http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/06/166807.

htm

The Way Forward in AIghanistan

Testimony
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary oI State
Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC
1une 23, 2011


SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you very much, Chairman Kerry and
Senator Lugar and to all the members oI the committee, it`s a pleasure to
be back here with you in the Senate. As the President said last night,
the United States is meeting the goals he set Ior our three-track strategy
in AIghanistan and Pakistan. The military surge has ramped up pressure
on al-Qaida and Taliban insurgents. The civilian surge has bolstered the
AIghan and Pakistani Governments, economies, and civil societies, and
undercut the pull oI the insurgency. The diplomatic surge is supporting
AIghan-led eIIorts to reach a political solution that will chart a more
secure Iuture.
All three surges military, civilian, and diplomatic are part oI the
vision Ior transition that NATO endorsed in Lisbon last December and
that President Obama reaIIirmed last night. As he said, AIghans must
take responsibility Ior their own Iuture.
Today, I want to ampliIy on the President`s statement and update you
speciIically on our civilian eIIorts. And I also look Iorward to answering
your questions about the road ahead. Because despite the progress, we
have to stay Iocused on the mission. As the President said, 'We have to
put al-Qaida on a path to deIeat, and we will not relent until the job is
done.
First, let me say a word about the military eIIort. Last night, the
President explained his plan to begin drawing down our Iorces next
month and transitioning to AIghan responsibility. I will leave it to my
colleagues Irom the DeIense Department to discuss the speciIics. But the
bottom line, as the President said, is that we have broken the Taliban`s
momentum. So we do begin this drawdown Irom a position oI strength.
With respect to the civilian surge, we greatly appreciate the attention
that this committee has devoted to it. Because improving governance,
creating economic opportunity, supporting civil society is vital to
solidiIying our military gains and advancing our political and diplomatic
goals.
Since January 2009, we have tripled the number oI diplomats,
development experts, and other civilian specialists on the ground in
AIghanistan, and we have expanded our presence out in the Iield nearly
six-Iold. And these new civilians have changed the way we do business,
Iocusing on key ministries and sectors, and holding ourselves and our
partners to higher standards.
And there should be no doubt about the results oI our investment,
despite the very diIIicult circumstances that you all know so well.
Economic growth is up, opium production is down. Under the Taliban,
only 900,000 boys and no girls were enrolled in schools. By 2010, 7.1
million students were enrolled, and nearly 40 percent oI them girls.
Hundreds oI thousands oI Iarmers have been trained and equipped with
new seeds and other techniques. AIghan women have used more than
100,000 microIinance loans. InIant mortality is down 22 percent.
Now, what do these numbers and others that I could quote tell us?
First, that despite the many challenges that remain, liIe is better Ior most
AIghans. And the Karzai government has many Iailings, to be sure. But
more people, in every research analysis we are privy to, say they see
progress in their streets, their schools, their Iields. And we remain
committed to Iighting corruption and strengthening the rule oI law in a
very challenging environment.
The aim oI the civilian surge was to give AIghans a stake in their
country`s Iuture and provide credible alternatives to extremism and
insurgency. It was not nor was it ever designed to solve all oI
AIghanistan`s development challenges. Measured against the goals we
set and considering the obstacles we Iaced, we are and should be
encouraged by what we have accomplished.
And most important, the civilian surge helped advance our military and
political objectives. Let me just oIIer one example. Last November,
USAID began Iunding the reconstruction oI irrigation systems in
Wardak province, providing jobs Ior hundreds oI workers and water to
thousands oI Iarmers. In March, just a Iew months ago, insurgents
demanded that the people abandon the project and support the spring
oIIensive. The people reIused. Why? Because they asked themselves,
'Should we trade new opportunities Ior a better liIe Ior more violence
and chaos? Frustrated, the insurgents threatened to attack the project.
Local shuras mobilized and sent back a clear message: 'We want this
work to continue. InterIere and you will become our enemy. And the
insurgents backed down.
We have now reached the height oI the civilian surge. Any eIIort oI this
size and scope will Iace considerable logistical challenges. And we have
worked hard in the last two and a halI years to strengthen oversight and
improve eIIectiveness. We have, Irankly, learned many lessons, and we
are applying them. And the eIIorts oI our civilians on the ground,
working in some oI the most diIIicult conditions imaginable, continues
to be nothing short oI extraordinary. Looking ahead as the transition
proceeds, we are shiIting our eIIorts Irom short-term stabilization
projects, largely as part oI the military strategy, to longer-term
sustainable development that Iocuses on spurring growth and integrating
AIghanistan into South Central Asia`s economy.
Now, the third surge is our diplomatic surge. It is diplomatic eIIorts in
support oI an AIghan-led political process that aims to shatter the
alliance between the Taliban and al-Qaida, end the insurgency, and help
to produce more stability. To begin, we are working with the AIghans on
a new strategic partnership declaration that will provide a long-term
Iramework Ior bilateral cooperation and NATO cooperation, as agreed
to, again, at Lisbon. And it will bolster AIghan and regional conIidence
that AIghanistan will not again become a saIe haven Ior terrorists and an
arena Ior competing regional interests.
As the President said last night, this will ensure we will be able to
continue targeting terrorists and supporting a sovereign AIghan
Government. It will also provide a backdrop Ior reconciliation with
insurgents who must meet clear red lines they must renounce violence,
they must abandon al-Qaida, and they must abide by the constitution oI
AIghanistan, including its protections Ior women. As I said in February
in the speech I gave outlining this strategy, those are the necessary
outcomes oI any negotiation.
In the last Iour months, this AIghan-led political process has gained
momentum. Twenty-seven Provincial Peace Councils have been
established in AIghanistan, and the AIghan High Peace Council has
stepped up its eIIorts to engage civil society and women, even as it also
begins reaching out to insurgents. And let me underscore something
which you will not be surprised to hear me say, but I say it not because
oI my personal Ieelings but because oI my strategic assessment:
Including women and civil society in this process is not just the right
thing to do; it is the smart and strategic thing to do as well. Any potential
Ior peace will be subverted iI women or ethnic minorities are
marginalized or silenced. And the United States will not abandon our
values or support a political process that undoes the social progress that
has been made in the past decade.
But we believe that a political solution that meets these conditions is
possible. The United States has a broad range oI contacts at many levels
across AIghanistan and the region, that we are leveraging to support this
eIIort, including very preliminary outreach to members oI the Taliban.
This is not a pleasant business, but a necessary one, because history tells
us that a combination oI military pressure, economic opportunity, and an
inclusive political and diplomatic process is the best way to end
insurgencies. With bin Ladin dead and al-Qaida`s remaining leadership
under enormous pressure, the choice Iacing the Taliban is clear: Be part
oI AIghanistan`s Iuture or Iace unrelenting assault. They cannot escape
this choice.
Special Representative Marc Grossman is leading an active diplomatic
eIIort to build support Ior a political solution. What we call the Core
Group AIghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States has met twice
and will convene again next week. At the same time, we are engaging
the region around a common vision oI an independent, stable
AIghanistan and a region Iree oI al-Qaida. We believe we`ve made
progress with all oI the neighbors, including India, Russia, and even
Iran. Just this past Friday, the United Nations Security Council voted
unanimously to support reconciliation by splitting its sanctions on al-
Qaida and the Taliban into two separate lists, underscoring that the door
is open Ior the insurgents to abandon the terrorists and choose a diIIerent
path.
We welcome these steps, and Ior the United States the key diplomatic
priority and indeed a lynchpin oI this entire eIIort is closing the gap
between Kabul and Islamabad. Pakistan must be part oI this process.
Earlier this month, the two countries launched a joint peace commission
and held substantive talks at the highest levels. Also, very signiIicant,
was the Iull implementation on June 12
th
oI the Transit Trade
Agreement, which will create new economic opportunity on both sides
oI the Durand Line and lay the Ioundation Ior a broader vision oI
regional economic integration and cooperation. This agreement started
being negotiated in the early 1960s. It thereIore took decades, including
great, heroic eIIort by the late Richard Holbrooke and his team. But the
trucks are now rolling across the border.
I recently visited Pakistan and had, as we say in diplo-speak, very candid
discussions with its leaders. The United States has clear expectations Ior
this relationship, and as President Obama said last night, the United
States will never tolerate a saIe haven Ior those who kill Americans. We
are looking to Pakistan to take concrete actions on the goals we share:
DeIeating violent extremism, which has also taken so many innocent
Pakistani lives; ending the conIlict in AIghanistan; and securing a stable,
democratic, prosperous Iuture.
Now, these are obviously tough questions to ask oI the Pakistanis and
there are many causes Ior Irustration. But we should not overlook the
positive steps oI just recent weeks since May 2
nd
: Counterterrorism
cooperation continues and several very key extremists have been killed
or captured. As I told the Pakistanis, America cannot and should not try
to solve Pakistan`s problems; they have to eventually do that themselves.
But nor can we walk away Irom this relationship and ignore the
consequences, Ior all the reasons that Senator Lugar outlined in his
opening statement: Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state sitting at the
crossroads oI a strategic region. And we have seen this movie beIore.
We have seen the cost oI disengaging Irom the region. As Secretary
Gates, who was there at that time, has stressed, we cannot repeat the
mistakes oI 1989.
That`s why it`s important we have the resources to continue
implementing our strategy. The State Department is Iollowing the
Pentagon`s model and creating a special emergency Iund an Overseas
Contingency Operations account that separates normal operating costs
Irom extraordinary wartime expenses. Now, I will hasten to say we are
painIully aware oI today`s Iiscal reality. And I know that it is tempting
Ior some to peel oII the civilian and diplomatic elements oI our strategy.
They obviously make Iewer headlines; people don`t know as much
about them. And it would be a terrible mistake, and I`m not saying that
just Ior myselI, but as our commanders on the ground will tell you, the
three surges work hand-in-hand. You cannot cut or limit one and expect
the other two to succeed.
Ultimately, I believe we are saving money and, much more importantly,
lives by investing now. And let`s not Iorget: An entire year oI civilian
assistance in AIghanistan costs Americans the same amount as 10 days
oI military operations.
So Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members, I thank you Ior this
opportunity to discuss our strategy. There have been a lot oI
developments in the last months and I Ieel that what we are doing is
working. But it is obviously important that we ask the hard questions,
and I look Iorward to working with you to improve the strategy and
work together to implement it.
Thank you very much.

PRN: 2011/1032




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Woodward 8ob (20100927) Cbamas Wars (pp 8483) Slmon SchusLer klndle LdlLlon

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an M8A every Llme" CllnLon sald And yeL we have 8000
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Woodward 8ob (20100927) Cbamas Wars (p 248) Slmon SchusLer klndle LdlLlon