G.R.

No. 86720 September 2, 1994 MHP GARMENTS, INC., and LARRY C. DE GUZMAN, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AGNES VILLA CRUZ, MIRASOL LUGATIMAN, and GERTRUDES GONZALES, Respondents. PUNO, J.: chanrobles virtual law library The constitutional protection of our people against unreasonable search and seizure is not merely a pleasing platitude. It vouchsafes our right to privacy and dignity against undesirable intrusions committed by any public officer or private individual. An infringement of this right justifies an award for damages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." 1 chanrobles virtual law library Sometime in October 1983, petitioner corporation received information that private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. Petitioner de Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation, was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., petitioner de Guzman, Captain Renato M. Peafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion, Sikatuna Village, Diliman, Quezon City went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items. The items were then turned over by Captain Peafiel to petitioner corporation for safekeeping.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents. 2During its pendency, petitioner de Guzman exacted from private respondent Lugatiman the sum of THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,100.00) in order to be dropped from the complaint. On December 6, 1983, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents. On February 6, 1984, he also ordered the return of the seized items. The seized items were not immediately returned despite demands. 3Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods. Even then, not all the seized items were returned. The other items returned were of inferior quality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Private respondents then filed Civil Case No. 51144 against the petitioners for sums of money and damages. 4In its Decision dated January 9, 1987, the trial court ruled for the private respondents, thus: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants, ordering the latter jointly and severally: chanrobles virtual law library 1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff Mirasol Lugatiman with interest at 12% per annum from January 12, 1984, the date of the last receipt issued, until fully paid; chanrobles virtual law library 2. To pay plaintiff Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the 26 pieces of girl scout items not returned; chanrobles virtual law library 3. To pay plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 for and as moral damages and P15,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and chanrobles virtual law library 4. P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and expenses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library litigation

Costs against the defendants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. The decision was appealed to the respondent court. On January 18, 1989, its Fifth Division, 5affirmed the Decision with modification, thus: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION; and, as modified, the dispositive portion thereof now reads as follows: chanrobles virtual law library Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs (private respondents) and against defendants (petitioners), ordering the latter jointly and severally; chanrobles virtual law library 1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff (respondent) Mirasol Lugatiman and cancel her application for distributor's license; chanrobles virtual law library 2. To pay plaintiff (respondent) Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the unreturned 26 pieces of girl scouts items with interest at 12% per annum from June 4, 1984 (date the complaint was filed) until it is fully paid; chanrobles virtual law library 3. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) the amount of P10,000.00 each, or a total of P30,000.00, for and as moral damages; and P5,000.00 each, or a total of P15,000.00, for and as exemplary damages; and chanrobles virtual law library 4. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and

litigation expenses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Costs of the case a quo and the instant appeal are assessed jointly and severally against defendants-appellants (petitioners) MHP Garments, Inc. and Larry de Guzman.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend: FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPUTING LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES TO THE PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT EFFECT THE SEIZURE OF THE SUBJECT MERCHANDISE. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT MADE A FINDING THAT THE MANNER WITH WHICH THE CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WAS TORTIOUS BUT PENALIZED INSTEAD THE PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT COMMIT THE ACT OF CONFISCATION. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND FOR THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND AGAINST THE PETITIONERS. We affirm.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects our people from unreasonable search and seizure. It provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 6In the case at bench, the seizure was made without any warrant. Under the Rules of Court, 7a warrantless search can only be undertaken under the following circumstance: Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. Petitioner de Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the raid was made on the stores of private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were seized. The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bench, the search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause for the seizure. Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." 8These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioners would deflect their liability with the argument that it was the Philippine Constabulary that conducted the raid and their participation was only to report the alleged illegal activity of private respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for violation of the private respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will not exculpate petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 9we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or private individual, thus: Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages. xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library (9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library (6) Illegal search; chanrobles virtual law library (1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded. xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort. (emphasis supplied) In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, 10the Court En Banc explained the liability of persons indirectly responsible, viz: [T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damages suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library [N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit

of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violations. (emphasis supplied) Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. 11As correctly observed by respondent court: Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing appellees' (respondents') merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair competition against appellees (respondents) were for the protection and benefit of appellant (petitioner) corporation. Such being the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to infer from those acts that it was upon appellant (petitioner) corporation's instance that the PC soldiers conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances should answer the trial court's query - posed in its decision now under consideration - as to why the PC soldiers immediately turned over the seized merchandise to appellant (petitioner) corporation. 12 chanrobles virtual law library The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. 13So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 1299 was precisely crafted on March 9, 1983 to safeguard not only the privilege of franchise holder of scouting items but also the citizen's constitutional rights, to wit: TITLE: APPREHENSION OF UNAUTHORIZED MANUFACTURERS AND DISTRIBUTORS OF SCOUT PARAPHERNALIA AND IMPOUNDING OF SAID PARAPHERNALIA. ABSTRACT: chanrobles virtual law library Directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines, to apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia, upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law; and to impound the said paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body. Orders the immediate and strict compliance with the Instructions. 14 chanrobles virtual law library Under the above provision and as aforediscussed, petitioners miserably failed to

report the unlawful peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a warrant. Private respondents' rights are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to transient needs. 15Petitioners did not have the unbridled license to cause the seizure of respondents' goods without any warrant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library And thirdly, if petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, 16in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We have consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. 17Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, op. cit., moral damages can be awarded in the case at bench. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were supported by their testimonies. Respondent Cruz declared: I felt very nervous. I was crying to loss (sic) my goods and capital because I am doing business with borrowed money only, there was commotion created by the raiding team and they even stepped on some of the pants and dresses on display for sale. All passersby stopped to watch and stared at me with accusing expressions. I was trembling and terribly ashamed, sir. 18 chanrobles virtual law library Respondent Lugatiman testified: I felt very nervous. I was crying and I was very much ashamed because many people have been watching the PC soldiers hauling my items, and many/I (sic) heard say "nakaw pala ang mga iyan" for which I am claiming P25,000.00 for damages. 19 chanrobles virtual law library While respondent Gonzalez stated thus: I do not like the way the raid was conducted by the team sir because it looked like that what I have been selling were stolen items that they should be confiscated by uniformed soldiers. Many people were around and the more the confiscation was made in a scandalous manner; every clothes, T-shirts, pants and dresses even those not wrapped dropped to the ground. I was terribly shamed in the presence of market goers that morning. 20 chanrobles virtual law library Needles to state, the wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary damages. 21It will also serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. The all encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly done both by government and indirectly by private entities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9, 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) for the unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), on the said amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof. 22Costs against petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Padilla, Regalado, and Mendoza, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 104513 August 4, 1993 SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC, Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (GLOWHRAIN), SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL CHAPTER, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, ELMER C. LABOG, JOSELITO A. SANTOS, FLORENTNO P. MATILLA, EDNA B. DACANAY, HENRY M. BABAY, RAY ANTONIO E. ROSAURA, DENNIS C. COSICO, VICENTE M. DELOSA, IRENE V. RAGAY, APOLONIO BONDOC, QUINTOS B. BARRA, ALFREDO S. BAUTISTA, RICHARD T. GALIGO, JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, Respondents. NOCON, J.: May the First Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) order the reinstatement of employees dismissed for leading and/or participating in an illegal strike, in an injunction case 1which is separate and distinct from the illegal case 2against them and which is pending appeal? chanrobles virtual law library In this instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, the answer to the main issue stated above determines whether or not the public respondent-NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing such an order. 3 chanrobles virtual law library The petitioner Silahis International Hotel Inc. is the employer of private respondent employees. Respondent-Union Genuine Labor Organization of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (GLOWHRAIN)-Silahis International Hotel Chapter, is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees in the company.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The antecedent facts are as follows: chanrobles virtual law library On November 16, 1990, respondent-Union filed a notice of strike against petitioner-Silahis Hotel for unfair labor practices: violation of CBA, dismissal of union officers/members, mass termination/illegal lockout, and union busting. 4 chanrobles virtual law library On the same day, private respondents staged a strike, picketing and allegedly

obstructing the ingress to and egress from the hotel. 5 chanrobles virtual law library On November 28, 1990, the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction and issued an order certifying the dispute to the NLRC for consolidation with an earlier case and for all striking employees to return to work. 6Accordingly, on November 29, 1990, the employees ended the strike and return to work.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On February 1, 1991, petitioner Silahis Hotel filed a complaint for illegal strike (NLRC NCR Case No. 02-00717-91) against respondent-Union, fourteen (14) named employees representing the union officers and John Does and Jane Does representing all the other employees who joined the strike. 7 chanrobles virtual law library In a decision dated February 12, 1992, Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan found private respondents guilty of illegal strike and declared the union officers to have lost and forfeited their employment. 8 chanrobles virtual law library On February 14, 1992, the day the private respondents learned of the decision, petitioner-Silahis Hotel barred them from entering the hotel and terminated their services. Respondent-Union and private respondent-employees filed their appeal on February 19, 1992, well within the ten-day period for perfection of appeal provided by law. 9 chanrobles virtual law library And on February 27, 1992, herein private respondents filed a Very Urgent Petition 10for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction under Art. 218(e) of the Labor Code, not in the illegal strike case then on appeal, 11but as NLRC NCR IC No. 00-0235-92. In that petition, respondents (petitioners therein) allege that petitioner-Silahis Hotel terminated the employment of respondents on February 14, 1992 even before the illegal strike decision 12became final and executory and that most of the employees terminated were not union officers nor proved to be participants in the strike. The termination of respondents' employment would cause grave or irreparable injury which can be corrected by the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The first division of the NLRC issued, in a Minute Resolution, an order in favor of respondents dated March 11, 1992, the dispositive part of which reads: Wherefore, weighing the relative position of the parties vis-a-vis the equitable reliefs available, we hereby rule subject. to petitioners' posting of a bond of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos to answer for whatever liability the respondent may suffer should it appear that they are not entitled to the reliefs hereby granted, directing the respondent company: (1) to reinstate either physically or on payroll, at respondent's option, to reinstate (sic) Rogelio M. Soluta, Joselito A Santos, Florentino P. Matilla, Edna B. Dacanay, Dennis C. Cosico, Alfredo S. Bautista and Richard T. Galigo; and (2) to reinstate, with full backwages, all the other petitioners to their positions held as of February 14, 1992. Labor Arbiter Adolfo C. Babiano is hereby directed to hear the incident of temporary and/or

permanent injunction, and to submit a report and recommendation thereon within ten (10) days from the conclusion of the hearing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library This Order shall be effective for a period of only twenty (20) days from petitioners' submission of the required bond. 13 chanrobles virtual law library On March 16, 1992, petitioner-Silahis Hotel filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order above, but the same was not and has not been acted upon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner-Silahis Hotel assails this Order and on March 25, 1992, filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order. The following day, we issued a temporary restraining order continuing until further orders from the Court, enjoining the NLRC from enforcing the Order dated March 11, 1992 in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-0235-92 and from further proceeding with aforesaid case. 14 chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner contends that: THE RESPONDENT NLRC ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, CONSIDERING THAT: chanrobles virtual law library A. The questioned Order illegally confers a relief on private respondents, in violation of petitioners right to due process. Injunction is not the appropriate remedy to order the reinstatement of private respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library B. The questioned Order operates as an adjudication on the merits of private respondents' appeal from the Labor Arbiter's decision, which raises the issue as to the scope of the declaration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library C. Respondents, be knowingly filing the injunction case during the pendency of the appeal in the illegal strike case are guilty of forum- shopping.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library D. The questioned order was issued in clear and palpable violation of Art. 218 of the Labor Code. 15 chanrobles virtual law library The resolution of the instant petition depends on whether public respondent- NLRC can validly entertain the "Very Urgent Petition" 16filed by respondents and issue the Order 17reinstating the respondents, assailed by petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The appeal from the decision of the labor arbiter in the illegal strike case (NLRC NCR Case No. 02-00717-91) was pending when respondents filed its "Very Urgent Petition" as NLRC IC No. 00-0235-92.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner claims that filing the "Very Urgent Petition" as another injunction case and not with the appealed case is "forum-shopping" and cannot be done for such practice has, long been condemned as "contrary to the interest of justice." 18It further argues that the issue of respondents' employment status and/or dismissal is pending in the appealed strike case and that respondents were dismissed precisely because of said illegal strike conducted by them. Hence, they (respondents) cannot seek relief from the effects of the dismissal in an entirely new suit the (injunction case). 19 chanrobles virtual law library On the other hand, private respondents contend that they are not guilty of forum-shopping because the issues involved in the appealed case and the injunction case are different. They claim that the issues in the appealed illegal strike case are whether the finding of illegal strike and the declaration that the union officers have lost and forfeited their employment are correct. And the issue in the injunction case, which arose the decision of the labor arbiter, is whether this decision can be executed or implemented by the petitioner even if the same was not final and executory. 20 chanrobles virtual law library The labor arbiter ruled that the strike staged by the respondents was illegal. After receiving notice of a favorable decision, petitioner-hotel dismissed the respondent-employees for having participated in this illegal strike. Respondents then filed its appeal from this decision. And within the same month, the respondents filed their petition for injunction as a new injunction case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is not very difficult to see that the issues in these two cases are interrelated. Because of this relevant connection, the relief prayed for by the respondents, i.e., injunction restraining the petitioner from dismissing them, could have been properly granted or denied in the case on appeal. There was in fact no reason for the respondents to file a new injunction case before the same agency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library By doing this, they effectively sought another forum to grant them relief. The Court cannot but proscribe this as a species of forum shopping.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In Villanueva v. Adre, 21we said that: There is forum shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. 22 And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 23we added that "filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the court's processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court." 24

We have consistently ruled that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different forums. Although most of the cases and have ruled upon regarding forum shopping involved petitions in the courts and administrative agencies, 25the rule prohibiting it applies equally to multiple petitions in the same tribunal or agency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library By filing, another petition involving the same essential facts and circumstances in the same agency, as in this case where respondents filed their appeal and injunction case separately in the NLRC, respondents approached two different fora in order to increase their chances obtaining a favorable decision or action. This practice cannot be tolerated and should be condemned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Public respondent-NLRC erred when it entertained the separate injunction case filed by respondents. Moreover, it should have consolidated the petition for injunction with the case already on appeal, for the fact of appeal and the attendant circumstances were stated in the petition and even acknowledged in the questioned Resolution of the NLRC. 26 chanrobles virtual law library While we find the action taken by the respondents was ill-suited however, this does not mean that the petitioner-hotel's act of dismissing respondent- employees before the decision of the labor arbiter became final and executory should be sanctioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Despite our proscription against forum shopping, the respondents should be allowed to have recourse to the processes of law and to seek relief from their dismissal as this allowance will better serve the ends of justice. The propriety of the hotel's act of dismissing the respondents and the resulting consequences may still be passed upon, in conjunction with the appealed case after filing a proper petition therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library However, the culpability of respondent's counsel, who are charged with the knowledge of the law and with the duty of assisting in the administration of justice, is clearly manifest. Because of the cunning practice they employed, respondents' lawyers, Attys. Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. and A.E. Dacanay are hereby warned and admonished to be more circumspect in their professional concerns otherwise a penalty more severe shall befall them for similar acts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The other issues raised by petitioner no longer bear any significance after the resolution of the main problem above. No further discussion regarding them will therefore be made.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the ruling of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby set aside. The temporary restraining order dated March 26, 1992 is made permanent. No costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur. LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO,G.R. No. 141309 Petitioner, Present: - versus -Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson), cralawAustria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, and Nachura, JJ. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION,Promulgated: Respondent. cralawJune 19, 2007 x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Petitioner assails the May 7, 1999 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 47167, which affirmed the September 29, 1997 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina, Branch 272, in Civil Case No. 97- 341-MK, denying petitioners motion to dismiss.The complaint filed by respondent sought to recover damages for the alleged violation of its constitutional rights arising from petitioners issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (RMC 37-93), which the Court declared invalid Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which are Champion, Hope, and More cigarettes. On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993.Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.[3]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Champion, Hope, and More were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%.However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying Champion, Hope, and More as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax.[4] RMC 37-93 in effect subjected Hope, More, and Champion cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142,[5] (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack.[6]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular.On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93.On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993.[7]The same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof.[8]On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation ofRMC 37-93.[9] In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93.This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.[10]It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance. On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint[11] for

damages against petitioner in her private capacity.Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss[12] contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority.She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was signed by respondents counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same. On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to present evidence.It further held that the defect in the certification against forum shopping was cured by respondents submission of the corporate secretarys certificate authorizing its counsel to execute the certification against forum shopping.The dispositive portion thereof, states: WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Liwayway Vinzons-Chato and the motion to strike out and expunge from the record the said motion to dismiss filed by plaintiff Fortune Tobacco Corporation are both denied on the grounds aforecited.The defendant is ordered to file her answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order. SO ORDERED.[13]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.However, same was dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the instant case.Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the corporate secretarys certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the same. cralaw Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that thesuit is grounded on her acts done in the performance of her functions as a public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which should be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence.She further averred that the Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of public officers; while Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public officers liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the same is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action.As to the defect of the certification against forum shopping, she urged the Court to strictly construe the rules and to dismiss the complaint. Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the public officers acts from which civil liability may arise, is a general law; while Article 32 which deals specifically with the public officers violation of constitutional rights, is a special provision which should determine whether the complaint states a cause of action or not.Citing the case of Lim

v. Ponce de Leon,[14] respondent alleged that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is not required that said public officer should have acted with malice or in bad faith.Hence, it concluded that even granting that the complaint failed to allege bad faith or malice, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action should be denied inasmuch as bad faith or malice are not necessary to hold petitioner liable. The issues for resolution are as follows: (1)cralawMay a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office? (2)cralawWhich as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code should govern in determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of action? (3)cralawShould the complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping? (4)cralawMay petitioner be held liable for damages? cralaw On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.[15]An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its

consent.[16]However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.[17]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer.And, under Section 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officers act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. Thus Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. x x x x Section 39.Liability of Subordinate Officers. No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties.However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acts under orders or instructions of his superior. In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[18] that a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith. Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff. Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action and that the decisive provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code. A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and

does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class.A special statute, as the term is generally understood, is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or section of the state only.[19]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both.The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special and particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all.[20]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle.Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication.[21]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Thus, in City of Manila v. Teotico,[22] the Court held that Article 2189 of the Civil Code which holds provinces, cities, and municipalities civilly liable for death or injuries by reason of defective conditions of roads and other public works, is a special provision and should prevail over Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409, the Charter of Manila, in determining the liability for defective street conditions.Under said Charter, the city shall not be held for damages or injuries arising from the failure of the local officials to enforce the provision of the charter, law, or ordinance, or from negligence while

enforcing or attempting to enforce the same.As explained by the Court: Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409 is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines. The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of city officers to enforce the provisions of said Act or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of the city Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by, any person by reason specifically of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to defective streets, in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.[23] In the case of Bagatsing v. Ramirez,[24] the issue was which law should govern the publication of a tax ordinance, the City Charter of Manila, a special act which treats ordinances in general and which requires their publication before enactment and after approval, or the Tax Code, a general law, which deals in particular with ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges, and which demands publication only after approval.In holding that it is the Tax Code which should prevail, the Court elucidated that: There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City

of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special law as one relating to particular persons or things of a class.And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case.However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular. Th[is] exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of ordinance in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a general provision must give way to a particular provision.Special provision governs. Let us examine the provisions involved in the case at bar.Article 32 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 32.Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x x x x (6)cralawThe right against deprivation of property without due process of law; x x x x (8)cralawThe right to the equal protection of the laws;

x x x x The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the Code Commission, as follows: DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights, Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so amended as to make a public official liable for violation of another persons constitutional rights only if the public official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Commission opposes this suggestion for these reasons: The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort. Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles introduced in the New Civil Code to implement democracy. There is no real democracy if a public official is abusing and we made the article so strong and so comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual rights even if done in good faith, that official is liable. As a matter of fact, we know that there are very few public officials who openly and definitely abuse the individual rights of the citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of desire to enforce the law to comply with ones duty. And so, if we should limit the scope of this article, that would practically nullify the object of the article. Precisely, the opening object of the article is to put an end to abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith, which is in most cases the plea of officials abusing individual rights.[25] The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code.It is not necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith,

otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights.It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.[26]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law.[27]A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation.[28]There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial.The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful.[29]Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort is not precluded The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant.[31]This is a fundamental innovation in the Civil Code, and in enacting the Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers, then President Corazon C. Aquino, could not have intended to obliterate this constitutional protection on civil liberties. In Aberca v. Ver,[32] it was held that with the enactment of Article 32, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.[30]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression, joint tortfeasors. On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability of superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties.For both superior and subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements that will make them liable for damages.Note that while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of government officials, the subject thereof is general, i.e., acts done in the performance of official duties, without specifying the action or omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned. Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an act that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties.Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers.All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code.While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and

allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers.Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek damages for violation of constitutional rights. The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code.Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action.The courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional right of the plaintiff. Anent the issue on non-compliance with the rule against forum shopping, the subsequent submission of the secretarys certificate authorizing the counsel to sign and execute the certification against forum shopping cured the defect of respondents complaint. Besides, the merits of the instant case justify the liberal application of the rules.[33]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1999 which affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, denying petitioners motion to dismiss, is AFFIRMED.The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, is hereby DIRECTED to continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK with dispatch. With costs. SO ORDERED.

 CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice [G.R. No. 141309, December 23, 2008] LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, RESPONDENT. R E S O L U T I O N NACHURA, J.: It is a fundamental principle in the law of public officers that a duty owing to the public in general cannot give rise to a liability in favor of particular individuals.[1] The failure to perform a public duty can constitute an individual wrong only when a person can show that, in the public duty, a duty to himself as an individual is also involved, and that he has suffered a special and peculiar injury by reason of its improper performance or non-performance.[2] By this token, the Court reconsiders its June 19, 2007 Decision[3] in this case. As culled from the said decision, the facts, in brief, are as follows: On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands `Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack." On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993. The same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem

tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37- 93) and demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof. On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93. In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance. On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was signed by respondent's counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same. On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to present evidence. It further held that the defect in the certification against forum shopping was cured by respondent's submission of the corporate secretary's certificate authorizing its counsel to execute the certification against forum shopping. x x x x x x x x The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the instant case.

Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the corporate secretary's certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the same.[4] [Citations and underscoring omitted.] In the aforesaid June 19, 2007 Decision, we affirmed the disposition of the Court of Appeals (CA) and directed the trial court to continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK.[5] Petitioner, on July 20, 2007, subsequently moved for the reconsideration of the said decision.[6] After respondent filed its comment, the Court, in its April 14, 2008 Resolution,[7] denied with finality petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Undaunted, petitioner filed, on April 29, 2008 her Motion to Refer [the case] to the Honorable Court En Banc.[8] She contends that the petition raises a legal question that is novel and is of paramount importance. The earlier decision rendered by the Court will send a chilling effect to public officers, and will adversely affect the performance of duties of superior public officers in departments or agencies with rule-making and quasi-judicial powers. With the said decision, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue will have reason to hesitate or refrain from performing his/her official duties despite the due process safeguards in Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code.[9] Petitioner hence moves for the reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision.[10] In its June 25, 2008 Resolution,[11] the Court referred the case to the En Banc. Respondent consequently moved for the reconsideration of this resolution. We now resolve both motions. There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the "duty owing to the public collectively" (the body politic), and the "duty owing to particular individuals, thus: 1. Of Duties to the Public. - The first of these classes embraces those officers whose duty is owing primarily to the public collectively --- to the body politic --- and not to any particular individual; who act for the public at large, and who are ordinarily paid out of the public treasury. The officers whose duties fall wholly or partially within this class are numerous and the distinction will be readily recognized. Thus, the governor owes a duty to the public to see that the laws are properly executed, that fit and competent officials are appointed by him, that unworthy and ill-considered acts of the legislature do not receive his approval, but these, and many others of a like nature, are duties which he owes to the public at large and no one individual

could single himself out and assert that they were duties owing to him alone. So, members of the legislature owe a duty to the public to pass only wise and proper laws, but no one person could pretend that the duty was owing to himself rather than to another. Highway commissioners owe a duty that they will be governed only by considerations of the public good in deciding upon the opening or closing of highways, but it is not a duty to any particular individual of the community. These illustrations might be greatly extended, but it is believed that they are sufficient to define the general doctrine. 2. Of Duties to Individuals. - The second class above referred to includes those who, while they owe to the public the general duty of a proper administration of their respective offices, yet become, by reason of their employment by a particular individual to do some act for him in an official capacity, under a special and particular obligation to him as an individual. They serve individuals chiefly and usually receive their compensation from fees paid by each individual who employs them. A sheriff or constable in serving civil process for a private suitor, a recorder of deeds in recording the deed or mortgage of an individual, a clerk of court in entering up a private judgment, a notary public in protesting negotiable paper, an inspector of elections in passing upon the qualifications of an elector, each owes a general duty of official good conduct to the public, but he is also under a special duty to the particular individual concerned which gives the latter a peculiar interest in his due performance.[12] In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper performance or non-performance of a duty, it must first be determined which of the two classes of duties is involved. For, indeed, as the eminent Floyd R. Mechem instructs, "[t]he liability of a public officer to an individual or the public is based upon and is co-extensive with his duty to the individual or the public. If to the one or the other he owes no duty, to that one he can incur no liability."[13] Stated differently, when what is involved is a "duty owing to the public in general", an individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against the public officer, even though he may have been injured by the action or inaction of the officer. In such a case, there is damage to the individual but no wrong to him. In performing or failing to perform a public duty, the officer has touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes no duty to him as an individual.[14] The remedy in this case is not judicial but political.[15] The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a particular or special injury on account of the public officer's improper performance or non-performance of his public duty. An individual can never be

suffered to sue for an injury which, technically, is one to the public only; he must show a wrong which he specially suffers, and damage alone does not constitute a wrong.[16] A contrary precept (that an individual, in the absence of a special and peculiar injury, can still institute an action against a public officer on account of an improper performance or non-performance of a duty owing to the public generally) will lead to a deluge of suits, for if one man might have an action, all men might have the like--the complaining individual has no better right than anybody else.[17] If such were the case, no one will serve a public office. Thus, the rule restated is that an individual cannot have a particular action against a public officer without a particular injury, or a particular right, which are the grounds upon which all actions are founded.[18] Juxtaposed with Article 32[19] of the Civil Code, the principle may now translate into the rule that an individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act or omission that violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or injury to the former. This is consistent with this Court's pronouncement in its June 19, 2007 Decision (subject of petitioner's motion for reconsideration) that Article 32, in fact, allows a damage suit for "tort for impairment of rights and liberties."[20] It may be recalled that in tort law, for a plaintiff to maintain an action for damages for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed the plaintiff, meaning a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. Indeed, central to an award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law.[21] Thus, in Lim v. Ponce de Leon,[22] we granted the petitioner's claim for damages because he, in fact, suffered the loss of his motor launch due to the illegal seizure thereof. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[23] we upheld the right of petitioner to the recovery of damages as there was an injury sustained by him on account of the illegal withholding of his horserace prize winnings. In the instant case, what is involved is a public officer's duty owing to the public in general. The petitioner, as the then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is being taken to task for Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 which she issued without the requisite notice, hearing and publication, and which, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,[24] we declared as having "fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance."[25] A public officer, such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid administrative regulations. But it is a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire body politic who would be affected, directly or indirectly, by the administrative rule.

 Furthermore, as discussed above, to have a cause of action for damages against the petitioner, respondent must allege that it suffered a particular or special injury on account of the non-performance by petitioner of the public duty. A careful reading of the complaint filed with the trial court reveals that no particular injury is alleged to have been sustained by the respondent. The phrase "financial and business difficulties"[26] mentioned in the complaint is a vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and cannot translate into a "particular injury." In contrast, the facts of the case eloquently demonstrate that the petitioner took nothing from the respondent, as the latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax assessment levied by the former by virtue of RMC 37-93. With no "particular injury" alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no delict or wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would violate the primary rights of the respondent. Without such delict or tortious act or omission, the complaint then fails to state a cause of action, because a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.[27] A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.[28] The remedy of a party whenever the complaint does not allege a cause of action is to set up this defense in a motion to dismiss, or in the answer. A motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. However, the hypothetical admission is limited to the "relevant and material facts well- pleaded in the complaint and inferences deducible therefrom. The admission does not extend to conclusions or interpretations of law; nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice."[29] The complaint may also be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is obvious from the complaint and its annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief.[30] The June 19, 2007 Decision and the dissent herein reiterates that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability of the public officer may accrue even if he/she acted in good faith, as long as there is a violation of constitutional rights, citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[31] where we said: Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with

malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioners, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of duties.[32] The complaint in this case does not impute bad faith on the petitioner. Without any allegation of bad faith, the cause of action in the respondent's complaint (specifically, paragraph 2.02 thereof) for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code would be premised on the findings of this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals (CIR v. CA),[33] where we ruled that RMC No. 37-93, issued by petitioner in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, had "fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance." This is a logical inference. Without the decision in CIR v. CA, the bare allegations in the complaint that respondent's rights to due process of law and to equal protection of the laws were violated by the petitioner's administrative issuance would be conclusions of law, hence not hypothetically admitted by petitioner in her motion to dismiss. But in CIR v. CA, this Court did not declare RMC 37-93 unconstitutional; certainly not from either the due process of law or equal protection of the laws perspective. On due process, the majority, after determining that RMC 37-93 was a legislative rule, cited an earlier Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC No. 10- 86) requiring prior notice before RMC's could become "operative." However, this Court did not make an express finding of violation of the right to due process of law. On the aspect of equal protection, CIR v. CA said: "Not insignificantly, RMC 37-93 might have likewise infringed on uniformity of taxation;" a statement that does not amount to a positive indictment of petitioner for violation of respondent's constitutional right. Even if one were to ascribe a constitutional infringement by RMC 37-93 on the non-uniformity of tax provisions, the nature of the constitutional transgression falls under Section 28, Article VI--not Section 1, Article III--of the Constitution. This Court's own summation in CIR v. CA: "All taken, the Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance," does not lend itself to an interpretation that the RMC is unconstitutional. Thus, the complaint's reliance on CIR v. CA--which is cited in, and a copy of which is annexed to, the complaint--as suggestive of a violation of due process and equal protection, must fail. Accordingly, from the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that paragraph 2.02 of respondent's complaint loses the needed crutch to sustain a valid cause of action against the petitioner, for what is left of the paragraph is merely the allegation that only respondent's "Champion", "Hope" and "More" cigarettes were reclassified. If we divest the complaint of its reliance on CIR v. CA, what remains of

respondent's cause of action for violation of constitutional rights would be paragraph 2.01, which reads: 2.01. On or about July 1, 1993, defendant issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (hereinafter referred to as RMC No. 37-93) reclassifying specifically "Champion", "Hope" and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand. A copy of the aforesaid circular is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as ANNEX "A". The issuance of a circular and its implementation resulted in the "deprivation of property" of plaintiff. They were done without due process of law and in violation of the right of plaintiff to the equal protection of the laws. (Italics supplied.) But, as intimated above, the bare allegations, "done without due process of law" and "in violation of the right of plaintiff to the equal protection of the laws" are conclusions of law. They are not hypothetically admitted in petitioner's motion to dismiss and, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, are not deemed as facts. In Fluor Daniel, Inc. Philippines v. EB. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd.,[34] this Court declared that the test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. In the instant case, since what remains of the complaint which is hypothetically admitted, is only the allegation on the reclassification of respondent's cigarettes, there will not be enough facts for the court to render a valid judgment according to the prayer in the complaint. Furthermore, in an action for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code premised on violation of due process, it may be necessary to harmonize the Civil Code provision with subsequent legislative enactments, particularly those related to taxation and tax collection. Judicial notice may be taken of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and of the law creating the Court of Tax Appeals. Both statutes provide ample remedies to aggrieved taxpayers; remedies which, in fact, were availed of by the respondent-- without even having to pay the assessment under protest--as recounted by this Court in CIR v. CA, viz.: In a letter, dated 19 July 1993, addressed to the appellate division of the BIR, Fortune Tobacco requested for a review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37- 93. The request was denied on 29 July 1993. The following day, or on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00. On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA.[35] The availability of the remedies against the assailed administrative action, the opportunity to avail of the same, and actual recourse to these remedies, contradict the respondent's claim of due process infringement.

 At this point, a brief examination of relevant American jurisprudence may be instructive. 42 U.S. Code 1983, a provision incorporated into the Civil Rights Act of 1871, presents a parallel to our own Article 32 of the Civil Code, as it states: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress. This provision has been employed as the basis of tort suits by many petitioners intending to win liability cases against government officials when they violate the constitutional rights of citizens. Webster Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Investigation,[36] has emerged as the leading case on the victim's entitlement to recover money damages for any injuries suffered as a result of flagrant and unconstitutional abuses of administrative power. In this case, federal narcotics officers broke into Bivens' home at 6:30 a.m. without a search warrant and in the absence of probable cause. The agents handcuffed Bivens, searched his premises, employed excessive force, threatened to arrest his family, subjected him to a visual strip search in the federal court house, fingerprinted, photographed, interrogated and booked him. When Bivens was brought before a United States Commissioner, however, charges against him were dismissed. On the issue of whether violation of the Fourth Amendment "by a federal agent acting under color of authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his constitutional conduct," the U.S. Supreme Court held that Bivens is entitled to recover damages for injuries he suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the Fourth Amendment. A number of subsequent decisions have upheld Bivens. For instance, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,[37] a liability suit for money damages was allowed against Ohio Governor James Rhodes by petitioners who represented three students who had been killed by Ohio National Guard troops at Kent State University as they protested against U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In Wood v. Strickland,[38] local school board members were sued by high school students who argued that they had been deprived of constitutional due process rights when they were expelled from school for having spiked a punch bowl at a school function without the benefit of a full hearing. In Butz v. Economou,[39] Economou, whose registration privilege as a commodities futures trader was suspended, without prior warning, by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, sued on a Bivens action, alleging that the

suspension was aimed at "chilling" his freedom of expression right under the First Amendment. A number of other cases[40] with virtually the same conclusion followed. However, it is extremely dubious whether a Bivens action against government tax officials and employees may prosper, if we consider the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in Schweiker v. Chilicky,[41] that a Bivens remedy will not be allowed when other "meaningful safeguards or remedies for the rights of persons situated as (is the plaintiff)" are available. It has also been held that a Bivens action is not appropriate in the civil service system[42] or in the military justice system.[43] In Frank Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents of the United States of America,[44] petitioner Vennes instituted a Bivens action against agents of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) who alleged that he (Vennes) owed $250,000 in tax liability, instituted a jeopardy assessment, confiscated Vennes' business, forced a total asset sale, and put Vennes out of business, when in fact he owed not a dime. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, ruled: The district court dismissed these claims on the ground that a taxpayer's remedies under the Internal Revenue Code preclude such a Bivens action. Vennes cites to us no contrary authority, and we have found none. Though the Supreme Court has not addressed this precise question, it has strongly suggested that the district court correctly applied Bivens: When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies. x x x x Congress has provided specific and meaningful remedies for taxpayers who challenge overzealous tax assessment and collection activities. A taxpayer may challenge a jeopardy assessment both administratively and judicially, and may sue the government for a tax refund, and have authorized taxpayer actions against the United States to recover limited damages resulting from specific types of misconduct by IRS employees. These carefully crafted legislative remedies confirm that, in the politically sensitive realm of taxation, Congress's refusal to permit unrestricted damage action by taxpayers has not been inadvertent. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed Vennes's Bivens claims against IRS agents for their tax assessment and collection activities. In still another Bivens action, instituted by a taxpayer against IRS employees for alleged violation of due process rights concerning a tax dispute, the U.S. District Court of Minnesota said: In addition, the (Tax) Code provides taxpayers with remedies, judicial and

otherwise, for correcting and redressing wrongful acts taken by IRS employees in connection with any collection activities. Although these provisions do not provide taxpayers with an all-encompassing remedy for wrongful acts of IRS personnel, the rights established under the Code illustrate that it provides all sorts of rights against the overzealous officialdom, including, most fundamentally, the right to sue the government for a refund if forced to overpay taxes, and it would make the collection of taxes chaotic if a taxpayer could bypass the remedies provided by Congress simply by bringing a damage suit against IRS employees.[45] American jurisprudence obviously validates the contention of the petitioner. Finally, we invite attention to Section 227, Republic Act No. 8424 (Tax Reform Act of 1997), which provides: Section 227. Satisfaction of Judgment Recovered Against any Internal Revenue Officer. - When an action is brought against any Internal Revenue officer to recover damages by reason of any act done in the performance of official duty, and the Commissioner is notified of such action in time to make defense against the same, through the Solicitor General, any judgment, damages or costs recovered in such action shall be satisfied by the Commissioner, upon approval of the Secretary of Finance, or if the same be paid by the person sued shall be repaid or reimbursed to him. No such judgment, damages or costs shall be paid or reimbursed in behalf of a person who has acted negligently or in bad faith, or with willful oppression. Because the respondent's complaint does not impute negligence or bad faith to the petitioner, any money judgment by the trial court against her will have to be assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State.[46] WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision and DENY respondent's motion for reconsideration of the June 25, 2008 Resolution. Civil Case No. CV-97-341-MK, pending with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Reyes, Leonardo-De Castro, and Brion, JJ., concur. Ynares-Santiago, J., see dissenting opinion. Corona, J., on leave.