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COMPLEXITY AND POSTMODERNISM

Understanding and Modelling Complex Systems

PAUL CILLIERS
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CONTENTS

Preface

Approaching Complexity 1

Introducing Connectionism 46

Post-Structuralism, Connectionism And Complexity 69

John Searle Befuddles 89

Problems With Representation 108

Self-Organisation In Complex Systems 165

Complexity And Postmodernism 206

Afterword: Understanding Complexity 260

Bibliography 264
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PREFACE

“Complexity” and “postmodern” are both controversial notions.

Contemporary society is readily described as being postmodern, but there are

divers reactions to this description. For some (like Zygmunt Bauman)

postmodernism creates the possibility for us to escape from the strictures of

modernism and to re-enchant the world. For others (like Ernest Gellner) it

exemplifies relativism – a theoretical framework in which anything goes – and

leaves them with a feeling of vertigo. Postmodernism can also be seen as

being parasitic on modernism, or as modernism’s underbelly. In such a case it

could be argued that we should drop the concept altogether if we want to move

beyond the oversimplified ideals of the Enlightenment.

The different responses to postmodern theory naturally have different

understandings of the word’s meaning. Even if it were possible to clarify this

debate, it is not my intention to do so in this book, nor do I attempt to provide

an apology for postmodernism. My main concern is with the notions of

complexity and complex systems. As far as postmodernism is concerned, the

argument is simply that a number of theoretical approaches, loosely (or even

incorrectly) bundled together under the term “postmodern” (e.g. those of

Derrida and Lyotard), has an implicit sensitivity for the complexity of the

phenomena they deal with. Instead of trying to analyse complex phenomena in

terms of single or essential principles, these approaches acknowledge that it is

not possible to tell a single and exclusive story about something that is really

complex. The acknowledgement of complexity, however, certainly does not lead

to the conclusion that anything goes.

The concept “complexity” is not univocal either. Firstly, it is useful to

distinguish between the notions “complex” and “complicated”. If a system –

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despite the fact that it may consist of a huge number of components – can be

given a complete description in terms of its individual constituents, such a

system is merely complicated. Things like jumbo jets or computers are

complicated. In a complex system, on the other hand, the interaction between

the constituents of the system is of such a nature that the system as a whole

cannot be fully understood simply by analysing its components. This feature of

complex systems is usually referred to in terms of emergent properties. The

brain, natural language and social systems are complex.

Secondly, it is necessary to say something about the relationship between

complexity and chaos theory. The hype created by chaos theory has abated

somewhat, but unfortunately the perception that it has an important role to play

in the study of complex systems is still widespread. Although I would not deny

that chaos theory could contribute to the study of complexity, I do feel that its

contribution would be extremely limited. When analysing complex systems, a

sensitivity to initial conditions, for example, is not an important issue. As a

matter of fact, it is exactly the robustness of complex systems that ensures their

survival. Although the metaphor of the butterfly’s flapping wings causing a

tornado on the other side of the globe is a good one for describing a sensitivity

to initial conditions, it has caused so much confusion that I feel it should not be

used at all. Chaos theory remains primarily of mathematical interest. Chaotic

behaviour results from the non-linear interaction of a relatively small number of

equations – whereas in complex systems there is always a huge number of

interacting components. Despite the claims made about the functioning of the

olfactory system, or the structure of ferns, I am unsure whether any behaviour

found in nature could be described as chaotic in the technical sense. This

might sound too dismissive, and I certainly do not want to claim that aspects of

chaos theory and fractal mathematics cannot be used effectively in the process
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of modelling nature. My claim is rather that chaos theory, and especially the

notions of deterministic chaos and universality, does not really help us to

understand the dynamics of complex systems. That showpiece of fractal

mathematics, the Mandelbrot set – sometimes referred to as the most complex

mathematical object we know – is in the final analysis complicated, not

complex. Within the framework of the present study, chaos theory is still part of

the modern paradigm.

The objective of the book is to illuminate the notion of complexity from a

postmodern, or perhaps, more accurately, post-structural perspective. The most

obvious conclusion drawn from this perspective is that there is no overarching

theory of complexity that allows us to ignore the contingent aspects of complex

systems. If something is really complex, it cannot be adequately described by

means of a simple theory. Engaging with complexity entails engaging with

specific complex systems. Despite this we can, at a very basic level, make

general remarks concerning the conditions for complex behaviour and the

dynamics of complex systems. Furthermore, I suggest that complex systems

can be modelled. The models, however, will have to be at least as complex as

the systems they model, and may therefore not result in any simplification of

our understanding of the system itself. As an example of such models, I make

extensive use of neural networks – a approach also known as connectionism.

As a matter of fact, the significance of postmodern theory for the study of

complexity is underscored by arguing that there are structural similarities

between the operation of neural networks and Derrida’s descriptions of the

working of language.

Apart from introductory chapters on connectionism and post-structuralism,

and a dismissal of Searle’s contributions to the debate, the central issues

discussed are representation and self-organisation. A discussion, or perhaps a

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deconstruction, of the notion of representation exemplifies the contribution that

a primarily philosophical analysis can make to modelling techniques.

Conversely, the discussion of self-organisation – a notion usually (but certainly

not exclusively) encountered in a scientific context – helps us to make the

(philosophical) point that the behaviour of a system without a pre-determined or

fixed structure, is not necessarily random or chaotic, in other words, that

anything does not go.

The book does not engage with moral theory in a systematic way, but it is

impossible, of course, to operate in a value free space. Ethical issues therefore

do surface now and then, especially in the final chapter. The characterisation of

complexity and complex systems developed in the present book certainly has

implications for social and moral theory that demand to be developed further.

This will hopefully be a more central aspect of future projects.

I would like to thank the following people for the contributions they have

made towards the development of the ideas presented here: Johan Degenaar,

Mary Hesse, Jannie Hofmeyr and the members of the two interdisciplinary

discussion groups at the University of Stellenbosch, one based in the arts

faculty, the other in the sciences. The help of Esmarie Smit in the completion of

the manuscript was invaluable.

Previous versions of some of the material used in chapters two, three and

seven have appeared in the South African Journal of Philosophy. Permission to

rework that material is gratefully acknowledged.