, has repeatedly railed against the

United States as a destabilizing force in the region (perhaps he meant for his own regime) and a prime endorser of Israels actions against the Palestinians. Long-time ally and embattled Yemeni President, Abdullah Saleh, took to his countrys television a few months ago to condemn the oppositions demonstrations as events that had been planned in dark rooms in Washington and Doha (the latter capital is tossed in for Al Jazeeras more militant style of reporting). Although still used by desperate exiting dictators, the practice is less successful now for reasons ranging from lack of credibility in the initiators to the sophistication of the citizenry and the fact that most regimes now have more burning matters on their hands, such as civil servants strikes, unemployed sit-ins, and Islamic fundamentalism. Given the probable backlash, even Assad has now learned (after the incidents involving the US ambassador in Damascus) to refrain from concocting anything, not even a spontaneous rally, which may lead to the burning of a US flag. 10. Finally, Social Media: Nothing worthwhile has been advanced on the subject of the exact roles played by social media (Face book, YouTube, Twitter, etc.), the internet, and the satellite television technology in the Arab revolts. However, it is safe to say that with one of these tools missing, the revolutions would not be where they are today. Each medium played a specific role in the uprisings: satellite television preached and prodded its audiences, mostly males in their late twenties and older rooting in their living rooms for victory to their sons and daughters. Television also awed and shocked the dictators and their aficionados, perhaps hastening the departure of some of them. Social media on the other hand were best for mobilizing and organizing the youth. They proved most effective as conduits of communication in the hands of young rebels in the streets and back alleys as they exchanged vital information amongst themselves and kept the world informed.

With such blazing fast communication tools like Facebook and Twitter nobody would logically elect to communicate about excessive US power via flag burning. Presently, the method stands as equivalent in efficiency and primitiveness to the communication technology (lighting fire to generate smoke) used by Phoenician traders along the Mediterranean coast to inform about their arrival. What's more, Facebook interestingly turned out to be the enemy of flag burning in the United States. LSU student, Benjamin Haas, announced last May on Facebook his intention to burn the US flag in public, only to have a thousand students link up through the same site, resolving to show up in the street the following day to thwart his desire (which they did most decisively). In the end, beyond addressing the question why the recent Arab revolts did not degenerate into anti-US rhetoric and US flag burning, there is also the hope that the reader had gained sufficient understanding to size up the volume of change that has swept the region and is set to bury the remaining regimes which refuse to adjust. Furthermore, a moral realist surveying current international relations would be encouraged to find in the positive change described here (the absence of flag burning) a propitious basis on which to build healthy and longlasting relationships between the different peoples and cultures. Surely, the expressions of sympathy and support from the entire world for the Arab revolutions have been there for everyone to see; and thats a pretty good start. Dr. Abdelmajid Hajji is professor of Media and International Communication at Moulay Ismail University and Al-Akhawayn University, Morocco (Email: hajjiglorioso@gmail.com)