Hoonsuwan The Crucial Elements: United Nations And The Use of Soft Power Countering terrorism requires addressing

conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. United Nations

Know your enemies, know yourself, and you can win a hundred battles without a single defeat, wrote one of the greatest military strategists in world history, Sun Tzu, in The Art of War. Although Sun Tzu did not live to see wars evolving into a transnational fight against barely identifiable enemiesthe hybrid-warfare1 wagers, or to put simply, groups of so-called terroristshis words still ring true: knowing the enemies and ones own potential is vital to successfully countering terrorism. Post-9/11 era is characterized by a sense of vulnerability lingering within the U.S. public. Many who once thought their homeland was so invincible and invulnerable.2 Perhaps, the whole country was still in shock when former President Bush authorized the invasion of Iraq that not many people dared question the governments decision to invade a sovereign state as a way to counter terrorism. As this paper will argue, the U.S. mistakes were the governments inability to understand who the enemies were and what role it should play in combating this transnational threat. Having no clear directions, the U.S. made a grave error in resorting to direct aggression; ignoring negative long-term consequences of its actions and invading Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead of alleviating the threat, the U.S. ended up exacerbating the danger, provoking even more opposition, and instigating even more violence, leaving the country in never-ending wars. Although the recent strategic shift in Afghanistan reflects the governments willingness to adopt a more humanistic protecting
1

David Kilcullen defines hybrid warfare as a war involving new actors, particularly non-state, the use of new technology such as media tools and nano-engineering to fight a new way of wars, such as Internetenabled terrorism and transnational guerrilla warfare. Yet, despite novel tactics and organizational structures, the old threats still remain and have to be dealt with simultaneously. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 2 Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Hoonsuwan the population first and foremost3 approach, it has not been proven effective4. Nevertheless, calling the use of soft power right away as being meaningless to

prevention5 of terrorism is too presumptuous. While many argue that the surge is only in its initial stage, this paper argues that the shift, to put it in Sun Tzus words, exhibits merely the understanding of the enemies sans the understanding of the U.S.the role it should play in combating terrorism. The U.S. needs to remove its superpower mindset and reassess its current role as a leader in the war on terror. Of course, the U.S. government has traveled down the right path by resorting to the use of soft power, but in order to smooth that path, a change in political actor is proposed. In the first section, the paper explores the root of terrorism as a way to understand the enemies and origin or terrorist threats and the implication on counter-terrorism policy. Then, the paper suggests that the current main actorsthe U.S. and its Western alliesare unsuitable to fight the war on terror. More power and authority, therefore, should be given to the UN and its entities to eliminate terrorism threats from a grassroots levela job they have always been accustomed to.

The Beauty of Soft Power The term soft power entered the public discourse in the 1990s and started gaining widespread usage when Joseph Nye, a renowned political scientist, developed the idea in his famed book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (1990).
3 4

Gen. Stanley McChrystal, interview by Martin Smith, Obama's War, (October 13, 2009). Many experts have refrained from concluding the effectiveness of the strategy on the ground that this is a long-term strategy that cannot be evaluated immediately, while less than half the troops President Obama authorized have arrived in Afghanistan. See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/07/AR2010050704506.html. 5 Michael Rubin, "More Creative Military Strategies Are Needed," in Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 218-234 (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2010).

Hoonsuwan To understand the essence of soft power, therefore, requires one to look at the original definition proposed by Nye, which he reiterates in his book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004) as follow: What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a countrys culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, out soft power is enhanced.6 Soft power, therefore, is distinct from throwing money into a country hoping its

government would comply with U.S. demands, such as the Marshall Plan during the Cold War years. Soft power is not a peaceful threat that calls for compliance such as numerous sanctions the U.S. has tried to impose on other countries. By Nyes definition, exercising soft power is being a role model, being a state where freedom burgeons, morality prevails, and justice forms the core of the society. Most importantly, genuine use of soft power involves legitimacyan acceptance from whom a particular soft-power policy affects. Yet, many have had a difficult time trying to understand soft power in Nyes terms and look at power only within the limits of the possession of capabilities or resources that can influence outcomes.7 The Iraq War has shown the world the downside of hard military power. The U.S. was able to removed Saddam Hussein from power, but did not resolve any terrorist threats. Moreover, Nye says that the war in Iraq has greatly downplayed the U.S. soft power, which further complicates counter-terrorism efforts. Americas standing plummeted in Islamic countries from Morocco to Turkey to Southeast Asia. Yet, the United States will need the help of such countries in the long term to track the flow of
6 7

Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), pp. x. Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), pp. 3.

Hoonsuwan terrorists, tainted money, and dangerous weapons, says Nye. Therefore, it is vital that the U.S. maintains good soft power standing while working to limit the use of hard military power to attract cooperation from other states. Of course, it makes sense to argue that hard power helps raise the price of engaging in terrorism so that the cost to terrorists and their sponsors outweigh the

benefits such as employment of disproportionate military response to restrain Palestinian terrorists.8 If hard power were the answer to counter-terrorism, why has it not eliminated the Taliban from Afghanistan, or local insurgents from Iraq? Instead, the U.S. invasion in both countries instigated even more violence, especially in the case of Iraq where U.S. invasion opened up an Iraqi Pandoras boxessentially spreading chaos all over the country. During Saddam Husseins regime, Iraq was a relatively stable country with modern infrastructure and decent social services. It was also safe comparing to other countries in the Middle East, at least for the Sunnis. Now, Iraq is safe for no one, Shiites or Sunnis, Jews or Christians, not even for the U.S. military personnel. Worse is the adverse effect the invasion has imposed on counter-terrorism; instead of decreasing terrorist threats, the U.S. and British occupation of Iraq has accelerated recruitment to the ranks of Osama bin Ladens terrorist network and made the world a less safe place, says a pro-war, London-based think tank International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS).9 To understand why soft power will accomplish more in terms of counter-terrorism than hard power requires a thorough study of the enemies. As Rama Mani describes,

Michael Rubin, "More Creative Military Strategies Are Needed," in Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 218-234 (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2010). 9 Kim Sengupta, Iraq Occupation Made World Less Safe, Pro-War Institute Says Studies, May 26, 2004, http://www.independent.co.uk/ (accessed December 8, 2010).

Hoonsuwan Terrorism is an umbrella term encompassing a range of situations in which different agents choose a particular set of means, targeting innocent civilians, in a sporadic or sustained way within their pursuit of a specific or nonspecific political objective.10 One cannot pinpoint a single, transcending cause of terrorism, but instead should look at terrorism as a threat being motivated by various factors such as poverty, human rights abuse, ideology, nationalism, and religious fundamentalism. Being the most popular and frequently cited theory within the UN11, poverty sounds convincing enough for one to generalize all terrorism as having arisen from

extreme poverty and economic despairthe same way crimes in U.S. inner cities become rampant. Despite the belief of many world leaders who attended the 2002 Monterrey poverty summit that defeating poverty would thwart a major driving force behind international terrorism,12 there is a lack of correlation between poverty, socioeconomic inequality, or low level of economic development and terrorism or public sympathy for terrorist activities.13 Comparing empirical datathe hard evidencefrom various reputable sources, James A. Piazza14 argues that the poorest and the least-developed states do not produce and experience the highest level of terrorism. Furthermore, terrorists tend to be more educated instead of poor and economically deprived, many of them are recruited while at university. Meanwhile, individuals sympathizing with terrorists are not likely to be either poor or uneducated. The lack of evidence connecting

10

Rama Mani, "The Root Causes of Terrorism and Conflict Prevention," in Terrorism and the UN, 219-241 (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004). 11 Rama Mani, pp. 225. 12 BBC, Poverty 'fuelling terrorism', March 22, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk (accessed November 26, 2010). 13 James A. Piazza, "Poverty is a weak causal link," in Debating Terrorism And Counterterrorism, 37-51 (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010). 14 Piazza is an Associate Professor at University of North Carolina at Charlotte. He has taught classes on Middle East politics and politics in the Islamic world, as well as doing research on the relationship between human rights abuse and terrorism. Some of his other academic works are also cited in this paper.

Hoonsuwan poverty to terrorism suggests that while poverty can fuel terrorism, there are other explanations worthy of further contemplation.

One of the worlds leading experts on guerilla warfare, having served as an aide to General Petraeus and one of the engineers behind the 2007 Surge, David Kilcullen offers another perspective. According to his accidental guerilla15 theory, those who join terrorist organizations mostly do not align their ideology with the ideologies held by the mother organizations. Only a small, elusive minority16 are fanatical neo-salafi jihadists, Kilcullen says. The rest are exploited, local guerillas who classify Western presence and globalized culture carried by Westerners as a threat to their local identity. These local guerillas may end up fighting alongside transnational terrorists despite ideological differences because they were unified by the same goal: expelling foreign presence from their territories; thus, becoming the accidental guerillas. Kilcullen argues that accidental guerillas are born out of a four-stage cycle consisting of infection, contagion, intervention, and rejection. Infection is the process of exploitation of existing breakdowns in the rule of law or pre-existing conflict by takfirinormally known as jihad. Contagion describes the spread of extremist groups influence. Intervention occurs when external actors take action against the extremist presence. Rejection is the stage in which local people become accidental guerillas to eject foreign presence from their own territory. Kilcullens theory suggests several potential sources that might fuel terrorism: nationalism, anti-West sentiment, and failed states. Poor social order and weak governance constitute another explanation. In this theory, failed states or weak or simply bad (i.e., undemocratic) states violate human

15 16

David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). Kilcullen, pp. xiv.

Hoonsuwan rights and create conditions for terrorism, says Mani.17 In addition, Piazza contends, in concurrence with Kilcullen, that states with little, if at all, functioning government are more prone to terrorist infiltrationboth homegrown and transnational, and are more likely to experience high levels of terrorist activities. States with poor governance also become a breeding ground for terrorists. Among the top ten failed states ranked by

Foreign Policy magazine18, four are identified by the U.S. Department of State as terrorist safe havens19, including Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The rest are either in dangerfailingstates or borderline states (excluding the Tri-Border Area between Brail, Paraguay, and Argentina).20 These statistics show that failing and failed states are at risk of becoming a breeding ground for terrorists. In addition, many of the states on the terrorist safe havens list rank medium to high on the Human Development Index (HDI)21, indicating that poverty has less to do with terrorism than the ability of governments to administrate their countries. Yet merely poor governance does not lead to terrorism. Countries with corrupted government could become a breeding ground for terrorist groups, but not all failed states are terrorist havens. If states with little functioning governments are a serious threat to the international community, countries like North Korea and countless parts of Africa such as

17

Rama Mani, "The Root Causes of Terrorism and Conflict Prevention," in Terrorism and the UN, 219-241 (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004). 18 Foreign Policy, 2010 Failed States Index: Interactive Map and Rankings, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com (accessed November 27, 2010). 19 Terrorist safe havens as defined by the U.S. Department of State is ungoverned, under-governed, or illgoverned areas of a country and non-physical areas where terrorists that constitute a threat to U.S. national security interests are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both. See, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140891.htm. 20 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009 Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe Havens and Tactics and Tools for Disrupting or Eliminating Safe Havens, August 5, 2010, http://www.state.gov (accessed November 27, 2010). 21 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)s Human Development Reports (HDR), 2010. See, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics.

Hoonsuwan Congo should be plagued with terrorist activities, too. Karen Von Hippel scrutinizes the

myths regarding the root of terrorism and concludes: poverty and a lack of education do not necessarily propel people to become terrorists.22 Poor governance may not induce terrorism per se, yet, strong authoritarian Arab and Muslim states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria, said Hippel, could be the serious root cause of terrorism because authoritarian states tend to suppress peoples freedom, or abuse human rights. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948, human rights are inherent rights one is entitled to regardless of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.23 In essence, everyone is guaranteed the right to life, liberty and securityor physical integrity, and the protection of these rights is undeniably a fundamental obligation of Government.24 Often times, failed states and authoritarian states are associated with human rights violations as states try to curtail their citizens activities to stabilize their crumbling political power, such as suppressing freedom of speech, freedom of religion, or subjecting their citizens to cruel, inhuman, degrading treatments. Failed states are also unsuccessful in fulfilling their fundamental obligation of protecting the right to life, liberty and security of their citizens due to the inability to provide basic, necessary services to their population such as welfare and health care, while allowing widespread corruption and criminality to threaten peoples daily life. Even for stable states, however, human rights violations become an issue when they
22

Karen Von Hippel, "The Root of Terrorism: Probing the Myth," The Political Quarterly (Blackwell Publishing), 2002: 25-39. 23 United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, http://www.un.org (accessed November 25, 2010). 24 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Fact Sheet 32: Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism," Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, July 2008, http://www.ohchr.org (accessed November 26, 2010). United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, http://www.un.org (accessed November 25, 2010).

Hoonsuwan

attempt to pursue counterterrorism measures, which they argue necessitate some restraint on human rights, as in the case of the U.S. Patriot Act. Focusing on the subclass of human rights, physical integrity rights, whose violation offends the most broadly shared norm of appropriate government conduct, Walsh and Piazza25 argue that the abuse of physical integrity rights increases terrorism; consequently, human rights should be taken more seriously by those attempting to understand the causes of terrorism. The rationale behind this is simple: human rights abuseespecially physical integrity rights abusewidens the gap between the people and their repressive government, delegitimizes the regime, provokes oppositional forces within the state, and alienate civilians who, as a result, will realign themselves with terrorist groups. Based on this assumption, it is undoubtedly true that states that fall for the evil temptation of human rights abuse while trying to counter terrorism risk worsening the situation by provoking anger in local people, giving them a reason to realign themselves with terrorists whom they do not agree with ideologically. Therefore, one can see that the use of hard military power violates human rights by denying them safety and security, stir up the lingering sense of anti-Western, destroy infrastructure, social orders, and push the invaded country deep under poverty line. As Nye says, soft power can be exercised through a countrys culture, political ideals, and policies. In the case of war on terrorism, international policies are very important. For effective counterterrorism strategy to be deemed legitimate it must not harm innocent people. It must focus on nation building, which will make life necessities available to the people, and the respect for everybodys human rights. This strategy will deter non-

25

James I. Walsh and James A. Piazza, "Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism," Comparative Political Studies (SAGE Publications) 43, no. 5 (2010): 551 577.

Hoonsuwan 10 terrorists from joining terrorist organization, while working toward a long-term goal of building stability and peace.

Multilateral Approach Combating global terrorism requires the cooperation of more than one state. As an international governmental organization, the UN represents a hope of the international community to collaborate on the matter of the world. However, it is widely agreed upon that the nature of the UNits respect of sovereigntyplays a major obstacle in implementing an effective counterterrorism policy. Zachary Shirkey outlines three areas in which the UN could possibly contribute toward the fight against terrorism, but has not been able to carry out the tasks successfully. First, the UN could provide an international legal framework to enhance law enforcement capabilities. It could mediate and verify agreements between terrorist groups and coordinate interstate cooperation in intelligence gathering as well as orchestrating individual state responses to terrorism.26 However, Shirkey argues, the UN could not create any legal framework because it has not be able to define terrorism while some members of the UN have been willing to tolerate certain terrorist groups as having admirable goals. The PLO is the example of such terrorist group that has been given observer status in the UN even if it is not a state actor as defined by the UN Charter. This creates a lot of tension among the UN member states and makes it even more difficult to cooperate. Moreover, enforcing the law is almost impossible due to the lack of official law enforcement agency while the International Court of Justice is irrelevant in this case because it only accepts state actors. Additionally,

26

Zachary C. Shirkey, "Can the United Nations Make a Difference in Fighting Terrorism?," in Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 275-287 (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2010).

Hoonsuwan 11 states act upon their interests. Leaving an international organization with non-binding power like the UN to coordinate a global effort against terrorism is ineffective due to the lack of shared state interests. Lastly, according to Shirkey, the UN could not mediate or verify agreements with terrorists because the UN has maximalist, non-negotiable demands; making negotiations with terrorist groups impossible. Not long after 9/11, the Security Council created the UN Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) on 28 September 2001 with the passage of Resolution 1373. Hoping to be a centre of global efforts to fight terrorism,27 the CTC receives priority attention and resources within the UN to strengthen the counterterrorism capability of UN member states, providing technical assistance to countries the need help implementing counterterrorism measures. Although the creation of the CTC came with high hopes, the reality of the committee is a mixed record. The committee has lacked the power to implement or mandate any counterterrorism requirements, even if it is a part of the Security Council. Thus, it is fair to argue that state actors are more effective than international governmental organizations like the UN in terms of counter-terrorism, but it is only true to a certain extent. Clearly, the UN could not pass any binding resolutions requiring member states to participate in the fight against terrorism, which is the source of dissatisfaction for many. States must work together on collecting intelligence, capturing and extraditing terrorists, tracking and stanching the flow of terrorist funding, and even military actions designed to curb terrorism, not waiting for the UN order for actions to

27

Kofi Annans description of the CTC: David Cortright, George A. Lopez, Alistair Millar and Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf, "Global Cooperation Against Terrorism: Evaluating the United Nations CounterTerrorism Committee," in Uniting Against Terror, 23-50 (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007).

Hoonsuwan 12 take place, argues Zachary C. Shirkey.28 He believes that the UN plays an important role in world politics, but when it comes to counter-terrorism, and issue necessitating decisive and swift actions, state actors must take the lead. However, his argument stems from the assumption that hard power is the primary tool to fight terrorism. Collecting intelligence, capturing and extraditing terrorists, and military actions are reactive measures. If the essence of effective counter-terrorism is preventive strategies29, then the UN should not be focusing on those aspects outlined by Shirkey. The CTCs role is also irrelevant in this discussion, as it represents a tool of the worlds superpowersthose sitting in the Security Council, in particularwho are more interested in pursuing punitive responses to terrorism with no reference to underlying causes.30 Hence, from a preventive perspective, the UN has been doing a lot of counter terrorism. September 8, 2006 marked another step taken by the General Assembly to adopt the human-rights based United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. This Strategy contains common strategic and operational framework to fight terrorism that has been agreed upon by all member states. The basis of the Strategy includes: helping member states counter terrorism, addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, preventing terrorist acts, developing state capacity to counter terrorism, and defending human rights.31

28

Zachary C. Shirkey, "The UN is limited in its ability to play a role," in Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 275-287 (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2010). 29 Michael Rubin, "More Creative Military Strategies Are Needed," in Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 218-234 (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2010). 30 Rama Mani, "The Root Causes of Terrorism and Conflict Prevention," in Terrorism and the UN, 219-241 (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004). 31 United Nations, United Nations General Assembly Adopts Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, http://www.un.org/ (accessed December 8, 2010). See, http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counterterrorism.shtml.

Hoonsuwan 13 Morever, the UN Secretary-General in 2005 created UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) to enhance coordination and coherence of counterterrorism efforts of the United Nations system32 and ensure that member states have the support they need to implement the Global Strategy. Consisting of 30 international entities such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), CTITF diverts counter-terrorism policy away from a suppressive and coercive action that may involve the use of force by focusing on four pillars of the Global Strategy: measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; measures to prevent and combat terrorism; measures to build states capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism. The Task Force has contributed tremendously to counter terrorism and extremism using measures separate from and additional to suppressive and coercive action that may involve the use of force.33 Programs and initiatives implemented under this Task Force include a plan to engage and work with civil society because working with communities and civil society enhances trust and transparency and strengthens social cohesion34; prison reform programs; counter-radicalization education programs; promotion of alliance of civilizations and intercultural dialogue to foster understanding; and, among many, a plan to tackle social and economic inequalities.

32 33

United Nations, About CTITF, http://www.un.org (accessed December 8, 2010). United Nations, About CTITF, http://www.un.org (accessed December 8, 2010). 34 Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes, United Nations (United Nations).

Hoonsuwan 14 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in North Africa North Africa is a region of five states: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. The evolution of terrorism in North Africa epitomizes Kilcullens accidental guerilla phenomenon quite well. Since 2001, nationally based organizations focusing on the overthrow of local regimes have evolved into regionalized organizations connecting local grievances to global procurement.35 Being the key site and source of transnational salafist terrorism, the region has experienced deadly suicide attacks in Algeria, kidnapping of Austrian tourists in Tunisia, and the arrest by Egyptian security forces of seven suspected members of an al-Qaeda-linked Palestinian group alleged of executing a Cairo bazaar bombing. Between 2006 and 2008, EUROPOL believes that many arrests in Europe of those suspected of involvement with Islamist terrorism came from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.36 Cross-border and interregional cooperation are crucial to counter terrorism in North Africa, yet until recently, such cooperation has been unlikely, but efforts by the United States, EU, and UN has gradually improved this cooperation.37 Moreover, Cockayne, Ipe and Millar argue that counter-terrorism cooperation in the region needs to move beyond a focus on military and law enforcement responses to a more holistic and prevention-based approach because the long-term threat in North Africa comes from poor governance areasplaces where state has no presence and terrorists are allowed to thrive. The Strategy, they argue, provides the best available

35

James Cockayne, Jason Ipe and Alistair Millar, "Implementing the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy in North Africa," Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, September 2010, http://www.globalct.org (accessed December 8, 2010). 36 James Cockayne, Jason Ipe and Alistair Millar, "Implementing the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy in North Africa," Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, September 2010, http://www.globalct.org (accessed December 8, 2010). 37 James Cockayne, Jason Ipe and Alistair Millar, "Implementing the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy in North Africa," Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, September 2010, http://www.globalct.org (accessed December 8, 2010), pp. 4.

Hoonsuwan 15 framework on which to construct such cooperation due to its universal support, thematic comprehensiveness and flexibility.

The Crucial Elements Although the UN is not the only source of legitimacy in world politics, but its universality, legal framework, and relative attractiveness do give its votes and pronouncements a considerable degree of legitimacy, says Joseph Nye.38 Of course, the UNs reputation and soft power have been fluctuating since its inception due to its sensitivity to the changing political environment, it remains quite popular throughout much of the world. A 25-nation Pew Global Attitudes survey conducted in May and June 2009 reveals that 19 out of 25 countries, including Lebanon and Egypt, express a positive opinion regarding the UN, a trend since 2007.39 At the same time, the U.S. approval also increased, but due mainly to the change of presidency from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. Belief that Obama will do the right thing in world affairs is now nearly universal in Western countries, where lack of confidence in President Bush had been almost as prevalent for much of his time in office, reported Pew Research Center. In a country such as Pakistan and the Palestinian territories, however, ratings of President Obama were not that much better than the ratings accorded Bush. In short, where as the UN approval has soared due to its involvement in disaster relieves and other development projects through out the world, the worlds opinion of the U.S. had only changed due to the alternation of presidencynot the policy. The UN certainly has carried out some

38

Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), pp. 95. 39 Richard Wike and Jacob Poushter, Obama Addresses More Popular U.N., September 21, 2009, http://pewresearch.org/ (accessed December 8, 2010).

Hoonsuwan 16 popular projects while the U.S. is still repeating the same policy mistakes. Having seen the attractiveness and soft-power resources of the UN, governments cannot afford to ignore it without paying a price.40 Moreover, ethnoreligious violence in southern Thailand illustrates how western interventions tend to deteriorate the conflict. According to Kilcullen, the case of southern Thailand is an interrupted cycle where all the elements of the accidental guerrilla phenomenon exist except the infection of the conflict by transnational terrorists. Thailand has resisted overt Western assistance and has been treating this matter as a domestic issue. While globalization is viewed as a form of Western imperialism, direct intervention is a definite form of colonialismmore of a serious threat than globalization itself. Therefore, Western interventionin this case, the U.S. interventionshould be avoided at all cost. Kilcullen suggests that a policy of international cooperation and low-profile support for legitimate and effective governance through local authorities, building effective and legitimate local allies, is likely to be a more viable response. Kilcullen is not the only one cautioning the U.S. on its exercise of interventionism. Pew Research Center found that favorable ratings of the U.S. plummeted after the invasion of Iraq and remained low through 2008. Most people, 63 percent, expressed their conviction that the U.S. acts unilaterally, ignoring interests of other countries. The anti-Americanism runs broader and deeper than ever before. And its getting worse, 41 not only in Western Europe or the Muslim World, but in other regions of the world such as Brazil and Russia as well. To understand the extent of antiAmericanism, Pew Research Center looked into the approval ratings of U.S. presidents
40 41

Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004). Pew Research Center, Anti-Americanism: Causes and Characteristics, December 10, 2003, http://pewglobal.org/ (accessed December 8, 2010).

Hoonsuwan 17 comparing to those of Osama bin Laden. The result was astounding: In 2008, most Muslims rated bin Laden as high, or higher than they rated President Bush. Even when most of the world has looked at the U.S. more positively since Obama became the president, in the Palestinian territories and Pakistan, bin Ladens ratings are still considerably higher than Obamas. All the evidence show that anti-American sentiment is real, and the U.S. should be careful in crafting its policy. The government must regard its soft power as the primary means to fight terrorism. Otherwise, it would end up not only destroying its credibility in the worlds affair, but also decreasing its soft power through the use of hard military power that produces nothing more than a short-term satisfaction. The U.S. intervention in other sovereign states would provoke the existing antiAmericanism in the people, alienating them, forcing them to realign with terrorist organizations. Therefore, to avoid worsening terrorist threats, the U.S. should refrain from declaring itself a leader in the fight against evils. It should leave the UN, which is deemed as being more neutral and less motivated by greed, to be the main force in an effort to counter terrorism and extremismin its own peaceful, sustainable way. Knowing the root causes of terrorism, what implications they have on counterterrorism measures, one cannot deny that soft power is the most important element that should be the main focus of all counter-terrorism policiesnot military hard power. Yet, it is clear that knowing how to combat the enemies is not enough to win this battle. As this paper argues, knowing what role should a state have in this war is another crucial factor in determining a successful outcome. The U.S. is powerful. It has sophisticated military weapons, top-notched generals, and enough money to fund two wars at the same time. Yet, it is not a suitable leader when it comes to a fight against global terrorism.

Hoonsuwan 18 Globalization has instilled anti-West, anti-American sentiments all over the world. For the U.S. to declare itself the worlds police and demand compliance to the U.S. ideals and interests is not a way to counter terrorism; in contrast, it is a way to exacerbate the recruitment of terrorists. The documentary Obamas War also demonstrates the U.S. denial of its unsuitable role in Afghanistan. Obamas administration has decided to understand the enemies and counter terrorism by befriending the local Afghans, hoping to deter them from joining the Taliban; nonetheless, the administration did not realize that the use of U.S. military personnel is not the same as using the UN peacekeepers. Who in the world would like to befriend and genuinely cooperate with a stranger with guns? It is time for the U.S. government to accept that it is not the leader of the worldit has never been, in fact. As long as the world has not found a new actor to lead this war, the UN seems to be the best alternative. For the sake of a better world, the U.S. should be the one listening to what the UN has to say, not the other way around.

Hoonsuwan 19

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