Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Abstract:
An understanding of the nature of geo-political borderlands is vital for the planning and
successful implementation of welfare and development projects in border regions. The
relative free movement of people across nation-state borders belies census-based
planning in demarcated development zones that do not have local legitimacy.
Mozambican citizens, living along the southern Mozambique-South Africa border,
routinely cross the border to benefit from the social welfare and local development
programmes of the South African state. They collect welfare grants, utilise the healthcare
and education system and benefit from Special Public Works Projects. The pressure that
they exert on state welfare and development projects impedes the ability of state agencies
to achieve their socio-economic growth targets. Since it would be immoral and contrary
to the goals of regional development to deny Mozambican citizens benefits accruing from
South African welfare and development programmmes, growth targets need to be re-
adjusted. The challenge facing South African government agencies will be to meet their
own development targets, whilst contributing to wider regional development.
Keywords:
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‘We are only here for the pension, tonight we will go back to Mozambique’: State
welfare and development projects in communities that transcend borders
Roelie Kloppers♣
1. Introduction
Nonhlanhla Khumalo complained this morning that she had still not received her wages.
Like many women from her village in Mozambique, Nonhlanhla works on a Special
KwaZulu-Natal. The main objective of the project is the alleviation of poverty in the
rural areas of South Africa. Despite its clearly defined target beneficiary group, this type
of project also benefits those outside the country’s borders who migrate freely across the
In contrast to the way in which the South African government paid temporary
workers on these types of projects in the past, a modernised system sees electronic
transfers of wages into the personal banking accounts of employees. Every employee has
to open a transmission account with the local bank before they can sign a contract of
employment. This new system has created a major problem for Nonhlanhla, and for
many other Mozambicans living just north of the South African border in Mozambique,
since they cannot open banking accounts in South Africa. In an effort to overcome this,
Nonhlanhla used a South African relative’s account details when she signed a contract of
employment. Noting that the employee details and account details supplied did not
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correspond, the bank did not transfer Nonhlanhla’s wages to her relative’s account.
Shared history, culture, economics and ties of kinship unite people across the southern
community. Using this area as a case study, I argue here that state welfare and
development planning in areas close to porous borders need to factor in the dynamics of
geo-political borderlands. These dynamics especially influence the sense of unity that
exists within the borderland and the free movement of people across the international
border. Borderlands are defined here as landscapes that stretch across and away from
nation state borders. Borderland inhabitants often share social identities, language and
even political solidarity despite the physical fragmentation of the landscape. Borderlands
are thus unique landscapes that differ from areas located closer to the geographical
centers of states (Anzaldua 1999; Berdahl 1997; Donnan and Wilson 1999; Martinez
1998). The nature of this landscape belies traditional census statistics that do not account
for the fluidity of border regions and the ease with which people migrate across geo-
political borders (Alvarez 1995; Peberdy 2000; Peberdy and Crush 2001).
South Africa borderland (see Figure 1). Through an analysis of how people negotiate the
border and engage with those on the other side, I wish to show that examinations of the
numbers and socio-economic needs of people living in the border regions of South
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Africa, critical for any socio-economic development planning, cannot take place without
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Nonhlanhla Khumalo’s case in the example above is not unique in northern KwaZulu-
Natal. She is but one of hundreds of Mozambican citizens who rely on the South African
close to the South African border collect old age pensions and other welfare grants in a
similar fashion to their South African counterparts. They also attend schools, frequent
hospitals and clinics and shop on the South African side of the border.
It should be made very clear that the aim of this article is not to make a
xenophobic plea to the South African government to tighten control over the
Mozambican border to stop Mozambican borderland citizens from benefiting from work
Instead, I will advise the South African government to continue the status quo as it
contributes to regional development and the strengthening of peace in what was, until
recently, a very unstable region. However, in setting development targets for the border
that Mozambican citizens will have on local development initiatives and social welfare
programmes. Such an analysis must then be included in targets set for the region. This
will ensure better service delivery to South African citizens and contribute to regional
development.
In the section below, I present a few notes on the research methodology I used,
where after I present a brief history of the borderland. This is followed by a discussion of
Mozambique to South Africa. My aim with the latter is to illustrate the openness of the
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borderland and the impact thereof on welfare and development planning in northern
KwaZulu-Natal.
I collected the majority of the ethnographic material presented here between March 2000
working in the area, which allowed me the opportunity of continuing my research in the
area.
the material presented here. To substantiate certain ideas and theories I developed, I used
more detailed statistical evidence collected by other organizations active in the area and
Africa directly bordering one another. For the latter, I employed an open-ended
questionnaire and used a random sample of 200 households situated within 5 kilometers
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4. THE MAKING OF THE BORDERLAND
The southern border between Mozambique and South Africa was imposed on the
southern African landscape in 1875. It is an artificial line that does not resemble any
natural frontier. The border was drawn on a map in France to solve a land dispute
between Portugal and Britain. Practically, it divided a unified political community with a
shared sense of identity and culture (Felgate 1982, 18; Hedges 1978, 135).
At first the border had no real impact on the lives of the Mabudu-Tembei people
whose chiefdom it divided (Felgate 1982, 21). The old authority structures of
chieftainship remained on both sides of the new border, despite the Portuguese
programme of assimilation (Mamdani 1996, 87). Ironically, the imposed border only
became a real obstacle to transnational contact after the withdrawal of the Portuguese in
1975. Whereas the colonial government in Mozambique supported the reactionary South
opposed South Africa’s minority government and lent active support to South African
liberation movements (Newitt 2002, 206). South Africa, in turn, supported RENAMO,iii
long and devastating war followed that saw the displacement of millions of people, many
of whom settled in South Africa. Under these circumstances the borderland became a
militarised zone, where access across the border and contact along the borderline was
during the war (McGregor 1998, 51). When the war ended in 1992, displaced soldiers
and refugees, with no ties to the land, settled in the border areas of southern Mozambique
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(McGregor 1997, 4-7). This trend continued after 1994 as Mozambique became a
corridor for refugees entering South Africa. As a result, the northern side of the
Apartheid re-shaped the ethnic landscape south of the border. In 1975 the area, which
was put in a trust for the Mabudu-Tembe chiefdom in 1896, was incorporated into the
newly-formed Zulu ‘nation-state’ of KwaZulu. People from the area could no longer
choose to identify themselves as Thonga in their identity books and Zulu became the
official language in the schools and administration (Webster 1986, 615). This was
intensified in the 1980s when the South African government planned to cede the area,
known as the Ingwavuma District,v to Swaziland, on the grounds that the inhabitants of
the area were ethnically and historically Swazi (Harries 1983, 1; Van Wyk 1983, 55). In
response, Inkhata, the Zulu political and cultural organisation, launched a forced
recruitment programme that led to an almost complete Zulu dominance of the area
(Webster 1991, 248). The so-called Ingwavuma Land Deal later failed and caused much
resentment between the Tembe chief and Chief Buthelezi of Inkhata (Omer-Cooper 1994,
269).
In 1994 elections were held in Mozambique and South Africa that dramatically
changed relations of power within and between these states. In Mozambique the peace-
process led to a general election that saw FRELIMO as victors (Newitt 2002, 224). In
South Africa the African National Congress won a majority vote, ensuring its place as the
ruling party of the ‘new’ South Africa. Mozambique and South Africa were no longer
opponents, but now viewed each other as partners in the future development of southern
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Africa. Along the southern Mozambique-South Africa border this was symbolized with
Kosi Bay is the only border post along the 80 kilometre land border that separates the
southernmost part of Mozambique from South Africa. On the South African side, the
border post is staffed by the South African Police Services and Immigration (Home
Affairs). There are no Customs and Excise officials, as this border post is not intended
for the import and export of commercial goods (Hennop & McLean 2001, 71). Three
immigration officers usually work on the Mozambican side of the border. Their houses
are within walking distance from the border post. Two of them are in charge of
immigration, while the third officer is tasked with issuing third party insurance –
According to Hennop & McLean (2001, 79) and Kruys (2002, 124) the majority
of people crossing the border do not pass through the official border post, but use some
sixty-seven alternative paths that lead to gaps in the four-foot high wire fence (Figure 2).
9
The people who use these illegal border crossing points can be divided into two
permanently live in the area stretching across and away from the international border.
Non-borderlanders, on the other hand, only move through the borderland temporarily,
usually travelling from north to south and are usually typified as illegal immigrants.vi
Since the focus of this article is on state welfare and development programmes in
borderlanders generally try to move through the area as quickly as possible and do not
development or welfare in the region. Although they question the authority of modern-
South Africans who routinely cross into Mozambique do so to visit kin, to hunt
wild animals, to fish, to tap palm winevii or to buy ‘cultural’ products unavailable in
10
South Africa, such as Mozambican bread (pao), beer and vegetables. These routine visits
do not exert any real pressure on the Mozambican government’s ability to deliver social
illustrated below, routine crossings from Mozambique are motivated not only by social
reasons, but also by economic necessity. This increases the demand on the South African
KwaZulu-Natal. Therefore, the international border does not indicate the boundary of
one socio-economic system and the beginning of a new one. Rather, a single economic
most residents of Matutuine frequently cross the South African border. Ninety-five out
on the South African border, said that they had visited South Africa at some point in their
lives. Out of this group, sixty had visited South Africa in the past month, and ninety
Apart from economic motivations, social ties also bind people across the border.
Most interviewees said that their destination in South Africa was nearby and situated
somewhere in the borderland, where many of them still have relatives. In fact, in Puza
alone, eighty-one interviewees claimed that they had family in Suth Africa. Most cross
11
the border to visit their kin in South Africa, but many also meet them at the border-
Given that there are very few commercial products available on the Mozambican
side of the border, Mozambicans frequently cross the border to shop. With the exception
of two Portuguese owned shops at Ponta do Ouro, the largest village on the Mozambican
side of the border, the only shops on the Mozambican side of the border are small ‘tuck-
12
shops’ (baracas) selling tinned food, sugar, maize meal and other bare essentials. These
tuck-shops are stocked almost exclusively with goods bought in South Africa.
Mozambicans also rely on the South African government’s social support system,
making use of schools, hospitals and clinics in South Africa and collecting state pensions
and welfare money. This is the case along many of South Africa’s geo-political
borders.ix
In the entire Matutuine District there are no secondary schools, which mean that a
child from the district will have to move to Maputo to school beyond the primary level.
Comparing the costs of living and schooling in Maputo with that of South Africa, it is
Many Mozambicans also rely on old-age pensions paid by the South African
government. At the time that I conducted fieldwork, people older than sixty-five years of
age received R600 per month as an old-age pension. To obtain a pension a person must
be in possession of a valid pension-card. Many people who lived in South Africa during
the Mozambican war were allocated these cards. Informants explained that previously
there was no way of telling Mozambican refugees from South African citizens as the
latter group also did not have identity documents. Informants also relate that
Mozambicans living in South Africa for a certain period of time were also granted an
amnesty in the 1990s, being offered citizenship and the benefits that come with it.
Although people returned to Mozambique when the war ended, many still routinely cross
The South African government also pays a maintenance grant for children
younger than six years. Any unemployed person with children is entitled to this grant.
13
The child’s mother determines his or her citizenship. According to nurses working at the
Manguzi hospital, Mozambican women who received South African citizenship during
the Mozambican war, often give birth to children in South African hospitals and
health care services across the border. There are no proper hospitals in the entire district
of Matutuine. The health care network is composed only of primary facilities, and even
these are very meagrely equipped. Before 1999 official policy stated that Mozambican
citizens were not allowed treatment in South African hospitals or clinics. Yet personnel
of the Manguzi hospital often ignored these regulations. However, after a serious
outbreak of malaria in 1999, the Consul of Mozambique and the South African
ten kilometres from the border the same health benefits as South Africans. At present,
approximately five per cent of patients admitted annually to the Manguzi hospital are
The South African government’s social welfare and local development programme has
become the major industry supporting people in the border regions of northern KwaZulu-
Natal. A household census I conducted in 2001 and 2002 in nine wards (izigodi)
bordering Mozambique revealed that as many as 83% of households receive at least one
form of social grant monthly. One needs only visit one of the many grant payout points
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in northern KwaZulu-Natal to see the amount of people that queue monthly for the
various grants. In most cases, these grants are paid out in the form of old-age pensions,
although many people also receive child support and support for living with HIV/AIDS.
The natural environment of the border region also suggests that the inhabitants of
the area could never have been subsistence farmers in the true sense of the word.xi
Historically, people in the region made a living as traders between Europeans and the
chiefdoms of the interior and later as migrant workers, finding employment in the mines
of the Witwatersrand (see Harries 1994, x and 48-49; De Bruin 1987, 45). However,
recesses in the South African mining industry have had detrimental repercussions in the
served as a major labour pools for the industry. Young men whom I interviewed said that
they struggle to find work at the mines and many prefer to remain in rural areas. For
various reasons the government of South Africa has targeted rural areas, especially in
KwaZulu-Natal where it recently started to make political inroads, for development and
the delivery of social welfare services. As was illustrated in this article, it is not only
South Africans who rely on the new systems of social welfare to make a living, but also
those across the border, who have in the past played an important role in establishing and
As stated in the introduction, the material presented in this article is not intended
to send alerts to the South African government of possible ‘alien invasions’ in a matter
akin to the War of the Worlds. The major contribution I hope to make is to inform those
responsible for development planning in border regions of the dynamics of these areas.
The message is simple – one cannot plan socio-economic growth in areas where people
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do not recognize the boundaries of the demarcated areas (municipalities, development
zones etc) in which growth is set to take place. As long as the social and cultural
frontiers extend the more rigid nation-state borders, the dynamics of the frontiers need to
What is needed is not the enforcement of political boundaries that have no local
immoral, but contrary to the goals of regional development for the South African
government to adopt a hard-handed approach that will see the exclusion Mozambican
borderland citizens from the social and economic benefits emanating from government
initiatives. Moreover, such an approach may lead to new problems along the border,
such as the escalation of theft and cross-border smuggling as desperate people may turn
Mozambique into its social welfare and development planning for the region. This can
be motivated on the grounds of both border security and regional development. It will
enable the government to set more accurate growth targets for the region as it will be
based on a better understanding of the real target population that is being served by its
Notes
and works for the Peace Parks Foundation in the field of conservation in northern
KwaZulu-Natal.
16
♣
Roelie Kloppers studied Anthropology at the University of Pretoria, where he recently completed his
Doctorate. He is currently employed by the Peace Parks Foundation and works in the Conservation
Development field in northern KwaZulu-Natal. Please direct all correspondence to Tembe Elephant Park,
Private Bag x356, KwaNgwanase, 3973 or e-mail kloppersr@mweb.co.za
i
The Mabudu-Tembe is the junior branch of the Tembe-Thonga (Felgate 1982, 1). They are also referred
to in the literature as the Maputo, Tembe and Ronga.
ii
Frente da Libertação de Moçambique – Mozambican National Liberation Front
iii
Resistência Nacional Moçambicana – Mozambican National Resistance
iv
Present-day Zimbabwe
v
The Ingwavuma district was the most northern municipal district of Natal and later of KwaZulu. The
Mabudu-Tembe chiefdom lay within the boundaries of the Ingwavuma district. The name of the district
has recently been changed and the boundaries have been redrawn. Today the Tembe Traditional Authority
lies within the Umhlabuyalingana local municipality of the Umkhanyakude district municipality.
vi
The cell register at the SAPS station in Kosi Bay indicates that the SAPS arrested 17,635 illegal
immigrants crossing the southern Mozambique-South Africa border between 1995 and 2002. During this
period there has been a remarkable decline in the number of Mozambicans arrested and a corresponding
rise in the numbers of migrants from other countries arrested in Kosi Bay. The latter group is comprised
mainly of refugees from Tanzania, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
vii
A fermented alcoholic drink tapped from the stems of ilala palms (Hyphaene coriceae), known locally as
ubusulu, sura or injemane.
viii
Matutuine is the name of the municipal district in Mozambique directly bordering with KwaZulu-Natal
in South Africa.
ix
People in neighbouring countries rely on the infrastructure of South Africa and make use of many of the
social and economic services offered by the South African government due to the lack of these services in
neighbouring countries. This is the case in areas throughout the world where states with well-developed
infrastructure and economies border states with poorly developed infrastructure and economy as for
example along the German/Polish border (Kruys 2002, 122) and along the U.S.-Mexican border (Herzog
1996, 176-187).
x
Apart from the hospital, there are three stationary and three mobile clinics in the borderland where
Mozambicans receive assistance. The three stationary clinics most closely located to the border admit
between 100 and 120 Mozambican patients per month, or ten per cent of the total (E. Immelman, pers.
comm.)
xixi
The area is typified by nutrient-poor soils, animal disease and erratic and unreliable rain-fall (Bruton &
Cooper, 508).
17
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PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS
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