Public Management Research Association

Governance without Government? Rethinking Public Administration Author(s): B. Guy Peters and John Pierre Source: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Apr., 1998), pp. 223-243 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Public Management Research Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1181557 Accessed: 20/09/2010 01:17
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Governance WithoutGovernment? RethinkingPublic Administration

B. Guy Peters
Universityof Pittsburgh

John Pierre
Universityof Strathclyde,Scotland

ABSTRACT The conceptof governancehas come to be used more commonlyin the discussionof public administration, the meaning but of the termis not always clear. Thereis a growing body of European literaturethat can be characterized "governance as without " government, stressingas it does the importance networks, of partnerships,and markets(especiallyinternational markets).This body of literaturecan be relatedto the newpublic management; yet it has a numberof distinctiveelements. This article discusses the strengthsand weaknessesof this literatureand its applicability to public administration the UnitedStates. in The traditional conceptualization the public sector has of come underincreasingstrainduringthe past several decades. The idea that nationalgovernments the majoractors in public are policy and thatthey are able to influencethe economy and society throughtheir actionsnow appearsto be in doubt. Some of the strainon nationalgovernments been the resultof the has increasedimportance the international of environment of an and arguablydiminishedcapacityof those governments insulate to their economiesand societies from the global pressures.Those pressureson nationalgovernments come aboutthroughinternational capitalmarkets(Strange1996; but see Hirst and Thompson 1996; Peters 1998) as well as throughsupranational organizations such as the EuropeanUnion (Scharpf1997). Anotherstrainon the traditional conceptionof governing arises from changesin the relationship betweengovernmentand the privatesector. At the extremeit is arguedthat "governance withoutgovernment" becomingthe dominant is patternof managementfor advancedindustrial democracies(Rhodes 1997). Othercharacterizations include "hollow"states and governments 223/Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

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RethinkingPublic Administration (Peters 1993; Rhodes 1994) and "negotiated" states and economies (Nielsen and Pedersen1990). In all these depictionsof changingpatternsof government,it is arguedthat societal actors have become influentialover policy and administration have and done so in ways that were unimaginable earliertimes. Governin ment is seen as weakenedand as incapableof "steering" it had as in the past. The traditional conceptof governmentas a controlling and regulatingorganization society is arguedto be for outmoded(Bekke, Kickert,and Kooiman1995). The discussionof governancewithoutgovernmenthas been largely Europeanand has concentrated primarilyin the United Kingdomand the Netherlands.The European roots of this debate appearto be in part a functionof the preeminent role of government in the welfare state in Europeand of the strengthand establishedpositionof interestgroupsin these societies (Kooiman 1993; Schmitterand Lembruch1979). In essence governmenthas much more power to lose, more areas of policy involvement,and a networkstructure alreadyin place thatcan replaceor supplementthe power of government.In the UnitedKingdomthe emergence of this patternof governingis a direct challengeto the Whitehallmodel of strong, centralizedgovernment. Althoughthe governancedebatehas been largely European, it is beginningto diffuse to the UnitedStates. There is some objectiveevidence that the same changes-such as contracting, public-private and partnerships, a variety of other interactions with the privatesector-move governmentaway from its role as the centralsource of the "authoritative allocationof values"for the society. Also, in the UnitedStatesthere is the beginningof a that relatesthese changes in the relationship body of literature with society to broaderquestionsof managingthe State (O'Toole 1997; Thomas 1997). The objectivesand concretedesign of administrative reform mirrorthe historical,political, and societal roles of public administration well as its internalculture. Such reformsare as path-dependent, probablyto a much greaterextent than we generally realize. Path-dependency refers to the range of policy choice availablefor administrative reformers;reformstrategies are embeddedin systems of normsand administrative practices and thereforereformstrategiesare shapedmore by what already exists thanby the desiredmodel of public administration. In this articlewe will examinethe emerginggovernance debatein Europeand the United Statesand will describeboth the dimensionsof the debateover the capacityof the state to continue to govern as it has in the past and the developmentof 224/J-PART, April 1998

RethinkingPublic Administration mechanismsfor exertingcontrolover society. We will alternative also addressthe questionof whetherthis is purely an academic debate, the productof developinga theoreticallanguagesuitable for the analysis, or whethera real change is occurringin the natureof government. WHAT IS THE GOVERNANCEDEBATE? The conceptionof governanceas it has developedover the past several years in the European debatehas severalconstituent elements. As we indicatedabove, however, takentogetherthese elementswould amountto a prescription steeringsociety for throughless direct meansand weakeningthe power of the State to controlpolicy. These changeswould, in turn, have implications for the meaningof democracyin the contemporary political system. We will not evaluatethese arguments here; ratherwe will save that for the discussionof how the governancearguments fit withinthe contextof both European American and public administration. The Importance of Networks Perhapsthe dominantfeatureof the governancemodel is the thatnetworkshave come to dominatepublic policy. argument The assertionis thatthese amorphous collectionsof actors-not formalpolicy-making in institutions government-controlpolicy. State agencies may place some imprimatur the policy, so the on argument goes, but the real actionoccurs withinthe private sector. Further,in the more extremeversions of the argument,if governments attemptto impose controlover policy, these networks have sufficientresiliencyand capacityfor self-organization1(Kooiman1993; Marshand Rhodes 1992; de Bruijnand ten Heuvelhof 1997) to evade the controlof govermment. It long has been arguedthatthe privatesector has real influenceover public policy throughstructures with varying degrees of formality,but this conceptioncarriesthe argument to that of dominance.This dominanceis possible partlybecausethe Statehas become delegitimated. The loss of legitimacyis in part because state actors are excessively clumsy, bureaucratic, and pathdependentand in partbecauseof the control of information 'Especially within the Dutch and Germnan and implementation structures privateactors. It appearsthat by literaturethe term autopoesis is used to whateverthe Statedoes it does poorly, while the privatesector describe this self-organizingnature of networks. (for profit and not for profit) is more effective.

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RethinkingPublic Administration From Control to Influence In the governancearguments Statedoes not become the totally impotent;rather,it loses the capacityfor direct control and replacesthat facultywith a capacityfor influence. Government actors are conceptualized in a continualprocess of baras gainingwith the membersof their relevantnetworks.Whathas changed,however, is thatthese governmentactorsnow bargain as relativeequals ratherthanas with the capacityto resortalways to power if the decision that is made is not what they want. Government organizations remaina partof the networksin these emergingmodels of governance,but they are conceptualized as dependent the other actorsto the same extent that on those actorsare dependent government.This mutualresource on dependency(Rhodes 1988) at first characterized relationship the betweencentralgovermments subnational and government,but the argument been extendedto cover the gamutof relationships has betweencentralgovernment and organizations the other organizationswith which they interact. Blending Public and Private Resources The use of networksmentionedabove easily leads to a blendingof public-sector private-sector and resources.These resourcesmay blend in a varietyof ways, one of the most commonbeing the creationof more or less formalpartnerships betweenactors in governmentand actorsin the privatesector. These partnerships permiteach side to use resourcesthat would not be at its disposalwere it to remainon its own side of the (presumed) divide betweenthe two sectors (Peters 1998). For example, governmentmay be able to evade some procedural requirements might restrictits operations,while the private that sector may gain public approvaland funds for projectsthat might be difficultto bring to fruitionwithoutthose resources. In some instancesthe public and privatesectors may be blendedwithin a single organization. increasingnumberof An nongovernmental organizations, quangos, and a host of other hybridorganizational formatsappearto have materialized as componentsof the governanceframework.These formatspermit the mutualleveragingof resourcesand the blendingof public and privateattributes ways that might not be possible in more in conventionalstructural arrangements.

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RethinkingPublic Administration Use of Multiple Instruments The utilizationof public-private for partnerships policy indicatesthe willingnessof a governmentoperatingwithinthe governanceframework develop alternative to means of making and implementing policy. This willingnessto innovatein the selection of policy instruments be seen as more general, with can governanceimplyingthe use of a wider repertoireof instruments than mightbe used by a more traditional public sector. Governments have a numberof instruments their do at disposal, but they tend to focus only on a few familiarones that involve direct intervention. The adoptionof the governance perspectiveon their roles and their opportunities enables governments to see that they can use a numberof less direct forms of intervention the meansto achieve their ends. These instruas ments may appearin the first instanceas less certainthanthe older instruments, in a networkedversion of the public sector but with more powerfulprivate-sector actorsthey may be more effective. GOVERNANCEVS. NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: SHOULD THEY BE SEPARATED? The debateaboutthese emergingforms of governance occurredat nearlythe same time as the diffusionof the new public management (NPM) in many westerndemocracies,principally the United Kingdomand the Antipodes(Aucoin 1996). For some scholars, the governancedebatewas triggeredin part by the management philosophyadvancedby the NPM experts (see, e.g., Rhodes 1997). Certainly,there are many similarities betweenthe mainstream debateon the emergingforms of governance and the overarching philosophybehindthe NPM (Hood
1991).

Developing New Instruments of Control and Accountability A commonfeatureof governanceand NPM is a changing view of the role of elected officials. Both governanceand NPM downplaythe role and significanceof elected officials. In the governancedebate, political leadershipis tied less to formal elected office and more to mattersof politicalentrepreneurship. Politicalleaders, in this perspective,have a key responsibilityin the developmentof networksand the pooling of public and private resources. The only traditional role remainingfor elected officials is that of settinggoals and priorities.In the NPM vision of the public sector, the role of political leadersis even less clear. Here, elected officials have a role in definingthe long-term 227/J-PART, April 1998

RethinkingPublic Administration goals of the public sector, but apartfrom that they shouldoffer considerablediscretionto the operativeagencies and institutions. In both perspectives,however, accountability remainsan theoristsarguethat traditional unresolvedissue. Governance have been replacedby several different channelsof accountability and processes of electoralcontrolsuch as "stakeholderism" consumerchoice. Thathavingbeen said, it seems clear that accountabilityremainsa weak spot in the governanceliterature.In the NPM school of thoughtthere is little concernaboutthese issues, is since accountability seen as one of the strongestpoints of the model. By relatingpublic services more directlyto market demandinsteadof to politicaldecisions aboutqualityand quanabouttheir tity, service providersreceive immediateinformation to performance.Customersare thus given an opportunity influence service producersdirectlywithouthaving to operatethrough their elected representatives. The basic problemin both theoriesis thatthe linkage betweencontrol and accountability-theheartof democratic theoryand a democraticsystem of government-has been conseek to replace fused. Both models of public administration or derivedfrom legal mandates elected office politicalpower with an entrepreneurial style of leadershipor-with the NPM-a remote and indirectmodel of leadership.This createstwo different problems,derivedfrom differentperspectiveson governance and citizenship.First, if elected politicalleadershave such is limitedcontrolover the public administration, it reasonableto for the decisions and actionsof the public hold them accountable service, and if elected officials shouldnot be held accountable, who then is accountable? The second problemoccurs when we acceptthe notion of consumerchoice and stakeholderism channelsof accountas ability. Obviously,consumerchoice and stakeholderism as instruments voice and accountability availableonly to of are stakeholders consumers.But if services are financedby and collective resourcesthen any model of democraticgovernment are requiresthat instruments also availableto those who are not of presentlyconsumersor stakeholders a particular public service. Further,it is often difficultto identifythe appropriate customersof service-prisons, customsand immigration, and perhapseven educationare clear examples. Downplaying the Public-Private Dichotomy In theoriesof governanceand also of NPM there are strong notionsthatpublic administration-and generally, the state-has 2281J-PART,April 1998

RethinkingPublic Administration become isolatedfrom and out of touch with the rest of society. While corporateactors, undersevere pressurefrom market models of management competition,have developedsophisticated and resourceallocation,the public bureaucracy long has remainedinsulatedfrom economicpressures.The result, according to the critics of the public service, has been organizational slack; widespreadinefficiency;economiccomplacency;an obsession with due process; indifferenceto clients' needs; and organizational autopoesis. The governancedebatetakes a more positive view of the public service. Here the perspectiveis not so much thatthe public service is forced to adaptto public-sector philosophiesand ideals; the prevailingview is ratherthatpublic institutions-as expressionsof the public interest-can and shouldplay a leading role in cross-sectoralresourcemobilizationand concertedventures. The role of political institutions differentmodels of in governancemay vary considerably,but as long as there is some significantpolitical involvementin governancethere are also collective objectivespresentin the process. Both governancetheoriesand NPM thus see the publicprivatedichotomyas essentiallyobsolete, albeit for different reasons. The generalargumentis thatjust as the public-private borderhas protectedthe public bureaucracy from extraorganizational pressuresto modernizeand increaseefficiency it has now become an obstacleto public-sector reform. Such reforms, NPM advocatesinsist, must focus on bringingin private-sector managerial strategiesand objectives. NPM is essentiallya philosophy of generic management because it arguesthat all management has similarchallengesand hence shouldbe resolved in similarways in public- and private-sector organizations (Peters 1996). Increasing Emphasis on Competition The idea of competitionas a meansto increasepublicservice efficiency and sensitivityto its clients-or customers is obviously a good exampleof corporateideals penetrating the public sector. Introducing competition,furthermore, farhas reachingorganizational consequences.Most importantly, it requiresextensive relaxationof politicalcontrol over the public service and substantive discretionfor managersat lower levels of the organization. Competition within the public sector has many obvious advantages.By creatinginternalmarkets,for instance,each unit in the public organization assess its actualcosts more can accuratelythantraditional organizational models allow. 229IJ-PART,April 1998

RethinkingPublic Administration Furthermore, introducing competitionalso providesbenchmarks and other meaningful bases for comparison.Competition between service suppliersforces organizations increasecontactswith to their customers.None of these consequencesof introducing internal marketsshouldencounteroppositionfrom even the fiercest critics of contemporary reform. administrative Bringingcompetitioninto the public service is at the heart of NPM. Withoutcompetition there is little point to changingthe managerial styles in the public sector. The currentstyle of govon of ernance,however, is less dependent the introduction comis petition, at least withingovernment.Governance generally more concernedwith blendingpublic and privateresourcesthan with competitionin the public sector. That said, governance representsan alternative way to produceand deliver services, and thereforeit welcomes competitionamongpublic and private initiatives. that However, marketsare themselvesinstitutions constrain our range of choice (Whitleyand Kristensen1997; Marchand Olsen 1989). Creatinginternalmarketsalters intraorganizational behaviorinto new practicesthatcan develop new potential sources of resourcewaste at the same time they eliminateother to problems.Some internalmarketsinduceorganizations oversupplyservices, since demandis definednot by the customerbut by the supplier.The medicalcare sector in several westernEuropean countriesis a good exampleof these problems. One substantive problemthatarises when competitive in are introduced the area of public services is that dimensions were never designedwith that objecpublic-sectororganizations tive, but ratherto ensurelegality and equality. Although structural organizational and changes-such as decentralization moving decision makingon operativeissues downwardin the organization-are very commontoday, the problemsassociated with changingthe cultureof the organization often much are more difficultthanare the structural changes. Increasing Emphasis on Output Control Rather Than on Input Control Both NPM and governancehave a primaryinterestin results. Inputcontrol, the preferredcontrolmechanismin the traditional is public administration, arguedto be inadequate because it conceals organizational slack and inefficiencyand does not relateperformance demandand customersatisfaction.Outto put controlcan manifestitself either throughcustomersatisfactionand otherperformance indicatorsessentialto the NPM 230/J-PART, Apr`l 1998

RethinkingPublic Administration school of thoughtor throughgenerating complianceand cusof tomer-attuning public services by bringingprivateand voluntary sector actors and interestsinto public service production and delivery. It also can be assessed more broadlyby organizational accomplishments relativeto its objectives. Devising New Instruments and Techniques for Steering In both NPM and governance,steeringis a key concept (Rhodes 1997, 49). Osborneand Gaebler(1992) coined the seductiveslogan that governments shouldfocus more on steering and less on rowing, and this managerial perspectiveplays a prominent role in both governanceand NPM. Much of this steering refers to organizations cuttingback while they simultaneously face increasingexpectationson diversifiedand customer-driven services. Governance,to a much greaterextentthan NPM, is concernedwith enhancinggovernment's capacityto act by forging strategicinterorganizational coalitionswith actors in the externalenvironment. Steering,in this perspective,is largely aboutsettingprioritiesand defininggoals. In the NPM, steering is primarilyan intraorganizational strategyaimedat unleashing productiveelementsof the public service. The questionis why we shouldexpect arms-length models of steeringleanerorganizations work any betterthanthe to Weberian,hierarchical steeringof traditional, comparatively resourcefulpublic organizations. it realisticto believe thatyou Is can steer the moderndiversifiedand transparent public organizations more effectively with more subtlemethodsthanthose that were availableto the managerswho steeredhierarchically integratedbureaucracies? the previousmodel of steeringfailed, If why shouldwe expect the new ones to be any more effective? As these few examplesshow, emergingforms of governance share many featuresof the NPM philosophy.However, several significantdifferencesalso exist betweengovernanceand NPM. Indeed,these differencesare so fundamental the two models that of public service shouldbe separated.The similaritiesseem to be primarilyat the operativelevel of administrative reform, whereas the differencesare locatedat a theoreticallevel. First, governancealways has been a centralelementof a democratic polity; indeedgovernance,albeit in a wide rangeof manifestations, as old as government.The emergingforms of is governancein westernEurope-networks, partnerships, publicprivatejoint ventures,the inclusionof the voluntarysector in service delivery, and so on-should be assessed in relationto traditional models of governancesuch as hierarchiesas well as 231/J-PART, April 1998

RethinkingPublic Administration state strategiesto compensatefor diminishingexternalcontrol resultingfrom decreasingresourcesand less relianceon legal control. The NPM campaign,on the otherhand, is more ideologically driven; it denies any political or culturalspecificityof the public service and arguesthatby emulatingcorporateorganzations many problemsof the public service-inefficiency, indifference towardthe needs of its clients, and so forth-should be ameliorated.While new forms of governanceultimatelymaintain some degree of politicalcontrol over the public service since it is seen as an extensionof the public interest,NPM seeks to transform the public bureaucracy a set of organizations to whose only differencefrom private, for-profitorganizations the natureof is the productthat is delivered. Second, governanceis aboutprocess, NPM is primarily aboutoutcomes. Understanding governance-its direction,practices, and outcomes-is largely a matterof observingand interpretingthe process throughwhich it evolves and what is the relativeclout of the actors involvedtherein. NPM says very little aboutthe process; it is focused almost exclusively on developing intraorganizational management techniquesthat ensurecustomer satisfactionand efficiency. This differenceis all the more important since public administration a significantextent is centered to aroundprocedural rules and regulations.Traditional models of public administration providedetailedrules concerningthe deliberationprocess, partlybecause regulatingthe process is the Weberianmethodof outputcontrol;a legally correctdeliberation process was believed to imply a correctoutcome. A relatedproblem is that NPM says very little aboutthose aspects of the public sector that are not involveddirectlyin production goods or of of services, and its application those sectors of the public remainsuncertain. bureaucracy Third, NPM is an intraorganizational programof administrative reformwhereasgovernanceis interorganizational perspecin tive (Rhodes 1997, 55). Furthermore, emergingforms of the governancewe see in several of the advancedwesterndemocracies shouldbe conceivedof as alternative models of the pursuit of collective interests(Peters 1996). Thus governanceis essentially a political theory-insofar as it describesa certaintype of exchangebetweenthe state and the society-whereas NPM is an organizational theory. Fourth,governanceis aboutmaintaining public-sector resourcesundersome degree of political controland developing strategiesto sustainthe government'scapacityto act; NPM is essentiallyabouttransforming public sector. Governance the refers to somethingthatdeliberately transcends bordersof the 232/J-PART, April 1998

RethinkingPublic Administration structures coordinateand governmentand where governmental give directionto collaborative,public-private efforts (Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1997). The perspectiveof the NPM strategyis more introverted aims at alteringstate-societyrelationships and models might replace only insofaras public-sectormanagement models of organizational in traditional management the public and administration in the exchangebetween service providersand public-sectorcustomers. Finally, governancedoes not come with the same ideological luggage or distinctiveideals as the NPM does. The introduction of new forms of governancecan be implemented withoutprofound cultureshifts in the public service; such changes, however, are at the heartof NPM. Indeed, as we have pointedout, many of the most important featuresof the governancemodel have been in place for years; some of the discussionof their importance is thatthey are now being implemented Westminster in with a traditionof stronger,more centralized,governsystems ment. Differencesbetweengovernanceand NPM become more when we look at a few cases where both of these philosapparent ophies have caughthold, or one of them, or none of them. The diffusionof NPM seems in some ways to be relatedto state strength.Strongstateshistoricallyhave not had to rely on the inclusionof private-or third-sector actorsin the politicalprocess in orderto increasetheir capacityto impose their will on civil society. The institutional capacityof strongstatescoupledwith a stronglegalistic traditionhas guaranteed state's abilityto the accomplishits intentionsand goals. For weakerstates (or cities), joining forces with private-sector actorshas been an established strategyto increasetheir governingcapacity(Stone 1989). The obvious exceptionto this patternis Britain.Mrs. Thatcherintroduced NPM style in both centraland suban nationalgovernments,using the full thrustof a strong, centralized government.Indeed,the transformation the Britishcivil of service was partand parcel of the grandThatcherite projectto allow marketforces to penetratethe public service, which was seen as an obstacleto economicgrowth. The fact thatthe AngloSaxon countrieswere amongthe first to embracethe NPM ideals might also be explainedon culturalgroundsand the inclinationto heraldfree enterprisein these countries(Peters 1996). Governance,as are all models of public service, is derived from the politicalculturewithinwhich it is embedded.The emergenceof governancethereforewill appearin differentinstitutionalforms in differentnationalcontexts. NPM is much less 233/J-PART, April 1998

RethinkingPublic Administration contextualand less sensitivetowarddifferencesbetweenjurisdictions;it is more generic and more directedat changingpublicsector values and practices.Since governanceis a blendingof privateand public values and NPM can be describedas a unilateralinfusionof corporate-sector values and objectivesinto the public sector and public-service productionand delivery, there is not very much interdependence between governanceand the NPM. Some states have embracedone philosophy,but not both. This brief discussionaboutNPM and emergingmodels of governanceultimatelybegs the normativeissue aboutthe specificity of the public service and the politicalprocess. This issue relatesto our perceptionof the public interestand what structures in society sustainand defendthat interest.If we maintainthat the public sector has a high degree of specificity, then that should lead us to acknowledgethatefficiency in the public service needs to be assessedby differentstandards thanthose of the corporate sector. To assess processes guidedby primaryreferenceto legality, equality, and legal securityin terms of their organizational efficiency is to some extentto underestimate consequencesof the the political and societal specificityof the public service. GOVERNANCEAND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION TRADITIONS IN EUROPE The emergenceof governancein the west European context must be viewed againstthe historicalnatureof the public administrationand state-societyrelationships there. While it is obviously far beyondthe scope of this articleto offer a full accountof these developmentsand how governancefits into these traditions,we will focus on two aspectsof the issue. One important dimensionof the issue of how governancefits European public administration the historicalpatternsof stateis society exchanges. Anothercrucialaspect of this problemis the Exhibit The Emergence of Governance and New Public Management: Four Cases
Governance Limited Limited NPM Intermediate Extensive Japan United States New Zealand Extensive Sweden The Netherlands Britain

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RethinkingPublic Administration significanceof legality, hierarchy,and politicalcontrolin the west European tradition. public administration State-Society Relationships and Public Administration In several west European in states, but most predominantly smallerindustrialized democraciessuch as Austria,Belgium, the Netherlands,and the Scandinavian countries,state-societyrelationshipshistoricallyhave been shapedby a varietyof corporatist arrangements. Organizedinterests,labor marketorganizations, and voluntaryorganizations mediatedthe state-societydistinction by exercisingconsiderable politicalclout and influenceat all stages of the policy-making process (Katzenstein1984 and 1985; Schmitterand Lehmbruch 1979). Similar-if less pronouncedpatternsof organizational involvementin the politicalprocess are also presentin Germanyand France. In additionto theircorporatist-style policy makingand of these countriesalso built comprehensive implementation, and universalwelfare states duringthe postwarperiod (EspingAndersen1990). These were distinctlypoliticalprojectsthat encountered fierce politicaloppositionas they evolved and were toleratedby the middleclass due to the universalnatureof their programs. Thus public administration been challengedthroughout has most of this centuryon two fronts. One has been the inclusionof organizedinterestsin the implementation public policy, which of confrontedthe public bureaucracy with powerfulsocietal actors withintheir organizational domain.Managingthe built-inclash betweenthe public interestas it is embodiedin the due process of the public bureaucracy the one handand more narrowly on defined societal interestson the otherhas requiredconsiderable negotiatingskills and mutualrespect. The otherchallengehas been the blendingof public administrationideals of impartiality legality with the implementation and of welfare state programs.Here, the problemhas been not so much thatthe welfare state programspresupposecompromiseson those core public administrative values and normsbut ratherthe task of musteringbureaucratic enthusiasm-or at least passive supportor tolerance-for the welfare state (Rothstein1996). Mainly as a resultof the exacerbated fiscal crisis of the west European democracies,market-driven administrative reforms have reshapedmany of the traditional featuresof public bureaucracies (Cassese 1995; Derlien 1993; Pierre 1993; Rouban1993; Peterssonand Soderlind1994). Thus there has been an 235/J-PART, April 1998

RethinkingPublic Administration introduction internalmarkets,diversifiedsalary schemes, of customerchoice, performance indicators,and so on. However, most of the west European states-with Britainthe significant exception-have not embracedNPM wholeheartedly. The increasedemphasison efficiency, and reformsimplemented to thateffect, has not changedthe overall structure the public of service or its management style but ratherhas been largely implemented withinthe existing organizational frameworks. Instead,several stateshave shown a growing interestin betweenthe state and exploringnew models of cooperation countrieshave had increasorganizedinterests.The Scandinavian and at ing cooperation the local level betweenauthorities voluntary associationsin public service delivery. The long traditionof involvementin policy implementation corporatist probablyhas helpedpave the way for emergingforms of governance.Such exchangehas meantgiving these new networksnew objectives and roles ratherthandevelopingnew networksacross the publicprivateborder. Franceappearsto be an important exceptionto the pattern of governancein west Europewe have describedabove. The more technocratic, top-downstyle of policy makingin France implies thatthe emerginggovernanceformatmight not be compatible(Hayward1983; Cohen 1996). There is a strongelement of networkingwithingovernmentitself, and thatcan link various elementsof state and society but certainlynot with the society as debateover the existence a dominantelement. The long-standing in of corporatism Franceis one indicationof the questionable of compatibility governancemodels in this setting. The RechtstaatModel of Public Administration and Governance If the corporatist politicalculturehas been an important foundation which governancehas been built duringthe 1990s, on the strongtraditionof legality and deliberation west European in has public administration been an obstacleto administrative reformalong similarlines. Rechtstaatideals of a highly regulated extensivedeliberaprocess, a verticallyintegrated organization, are tion, and fair and equal treatment not amenableto generating economiesof scale or increasingefficiency. More thananythingelse, the trade-offbetweenlegality and legal securityon the one handand efficiency on the otherhas been a complex issue. Whatmost governments seem to have done is, interestingly,to simply ignore the trade-off,or alternativelyto displaceit from the policy makingto the bureaucratic 236/J-PART, April 1998

RethinkingPublic Administration sphereof government.Thus most of westernEuropehas seen relaxationof budgetary(input)control, growing political emphasis on efficiency in the public service, decentralization from the state to subnational government(with Germanyas a slight exception), and strongpoliticalpressureson the bureaucracy provide to more choice in their service. Very few of these policies have explicitly addressedthe issue, To what extent shouldthese reformsbe accompanied a relaxationof traditional by Rechtstaat standards? strictusensu is alien to the traditional Competition European model of public administration, both within the public service and betweenpublic- and private-service providers.Allowing for such competitionthereforehas causedconsiderableorganizational problems.In most jurisdictions,the outcomehas been thatthe state has retaineda fairly rigorousqualitycontrolover services that have been contracted out; such controlhas been believed to be the most important safeguardagainstdecliningservice standards. As we have noted, NPM has been introduced most extensively in Britain.However, almost all countrieshave at least consideredsome modificationsin the same direction.The pattern of reformoften has been similarto thatof allowing governance to replacetight governmentcontrol;changeshave been more de facto operativechangesthanchanges in the normativeand legal framework the public administration. of The historyof public administration westernEuropeto a in large extent has been shapedby tensionsbetweenpoliticization and Rechtstaatideals and betweenuniversalismand corporatism. Unleashinglocal governments orderto providethe discretion in necessaryfor them to engage in partnerships, networks,andjoint ventureswith key societal actorshas been an important element of governance.Here, public bureaucracies the European in welfare states can draw on considerable expertiseand organizational memory;most of these stateshave seen the vast majorityof welfare stateprogramsimplemented more by local and regional governments thanby the state (Pierre 1994; Sharpe 1988). HOW DOES THE GOVERNANCEDEBATE FIT WITH PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONIN THE UNITED STATES? The conceptof governancewithoutgovernmentmay appear to fit well with the traditionsof Americanpublic administration. The UnitedStateshas been describedas a statelesssociety, lacking in any of the traditionsof Europeanstates. In this typification of the United States its governmentis more political than it is a 237/J-PART, April 1998

RethinkingPublic Administration of manifestation a virtuallymetaphysical State entity. In that view of Americangovernmentthe movementfrom a state-centric conception of governmentto a more societal centeredview shouldbe an easy shift of emphasis. In additionto the apparent weaknessof Americangovernment, the traditionof a strongcivil society bears some of the bruntof governing. Even before it became fashionable,government in the United Statesutilizedthe privatesector (both forprofit and not-for-profit elements)to help make and implement policy (Salamon1981; Kettl 1987). The privatesector may have become somewhatmore prominentin recentyears, but the shift has been less startlingthan in Europe.Indeed, the history of resistanceto and skepticismof governmentin the United States makesthe conceptof governancewithoutgovernmentsoundperfectly normalin the United States. On the otherhand, there is a good deal of evidence that public administration the UnitedStateshas changedless than it in has in many other systems (Peters 1998). The NPM philosophy has been adoptedto a lesser extent thanin Europeor the Antipodes. This is especiallytrue of the competitivedimensionof NPM. Any modificationof administration been in the direchas tion of enhancedparticipation (especiallyfor memberswithin governmentorganizations) internalderegulation and (DiIulio 1994). The NationalPerformance Review emphasizedthe need to reducethe degree of hierarchywithin federalorganizations to and "letthe managersmanage." The very absenceof a strongstate traditionin the United States appearsto make moving to the fully networkedmodel of governanceless likely. The generaldenigration government, of especially the bureaucracy, makes it less likely thatthe bureaucracy will be given the latitudeto negotiateso freely with the privatesector. There are some contraryexamples, such as the use of negotiatedrule making,but the generalpracticeis for Congressand the presidencyto exercise substantial oversightof the bureaucracy. The AmericanState (yes, there is one) is somewhatparadoxical in the continuedemphasison the separation state and of society. The privatesector is extolled as the model of efficiency and good management. The recentemphasison the private sector in welfare reformis an indicationof the homagepaid to that sector. Government appearsquite willing and often anxiousto divest itself of functionswheneverpossible and to permitthe privatesector to do what it can do better-almost everythingin this view. The differencefrom much of Europeis that there are 2381J-PART,April 1998

RethinkingPublic Administration many more thingsthat Americansconsiderappropriate the for privatesector. Despite the emphasison the virtue of private-sector management there is more politicizedcontroland more legalisticcontrol over the bureaucracy thancurrentlyis found in other AngloAmericandemocracies.Organizations not permitted go are to into competitionfor themselves;instead,they remainunderpolitical control. The assumption appearsto be thatbureaucracies are not to be trusted,and any arrangements they might make for governanceare not to be trustedeither. Politicalcontrolis especially important Congress,given that it dependson constitufor ency service and particularistic controlover bureaucracy for much of its politicalappeal.The one majorexceptionto this generalization the Government is Performance ResultsAct of and 1994, which is beginningto implementresults-based management at the federallevel. Althoughthe U.S. federalgovernment does not appearcompatiblewith the governancemodel, Americanlocal government has adoptedmany of its concepts. For example, the use of public-private has partnerships been well establishedat this level of government(Beauregard 1998), and there are well-developed networkswith greaterinfluenceover-and even in controlofpolicy than is encountered the nationallevel. There is also a at sense that Americanlocal government been more creativein has the selectionand implementation policy instruments of than is true at the nationallevel. State and local government also has been more likely to adoptthe ideas of the NPM. Indeed, Osborneand Gaebler(1992) developedtheir ideas aboutreinventing government primarily from the experienceof California local government.Many market-based ideas associatedwith NPM have been eschewed at the nationallevel but are alreadyin place at the local level, and subnational governmentin the UnitedStatesis the more modem of the two levels of government.The federalgovernmenthas to some extentenabledthe reformof state and local government with the use of block grantsthatprovidedthem with resources and the latitudeto develop more creativemeansto provide services to the public. Why are local and state governments the United States in capableof greaterlatitudein governingand management than is the nationalgovernment? One answeris that local governmentis less delegitimated thannationalgovernment; most surveysdemonstratethatlocal governmentis more trustedthanis the federal government.The public is thereforelikely to concede to this 2391J-PART,April 1998

RethinkingPublic Administration level of governmentthe latitudeneededto manageand implement effective partnerships. Further,local governmentis likely to have close and continuinginteractions with the privatesector in its own area, so that these relationships may emerge naturally.Local governmentin the United States is thereforeoften a more powerfulactor than is the federalgovernment,given that it is able to govern both throughtraditional commandand control techniquesand throughthe less conventionalformatsassociated with governance. CONCLUSIONS:BREAKING THE PATH? The debateover governancemay simplybe the academic communitycatchingup with the realityof the public sector in the world. Just as there may be for institutions,there contemporary may be a path dependencyin academia.We are often so locked into our theoreticaland empiricalpathsthat it is difficultfor us to recognizethe subtlechangesthat occur over time. The architects of reformhave been forced to addressthese changesmore carefullyand more directly. Architectsof administrative reformhave faced a complex dilemmaconcerningthe degree of changethey can achieve on the one hand and the likelihoodof successfulreformon the other. Reformsthat aim at alteringthe normativeframeworkand modus operandiof public administration, thus profoundlychallenge and establishednormsand practices,may at best accomplishminor changesand at worst bring to the public service confusion, conflict, and discrepancies betweenorganizational cultureand externalrole expectations,thus causing stalemate.More moderate reforms-for example, a sequenceof incremental consistent but changes-are likely to bring aboutless dramaticchangebut without majordysfunctional consequences. Most importantly, reformersencounterthe path dependency of administrative systems that we noted earlier. For example, the emergenceof governancein westernEuropeis to some extent embeddedin the corporatist traditionof this political culture. Similarly,the hesitancytowardsNPM in most of westernEurope is explainedby the stronglegalistic traditionof the public administration there. Such controlalways has been extensive in the United States, and yet market-based administrative reformhas encountered much less oppositionhere, at least in state and local governments.Much of this strategyof administrative reformhas been the subjectof intensedebateat the federallevel. Meanwhile, local governments seeminglyless botheredby the are ideologicaldimensionof principlesas they forge public-private coalitionsin differentareas of public-servicedelivery. Local 2401J-PART,April 1998

RethinkingPublic Administration govermnents always have been more resultsorientedin their modus operandithanhave state or federalinstitutions. Strongstates seem to be much less inclinedto compromise the Rechtstaatmodel of public administration seem to have and in many fewer problemsparticipating governancethando weaker states such as the United States. Thatbeing said, there is much in the governancedebatein Europethat speaksto the currentdebate aboutadministrative reformin the UnitedStates. One such theme is the growing importance networks,which assumea powerful of in public policy makingand implementation. Europosition For peans with their strongeretatisttradition,statescan enter such coalitionswithouthavingto fear thatthey will have to compromisecore politicaland administrative values. In the United States, on the otherhand, weak federalor local institutions a run much bigger risk of cooptationor marginalization privateby sector actorsand interests. Thus, governanceand the NPM have encountered opposition in both Europeand the UnitedStates, althoughfor different reasons. In neithercase are these reformsfully compatiblewith the administrative traditions the countriesthat are advisedto of implementthese reforms. Even withinthe two areas there are markeddifferencesin the compatibility the reforms.In the of UnitedStatesthe changestend to be more compatiblewith the ethos found in local governments thanwith that of the federal government.In Europe,the Scandinavian countriesand the low countrieshave had many of the ideas of governancein operation for decades, while the largerEuropean countrieshave had somewhat more difficultyabsorbingthese ideas and concepts. Thus we can see again that no reformis likely to be universal;instead reformmust be matchedcarefullywith the needs and the traditions of the largerpolitical system.

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