Monsicha Hoonsuwan Critical Book Review Professor Curt Cardwell U.S.

Interventionism September 13, 2010 Facades of the Great Aberration In the spirit of its recently acquired independence, the newborn United States of America had neither adequate political nor military might to engage itself in what Thomas Jefferson coined entangling alliances in the worlds affairsespecially in, then, the shambolic European relations. In coherence with this fact was the belief carried by many early U.S. settlers and political figures that the U.S. should remain neutral and isolated from matters other than its own, extending mere commercial relations sans political ties to foreign countries. In his famous Farewell Address, George Washington promulgated the idea and, consequently, laid the groundwork for subsequent practices in U.S. diplomacy. With a widespread credence in the U.S. unusual feat of faithfully exercising isolationism throughout the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, William Appleman Williams may appear radical, socialistic even, to scrupulously contest the very essence of traditional U.S. diplomatic history in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. Integrating economic aspects of the U.S. to the studies of foreign relations, Williams analysis provides an exceptional insight to the inherent flaws of the U.S. diplomacythe contradictions between the U.S. ideals and its uses of powerthat surpasses any superficial left-versus-right debates in international relations. Rarely, if ever, has the U.S. been isolated from international affairs, as almost every single page of its diplomatic

history is marked by the self-righteous uses of power to intervene and expand its sphere of influence for the sake of its ideology. The practice is profoundly ingrained in the U.S. mindsetnot only in those who make decisions, but also in the populacethat if the country stops expanding, the U.S. would be rid, not so much of its wealth and prosperity, but of its proud identity. For this reason, Williams concludes, the U.S. diplomacy is a tragedy in itself. The abundant uses of primary sources such as the presidents, cabinet members and congressmens statements, coupled with Williams own thoughtful interpretation provide an outrageous, yet convincing outlookand arguably a simple generalization of the U.S. motives to expand, which eloquently challenges the traditional beliefthe myth of isolationismheld by the U.S. public. After reading The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, one cannot help being skeptical of the U.S. real intentions when it steps into other societies affairs and is forced to look inward at the U.S. domestic orders and capitalistic ideology to find new solutions to problems that are previously solved by way of expansionism. Williams famed book opens up a whole new sub-field within the studies of history and U.S. foreign relations, one in which the U.S. economic ideals plays the main villain in international affairs. The Cuban crisis of 1959-1961 serves as Williams epitome of the underlying tragedy concerning the U.S. diplomacy in the twentieth century, when the U.S. intervened with good intentions but ended up provoking strong local oppositions that later disarray established societal orders of the peoples it intervened. Williams diagnosis of the U.S. foreign policy is not circumstantial. Rather, he goes beyond the conventional realist analysis commonly applied in the studies of foreign relations and pinpoints the U.S. deep-

seated flaws evident in not only the Cuban case, but also in other diplomatic endeavors. Williams argues that the U.S. generosity and advocacy of self-determination, although commendable, produce the most devastating catastrophe when clashing with the U.S. conviction that other societies cannot solve their problems unless they adopt the U.S. values and system. Having identified the three conceptions guiding the U.S. policy, Williams investigated the U.S. policy from the colonial times until the Vietnam War to illustrate how these ideas play out against the legend of isolationism throughout its history. From the beginning, the U.S. had always sought the expansion of land as a means to solve personal financial problems. This mindset developed from an individual level into a wider scope as the society started to industrialize. Williams cited James Madison who forewarned that once the continent had ran out of productive land, major crisis might occur and suggested that expansion was the key to preventing factionor class conflictswhich could disrupt the fabric of society. Indeed, Williams brought up the Crisis of the 1890s as a turning point when the U.S. public realized the need to expand beyond the U.S. current borders to sustain freedom and prosperity. In other words, Williams seemed to imply that the U.S. was at a crossroad where it had to choose between a revolution down the path of socialism or expansionism to preserve its valued characteristics: freedom and capitalism. Centered to Williams arguments is the Open Door Policy implemented as a way to spread out the U.S. system through its economic power without the embarrassment and inefficiency of traditional colonialism. During the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, recognizing the relationship between economic expansion and overseas

reform, synthesized them into the strategy of the Open Door Policy, in a hope to reconstruct other societies to make them more susceptible and cooperative to the expansion of the U.S. economy. Attempting to solve domestic affairs, prevent revolutions through the U.S. foreign policy, the Open Door Policy is nothing more than the U.S. version of the liberal policy of informal empire or free-trade imperialism. Even during the nations Lost Weekend of the 1920s, when the U.S. was believed to find comfort in its isolation, Williams proposed that it was a crucial period during which the debate over imperialism and anti-imperialism was rendered obsolete, while the argument over how the U.S. should maintain and enlarge the U.S. authority in the revolution-laden world came into focus. The rejection to joint the League of Nation, hence, was seen by Williams as another response to the consensus to politically and economically expand the U.S. It was not the doctrine of isolation that the U.S. has faithfully practiced, but the Open Door Policy, which has transformed from a utopian idea into an ideology. Even Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the president who was thought to be revolutionary in trying to steer the society toward socialism by establishing social programs, was criticized by Williams as having not abandoned the policy of the open door; he merely created a different version of it to save the corporate system essential to the Open Door Policy. Even more striking is Williams denunciation of Wilson as being an interventionist, able to do anything for people but get off their backs and let them live their own lives. Meanwhile, Williams praised Herbert Hoover for adhering to the principle put forth in Washingtons Farewell Address, placing more emphasis on the economic aspects of foreign policy instead of the political ones.

It is clear that Williams has, at this point, flipped the traditional history upside down and almost rewritten the new onethe one in which the U.S. has never retreated back into isolationism. The Spanish-American War of 1898 was not the great aberration, a period in which the U.S. embarked on a brief imperialistic campaign. The U.S. entry into WWI and WWII was not a result of the U.S. concern in European affairs or the pressure from the international community, but was a consequence of revolution threat caused by economic downturn. Since the U.S. was so reliant on European states to purchase its goods, it went into war attempting to install a stable economic system so it could, again, ensure the flows of funds back into its economy. Finally, it is the history in which the U.S. initiated and was hyper-enthusiastic to fight the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Implied in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy seems to be Williams suggestion that U.S. leaders should have taken a different patha path that no leaders have ever considered taking: revolution. Williams may have put too much blame on the U.S. liberal capitalism, generalizing the problems of the U.S. foreign policy as merely being economic that he downplays other factors involved in the international level of analysisthe Stalinist regime being the example. Nonetheless, his arguments are more than compelling. Whether one agrees with his message or not, it is unavoidable that one will never look at the U.S. policy the same way again.