Enlightened Pacification - Imperial Precedents For Current Stabilisation Operations

ARTICLE
Enlightened Pacification: Imperial Precedents for Current Stabilisation Operations

CH RI S TI AN TR I PODI
At the turn of the new Millennium, the American scholar Douglas Porch pondered the relevance of the small wars of history to an international environment that had, through the promotion, or attempted promotion, of apparently superior Western culture and values, witnessed a revival of imperialism, A softer, gentler version, shorn of its racist overtones, but imperialism nonetheless.1 For Porch, examining the post-Cold War New World Order of the late 1990s, the parallels between Imperial warfare and an increasing number of Peace Support Operations (PSO) were clear; while modern warriors might decry such missions as perversions of their true role to fight and win their nations wars activities such as famine relief, arbitration, civic action and general nation-building were simply business as usual if viewed from the perspective of Imperial activists.2 Now, events in Afghanistan and Iraq post 2001 have not only sharpened the sense in the eyes of many that the West is in the process of forcibly imposing an Imperialism that is neither soft nor gentle, but potentially further increased the relevance of the imperial experience to current operations.3 This article develops the notion propounded by Porch, and others, that modern militaries and political administrations should recognise the significance of the imperial model with relation to contemporary and possibly future operations. It argues that the roots of what are now termed stabilisation operations can be found in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, specifically in the methods of a small number of French, British and American thinkers and practitioners in select regions during this period. In Iraq and most notably Afghanistan, coalition forces are engaged in activities that mimic, to a huge extent, the practices developed by these men, whose
CTripodi.jscsc@defenceacademy.mod.uk Dr 000000March-June 1-2 10 ChristianTripodi Taylor and Francis 2010 & (print)/1743-9698 Original Article 1470-2436Francis Defence Studies 2010 10.1080/14702430903378009 (online) FDEF_A_437978.sgm
Christian Tripodi, Kings College London, at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, UK.
Defence Studies, Vol. 10, Nos. 12 (MarchJune 2010), pp. 4074 ISSN 1470-2436 http://www.informaworld.com DOI: 10.1080/14702430903378009 2010 Taylor & Francis
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task it was to implement a range of politico-military doctrines designed to smooth the advance of external influence into indigenous societies.4 Hearts and minds; Sandemanisation; peaceful penetration; tache dhuile (oil stain or spot); policy of smiles; attraction and chastisement all of these theories possess significant relevance to current practitioners. And a fresh examination of imperial methods encourages at least three perspectives. First, it allows us to perceive the genesis of modern stabilisation operations. Second, it provides some salutary lessons on the difficulties and challenges faced by practitioners. Third, it supports the notion, decried by those such as Steven Metz, that history still holds value for the study of contemporary internal conflicts and insurgency.5 For while there is merit in his criticism that traditional counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns, namely those of imperial maintenance or nationalistic transition, may hold many unsuitable or misleading lessons for Western militaries engaged in current expeditionary operations, this article argues that imperial techniques of initiating and cementing influence in indigenous societies still has much to offer as a field of study. Definitions Imperialism Although this article is not a detailed examination of the nature of imperialism per se, it is worth understanding some of the relevant aspects.6 In its most basic sense, imperialism was the aggressive extension of authority over another power or people for the purpose of territorial conquest. Yet it came in a variety of forms and the respective natures of the French, British and American models differed from those of other powers. Although satisfying their own strategic requirements, each displayed motivations beside the acquisition of wealth, status and territory. Their actions during the following case studies embodied what might be termed enlightened self interest, an ideology which not only stood in drastic contrast to the more exploitative (Belgium/Congo, Portugal/Mozambique) and brutal (Germany/South West Africa, Russia/Caucasus and Central Asia) colonial models of the time, but one which has a ring of familiarity about it even today.7 French imperialism was slightly schizophrenic, propelled as it was by the seemingly contrary motivations of Republicanism whose ideological forebears had after all thrown off the yoke of oppression and declared the rights and freedoms of man and of the citizen and the strategic necessity of conquering and administering territories as outlets for French power in the face of German strength in Europe. The inherent tensions within the French model led toward a variable style, with a propensity for
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centralisation in Africa contrasting with a tendency toward local initiative in Indochina.8 For the British, especially in India, any centralised direction for the purpose of strategic aggrandisement appeared subordinate to the influence of individual agency.9 However, although rather more laissez faire with regard to the moral justifications of their actions and less doctrinaire in their methods, the civilising mission still exerted an influence on British imperialists.10 The United States pursued a far more contemporary form of imperialism that generally reflected a desire to introduce its values and culture, enable the indigenous administration to stand on its own feet while satisfying the USs strategic interests without becoming entangled in the messy and morally questionable practice of colonialism.11 All three powers maintained a largely paternalistic attitude toward conquered populations. In sum then, during this period and in the regions examined, British and French colonial activists exploited systems that in one way or another, through lack of control or lack of interest, promoted initiative and gave free reign to the most forthright individuals, whereas their American counterparts were guided by somewhat more explicit instructions from government which could nevertheless give great flexibility to those charged with implementing policy. Pacification Among the brutality of conquest, sophisticated methods of addressing insurgency or armed resistance have long been present throughout history. Petraeus, Gallieni, Hoche, Wade; one can move ever backward through innumerable empires and conflicts and find evidence of such behaviour to the extent that one might claim it almost impossible to present a distinct period of history in which such methods flourished as doctrine.12 However, this article proposes that during the period 18701920 a small cadre of individuals were responsible for developing and implementing what might be termed enlightened pacification, an articulate blend of military and political actions which sought to enable the spread of influence on the part of the external actor. The term enlightened is a consequence of the fact that pacification is a broad concept in itself, encompassing a variety of lines of activity from the political instituting or reforming instruments of government, economy and community through measured military action to the ultimate expression of force and coercion in the shape of retribution and punishment. For example, in Baluchistan 187792, the political agent Colonel Sandeman pursued a largely subtle policy of enlightened pacification notable for its attention toward satisfying local
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concerns regarding tribal autonomy and justice while simultaneously instituting wider developmental reforms; while in Northern Nigerian Sokoto Caliphate in 1906, the High Commissioner Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Lugard would order that the 2,000-strong population of the village of Satiru be annihilated for resisting the encroachment of British influence.13 These examples illustrate that pacification can encompass two opposing extremes of behaviour and all points in between, rendering it almost meaningless as a concept unless one is clear in ones definitions. Interestingly they also illustrate that methods were often less a matter of national difference or technique strategic culture if you will - and largely one personal approach. French, British and American officers appeared to mimic each others methods without realising it. So, what are the characteristics of enlightened pacification? In general, one can point to several lines of operation: The use of force to create a suitably benign environment; the generation of cultural and tactical intelligence; key leader engagement and the creation and/or training of indigenous security forces. These activities would occur parallel or subsequent to what would then be called public works but which are now termed development projects; the reform of local, municipal and state governance, the creation or reform of justice, health and educational infrastructure, agricultural initiatives and or land reform, town building and planning and range of communications infrastructure. This is, essentially, stabilisation. According to the UK Government Stabilisation Unit, stabilisation operations encompass a variety of broader activities and initiatives, that is, the enforcement of ceasefires and peace agreements; the establishment of public order, the restoration of basic services, infrastructure and livelihood; the reformation and rebuilding of the security sector and the (re) establishment of administrative capacity to more focused activities the creation of a functioning judicial system, the increased effectiveness of police and indigenous intelligence agencies, the provision of support to traditional security and justice systems, dialogue with real power centres and the adoption and implementation of a suitable political system, for example.14 And if one then reduces these tasks down to basic components, one is left with various themes, most notably the generation of security and the launching of peace processes; the establishment or reinforcement of native governance, finance justice and security sectors; the implementation of public works/economic development and the provision of humanitarian aid.15 With these themes in mind therefore, this article will use historical experience to understand how imperial soldiers and administrators sought to address these very issues.
44 Imperial Past versus Modern Day?
Before any detailed examination of methods is undertaken, however, it is of course entirely legitimate to question the way in which the broader processes, politics and culture of Imperialism might be of relevance to modern practitioners and policy-makers when, in truth, the modern operating environment is so different and so comparatively complex. How can one draw lessons from the hugely permissive moral, racial and political environment of the high renaissance of Imperialism? Or indeed from commanders who, in bringing superior firepower, discipline and technology to bear against weak, fractured and disparate resistance movement, found themselves free from the complications of the modern environment. Unburdened by a watchful media, uninterested allies, vengeful diasporas, interfering civilian experts, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or private military companies (PMCs) and supported throughout by an unquestioning domestic populace, they fell upon adversaries who lacked the brutality, sophistication, flexibility and cohesion of their modern equivalents. Similarly, what can modern actors, envisaging relatively short-term engagements designed to facilitate the development of effective indigenous government, learn from their imperial predecessors who sought in contrast to establish permanent or long-standing forms of control over native societies? Yet how accurate are these assumptions? The caricature of the Imperial activist brutalising an uncomprehending, defenceless and ill-educated foe, safe in the knowledge that an uncaring public and government will pay scant regard to abuses, shielded from criticism by a combination of racism, the lofty moral justification of the civilising mission and the ultimate boost to national prestige as a result of the acquisition of yet more territory leaves much to be desired. Imperial campaigns were generally fought in harsh environments in the face of indigenous resistance movements that may have lacked the unity and cohesion of their post-imperial successors but which still comprised formidable obstacles for forces operating far from home and with minimal logistical support.16 Disease and/or enemy action could cause alarming casualties; in 1895 the French expedition to Madagascar saw losses of 5,592 men out of a total force of 21,600, all but 20 to disease. Coming hot on the heels of the 1,500 dead suffered at the hands of Zulu impis at Isandlhwana on 22 January 1879, the Battle of Maiwand on 27 July 1880 saw the loss of 1,120 British and native soldiers in a matter of hours at the hands of Afghan tribesmen. On 1 March 1896 the Italians lost 5,000 of their men, and half that number again taken prisoner, at the Battle of Adowa, Abyssinia, while in June and July 1921 in operations around Anual in Morocco the Spanish lost 20,000 men and 129 guns to Riff irregulars.17
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The sheer financial and human cost of such endeavours therefore often led to an array of critical voices. Politicians and public clamoured for wars on the cheap, military commanders were vulnerable to fickle domestic support and reverses could spell the end of governments. The fall of Benjamin Disraelis Conservative administration in April 1880 as a consequence of difficulties in Afghanistan and Zululand preceded the multiple collapses of French Prime Minister Jules Ferrys administrations as a result of similar humiliations in Indochina over the following few years. Disraelis successor, William Gladstone, was similarly forced to resign in June 1885 largely as a consequence of the sacking of Khartoum and the murder of Major-General Charles Gordon by Sudanese rebels. He was promptly followed out of office by his Italian counterpart Francesco Crispi subsequent to the fiasco at Adowa. Such upheaval illustrated the sheer political volatility of Imperial expansion and simply embarking upon such endeavours was a risky political manoeuvre. US President William McKinleys sensitivity to charges of imperialism during the Philippines War was evident throughout his tenure.18 Neither was the imperial activist necessarily immune to the presence of interfering civilians. NGOs and PMCs may have been far distant concept, but civil servants were not and a variety of government departments, specifically those relating to finance and administration, impacted heavily upon the activities of commanders. In addition, while the physical process of pacification would be the responsibility of the military, they were usually creating an environment suitable for civilian administrators to become involved. As to whether the long-term designs underpinning imperial conquest can be in any way be compared to the modern day, there are two points to be made in this regard. First, differences certainly exist but should not obscure the fact that many of the tactical processes through which influence was sought are remarkably common in both eras, as will be illustrated. Second, not all Imperial actors envisaged permanent or even long-term control. The motivations and methods underpinning US actions in Cuba (18991902), one of the case studies under examination, would appear remarkably familiar to modern policy-makers; a short-term occupation allowing the transplant of American systems of governance and the establishment of a democratic administration with the interests of the United States at its heart. Other similarities are apparent. Then, just as now, politicians were keen to spin the process of Imperialism. Since the initial toppling of the Taliban in 2001/2, much of the strategic rationale for action in Afghanistan appeared to be largely justified by lofty sentiments of representative government and
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human rights. Such high-mindedness was little different over a century ago when Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India (18991905), stated that the British had come to India, [I]n obedience to what I call the decree of providence, to the lasting benefits of millions of the human race.19 Yet, just like the disillusionment provoked by 2003/4 events at Abu Ghraib Prison for example, the systematic use of violence by French forces in North Africa during the 19th century, the severe occupation of Kabul by Roberts Army of Retribution in 187980, the large-scale system of concentration pursued by Lord Kitchener against Boer civilians in South Africa (19002), all raised an outcry among influential segments of the domestic press, populations and opposition political parties.20 Throughout the Philippines campaign 18991902, the US military was subjected to sustained media attack over its role as an Imperial force: the Educate em with a Krag ditty illustrative of the widely held perception that the US Army was using heavy-handed tactics in its response to the insurgency.21 And the killing of over 600 men, women and children at the Battle of Mount Dajo in 1906 during the Moro insurgency shocked an American public convinced, until that point, that its soldiers were representatives of enlightened American values. Indeed, the well documented practice of water-boarding by US troops during the interrogation of suspected Filipino insurgents lends US Army actions over a century ago an eerily familiar bent.22 It is clear, therefore, that the Imperial activist operated in a turbulent political, fiscal and moral environment where significant elements of the domestic populace held the government of the day to account for its expeditionary adventures, where heavy handedness or military reverses could have dire political consequence and where mission creep was a common feature of military operations as political leaders, once having made the decision to intervene, found themselves drawn into steadily expanding military operations.23 And the relevance of the Imperial model then devolves downwards into what one might term the tactical and operational levels. For one has to ask: how were the relatively small armies of the colonial powers able to gain control over significant territories and populations in Africa and Asia? The experience of these same powers post-World War II illustrated that superior technology, manpower, financial clout and logistics did not guarantee success. It must follow therefore that there exist additional explanations for the rapid advance of Western conquest during this heyday of Imperialism.24 Of course, many of the resistance movements encountered post-1945 required the process of colonial occupation to engender the necessary unity, cohesion and organisation lacking prior to that. However,
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many of the reasons for the success of French, British and American methods in the examples examined lay at the point at which they and the indigenous non-Western components they encountered interacted at the point of impact. In other words, the way in which they established relationships and forms of collaboration with indigenous populations as they sought to impose their authority upon them. It is at this point that one enters the field of enlightened pacification, and its relevance to modern operations.25 Theme 1 Part 1: Imposing Security and Peace Oil Spots and Circles It could be argued that many of the commonalities between imperial methods and those of today are just that; commonalities borne out of a common sense approach to the timeless problem of developing ones influence in the face of resistance. However, there are direct conceptual links between some of the techniques pioneered by imperial activists and those in practice today. The administrative function of De Lannessans Cercle for example, developed in Indochina in the 1890s, can in many ways be seen as the progenitor, in an organisational sense, of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept used increasingly in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, the oil spot strategy, developed by Gallieni during service in the Soudan (roughly modern Niger) in the 1870s is the precedent for the Afghan Development Zone (ADZ) policy used today by NATO forces in Afghanistan as well as the more generic clear, hold, build strategy used in Iraq.26 It could be argued that French colonial forces of 18801925 were leaders in the conceptualisation of pacification strategies. During this period, and building upon previous experiences in Algeria, Senegal and Soudan (184070), French colonial commanders in Indochina during the early 1890s developed and refined a string of doctrines designed to smooth their influence into indigenous societies and combat growing insurrection. The duo of General Jean de Lannessan, Governor-General of Tonkin (north Vietnam) in 189194, and his subordinate Colonel Joseph Gallieni, sought not only to defeat insurgency once and for all, but simultaneously rebuild the province, rehabilitating the relationship between the French and the Tonkinese and improve the latters economic welfare and general standards of living.27 Upon assuming office, de Lannessan had realised that French strategy was misfiring, most notably in its determination to bypass local Tonkinese authority figures.28 His first move was a sort of key leader engagement in the shape of the Mandarin policy, engaging the village leaders who comprised the local low-level power base.29 This collaboration was supplemented by a
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controversial strategy of arming villagers and organising them into native militias linh-co who were employed against the insurgents.30 Simultaneously, de Lannessan organised Tonkin into discrete cercles, each one an administrative territory within which a specific military commander simultaneously assumed the role of civil governor. After an initial military pacification campaign, territory was divided into these cercles in order to allow military operations and economic development activity to occur simultaneously, with the latter taking precedence as time progressed, the unified command structure preventing overlapping responsibilities and interdepartmental jealousy. The cercle was a mainstay of French technique in Indochina and subsequently in Madagascar where Gallieni, having observed de Lannessans techniques, would implement the same system.31 The cercle was not, however, an end to itself. It acted as a structural vehicle through which the oil stain strategy was implemented. Usually referred to today as the ink spot strategy, whereby military forces target specific areas, creating an environment amenable to economic and social development strategies that then facilitate the spread of security and stability like a spreading spot of ink/oil, its initial incarnation under Gallieni was that of a fairly prescriptive three-stage strategy.32 Strategic strongholds were chosen and military forces deployed within; the military would then comprise a focal point of rudimentary economic development and gradually introduce themselves into the lives of the local populace, convincing them of the mutual interest of the two parties. As development accelerated within the centre of the circle, initial development and security measures were already being implemented towards its outer reaches. At the leading edge of the oil spot, where pacified and dissident territory met each other, military units would engage the enemy combatants/insurgents before them. In this way, through constant and simultaneous civil-military actions, each strategic stronghold facilitated an ever widening circle of security and development, spreading like an oil spot until it merged with others.33 Gallienis philosophy was essentially one of organisation on the march, where organisation referred to development projects. A military force would clear a particular territory or region of enemy combatants and immediately transform itself into a force dedicated to governance and development. Each soldier would know what his task would be on the day after the shooting stopped, [W]hen the army became instantly responsible for the social rebuilding and economic development of the occupied territory.34 Most importantly, perhaps, Gallieni stressed the requirement for unity of action, provided in his mind by the presence of a single command with both civilian and military authority.35 Marshal Hubert Lyautey would further
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develop this preference for unity of command in Morocco. He was similarly determined that all power in a defined area be vested in a single, well chosen officer but reinforced that the principle of unity was most important whether the officer involved was military or civilian was unimportant.36 Above all, French officers were supremely aware that military action and development strategies went hand in hand if not simultaneously, then as close to each other as possible. As the influential colonial activist Joseph Chailley-Bert had warned, It does not become a question of a certain length of time during which the military act with perfect freedom in their own resources and on their own responsibility (to be) succeeded by another period, when their service abruptly ceases and gives place to the rule of politicians and representatives of civil power It is well nigh impossible to say where one begins and the other ends.37 Interestingly, initial US methods in Cuba under the administration of Major General John R. Brooke mimicked French methods to an extent, even pre-dating them. Upon assuming control of the island in January 1899 following the departure of Spanish officials, Brooke found a country devastated by three years of rebellion and warfare, with commerce, agriculture and housing almost totally destroyed and with 50,000 members of the Cuban Army of Liberation (CAL) gathering on the outskirts of Havana, clamouring for independence. Brookes immediate reaction was to divide Cuba into four geographical regions, each region under the command of a general officer maintaining both military and civil powers, the latter slowly relinquished in line with the establishment of native governors, who then served as conduits for US power. Importantly, Brooke moved quickly to defuse the potentially explosive situation posed by the presence of the CAL by demobilising them. Incentivised by the payment of wages and bonuses for surrendered weapons, the Cubans were provided with employment either in the military government or the new Rural Guard, responsible for the provision of security in the countryside.38 However, this is not to say that sophisticated organisational approaches were the solution in themselves, and the trials and tribulations undergone by Gallieni in Madagascar (18961904) and Lyautey in Morocco during his tenure there as Resident- General (191225) are instructive.39 The former, upon taking command of French forces, was determined to capitalise upon his experience in Indochina and immediately demanded that all powers military, civil and administrative, be concentrated in his hands.40 He then declared that the central plateau of Imerina, where the Red Shawl insurgency was concentrated among the former ruling Merina elite, was to be
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divided into four cercles, all power being concentrated into the hands of the military commanders, all being responsible only to himself.41 Interlinking military posts concerned themselves with administration and economic reconstruction.42 Gallieni believed that economic improvements would effect changes so quickly and visibly that French influence would spread rapidly. Yet the insurgency not only persisted but began to spread from the Imerina plateau to other tribes on the island. Gallieni, deciding that resistance stemmed from dissident former members of the Merina government, moved quickly to address the problem. He ordered the execution of Minister of Interior Rainandriamamapandry and Prince Ratsimamanga, the uncle of former Queen Ranavalona II, who was herself exiled. The insurgency began to wane and although outbreaks of violence would continue to occur until 1904, by the spring of 1897 French activity was largely political in nature as development strategies began to hold sway.43 Yet Gallienis initial pacification strategy had pointedly illustrated that his desire to pursue sophisticated and conciliatory methods had been compromised by lingering resistance to his authority and, ultimately, he had been forced to revert to the execution and exile of key indigenous personalities, a course of action for which he was severely criticised and which would be largely unthinkable today.44 Similarly in Morocco two decades later, despite the application of sophisticated pacification methods and significant success in urban and lowland areas, Gallienis protg Hubert Lyautey was eventually forced to rely upon brute military conquest in his attempts to subdue powerful tribal groupings in more remote areas such as the Middle Atlas.45 Time and again, political initiatives directed at the tribes were either abandoned in favour of sheer force or, more commonly, not even attempted at all.46 The clear, hold, build strategy demanded by the oil spot technique was far simpler in principle than in practice, especially when applied to the transhumant Berber tribes. Even with the application of sophisticated measures to address unrest and resistance, such as alliances with local religious figureheads (Caids), economic inducements, bribes, the employment of Indigenous Affairs (IA) officers to negotiate with the tribes and raise groups of partisans, or tribal levies, to further enhance the bond between tribal units and French authority, little progress was made and there ensued instead a classic form of military-focused pacification that remained largely unsuccessful for the duration of Lyauteys tenure.47 The Islamic Berber tribes resisted what they perceived to be an alien intrusion with all their might and it was not until 1933, 21 years after Lyauteys appointment and eight years after his departure, that they were finally forcefully subdued by his successor, Theodore Steeg, and Morocco could be considered to have been fully pacified.48
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Theme 1 Part 2: The Balance between Attraction and Chastisement The Philippines 18991907 presented US commanders with a similar tension between ideals and reality.49 Problematically, for commanders engaged in pacification or stabilisation campaigns under any banner of civilisation or improvement there was, and is, a natural tension between what they were expected to achieve, and the methods used to achieve it. The nature of the civilising mission or the current endeavour of regime change may be a theoretically admirable enterprise, but the subsequent process of pacification/stabilisation, which will probably involve violent and, at first glance, repressive measures, is often anything other than admirable. Thus, US forces in the Philippines found that although they ultimately defeated the Nationalist and Moro insurgencies in relatively short order, and with great skill and fortitude, the real challenge lay in assessing the precise combination of enlightened methods (attraction) or robust and often brutal military methods (chastisement). The US Army was hugely experienced in pacification campaigns.50 The Second Seminole War of 183542, the Indian Wars of 186598 and the aftermath of the Civil War (186165) had bestowed upon it genuine experience in pacification, gendarmerie operations and municipal administration.51 Even so, the Philippines campaign presented new problems. The sheer size and geography of the archipelago, covering 500,000 square miles including hundreds of islands, combined with an emphasis upon decentralisation by US commanders resulted in numerous discrete pacification campaigns, often differing wildly in their methods, being carried out in a variety of isolated locations; a patchwork of different policies and techniques on the part of individual commanders. Problems were exacerbated by limited troop numbers; on average around 24,000.52 Despite (admittedly vague) Presidential direction, campaign coherence was certainly an issue.53 This then fed into the major debate; to what extent should US forces follow a policy of attraction or chastisement? The initial stages of pacification under Major General Elwell S. Otis were characterised by a determination to pursue the former. He saw, as the key to securing the allegiance of the population, the need for wide-scale public works and development projects, especially in regard to education and municipal works, and a general adherence to President McKinleys vision of benevolent assimilation. Unfortunately, this enlightened and sophisticated approach caused problems. US commanders struggled to inculcate values and virtues that simply did not exist prior to their arrival while their promises were often too high minded for the average Filipino, who could not work out how it
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related to his day-to-day existence. Neither could those promises necessarily reassure a population nervous of retributive insurgents. Articulating a security dilemma common to many counter-insurgency campaigns, Brigadier General Samuel S. Sumner pointed out that, Nothing the US could offer in the way of peace or prosperity weighs against their (the peoples) fear of assassination which is prosecuted with relentless vigor against any one giving aid or information to the government.54 Until US forces could prove that they were strong enough to protect friends and punish enemies they were at a huge disadvantage. But geography, limited numbers and the time needed for public works and development projects to come to fruition allowed the growing insurgency to gain steam to the extent that, even as General Otis proclaimed that the US campaign in the Philippines was won, the nationalist insurgency began to hit its peak. Ironically, much of this was due to the fact that a policy of attraction, concentrating upon schools, governance and public works, did indeed appear to the insurgents to comprise a real threat to their own chances of success. Consequently they increased their attacks on both the civil population and US forces in an attempt to derail progress. Understandably, the conclusion drawn by many military officers from this increase in insurgent activity was that the policy of attraction had failed. They therefore pressed for a more vigorous military campaign, a policy of chastisement which, in its murkier form, included recourse to torture, intimidation and suppression, all of which cast a pall over the morality and ethics of US forces.55 Brian M. Linn points to the pacification campaign on the Island of Negros as a microcosm of the whole pacification debate. Under the command of Brigadier General James F. Smith, US forces were notable for their attention to political and humanitarian matters. Aside from the usual panoply of civic action projects, soldiers were instructed to develop and sustain good relations with the locals, to show every courtesy to them. Smith also organised a paramilitary constabulary, improving its equipment and conditions of service and leading to the creation of one of the most successful anti-insurgency units during the campaign. Throughout, Smith believed that US forces should work within the law and should favour selective punishments fines, removal from office and imprisonment. Smiths subordinate, Colonel Charles W. Miner however, believed that the immediate priority was the defeat of the enemy forces. Believing that Smith was overly concerned with the personal and property rights of those in rebellion against US forces, disagreements boiled over into open dispute over certain issues, notably the control of rice supplies, which Smith wanted moved to a central storehouse so that they could be parcelled out,
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while Miner wanted to destroy food that it believed was destined for guerrillas. As Linn states, although the situation was eventually resolved in Smiths favour, the episode had highlighted a critical point facing all those engaged in enlightened pacification strategies; the tensions between those military officers dedicated to the long-range goals of benevolence and reconciliation, and those who viewed matters through the prism of immediate military necessity.56 Yet even Miners relatively draconian attitudes paled in comparison to the strategies undertaken on the tiny island of Marinduque by Lieutenant Colonel A. Corliss who, according to observers, had decided upon his appointment to, bring the island to its knees through mass devastation. Problematically for those wedded to attraction, the widespread use of population concentration and crop/house destruction, while certainly one of the darker episodes of the Philippines campaign nevertheless brought armed resistance on Marinduque to an end in short order and perfectly illustrated the value of force to the problem.57 Marinduque exemplified the issues encountered by Otiss replacement, Major General Arthur MacArthur, father of noted US General Douglas MacArthur, who assumed command of US forces in the Philippines in May 1900. Attraction was without a doubt the most desirable strategy for those progressives charged by their President with bringing the fruits of the American way to the Filipino people. But there was also a growing recognition that a focus on public works without a complementary aggressive military campaign was doomed to failure. It remained for MacArthur to initiate a greater equilibrium to US efforts and to balance the positives of attraction with the necessary degree of chastisement to deny rebels time, space and support among the local population, a policy that would be further refined by his successor, Major General Adna R. Chaffee, who replaced him in July 1901. This new emphasis, combined with the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo, the totemic leader of the insurgency, in the spring of 1901, meant that the insurgency gradually lost impetus although it survived for a further year. Despite the groundwork of for success laid by Otis, it was MacArthur and Chaffees more judicious blend of politics and violence that fatally overwhelmed the insurgency. Nevertheless, US forces had encountered a perennial problem in counter-insurgency and stabilisation; measures that appeared best suited to address the causes of insurgency required time and were difficult to measure in terms of effect, while those more robust measures that offered the prospect of victory in a quick and expeditious manner often appeared to contravene the rationale for involvement, namely releasing the population from oppression and introducing universal freedoms and rights. This dilemma
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was subsequently brought into even sharper relief during the subsequent Moro insurgency of 19031907.58 Inhabiting the island of Mindanao in the southern Philippines and having a long tradition of resistance to prior Spanish rule, the Moros had directed their antipathy toward their new colonial masters. Having been focused upon the Nationalist insurgency until 1902, it was not until the following year that US forces moved properly to address Moro dissent. Again, idealism met reality in conditions even more challenging than those encountered previously. The Islamic Moros lived within a feudal society constructed around independent fortress villages known as cottas. Their ruling elites, or dattos, governed with absolute authority based on Islamic law. Outside the cotta, anyone was an enemy, be they European, Filipino or Moro. The US pacification campaign was headed by Major General Leonard Wood, steeped in the civil-military approach as a result of his prior experience in Cuba over the preceding three years. However, his immediate establishment of civil governance and educational facilities meant little to the Moros and when US forces attempted to administer judicial reforms it aroused intense hostility from a population reliant upon long-standing tribal custom. As resistance persisted among the more powerful dottos who stood to lose the most from submitting to US authority, Wood became increasingly frustrated with a people who, it appeared, could not recognise the blindingly obvious benefits of US rule. Within months, Woods policy of attraction had been replaced in the most part by a series of large-scale military operations aimed at destroying the recalcitrant dottos which, during the next three years, would result in the deaths of thousands of Moro villagers, culminating in the Battle of Mount Dajo on the Sulu Islands. There, hundreds of devout Muslim Moros had concentrated in large numbers in the crater of an extinct volcano. Wood ordered US troops to attack and at the end of the three-day battle, the bodies of over 600 men, women and children lay in the crater, at a cost of 18 American dead.59 While the example of the Moro insurgency illustrated the difficulties of implementing complex reform strategies in what might be termed medieval societies, it highlighted another issue that is still hugely pertinent today, namely the qualities and methods that military officers are judged by their peers and superiors and the place for these qualities within COIN/stabilisation operations. The accusation has been levelled that Woods willingness to abandon conciliatory methods and adopt an overtly punitive policy was a result of his desire to enhance his military reputation.60 Famous for his administrative and reform work in Cuba, Wood was well aware that Army officers were rewarded for their fighting prowess rather than their administrative skills. Without having commanded a significant military campaign
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or expedition, the career of this hugely ambitious officer might fade into obscurity. Thus, a visible military victory over Moro resistance was preferable to any gradual pacification. This phenomenon was noted in the case of the future General of the Armies, John J. Pershing. Initially celebrated for his civil work in Mindanao, it was his 190613 punitive campaign against the Bacolod Moros which enhanced Black Jacks reputation and delivered a prestigious appointment in Washington. His subordinate, the future Lieutenant General Robert L. Bullard, who had hitherto specialised in peaceful pacification but was ignored by superiors, similarly turned from palavering to fighting. As Lane states, there was more career mileage to be gained from the Krag than from Quinine.61 This military value judgement system is still a potential matter of concern.62 Theme 2: Governance and Security Sector Reform The way in which imperial activists sought to construct or rebuild indigenous capability in the governance and security sectors merits an entire article to itself. Nevertheless, a prcis of British and American activities in this regard is still instructive. The British in India and some parts of Africa tended to view native society as a resource in itself, thus engaging in a policy of indirect rule. If properly administered by a select cadre, overseeing and working through indigenous leadership, native political structures were often retained in order to channel the authority of the colonial power, helpful in a system characterised by limited human and financial resources.63 The Americans displayed a similarly formidable desire to penetrate native societies, often tribal in nature, but rather than exercise power through native systems, sought instead to give them the mechanisms for government that would replicate, to the greatest extent possible, the US model. The Americans, limited in their exposure to imperial acquisition, were disinterested in colonial rule. They were motivated by a combination of their own progressive ideals and the strategic benefits of imperial conquest. Consequently, they sought to establish free-standing democratic, representative governments, allied to US interests and thus able to provide a series of strategically located outposts for American military power. In many respects, the paradigm for the flexible British method of indirect rule when confronted by tribal society was that practised by Robert Sandeman in Baluchistan during 187792. He determined, in light of the minimal human and financial resources available to him, that the best route to successful control of the country lay in the revival of indigenous Baluchi
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political systems, placing power in the hands of effective local leaders and promoting the restoration and maintenance of a system of rule and law that was perfectly suited to that particular region.64 Simultaneously, security in a still fractious environment would be guaranteed not by British forces but by native auxiliaries. Although not a new concept it appeared in many colonial enterprises to have been a common strategy for encouraging mutual trust and good relations between an Imperial power and its nascent subjects Sandeman differed from others by using the system as the mainstay of tribal-government relations, recruiting thousands of tribal levies. Chiefs or Tumadars would be paid a substantial subsidy in return for the recruitment of their best men, although they were simultaneously held accountable for the behaviour of the recruits. Apart from engineering a bond between tribe and the Imperial Crown, the levy system created an aura of prestige and respect around the concept of Government of India service, notions that held a great deal of weight on the Frontier. At the same time, instead of bolstering conventional military strength, as was the case in Morocco under Lyauteys administration, levies freed the British-Indian Army from internal duties, acting in their place as a rudimentary gendarmerie and police force, allowing the military to focus on border defence.65 The system was essentially the forerunner of both the tribal militias and the Khassadars, both of which became notable features of the British administration of the North-West Frontier until 1947 and which still continue today in the shape of the Pakistan Frontier Corps.66 With respect to the reform of governance and judiciary, in both Baluchistan and the autonomous tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province (created 1901), the British were confronted with an almost stoneage society based upon a system of tribal allegiance. The forms of governance and lawmaking at work in the settled districts of the Punjab were entirely unfeasible for application in such remote, underdeveloped areas. Consequently, the British modified their approach to take account of local conditions. In Baluchistan, Sandeman utilised the tribal system as the vehicle through which the tribes would regulate themselves. Aided by the feudal nature of Baluchi society, he sought to reinforce the position of influential tribal leaders and work through them, rather than try to implement the forms of administration at work in more developed parts of the frontier.67 By appealing to the traditional customs and culture of the people rather than forcing an alien system upon them, and by working through the chiefs, the broad mass of that population would perceive themselves to be under their own rule and thus less likely to take exception to British administration. Sandeman simultaneously emphasised use of the Jirga, whereby
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tribal councils decided a range of matters including criminal cases. This further appeased fears of creeping interference while reducing the burden of administration in the shape of the courts and judiciary. The administration of large expanses of territory with minimal physical and financial resources demanded a light touch when it came to relationships with the tribes. Further north in the tribal agencies (five from 1901) of the North-West Frontier, the situation was slightly different. Governance was left largely to the tribes and relations with the Indian government managed through subsidy and the use of political agents. Attempts to pursue Sandemans methods after his death in 1892 had been abandoned, controversially, as unfeasible in light of the more democratic nature of the Pashtun tribes of the North-West Frontier, compared to their feudal neighbours to the south.68 The Indian government, taking the decision that the tribes should be left largely to their own devices unless they transgressed on British territory, relied upon the controversial Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR).69 The FCR was the mechanism through which the British sought to extend at least a modicum of law and order into what appeared to be an often anarchic environment, allowing those political agents responsible for tribal administration a mechanism by which they could refer those guilty of criminal acts within the tribal areas to be tried in an in-house fashion by Jirgas employing either Sharia or tribal custom.70 However, even though it theoretically appealed to tribal sensitivities and could be seen as an example of cultural sensitivity, the FCR was never particularly altruistic. Its real purpose, it has been proposed, was to keep the tribes away from any universally recognised or representative legal system.71 Those same criticisms still rebound today, as the FCR remains the legal/judicial system under which the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan operate.72 However, perhaps the most active with regard to governance, judiciary and security reform were the Americans. Again, ideology, altruism and good deeds vied with pragmatism and the recognition that such reforms only increased the potential for conquered territories to adopt governmental structures and policies line with US strategic interests. The basis of such transformation was the reform or creation of municipal government and judiciary, as well as the establishment of effective police and security forces. In both the Philippines and Cuba, the creation of municipal government was a centrepiece of the pacification programme, although it could be an unpredictable process. It placed heavy burdens upon small unit commanders who, without the benefit of additional staff, had to oversee local governments and orchestrate civil affairs activities while attending to routine military administrative and operational duties. Many had neither the desire
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nor ability to do these things and under such leaders the management of civil affairs invariably suffered.73 In turn of the 20th century Philippines, US commanders benefited from doctrine in the shape of both General Orders (GO) 43 and 40 which spelled out, in black and white, procedures for the establishment of local government, which in itself was viewed as the basic facilitator of subsequent development projects. In practice, municipal government was rarely organised along the lines set out by General Otis and his military government. Some officers strived to ensure democratic and fair elections, some found it impossible to encourage local candidates to stand for office, mainly through fear of assassination, others merely went through the motions or even discarded General Orders and implemented their own plans. Some even used local government as a way of imposing their own authority on a town; by restricting funding, officers could ensure that their municipal government remained compliant.74 And American officers were nothing if not realistic about the capabilities of Filipino local government at this stage, even being sympathetic to the case of one town presidente who was subsequently captured in a guerrilla camp.75 Nevertheless, they persisted in (and were relatively successful in doing so) in attempting to deliver what was considered the basic building blocks of effective state governance. With regard to the police and security forces, more relaxed conditions in Cuba about 1900 meant that structural reform of government took precedence over immediate reform of the security sector, although a rural police force was created. In the Philippines, however, the immediacy of the threat posed by nationalist insurgents propelled the need to create effective indigenous state security forces at a national and local level. General Orders 40 and 43 provided for the establishment of police forces at the municipal level and initial moves in this direction had been undertaken only a few weeks after US forces had landed, with the formation of their own police force and provost guard. It was obviously recognised that indigenous forces were crucial to pacification efforts but nevertheless, both Otis and MacArthur struggled to place their trust in indigenous police and constabulary units. In some ways this was understandable; indigenous units often displayed breathtaking brutality against captured or suspected guerrillas, an objectionable tendency in not only in moral but also strategic terms, with reconciliation being a major plank of US policy. There were also major fears over such units loyalties with the result that Otis initially refused to arm them. Although local initiatives might prove successful the aforementioned pacification campaign by General James Smith on Negros had seen the creation of a specialised paramilitary constabulary that proved most effective against Babylane insurgents and brigands no larger-scale initiative was
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allowed, for fear that such units would employ torture or turn traitor. Even when, under MacArthur, the order for the arming of municipal police and the creation of mobile constabulary units was promulgated, the General found it difficult to shake off similar fears. It was not until sizeable numbers of US troops were scheduled to return home that MacArthur allowed the proper arming of indigenous security forces to take their place and involve them intimately in his pacification efforts, for which they rewarded him by proving to be some of the most effective counter-insurgency forces at his disposal.76 Indeed, the variety of native police units, scouts, constabulary and militias were integral to the successful US pacification of the Philippines by May 1902. It was Cuba, however, that provides some of the most instructive lessons for the broader regeneration of indigenous capacity. Upon assuming command of the Cuban military administration in December 1899, and building upon the initial measures implemented by General Brooke since the previous January, whereby basic governance structures had been established, Colonel Wood decided to entirely regenerate the existing system of local government, which he considered weak and corrupt. He declared municipal elections for local office, encourage the adoption of US electoral systems although, interestingly, Wood was firm in his conviction that only the middle and upper classes should have suffrage, fearing that the peasant classes would vote for radical factions.77 The military governor also sought to transform Cubas judiciary by weeding out corruption, inertia and a bureaucracy that stifled any possibility of effective justice. Police courts were established to deal with minor cases while new perjury laws were passed and public defenders provided for the poor. Corrupt or dishonest judges were dismissed and employees paid fixed incomes rather than exorbitant fees. Prison conditions were improved and numerous inmates pardoned. But what was of the greatest interest was the way in which Wood sought to tie the two nations together. Deciding the shape of the new Cuban constitution, Wood sought to influence the wording of the document so as to explicitly codify the relationship between the two countries. Together with Secretary of War Elihu Root and others, possibly including President McKinley himself, Wood helped draw up the Platt Amendment, which stipulated the nature of Cubas strategic relationship with the United States.78 Theme 3: Public Works and Economic Development Stabilisation places a strong emphasis on development works, and the mise en valeur, (literally improvement and development) of conquered territory
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was a sine qua non of enlightened pacification during this period. It stemmed from a combination of the philosophical rationale of the civilising mission, to which the French, British and Americans all subscribed to varying extents, an understanding that improving the standard of living of the broader mass of the population would ease the transition to Imperial authority and undermine armed resistance, and broader strategic imperatives of drawing dissident societies into line with the interests of imperial powers. All the activists named so far exhibited a strong favour for development projects, especially Leonard Wood, which is somewhat surprising considering his record in Mindanao. As Sir Robert Sandeman so memorably put it in 1891, It is important do deal with the hearts and minds of the people, and not only with their fears. 79 Apart from coining a phrase, hearts and minds, that has echoed through numerous counter-insurgency campaigns, Sandeman was simply articulating something long recognised: one cannot hope, ideally, to achieve influence simply through intimidation or fear, neither should one get distracted by quaint notions of encouraging the population to like you. Rather, one must encourage the broader mass of that population to identify their best interests as lying with your authority, recognise and appeal to aspirations and potentially hope to shape those aspirations. The phrase mise en valeur gives some indication of the importance attached by the French to economic development especially. In Indochina, Gallieni noted with pride that his soldiers had transformed themselves into teachers, engineers, architects, bricklayers, carpenters and blacksmiths.80 Roads and railways were built utilising local paid labour which not only opened up resources but engaged men who might otherwise have been motivated to resist French rule. In Madagascar, after suppressing the Merina Revolt, Gallieni paid a huge amount of attention to public works as he sought to organise public heath and educational facilities. However, he faced difficulties with major projects such as road building insofar that he suffered from a limited supply of labour to carry out public works. Using forced labour only caused resentment and led to sporadic outbreaks of violence. Nevertheless, between 1896 and 1905 Madagascars imports had risen by 250 per cent and exports by 600 per cent. French commerce grew from 9 to 92 per cent of Madagascars trade while public health services, a school of medicine and a territorial health system were organised.81 In Morocco, Lyautey paid huge attention to health and educational facilities as part of his policy of peaceful penetration, a system which compared hugely with Sandemans.82 Marketplaces attached to Army outposts comprised a central component of his oil stain strategy, using them to pay
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inflated prices for local produce and thus create a favourable attitude toward what was ostensibly a foreign military presence. Road and railway building projects moved apace during his tenure as Resident-General and one of the most significant projects was the building of significant port facilities at Casablanca and Rabat. No fewer than 113 medical centres were established throughout the protectorate, ranging from a large, central laboratory in Rabat to mobile ambulances and ophthalmic and radiotherapy centres. 83 Equally attentive to development projects were US forces, under both Otis and MacArthur in the Philippines, and Wood in Cuba. In the Philippines, under Otis, road building was considered vital, although it was intended primarily to benefit the US Army. Most existing roads were nothing more than single tracks that forced regiments to push out into the jungle and render them vulnerable to ambush. Consequently, 1,000 miles of road were constructed in short order by August 1900 and this was generally considered key to victory by end of 1901.84 Closely related to this was building of telegraphs 139 miles in June 1899, 10,000 miles by 1902.85 In Cuba Wood had estimated that his military government spent $15 million on public works during his two-and-a-half year tenure.86 Numerous harbour dredgings and repairs to dock facilities were undertaken; there were improvements to streets, sewers and surface drainage, repairs to public buildings and extensive school and hospital construction. Public works were distributed across the poorer districts and workers provided with the necessary tools as well as regulated working hours. Indeed, the building of schools was indicative of US priorities during its pacification campaigns. US commanders devoted a huge amount of attention to education and there was a direct strategic rationale for this. By educating the youth to the standards and values of the US educational system, US officers could begin to create a layer of society imbued with American values. Over time, this would facilitate a closer relationship with the United States and contribute to the ultimate strategy of creating US satellites in vital strategic locations. Consequently, education was envisaged as integral to strategic interest of the United States. In the Philippines, 18 soldiers were assigned as teachers in Laguna and it became plainly evident to US forces that every school in every outlying barrio meant an extension of lawful authority into both the hearts and territories of the Filipinos. One officer boasted that his wife was more valuable than 2,000 soldiers when it came to tranquilising the country.87 Even Smith and Miner on Negros were united on the importance of public school education and the use of soldiers as teachers. In Cuba, one of Woods first actions as Governor was to overhaul the measures already directed toward educational reform. Although thousands
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of schools had been built, the standard was abysmally low, with few trained teachers, hardly any textbooks and sporadic attendance. Woods temporarily suspended building of new schools and set about improving standards of those existing, using the Ohio state school system as a model.88 In the desert wastes of Baluchistan, Sandeman paid great heed to development and public works. Much of this was due to his genuine desire to improve the circumstances of the Baluchi tribes. But he was a pragmatist too; in order to justify the value of his private empire, he had to make it pay, which in term meant maximising economic development, leading to oil exploration and logging. From a broader point of view, and just like Gallieni in Madagascar, there was minimal military presence to provide support but the need to bring the Baluchi tribesmen on board was paramount. He increased medical provisions for the tribes, building dispensaries and affording medical facilities to over 100,000 Baluchis.89 With regard to education, Sandeman struggled, admitting that the tribes did not seem overly keen on what he had to offer, although he was able to point to the opening of five mixed English/native schools including a girls school at Quetta.90 The British political agent proclaimed his confidence that the tribes would eventually come round to the concept. A total of 500,000 rupees were spent on irrigation projects, a welcome development for those trying to cultivate land in such an inhospitable environment, a reservoir was constructed and even experimental borings for petroleum were made.91 However, Sandeman also needed to address the problems of administering a huge and essentially lawless territory. Road building was a high priority, with over 1,500 miles of roadway constructed in a decade, in addition to three railways and numerous telegraphs.92 Again, much like US commanders, communications infrastructure was designed to benefit government forces as much, if not more so, than the native population. Theme 4: Humanitarian Aid The provision of humanitarian aid was a central feature of US interventions in Cuba and the Philippines. In both cases the collapse of Spanish colonial authority resulted in potential humanitarian emergencies as famine and disease spread rapidly through urban civilian populations. US forces landing at Manila in late July 1899 encountered 70,000 of the citys population concentrated within the citys walls, in highly unsanitary conditions and short of food while the 13,000-strong Spanish garrison defended itself against both 10,700 American forces and 10,000 Filipino insurgents.93 In the heat and humidity and with no supply of clean water, typhus, malaria, dengue and other diseases flourished in the generally unsanitary conditions.
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Otis primary task, even above confronting burgeoning nationalist resistance forces, was the application of all available effort to sanitise Manila, as much for the US Armys benefit as the populations, for soldiers stationed in such an unsanitary environment were prey to the same diseases. It was in Cuba, however, that humanitarian efforts were most pronounced. When assuming the Governorship of Santiago de Cuba in mid-July 1898, acting General Wood was confronted by nearly 20,000 refugees, living in almost pestilential filth, surviving on unripe fruit, filthy water and generally more dead than alive, bearing in the bodies the germs of diseases soon to terminate their lives. 94 As Wood himself stated, men could not bury the dead fast enough, And the only recourse was to burn piles of eighty or ninety bodies with thousands of gallons of kerosene, reducing the whole frightful heap to ashes.95 Avoiding an epidemic was Woods primary concern and this former medical corps surgeon estimated that of a population of 50,000, one quarter were sick and approximately 200 dying each day.96 Importantly, those figures were being replicated among his own troops, who by August 1898 were afflicted with a mortality rate of 48.6 per 1,000 men. Indeed, for every man that died, up to 20 were rendered unfit for service and the army as a whole teetered on the edge of disaster.97 Wood immediately divided the city into five sanitation districts, each with its own military physician, and every house, court, yard and alleyway was surveyed by 100-man work crews. Carts and wheelbarrows were commandeered for the clean-up operation and when those ran out, more were built.98 The citys water pipes were dug up and repaired, a sewage system implemented and every single house in Santiago sanitised. Simultaneously, large caches of food which had been stored by the Spanish Army were liberated and distributed to centres throughout the city, with meat kitchens being established to combat growing cases of anaemia and pellagra. Within four weeks of taking command, Wood was serving nearly one million meals a month to the citizens of the city, with over 50,000 of them using the distribution centres on the busiest days. In addition, the American governor moved to encourage the rehabilitation of the farming community by paying men to help clean the city, encouraging them to spend their money on rebuilding their farms, and then relocating food supplies to rural areas so men did not have to travel to the city for supplies. By January 1899, food production levels had risen to the extent that US Army field kitchens were distributing only 25 per cent of what they had the previous summer. With his sanitation and farming reforms, by late 1898 Wood could claim to have restored the city and its environs to health. With the exception of a few cases of malaria, he considered it as healthy as any city in the United States. Exaggeration or not, the transformation had been remarkable. He
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went even further when eventually promoted to Military Governor of all Cuba by making the elimination of yellow fever his highest priority. His own medical background led Wood understood the necessity of addressing the problem and he not only supported scientific methods with the governments money but once the cause of the fever had been determined, led an extensive mosquito extermination programme.99 He simultaneously created a department of hospitals and charities charged with the supervision of hospitals, orphan homes and insane asylums. Where do Lessons Lie? With regard to current operations, does the imperial model offer any benefit, as a field of study, over and above more traditional classical COIN thinking? And do either have any relevance in the age of modern insurgency and the hybrid war?100 With regard to the latter, the more traditional model still applies to a certain extent, even accounting for those who believe it to be unrepresentative of modern insurgency.101 Legitimacy, the centrality of the population to conflict resolution, the importance of the political aspect some of the key principles of COIN are still as valid as ever and certainly, on operations, appear to be largely applicable still.102 Indeed, it is interesting to note the views of one of the foremost commentators on modern insurgency, David Kilcullen. Responsible in part for shaping the coalition counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq in 2007 and similarly involved in formulating current US strategy in Afghanistan, he is suitably well placed to theorise on the nature of modern insurgency and thus the most effective response to be taken. Although believing classical COIN theory to be fundamentally inadequate in single-handedly challenging the current phenomenon of the hybrid war, this former Australian infantry officer considers it to be hugely relevant still at the tactical level, and at the operational level when combined with aspects of counter-terrorism (CT), nation- building and peace enforcement operations.103 Interestingly, Kilcullens suggestions for future policy are revealing. Proposing a series of eight best practices for modern counter-insurgency, fully six of his proposals would have been immediately familiar to Gallieni, Lyautey, Wood et al.: Namely, the close integration of civil and military efforts and a solid, long-term commitment; the continuity of key personnel; a population-centric security strategy founded on physical presence, local community partnerships and self-defending populations; a synchronised development, governance and security strategy to be exercised in a simultaneous manner and, last, a strong emphasis by external intervening forces on building effective and legitimate local security forces.104
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Thus, it would appear that history is not entirely redundant for those engaged in the study of modern insurgency. Classical COIN thinking still holds valuable lessons, if not the answer in itself. So what of the Imperial model? Aside from some rather timeless suggestions for the exportation of power and influence, there is still one hugely pertinent factor that gives the Imperial age its relevance, even today. In Malaya, Algeria, Indochina, Aden and many other imperial possessions, victorious or otherwise, colonial forces were the authority around which the fabric of the state or colony was wound. Government and administration was in the hands of the colonial power, as were the various arms of that administration police, army and intelligence services. Administrators and civil servants, as well as police and military officers, were generally familiar with local language and custom. Whether or not the ultimate strategy was successful, implementing a chosen strategy was facilitated to a certain degree by the owning of that particular environment. For Imperial activists, as now, the task that fell to them was to push into virgin territory, to generate influence and understanding from scratch, to fundamentally change that which already existed, rather than preserve it. That is a fundamental difference, and one that still resonates. The danger, therefore, lies not in looking backward rather than forward, but in the massaging of the institutional ego by way of an adherence to superficially informative or subsequently unsuitable lessons. For example, despite Sir Robert Thompsons codification of the fundamental principles of COIN as a consequence of the Malayan Emergency 194857, the defeat of that particular Maoist national liberation movement deep within the jungles of the Malayan peninsula by methods that would today be characterised as brutal beyond belief served as a false paradigm for British Counter-insurgency expertise over the following five decades. This period despite small-scale engagements in Dhofar (Oman) for example would see the British Army heavily committed to Northern Ireland for 30 years and then Afghanistan from 2001 and Southern Iraq from 2003 environments very different, in both a conceptual and physical sense, from the jungles of Malaya.105 Indeed, the British would have been better served by closely examining the 195559 campaign waged by EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kipriakou Agono/ National Organisation of Cypriot Struggle) in the mountains, villages and towns of Cyprus. A national liberation campaign perhaps, but one that pitted security forces against a small-scale movement adept at guerrilla warfare, under the command of shadowy but charismatic leader, drawing strong support from religious figureheads, utilising a small cadre of activists able to blend into a hugely supportive/intimidated population and similarly
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able to infiltrate indigenous police and security forces, employing not only the bullet and bomb but also the media, international opinion and public/ external support. All in all, this model of insurgency would provide a grim foretaste, albeit on a limited scale, of what was to come. 106 Yet due to the effective defeat of the British military effort there, the lessons of Cyprus 195559 lay almost entirely absent within the collective consciousness of the modern British Army while the example of Malaya, the archetypal and atypical COIN success, sat supreme. Examples should be chosen for their applicability, rather than success or failure. Conclusion Every generation likes to imagine that the challenges it faces, and the responses that it develops, are unique. With regard to stabilisation, this article illustrates that in one way or another and to varying extents, we have been there before. The British Army points to its strategy of combining civil and military powers under a single commander in Malaya as the epitome of a clear minded and original approach to combating insurgency. Yet Gallieni had indoctrinated his men as to the wisdom of this approach by the 1880s and it was similarly embraced by US commanders in the Philippines over the turn of the century. When Douglas Alexander, the UK Minister for Development, stated in September 2008 that war fighting and post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan should not be seen as separate events but as a seamless garment, whereby the panoply of military and civil measures designed to deliver peace and stability be delivered not in discrete increments but in a fluid and non-sequential manner, he was simply repeating the advice given by Joseph Chailley-Bert 120 years previously.107 The technique of utilising self-formed rescue councils in Iraq in 2007 finds its precedent in de Lannesans security policy in Indochina over a century earlier while in Afghanistan as of early 2009, British officials in Helmand Province are sanctioning the creation of Islamic and tribal justice systems are simply a throwback to Sandemans techniques in Baluchistan and on the North-West Frontier during the 1880s.108 Still in Afghanistan, current measures for economic and social development, and the reform of governance and justice sectors, find their precedence in the US model of enlightened pacification, the examples of Cuba and the Philippines being a perfect illustration of the methods by which a Western power sought to rebuild a failed state in such a way as to benefit its strategic interests. There are significant limits to the applicability of the Imperial model, of course. The ability of post-war national liberation/insurgent movements and those of the modern day to an even greater extent to mobilise every
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aspect, military and otherwise, of their struggle was and is far beyond that encountered in the Imperial heyday and is a phenomenon that has only accelerated in the case of the modern insurgent. The Baluchi and Pashtun tribes of the Western Frontier, regardless of their ability to dispute authority and inflict losses, never posed an existential threat to British control of India for the duration of its occupation. The Black Flag guerrillas of Tonkin, the Red Shawls of the Madagascan Merina Plateau and the Berber tribes of the Middle Atlas similarly posed problems, but no insurmountable threat, to the gradual expansion of French authority in those respective territories. And although Filipino nationalists and Moro insurrectionists forced a gruelling and testing campaign upon US forces, it could be argued that there would only ever be one victor in that particular campaign. Yet half a century later, Malaya notwithstanding, the British would be facing an embarrassingly inconclusive campaign against EOKA in Cyprus followed by defeat in Aden. The French would be humiliated in Indochina and Algeria respectively, the US was preparing to walk to its defeat in Vietnam and the Portuguese and Dutch would find themselves similarly hostage to national liberation movements in Southern Africa and the East Indies. More recently, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) found itself on the verge of engineering a full-blown civil war that threatened to tear that country apart, that grim prospect foiled only by a combination of its own poor strategising and some hugely effective adjustments in US strategy.109 Meanwhile, by early 2009, the Pakistani Taliban has felt emboldened enough to challenge the Pakistani state outside of the tribal areas, absorbing the Swat valley into its jurisdiction and moving to a war footing against the Pakistan Army as it advanced upon Islamabad.110 A full-scale offensive by the Pakistan Army was needed to recapture the valley. There is no denying however, that the Imperial model offers instructive precedent well suited to our present dilemmas. It illustrates clear and clever thinking. Importantly, however, it also reinforces certain eternal truths, namely that no matter the sophistication of ones approach or the clever models developed to promote influence and stability, success is never guaranteed and even if one does succeed, one may have to compromise ones stated principles to such an extent that success will always be tainted. Rebellion, insurgency, culture and tradition are always capable of defeating the best laid plans of theorists and practitioners. When the United States handed the reins of government to the Cuban Republic in May 1902, it did so safe in the knowledge that it was bestowing the fruits of the US model to the Cuban people. Yet almost immediately, the new road networks fell into disrepair, democratic institutions decayed, the justice sector foundered and many of the newly implemented
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health and sanitation programmes were abandoned.111 Cubas history and culture prevented the easy transplant of American institutions. Without any say in the transformations undertaken, with superficial educational reform, with the traditional middle class elites bolstered by Woods refusal to extend universal suffrage, with no changes to traditional land and property ownership, and thus a reinforcement of the traditional spread of wealth and influence, the old system prevailed. Traditional social and political culture continued to shape the lives and attitudes of ordinary Cubans despite the veneer of republican institutions erected on their behalf. The US 1899 1902 pacification of Cuba had in some ways been its finest hour of the Imperial age. It was also, eventually, a huge disappointment. NOTES
1 2 3 4 D. Porch, Wars of Empire (London: Cassell 2000) p.4. Ibid. See N. Fergusson, The Last Iraqi Insurgency, New York Times, 18 April 2004. See E.M. Spiers, Wars of Intervention: A Case Study: The Reconquest of the Sudan 189699 (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic and Combat Studies Institute 1998). See also L.A. Yates, The US Militarys Experience in Stabilization Operations 17892005 (Ft Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College 2006) Yates conducts an interesting survey of the US Armys historical roots as a long experienced practitioner of pacification/stabilisation although his survey focuses in the main on the post-Imperial age. S. Metz, Rethinking Insurgency (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute June 2007). For a detailed analysis of Imperialism and its origins, methods and ideologies see A.N. Porter, European Imperialism 18601914 (London: Macmillan 1994). Although Russian expansion throughout Central Asia and the Caucasus was often characterised by brutality, scorched earth tactics and a reliance upon military strength, the methods of Prince Ivan Bariatinskii, appointed Viceroy of the Caucasus in 1857, have attracted attention for their relative skill and patience during the pacification of Circassia 186264. See P.B. Hunze, Circassian Resistance to Russia, in M. Bennigsen (ed.), The North Caucasus Barrier (London: Hurst 1992) pp.62112 and M. Saray, The Russian Conquest of Central Asia, Central Asian Survey 1/2 (1982) pp.131. Much has been written on the subject of French colonialism over the past century, specifically the competing theories of assimilation and association. Adherents to the former saw it as the method by which Republicanism could square away its moral concerns over colonial conquest. Assimilationists Believed that France could mould any culture into that of its own image, pre-colonial political, social and hereditary elites would be disbanded in favour of a new, francophone civilisation. The largely metropolitan assimilationists, however, found themselves opposed by the activist associationists, notably the military commanders operating in what was to become French Indochina, who believed assimilation to be naive in its assumption that all civilisations could follow or adhere to the French model, impracticable in reality and ignorant of the benefits of utilising those pre-existing political and social elites, which they in turn recommended. See M. Gershovich, French Military Rule in Morocco (London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass 2000) also M.D. Lewis, One Hundred Million Frenchmen: The Assimilation theory in French Colonial Policy, Comparative Studies in Society and History 4/2 (1962) 12953. For an excellent survey of modern interpretations of French colonial policy, see R. Aldrich, Imperial Mise en Valueur and Mise en Segne: Recent Works on French Colonialism, Historical Journal 45/4 (2002) pp.91736.
5 6 7
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9 For more on the nature of British Imperialism during this period, notably the lack of central control therein, see J. Darwin, Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion, English Historical Review 112/447 (1997) pp.61442. Darwin states that British expansion throughout India especially was less a centrally directed strategy and more a function of individual initiative, commercial and military, on the part of the missionaries, merchants and officers of the East India Company and Indian Army. 10 C. Barnett, Imperial Overstretch, from Dr Arnold to Mr Blair, RUSI Journal 150/4 (Aug. 2005) pp.2630. 11 The taint of Imperialism, however, dictated that the United States, and President William McKinley in particular, was keen to emphasise the benign nature of such missions; in the case of the Philippines a policy of benevolent assimilation, Substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. See B.M. Linn, The Philippine War 18991902 (Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas Press 2000) p.30. 12 Gen. David Petraeus (born 1952), noted for his sophisticated approach to COIN operations during his various postings in Iraq between 2003 and 2008, first as a divisional commander with 101st Airborne and later as Commander Coalition forces in Iraq. Gen. (posthumous Marshal) Joseph Gallieni (18491916) French soldier made famous for his defence of Paris on the Marne Sept. 1914 but whose initial reputation was built upon his sophisticated approach to combating guerrilla warfare in Indochina and Madagascar during the 1890s. Gen. Lazare Hoche (176897) was a Revolutionary soldier famous for his enlightened pacification of the Vende 179495 and Field Marshal George Wade (16731748), was noted for his construction, between 1725 and 1737, of a road network in the Scottish Highlands Wades Roads which, by linking various military garrisons designed to aid in the pacification of dissident Highland tribes, appears to be the progenitor of similar policies in Waziristan two centuries later. 13 For more on the activities of Sir Robert Sandeman (183592), see Thornton, Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman His Life and Work on Our Indian Frontier (London: John Murray 1895). With regard to the massacre at Satiru, see B. Vandervoort, Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa 18301940 (Bloomington: Indiana UP 1998) p.186 and J. Iliffe, Honour in African History (Cambridge: CUP 2005) p.187. 14 <www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/resources/tasksmatrix-version%201.0%20.doc>. 15 Ibid. 4. 16 For example, between 1882 and 1898 French colonial forces struggled to defeat the Sudanese warlord Samory Toure (18301900), experiencing several notable defeats along the way. At Adowa in 1896 Italian forces not only found themselves outnumbered almost 5:1 but found the Abyssinian Army to be well supplied with modern rifles and artillery. And on the North-West Frontier of India, British-Indian troops were never able to fully subdue the Pashtun tribes to their satisfaction, despite eventually having access to armour and aircraft by the 1930s. 17 D.E. Long and B. Reich, Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa (Westport, CT: Westview 2002) p.393. 18 Although Disraelis defeat by Gladstones Liberals in 1880 also coincided with economic difficulties in Britain, there is no doubt that foreign policy disasters were the main reason for public dissatisfaction. Costly military defeats at Isandlwana in Zululand in 1879 and Maiwand in Afghanistan the following year (the latter coming after the then Maj.-Gen. Sir Frederick Roberts publicly criticised retributive actions at Kabul the previous year, where he had summarily executed nearly 100 Afghans suspected of involvement in the murder of Louis Cavagnari, British envoy, earlier that year) hugely damaged the Conservative government. 19 P. Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India (London: Duckworth 1988) p.912. 20 For public outcry over the activities of Roberts Army of Retribution see R. Atwood, The March to Kandahar: Roberts in Afghanistan (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword 2008) and for similar outrage by public and politicians alike over Roberts and Kitcheners practices during the Second Anglo-Boer War see D. Brooks, The Age of Upheaval: Edwardian Politics 18991914 (Manchester: MUP 1995) p.35.
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21 The term Krag refers to the rifle most widely used by US soldiers during the Philippines campaign. See M.R. Hollneister, M. Racelis, and J.C. Ick, Bearers of Benevolence: The Thomasites and Public Education in the Philippines (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan 2001) p.24. 22 The practice was referred to as the Water Cure and had some eager adherents among US forces. See Linn (note 11) p.224. 23 Ibid. p.30. With regard to mission creep, see Spiers (note 4) p.14. Spiers is referring to Lord Kitcheners attempts to remove the threat posed to Kenya by the Sudanese ruler Khalifa Abdallahis control of the Upper Nile Valley. 24 See J.K. Munholland, Collaboration Strategy and the French Pacification of Tonkin 1885 1897, Historical Journal 24/3 (1981) pp.62950. 25 Munholland quotes from R. Robinson, Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration, in R. Owen and B. Sutcliff (eds.), Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London: Longman 1972) p.138. 26 For more on the utility of Provincial Reconstruction Teams see M. Jackson and S. Gordon, Rewiring Intervention? UK Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Stabilisation, International Peacekeeping 14/5 (Nov. 2007) p.647. For the relationship between Afghan Development Zone strategy and Ink Spot theory, see G. Mills, T. McNamee and D. Lane, Security Vortex, Warlords and Nation Building, RUSI Journal 1 Sept. 2006, http:// www.rusi.org/news/rss/ref:N454899C5DABDA/, accessed 10 March 2009. 27 De Lannessan and Gallieni were not alone in developing pacification techniques. Col. Theophile Pennequin created the politique du races (policy of races), the practice of applying discrete techniques to different ethnic groups or geographic populations such as highlanders and lowlanders. See W. Hoisington, Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco (London: St Martins Press 1995) p.12. 28 It should be acknowledged that the initial change in French policy from overt militarism to a more nuanced form of penetration was initiated by Paul Bert, civilian resident-general for Annam and Tonkin and implemented by Col. Theophile Pennequin in late 1890. De Lannessans arrival in the summer of 1891 capitalised upon this new policy. 29 See Munholland (note 24) p.643. 30 The recruitment of indigenous forces was a common feature of imperial pacification techniques and would be used by both the British and Americans in their own respective campaigns. See G. Hughes, and C. Tripodi, Anatomy of a Surrogate: Historical Precedents for the Use of Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency and Counter-Terrorism, Small Wars and Insurgencies 20/1 (Jan. 2009) pp.134. 31 V.L. Matthew Jr, Joseph Simon Gallieni, in L.H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds.), African Proconsuls: European Governors in Africa 18491916 (Berkley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California 1978) pp.80108. 32 In his study of the deployment in 2006 by British troops to Helmand province, Afghanistan, Daniel Marston states that Brigade personnel were proceeding upon the assumption that they were carrying out ink (oil) spot-type strategies. His conclusion that both Operation Herrick IV and V deployments highlighted significant shortcomings in both economic development and the coordinating of security and reconstruction initiatives would suggest that the oil spot strategy was unable to be applied properly. See D. Marston and C. Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (London: Osprey 2008), 22041. 33 See Gershovich (note 8) for a more detailed appraisal of the oil stain technique. 34 Hoisington (note 27) p.15. 35 Interestingly, Gallieni had demanded that the commander of any colonial expedition be subsequently selected as the first administrator of the country after the period of conquest was over, so as to preserve continuation of policy. See Hoisington (note 27) p.15. 36 Similar concentration on unity of command and intent would no doubt find favour with those in Afghanistan who began to voice fears that PRTs, for example, were being forced to report through a different chain of command than military manoeuvre units in the same battle space and that the continual turnover of commanders made continuity of effort a recurrent challenge in a deeply complex environment. See D. Barno, Fighting the Other War: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan 20032005, Military Review (2007) p.43.
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37 These comments were made by Joseph Chailley-Bert, an influential member of the French Colonial Party. See The Colonisation of Indo-China (London: Archibald Constable 1894) p.175. Interestingly, his concerns mirror those of contemporary commentators who point out this lack of simultaneity in current operations in Afghanistan. See Jackson and Gordon (note 26) p.647. 38 L. Perez, Army Politics in Cuba 18981956 (Univ. of Pittsburgh Press 1976) pp.67. See also J. McCallum, Leonard Wood: Rough Rider, Surgeon, Architect of American Imperialism (New York: NYUP 2005) p.133. 39 Lyautey was instinctively suited to the tasks of pushing French influence into Morocco. Aside from his experience in Indochina he had served in command of the southern military district of Madagascar in 19002 under Gallieni and at his request. 40 Gallieni replaced Gen. Duchesne, who had led French forces in the full-scale invasion of 1895, known as the Second Franco-Hovan War, itself capitalising upon the initial invasion and declaration of protectorate status in 1893. 41 Madagascar is a combination of bare hill country, dry savannah and damp tropical forest and its society at the time was based on small local units linked by land, kinship relationships and burial monuments. These had federated and coalesced into larger units and kings emerged. Religion centred around talismans. Society was divided into nobles (andriana) and commoners (hova). In addition to centralising authority in his own hands through the cercle system, Gallieni implemented a general policy of amnesty for rebel leaders, even giving some positions of responsibility in his administration. In light of a shortage of his own forces, he also armed local partisans to supplement his efforts. As much as anything, his techniques meant economy of men and methods, all the more important on an island of 300,000 sq. miles and a population of 2.5 million. See S. Ellis, The Rising of the Red Shawls: A Revolt in Madagascar 18951899 (Cambridge: CUP 1985). 42 Matthew (note 31) pp.80108. 43 Ibid. 44 See M. Michel, Gallieni (Paris: Fayard 1989). Although Saddam Hussein was arrested by US forces, his trial and subsequent execution were carried out under the auspices of the Iraqi government. It is unlikely that international opinion could have allowed his execution by coalition forces. 45 See Hoisington (note 27) for more on Lyauteys resort to force against the Berber tribes of the Middle Atlas. 46 See D. Porch, Bugeaud, Gallieni and Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare, in P. Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy (Oxford: OUP 1986) pp.376408. 47 IA officers were used along the same line as British Frontier political officers on the Western border of India. With regard to their relationship to the tribes, the French found that their attempts to protect and thus support indigenous tribal systems were in fact quite harmful. Tribal leaders became mere dependents and members of the tribes began to look with disrespect upon their own assemblies, which in turn generated a feeling of insecurity and inferiority viz the French presence. See R. Bidwell, Morocco Under Colonial Rule: French Administration of Tribal Areas 19121956 (London: Frank Cass 1973) pp. 15597. 48 Berber resistance in the Middle Atlas was enough to force Lyautey to restrict his intention only to conquer Maroc Utile, that part of Morocco which was of use to France. Lyautey returned to France in 1925, replaced as Governor-General by Theodore Steeg, who conquered the remaining dissident tribes by using almost exclusively military methods. 49 The Philippines War 18991902 was a two-stage campaign, initially conventional and then evolving into a counter-insurgency operation that focussed ostensibly on the Katipunan resistance forces led by the Nationalist Emilio Aguinaldo. There were, however, a large number of discrete resistance movements acting in their own accord without the guidance of Aguinaldo. The Moro insurgency, centred on the southern islands of the archipelago, would begin subsequent to the defeat of the initial resistance movements. 50 General Orders 100 (G.O. 100) Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field. Drawing upon experience gained during the Civil War and the Indian Wars, this document imposed strict limits on the behaviour of US troops when acting as occupying forces.
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51 See A.J. Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 18601941 (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History 1998) passim. 52 Linn (note 11) p.302 53 Birtle (note 51) p.100. 54 Ibid. 55 US forces also found it difficult to cope with the Filipino societal structure, specifically the power of the Principale over the hombre. The former, the traditional landowning classes, exerted tremendous influence over the majority of the peasant population with the consequence that the latter was so dominated and inert that, You can no more influence him by benevolent persuasion than you can a fly. He is going to do whatever he is told by his master or leaders. See Birtle (note 51) p.126. 56 Linn (note 11) p.174. 57 See A.J. Birtle, The US Armys Pacification of Marinduque, Philippine Islands, April 1900April 1901, Journal of Military History 61/2 (April 1997) pp.25582. 58 Marston and Malkasian (note 32) p.45. See also C.A. Byler, Pacifying the Moros: American Military Government in the Southern Philippines 19031913, Military Review (May/June 2005) pp.415 59 J. Lane, Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood (San Rafael, CA: Presidio 1978) p.126. 60 Ibid. p.124. 61 Ibid. p.125. 62 For example, as shown with US Army operations, contrast between 101st Airborne and 4th Infantry Divisions in Iraq in 2003 see T. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (London: Allen Lane 2006) passim. 63 For an explanation of the origins of Indirect Rule, see T.C. Coen, The Indian Political Service: A Study in Indirect Rule (Chatto & Windus 1971). 64 Ironically, British policy-makers in Helmand are beginning to adopt a similar strategy. See Britain Helps set up Sharia Courts in Afghanistan, Daily Telegraph, 9 March 2009. 65 Thornton (note 13) p.188. 66 A notable feature of Pakistans independence in 1947 was its adherence to British methods of tribal administration, methods which still persist today in the shape of tribal militia in the form of the Frontier Corps and a continued adherence to the Frontier Crimes Regulations, the colonial-era legal system that applied to the autonomous tribal agencies of the NorthWest Frontier. 67 For an interesting account of British policy in this respect see Charles Bruce, Waziristan 193637: The Problems of the North-West Frontiers of India and Their Solutions (Aldershot, UK: Gale & Polden 1938). 68 For more on this debate see C. Tripodi, Good for One and not the Other: The Sandeman System and its application to Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier 18771947, Journal of Military History (Society for Military History, Lexington, VA) 73/3 (July 2009). 69 Although originating in 1873, the FCR was updated 1901 to include extra legislation. 70 If the offence was carried out on British territory, the accused faced trial according to Indian government law. 71 S.S. Ali and J. Rehman, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Minorities in Pakistan: Constitutional and Legal Perspectives (London: Curzon 2001), 52. 72 There is an energetic and ongoing debate as to the suitability of FCR to the administration of the tribal agencies of the North-West Frontier as critics continue to complain that it prevents the tribes from having access to a recognised legal system as is the case in the remainder of Pakistan. Recent studies advocate the full incorporation of the tribal agencies and districts into the provincial and national justice system. See Pakistan: Countering Militancy in the FATA International Crisis Group, Asia Report No178, 21 October 2009 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6356. 73 Birtle (note 51) p.120. 74 Linn (note 11) p.200. 75 Ibid. p.201. 76 Ibid. 202.
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77 Lane (note 59) p.95. 78 The Platt Amendment provided for US involvement in Cubas domestic and foreign affairs, including provision for the establishment of a US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay (in 1903). For more on the Platt Amendment see L.A. Perez, Cuba Under the Platt Amendment 19021934 (Univ. of Pittsburgh Press 1986). 79 Thornton (note 13) p.i. 80 See Matthew (note 31) pp.80108. 81 Ibid. p.98. 82 Coen (note 63) p.158. For Lyauteys opinion of Britains Indian administrators see Bidwell (note 47) p.161. 83 See E. Wharton, In Morocco (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Rare Reprints 2004) pp.94105. 84 Linn (note 11) p.202. Interestingly, todays Australian COIN expert David Kilcullen points to road building as absolutely fundamental to establishing relationships with indigenous communities. Not so much in the sense of purely what benefits might accrue to that community by way of improved communications, but through the simple process of road-building itself, which tends to bring community and counter-insurgent together for a common purpose. See D. Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (London: Hurst 2009) pp.701. 85 Ibid. p.202 86 Lane (note 59) p.97. 87 Linn (note 11) p.203. 88 Lane (note 59) pp.924. 89 Thornton (note 13) p.209. 90 Ibid. p.214. Interestingly, during the 1920s and 1930s policymakers began to voice concerns that unless there was available employment subsequent to any school programme, the net consequence of educating the tribesmen would be a generation of young men who had had their horizons lifted and did not like what they saw. In other words; potential political agitators. See India Office Collections, British Library London MSSEUR D693/3 papers of Arthur Parsons Frontier Watch and Ward Committee Nov. 1936. 91 Petroleum of excellent quality was found in the Sherani hills of northern Baluchistan. See entry for Baluchistan Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition (London 1911). 92 Thornton (note 13) p.245. 93 See Linn (note 11) p.32. In Cuba during the same period, many US Army units had lost up to two thirds of their own strength through disease 94 Lane (note 59) p.54. 95 Ibid. 96 L.Wood, Santiago Since the Surrender, Scribners 25 (May 1899). Quoted in Lane (note 59) p.56. 97 McCallum (note 38) p.114. 98 Those who persisted in fouling the streets were publicly horse-whipped on Woods orders. See McCallum (note 38) p.119. 99 Wood had originally joined the Army as a doctor in 1886 and his medical background was to prove crucial in grasping the severity of the public health crisis in Santiago during the summer of 1899. 100 See F. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Dec. 2007). 101 Metz (note 5) passim. 102 Specifically: Political control, unity of effort; importance of intelligence; separation of insurgent from public support; neutralisation of insurgent; and reform. Testimony by CO 2 Para Battle-Group Helmand Province, MayOct. 2008. Presentation to UK Joint Services Command and Staff College, 18 March 2009. See also Andrew Mumford, Robert Thompsons Lessons for Iraq: Bringing the Basic Principles of Counter- Insurgency into the Twenty-First Century, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Associations 49th Annual Convention, 26 March 2008. 103 Kilcullen (note 84) p.152.
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104 Ibid. 265. Obviously, whereas Kilcullen envisages a close relationship between civilian agencies and the military, Imperial forces envisaged military officers, at least initially, carrying out civilian tasks. 105 Although the Malayan Emergency lasted effectively until July 1960, overt British involvement effectively ended in Oct. 1957 with Malayas independence. In addition, it is easy to draw the wrong conclusions as a result of received wisdoms. British success in Malaya has long been accepted as a result of Gen. Sir Gerald Templers influence 195254 whereas Karl Hack proposes that the basis for success was the result of enforced population movement implemented prior to his arrival. See Chin Peng, C.C. Chin and K. Hack, Dialogues with Chin Peng: New Light on the Malayan Communist Party (Singapore: NUS Press 2004) pp.14468. 106 Even deaths to enemy action were roughly proportional, with 178 British fatalities in the six-year operation in Iraq, and 159 (including 56 policemen) killed in three years of operations in Cyprus (although the military campaign took place between April 1955 and early 1959, there was a year long truce between March 1957 and March 1958). 107 Afghanistan: From Stabilisation to State Building, speech given by Douglas Alexander to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 17 Sept. 2008. 108 Britain Helps set up Sharia Courts in Afghanistan, Daily Telegraph, 9 March 2009. 109 See Kilcullen (note 84) pp.11585 and T.E. Ricks The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 20062008 (London: Allen Lane 2009) passim. 110 See Taliban and Pakistani officials agree permanent ceasefire in Swat Valley, The Guardian, 21 Feb. 2009. 111 Matters deteriorated to such an extent that US forces were forced to return in 1906 to uphold the Cuban government in the face of a domestic uprising. The United States eventually relinquished control in 1909.
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Enlightened Pacification - Imperial Precedents For Current Stabilisation Operations

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Enlightened Pacification: Imperial Precedents for Current Stabilisation Operations

44 Imperial Past versus Modern Day?

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