India Today / Archive / The Big Story / November 7, 2011 / Story ANIT MUKHERJEE OCTOBER 29, 2011 | UPDATED

20:03 IST

Mental Battle
Indian Army needs an intellectual transformation

At the end of the First World War, the three main military forces in Europe, the British, French and the Germans, faced different but similar problems - how to prepare for future uncertainties. In what is now known as the inter-war years, these three militaries imagined war differently and trained, planned and equipped accordingly. In May 1940, however, in six devastating weeks, the German Blitzkrieg defeated the French and British forces in continental Europe and changed the face of warfare. Unlike what is commonly believed, there was nothing inevitable about their victory as the Allied forces enjoyed material superiority - in tanks, artillery and infantry. The Germans won mainly due to the superiority of their intellect and imagination of their High Command. The French historian and resistance hero Marc Bloch in his classic Strange Defeat admitted as such when he wrote that the German victory was essentially "a triumph of the intellect." While history is an inexact science it might be instructive for Indian military leaders, confronting strategic uncertainties of their own, to study this period and internalise the need for an intellectual transformation in their own organizations. According to some estimates, the Indian military is poised to acquire hardware worth $120 Billion over the next six years. Considered in isolation that is an impressive figure, however this is less comforting when compared to the unpredictable consequences stemming from the rise of Chinese military power (some estimate that the current military budget is a $150 billion), a relative decline, real and perceptual, in U.S. and NATO power, an unpredictable, apparently irreconcilable Pakistan and seemingly prolonged instability in Afghanistan. To prepare for all eventualities arising from such challenges, the Indian military rightly appears to be on course for a hardware transformation. However, even more important is the need for an intellectual transformation, the evidence for which is spotty at best. One of the biggest obstacles to the intellectual development of Indian military officers is their inability to learn from the past - a prerequisite for strategic thinking. Hence, for instance, military leaders will be unable to name one book on the post-independence military that relies on official documents. Instead, all we have is either self-exculpatory autobiographies or hagiographies. Even when written, for instance by the History department of the Ministry of Defence or by the Navy (by far a different service), the primary sources on which they are based are unavailable to ordinary researchers. It is not surprising therefore that whatever impartial accounts we have relied on archives based overseas. However, the import of this fact is significant - this is a military that cannot honestly analyse it's past. Some military officers rightly point out that this is true of all other major government bureaucracies including the Ministries of Defence, Home,

External Affairs, and so on. However, this larger societal failure should not absolve the military as it controls its own destiny and can unilaterally declassify historical records. There are at least three other factors that hinder the intellectual development of the Indian officer corps. First, there is almost no civilian involvement in professional military education. As a result instruction at military academies usually ends up perpetuating convenient organizational myths. In contrast, civilian instructors at war colleges in most other democracies encourage out-of-the-box thinking and organizational criticism. More importantly, they research and publish on topics closely related to strategic studies. The absence of this career stream in India inhibits civilian knowledge "of matters military." Second, there is an overemphasis on regimental spirit that results in a desire to cover-up and disallows self-criticism. Hence in the name of regimental and service "izzat" mistakes if any are conveniently buried. Finally, there is almost no career incentive for intellectual study, publishing in professional journals or encouraging study leave to enhance skill-sets. As a result, unlike other militaries, the concept of scholar-warriors is not adequately emphasized. However, with acquisition of new technologies and the advantages of the information revolution there is some hope that an intellectual transformation is possible. For instance, with the ability for mid-air refuelling officers of the Indian Air Force increasingly talk of a sub-continental area of operations perceptually broadening their intellectual horizons. Similarly, there is increasing exposure especially among junior officers to intellectual debates in other militaries. Ultimately, however, an intellectual transformation can only be realized with the active encouragement of senior military leaders. While some of them acknowledge the need for such an effort the vast majority of senior officers are either not cognizant of the problem or are satisfied with the status quo. One of the reasons for the success of the German High Command in the Blitzkrieg operations lay in their organizational culture that protected out-spoken officers, like Guderian, and encouraged self-criticism. Currently, there are many media reports about an impending transformation of the Indian military. However senior officers must realize that the fundamental transformation begins when we think differently. Hence, if General VK Singh really wants to transform the army he must lay the foundations for such an intellectual transformation. This can happen only when he along with other senior officers identify this as a priority. Discussing all these issues at the next Combined Commanders Conference, to be held later in the year, might then be the best place to start.