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IMPACT AND EFFECT OF THE ATTACK OF JAPAN IN JITRA

BEGINNING OF BATTLE
xx. n the evening, the Japanese troop move into the east street Jitra - Changlun. After
that, British tanks applied position at the streets and started shooting with the help of a light
blanzing shots. Japan fought with the 2 / 9 Jats and began to badger the right defense. At
approximately 2030H, the Japanese tanks with the help of faint headlights, moving towards
the south of main road to the center position of the British defense. Japanese military patrol
beat 1 Leicestershire patrol section before its two tanks; hit the main shock from the 215
Anti-Tank Battery and at that time that Jats also bombarded with Japanese bullets.
xx. Meanwhile, 15 Brigade Headquarters is said to receive inaccurate reports of
horrendous Japanese had occupied Jantan Hill and Alor Hill. This report caused fear for Brig
Carpendale Japanese siege of his right of defense. Without referring to the Division
Commander, Brig Carpendale sought help from Commander 6th Brigade, Brig Lay to sent
two companies of 2 / 2 Gurkha which are a battalion rifle reserves. This company occupied
the east road and a company of 2 / 16 Punjab is located in Kelubi to strengthen the back of
his right of defense. This movement is done before sunrise.n fact, one company 1 / 18
Punjab ordered to occupy the defense left by the Jats, but the order was canceled before the
company arrived at that position.
xx. On 0300H, the Japanese invaded through the middle of the road barrier and infiltrate
into the back right side of the front of 1 Leicestershire company. When an immediate
counter-attack failed, the Japanese could only be withdrawn any organized counter-offensive
near dawn, with the help of Bren carriers.
xx. At approximately 0600H, in the heavy rain poured down, a company of Japanese
infantry, supported by fire from tanks face attacks in eastern junction that divides the team
from 1 Leicestershire and 2 / 9 Jats. The attack into the area of the two battalions of defense
and were able to defeat the front of the artillery observer post. The British tried to
counterattack but failed. Japan did not show any effort to exploit their success. Seeing this
situation, Brig Carpendale again asked for help from Brig Lay, 6 Brigade. Carpendale had 6
Brigade Headquarters and two companies of 1 / 8 Punjab is still in command. They were
ordered to launch a massive counterattack with artillery troops to regain the area fell to the
Japanese. Counter-attack team moves through the area near the headquarters of the Jats
who thought the shot was from the Japanese. This has delayed efforts to organize the
counterattack.This counterattack plan failed when the attack at 1000H that claimed many
lives, but also the Commanding Officer of the attack also killed.
xx. On the morning of December 12, General Murray-Lyon examines a report from the
Brigade front. At 0900H, Jen. Murray looking at Headquarters 15th Brigade have besieged
the Japanese military efforts being made. However, he was told the loss of two battalions in
fighting a day earlier, even more so with Brig Carpendale used to order all reserves power
that night, the Division has no reserve team again. Brig Carpendale see his troops
exhausted and dispirited. Japanese military prowess backed by tanks is believed capable of
reaching the south. n this case, Jen. Murray-Lyon seek permission through the Malaya
Command Headquarters Commander 3rd Corps to retreat from Jitra and make a stand at
Gurun.
xx. n the Japanese military was, in the afternoon, the 9th nfantry Brigade commander,
Maj. Gen. Kawamura look ahead and command the 41 nfantry Regiment replaced the front
guard and launched an attack on the night in the area east of the road. Meanwhile, 11th
nfantry Regiment are ordered to attack the west at the same time.This causes tremendous
battle. Japanese stir the 15th Brigade and the beating heart before the company made up of
Jats left and forced the company retreated to the southeast. Then, they attack the right side
of Leicestershire, and by 1430H, Japanese troops clashed with 2 / 2 Gurkha in Sungai
Bata. A counter attack by a platoon of moving from 2 East Surrey by 6 Brigade sent to
rescue the besieged Japanese right of Leicester. By 1500H the atmosphere shooting and
explosions stopped.
RETREATED TO GURUN
xx. At this time Brig Carpendale also saw the defense of Jats and Leicestershire in
danger and vulnerable to attack by Japan. n the evening, Carpendale plans to withdraw Jats
to fill the void area between Kelubi with one Punjab company at Sungai Bata.Leicester's
defense planned to focus the west and north of the river to enable them to counter attack
from the east the next day. Brig Carpendale Lay suggested that East Surreys team to
counterattack to the left (north) Leicester. The Carpendale Plan is agreed by Brig-
Gen. Murray-Lyon, except for Team East Surreys designated as reserve team division. Brig
Lay resigned two companies ordered East Surreys to Kepala Batas to protect the Sungai
Kedah bridge as soon as Leicester and 2 / 2 Gurkha battalion joined forces to withdraw all
the air base area.
xx. Brig Carpendale cancel his plan to allow Leicester to focus on the task at hand
defense. At 1515H, Leicester ordered to retreat from the jungle along the Jitra River to the
streets and moving south through the field to the Sungai Bata. Jats also safe right back up
except for defense companies are not just for allegedly losing Japanese.
xx. At 1800H, Jen. Murray-Lyon arrived in the south of Tanjong Pauh and chaos have
occurred in the streets because they claim there are reports that the Japanese tanks had
crossed the Sungai Bata. On arrival at the Division Headquarters at 1830H, a report says
team waiting Leicestershire, was attacked during the retreat.Jats are also said to have been
defeated, but Japan is said to also attack the 2 / 16 Punjab in Kelubi. The report then said to
be not true.
xx. At the same time the situation became dangerous in terms of communication
because the 3 / 16 Punjab Regiment could not defend the advancing enemy in the area
Baling and Kroh more than three days. Therefore, Jen. Murray-Lyon make arrangements to
moved immediately to have defense in Jitra which is his soldiers are fatigue and the order
was irregular. Moreover, with rapid progress of Japanese troops, assisted by tanks, unless
the obstruction can be made against the Japanese tanks. Therefore, Jen. Murray-Lyon
decided to withdraw on the same night across the Kedah River. At 1930H, Commander of 11
Division's request for permission to retreat further to the south and make a defense at
Gurun. The request submitted by the Headquarters 3rd Corps of the Army to Markas
Malaya.
xx. At 12 December, 2200H, Jen. Murray-Lyon issue an order for 11 Division retreated
to the south of the Kedah River in Alor Star.Beginning the middle of the night, and the retreat
from Jitra disenggagement far 15 miles from the main road in very bad weather conditions. t
is a very painful back operations, not only because soldiers are not trained and too young,
but the troops who had lost his passion and fatigue. The operation have a lack of
communication problems for the withdrawal of the pouring and spacious location.There are
teams that do not receive the order to retreat. This makes them still in defensive positions
until the next morning. As a result, the team left behind is moving in small groups and loss of
equipment. n the defense area to the west of Jitra with some paddy fields and swampy
jungle to retreat, there is a run along the railway to Alor Star and there are also a retreat
coast hoping to get the boat to enable them to meet the Division Headquarters in the
south. There is a small group finally reached the coast of North Sumatra, suffered some
broken and sunken boats. The withdrawal of British troops are suffering and chaos, but more
punishment if Japan continued to march in the night.
FALL OF JITRA
xx. Effective midnight 12 December 1941, the Japanese army during the raid on the
Bata River bridge but was driven out again by a 2 / 2 Gurkha Rifle Regiment. Gurkha
soldiers bombarded the bridge at 0200 on 13 December 1941 then before stepping through
the back of the defense team of 2 / 9 Gurkha. The team behind the defense after a clash
over several hours, finally retreat at 0430H. 2 / 6 Gurkha Rifle Regiment is the last unit to
leave Jitra. After that, the battle with the Japanese paused. By sunrise, the Japanese army
move into the empty Jitra town abandoned by the British army. Also 50 top British weapons
left behind (field guns); 50 heavy machine guns, 300 trucks and armored vehicles. Japan
also found ammunition and enough food for the divisions to be used for three months. A total
of 3000 ndia soldiers surrendered to Saeki Detachment after dominate the surrounding
forest aorund Jitra.
JAPANESE ATTACK TACTICS
xx. Bridge crossing tactics by the Japanese is a unique tactical combat this Battle of
Jitra. This tactic helped speed the movement of troops and to an upset against the British
defenses.
xx. n the case of the battle on the bridge at Jitra River, we see the British defensive
positions and tactics of the Japanese advance.Japanese infantry in the right bank to cover
the operations of the bridge repairs, which was blasted by the British. The main focus of
Japanese artillery fire was to neutralize the British artillery team to assist movement of the
army engineers and infantry. Once the tanks, a section of artillery and infantry soldiers carry
out a surprise attack (a sudden attack), preceded by the advancing infantry to the enemy
position. Taken advantage of current and heavy rain at dusk. After infantry attacks, other
teams quickly reached, covered by the dark or rain to break the enemy forces and control of
Bata River bridge before the bridge was blown up by the British time.
xx. Jitra prepared for the defense for three months by a military division was ultimately
dominated Japan in the next three days while the strength of the Japanese troops, less than
two battalions. The Japanese main body are not used directly in the movement control of
this Jitra.
LESSONS FROM THE BATTLE JITRA
xx. n analyzing this topic, two situations can be compared namely: the success of both
the Japanese and British military defeat. By comparing the strategies and tactics as well as
the balance of the two teams, it can be concluded because of victories and defeats in battles
such Jitra.
xx. There are six factors that helped the Japan to defeat British:
a. Careful planning.
b. Good leadership.
c. Application of the principles of war.
d. Good intelligence.
e. Decentralization of command.
f. The use of tanks.
xx. While the British failure to defend Jitra caused by several factors such as:
a. The abortion of Matador Plan.
b. Faulty deployment.
c. Distress of the principle of defense applications.
d. Lack of communication.
e. Unbalanced team.
f. Coordination.
g. Reservists.
h. Belittle the power of the enemy.
i. Morale of troops.
j. Anti-infiltration tactics.
k. The participation of local people.
JAPANESE SUCCESS
xx. The Succeed Planning. Japan has been conducting research on tropical forests to
enable his side to maximize the opportunities or advantages and minimize the loss of
troops. Japan also demonstrates how the forest is called the "mpenetrable" a Fallacy.Japan
is planning and training of members or inflitration tactics and this tactic succeeded played
havoc with British troops.
xx. Good Leadership. Japan has chosen a good commander, General Tomoyuki
Yamashita in particular the selection of the 25 Army Corps Commander to invade
Malaya. Yamashita also known as the 'Tiger of Malaya ". He is aware, the price for a failure
is the removal of troops immediately. Despite the successful occupation of Singapore,
Yamashita moved to Manchuria as an exile army. n 1944, he was called back on duty in the
Philippines.Yamashita surrender on 2 September 1945. He was found guilty as a war
criminal and sentenced to death on 23 February 1946. Prior to the last breath, Yamashita
pray that the Emperor of Japan extended age. Lt. Kol. Hosaku Shimada is a permanent
officer in the Tank Regiment 5th Division who led the advance, led by Lt. Jen. Matsui to the
south and fought in the Slim River. Hajimo Sudo, the officer who led the suicide bomber
attacked the Fleet Air No.1 HMS Repulse in the South China Sea at 0148H. Jen. Sugita who
is an officer who speaks English and is involved in the discussion of the British surrender.
xx. Application of the principle of War. Three significant matters here is the moral
aspects of care; air power and maintenance of momentum. Japanese sense of morality, or
they have very high which was endoctrine that they are advancing for their economic
survival and liberate Asia from western violence. Most of the strong sense of Japanese
Bushido - willing to sacrifice lives for the country. Japanese superiority also due to the
strength of air power can provide protection to its ground armies. n terms of conservation of
momentum, the Japanese created a number of uniqueness. Among them are the team of
Engineers to move in front, followed by the tanks as a shield and then followed by the line
infantry. Them, the Japanese used motorcycles and bicycles to ensure that the speed of his
march - they only took two days from Singgora-Patani to Jitra.
xx. Good ntelligence. Japan's advantage is his knowing what is being done by the
British. nstead the British could not fathom manouvres activities from the Japanese. n
addition to having a Combat ntelligence, Japanese businessmen have in Malaya had made
contact with local subversive elements. Japanese businessmen accompanying this was the
case that the advancing Japanese forces driving the Japanese military movements through
the forest. More importantly than that, the Japanese know the full details of the Japanese
military movements, plans, programs, military base and important places.
xx. Decentralizing of command. Japan recognizes the central control is not practical in
forested countries such as Malaya. Thus, they implement a decentralization of command to
the platoon. nfiltration tactics implemented on a large scale, was successfully implemented
in this decentralized command.
xx. Use of Tank. Japan has the tanks, such as the type 89 medium tank with 57 mm gun
as a weapon and two-barrel main machine gun. The tanks are fully utilized in a variety of
attacks and battles with the British.
BRITISH FAILURE
xx. Cancellation Operation Matador. This operation was planned in London for the
purpose of blocking the advance of Japanese troops to storm southern Thailand and capture
Singora. The minimum strength of three Brigades and aided by the strength of six British
Royal Air Force squadron needed for defense Singora. Air base in Kepala Batas, Gong
Kedak and Kota Bharu in Kelantan have been identified as an important additional
base. Operation Matador is on responsibility.Gen Percival as the Chief of Operations of
Malaya and Air Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham as Commander of the Royal Air Force
Far East from 16 May 1942. Another alternative to military movements are also planned. as
of 5 December 1941, approved with conditions Matador operation of the consent authority in
London that the Japanese found to have moved to land on the Segenting Khra or demolish
any area of Thailand. However, at 8 December 1941, on 1330H, Matador operation is
canceled. nstead the British defense performed in Jitra. With the revocation, Jitra defense
preparation is in a state of panic and undermine the spirit of British troops, and ultimately
defeated.
xx. Faulty Deployment. setting the position of Division 11 is very weak.Division should be
organized in depth, but it is sown in a row as far as seven miles with half of one battalion in
the defense of isolated beach. Such conditions allow the defense of Japan to make 'deep
penetration and defeat the British defensive positions. nvolves two battalions for defense
outside the postal duties without the support of anti-tank defense also proved to be an act
book of death.
xx. Distress of the principle of defense applications. British fail to defend Jitra can also
be seen in terms of their distress to apply the principles of defense.Three principle of
defense are all round defense is not implemented in the defense Jitra - There is a gap or
void area between the 15th Brigade, which occupied the right side of the road-Changlun Jitra
with 6 Brigade on the left. The second is the communication. Scattered troops in position,
and there are extensive wetlands between the Brigade.The result is that when the Japanese
invaded the right one, the other teams in the division can not be helped immediately. Thirdly,
the denial of Ground of Tactical mportance. The area defended by the 2 / 9 Jats GT or land
is important in terms of tactics. However, this does not invulnerable GT from the
enemy. Therefore, Japan takes this opportunity to rush to get rid of the British which
eventually forced to retreat.
xx. Lack of Communication Facilities. The weakness of the communication system
between the sides saw rumors easy to grow and devastating defense spirit in Jitra. Even in
the critical moment, the order information and failing to reach the commander of the
team. Field Signal is frequently interrupted and often proved ineffective. More important than
that is the map used by British troops was issued in 1915 and large-scale, does not indicate
land use changes and sign the reference map.
xx. No anti-infiltration tactics. All streets for infiltration must be guarded and barred the
defense regardless of the position and the front covered. But all this was not done by the
British. Attacking enemy infiltration tactics to cross the main defensive positions and later
destroy the British defense. On 11 December 1941, Japan attacked the defense Jitra after
infiltration of the defense area and caused the British defense lost contact with their
headquarters.
xx. Unbalanced Clustering. A team must have a balanced group of combat arms
assisted by appropriate support units.nstead British troops stationed in foreign posts with
the help of anti-tank weapons in very small. While the Japanese invaded with the use of
tanks on a large scale. As a result, the British forced to retreat back.
xx. Coordination. planning, coordination and timing is important.Earlier destruction of
reserves explosives and accidentally shot own troops proved to play havoc with the
British. This is evidence that as a result of the presence of absence of coordination and poor
communication systems.
xx. Reserve Troops. Energy and reserve supply should be maintained at current levels
of defense operations. n the case of Jitra, the British have reserves but wasted or moved
too early. More strange is that when division pool is used by a commander without the
knowledge of division commander. This makes the division commander no longer has a
reserve team to influence the battle.
xx. Belittle the power of the enemy. The British does not expect the strength and military
power of Japan. t is wise if the British make a balanced expectations of the enemy from the
reckless disregard trend strength. British cultural arrogance and belittling put Asian
community.
xx. Morale of troops. The spirit or the British troop morale and motivation is low. Many
soldiers were brought from ndia and mostly not very well trained. They are not only shock
with the soil conditions here are very much different for the ndian continent, but they also
ran away in fear when attacked by the Japanese - is a form of weaponry effects of war they
had never seen before.
xx. nvolvement of Local People. The British did not want to involve local people in
defending their homeland.The British think the Malays are the people who do not have high
fighting force.British also feared the Chinese because the Chinese train means weaponized
the Communists. While the others still to their home countries. The people of ndia for
example has proven resilient to the land of ndia where many of them joined the ndian
National Army (NA) that was established informally at Gurun as soon as the ndian Army
laid down arms and launched its establishment by the Japanese in Taiping. NA seeks to
liberate ndia from British rule. Establishment of the NA and ndia to persuade soldiers to
resign is undermining efforts by the British defense intelligence