Military Rule in Chile: The Revolutions of September 5, 1924 and January 23, 1925 Author(s): Frederick M.

Nunn Reviewed work(s): Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Feb., 1967), pp. 1-21 Published by: Duke University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2511538 . Accessed: 27/10/2011 11:21
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of Rulein Chile:The Revolutions Military 23, 5, September 1924and January 1925

FREDERICK M. NUNN*

by the military EARLY A CENTURY of nonparticipation in Chilean politics came to an end on September5, cast 1924, as armyofficers traditionaside to deliberate politics openly, and a general was named ministerof the interior. unDisturbed by the inability of politicians to cope with inflation, and otherpressingissues, and anxious for legislationto employment, demanded action. improvetheir own conditions,junior army officers When their demands resulted in the toppling of civilian government and the establishmentof a reactionary military regime the had second thoughts. Within five months they rejunior officers of volted again to insure fulfillment their original goals. A study of these militaryrevolutionsand of power struggleswithin the armed forces during the brief period of militaryrule provides an opportunityto observean early example of organizedmilitarysupport for in Latin America. social and political reform twentieth-century was Such conductby army officers unique in Chilean history. As the army to military early as the 1830s Diego Portales had confined activities. Later, in 1885, a German militarymissionled by General of Emil K6rner began the modernization what became the most proto fessionalarmy in Latin America. A furtherimpediment political activitiesby the militarywas the stabilityof Chilean politics during the period from1830 to 1891. Afterthe Civil War of 1891, in which revoltedagainst Jose Manuel Balmaceda, politicsdegenerated congress fromthe stable, vigorous presidentialsystemof the preceding sixty years into a weak imitation of British parliamentarygovernment. This systemproved incapable of dealing with Chile's social and economic problems. Numerous voices were raised against the Parliamentary Republic. On several occasionstherewere rumblingsof discontent from the military. Neverthelessthe parliamentarysystem withstoodall challengesuntil 1920.
* The author is Assistant Professor of History at Portland State College. A grant from the Henry L. and Grace Doherty Foundation made possible the research for this article.

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In that year Arturo Alessandri Palma, candidate of the Liberal Alliance (left-wingLiberals, Radicals, and Democrats) and idol of the middle and lower classes, was elected presidenton a platformof reform. He advocated separation social, political, and constitutional of church and state and a return to strong executive leadership. After four years, however,Alessandri had made little progress; his supportersin congress were disunited, and few were committedto his program. The opposition blocked his proposals and made a shamblesof national politics. Then in March 1924 Alessandri saw his opportunityto obtain meaningfullegislation. Breaking a precedentestablishedduring the ParliamentaryRepublic as well as a promise he had made to the opposition,he exerted executive pressure in parliamentaryelections to by appointingarmy officers overseethe votingin various provinces. Political observerswould later argue that his electoral intervention had been unnecessary,for the Liberal Alliance won easy majorities in both the Chamberof Deputies and the Senate. Soon after the congressional elections Alessandri's opposition, the National Union (Conservatives and right-wingLiberals), acwith proper electoralprocedures. Gencused the army of interfering eral Luis Brieba, the ministerof war, was charged with complicity. apBrieba denied the accusations, maintaining that army officers pointed to supervise electionswere legally under executive control.' however, criticized him and the high command for Many officers, their evasive defense.2 Congress convened on June 1 without representationfrom the elected National Union, which consideredthe parliamentfraudulently to participatein it.3 Fearful that the "packed" congress and refused would carry out Alessandri's reformprogram,a number of rightwing politicians formed a secret society,the TEA (Tenacidad, Entusiasmo, Abnegacion), to plan the overthrowof the government. to The cabal invited high-rankingofficers its meetings,including Army Inspector General Luis Altamirano Talavera.4 Meanwhile congressignored Alessandri's pleas for reformlegislation and budgetary appropriations measures and concentrated
1 Luis Brieba A., Actuaci6n, del ej6rcito en las elecciones de 1924 (Santiago, 1927), 9, 77. 2 Ernesto WfirthRojas, Ibdfiez, caudillo enigmdtico (Santiago, 1958), 26. 3 Ricardo Donoso, Alessandri: agitador y demoledor (Mexico, 1953), I, 374. 4Wfirth, Ibdfiez, 26. Generals Luis Contreras, Juan P. Bennett, and Juan de Dios Vial and Admirals Luis G6mez Carreilo and Guillermo Soublette were also aware of the TEA's activities. Donoso, Alessandri, I, 373; Enrique Monreal, Historia complete y documentada del periodo revolucionario,1924-1925 (Santiago, 1929), 23, 135.

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on a bill to provide salaries for legislators. Alessandri supportedthe measure,hoping that once it passed, work on his legislative program would begin. As the debate dragged on, various membersof the National Union attended Senate meetings to voice their disapproval. Because the bulk of the electorateopposed parliamentaryremuneration,the Unionistscould sincerelyclaim theywere acting in the best of interests all Chileans. of Since the March elections,army officers the Santiago garrison had been meeting to discuss military problems and the political situation. Major Marmaduke Grove Vallejo led discussions on the political influenceof the Spanish army,while Major Carlos Ibafiez del Campo spoke on Chilean politics and social problems.5 Both statutes demandedmilitarylegislationto revise antiquated promotion inflation;both opposed the parliamentary and adjust salaries to offset salary bill. Despite their intermissioninto political matters, no disciplinaryaction was taken by the high command. serving during this period justified the army's attiOne officer tude by saying that Chilean political parties were unconcernedwith the country's developmentand were interestedonly in power and prestige. The Liberal and ConservativeParties, he said, sought only to maintain the status quo. The Radical Party, originallya socially consciousorganization,had turned its back on the lower classes and therehad lost much of its earlier reformzeal. The only institution, fore,which he thoughtcapable of solving Chile's social, political,and economicproblemswas the army. Its intimatecontactwith all social and economic sectors and its apolitical nature made it a truly namotivatedsolely by principles of order, stability, tional institution, and patriotism.6 were wrotethat by the 1920s many junior officers Anotherofficer convinced that their leaders were unfit to serve.7 Imbued with a spirit of military professionalismand progress after attending chafed at this junior officers Germanor French militaryinstitutions, incompetence.At the same time they blamed politiciansfor the lack of new legislation on militarysalaries and promotions.8Politicians with connectionsto get quick were also accused of helping officers spent years in the lower promotions,while more capable officers
B Carlos Saez Morales, Becuerdos de uin soldado. El ej6rcito y la politica (Santiago, 1933), 64. 'Rene Montero Moreno, Origenes del problema social en Chile (Santiago, 1926), 33 ff. 7 WUrth, Ibdiiez, 28. 'Arturo Ahumada, El ejercito y la revoluci6n del 5 de septiebre, 19d4. Beminiscenciag (Santiago, 1931), 39.

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ranks awaiting advancement.>Aware of such complaints,Alessandri in different ministers fouryears,but none war had appointedthirteen had been able to secure reformlegislationfromthe congress. Another factor responsible for the political activity of junior officers this period was internalschismin the army and navy arisin ing fromclass distinctions.Since the timeof Portales it had been the custom to select army cadets from the aristocracy,but by the late nineteenth centuryan increasingnumberof cadets were comingfrom the middle sectors.'0 In 1924 most of the lieutenants,captains, and majors had been born outside of the aristocracy. Many older officers, on the otherhand, were close to the oligarchy,eitherthroughfamily ties and political connectionsor because their rank and position had moved theminto the top echelonsof society. A similar situation were from existed in the navy where the majority of line officers aristocraticfamilies. Most engineerswere not, and they resentedthe snobbishtreatment accorded them by their equals in rank."l of Disillusioned with Chilean politics, junior army officers the decided to take mattersinto their own hands. On Santiago garrison army officers enteredthe Senate September2 a group of nearly fifty galleries to hear final debate on the parliamentarysalary bill. They made no disturbance,but several officers applauded a senator who spoke against the measure. The immediatereaction to the military be officers intrusionwas a demand by the Senate that the offending punished.'2 The army ignored the senate's demand, however, as attendanceof military therewas no law, civil or military, prohibiting personnel at legislative sessions. Furthermore, according to La Nacl6', owned by Senate President Elidoro Yafiez, a group of army had been present at debates on the same measure months officers were protesting not before.'3 In both cases the officer-spectators law but Chile's entire sociomerelythe parliamentaryremuneration of especially the outmodedConstitution 1833.'4 political system, At the session of September2 the Senate passed a bill providing
9 Saez, Recuerdos, 33-35. Ahumada, El ejercito, 41; Juan Bennett A., La revol4uci6n 5 de setiembre de 1924 (Santiago, 1926), 13-14; Emilio Rodriguez del Mendoza, El golpe de estado de 1924, ambiente y actores (Santiago, 1938), 174. 10 This was partly due to the army's loss of prestige in the Civil War of 1891 when it remained loyal to President Balmaceda and to the concomitant rise of naval prestige. See Luis Langlois, Influencia del poder naval de Chile desde 1810 a 1910 (Valparaiso, 1911), 230-234. 1 Carlos Vicunia Fuentes, La tirania en Chile (Santiago, 1938), I, 137. 12 Bennett, La revoluci6n, 19. 13 La Naci6n, September 4, 1924. 14 Oscar Fontecilla, Alessandri ante la historia. Mensaje a su excelencia el president de la repTblica (Santiago, 1925), 21-22.

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of a remuneration 2,000 pesos per month for membersof congress. which prohibited By so, doing, the Senate violated the constitution, service. From the viewpointof manyjunior for payment congressional and therefore, officers, army was not bound by the constitution, the it.'5 was equally free to circumvent appeared in the galOn September 3 a larger group of officers leries. War Minister Gaspar Mora met them and ordered one of a present. The officer, to the officers take the name of all officers captain, replied that he was not Mora's secretary and would not complywithsuch an order. Mora was thentold that the group would leave if he came to the Club Militar after adjournment. When filed out. he agreed, the officers After the Senate adjourned, Mora proceeded to the Club Militar. could not that the government There he told the assembled officers grant salary increases,as the conditionof the national treasurydid not permitit. LieutenantMario Bravo Lavin answeredthat the army had rejected this argumentthe minute the parliamentaryremuneration bill became law."' Mora then left the Club Militar to confer with Alessandri. On the morning of September 4 the war minister met with troop commandersand implored them to maintain discipline and order among their subalterns. That afternoon Inspector General were Altamiranotold a meetingof the cabinetthat the junior officers justifiedin their hostile attitude and that he would take no disciattitudes were apparent. The Alesplinary action.'7 Two different acsandri administrationwanted to halt the army's extramilitary tivities; the army high command,which knew the plans of the TEA, solidly defendedthese activities. That same afternoonat the Club Militar army lieutenants gave a receptionin honor of the captains. This was to have been a closed could freely discuss the events of affairwhere the younger officers two previous days. Major Carlos Iba'nez, commanderof the Cavthe alry School, was also present as an observer. News of Altamirano's actions at the cabinet meetingaltered the original purpose of and he was invitedto the reception. Altamirano's visit the reception, for was short but momentous, he agreed to assume titular leadership of the movement.'8Encouraged by the general's visit,the lieutenants
SAez, Becuerdos, 74; Ahumada, El ej6rcito, 53. " Wurth, Ibaniez, 35. 17 At approximately the same time General Pedro Dartnell told a meeting of that no punishment was forthcomingand that work was soon to begin officers on military legislation. Bennett, La revoluci6n, 23. 18 Saez, Recuerdos, 77.
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and captains passed motionscalling for veto of the salary law.1' At was at its 8 :00 p.m., when the aggressivespirit of the young officers peak, Mora appeared at the entrance of the Club Militar and was forcibly ejected.20Two hours later Alessandri requesteda conference of with representatives the group in the Club Militar. The officers headed by Capto commission the executive offices sent a three-man tain Heraclio Valenzuela. Alessandri,realizingthe potentialpoliticalimpact of the military's actions,told Captain Valenzuela and his companionsthat he heartily agreed with their desires for militarylegislationand for the responsible conduct of congressionalactivities. He asked them to organize and to draw up a list of legislativeprojects which a formalcommittee congressshould consider. If the legislatorscontinuedtheir irresponsible ways, he promisedto close congressand convoke a constituent assemblyto rewrite the constitution.With the army's support, he concluded, he would "make a new Chile."21 While Alessandri attemptedto attach himselfto the army movement and gain military support for his reformprogram, Interior army officers Minister Pedro Aguirre Cerda implored high-ranking to maintain order and discipline. Aguirre Cerda also sent a messenger to Valparaiso to meet with Admiral Francisco Neff,director general of the navy. Neffdeclared that the navy considereditself completelyremoved from politics, that it had not been involved in the postelectionsquabbles, and that it was unconditionallyloyal to would he Nevertheless, added, under no circumstance the government. against the armyin the eventof a political crisis. This the navy fight was a declaration of neutralityand hardly one of "unconditional " loyalty. 22 Simultaneously War Minister Mora notified Admiral Arturo Acevedo, commanderof the naval station in Talcahuano, of what had happened in Santiago. Mora feared that Admiral Luis Soffla, also in Talcahuano, mightcomplicatemattersby pronouncing but in favorof the armymovement, Neffreassuredthe administration that naval discipline would not crumble and that Soffia could be feared that the discontentof the trusted.23Clearly the government lieutenantsand captains in Santiago mightbecomecontagious. There"Bennett, La revolucion, 24. Ibid.) 24. 21 Saez, Reccuerdos, 77; Rodriguez, El golpe, 201-208. Rodriguez cited a personal memorandumwritten by Captain Valenzuela. 22 Monreal, Historia, 148-149. Monreal cited a memorandum of the interview writtenby Luis Espinoza, secretary to Alessandri. 23 Ibid., 148-149.
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fore,while Alessandriappeared willing to listento the young officers, was strivingto isolate the movement. his administration Alessandri's requestfor a petitionencouragedthe armydissidents even more than Altamirano's adherence to their cause. They were was rumorsthat the government also goaded into action by persistent action for all involved. The group called consideringdisciplinary a meetingfor the next day at 10:00 a.m. to prepare the petition had time to contemplatepunishment. beforethe government During the nightMajor Iba'iez and his aide Lieutenant Alejandro Lazo labored over a documentto be consideredat the morningmeeting. Up to this point Iba'nez had merelyobservedthe lower-ranking in officers action,but his rapid work of September4 and 5 converted leader. At 9:00 a.m. on September5 Iba'niez him into a revolutionary at assembled his officers the Cavalry School. The army itself, he in said, was about to violate the constitution orderto deliberateopenly national polities.24 assembledat the Club Militar. One hour later the rebelliousofficers At Ibaniez' suggestionthey formeda militaryjunta to act as central for the movement.Colonel Arturo Ahumada, directorof directorate the Military School, was named president,and three lieutenant colonels, nine majors, six captains, and four lieutenants completedthe junta.25 The document drawn up by Iba'nez and Lazo was then accepted for submissionto the President. The petition of September5, 1924, called for veto of the parliasalary bill; immediatepassage of the annual budget; reform mentary of the army ordinances; salary raises for the army,navy, and carabineros; income tax reformlegislation; pensions for veterans of the War of the Pacific; stabilization of the peso; passage of workers' health and accidentinsurancelaws; passage of a pendinglaw concernpaymentof back salaries to public employees ing privateemployment; unacceptable and public schoolteachers; dismissalof cabinetministers as of a professionalofficer ministerof war; to the junta; designation and exclusion of the armed forces frompolities.26 The meetingwith Alessandri took place in the Moneda at 11:30
Ibid., 152-153. The original memberswere Ahumada, Lieutenant Colonels Bartolom6 Blanche, Emilio Salinas and Alfredo Ewing; Majors Roberto Canales, Arturo Muijica, Matias Diaz, Guillermo del Pozo, Arturo Puga, Ambrosio Viaux, Carlos Grasset, Carlos Vergara, and Carlos Ibaniez; Captains Angel Moreno, Oscar Fenner, Armando VaYsquez, Socrates Aguirre, Luis Cabrera, and Carlos Milla'n; Lieutenants Mario Bravo, Alejandro Lazo, Silvestre UIrizar, and Enrique Zunfiiga. Wirth, Ibainez, 40; Ahumada, E7 ejercito, 110-111. 26 Saez, Becuerdos, 30-31; Wirth, Ibdfiez, 39.
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Alessandri replied that a.m. AfterLieutenantLazo read the petition, in he had done everything his power to help the army, and would devoteall his energyto seeing that the measuresin the petitionwere carried out-all but the request for dismissal of cabinet ministers, which he considered rank insubordination.27Lieutenant Lazo re"28 plied: "We have come not to requestbut to demand. At this Alessandri angrilydeclared the meetingat an end, whereupon Colonel Ahumada intervened and placated the president by saying that Lazo was an impetuousyouth,and that the demandswere aimed at congress,not the executive.29Satisfied,Alessandri allowed the meetingto proceed and said that he would call in the cabinetfrom requested that an adjacent room to hear the petition. The officers only Aguirre Cerda be invited,as they did not want to see any other cabinetmembers.30 When Aguirre Cerda entered, Lieutenant Colonel Bartolome to Blanche told him that the junta knew of his communications highBlanche warned him against the previous night. ranking officers furtheractions and closed by saying that the entire army was in complete accord with the junta.3' Lieutenant Lazo then read the petitionanew. When Aguirre Cerda attemptedto reply, Lieutenant Bravo told him that no reply was necessary,only action. Aguirre he Cerda was informed would receivea copy of the petitionfor study by the cabinet,and at that point the meetingended. Alessandri told that in the future he would communicatewith them the officers throughAltamirano.32 On the same afternoonAltamiranotold the junta that Alessandri had asked him to serve as ministerof the interiorand form a new cabinet,Aguirre Cerda having just resigned. The junta was jubilant, for it seemedthat the armywas unifiedin purpose. Still later in the became movement day the purely militaryside of the junior officers' of evident when Major Grove called for the reformation the army as a prerequisitefor total success. He said that "in order to perit form our work of regeneration, is necessaryto begin by purging [this] institutionof those who have played at politics during the last few years and of all those withoutaptitude who clutterup the
2"Arturo Alessandri, Recuerdos de gobierno: administraci6n 1920-1925 (Santiago, 1952), 322. 28 SAez, Recuerdos, 79. 29 Ahumada, El ejercito, 78. soWfirth,Ibdaiez, 42. " Ahumada, El ej6rcito, 80. "2 Wirth, Ibaiez, 43.

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ranks because of the defectivelaws and present-daydisorganization "33 of the army. On September 6 Altamirano completed his cabinet. He named Admiral Neffto the post of treasuryministerand General Bennett as minister of war and marine. Through Altamirano, Neff, and Bennett it was presumed that the militarywould speak out on namilitaryas well as ecotional mattersand on the proposed reforms, and constitutional. nomic,social, Civilian reaction to the events of September 2-5 was generally Liberal Alliance coalition,while fundafavorable. The pro-Alessandri mentallyopposingthe army's tactics,agreed to approve the measures presentedin the petition.34The agreementwas by no means unanimous,however,as the Radical Party, which lost prestigeby the cabinet change,had earlier voted to oppose the army's meddling.35The National Union, through its conservative mouthpiece El Diario maintainingthat the officers Itustrado,also supportedthe movement, were justifiedin their opposition to the parliamentarysalary law.36 of The army's action, said the editors,was a true interpretation the nation's feelingsand a noble and patrioticgesture. The junta met three times on September6. At the firstmeeting Ahumada resigned as president because of illness. The junta chose Lieutenant Colonel Blanche to replace him and named Lieutenant Lazo secretary. Major Iba'nez suggested the formationof a central with the president to committee take charge of direct communication as and cabinet. He also suggested that there be no discrimination to rank withinthe group,that meetingsof the junta take precedence refrainfrommeeting over all othermilitaryduties, and that officers with politicians.38 the junta voted to send Grove At a second meetingthat afternoon to Valparaiso to sound out the navy chiefs regardingtheir cooperation.39At this meetingthe junta learned that the police had declared their support of the army. Then, when the meeting seemed to be news came that Alessandri had suggestedthe smoothly, progressing submissionof a new petition for the closure of congress. The presiof dent's proposal revealed to the members the junta their precarious position,for closure of congress would necessitate rule by decree,
" Cited in Ahumada, El ejercito, 86. " La Naci6n, September 6, 1924. 8 EI Mercurio, September 5, 1924. 88EI Diariollustrado, September 5, 1924. 8 Ibid., September 6, 1924. 88 Wirth, Ibaniez, 49-51. 89 Sdez, Becuerdos, 87.

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giving Alessandri virtual dictatorial powers. This might enable the president's supportersto rally behind him in a power struggle to wrest controlfromthe army. Alessandri's suggestionwas refused.40 One other thing worried the junta members: the National Union had been vociferousin its support-a curious attitude for those who stood to suffermost if numerous reformmeasures were instituted. Because of this, some Alessandri partisans had already accused the junta of being used by rightistpoliticians to create a reactionary military regime.41 Altamirano notorious conservatismgave some 's support to this thesis. The third meetingon September6 began at 10:00 p.m. Here it was proposed that the presidentleave the countryfor a few months, thus alleviatingthe danger of a power struggleand makingthe military's position more tenable. The junta chose Lieutenant Colonel Ewing, a personal friend of Alessandri and a formerwar minister, to state this to Alessandri should it becomeexpedient.42 On September 7, the junta reopened the Alessandri question. Further discussion stemmedfrom the fear that congressmight not pass the reformmeasures. Major Carlos Saez suggested that Alessandri resignimmediately and ask his partisansto supportAltamirano as vice-president.Altamirano could then dissolve congressand rule by decree.43Despite a growingfear of Alessandri,this solution was rejected. The junta reaffirmed conditionalsupport for the existing administration, provided congress passed the reformlegislation. If congressrefused,Alessandri would be asked to dissolve the parliaAt ment. Only then would Alessandri's resignationbe considered.44 a manifestoproclaimlater meetingsthe same day the junta planned ing the apolitical nature of their movement.*Thememberschose rep' and formed tribunal, a to resentatives approachworkers organizations headed by General Juan Ortiz, to hear professionalgrievances. Grove returned from Valparaiso on September 8 shortlybefore congressmet to vote on the requested legislation. He informedthe support the resignationof junta that the navy would unconditionally naval officers were Alessandri. He also reported that high-ranking in contactwith National Union politicianswho advocated the closure
Ibid., 89; Rodriguez, El golpe, 250-251. Bennett, La revoluci6n,42. 42 Wfirth, Ibainez, 52. 43 Shez, Recuerdos, 92-94. Under the constitution,the minister of the interior automatically assumed the position of vice-presidentin the absence of the president. "The lack of unanimity on the Alessandri question was the first of many examples of disunity which would impede decisive action by the junta military.
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of congress.45That afternooncongresspassed all social, labor, and militaryreformmeasuresincorporatedin the petition of September 5. Apparentlythe missionof the junta had ended, for congresshad than during the previous acted on more legislationin one afternoon the junta four years of the Alessandri administration.Nevertheless votednot to disband and remainedon the political scene to insure the and application of the reforms. promulgation action of September8 had not ended Obviouslythe congressional the political crisis. Alessandri had failed to dominatethe junta, and at the same time he had no desire to be controlledby the military. in demonstrations the Plaza Furthermore,civilian antigovernment de la Moneda had increased in magnitude. These factors prompted Alessandri to resign the presidency. Alessandri's resignationdivided opinion in the junta. One group, led by Major Saez, favored acceptance of Alessandri's resignation, while another faction, led by Lieutenant Colonel Blanche, argued that instead the president should take a short leave of absence. In he office would continue as the target of vitriolic criticismby the he National Union; furthermore, was the natural center around to whichLiberal Alliance politiciansmightcongregate regain political leadership. The Blanche group urged that if Alessandri were to absent himselffor a short period, political temperswould cool, and This opinion prevailed. could be reconstituted.46 the administration In a statementto the public, signed by Blanche, the junta requested that the presidentnot resign but instead ask for a leave of absence. The junta guaranteed the personal safety of Alessandri and his familyand would permit them to leave the countrywith full presidential honors.47 If Alessandri's resignationwas a bluffto whip up popular opposition to the army, it failed. Converselyif he hoped for outright acceptance of his resignationto make himselfa political martyr,he hoped in vain. His position was furtherweakened on September 8 strictlyan army group, became an and 9 when the junta, heretofore interservice organizationwith the addition of five navy captains.48 They restatedthe opinion of the naval high commandthat Alessandri
4 Ahumada, El ejercito, 103. While in Valparaiso Grove also talked with Francisco Huneeus and Guillermo Rivera, two leaders of the TEA. 46 Bennett, La revolucion, 53; Shez, Becuerdos, I, 98. 47 Saez, Recuerdos, I, 98. 48 Original naval delegates were Captains Olegario Reyes del Rio, Benjamin Barros Merino, Carlos Jouanne, Luis Escobar, and Julio Dittborn. Bennett, La revolucion, 46. The navy sent only captains; the views of their subalterns were not presented in the junta.

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should resign,but the junta maintainedits stand. More army officers also joined the revolutionarybody-all but one of them from the Santiago garrison.49 At its next meeting on the morning of September 9, the junta learned that Alessandri had fled the Moneda and had taken refuge in the United States embassy. He told the American ambassador that he had resigned. He sought asylum, he said, because it was and dignity to remain as presi"inconsistentwith his self-respect dent while he was not permittedby the military to performthe duties of his office."50That day the senate rejected his resignation leave of absence. By so doing, but voted to give him a six-month congressdeliveredChilean politicsinto the hands of the armed forces. Alessandri's flightput the integrityand sincerityof the junta in doubt. To reassure the people, a new statementwas issued prowas in no way political and that claimingthat the militarymovement the supreme purpose of saving the it was "exclusively inspired by nation, with the purpose of avoiding political and administrative corruption." Though it would not disband until its mission was the fulfilled, membersassured the nation "that neitherthe establishnor the creation of any type of dicment of a militarygovernment was tatorship" was intended.51Within threedays this last statement proved to be false. AfterAlessandri left for Argentinaon September10, the civilian membersof his cabinet resigned. When Admiral Luis G6mez Carreno demanded closure of congress,the civilian ministersrefused to serve. They said that it was now the military's problemto assume for governmentduring the extraordinarysituation.52 responsibility The next day General Altamirano consolidatedhis grip on Chile by he dissolving congress. Instead of assuming the vice-presidency, of himself as of government consisting formed a three-manjunta president,General Bennett, and Admiral Neff,and he organized a
"New army members were Colonels Carlos Fernandez Pradel and Francisco J. Diaz; Lieutenant Colonels Feliz Urcullu and Pedro Charpin; Majors Saez and Rafael Poblete; Captains Tobias Barros, C6sar Arroyo, David Bari, and Guillermo Villouta; and Lieutenant Enrique Calvo. Bennett, La revoluci6n, 45, 60. Major Grove replaced Colonel Ahumada who resigned because of ill health. 50 Department of State Files, 825.00/284. Collier to Hughes, September 10, 1924. Hereafter cited as DSP. Asylum was not granted. Instead Alessandri was extended the "hospitality" of the ambassador. El Mercurio, September 9, 1924. 62 Emilio Bello Codesido, Recuerdos politicos. La junta de gobierno de 1925. Su origen y relaci6n con la reform del regimen constitucional (Santiago, 1954), 19.

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was new cabinet. The junta of youngerofficers not consultedon these matters. Rodriguez, the new treasuryminister,was Because Fidel Munhoz Radical and Oscar Davila, the new public works an anti-Alessandri was known to have been a leader of the TEA, suspicions minister, elements. did grewthat the new government not representthe reform reiteratedits resolutionnot to disband. NeverThereforethe junta and theless,the new cabinet began its functionsalmost immediately, 's 12 Altamirano junta accepted the resignation of on September Alessandri, completingthe transitionfrom civilian to militaryrule. The day Alessandri left the Moneda, Altamirano, Bennett, and Neffissued a manifestoassuring the public that the military govand that civil constitutional government would be temporary, ernment would be restoredby means of electionsas quickly as possible.53The followingday, the military junta issued its own manifesto,which also proclaimed the transitorynature of military rule, but which went much furtherin discussing the governmentalsituation. The it militarymovement, stated, was one of political regeneration. No militarycaudillo would be tolerated; civil liberties would be maintained; and a constituentassembly would be convoked to write a new constitution. Only then would elections be held.54 The manishowed clearly where their political sentifestoof the junior officers reform mentslay. A rapid returnto civil rule withoutconstitutional would almost certainlyaid the National Union to recapture control conof politics. This the junta did not want. The junior officers not one of regeneration, reaction. sidered their movement In spite of the threatenedpower strugglebetweenthe two juntas, was peaceful. the civilian reactionto the collapse of civil government In the words of the United States ambassador,the nation was "inat clined to accept the new government, least until a new constitution is adopted or until new electionsbring about a change."55 The two extremesof Chilean politics openly supported the militaryinreasons: the rightbecause Alessandri trusionbut for totallydifferent had been eliminated; the radical left and his congressionalmajority because of the reformsand social legislationadvocated by the junta however,found and passed by congress. Neither of these extremes, favorin the junta. through The National Union supportedthe change in government publication,stated El Diario Ilustrado. Zig Zag, anotherconservative
" Sa'ez, Recuerdos, 102-103. "4Ibid., 169-170. "rDSF, 825.00/284. Collier to Hughes, September 10, 1924.

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that the military movementof September was like none other in the historyof Latin America because it was a truly national movement,not one in behalf of any particular political organization or social sector.56 The left (Communistsand Democrats) also voiced approval. The militaryjunta had designatedseveral of its members to conferwith labor groups, and at a mass meeting of workerson September 14 Captain Carlos Millan explained the purpose of the revolution. Luis Emilio Recabarren, leader of the Chilean Comand called the movementa munist Party, lauded the young officers great step forward for the workers.57All labor groups concurred, even the syndicalists,who hoped to make use of the situation to furthertheir own purposes.58 In their qualified support for the movementtwo Santiago dailies spoke out for political change and which,they said, were commongoals of the young offisocial reform, cers and the deposed president. In an editorial by novelist Joaquin Edwards Bello La Naciodnwarned the junta not to let itself be corruptedby outside forces,but to strugglein behalf of the workers, the intellectualsdesirous of reforms,and indeed the entire population.59El Mercuriopraised the militaryin an editorial of September 16. But the editorsbelieved that a simple change in leaders was not enough; the reformof Chile's political structureand a returnto the presidential systemwere prerequisitesto the success of the army's venture into politics.60 Ironically, the ultimate success of the original militarymovementdepended on support from those staunchly Alessandristaswho had lost both opposed to it-the reform-minded their prestige and their leader. The political situationwas furthercomplicatedby a rift between The admiralsand theirsubalterns the lower and highernaval officers. reasons. Iba'nez but supportedthe Septembermovement, for different would later state that because of their ties with the aristocracyof Valparaiso and Vinfadel Mar, the admirals participated in the revolution for the sole purpose of deposing Alessandri.61 Many of the because theysympain officers thelower ranks endorsedthe movement thizedwith the junta's aims. The admirals excluded the junior naval fromdirectparticipationin the activitiesof the militaryjunta officers
IComentario sabatino. Los "6Juan Caceres [sic] [pseud. Carlos Acufla], "I politicos en bancarrota," Zig Zag, September 13, 1924, 37. 67La Nacion, September 15, 1924. 68 Bennett, La revoluci6n, 84. La Naci6n, September 18, 1924. '? El Mercurio, September 16, 1924. e Cited in Ricardo Boizard, Cuatro retratos en profundidad: Ib6fiez, Lafferte, Leighton, Walker (Santiago, 1950), 23.

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to prevent the naval reformistelements from joining with their in counterparts the army.62Both the army and the navy, then,were as divided with respect to the purpose of the military's political activitiesas were civilian elements. Military support was unanimous but disunited. In October when the junta presented two petitions to Altawas not disposed to take mirano,it became clear that the government petition The first seriouslythe political counsel of the junior officers. be was a request that a numberof army officers retired fromactive duty. The governmentresponded quickly, ordering those named that the govremovedfromthe army list. One general commented for ernmentthoughtit best to placate the junior officers fear of a to The second petition,however,was a list of reforms be studied and junta of government by the cabinet. The young by the three-man of assemblyto drafta officers called for the convocation a constituent new constitution;the creation of new ministriesfor customs,transportation,agriculture,public works,sanitation,and labor; moderniof and streamlining the bureaucracy; zation of the civil servicesystem price speculation,rentals,and commodity legislationon fiscalreforms, protection of national industry; autonomy for the judiciary and education systems; and a law for the creation of a central bank.64 Except for the creationof three new cabinet positions,the governmentshowed no interestin complyingwith the second petition. With the exception of General Bennett, the governmenteither failed to understandor moreprobablychoseto ignorethe demandsof the subordinates. Failure to embark on a program of reformsin and the October 1924 widened the breach between the government by junta of junior officers making it completelyclear that the leadershipof the revolutionhad indeed becomereactionary. The situation was furtherexacerbatedby an incident on October 23 during a banquet at the Cavalry School on the occasion of the annual interservicesports competition. In a program staged by berated Altamirano, read aloud secret docuIbafiez, army officers be ments,and demanded that junior naval officers allowed to join accused Iba'nez of insubordinathe junta. Next day the government tion and warned him that his actions mightbe consideredsubversive. Ibai'iez apologized, but when he also tendered his resignationas diAumada, El eje'rcito, 146; Bennett, La revoluci6n, 79. Monreal, Bistaria, 101. 64 Bennett, La revoluci6n, 122-124; WUrth, IbdAez, 69-70. Ministries of Health and Welfare, Agriculture, and Public Works were created on October 14.
62 63

coup.63

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recrector of the Cavalry School, it was refused.65The government and knew ognized him as a leader of the discontented junior officers that his supporterswould assume that he had been dismissed. The banquet and its aftermathcreated an even greater rift between the and all naval two army groups, for a small group of army officers delegatesbrokewith the Iba'nez bloc in the junta. Events on the civilian political scene furtherisolated the Ibanez antigovernment junta faction. On November2 a conventionof the and pubRadical Party demanded a return to civilian government licly condemned the military interventionas contraryto the best interestsof Chile. Later that month the Democratic Party, which had earlier approved of the junta's reformprogram, accused the armed forcesof acting in the interestsof the oligarchy.66The total was emphasizedthe day failure of the junta as a generatorof reform after the Radical declaration,when the cabinet, after having agreed on to consult with a junta committee a new electoral law, published it withoutconsultation.67 That afternoonthe junta's committee(dominated by antigovernment officers)met with the government.Lieutenant Lazo accused Altamirano of handing the revolution over to the National Union asby calling for elections without firstconvokinga constitutuent sembly to reformthe constitution. As tempers flared, Altamirano, to Bennett,Neff, and the entirecabinet threatened resign ratherthan be berated by a junior officer. Navy Captain Luis Escobar, a junta committee member, then stated that the navy was in completeaccord with the government and would tolerateno changes.68Knowing that they had little civilian backing and almost none fromthe rest of the armed forces, the members of the junta committeebacked down and agreed that the junta should continueto functionin an advisory capacity. A total rupture appeared to have been avoided. When this proposal was presented to the entire junta, however, it was broke out again. The antigovernment marejected, and the conflict jority clearly controlledthe junta. But as long as militarydiscipline were effectively and tradition were maintained, the young officers stymied. The situation remained in flux until the first week in December.
65 Ahumada, El ejercito, 143-145; WUrth,Ibainez, 73. Ibffiez was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel on October 8, 1924. 68 Bennett, La revoluci6n, 215-216; Monreal, Bistoria, 107, 114. 67 This law put the registration of voters in the hands of local committees (junrtas de vecinos) composed of those citizens who paid the highest taxes. The law gave control of elections to the conservative elements. 68 Recuerdos, 129-131. "Sez,

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With the publication of the decree calling for elections in May, various political parties began preparationsfor the comingcampaign. On December 5 El Diario Iltustradohinted that Colonel Alfredo Ewing, head of the carabineros,would be the armed forces' candidate with Alessandristabacking. Ewing denied this report to Altamiranoand the cabinet. He then resignedhis post. On December 11 announced that it was sending Ewing to Spain as the government militaryattache&s That night the junta disavowed support of any objected to Ewing's reassignment militarycandidacy,but the officers had agreed not to transferjunta on the groundsthat the government withouttheir consent. Against the oppositionof the naval members delegatesthe junta then voted to demand that the cabinet resign and be that the junta of government reconstituted.The next day a compromisedto break promisewas reached by which the junior officers up their junta if an acceptable cabinet were organized.70 On December 13 the junta disbanded, and its membersawaited the announcement a new cabinet. of The new cabinet,formedand swornin by December19, was every bit as reactionaryas its predecessor. The interiorminister,Rafael Luis Barahona, a National Unionist,stated that the cabinet would follow policies already established and would hold elections as soon as possible. Lacking political backing,withoutunity of purpose, and minoritycomposed of moderatearmy harassed by a pro-government to and officers the naval delegates,the junta failed in its efforts work with the government. The reformistzeal and pressure tactics of results. The Blanche, and othersfailed to produce significant Ibkfiez, congressionalaction of September 8 and the retirementof some were not in officers October,the only victoriesof the junior officers, enough to satisfy them. They were convincedthat a return to oligarchic rule was inevitable."' tensionswere more noticeable As the new year began, intra-army than during the existence of the junta. Several antigovernment known to be loyal to the were replaced by officers troop commanders Ibafiez was relieved of his duties at the Cavalry School; government. he had reputedlyasked to be sent abroad, claiming that he was disillusionedby political activity.72The proclamationof Ladislao ErrhBennett, La revoluci6n, 167-172. Most of the 170 decree laws promulgated since September were merely clarificationsof earlier laws of statutes; thirteen were actually clarifications of other decree laws. 72 Saez, Recuerdos, 152-153. Grove, Blanche, and seven other members of the defunct junta militar were relieved or scheduled to be transferred. Bennett, La revoluci6n,354-355.
70 71

69Bennett, La revoluci6n, 157; Ahumada, El ejercito, 156.

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zuriz as the government-supported presidentialcandidate completely alienated most of the junior officers.One charged Errazuriz was "73 "the incarnationof the reactionaryspirit. Tension mounted on the political scene. It appeared that no candidate could unite the warringLiberal Alliance factions,and that Errazuriz would become presidentby default. Radicals, Democrats, and Alliance Liberals voiced loud protestsagainst his candidacy,but they could reach no accord on an Alliance candidate. The Communists,mourning the recent suicide of party leader Recabarren, demonstratedvociferouslyagainst the government.Many Alliance politicians held that Alessandri was the only candidate capable of defeatingErrazuriz. The candidacy of Errazuriz and the threat of a returnto oligarchicrule drew the Alliance, the Alessandristas,and the army revolutionaries togetherin solid oppositionto the government. Alessandri could unite the Liberal Alliance. Ideologically,he was acceptable to the junior officers. In early January,Captain Oscar Fenner discussed the possibility of a new coup with Armando Jaramillo, an Alessandrista Liberal. Fenner told Jaramillothat only Iba'iez could lead such a movement.74 On January 15 the firstdefinite plans were made, but Iba'nez, being closelywatched by the government, not take part in all the early did discussions. On January 18 Grove,recentlypromotedto Lieutenant other Colonel, met with Captain Soerates Aguirre and twenty-five at officers the Pudeto Regiment. Owing to the close surveillance of Ibafiez,Grove assumed temporary leadership of the group.75 the coup for January 23. This clandestine The plottersplanned version of the junta of September1924 consistedof Iba'nez, Grove, twelve captains, and eight lieutenants.76It was far more cohesive
73

7' Grove was not under surveillance as the governmentdid not consider him dangerous. In his autobiography he wrote that from January 18 to January 23 he did not see Ibainez and assumed leadership only in his comrade's name. Toda la Verdad (Paris, 1929), 7. An anti-Iba'fie contemporarystated that Grove was definitelythe original leader and ceded leadership to IbAliez only out of loyalty. Eulogio Rojas Mery, Beceuerdos de un oven "octogenario " (Santiago, 1958), 228. Shez concurred. Beceuerdos,I, 165. On the other hand, Monreal wrote that Grove, because of his impetuous nature, was not informed of the plans until January 18. Historia, 166. Grove was undoubtedly a key figure in the plotting. He was popular, colorful, and intelligent. Ibaniez, though, was both careful and methodical, and he inspired more confidenceamong his subordinates. He was the only jefe mdximo of the January movement. "6 Members were Captains Oscar Fenner, Ernesto Fernhndez, Andres Soza, Alejandro Lazo, Socrates Aguirre, Carlos Millan, Fernando Cabezon, Enrique Zliffiga,Amaro Perez, Eduardo Lopez, Federico Barahona, and Armando VAsquez; and Lieutenants Mario Bravo, Roberto Alarcon, Rafael Hormazabal,

Monreal,Hlistoria, 166.

Saez, Recuerdos, 156.

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than its predecessor. Whereas the first junta had been split by dissension,the new group was united behind its leader Iba'nez. On January21, with Ibafnezpresiding,the plottersheld their last large meeting. In order to avoid suspicion Ibafiez retired early, leaving Grove in charge. The next day, a small group met brieflywith Iban-ezand Groveto lay finalplans forthe next day's activities. Early on the morningof January 23, Captain Aguirre arrested the commanderof the Pudeto Regiment. Aguirre's action gave the insurgentsa loyal body of troops willing to seize the Moneda. By 7:30 a.m. the Pudeto was ready to move into central Santiago. The Altamiranovisitedthe carabinerobarracksin Santiago. same morning absent, he sensed the impending danger and Finding many officers ordered elementsof the police and Carabinero School to guard the presidentialpalace.77 Aguirre waited until 5:00 p.m., then moved his commandtoward the centerof the city. At 5 :30 they appeared on the east side of the of Moneda. Facing themwere the contingents carabinerosand police. Simultaneously,Captain Benito Contreras,leading a squadron of cavalry, approached on the opposite side of the Plaza. With no rethe sistancefromcarabinerosor police, the rebels fortified Plaza with the machineguns and sealed off east entranceto the Moneda. While the Moneda was being surrounded,most of the high-rankwere at a meetingat the loyal to the government ing army officers War Ministrycalled by Inspector General Pedro Dartnell. Except to forDartnell all were confined the buildingby troopsof the Pudeto. the entrance to El from the same regimentfortified Other troops and military Diario Ilustrado and gained controlof all government centers.78 communications As this occurred,Altamiranowas taking tea with Neffand other governmentmembers in the Moneda. Conspicuously absent were Dartnell and General Bennett,who was vacationingat the seashore. Shortly after 5:30 Navy Minister Admiral Gomez Carreiio ran in with the news that armed troops were enteringthe building. ImmediatelyIbanez and Grove walked in and demandedthe resignation of the junta of governmentand the cabinet. Altamirano and his party had no choice but surrender; he, Neff,and the others were placed under house arrest.79 Dartnell and General Ortiz, the war
Delaskar Iribarren, Jose Jara, Adolfo Ballas, Jose Mufiox, and Pedro Zuloaga. Bello, Becuerdos, 66; Monreal, Historia, 167-258. " Shez, Recuerdos, 165. 8 Monreal, Historia, 169-170. 7 Skez, Recuerdos, 166-167. See also the biography of Socrates Aguirre Bernal

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and began were named to a provisionaljunta of government minister, to forma cabinet. On January24 the provisionalgovernment published a manifesto to the nation. It stated that the ideals of the Septemberrevolution had been betrayed; that the army had never desired Alessandri's resignation (this was not entirelytrue); but that Altamirano had insisted: "The present coup d'etat betrayed him. The government and theirmanipuis directedagainst the traitorsAltamiranoand Neff lators. Throughit we will prove that the oligarchsare not the masters of Chile, that democraticdoctrineshave not made theirway into the national conscience in vain and that the vigor of the perpetrators "80 The next day of the September revolutionhas not diminished. Altamirano publicly that the army had overthrown Ibaniez affirmed in order to restoreAlessandri to the presidency.8' Acclaim for the January 23 revolutioncame fromthose civilian sectors which stood to benefitfrom Alessandri's reform program. Labor unions and Liberal Alliance parties unanimouslysupportedthe The and asked for Alessandri's rapid reinstatement. new government of National Union, its hopes for the reestablishment the oligarchy and the idea of Alessandri's resdefeated,condemnedthe movement toration. The navy chiefsalso opposed Alessandri's return. Furthermore they were incensed at Neff's arrest. class. The high commanddid not speak for the entirenaval officer Rumors of a countercoupby the National Union and the navy led and most of the pilots, surgeons,engineers, many junior line officers and civilian naval employeesto declare for Alessandri. Moreover, they threatenedopen rebellion if the high commandtried to topple the provisional governmentor prohibit Alessandri's restoration.82 Faced with a completebreakdownof discipline,navy leaders finally accepted the situationon January 27. The same day the government released all those who had been arrested with the exception of the erstwhilepresidentialaspirant, Ladislao Errazuriz. Once the danger was of a countercoupwas eliminated,a new junta of government named consistingof Emilio Bello Codesido as president, General Dartnell, and Admiral Carlos Ward. This junta governed Chile until the returnof Alessandri on March 20. Military rule technicallyended when Emilio Bello became presiin Virgilio Figueroa [pseud. Virgilio Talquino], Diccionario hist6rico y biogrdficode Chile, 1800-1925 (Santiago, 1925), I, 173-177. 80 El Mercurio, January 24, 1925. 8"La Naci6n, January 25, 1925. 82 Rodrfguez,El golpe,357.

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dent of the provisionaljunta. Alessandri's returntwo monthslater and Alessandri carcompletedthe transitionto civilian government, proried out the tasks he had set out to perform.A new constitution mulgated on September 18 fulfilledthe promises he had made to Chilean votersin 1920. It restoredthe chief executiveto a position of leadership,separated churchand state, and provided for extensive social and economicreforms. The Constitutionof 1925 was framed by civilians,but it was the result of the militaryrevolutionsof 1924 were responsible who and 1925. The armyofficers led both movements of for the regeneration the Chilean political system. After constitutional government had been restored, however, Iba'nez and his followerscontinued to watch politics closely, being and hopeful to determined insure full application of the constitution that it would lead to the creation of a new Chile. Ibafiez, named ministerof war after the January 1925 coup, used his position to to apply pressureon the government.This pressurebecame offensive Alessandri,and he resigned on October 1, 1925, but his elected successor,Emiliano Figueroa, fared no better. As a result,by February 1927 Iba'nez was but a step from the presidency. When Figueroa resigned two months later, the election of Ibfifiezwas a foregone conclusion. The task of creating a new Chile, then, ultimatelyfell to the leading figureof the revolutionsof September 5, 1924 and January 23, 1925.