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have received the greatest attention. We believe that it is necessary to examine protection systems, because of the role it plays in system security. This paper is an examination of some issues in restructuring from a protection engineer's point of view. We recognize that the proposed changes and improvements to the protection practices that we put forward here may be desirable not just from the point of view of the post-restructuring era, but also for protection practices in general.
Introduction
System protection concepts exist in the vertically integrated systems now to assure continuity of service even at the expense of immediate economic disadvantage. How is it to be altered and expanded when an ISO encompasses many existing utilities and are driven by economic concerns? There have been significant advances in the field of protective relaying due to the impact of computers and communications and the introduction of adaptive relaying concepts. Can these new systems play a role in a new era of protection design? The protection system has not received much attention in the literature on re-structuring in the power industry. Subjects such transfer capabilities, generation margins, and other issues related to sale and transfer of power in the new era of power systems without borders
Local Control
Local Control
Local Control
Local Control
Figure 1. Hierarchical Control Centers In the pre-restructuring era, i.e., with the vertically integrated, non-competitive utility there is a close interaction between the planning and operation
Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999 Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999
disciplines. The effect of a maintenance outage on the HV and EHV systems would have undoubtedly been studied beforehand and addressed by planning, operating and relaying engineers before scheduling and performing any given outage to be certain that the system is not endangered by removing transmission elements. Similarly, the general subject of power sales and purchases and the resulting flows would have been determined off-line to establish guidelines for the dispatcher to follow in his/her daily activities. Summer and winter thermal limits are established, unusual magnitudes of loads are identified, generation schedules are determined to maintain the most economic performance and to assure load-frequency balance, and voltage levels are calculated. The system control center has the primary coordinating responsibility for the system configuration and the balance between all of the maintenance requests and the sales and purchases with the power systems overall security. In the vertically integrated utility, the relationship between security and optimum performance can be relatively easily reconciled. Generation dispatch is not as easily balanced. Each power plants operating personnel has its own agenda with a significant measure of control. There are legitimate reasons to limit a units output based upon the condition of the unit and /or its auxiliary equipment. As a result, the real or reactive output of a generator may be requested by the system dispatcher but not delivered. Again, since we are dealing with a unified organization the conflicts are amenable to a rapid resolution.
important. Strong interconnections between larger networks make it necessary to be sure of the nature of the response of the protection system to a fault or disturbance on any part of the system. Local inputs must be involved for some at least some relays. Hard wired connections to inputs that are independent of any outside device within the substation or at some remote location are required to insure that equipment is protected in the event of communication failures Primary protection Primary protection is usually based on closed zones such as differential protection of transformers and buses and phase comparison and longitudinal differential relaying of transmission lines. Such schemes are preferred to open zone protection schemes since infeed, loading conditions, power swings, and other exogenous events can affect the later. Back-up protection schemes are required to operate when the primary protection equipment fails to clear a fault. Both local back-up protection (breaker failure protection) and remote back-up protection are common. The operation of any back-up protection involves a larger part of the system than the corresponding primary protection. These schemes are also frequently open zone schemes, and are subject to the problems mentioned above. Coordination of primary and back-up protection schemes is used to avoid incorrect operation of back-up systems. Back-up protection should not be used when the fault can be cleared by the primary protection. Coordination involves both relay operating time as well as in the relay reach. Special protection schemes (Remedial Action Schemes) have become control schemes that are intimately tied to protective relays. They are preprogrammed to operate after a relaying event and in response to prevailing conditions on the network.
Substation Equipment
Transformers- the traditional and most effective protective system for power transformers is differential protection. With such protection there is no coordination problem since the differential zone is a closed zone and only detects faults within the area defined by the current transformers. Except for hidden failures then, power transformer protection should not miss-operate during any other system faults. As backup protection, it is not uncommon to add instantaneous and/or time delay overcurrent relays. Instantaneous relays are not of any concern in the present discussion since they are set above maximum inrush and would not be in a position to miss-operate during any system faults. Time delay overcurrent relays are set for
Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999 Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999
unusual loads and may miss-operate as system elements are removed during any widespread outages. Buses - Differential protection is virtually the only protection used and should not miss-operate during any unusual system events. However, bus differential relays are uniquely sensitive to current transformer saturation depending upon the specific relay design and may be subjected to severe fault contributions during unusual system configurations and may be a cause for concern. Shunt Reactors and Capacitors - These elements are used to provide system voltage support or correction and are protected by a wide variety of protective devices; differential, impedance and negative sequence relays for reactors, fuses and overcurrent relays for capacitors. They are susceptible to misoperation as system parameters change drastically under unusual system events. Their misoperation would exacerbate any system problem by changing the voltage at the associated system node. Transmission System - Extra-High Voltage and High Voltage are almost exclusively protected by pilot schemes with stepped distance backup. The pilot schemes are relatively immune to misoperation due to the differential nature of its measurement. However, as discussed above, hidden failures may be involved and the parameters that accompany unusual system events may trigger these failures and cause misoperations. In addition, system swings appear to the impedance relays as slowly moving faults and, unless properly monitored, could cause them to operate. This has to be evaluated for each situation. For stable swings lines should not trip and a out-of-step blocking and tripping scheme may be required For unstable swings it is sometimes desirable to trip a line that sees the swing but sometimes it is desirable to transfer trip another line. Generator - Generator protection is provided by a wide variety of devices to cover an extensive array of abnormal operating problems. The primary protection for stator phase faults is the differential relay and its operating features are the same as described above for transformers and buses. These relays should not trip incorrectly for system events. It is common practice to provide loss-of-field relays using some combination of impedance relays and these can operate incorrectly during stable or unstable system swings. This operation will, of course, worsen any cascading or potential cascading outage. In addition to the loss of field, modern generators have field limiting circuits and these can result in adverse conditions during cascading outages as the voltage across the system calls for more reactive support. Volts per Hertz relays monitor the ration between system voltage and system frequency. They may be set to trip depending upon the philosophy of the utility although it is more common to allow the relay to trip only when the circuit breaker is open. The
assumption is that neither system voltage nor frequency can vary significantly with the unit connected. This may not be true during abnormal system events and some logic may be required to reconnect the relay to trip. Reverse power or directional relays and system backup relays are sometimes used to trip the unit if an abnormal system condition lasts beyond a reasonable length of time. Since widespread outages do result in severe abnormal conditions these protective may operate.
Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999 Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999
transmission services derived from those rights. The STP must use the Transmission Services Information Network (TSIN) node and must comply with requirements for secondary market information. The STP introduces a very possible cause of incorrect relay performance. To appreciate this, let us study the operation of control areas in the pre- and postrestructured era. (reference 1) In the Figure 1 the existing simple interchange scheduling is shown. There are 5 interconnected control areas. A typical schedule would be with adjacent areas, i.e, A is scheduling to control B and B with E. What is not visible to anyone but B is whether B is wheeling from A to E or purchasing from A and reselling to E. Of course. B has all of the information needed to include the associated costs in its contracts with A and E. From the protection point of view, B is aware of the loadings, real and reactive power flows and, as discussed above, should be able to coordinate any generating and relaying problems within its own organization. Control Areas C and D have no involvement directly in the schedule although some of the energy from A is flowing through the transmissions systems of C and D on its way to E. Herein lies the potential danger to relaying even in the pre-restructured era. If this parallel flow is not recognized by previous studies or through a sophisticated monitoring system then, again relay settings may be inadequate.
A, B and E. Similar arrangements must be made for the transactions betwen G2 and L2. In addition, there is another player that has a major role in this game. An Independent System Operator (ISO) has entered the arena and is the actual point of contact between the control areas and the broker. G1 A Broker C L1
ISO
D Broker G2
E L2
Figure 3 Complex Interchange Schedule When we consider that a large control area may have over 1000 individual transactions taking place each hour the complexity is obvious. Again, our interest is in the effect on the protection system and visa versa. As long as the extremes of line loading, voltage profile and system configuration are known the settings can be conservative, traditionally erring on the side of dependability, i.e. allowing an incorrect trip to avoid tripping times that would endanger system stability. Under this post-restructured arrangement, however, we must recognize the impact of a line or generator outage on the many contracts negotiated.
Figure 2 Simple Interchange Schedule An illustration of what the post-restructured era may hold is shown in Figure 3. The same five interconnected control areas are now dealing with an energy broker who has contracts with generation resources G1 and G2 and locates buyers L1 and L2. Using wheeling contracts with control areas A, B and E, a schedule is established for a transaction between G1 and L1. The parties involved in this one transaction are now the broker, G1, L1, control areas
Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999 Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999
Maintenance and calibration schedules that are compatible with the protection system on the contiguous power system should also be developed. It may be profitable to rethink back-up protection philosophy for the restructured utility industry. The communication network may be used to a greater extent to improve back-up protection. Recognizing that the loadability of back-up protection systems is frequently involved in cascading outages on power systems, existing telescoping back-up characteristic can be abandoned in favor of back-up differential protection on larger portions of the system. Back-up protection systems can also be altered from a central control point as the network conditions change. Load-independent relays should be developed and installed at critical locations on the power systems. Pre-fault load currents can be removed from protection considerations by devising relaying algorithms that operate only on incremental currents (and voltages). Relays that automatically check the historical load patterns over long periods (years), and generate alarms when loads approach any of the protective relay can be designed. Relay characteristic databases will have to be developed and maintained for these purposes. It may be possible with computer relays to switch the protection system to a single-phase mode in the event that the power system is stressed. Remedial action schemes have dependencies on system state that must be well known to all interconnected parties. It is necessary to examine the interaction between all of the various remedial action schemes that may be in service. It is also necessary to evaluate load shedding and restoration principles in use on the total interconnection. The market consequences of islanding and load restoration must be understood.
collection of scanned measurements of the system. The static state calculated in this fashion is not actually the state of the power system, as it is calculated from measurements obtained over the measurement scan time which may range from several seconds to minutes. Adaptive protection systems and remedial action schemes require the true system state. The advent of synchronized phasor measurement technology using the Global Positioning System make possible a state estimate which is a true snap shot of the power system. The state could be measured in tens of milliseconds making it possible to track system dynamic events in real-time. As the need for adaptive relaying and intelligent remedial action schemes becomes more critical in the post-restructured environment synchronized phasor measurements will play an important role.
Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999 Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999
It is essential to take into account the performance of the protection system, the remote possibility of hidden failures, and regions of vulnerability of various protective devices in creating the contingencies used to estimate the of various transfer capabilities and loading margins. Relay with hidden failure Faulted Line
and its variants (NATC, RATC, etc.). It is described as 1 follows: Available Transfer Capability (ATC) is a measure of the transfer capability remaining in the physical transmission network for further commercial activity over and above already committed uses. The ATC between two areas provides an indication of the amount of additional electric power that can be transferred from one area to another for a specific time frame for a specific set of conditions. The "specific set of conditions" includes security under a reasonable set of contingencies. It is clear that multiple contingencies are possible through interactions of various protection systems and hidden failures. At best the ATC determination would begin with the current state of the power system. The static state that has been traditionally determined with state-estimation software requires complete coverage of the network to obtain the state. In the present environment it is unlikely that all parts of the interconnected system will be metered, and hence it would be impossible to determine the state of the contiguous system. Measurements based on synchronized phasor measurements makes it possible to locate these units at strategic points on the network as needed, and augment the network state so that meaningful contingency analysis could be performed on the entire network. The system state would then be tested for various credible contingencies. The contingency selection should take into account the performance of critical portions of the protection systems, particularly the possibility of having hidden failures. One would then determine the margins available for power transfer without violating any of the operational constraints (thermal, voltage, or stability). These concepts are illustrated in Figure 5.
Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999 Proceedings of the 32nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 1999
Adaptive security/dependability
Combining the outputs of the multiple primary relays can alter the security/dependability of protection. In conventional schemes where any relay can trip the breaker the outputs are logically in parallel. Requiring all of the primary relays to indicate fault before the relay was tripped (a series connection). produces the extreme in security. A two out of three voting scheme can be produced with three primary systems. The relay algorithm design can be used to produce more subtle trade-offs between security and dependability. It is possible to imagine a relaying system that had a continuously adjustable security/dependability index. During a cascading outage it would be desirable that a rapid change in security/dependability could be achieved to stop relay involvement in the disturbance propagation.
make the security/dependability compromises discussed in the previous section. The owner of the transmission system, on the other hand, would naturally want to protect the equipment and would set the protection accordingly. . Conflicts between losses due to damage to equipment caused by a failure to trip verses losses due to false trips must be resolved. The issue is the responsibility for the design, setting, and maintenance of the protection equipment.
Conclusions
Some possible implications of existing protection systems and practices on the post-restructured power system have been examined. Advances in the field of protective relaying primarily due to the impact of computers and communications may allow changes in protection practices that are required by new operation regimes. The role of the protection system in on-line transfer capability determination and the possibility of adaptive security/dependability have been considered.
System RTUs
References
State Estimator
STATE
Contingency List Margin Estimation Protection System Operational Constraints
[1] Available Transfer Capability Definitions and Determination, NERC, June 1996 [2] J.S. Thorp, A.G. Phadke, S.H. Horowitz, and S. Tamronglak, Anatomy of Power System Disturbances: Importance Sampling, Electrical Power & Energy Systems Special Issue on the 12th PSCC, Vol. 20, No. 2, August 1997, pp. 147-52. [3] A.G. Phadke and J. S. Thorp, Expose Hidden Failures to Prevent Cascading Outages, IEEE Computer Applications in Power Vol. 9, No. 3, July 1996, pp. 2023. [4] S. Tamronglak and S.H. Horowitz, A.G. Phadke, J.S. Thorp, Anatomy of Power System Blackouts: Preventive Relaying Strategies, IEEE Trans. on Power Delivery, Vol. 11, No. 2, April 1996, pp. 708-715.
Figure 5: Role of Protection System analysis in on-line ATC determination. Is it also possible that security/dependability should be changed under certain market conditions? If because of market conditions, the false trip of a given line would result in a substantial economic penalty, it might be acceptable to increase the probability of failing to trip an actual fault on that line. Even with an increase the probability of failure to trip is still extremely small. Responsibility and authority for protective systems A potential conflict can develop in terms of the protection system if the transmission system owner and the system operator are different entities. The transmission system operator might be quite willing to