CASE NAME: TOPIC:

Guy v. CA Waiver of Rights

CASE NO.: 10

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006 MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner, versus HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al., respondents

Facts: Private respondents, Karen and Kamille Wei, alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate on October 29, 1992. Petitioner argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code. On June 7, 1993, private respondents mother, Remedios Oanes, executed a Release and Waiver of Claim which states that Remedios received P300,000 and an educational plan for her minor daughters by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim.

Issue: Whether the Release and Waiver Claim executed by Remedios is a valid waiver of successional right

Ruling: The requisites for a valid waiver of right are the following: (1) the person waiving must be capacitated, (2) the waiver must be made clearly, (3) the person waiving must actually have the right which he is renouncing, (4) the waiver must comply with the formalities of a donation, (5) the waiver must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy, public order, or good customs, and (6) waiver must not prejudice others with a right recognized by law. In the present case, the Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. The document did not specifically mention private respondents hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei. Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will be void for not having been judicially authorized. Repudiation of inheritance by parents or guardians must pass the courts scrutiny to protect the interest of the ward. However, in the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Therefore, absent the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th requisites, the waiver is VOID.

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Recio v. Recio Persons: Nationality Principle

CASE NO.: 22

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, versus REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent

Facts: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen. On January 12, 1994, Grace and Rederick were married. In their application for a marriage license, Rederick was declared as single and Filipino. On March 3, 1998, Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Rederick contended that his first marriage had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree, thus, he was legally capacitated marry Grace. On July 7, 1998, respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage had irretrievably broken down.

Issue: Whether Rederick was legally capacitated to marry Grace in 1994 by virtue of the divorce decree

Ruling: The case was remanded to the trial court for the purpose of receiving evidence which would conclusively show Redericks legal capacity to marry Grace; and failing in that, of declaring the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. Rederick is now an Australian citizen and is therefore, covered by Australian law. However, Rederick failed to prove which type of divorce was granted to him. The two basic types of divorce are: (1) absolute divorce, which terminates the marriage; and (2) limited divorce, which merely suspends the marriage and leaves the bond in full force. Rederick also failed to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian law governing his personal status.

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Cruz v. NLRC Damages, Concepts and Kinds

CASE NO.: 34

G.R. No. 116384 February 7, 2000 VIOLA CRUZ, petitioner, versus NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et. al., respondents

Facts: Petitioner was an employee of private respondent Norkis Distributors, Inc. On October 14, 1990, while petitioner and her co-employees were preparing to transfer the Valencia branch, petitioner suddenly collapsed. She was rushed to the hospital. Starting October 15, 1990, the petitioner stopped reporting for work. On October 19, 1990, respondent Norkis was informed by petitioners co-employees of her condition. Respondent sent petitioner a termination letter dated November 2, 1990, citing health reasons as the cause for her dismissal.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is entitled to recover moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees from private respondents

Ruling: The award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of petitioner is warranted by her unjustified dismissal. Award of moral and exemplary damages for an illegally dismissed employee is proper where the employee had been harassed and arbitrarily terminated by the employer. Moral damages may be awarded to compensate on for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation occasioned by the employers unreasonable dismissal of the employee. The award of such damages is based on Article 220 of the Civil Code.

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Guaring v. CA CASE NO.: 46 Effect of Acquittal in the Criminal Case upon Civil Liability

G.R. No. 108395 March 7, 1997 HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING, JR., petitioners, versus COURT OF APPEALS, et. al., respondents

Facts: On November 7, 1987, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by one of the private respondents Angeles Cuevas, hit Teodoro Guaring, Jr.s Mitsubishi Lancer causing it to collide with another car coming from the opposite direction. Guaring died as a result of the mishap. The heirs of the deceased brought an action for damages, based on quasi-delict. Evidence tended to show that the bus tried to overtake the Lancer and that in so doing it hit the Lancer.

Issue: Whether the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case, whether on reasonable doubt or not, is a bar to the prosecution for damages based on quasi-delict

Ruling: The present action was instituted pursuant to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. It was held in Tayag v. Alcantara that the acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi-delict. Moreover, even if the damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasidelict, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. This is because, in civil cases, only preponderance of evidence is required.

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Barredo v. Garcia CASE NO.: 58 Concept of Quasi-Delict or Culpa Aquilana

G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942 FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, versus SEVERINO GARCIA, et. al., respondents

Facts: At about 1:30 a.m. of May 3, 1936, the taxi driven by Pedro Fontanilla collided with a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. One of the passengers, Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from the accident which caused his death 2 days later. Fontanilla was convicted for the death of Faustino. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, Faustinos parents, filed a separate civil action on March 7, 1939 against Fausto Barredo as the owner of Malate Taxicab and the employer of Fontanilla. The Court of Appeals ordered Barredo to indemnify Severino and Timotea for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Fontanilla to prevent the damages suffered by the Severino and Timotea. The basis for the civil liability was Article 1903 of the Civil Code which pertain to those obligations arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission not punishable by law.

Issue: Whether Fausto Barredo may be made primarily and directly liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code

Ruling: Yes. In civil cases, only a preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. In cases of criminal negligence, which can only be proven by such quantum of evidence, the defendant should be made responsible in a civil action under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. These articles pertain to quasi-delicts, which are separate legal institutions entirely independent from delict or crime. These include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes. Article 1903 makes the master liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his masters employment. The primary and direct responsibility of the employers and their presumed negligence are principles to protect society. It is their duty to carefully choose and supervise employees to avoid injury to the public.

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Aruego, Jr. v. CA CASE NO.: 70 Retroactive Application of the Family Code of the Philippines

G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996 JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., et. al., petitioners, versus THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al., respondents

Facts: Private respondent Antonia Aruego alleged that she, and her sister Evelyn, are illegitimate children of Jose Aruego Sr., who died on March 30, 1982. On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights was filed on the basis of Antonia and Evelyns open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children. Petitioners contend that the provisions of the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, should be applied to the instant case pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code which provides: This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Issue: Whether the provisions of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect in the present case

Ruling: The present law cannot be given retroactive effect in the present case because its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under the Civil Code and the right of the minor child she represents. The right was vested to her and to the minor child by the fact that the action was filed under the regime of the Civil Code. This reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, once attached, cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, and shall be retained by that court until it finally disposes of the case.

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Republic v. Cagandahan Sex/Status of Same-Sex Marriage

CASE NO.: 82

G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, versus JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, respondent

Facts: Petitioner was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the certificate of live birth. While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH). She alleges that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. She prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. Respondents condition is permanent and her gender change is recommended because she has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as a male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.

Issue: Whether the change of sex or gender in the birth certificate of respondent should be allowed

Ruling: Respondent undisputedly has CAH, which causes the early or inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. Respondent has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have taken steps to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents development to reveal more fully his male characteristics. In respect of respondents human right to the pursuit of happiness and in the absence of any evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of the society, the Court affirmed the respondents position and personal judgment of being a male. The correction in respondents birth certificate was ordered.

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Cario v. Cario Valid Marriage License

CASE NO.: 94

G.R. No. 132529 February 2, 2001 SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, versus SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondents

Facts: On June 20, 1969, SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao. On November 10, 1992, he married Susan Yee, with whom he had been cohabiting since 1982. In 1988, SPO4 Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992. Susan Nicdao and Susan Yee both filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance. Susan Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 while Susan Yee received a total of P21,000. Susan Yee filed a case for collection against Susan Nicdao. She contended that the marriage between Susan Nicdao and SPO4 Cario is void ab initio because it was solemnized without a marriage license. Susan Yee presented (1) the marriage certificate of the assailed marriage, which bears no marriage license number; and (2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar, which states that the Office has no record of the marriage license of SPO4 Cario and Susan Nicdao.

Issue: Whether the marriage between SPO4 Cario and Susan Nicdao is valid

Ruling: No. It was held in Republic v. Court of Appeals that a certification by the Local Civil Registrar, that their office has no record of such marriage license, is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Since the assailed marriage was solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, it is then undoubtedly void ab initio. However, the marriage of SPO4 Cario with Susan Yee is likewise void ab initio because it was solemnized without obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage between SPO4 Cario and Susan Nicdao void.

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Tenchavez v. Escao Foreign Divorce

CASE NO.: 106

G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965 PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, versus VICENTA F. ESCAO, et. al., defendant-appellees

Facts: On February 24, 1948, Pastor, 32 years old, and Vicenta, 27 years old, were secretly married before a Catholic chaplain. When Vicentas parents found out, they scheduled a recelebration, which did not happen because of a letter received by Vicenta disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor and one Pacita Noel. On June 24, 1950, without informing Pastor, Vicenta applied for a passport, indicating that she was single. Her application was approved and she left for the United States. On August 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against Pastor on the ground of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character. On October 1950, a decree of divorce, final and absolute, was issued in open court by the Second Judicial Disctrict Court of the State of Nevada. On September 13, 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, and on August 8, 1958, she acquired American citizenship.

Issue: Whether the divorce obtained by Vicenta should be recognized in the Philippines

Ruling: No. When the divorce was issued, Vicenta was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit absolute divorce and in fact does not even use that term. A foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code, is not entitled to recognition as valid. The grant of effectivity to such foreign divorce would give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.

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Sy v. CA

CASE NO.: 118

G.R. No. 127263 April 12, 2000 FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, versus THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, and FERNANDO SY, respondents

Facts: Filipina and Fernando were married on November 15, 1973. Both were then 22 years old. Their marriage license and marriage certificate were issued on September 17, 1974. They were blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah. The spouses first established their residence in Manila, then in Pampanga, and later in Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately.

Issue: Whether the marriage between Filipina and Fernando is valid

Ruling: No. On the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage license was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet neither Filipina nor Fernando ever resided in Carmona. The marriage between Filipina and Fernando is void from the beginning.

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Republic v. Nolasco CASE NO.: 130 Requisites for Declaration of Presumptive Death

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, versus GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent

Facts: Gregorio Nolasco was married to Janet Monica Parker on January 15, 1982. After the marriage celebration, he obtained an employment contract as a seaman and left Janet in Antique. While he was working overseas, Nolasco found out that Janet gave birth to a son and that she left Antique. He returned to Antique in November 1993. Nolasco sent letters to Janet at the address of the bar where they met in Liverpool, England. All his letters were returned to him. He also inquired among friends but they too had no news of Janet. He also claims that he has no knowledge of Janets family background. Instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, Nolasco secured another seamans contract and went to London in the hopes of finding Janet there. All his efforts proved fruitless. On August 5, 1988, Nolasco filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of Janet.

Issue: Whether Janet should be declared presumptively dead

Ruling: No. The Court believed that Nolasco failed to conduct a search for Janet with such diligence as to give rise to a well-founded belief that she is dead. Walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of bumping into one particular person cannot be regarded as a reasonably diligent search. Nolascos lack of knowledge of Janets personal background is a convenient excuse to justify his failure to locate her. Nolasco also failed to present as evidence the letters which were returned to him and the friends who he had inquired from. Nolasco also failed to explain why he did not get the help of the authorities in the effort to look for his wife.

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Ochosa v. Alano CASE NO.: 142 Evolution of Jurisprudence on Psychological Incapacity

G.R. No. 167459 January 26, 2011 JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA, petitioner, versus BONA J. ALANO, et. al., respondents

Facts: Jose and Bona were married on October 27, 1973. During the marriage, Jose was often assigned in various parts of the Philippines as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him nor did she visit him in his areas of assignment, except once when Bona stayed with him for four days. In 1985, they were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio where they resided. In 1987, Jose was incarcerated for rebellion. Bona was an unfaithful, she had illicit relations with other men. When the rumors of her unfaithfulness proved to be unbearable to Jose, he got a military pass and confronted Bona. Bona admitted to the rumors and Jose drove her away. Jose filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of Bonas psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. Jose later presented Dr. Rondain as scientist. Dr. Rondain testified that Bona was suffering from Histrionic Personality Disorder, which is characterized by excessive emotion and attention seeking behavior. Because of this behavior, Bona developed extra-marital affairs with other men and therefore, failed to fulfill the basic responsibility in a marriage. She further testified that Bonas psychological disorder was traceable to her family history. Bonas father was a gambler and a womanizer and her mother was a battered wife. There is no possibility of a cure since Bona does not have an insight to what is happening to her and refused to acknowledge the reality.

Issue: Whether Bona is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations

Ruling: No. There is inadequate credible evidence that Bonas defects were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. Her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of juridical antecedence. In addition, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bonas psychological condition indirectly from the information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the information Dr. Rondain obtained were tainted with bias.

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Paras v. Paras CASE NO.: 154 Evolution of Jurisprudence on Psychological Incapacity

G.R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007 ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner, versus JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent Facts: Twenty-nine years after her marriage with Justo, Rosa filed a complaint for annulment alleging Justos psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. Rosa claimed that Justo failed to give financial support to the family for the first 5 years of the marriage because he shouldered his sisters schooling. He also did not contribute to the medical expenses when their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. Their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was with his barkadas. To cope with the deaths of the children, the family moved to the United States. Justo left for the Philippines after 3 months. When Rosa returned to the Philippines she found out that her businesses were heavy in debt and that Justo had been disposing of conjugal properties without her consent. Justo also maintained a mistress and sired an illegitimate child with one Jocelyn Ching. The child was named Cyndee Rose.

Issue: Whether Justos acts show psychological incapacity

Ruling: No. Even though the allegations of Rosa against Justo were true, such traits are at best indicators that Justo is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. They do not manifest psychological incapacity on the part of Justo to fulfill the basic marital covenants. There is nothing in the records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder. Records indicate that the assailed marriage had a good start, resulting in the birth of their four children and enabled them to acquire various assets. Unfortunately, the passage of time appeared to have taken its toll on their relationship. There was also no evidence that Justos defects were present at the inception of the marriage. Such defects surfaced only after two of their children died, after he lost in the election, after he failed in his business ventures and law practice. There was also no evidence to show that Justos defects were incurable or grave.

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Republic v. Dagdag CASE NO.: 166 Evolution of Jurisprudence on Psychological Incapacity

G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, versus ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent

Facts: Erlinda Matias and Avelino Parangan were married on September 7, 1975. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. During the time when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force Erlinda to have sex with him and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her. On October 1983, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda later learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985. On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. For her part, Erlinda presented herself and her sister-in-law as her only witnesses. The trial court granted the petition. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag in not of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to the Solicitor General, emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, habitual alcoholism, and being a fugitive from justice do not amount to psychological incapacity.

Issue: Whether psychological incapacity exists on the part of Avelino

Ruling: No. Erlinda failed to comply with the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. Specifically, she failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.

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Corpus v. Ochotorena CASE NO.: 178 Appearance of the State/Prohibition v. Default Judgment

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861 July 30 2004 MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS, complainant, versus JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA, RTC BR. 11, SINDANGAN, ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, respondent

Facts: On February 6, 2001, Mariano Joaquin Macias filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage against Mrs. Macias. The Summons issued to Mrs. Macias was published in the local newspaper because Mrs. Maciass whereabouts were allegedly unknown. Mrs. Macias learned of the publication of Summons during the first week of April. On April 10, 2001, or within the 30-day period to file an answer, Mrs. Macias filed a Motion to Dismiss, which she set for hearing on April 20, 2001. Judge Ochotorena set the hearing on April 19, 2001. On that date, the hearings on the merits were reset. After the scheduled hearings, Judge Ochotorena terminated the proceedings and declared the case submitted for decision.

Issue: Whether Judge Ochotorena was authorized to conduct a hearing of the case

Ruling: No. The Rules of Court prohibits default proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage. Judge Ochotorena disregarded Mrs. Maciass right to due process when he proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case. Instead of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, which was filed timely, Judge Ochotorena received Mr. Maciass evidence ex-parte. This is a classic example of railroading or procedural shortcut.

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Domingo v. CA Requirements for Remarriage

CASE NO.: 190

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993 ROBERT DOMINGO, petitioner, versus COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA, respondents

Facts: Robert and Delia were married on November 29, 1976. Unknown to Delia, Robert had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969. Delia only came to know of the prior marriage sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy. Delia has been working in Saudi Arabia and Robert is unemployed and completely dependent upon Delias support. Sometime in June 1989, Delia discovered that Robert was cohabiting with another woman and that he had been disposing of some of the properties purchased by Delia, without her consent. Robert refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to Delias brother. Delia filed a petition praying that Robert be enjoined from any act of administration and ownership over said properties and that their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect. Robert contended that since the marriage was void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. He further adds that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since Delia did not allege any intention to remarry, her petition should therefore, be dismissed.

Issue: Whether the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage

Ruling: No. Article 40 of the Family Code denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Therefore, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may also be invoked in an action for liquidation, partition, distribution, and separation between the erstwhile spouses. As for purposes of remarriage, the final judgment declaring the previous marriage void is necessary to protect the sanctity of the inviolable institution. Its nullification should not be left on the determination of either or both spouses. Only an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage.

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Alcazar v. Alcazar Impotency

CASE NO.: 202

G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009 VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, petitioner, versus REY C. ALCAZAR, respondent

Facts: Veronica and Rey were married on October 11, 2000. The newlyweds went back to Manila but Rey did not live with Veronica. On October 23, 2000, Rey left for Riyadh. Veronica tried to communicate with Rey by phone or by letter but he never answered. About a year and a half after Rey left, Veronica learned from a co-teacher that Rey was about to come home to the Philippines. She was surprised that she was not advised by Rey of his arrival. At the time Rey arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted Veronica. Thus, Veronica concluded that Rey was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her. On August 22, 2002, Veronica filed a complaint for the annulment of her marriage to Rey on the basis of paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines. During trial, Veronica presented Dr. Tayag to present his psychological evaluation of the spouses. According to Dr. Tayag, Rey was afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

Issue: Whether the marriage should be annulled on the basis of paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines

Ruling: No. Article 45 (5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. It denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse. Such inability may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to a chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from psychological conditions. No evidence was presented in the case to establish that Rey was in any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with Veronica. Veronica even admitted during her cross-examination that she had sexual intercourse with Rey after their wedding and before he left for Riyadh.

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People v. Zapata and Bondoc Condonation / Pardon

CASE NO.: 214

G.R. No. L-3047 May 16, 1951 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, versus GUADALUPE ZAPATA and DALMACIO BONDOC, defendants-appellees

Facts: On March 14, 1947, Andres Bondoc filed a complaint for adultery against Guadalupe and Dalmacio for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 to March 14, 1947. Guadalupe plead guilty and served her penalty. On September 17, 1948, Andres filed another complaint for adultery against Guadalupe and Dalmacio for adulterous acts committed by them from March 15, 1947 to September 17, 1948. The trial court quashed the second complaint and held that the adulterous acts charged in the first and second complaints must be deemed one continuous offense. It also held that the two sets of acts were within the scoped of the constitutional provision against double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether a pardon from the husband would extinguish criminal liability

Ruling: No. Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts. As to the reasoning of the trial court, the Supreme Court of Spain has held that adultery is an instantaneous crime which is consummated at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery. Additionally, there is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were acts committed, each constituting one crime.

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Sabalones v. CA Legal Separation Pendente Lite

CASE NO.: 226

G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994 SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner, versus THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES, respondents

Facts: Samson left to his wife the administration of some of their conjugal properties for fifteen years. He retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership. He claimed that he needed the proceeds to defray the costs for his hospitalization and medical treatment. Remedios filed a counterclaim for legal separation because Samson had not returned to his legitimate family and was instead maintaining a separate residence with one Thelma Cumareng and their three children. The court decreed the legal separation of the spouses, the forfeiture of Samsons share in the conjugal properties, and declared that he was not entitled to support form Remedios. This decision was appealed to the respondent court. Pendente lite, Remedios filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Samson from interfering with the administration of their properties. The Court of Appeals granted the preliminary injunction on April 7, 1992.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals failed to appoint an administrator of the conjugal assets as mandated by Article 61 of the Code

Ruling: No. Even though the Court of Appeals made no formal designation of the administrator, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying Samson any share in the conjugal properties and thus disqualifying him as administrator thereof. That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of Remedios the preliminary injunction.

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Matabuena v. Cervantes CASE NO.: 238 Prohibition against donations to each other

G.R. No. L-28771 March 31, 1971 CORNELIA MATABUENA, plaintiff-appellant, versus PETRONILA CERVANTES, defendant-appellee

Facts: On February 20, 1956, during the common law relationship between Felix Matabuena and Petronila Cervantes, Felix executed a Deed of Donation of a parcel of land in favor of Petronila. On March 28, 1962, Felix and Petronila got married. On September 13, 1962, Felix died intestate. Cornelia Matabuena, the sister of Felix, filed a claim over the parcel of land arguing that the donation made by Felix to Petronila was void. She invoked Article 133 of the Civil Code which states that every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.

Issue: Whether the donation made during the common law relationship was void

Ruling: Yes. Even though Article 133 pertains to donations made during the marriage, it should also apply to donations made during the common law relationship. Donations between spouses during their marriage are prohibited because it might exert undue influence and improper pressure upon the donor. Therefore, such prohibition should also apply to those living as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. However, since Felix and Petronila were married, Petronila, now as Felixs widow, is entitled to half of the estate of Felix. Cornelia does not have exclusive right over the parcel of land but is entitled only to the other half.

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Sps. De Leon, et al v. De Leon, et al Disposition

CASE NO.: 250

G.R. No. 185063 July 23, 2009 SPS. LITA DE LEON and FELIX RIO TARROSA, petitioners, versus ANITA B. DE LEON, DANILO V. DE LEON, and VILMA B. DE LEON, respondents

Facts: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon and the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a lot situated in Fairview, Quezon City. On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita De Leon. To this union were born Danilo and Vilma. On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. The Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, single. Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister Lita and brother-in-law Felix for P19,000. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On May 23, 1977, Bonifacio and Anita renewed their vows in a church wedding at St. John the Baptist Parish in San Juan, Manila. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.

Issue: Whether the sale of the subject lot is a valid one

Ruling: No. Under Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. Ownership over the subject lot was transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. Under Article 166 of the Code, the consent of the wife is required before the husband may alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership. Since the sale was made without Anitas consent, the sale is void ab initio. However, Lita and Felix are entitled to the amount they paid to be reimbursed from the share of Bonifacio after the liquidation of the partnership.

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Cuenca v. Cuenca CASE NO.: 262 Effect of Separation De Facto on Respective Interest in the Absolute Community Property

G.R. No. 72321 December 8, 1988 DIOSDIDIT, BALDOMERO, FILOMENO, ELPIDIO, AIDA, all surnamed CUENCA, petitioners, versus RESTITUTO CUENCA, MELADORA CUENCA and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents

Facts: This case has for its subject matter parcels of land which are being claimed by two sets of families. Restituto and Meladora are claiming ownership over the subject parcels of land on the ground that they are the legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, both deceased, owners of the subject parcels of land. Petitioners are claim that Agripino and Engracia Basadre were legally married and that they are the legitimate children of the couple. They contend that the subject parcels of land are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia. On June 13, 1950, or during the lifetime of Agripino Cuenca, he executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria Bangahon wherein he expressly stated that three of the subject parcels of land in the present case belong exclusively to Maria Bangahon as her inheritance from her parents before her marriage to Agripino. Petitioners presented eight sketch maps obtained on December 27, 1984 from the Regional Office of the Bureau of Lands in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners allege that these were surveyed and approved when Agripino was already married to Engracia. The documents did not show that the claims to the subject parcels of land were perfected during the marriage of Agripino and Engracia. Moreover, the documents show that five of the eight parcels covered by the documents are titled in the name of either Restituto or Meladora. Nevertheless, petitioners still contend that the presumption of conjugality under Article 160 of the New Civil Code should apply to this case.

Issue: Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership by the death of spouses Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, to whom should each subject parcel of land go?

Ruling: The Court ruled that the three lots pertaining to Marias exclusive property should go to Restituto by virtue of the extrajudicial settlement executed by Agripino Cuenca. The remaining subject parcels of land, which belong to the conjugal partnership of Agripino and Maria, shall be divided accordingly: (1) one half goes to Agripino Cuenca which portion after the death of Agripino goes to his alleged third wife, Engracia Basadre, and to Restituto and Meladora as Agripinos forced heirs; (2) one half goes to Maria Banganon which portion after the death of Maria will go to her compulsory heirs. The Court did not accept petitioners contention that the presumption of conjugality should apply to the subject parcels of land. It ruled that the presumption refers only to the property acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. The presumption shall also not apply when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.

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Titan Construction Corp. v. David CASE NO.: 274 Property Included in Conjugal Partnership of Gains

G.R. No. 169548 March 15, 2010 TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner, versus MANUEL A. DAVID, SR. and MARTHA S. DAVID, respondent

Facts: Manuel and Martha were married on March 25, 1957. In 1970, they acquired a lot which was registered in the name of Martha S. David, of legal age, Filipino, married to Manuel A. David. In 1976, the spouses separated de facto and no longer communicated with each other. On March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha sold the property to Titan Construction Corporation (Titan). On March 13, 1996, he filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Reconveyance against Titan. He alleged that the sale was executed without his knowledge and consent, and therefore void. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Manuel. Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and that the property was Marthas paraphernal property.

Issue: Whether the subject lot was Marthas exclusive property

Ruling: No. Under Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Under Article 116 of the Family Code, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made or contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. The presumption that the property is part of the conjugal partnership applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. Manuel was not required to prove that the property was acquired with the funds of the partnership.

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Bautista v. Silva CASE NO.: 286 Ownership, Possession, Enjoyment and Administration of Conjugal Partnership Property

G.R. No. 157434 September 19, 2006 SPS. CLARO and NIDA BAUTISTA, petitioners, versus BERLINDA F. SILVA, respondent

Facts: The Transfer Certificate of Title to the subject lot was registered in the names of spouses Berlinda and Pedro on August 14, 1980. On March 3, 1988, Pedro signed and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject lot in favor of Claro and Nida. He presented a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed on November 18, 1987 by Berlinda in his favor. Based on evidence presented, the signature appearing on the SPA as that of Berlinda was a forgery. At the time the SPA was purportedly executed, Berlinda was in Germany working as a nurse.

Issue: Whether the sale made by Pedro to spouses Bautista was valid.

Ruling: No. The SPA being a forgery, it did not vest in Pedro any authority to alienate the subject property without the consent of respondent. Absent such marital consent, the deed of sale was a nullity. The nullity of the sale of conjugal property contracted by the husband without the marital consent of the wife affects the entire property, not just the share of the wife. Thus, spouses Bautista may not retain the portion of Pedro in the subject property.

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Perez v. CA Effect of Separation De Facto

CASE NO.: 298

G.R. No. 118870 March 29, 1996 NERISSA Z. PEREZ, petitioner, versus THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C. PEREZ, respondents

Facts: Nerissa and Ray were married in Cebu on December 6, 1986. On July 20, 1992, Nerissa gave birth to a baby boy, Ray Perez II, in New York. Nerissa began working in the United States in October 1988 as a registered nurse. She used part of her earnings to build a modest house in Mandaue City. On January 17, 1993, the family arrived in Cebu. After five weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S. Ray stayed behind and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued working. Nerissa came back to the Philippines, a few days before the babys first birthday, asking for the custody of the baby. Now separated in fact, the Nerissa and Ray seek the Courts assistance in the matter of custody or parental authority over the child.

Issue: Whether the custody over the baby should be awarded to Nerissa

Ruling: Yes. Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court both contain the provision No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The mother would only be deprived of custody for compelling reasons that would show her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. The following grounds are considered ample justification for such deprivation: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and being sick with a communicable disease. The Court ruled that Nerissa does not fall under any of the grounds earlier mentioned. In considering the irreplaceable role of the mother in the life of her child, the Court granted custody over the baby to Nerissa.

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Valdez v. RTC Co-ownership

CASE NO.: 310

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996 ANTONIO A.S. VALDEZ, petitioner, versus, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ

Facts: Antonio and Consuelo were married on January 5, 1971. On June 22, 1992, Antonio sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. On July 29, 1994, the trial court declared the marriage null and void on the ground of the spouses mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations. The trial court likewise ordered Antonio an Consuelo to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, which pertains to property regime of unions without marriage.

Issues: Whether the trial court correctly applied Article 147 in the present case

Ruling: Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 and 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. The particular kind of co-ownership under Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term capacitated refers to the legal capacity to contract marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. The fruits of the couples separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

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Guerrero v. RTC Family Relations

CASE NO.: 322

G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994 GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner, versus, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, and PEDRO G. HERNANDO, respondents

Facts: Respondent Judge Luis Bello dismissed the complaint on the ground that the parties, being brothers-in-law, should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise. It was only on December 7, 1992, at the pre-trial conference, that the relationship between Gaudencio and Pedro was noted by Judge Bello, they being married to halfsisters hence are brothers-in-law. Judge Bello gave Guerrero five days to amend his complaint to allege that the parties were very close relatives and that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but failed. The case was dismissed after Guerrero failed to amend his complaint within the prescribed period.

Issue: Whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family

Ruling: No. It was ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of brothers and sisters as members of the same family does not comprehend sisters-in-law. In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that sisters-in-law (hence, also brothers-in-law) are not listed under Article 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Consequently, Guerrero was not required to exert earnest efforts toward a compromise before filing the present suit as required by Article 151.

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Josef v. Santos Family Home

CASE NO.: 334

G.R. No. 165060 November 27, 2008 ALBINO JOSEF, petitioner, versus OTELIO SANTOS, respondent Facts: Josef was the defendant in a case for collection of sum of money filed by Santos, who claimed that Josef failed to pay the shoe materials he bought on credit from Santos on various dates in 1994. Josef was found liable to Santos in the amount of P404,836.50 with interest at 12% per annum from January 9, 1995 until full payment. A writ of execution was issued on August 20 and executed on August 21, 2003. On October 28, 2003, a real property in Marikina City was sold by way of public auction to fully satisfy the judgment credit. On November 5, 2003, Josef filed an original petition for certiorari. He claimed that the real property was his family home and thus, exempt from execution.

Issue: Whether the attachment and sale of the family home to satisfy the judgment award in favor of Santos is legal.

Ruling: No. The family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors. The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime. Its protection is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic social institution. However, the trial court is directed to conduct an inquiry to determine whether the real property in question is indeed the family home of Josef. If the property is indeed Josefs family home, the court should determine if the obligation was contracted prior to or after the effectivity of the Family Code, who the beneficiaries of the family home are, if Josef has more than one residence for the purpose of determining which of them is his family home, and the actual location and value.

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Babiera v. Catotal Action to Impugn Legitimacy

CASE NO.: 346

G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000 TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, versus PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondents

Facts: Presentacion filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista. She asserted that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa. According to Presentacion, Teofista is the child of Flora Guinto, a housemaid of the spouses. Hermogenas signature was forged. Teofistas birth certificate is void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because of their advanced age. Teofista contended that the petition is an attack on her legitimacy as the child of the spouses Eugenio and Hermogena. She invoked Article 171 of the Family Code in stating that Presentacion has no legal standing in the case, and Article 170 of the Family Code is stating that the petition is barred by prescription.

Issues: (1) Whether Presentacion has legal standing and (2) whether the petition is barred by prescription

Ruling: (1) As to Presentacions legal standing, Article 171 states that the childs filiation can be impugned only by the father, or in special circumstances, his heirs. Presentacion has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that a real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The case concerned the properties inherited by Presentacion from her parents. Moreover, Article 171 is not applicable in the present case. Article 171 applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child. It presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present action does not impugn Teofistas filiation to spouses Eugenio and Hermogena because there is not blood relation to impugn in the first place. (2) As to the prescription of the action, Article 170 refers to actions to impugn legitimacy. The action in the present case involves the cancellation of Teofistas Birth Certificate. The action does not prescribe because it was allegedly void ab initio.

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De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon CASE NO.: 357 Voluntary Recognition of Illegitimate Children

G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001 JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS, et. al., petitioners, versus THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, et. al., respondents

Facts: Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves were married on August 23, 1964. During this marriage, Jinkie and Jacqueline were born. In a notarized document, dated June 7, 1991, Juan Dizon acknowledged Jinkie and Jacqueline as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves. Juan died intestate on March 12, 1992, leaving behind considerable assets.

Issue: Whether the acknowledgement made by Juan Dizon established Jinkie and Jacqueline as his illegitimate children

Ruling: No. Since Jinkie and Jacqueline were born during the subsistence of a valid marriage between Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves, they are presumed to be the legitimate children of the spouses. Only when the legitimacy of the children has been successfully impugned that the paternity of Danilo can be rejected.

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Aparicio v. Paraguya CASE NO.: 358 Voluntary Recognition of Illegitimate Children

G.R. No. L-29771 May 29, 1987 CONSOLACION LUMAHIN DE APARICIO, Accompanied by her husband BENITO APARICIO, plaintiffs-appellees, versus HIPOLITO PARAGUYA, defendant appellant Facts: Trinidad Montilde had a love affair with a priest, Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and in the process she conceived. When she was almost 4 months pregnant and in order to conceal her disgrace from the public, she decided to marry Anastacio Mamburao. Fr. Lumain solemnized the marriage on March 4, 1942 but Trinidad and Anastacio never lived together as man and wife. On September 12, 1924, Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion. As shown by her birth certificate, her registered parents are Trinidad and Anastacio. On October 31, 1936, Fr. Lumain died but he left a last will and testament wherein he acknowledged Consolacion as his daughter and instituted her as the sole and universal heir of all his property rights and interests. Soon after reaching the age of majority, Consolacion filed an action for the recovery of certain parcels of land, which she claims to have inherited from Fr. Lumain.

Issue: Whether Consolacion should be considered as Fr. Lumains illegitimate child

Ruling: The Court ruled that it was unnecessary to determine the filiation of Consolacion. Hipolito contended that the declarations against the legitimacy of Consolacion cannot prevail over the presumption of legitimacy under the provisions of Article 109 of the Spanish Civil Code, now Article 256 of the Civil Code. However, since Fr. Lumain not only acknowledged Consolacion as his natural daughter but also designated her as his only heir, the Court found it unnecessary to determine the filiation of Consolacion. Since Fr. Lumain died without any intestate heirs, Consolacion is therefore his lawful heir as duly instituted in his will. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

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Cabatania v. CA Proof of Illegitimacy

CASE NO.: 365

G.R. No. 124814 October 21, 2004 CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner, versus COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS, respondents

Facts: Florencia Regodos filed a petition for recognition and support against Camelo Cabatania, in behalf of her son Camelo Regodos. In the petition, she alleged that she was a widow but it was later found out that her husband was still alive. During trial, Florencia testified that her husband left her in the early part of 1981. She then started working as a maid for the Cabatania household. On January 2, 1982, Camelo Cabatania brought her to the Visayan Motel where they had sexual intercourse. Camelo Cabatanias wife suspected that Florencia was pregnant so she sent her home. Camelo Cabatania brought Florencia to Bacolod City and rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, Florencia gave birth to Camelo Regodos. The trial court, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, decided in favor of Camelo Regodos finding that the misrepresentation of Florencia as a widow was irrelevant; that Florencias testimony was of probative weight; and that based on Camelo Regodos personal appearance, there is no doubt that Camelo Cabatania is his father. Camelo Regodos likewise presented his birth certificate and baptismal certificate which were prepared without the knowledge of Camelo Cabatania.

Issue: Whether there was sufficient proof of Camelo Regodos filiation

Ruling: No. As to the birth certificate, the Supreme Court ruled that it is not competent evidence of filiation having been prepared without the putative fathers participation. The baptismal certificate cannot also serve as proof of filiation but only as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified. The Supreme Court found Florencias testimony as self-serving. Personal appearance is, likewise, not sufficient proof of filiation because of its extremely subjective nature and because of the development of genetic profiling. Moreover, since Florencias husband is alive and that there was a valid subsisting marriage between him and Florencia at the time Carmelo Regodos was born, Carmelo Regodos should be presumed as a legitimate child from that marriage.

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Rodriguez v. CA Proof of Illegitimacy

CASE NO.: 370

G.R. No. 85723 June 19, 1995 BIENVENIDO RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, versus COURT OF APPEALS and CLARITO AGBULOS, respondents

Facts: On October 15, 1986, Clarito filed an action for compulsory recognition against Bienvenido Rodriguez. At the trial, Clarito presented his mother, Felicitas Agbulos Haber, as first witness. In the course of her direct examination, she was asked by counsel to reveal the identity of Claritos father but the defendants counsel raised a timely objection which the court sustained.

Issue: Whether Felicitas should be allowed to testify as to the identity of Claritos father

Ruling: Yes. The action was brought under Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which added new grounds for filing an action for recognition: (4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. It is also stated in Article 172 of the Family Code that legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The said article adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code that filiation may be proven by any evidence or proof that the defendant is the father.

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People v. Yatar DNA Tests: Probative Value

CASE NO.: 377

G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, versus JOEL YATAR alias KAWIT, appellant

Facts: In the evening of June 30, 1998, the body of Kathylyn Uba was found sprawled naked on the floor of her grandmothers house with multiple stab wounds and with her intestines protruding out of her stomach. Joel Yatar was apprehended and charged of the crime of rape with homicide. Dr. Bartolo testified that in the postmortem examination, he discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of Kathylyn. On March 20, 2000, Joel submitted himself for blood sampling conducted in open court and in the presence of counsel. Subsequent testing showed that the DNA of the sperm specimen from the vagina of Kathylyn was a match to Joels gene type.

Issue: Whether the DNA evidence serves to prove the guilt of Joel

Ruling: Yes. In assessing the probative value of the DNA evidence, courts should consider the following factors: (1) how the samples were collected; (2) how they were handled; (3) the possibility of contamination of the samples; (4) the procedure followed in analyzing the samples; (5) whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests; and (6) the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. In the present case, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on her testimony, it was determined that the blood sample taken from Joel was of the same gene type as that of the semen taken from Kathylyns vaginal canal.

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Briones v. Miguel CASE NO.: 382 Illegitimate Children: Who May File Action for Compulsory Recognition

G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004 JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner, versus MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL, respondents

Facts: On March 5, 2002, Joey filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. The writ was granted on March 11, 2002. Michael was born on September 17, 1996 as an illegitimate child of Joey with Loreta. Loreta is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. Joey alleges that on November 14, 1998, he caused Michael to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him, with the help of Joeys parents. On May 2, 2001, Maricel and Francisca took Michael away after promising to bring him back after going to the SM Department Store. Michael is currently with Loreta in Japan, where he is studying. Joey prays that the custody of Michael be given to him as his biological father and as he has demonstrate his capability to support and educate him.

Issues: Whether Joey should be granted custody over Michael

Ruling: No. Under Article 176 of the Family Code, parental authority over Michael resides in Loreta notwithstanding Joeys recognition of him. It was held in David v. Court of Appeals that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Loreta cannot be deprived of her right of custody over Michael. Only the most compelling of reasons, such as unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else. Joey is granted only visitorial rights.

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Mossesgeld v. CA Rights of Illegitimate Children

CASE NO.: 394

G.R. No. 111455 December 23, 1998 MARISSA A. MOSSESGELD, petitioner, versus COURT OF APPEALS and CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL, respondents

Facts: On December 2, 1989, Marissa, single, 31 years of age, gave birth to a baby boy. The presumed father, one Eleazar Siribian Calasan, 42 years old, a lawyer, married, signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating the childs first name as Jonathan, middle name as Mossesgeld, and last name as Calasan. Eleazar and Marissa accomplished the dorsal side of the certificate of live birth. In addition, Eleazar executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child. On December 6, 1989, Eleazar submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar. On December 28, 1989, the municipal treasurer rejected the registration on the basis of Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which states that illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of their mother.

Issue: Whether illegitimate children may use the surname of their father

Ruling: No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. This rule is regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioners illegitimate child using the surname of the alleged father, even with the latters consent. The putative father may legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of adoption, the child shall then be considered a legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his surname.

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Cang v. CA CASE NO.: 406 Substantive and Procedural Requirements for Adoption

G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998 HERBERT CANG, petitioner, versus, COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents

Facts: Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married on January 27, 1973. They begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 13, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977; and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981. Herbert and Anna Marie were legally separated and Herbert left for the United States. The three children are the subject of the petition for adoption filed on September 25, 1987, by spouses Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. Ronald and Maria Clara are the brother and sister-in-law of Anna, respectively. Anna Marie filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had evaded his legal obligation to support his children. Upon learning of the petition, Herbert returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto.

Issue: Whether Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony may be legally adopted without the written consent of Herbert

Ruling: No. It is stated in Article 188 of the Family Code that the written consent of the parents by nature of the child shall be necessary in the adoption of the child. It is also stated in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court that the petition for adoption shall be filed with a written consent by each of its known living parents. It is thus clear that the written consent of the Herbert is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Anna Marie contends that Herberts consent may be dispensed of because he has abandoned his children. However, the court found that even though Herbert was physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He would also send packages by mail and catered to their whims. He also deposited amounts for the benefit of his children. These were all supported by documentary evidence thus negating the claim of Anna Marie of abandonment.

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Mangonon v. CA Who must pay support

CASE NO.: 418

G.R. No. 125041 June 30, 2006 MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, petitioner, versus HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, FEDERICO C. DELGADO and FRANCISCO C. DELGADO, respondents

Facts: On February 16, 1975, Ma. Belen was civilly married to Federico Delgado. At that time, Ma. Belen was 21 years old while Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent, it was annulled on August 11, 1975. On March 25, 1976 (within 7 months after the annulment), Ma. Belen gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to Ma. Belen, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as Federico had totally abandoned them. On March 17, 1994, Ma. Belen filed, in behalf of her then minor children, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America. In a year, Rica and Rina would need around $25,000 each for educational and general maintenance support. Unfortunately, Ma. Belens present monthly income from her 2 jobs is merely $1,200 after taxes. Neither can Danny be compelled to share in the support of Rica and Rina since he has his own son with Ma. Belen and own daughter (also in college) to attend to.

Issue: Who should pay for the support of Rica and Rina?

Ruling: Under Article 199 of the Family Code, whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) the spouse; (2) the descendants in the nearest degree; (3) the ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) the brothers and sisters. Ma. Belen and Federico are primarily charged to support their childrens college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina. Francisco is a majority stockholder of two corporations, the owner of Citadel Corporation, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Isla Communication Co., and owns real properties both in the Philippines and abroad. He is, therefore, financially capable of providing support to his granddaughters.

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Gualberto v. Gualberto Tender Age Presumption Rule

CASE NO.: 430

G.R. No. 154994 June 28, 2005 JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, petitioner, versus CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V, respondent

Facts: On March 12, 2002, Crisanto filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn with an ancillary prayer for custody pendent lite of their almost 4year-old son Rafaello. Crisanto prays that he be granted custody over Rafaello because Joycelyn is unfit to become a mother and that because her alleged lesbianism would affect Rafaello.

Issue: Whether custody over Rafaello should be awarded to Crisanto

Ruling: No. Article 213 of the Family Code states that: no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The so-called tender-age presumption may be overcome only be compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness such as: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity of affliction with a communicable disease. Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. However, sexual preference alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. To deprive Joycelyn of custody on the ground of immorality or lesbianism, Crisanto must demonstrate that she carried on her purported lesbian relationship in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the childs proper moral development. Such a fact has not been proven. Thus, the custody was awarded to Joycelyn.

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Sombong v. CA CASE NO.: 442 Termination / Suspension of Parental Authority

G.R. No. 111876 January 31, 1996 JOHANNA SOMBONG, petitioner, versus COURT OF APPEALS and MARIETTA NERI ALVIAR, LILIBETH NERI, and all persons holding the subject child ARABELLA SOMBONG in their custody, respondents

Facts: Johanna is the mother of Arabella, who was born on April 23, 1987. Sometime in November 1987, Arabella was brought to the Sir John Clinic for relief of coughing fits and for treatment of colds. Johanna did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the amount of P300. Arabella could not be discharged because of Johanna failure to pay. Johanna claims that she paid by installments in the total amount of P1,700. Despite such payments, the owners of the clinic, Dr. Carmen Ty and her husband Vicente, refused to turn over Arabella to her. Johanna testified that she visited Arabella at the clinic only after two years (in 1989). Three years after that (in 1992), she again resurfaced to claim Arabella. Johanna filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus on May 21, 1992 and a criminal complaint thereafter against spouses Ty. Both were dismissed. Johanna then sought the help of Barangay Captains Alfonso and Bautista and even Congresswoman Hortensia L. Starke. Their efforts availed her of nothing.

Issue: Whether Johannas acts constitute culpable negligence which should warrant the suspension of her parental authority over Arabella

Ruling: Yes. The trial court ruled that Johanna was not negligent. This can be deemed from the efforts she exerted in looking for and in demanding the return of Arabella. However, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court disagreed. Abandonment can also be included under the phrase cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent (par. 2, Art. 231 of the Family Code). The worst culpable negligence of a parent is abandoning her child. Johannas explanation that she had been negotiating for the discharge of Arabella for the past five year is untenable. That was too long a time for negotiation when she could have filed immediately a complaint with the authorities or the courts.

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Cesario Ursua v. CA CASE NO.: 454 Usurpation of Name/Surname in Relation to CA No. 142

G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996 CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, versus COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents

Facts: On August 1, 1989, Atty. Francis Palmones wrote the Office of the Ombudsman requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against Cesario for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority, and giving of unwarranted benefits. Atty. Palmones then requested Cesario to take the letter to the Office of the Ombudsman because the law firms messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Cesario told Oscar that he was reluctant to ask for the documents since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Oscar advised him to just sign his (Oscar) name if he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. At the Office of the Ombudsman, Cesario signed in the visitors logbook as Oscar Perez. He then proceeded to the Administrative Division where he received a copy of the complaint from Ms. Loida Kahulugan. He then acknowledged the receipt by writing the name Oscar Perez.

Issue: Whether Cesario should be penalized for using an alias name which was not duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register

Ruling: No. An alias is a name used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. The use of the name Oscar Perez was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity.