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Foreign Policy Analysis (2006) 2, 223–244

The Rift: Explaining Europe’s Divergent
Iraq Policies in the Run-Up of the
American-Led War on Iraq
Eberhard Karls Universita¨t Tübingen

Universität Regensburg

America’s plan to attack Iraq split Europe down the middle. Why did
European countries take such different stances toward the Bush ad-
ministration’s policy? This article examines three different approaches,
each rooted in one of international relations (IRs) prominent schools of
thought, with regard to their explanatory power in this specific puzzle.
Firstly, it shows that public opinion (utilitarian–liberal approach) cannot
account for whether a state joined the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ or not.
Secondly, it demonstrates that in Eastern Europe systemic forces of
power relations (neorealist approach) are suitable for explaining state
behavior, but not in Western Europe. Thirdly, it shows that the ideo-
logical orientations of governments (liberal–constructivist approach)
were the decisive factor in determining whether a state supported the
United States in Western Europe, but not in Eastern Europe. These
results offer some interesting insights for the theoretical debate in IRs
theory and foreign policy analysis, which are discussed in the final sec-
tion of the article. In regard to foreign policy analysis, for example, the
results of this study propose to ‘‘bring political parties in.’’

America’s Iraq policy split Europe down the middle. After months of ‘‘fighting’’
inside and outside the Security Council, the United States, supported by a ‘‘coa-
lition of the willing,’’ attacked Iraq on March 20, 2003 without having obtained the
clear legitimacy they sought. Europe was deeply divided over the question of
whether it should support its main ally or ‘‘balance’’ against his Middle East plans.
Some European allies like Germany and France vehemently opposed the Bush
administration’s policy to disarm Iraq by military means and the accompanying
reorganization of the Middle East’s political landscape. Others like Spain and Po-
land explicitly supported this policy. Why did the European states take such dif-
ferent political positions toward Iraq or, more accurately, toward the United States,

Authors’ note: We thank all the people who helped to improve this article with their critical comments. We are
especially grateful to the editors, the anonymous reviewers, the participants at the Graduate Program in Inter-
national Relations at Eberhard Karls University Tübingen and the following individuals: Verena Andrei, Stephan
Bierling, Thorsten Göbel, Andreas Hasenclever, Carmen Huckel, Reinhard Meier-Walser, Philipp Schuster, and
Christian Strobel.

r 2006 International Studies Association.
Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

224 The Rift

despite them all having been allies of the United States, often for decades, and
rarely ever parting with Washington in major international crises in the past?
International relations (IRs) theory offers various approaches for the explanation
of international politics as well as for the analysis of particular foreign policies.
Three paradigms have been dominating the field in recent years: (neo)realism,
liberalism, and constructivism (Walt 1998; Rittberger 2001; Snyder 2004).1 As these
approaches offer different and competing explanations of foreign policy,2 it seems
worthwhile to analyze which one offers the most convincing account of the behavior
of European states during the Iraq crisis or to see, indeed, if any of them can
provide answers to such a profound and ‘‘real-world’’ question at all.
In the following section we derive three hypotheses out of these paradigms. The
competing explanatory factors of the study are systemic forces of power relations (a
neorealist approach), public opinion (a utilitarian–liberal approach), and ideological
orientations of governments (a liberal–constructivist approach).3 The neorealist or
power–structural approach regards state behavior as a function of a specific state’s
power position in the (relevant) international system. It explains variance in IRs and
foreign policy not through differences of the individual units but via different sys-
temic power constellations. The utilitarian–liberal approach and the liberal–con-
structivist approach reject this Primat der Außenpolitik. Instead, as reductionist
approaches, they explain variance in international politics and foreign policy through
differences in domestic characteristics, that is, they postulate a Primat der Innenpolitik.4
We tested these hypotheses or the explanatory factor they claim is valid, respec-
tively, on the position of 20 European states toward an American-led Iraq war. As
already mentioned, what we hope to explain with these hypotheses is the political
position the (European) states took toward an American-led attack on Iraq, that is, if
a country (openly) supported the United States endeavor and was part of the
‘‘coalition of the willing’’ or if it rejected the demand for (political) support.5
The reasons why we selected those states listed in Table 1 are manifold. Following
Mill’s ‘‘method of difference’’ we confined our cases to a certain class of countries,
European democracies, primarily because by doing so we were able to control for a
range of possibly different explanations like form of government or, partly at least,
cultural differences. Furthermore, Hypothesis 3, the partisan hypothesis, could
reasonably only be tested in ‘‘western democracies’’ and it was the behavior of some

See note 7 for basic literature on structural realism, page 227 for modern liberalist work, and page 231 for
prominent examples of social-constructivist writing.
Though it is sometimes disputed to what extent theories of IR, especially neorealism, can be used as or
translated into theories of foreign policy, all approaches stress specific factors that can be used to analyze and forecast
foreign policy. The claim that ‘‘international politics is not foreign policy’’ and that IRs theory cannot be used to
analyze foreign policy is especially maintained by Kenneth N. Waltz (1979:71–72 and 121; 1996). Waltz’s arguments
are convincingly refuted by Colin Elman (1996) and James Fearon (1998:289–313). It is quite common for IR
scholarsFneorealists are no exceptionFto analyze foreign policy with their IR-toolbox. Waltz himself makes
statements and predictions about foreign policy based on his theory (1991:667–670; 1993:45–46 and 61–76). See
Rittberger (2001) for a practical demonstration how not just hypothesis, but also theories of foreign policy can be
constructed out of IR approaches.
The reason why we selected these hypotheses for a closer examination is a twofold one. Firstly, each is derived
from one of the currently leading theoretical approaches to IR (see next section). Secondly, those were factors
regularly cited as possible reasons for state behavior in media reports and comments before the last Gulf War.
Of course, there are constructivist scholars like Alexander Wendt who locate the primary source of state
behavior on the systemic level of analysis (Wendt 1992; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Wendt 1999). This strand of
constructivist thought is sometimes labeled as sociological institutionalism, whereas what we call liberal construct-
ivism might also be called ideationist liberalism.
We used a range of different criteria to establish whether a country supported the United States or not. As the
most obvious form of assistance, we regarded direct military participation in the war. Unhesitating and open passive
military help also has to be regarded as support as well as troop commitment in the aftermath of the war, especially if
this was not subject to the condition of a UN mandate. Furthermore, we especially focused on top official’s speeches,
interviews, etc. We also considered a country’s behavior in international organizations like the UN. Finally, we also
thought the assessment of other countries to be of importance and therefore regarded the White House’s list(s) of
coalition partners as a helpful tool.

3 4 57.2 1 Estonia 11.8 3.0 Russiaw 625.4 1.7 2 36.000 6.000 3.440. lines of argument. 1995).2 19 144 0.2 11 Bulgaria 41.0 n Data rounded and for the year of 1999.3 1.4 13. 2001:1–54).160.000 1.4 12 10.2 18 3.450.7 5 Sum: 8. This neorealist or power–structural per- spective on the Iraq dispute offers the hypothesis thatFbecause of differences in their power positionFthe ‘‘Great’’ European powers should oppose the United States.3 13 2.000 1.6 16 5.8 1 59.6 11 5.5 12 6.000 24. whereas the small ones should lean toward supporting the superpower.500 20.7 8.1 2 Greece 128.000 2. Office.240 0.4 0.780 1.000 1.5 16 1.3 20 Francew 1. This can be regarded as a sufficient reason to explain why none of these countries actively supported the offensive U.1 13.000 2.0 9 10.000 0.4 19 Spain 589.2 11 Italy 1.6 12.900 0.0 3 Great Britainw 1.6 6 7. 7 For assumptions and core elements of structural neorealist thought. Balance-of-Power Politics Although neorealists sometimes offer rather dissimilar theses about foreign policy behavior.670.5 10 2.190 1.100 0.6 2.3 14 1.2 2. Waltz (1979.8 7 38.1 1 32. but closely related.217 100.5 11 3.0 7 Slovakia 56.3 10 Denmark 172.4 0.260. and Baumann et al.4 8.2 15 Slovenia 31. dollar.7 14 Czech Republic 132.0 United Statesw 9.410 1. Elman (1996:18–21). GDP and military expenditure in million U. see. which seems justifiable as such states generally reject taking sides in military conflicts of third parties.7 15 7.030 3.6 15 1.1 14 10.7 10 10.300 0.9 6 15.3 3 82. we compared all those European countries that are a member of both NATO and the EU or can hope to join both clubs until the end of this decade.880 1.000 16.5 18 Lithuania 24.9 0.6 Power.7 All neorealists see 6 Except for Luxembourg.6 18.3 18 314 0. they do share some basic assumptions and conclusions. Illustration of Power Positions Military Relative Rank Expenditure Relative Rank Relative Rank Countryn GDP GDP (GDP) (ME) ME (ME) Population Population Population Belgium 251. It does not take into account internal mechanisms and constellations of states.090. population in milllion inhabitants.560 4. w Nuclear powers.1 19 1.4 4 23.600 2.000 147.0 2. JRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER 225 TABLE 1. for example.000 4.000 35.3 2.900 21.700 13. European allies of the United States that sparked off a debate about the future of transatlantic relations and NATO and the EU.0 9 2.800 0.1 20 173 0.060 3.7 7 6. .3 100. policy.0 454.S.4 17 436 0.9 1. Mearsheimer (1995:9–14.8 5 7.6 3 38.7 4 Latvia 15.2 5 39.000 16.5 8 Poland 324.600 0.000 1. This leaves all neutral European states out. (2001:38–42). Relative data only refers to the proportion of the examined countries.5 2 59.8 17 Netherlands 397.010 0.000 273.000 13.600 18. or (Ideology-Based) Identities? The Systemic Level: Power Positions and Power Politics Hypothesis 1 explains different state behavior through varying material restrictions and opportunities on the systemic level.000 1.S.000 1.3 9 Hungary 111.700 100.5 5.2 17 1.000 281.2 13 Romania 134.0 178.6 0.1 20 2.2 13 22.690 3.2 16 Germany 2.2 2. This thesis can be established via two different.5 6 Portugal 112.9 8 3.4 8 10.

An alternative way to defend oneself from the influence of other. This is why countries balance in a way that minimizes their (expected) loss in autonomy.. They seek power as a means to secure survival (Waltz 1979:79–80). but rather focused on those states that pose the potentially greatest (negative) influ- ence-potential or even threat (Walt 1987:esp.10 In terms of security seeking. For further discussions of this central but elusive concept. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2001:71–75) and Baldwin (1993:3–25). whose freedom of action is again 8 Liberals. . Rittberger. Powell 1994). balancing alliance behavior is not foremost aimed at the greatest power. that maximizes their (expected) long-term freedom of action (Baumann. Wolf 2004). a political structure is determined by three characteristics: the or- dering principle. 5). maybe stronger. The prerequisite to survive is power. the distribution of power is what counts. Thereby. and Wagner 2001:42). From a neorealist point of view all states face rather harsh security pressures in such a setting. 23–24 and 153–165). measured by GDP. and Constructivists typically do not doubt that the international system is anarchic. but against threats. the aim of a state’s balance politics is to prevent other states from gaining (dominating) influence over it. 10 The geographical proximity is a core element of Walt’s ‘‘Balance-of-Threat-theory. Power enhances a state’s freedom of action. For most states. in this perspective neorealism is not an evolutionary theory. the systemic variable ‘‘distribution of power’’ has to be translated into a unit-level variable. which does not allow for the functional differentiation of units. In order to explain the behavior of individual states. and gives it influence over other states: both of which improve its security. we focus on the ‘‘input dimension’’ of power and follow the neorealist understanding of power as control over resources (Mastanduno 1999:141.226 The Rift states as unitary and the central actors in an anarchic international system. Because of their importance and their relative ease to measure and compare. because the possibilities of economic and military power projection decline with increasing distance. and the unit’s power re- lations (Waltz 1979:ch. This produces the relative power of a state in a system as the relevant neorealist-independent variable for foreign policy anal- ysis. 9 For short definitions of power and its components see Waltz (1979:131) and Morgenthau (1973). its autonomy. Link 2001:107). It is important to note that the main motive that guides the actions of states does not necessarily have to be the whole international system and a state’s power po- sition within the global power structure (Mearsheimer 1990:7). the power structure within their ‘‘salient environment’’ (i. But they reject the classical neorealist conclusion that this property inevitably produces a high security pressure. The central element of structural realism is the concept of structure.11 The small European states’ freedom of action and autonomy is most likely con- strained by the great European countries. According to Kenneth Waltz. and the size of the population (see Table 1). Neighboring countries and those who are rather close possess a greater potential for influence. but a theory of collective rational choice. There- fore. In international politics. which makes predictions about specific foreign policy actions possible. economic power. measured by military expenditure. Power and security can be obtained by increasing one’s own military capabilities. As anarchy is seen as a quasi-constant condition in the international world. in other words.9 States therefore act rather similar. which makes power politics a necessity and genuine cooperation impossible (Wendt 1992. the functional properties of the units.8 Ultimately they are dependent on self- help. where no superior authority exists. Rittberger. see for example. we took the following three components of power into account: military power. because ‘‘power and incentives wane with distance from states’ homebase’’ (Mouritzen 1998:4). powers is to engage in alliances (Waltz 1979:118–119. the only relevant difference between states is their relative power capabilities. Institutionalists. who are supposed to have much further reach- ing interests. In neorealist understanding a nation’s foreign policy should be explainable and predictable through identifying its power position (Baumann. or. excluding great and superpowers.e. their neighborhood) is relevant.’’ which says that states do note balance against power alone. and Wagner 2001:46). 11 Obviously.

On the other hand. According to the applied indicators. but also Italy stand apart. the nuclear powers France and Great Britain. they have to fear being dragged into the others’ conflicts. For (modern) liberals and liberal- constructivists. On the one hand.12 For them it is appropriate to demonstrate their loy- alty in order to reassure themselves of further support from the United States and to make clear their own relevance. Great Britain. these four countries constitute the group of the great European powers. This concern will be greater if a state is dependent on his ‘‘great partner’’ and minor if the alliance leader is in turn (at least indirectly) dependent on the former (Snyder 1984. which is in principle based on considerations of balance of power. The argument is that asymmetric dependent allies face an alliance dilemma. Bennet. 2003). and population. From a domestic politics perspective the sources of foreign policy lie in the material and ideal interests of individuals and groups. Domestic actors and structures explain states’ prefer- ences and actions (Moravcsik 1997. The country-specific neorealist forecast is therefore that Germany. Whereas the powerful states can self-confidently confront the United States because their risk in doing so is simply relatively low. Hypotheses 2 and 3 identify domestic configurations as relevant factors determining foreign policy. too. JRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER 227 foremost curtailed by the United States. against the United States to enhance their own autonomy and influence. It was the United States that fended off a hegemonic attempt by a European great power three times within one century. military expenditures. Thus it can be argued that the great European powers tend to balance. Obviously. larger countries. especially those of the leading power. or at least try to balance. Germany. . as they are too weak without a strong partner. they are afraid of being abandoned by the leading ally. in essence. and Unger 1994). in small states the fear not to anger the superpower should prevail. Alliance Dependencies Alliance politics is often explained with reference to conditions of dependence. is the classical balance-of-power argument ‘‘disguised’’ as alliance dependency. They are much more vulnerable to influ- ences from other. and their relative strengths. Kupchan 1988. Subsystemic Level: Societal Forces and Ideological Preferences Whereas the power–structural hypothesis sees the configuration of power resourc- es of unitary states as crucial. France. For the small European states. the relations between them. Lepgold. the international system does not determine states’ preferences and actions. while the small European states tend to balance (with the help of the United States) against the powerful European countries for the same reason (Link 2001:134). because they cannot guarantee their security autonomously. Whether argued directly with balance politics or indirectly with alliance depend- encies: the neorealist forecast says that the small European states tend to support the American Iraq policy because it is American power that enhances their security and strengthens their autonomous freedom of action by holding in check the power of the bigger European states (Link 2002:41). The same hypothesis can be derived with a slightly different line of argument. and Italy should oppose the Unites States’ Iraq ambitions. The main foreign policy actor is a 12 Remember that the small European states’ experience with the United States is very positive. This. a sound relationship with the United States ap- pears much more important than for the powerful countries. whereas the 16 remaining countries are considered to be small states (similarly Mearsheimer 1990). but the rest should support Washington. But which are the small and the Great Powers in Europe? Table 1 illustrates the relative capabilities of the analyzed countries using the indicators of economic strength.

There were some cross- country surveys available. we analyzed the extent of public protests. Furthermore. This was surely the case with the Iraq question. Therefore we operational- ized the influence of society. The influence of private interest groups etc. especially if 13 Clearly. societal interests shape the behavior of governments and therefore of states. A growing number of studies reached the conclusion that ‘‘mass public opinion matter[s]’’ (Risse-Kappen 1991:510. However. Whereas it was nearly consensus for several decades that mass public opinion plays only a very minor role in foreign policy. . leaders follow masses’’ (Risse-Kappen 1991:480). Hypothesis 2 assumes that the general public has a distinct and measurable impact on the foreign policy behavior of countries. Thus Hypothesis 2 examines how signif- icant the domestic interests of governments were. and because of changes over time. Hypothesis 3 exam- ines whether the ideological stances of governments played a role in determining a country’s position during the Iraq crisis. From that perspective the aspiration of politicians to ‘‘attain the income. Its ‘‘core shared beliefs and interests’’ are said to be ‘‘the primary motivational basis . this interpretation has been considerably challenged over the last 20 years. . representative government acts as a ‘‘transmission belt’’ that translates individual and group in- terests into public policy (Moravcsik 1997:518). especially in very important issue areas like security. if an administration is left or right orientated. and power which come from being in office’’ (Downs 1957:28) finally acts as the mechanism that makes society’s preferences those of governments. public opinion. Holsti (1992). especially issue specific. The core statement of this ‘‘bottom-up’’ approach is that ‘‘[i]n sum. should be rather low in the analyzed situation compared with situations with distributional effects.14 The thesis that mass public opinion has an effect on policy should be especially true if a broad public is activated (Powlick and Katz 1998). Secondly. because ‘‘in the case of broader political and security issues. that is. of foreign policy’’ (Hagan 1995:133). survey data become available to politicians (Holsti 1996:195). In essence. Firstly. 14 For overviews of the debate about the effect of public opinion on foreign policy see Russett (1990:87–110). prestige.15 We applied two criteria to measure public opinion. if any.13 In such a conception of public policy. Influence of Public Opinion One central argument of utilitarian–liberal approaches is that. and positions of interests groups are decisive factors for political action. because rational politicians adapt to the interests of society in order to assure re- election and stay in power. First of all. the influence that private interest groups can exert in politicized issues seems to be largely dependent on the support of mass public opinion (Risse-Kappen 1991:510–511). its beliefs.228 The Rift country’s government. second-hand survey data had to be used. elites’ attitudes. some problems with the case-specific formulation of the hypothesis that mass public opinion determines a government’s Iraq policy should be discussed. but in order to get a broader picture it was essential to use country-specific surveys as well. Furthermore. emphasis in the original). it postulates that the preferences of society determine the actions of governments. it seems reasonable to allow for a rather wide tolerance. is the decisive factor in determining the position a country took. Therefore. we considered the results of surveys. the hypothesis exists that the influence of mass public opinion grows as more. . and Shapiro and Jacobs (2000:223–245). powerful domestic actors do not frame policy decisions as they do on domestic matters’’ (Banchoff 1993:12). which was hotly debated around Europe. Furthermore. interests. This study focuses on public opinion and asks to what extent it can explain the behavior of European states during the Iraq crisis. To put it rather simplistically but vividly. in democracies at least. It claims that the party affiliation of a government. and actors through the concept of mass public opinion. this argument is based on the concept of political actors as rational utility maximizers as it is for- mulated in classical economic theory of politics and pluralist theory of democracy. 15 This operationalization of societal attitudes also results from the nature of the examined problem.

If there were mass dem- onstrations against an Iraq war.16 As mentioned above.S. JRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER 229 prediction: country does ‘neutral range’ prediction: country H 2a not support the U. The dotted arrows show when and how mass protests altered the classification compared with survey data. If opposition is below that threshold. a country will take a corresponding stance. Do Parties Matter? The third or partisan hypothesis suggests that the ideological background of a government. A very strong issue-specific activation suggests that the relevant issue has a significant impact on the overall valuation of a government or party.S. for diplomatic reasons. because it seeks to avoid conflict not only on the domestic level. it can be argued that. (1994). . even if the general public mood was in the ‘‘neutral’’ range.4 against attack mass protests against an Iraq-war prediction: country does H 2b prediction: country supports the U. this issue should be relevant for the voting decisions of an important part of society. has a major influence on foreign policy.6 0. which is expressed in its party affiliation. it was deemed necessary to specify an ‘‘undetermined’’ or ‘‘neutral’’ range. a significant part of the pop- ulation is highly mobilized if hundreds of thousands of people take to the street. Only if more than 60% persistently opposed an attack would it be expected that the gov- ernment followed in its policy. 1. we formulated Hy- pothesis 2 in a second version. Thus. this argument leaves the subsystemic level and employs a third-image argument. besides survey data.S. supports the U. we employed a second criterion to determine the public’s attitude. according to the societal hypoth- esis. not support the U. As an indicator of salience we considered to what extent people took to the street to express their opinion. measurement difficulties are considered. which we defined as instances where between 40% and 60% of the people were against or for an Iraq invasion in the weeks and months before the beginning of the war. In the strict sense.5 0. For example. a country tends to support a friendly nation. if more than 60% oppose such an action. Thus. share of population 0. See Bennet et al. Governments formed by left-of-center parties or at least dominated by leftist parties are expected to oppose America’s Iraq policy. which argues that only if public opinion is clearly against an invasion.S. Figure 1 shows the possible values and the accompanying forecasts of these hypotheses. Only if domestic opposition is obvious. it can be argued that there was clear public pressure on the government. under such circumstances a government should have taken an op- posing stance against the United States as well. Thus. it is rather unlikely that a government will follow public opinion if there is no clear or a changing majority. Hypothesis 2b predicts that a country supports the United States. a government should withdraw from its predisposed supporting stance.17 As describing all possible constellations and predictions of Hypothesis 2a and 2b would be too long winded for this paper. 17 This argument rests on the consideration that even with unclear survey data. Decision rule for the societal hypothesis. that is. but also on the international level. Governments 16 This argument needs at least one further auxiliary assumption. It is clearly a weakness when for a particular value range of an independent variable no meaningful prediction can be formulated. FIG. Consequently.

19 Member lists are provided by all major international party organizations. Regularly policy preferences are operationalized through the left–right scheme. Roubini. Rittberger. The category of right parties consists of conservative. 20 Besides country-specific articles about party systems that cannot all be listed here. and Therien and Noel (2000). with the ‘‘constructivist turn’’ (Checkel 18 A complete list of the 116 examined parties and their classification can be downloaded at http://www. Banchoff for example.evppe. Verbeek 2003).org. Kaarbo (1996). this hypothesis implies a very different conception of political actors. which leads to a similar assessment of problems and a similar policy. we mainly used Ismayr (2002. should oppose the Iraq policy of the Bush administration rests on three considerations. It assumes that their first and foremost concern is to shape their countries’ policy according to their political beliefs or ideology. Boix 1998). www. green and social-liberal parties were counted as left parties. respectively. 23 Of course.socialistinternational. It is also remarkable because. See Comparative studies are rare. discussed.23 This neglect of party politics in the analysis of foreign policy and IRs is partic- ularly Social-democratic. which implies that right-orientated gov- ernments tend to support a conservative U. even though disagreements between parties over foreign policy issues are quite common and often as fiercely debated as those about domestic issues. communist. it is neglected in Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis and IRs. it can be argued that ideological kinship plays a role in international coalition-building Studies that explicitly examine whether the ‘‘color’’ of a state’s government makes a difference for its external behavior in comparative perspective are very rare. We followed this scheme and grouped all major parties and all governments in either the right category or the left one. political actors are. especially when there is no ‘‘clear’’ humanitarian cause for an intervention. www. Therien and Noel provide a short overview of the spare literature about the impact of political parties on foreign policy as well. the political science literature about European parties and their ideological orientation and media re- ports were used to classify the parties. who derive utility only from being in office. the po- litical left tends to value peace and nonmilitary conflict resolution higher. with limits of course. and usually affirmed in Comparative Politics and Comparative Economics.18 We applied two criteria for that classification.html. this hypothesis models political actors as mainly policy oriented. www. which is expressed in which international party organization a party is a (associate) member. and Cohen 1997. and www. able to do this. Kittel. . anti- American sentiment seems to be stronger within the European left than the (mod- erate) right. Zürn (1993).230 The Rift formed by or dominated by right-of-center parties are supposed to back the United States. On the contrary.21 Secondly. 2003) and Bugajski (2002). Obviously. Exceptions are. According to the ‘‘partisan theory’’ (Hibbs 1992). 22 The dimensions ‘‘peace’’ and ‘‘military’’ are important indicators for classifying parties on the left–right continuum (Budge and Klingemann 2001). Although the partisan hypothesis is widely examined. The first criterion was the way a party sees itself.uni- regensburg. for example. Schmidt 1996. some studies on foreign policy analyze the role of political parties.19 Secondly. administration.20 The hypothesis that leftist parties. Christian-demo- cratic. Party ideologies are thought to be relevant for public policy (Hibbs 1977. liberal and liberal-conservative. and therefore governments dominated by leftist parties. 21 The assumption behind this argument is that ideological kinship involves a similar belief system or set of normative political attitudes. socialist. Thirdly.S.eldr. and center-parties. which provide a good overview of European party systems. because the ‘‘partisan theory’’ lies at the center of democratic legitimation.europeangreens. but mostly those are country- specific studies (see. Alesina. They are not primarily regarded as utility maximizers. Partisan theory suggests that the partisan composition of a government is a major determinant of policy outputs and outcomes as well. and Schimmelfennig (1995).pes.liberal-international.

oppose an attack. summarizes those values for each country. norms. FIG. whose liberalism image to attain (exogenous) preference public is office societal (public against an preference opinion) Iraq-war.’s Iraq- skeptical against policy. 1998) in IRs. Boekle. Figure 2 gives a short overview of the three hypoth- eses derived above. Maximizing Power position Weak states realism image security autonomy and support U. Government. nothing speaks against locating the ‘‘intersubjectively shared. Wendt 1999.S. (neorealism) influence strong oppose. State Survival. which can be found in the appendix.25 Table A1. right (conservative) governments U. Palan 2000). a new (or renewed) emphasis has been put on ideational factors like beliefs. Tables A2–A5 summarizes the performance of the hypotheses tested. Katzenstein 1996. see Schuster (2004). Results In this section the results of the hypotheses tests on the 20 European countries listed above will be presented. and culture (Goldstein and Keohane 1993. Hypothesis 1: Small States and Great Powers Out of 16 small states only three did not declare themselves part of the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ and did not lend their political.S. Liberal Second. Overview of the examined hypotheses.24 In principle. support the U. as they had dif- ferent identities or normative visions about appropriate political behavior. Rittberger. which examined the behavior of each country from summer 2002 until summer 2003. If parties and governments took a distinguishable position according to their ideological background. Utilitarian Second. Before this presentation. which constructivists claim to guide actors’ behavior at the level of political parties or party ideologies. sometimes even military. ideas. and Wagner 2001). 2. The dichotomous values of the variables were de- rived with the help of case studies.S. . Convert Assumption: Left Party Left constructivism image party elites partisan is stronger affiliation of governments (idealist identity into peace-orientated government oppose the liberalism) public policy and more U. Klotz 1995. then they did so because they differently interpreted or constructed the situation.S. support to the 24 We use the term constructivism in the sense of ‘‘soft’’ or ‘‘thin’’ constructivism (Carlsnaes 2002. value-based expectations of appropriate behaviour’’ (Boekle. 25 For those case studies and their sources. The next section presents the empirical answers to the question of whether it were international power structures.. Government (Re-)election Determined by Societal States. public opinion. and Wag- ner 2001:106). respectively. Rittberger. with Tables A3–A5 providing some simple statistics as well. or party ideologies that had the dominant impact on the Iraq policy of European states in the months before the war. Finnemore 1996a.-policy. JRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER 231 Theoretical Level of Actor Actor’s Actor’s Independent Hypothesis Background analysis basic Preference variable interest Structural Third.

the Czech Republic. Hungary. In no country was there a clear and permanent majority for a military solution of the Iraq crisis. In some states. where its fore- cast and actual behavior fit in 6 out of 10 cases and where alternative accounts attain a better record. Not so much in Western Europe. And the only ex-communist country that did not align itself with the United States was Slovenia. Despite this sometimes massive public resistance. public pressure seems to have influenced governments in their decisions about the use of their own military forces. a forecast about military participation of European countries in an Iraq war based on the public’s stance would have scored very well with a ‘‘hitrate’’ of nearly 26 Chan and Safran (2006) and Schuster (2004) provide a more detailed discussion of this issue. On the contrary. In those countries. and so forth. But the other two Great Powers. however. Ad- ditionally. but contrary to the four countries listed above. although for several months it seemed as if Slovenia would declare itself part of the ‘‘coalition of the willing. opinion polls showed a crystal clear picture with up to 90% rejecting an invasion and support of an intervention. namely Belgium. Hungary. Greece. with Slovenia being rather unsure for quite a long time. All those casesFEstonia. fiercely opposed the United States. it seemed worthwhile to analyze how well the societal hypothesis would have fared. Italy. As just indicated.’’ Obviously. Several further points are also noteworthy. Great Britain and Italy. the public’s attitude toward an Iraq interven- tion was clearly hostile against an invasion (see Tables A2 and A4 in the appendix). became more cautious with mounting public opposition and. and Romania before the war. Although there are clear signs that some governments that supported the United States. governments generally did not follow public opinion. Greece. Italy. in the eastern parts of Europe the power- structural hypothesis scored well. Poland.26 Although the dependent variable of this study is the political stance a country took. even if supported by a further United Nations Security Council Resolution. saw massive public protests as well. Britain saw substantial public unrest as hundred of thousands took to the streets to protest against an imminent attack and their own government’s support of such a move. like those of Spain. the forecast of the societal hypothesis was correct in only 31% (Hypothesis 2a) and 45% (Hypothesis 2b) of the cases.232 The Rift United States. Nearly everywhere. there were no cases in which public opinion served as the only expla- nation for the relevant country’s political position. and Ro- maniaFare former communist countries in Middle-Eastern Europe. if the dependent var- iable had been altered into ‘‘active military participation in an Iraq intervention. Hypothesis 2: The Sceptical People In all but a few European countries. Opinion polls showed similar figures for Great Britain. respectively. and Spain. the two leading continental powers.’’ Clearly. . European societies generally were very skeptical against the United States Iraq policy. for example. In fact. and Slovenia. the power-structural hypothesis scored rather high as Tables A2 and A3 show (see appendix). Germany. no country that stood in the camp of the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ altered its pro-American position and shirked from its political support. France and Germany. Poland. Denmark. sending own troops to Iraq was regarded as anathema by large majorities. supported the United States. In several cases Hypothesis 1 is the only hypothesis that offers a correct forecast. Together with Belgium. Public opinion about the right Iraq policy was unclear in Bulgaria. Lithuania. backed away from once offered active military sup- port. or the Czech Republic. With a ‘‘hit rate’’ of 75%. in most countries a clear majority rejected an attack. but also in France. where nearly half of the population expressed consent to America’s Iraq policy and wanted their governments to sup- port the United States. to name just the most striking examples. public opinion was rather undetermined.

However.8286 82.7647 Eastern European partiesn 0. Summary of European Political Parties’ Positions Fisher–Yates Percentage Test on Statistical K Coefficient Rate Independence (Normed) f (Via w2) Difference l w All parties 0.0000 0.3093 0.4000 Western European opposition partiesw 0.31 0.7715 0. w Passed exact Fisher–Yeates test at a ¼ 0.6509 59.5021 45. the ideological orientation of a government. but a closer look reveals some interesting details. Whereas in Middle Eastern Europe the partisan hypothesis correctly predicted only 4 out of 10 cases.2689 0.0000 n Passed exact Fisher–Yeates test at a ¼ 0. measured in the categories of left-of-center and right-of-center. Table 2 summarizes the results of this analysis. As there is further evidence from the case studies that some governments really backed away from military support and constrained their support for the United States at the political level in the face of public opposition. Still.28 0. In 12 out of 20 cases a state took the position expected by the partisan hypothesis.2241 15. ob- viously has no explanatory power for a country’s position during the Iraq crisis. Hypothesis 3: Party PoliticsFThe Left Versus the Right? The result of the partisan hypothesis is somewhat ambivalent. it can be argued that the public’s will is generally mighty enough to hinder the use of military force. this result is not very im- pressive.’’ In this part of Europe. respectively.48 0.87 0. France.0000 0. In contrast. by the way.9023 0.00 0.6125 0.58 0.05.7265 0. .S. it was wrong in only two West European Countries: in Britain and France.01.86 0.6346 0. The hypothesis that leftist parties tended to object to the U.4164 0. gets further support from a more detailed analysis of the positions of individual parties.5988 60. N ¼ 116. JRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER 233 90%.8406 81.4167 All governmental partiesw 0. the party affiliation of a government seems to be a good indicator of how a country behaved during the Iraq crisis. which examined the stance of 116 European parties or their leadership. six out of seven left-of-center governments in Eastern Europe positioned their country in the ‘‘coalition of the willing. whereas the political right supported this action.0171 0. the main point is that there exists a clear difference between Eastern and Western Europe. was the only country with a right-of-center leadership that opposed the United States’ Iraq policy.03 0. but it seems not to be influential enough to determine key political foreign policy positions.0245 0. In Western Europe though. And Britain’s labor government was the only leftist West Eu- ropean government which supported the United States.8000 Eastern European governmental parties 0. in both countries there was clear case evidence that the parties of the right were more supportive toward the United States than those on the left.3333 Eastern European opposition partiesn 0.0004 0.93 0.0714 Western European governmental partiesw 0. but is nevertheless significant. Overall. TABLE 2.8473 0. This relationship is weaker in Eastern European countries than in Western European ones.0018 0. but very interesting (see again Tables A2 and A5 in the appendix).-led invasion.0000 0.3081 29.7483 60. as Table A2 and espe- cially the low value of the Fisher–Yates test on statistical independence show (see Table A5). It shows a significant relationship between the ideological orientation of parties and their stances during the months before the Iraq war.0001 0.9100 0.0000 All opposition parties 0.5769 Western European partiesw 0.4805 48.

0547 Hypothesis 3 (East) 4 6 0. For governmental parties. Test of Results’ Superiority Against Guessing Proportional Proportional Right Wrong Right Wrong N P(x  r)w Hypothesis 1n 15 5 0. has an apparent implication.2517 Hypothesis 3 (West)n 8 2 0.11 19 0.8281 n Significant at a ¼ 0.45 0. especially in Eastern Europe.80 0. however.5 (H0: pi  0. Obviously. those ideological attitudes were superimposed by other forces and consequently had no effect. with pi being the proportion of correctly predicted cases. could just as well have been achieved through simple guessing or by tossing a coin.1. .60 0. which formally reads H1: pi40.10 10 0.31 0. both in Eastern and Western Europe. Eastern European parties in government mostly did not act as expected according to their ideological background.0004 Hypothesis 3 12 8 0. The partisan hypothesis offers a convincing account for the TABLE 3. Power in the East–Ideology in the West? One major result of this study so far has been that the explanatory power of the partisan and the power structural hypotheses differ sharply in the western and the eastern part of Europe. are presented in Table 3.40 0. A forecast about military support for the United States. The results described so far can be further validated by a short significance test. The results of this test.0107 Hypothesis 2 (a) 5 11 0. the party affiliation of its government.75 0. or the public’s attitude significantly enhanced the chances to predict correctly if a country was part of the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ or not.40 20 0. Cleary. though. it did not really matter in former communist states if a country had a left-of-center or right-of-center government. With a simple binomial test.40 10 0.89 0. would have been rather reliable and clearly not accidental if based on the public sentiment about such a policy. In the western part of Europe ide- ological preferences generally transformed into foreign policy.90 0.9616 Hypothesis 2 (b) 9 11 0.5). only in Western Europe does a strong and significant relationship between the ideological orientations of parties and their positions regarding an Iraq intervention exist. we examined whether the results of the hypotheses were just accidental.0207 Hypothesis 1 (West) 6 4 0.234 The Rift The partisan hypothesis clearly holds for oppositional parties. The same is true for the power- structural hypothesis.55 20 0. Knowledge of public opin- ion could not really help to forecast a European country’s political position on an American-led Iraq intervention.25 20 0. and the partisan hypothesis in Western Europe.60 10 0.69 16 0. with r being the number of correctly predicted cases by each hypothesis. w Probability that a ‘‘success rate’’ at least as good as the actual rate would have been achieved by pure guessing. this test confirms the results described above. It did make a significant difference in Western Europe though.60 0. that is.20 10 0. The observation that an overall relationship between parties’ ideologies and po- sitions toward America’s Iraq policy exists. In the eastern part. as it is clearly visible in the opposition parties’ stances. or if the knowledge of a state’s power position.3770 Hypothesis 1 (East)n 9 1 0. In these cases it is highly unlikely that the observed proportion of congruence between prediction and actual behavior could have been achieved through random guessing.7483 Hypothesis 2 (Military)n 17 2 0.

cultural explanations like the argument that the Eastern European countries are all former communist countries which had just been freed by the United States and because of this are more willing to engage in the liberation of subjugated countries. the relationship between ideological background and political stance in the Iraq issue is clearly weaker in Eastern Eu- ropean countries than in Western European ones. The second explanation seems more convincing. why systemic forces operated in Eastern Europe but not in Western Europe and made Eastern European countries support the United States regardless of domestic con- figurations. dependent on the United States for security.’’ In the end. But what can account for the different explanatory power of the power structural and the partisan hypothesis in different regions of Europe? Why had there been obviously dissimilar motivational sources of foreign policy? Apparently. which makes power political considerations prevalent and pushes do- mestic motives aside. according to which those governments were forced to act. from which those states just ‘‘escaped. it is plausible that a country which faces tougher security pressures and more negative influence scenarios from its neighbors is more likely to look for a strong partner to provide shelter and security. The fact that the Eastern European parties in government. but had generally a decisive weight in Western Europe if the security situation is just perceived or objectively determinable. but the power position of a country seems to be a rather inadequate indicator of behavior in Western Europe. generally took a pro-American stance regardless of their political background supports the interpretation that there exists an objectively more pre- carious security situation in Eastern Europe. there is an argument that speaks against the predominance of alternative. The power-structural hypothesis is well placed to account for the supportive behavior of nearly all Eastern European countries. re- gardless of whether it is in opposition or if it governs. However. an inter- vening variable had to be at work. After all. Without dwelling on details. respectively. Nonetheless. We argue that the dissimilar security situation is the prevailing reason. JRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER 235 behavior of West European governments. But the argument is that Eastern European states live in a worse. generally decided if a country was part of the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ in . The essence of the empirical results of this study can be summarized as follows. it has no consequences at all for the observation that domestic con- stellations did not influence the security policy of the former communist states. the intervening variable. that is. or perceive a worse. they are likely to strive for a close and untroubled relationship with the United States. but cannot explain the positions of their eastern counterparts. but not the oppos- itional parties. Two rivalry explanations seem plausible: one that stresses cultural factors and one that is located at the systemic level and stresses differences in the security environment or its perception. But there is also evidence that cultural and/or perceptional factors played at least a minor role because. or perceive themselves as. this is true for all small states in Europe. it can be argued that a worse ob- jective security situation can be established through the higher political instability in neighboring regions and through the potentially dominating influence of Russia. The oppositional parties in Eastern Europe therefore generally should not have acted according to the partisan hypothesis. security en- vironment. Of course. A possible decline in the relationship with the United States seems much graver for those states under the assumption of a declining marginal utility of security. Domestic constellations. or more precisely. as Table 2 also shows. As long as the small European states are. the ideological background of govern- ments. they did (see Table 2). that is. If these interpretations were the most convincing. then there should have been no significant difference in the behavior of governmental and oppositional parties as cultural and perceptional factors should have the same effect on a party.

This leads to the thesis that neorealist theory is not a very suitable model to account for foreign policy in regions like Western Europe.27 27 This view is very similar to Stephen Walt’s ‘‘Balance of Threat’’ theory and partly derived from it as the informed reader surely is aware of (Walt 1987. states are supposed to be relatively relaxed about a marginal change in their power position. There. independently of power relations have an effect on the security of a country. even if the dis- tribution of power would suggest such policies. the better its security position is. and from the variability of security independent of power. considerations of power typically seem to be superimposed by domestic factors. Instead of being a function of its power position. Where threats are small. in security issues. then its security position is solely determined by power- independent factors. at least to a certain degree.’’ There. or even totally. Neorealist approaches could enhance their plausibility and applicability. because a marginal change in security has comparably little impact on a state’s utility under the condition of high security. The obvious dependency of the explanatory power of the structural approach on the security environment a state faces implies that. domestic constellations did not play a role. If the power po- sition of a country is very weak because of its own minor capabilities and/or the system’s power structure. However. instead of relative differences in threats from different states. though. neorealist accounts score poorly. We argue that (1) neorealist theory would benefit from acknowledging the possibility of varying security pres- sure independent of a state’s power position. espe- cially in the field of alliance and balance politics if they employed a state’s security position as the explanatory variable (or at least explicitly recognized the security environment as an intervening variable) instead of the power position. the scope of the neorealist theory is more limited than claimed by its advocates. dependent on its power position (and those of its allies). and (2) political parties should receive greater attention in the analysis of foreign policy. etc. However. if a state’s security position is bad. If the security environment is very fragile and threatening. Implications for IRs Theory This last section focuses on two implications of our empirical study for the the- oretical debate in IRs and foreign policy analysis. for a similar argument see Brooks 1997). In such a model. and balance of power politics will determine policy less. it emphasizes the importance of the ‘‘absolute’’ level of security. Under the common neorealist premise that states derive utility from security and under the assumption of a declining marginal rate of utility from security. where national policy is. Power con- siderations only seem to govern foreign policy if a country’s security position is fragile or is perceived as fragile. transformed by institutional arrangements. the security position increases both with an increasing power position and with a better power-independent security position. Following from this. states will strive less for power. too. The worst-case assumption of structural realism seems not to describe correctly the actual calcu- lation of political actors in those ‘‘safe regions. then the security and autonomy of a country is largely. Stronger than Walt’s theory. as the power-independent security position can be . though. states predominantly acted according to structural forces at the sys- temic level.236 The Rift Western Europe. and where no significant external threat to autonomy can be perceived. The security position can be understood as consisting of the power position and further com- ponents which. the similarity is clearly strong. we expect it to be much more sensitive to changes in relative power and to act much more according to power and alliance motives. Especially if a good security position is mainly a result of power-independent factors. In Eastern Europe. the foreign policy of a country should be understood as a function of its security position. power and balance politics will not play a major role if the security position is good..

’’ Determining in more detail and across a wider range of issues and cases what generally constitutes the power-independent security situation should be a prom- ising field of future research. for the model just described domestic factors are not just intervening variables. liberal. Kaarbo (1996. 30 See. Katzenstein 1996. However. for example. 2001). we expect the power position to be a useful indicator for foreign policy analysis only if the nonpower components of security are in a ‘‘bad condition.29 Various arguments about what constitutes a state’s security situation besides its power position can be found in institutionalist. With varying emphasis these approaches argue. Grieco (1995) and Schweller and Priess (1997). the form of government (Russett 1993. orientations. two things are remarkable: they are either touched on in a footnote or a small paragraph or they are discussed generally in the context of government structure. Ireland and Gartner (2001). JRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER 237 Our results imply the thesis of a smaller scope of the power-structural neorealist approach. Lipson 2003). The second major implication.30 Although these are important contributions that provide remarkable insights. which ignore the political aims. neorealists generally see security that is not based on power as constant (and small). and also of different party systems. which lead to suboptimal policy. or national cultures (Kier 1995. they offer a promising field of research.28 According to the results of this study. especially neoclassical realists. See further and on neoclassical realism gen- erally Schweller (1997. Indeed. offering the opportunity of theoretical advancements by connecting insights from different paradigms. that challenge the constant effects of anarchy from a neorealist perspective. there is a strand in the literature discussing the effects of different government and cabinet structures. 29 Especially in foreign policy analysis. norms (Kratochwil 1989. Whenever political parties are mentioned. It provides a (systemic) boundary condition. This study suggests that it is sensible to analyze the effects that governments’ party affiliations have on foreign policy in more detail. and constructivist thinking. political parties and their differing ideological orientations have been neglected in the theoretical study of IRs and foreign policy. for example. Hudson 1997). Textbooks on IRs and foreign policy are mostly ignorant on the role of political parties and their ideological preferences. However. and from a comparative perspective. frequently argue that the power position of a country does not necessarily entail the expected policy. They maintain that domestic factors hinder states to react ‘‘correctly’’ ac- cording to the structure of the international system (Waltz 1979:71). In countries that do not face significant external threats. Hey. of our study is: ‘‘Bring parties in!’’ Surprisingly enough. Neack 2003). 2002). on foreign policy at some length. 2003) and Rose (1998). Further neorealist works that offer some similar aspects. In contrast to that. risk overestimating structural conditions while disregarding the agency of the understood as the sum of all threats from other states. Russett and Oneal 2001. or Chan and Safran (2006). and ideologies of their subjects. These approaches have in com- mon that they do not work with worst-case assumptions and allow for a variation of the power-independent security situation. Oneal and Russett 1999. and Haney 1995:2. for example. Onuf 1989. As indicated above. especially for the study of foreign policy formulation in parliamentary systems. 28 (Neo)realists. it seems to us thatFmuch like at the international levelFsuch analyses of governmental struc- tures. Finnemore 1996b) and ideas (Goldstein and Keohane 1993) have a changing effect on policy. there are trends that endorse the combination of different approaches and accept eclecticism in theory building (Neack. because they operate with worst-case sce- narios. that information. .23 there are just a handful of scholarly publications discussing this topic seriously and in a comparative perspective. or rather claim. Hill 2003:30. international institutions (Keohane 1993. because such factors are supposed to offset the constancy of anarchy (Wendt 1992). under which circumstances foreign policy is led by power structures. this domestic factor seems to have an underestimated influence on foreign policy. In our model the concept of the power-independent security position leaves room for changes in a state’s security position regardless of changes in its power position. Sprecher and DeRouen (2005). and that influenced our model are.

Values of Variables Governments’ Power Ideological PO on Military Country Political Stance Position Orientationn Public Opinion (PO) Participation Belgium (W) Oppositional Weak Left Oppositional Oppositional Bulgaria (E) Supportive Weak Right Neutral Oppositional Czeh Republic (E) Supportive Weak Left Oppositional Oppositional Denmark (W) Supportive Weak Right Neutral Neutral Estonia (E) Supportive Weak Left Oppositional Oppositional France (W) Oppositional Strong Right Oppositional Oppositional Germany (W) Oppositional Strong Left Oppositional Oppositional Great Britain (W) Supportive Strong Left Oppositional Oppositional Greece (W) Oppositional Weak Left Oppositional Oppositional Hungary (E) Supportive Weak Left Oppositional Oppositional Italy (W) Supportive Strong Right Oppositional Oppositional Latvia (E) Supportive Weak Right Oppositional Oppositional Lithuania (E) Supportive Weak Left Oppositional Oppositional Netherlands (W) Supportive Weak Right Oppositional Oppositional Poland (E) Supportive Weak Left Neutral Oppositional Portugal (W) Supportive Weak Right Oppositional Oppositional Romania (E) Supportive Weak Left Neutral Oppositional Slovakia (E) Supportive Weak Right Oppositional Oppositional Slovenia (E) Oppositional Weak Left Oppositional Oppositional Spain (W) Supportive Weak Right Oppositional Oppositional n Where both left and right of center parties were part of a government this government was classified according to the dominating party of parties. It might have been justified to neglect governments’ party affiliations in times of high security pressures that threatened the survival of Western democracies. it appears not erroneous to care about governments’ ideologies.238 The Rift actors. At least in Western Europe. into account. visible in party affiliations. We think this limitation on structure at the domestic level misses oppor- tunities of more actor-focused explanations that take the ideological orientations of important players. But to ignore the ideological orientations of parties and governments today means to ignore an important determinant of foreign policy. . but necessary. Appendix Tables A1–A5 TABLE A1. as Morgenthau once claimed (Morgenthau 1973:5).

4) 0. E:0.75 (W:06.14) 0. E:6) 11 (W:5. E:0. E:4) 17 Sum ‘‘not confirmed’’ 5 (W:4. E:10) 19 Proportion of confirmed cases 0. E:7) 20 (W:10. E:10) 16 (W:9. E:10) 20 (W:10. E:6) 2 No.5. of valid cases 20 (W:10.4) 0. E:1) 9 (W:5. TABLE A2.6 (W:0. Therefore no clear prognosis is possible.8.9) 0.89 n But some evidence that a county’s behavior was influenced by the desire not to anger the United States. ResultFOverview Societal Power-structural Partisan Societal Societal Hypothesis Country Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis (a) Hypothesis (b) (Military) Belgium (W) Not confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Bulgaria (E) Confirmed Confirmed Fz Confirmed Confirmed Czech Republic (E) Confirmed Not confirmedw Not confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Denmark (W) Confirmed Confirmed Fz Confirmed Fz Estonia (E) Confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed France (W) Confirmed Not confirmedw Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Germany (W) Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Great Britain (W) Not confirmed Not confirmedw Not confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Greece (W) Not confirmedn Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Hungary (E) Confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Italy (W) Not confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Latvia (E) Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Lithuania (E) Confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Netherlands (W) Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Poland (E) Confirmed Not confirmed Fz Confirmed Not confirmed Portugal (W) Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Romania (E) Confirmed Not confirmed Fz Confirmed Confirmed Slovakia (E) Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed JRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER Slovenia (E) Not confirmedn Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Spain (E) Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Sum ‘‘confirmed’’ 15 (W:6. E:1) 8 (W:2. with the left being less willing to support the United States than parties of the right. 239 . w But a clear difference in the stances of left and right parties. z Observed values of surveys are predominantly in the ‘‘neutral’’ range and no massive public protests. E:9) 12 (W:8. E:6) 11 (W:5. E:4) 5 (W:4. E:0.3 (W:0.44.45 (W:0. E:0.

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