NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. BENJAMIN ONG CO [G.R. No.

166973, Feb 10, 2009] Facts: The petitioner herein, NPC, is a government corporation created under R.A. No. 6395 to undertake the development of hydroelectric generation of power and the production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as well as the transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis. Its charter grants to petitioner, among others, the power to exercise the right to eminent domain. Sometime in June 27, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, for the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way over three (3) lots at Barangay Cabalantian, Bacolor, Pampanga belonging to respondent herein for purposes of construction of its transmission lines for its Lahar Affected Transmission Line Project. On March 25, 2002, NPC obtained a writ of possession and on April 15, 2002 they took possession of the property. On hearing the RTC appointed 3 commissioners to determine the fair market value of the property as of 15 April 2002. The first two commissioners appraised the property at P1,900.00 per square meter or a total of P1,179,000.00. While the third commissioner peg the value of the property at P875.00 per square meter. The RTC rendered its Partial Decision, wherein it declared the validity of the expropriation and ordered petitioner to pay the sum of P1,179,000.00, with interest at 6% per annum beginning April 15, 2002, the date of actual taking, until full payment. Not satisfied with the ruling of lower court NPC elevate the case to CA, which the appellate court also rendered Decision holding petitioner liable to pay the full fair market value at the time of actual taking, with interest at 6% per annum from 15 April 2002. Aggrieved with the order NPC appealed to SC hence this case. Issue: Whether or not petitioner herein should pay the subject property in its full market value? Is the reckoning date for the determination of just compensation is upon position or upon the date of filing? Held: YES. As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, substantially provides that properties which will be traversed by transmission lines will only be considered as easements and just compensation for such right of way easement shall not exceed 10 percent of the market value. However, this Court has repeatedly ruled that when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts. The presence of transmission lines undoubtedly restricts respondents use of his property. Petitioner is thus liable to pay respondent the full market value of the property. UPON THE DATE OF FILING. Rule 67 clearly provides that the value of just compensation shall be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. EXCEPTIONS: There are exceptions grave injustice to the property owner, the taking did not have color of legal authority, the taking of the property was not initially for expropriation and the owner will be given undue increment advantages because of the expropriation. However, none of these exceptions are present in the instant case. Based on the foregoing, the reckoning date for the determination of the amount of just compensation is 27 June 2001, the date when petitioner filed its expropriation complaint.

-oOoPHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK vs. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY [G.R. No. 173085, January 19, 2011] Facts: Sometime in 2003 respondent Bases Conversion Development Authority, a government corporation, filed several expropriation actions before the various branches of the RTC of Angeles City, for acquisition of lands needed for the construction of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway Project. Ten of these cases were raffled to Branch 58 of the court which was being the concern of this case. Respondents in Branch 58 cases are Armando Simbillo, Christian Marcelo, Rolando David, Ricardo Bucud, Pablo Santos, Agrifina Enriquez, Conrado Espeleta, Catgerube Castro, Carlito Mercado, and Alfredo Suarez. All of them are the registered owners of the expropriated lands that they acquired as beneficiaries of the comprehensive agrarian reform program. Land Bank of the Philippines, another respond herein, is the mortgagee of the lands by virtue of the loans it extended for their acquisition. The lands in these cases were located in Porac and Floridablanca, Pampanga. Upon notice of the filing of the case, petitioner herein, move for intervention before the RTC branch 58 which was also denied by said court. PVB then filed its motion for reconsideration but Branch 58 denied the same, prompting the bank to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA on its decision rendered dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence this case. Issue: Whether or not intervention in the expropriation cases allowed? Held: YES. PVBs point regarding the authority of the court in expropriation cases to hear and adjudicate conflicting claims over the ownership of the lands involved in such cases is valid. But such rule obviously cannot apply to PVB for the following reasons: 1. At the time PVB tried to intervene in the expropriation cases, its conflict with the farmer beneficiaries who held CLOAs, EPs, or TCTs emanating from such titles were already pending before Angeles City RTC Branch 62, a co-equal branch of the same court. Branch 58 had no authority to pre-empt Branch 62 of its power to hear and adjudicate claims that were already pending before it. 2.Of course, subsequently, after the CA dismissed PVBs petition on January 26, 2006, the latter filed a motion for reconsideration, pointing out that it had in the meantime already withdrawn the actions it filed with Branch 62 after learning from the decision of the Supreme Court in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Cuenca, that jurisdiction over cases involving the annulment of CLOAs and EPs were vested by Republic Act 6657 in the DARAB. Branch 58 would still have no power to adjudicate the issues of ownership presented by the PVBs intervention. Section 9 above empowers the court to order payment to itself of the proceeds of the expropriation whenever questions of ownership are yet to be settled. There is no reason why this rule should not be applied even where the settlement of such questions is to be made by another tribunal. Denied. -oOoREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, In his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 117, Pasay City [G.R. No. 166429, Dec 19, 2005] Facts: There are two cases has been filed, one is Agan v. PIATCO which has been decided on 2004 on the basis of fairness, the same norm that pervades both the Courts 2004 Resolution in the first case and the latest expropriation law. The second is this present controversy which involves the matter of just compensation due the contractor for the terminal complex it built.

The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Courts decision in Agan v. PIATCO, which nullified the Concession Agreement for the BuildOperate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III entered into between the Philippine Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. as well as the amendments and supplements thereto. On the ground that the said agreement was contrary to public policy. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities. Sometime inDecember 21, 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay RTC, together with an Application for Special Raffle seeking the immediate holding of a special raffle and sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminals assessed value for taxation purposes. The case was raffled to the sala of public respondent herein, who issued the same an order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to take or enter upon the possession However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the Writ of Possession noting its earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It was found out later that said rule 67 sec. 2 had been amended by R.A. No. 8974 known as An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes. Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. No. 8974 and Section 10 of the Implementing Rules, issued another order. First, it directed theLBP-Baclaran, to immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO. Second, the Government was directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third, the Government was directed to maintain, preserve and safeguard the NAIA 3 facilities or perform such as acts or activities in preparation for their direct operation of the airport terminal, pending expropriation proceedings and full payment of just compensation. However, the Government was prohibited from performing acts of ownership like awarding concessions or leasing any part of NAIA-3 to other parties. The government then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by public respondent. Hence a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was filed, praying for the nullification of the RTC orders dated January 4, 2005, January 7, 2005, and January 10, 2005, and for the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action on the expropriation case. Issue: Whether or not Rule 67 prevails over R.A. 8974? Held: NO. Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects.[28] Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply. It is the finding of this Court that the staging of expropriation proceedings in this case with the exclusive use of Rule 67 would allow for the Government to take over the

NAIA 3 facilities in a fashion that directly rebukes our 2004 Resolution in Agan. This Court cannot sanction deviation from its own final and executory orders. Thus, at the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Courts requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before the Government may take over the property. -oOoREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON [G.R. No. 166429, Feb 1, 2006] Facts: ibid Issue: is motion for intervention allowed? Held: Since this case originated from an original action filed before this Court, the appropriate time to file the motions-in-intervention in this case if ever was before and not after resolution of this case. To allow intervention at this juncture would be highly irregular. It is extremely improbable that the movants were unaware of the pendency of the present case before the Court, and indeed none of them allege such lack of knowledge. Moreover, the requisite legal interest required of a party-in-intervention has not been established so as to warrant the extra-ordinary step of allowing intervention at this late stage. As earlier noted, the claims of Takenaka and Asahikosan have not been judicially proved or conclusively established as fact by any trier of facts in this jurisdiction. Certainly, they could not be considered as indispensable parties to the petition for certiorari. -oOo-