JustDesertsinIraq:AmericanVengeancefor9/11

PeterLiberman(correspondingauthor) DepartmentofPoliticalScience QueensCollegeandtheGraduateCenter,CUNY liberman@qc.cuny.edu LindaJ.Skitka DepartmentofPsychology UniversityofIllinoisatChicago lskitka@uic.edu

July10,2008

Paperpreparedforthe2008AnnualMeetingoftheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation,BostonMA, August2831.

Acknowledgments ThisresearchandpreparationofthisarticleweresupportedbyNationalScienceFoundationgrantsNSF 0210053andNSF0530380toLindaJ.Skitka.ThankstotheprofessionalstaffatKnowledgeNetworks ofMenloPark,CAfortheirsurveyexpertiseandservices,andespeciallytoJ.MichaelDennisand

MichaelDender,whoservedastheprojectmanagersforthedatareportedinthispaper.TheProgramon InternationalPolicyAttitudesgenerouslysharedadditionaldata.Wearealsogratefulforfeedbackfrom audiencesattheCenterforPlace,CultureandPoliticsattheCityUniversityofNewYork,theMershon CenteratOhioStateUniversity,theNewYorkAreaPoliticalPsychologyWorkshopatColumbia University,theStudyGroupontheEconomicsofSecurityattheNewSchoolforSocialResearch,the 2008MidwestPoliticalScienceAssociationAnnualMeeting,andthe2008PsychologyandSocialJustice Conference.

Abstract InJanuary2002nationalsurveydata,wefindastrongrelationshipbetweenAmericans desirestoavenge9/11andtheirbellicositytowardIraq,evenaftercontrollingfortheperceived terroristthreat,leftrightideology,andapprovalofU.S.politicalleaders.PriorbeliefsaboutIraq couldhavepromptedsuspicionsofIraqicomplicity.Inaddition,appraisaltendencyresearch suggeststhatangeranddesiresforrevengecouldhaveheightenedoutgroupantipathy,displaced blaming,andoptimisticassessmentofwarrisks.Wetestthefirstoftheseprocessesandfind evidencethatantiArabandantiMuslimantipathypartiallymediatedthevengeanceseffecton bellicosity.Vengeance,inturn,mediatedtheeffectsofretributiveness(proxiedbyrightwing authoritarianism)andpatriotismonpublicbellicosity.WhileperceptionsoftheIraqithreat probablyassumedgreaterimportanceoverthecourseofthefollowingyear,additionalsurvey datashowsthatevenaswarapproached,mostsupportersacknowledgeditwouldsatisfyadesire forrevenge. Keywords 2003IraqWar;terrorism;publicopinion;emotion;cognition;intergroupemotion;appraisal tendency;retribution;rightwingauthoritarianism;patriotism.

TheSeptember11th,2001,terrorattacksonNewYorkandWashingtonhadastrongand immediateimpactonAmericancitizensbellicositytowardIraq.Supportforwarjumpedfrom52%in early2001to7374%inNovember2001andJanuary2002polls,andthosewillingtoincursubstantial U.S.casualtiesinordertotoppleSaddamjumpedfrom30%in1998to56%inJanuary2002(Evertsand Isernia2005;Huddyetal.2002,448).Mostobservershavechalkedupthiseffecttopopularfeelingsof insecurityfollowing9/11.Accordingtothisview,fearofterrorismandtherallyroundtheflageffect madeAmericansreceptivetoPresidentGeorgeW.BushscasethatIraqhadtobepreventedfrom supplyingweaponsofmassdestruction(WMDs)toterroristsforevenmoredevastatingattacksonthe U.S.homeland(e.g.,Kaufmann2004;Western2005,chap.6). Wecontend,incontrast,thatAmericansdesiretoavengethe9/11attacksplayedamore importantroleintheirbelligerencetowardIraqthandidfearoffutureterrorattacks.Pastresearchon crimeandpunishmentthinkinghasshownthatseriouscrimesarousestrongfeelingsofangeranddesires forretribution,whichhaveastrongereffectonpunitivenessthandoutilitarianmotivessuchasdeterrence andincapacitation(seereviewbyCarlsmithandDarley2008).Weshouldexpectsimilarreactionsto crimescommittedbyforeignnationsagainstonesown,accordingtorecentworkonintergroupemotion theory(e.g.,Gordijnetal.2001;Mackieetal.2000).Thus,misperceptionsthatIraqwasinvolvedinthe 9/11attacks,perhapspromptedbypriorimagesofSaddamasanevilnemesis,wouldhavearoused outrageanddesiresforvengeanceatIraqaswellasattheactualalQaedaculprits. Angerandvengefuldesiresmayhavehadadditional,prioreffectsonAmericansthinkingabout Iraqandthewaronterror.Recentexperimentalresearchhasdemonstratedthatoutrageoverserious, unpunishedcrimesmakespeoplemorepunitivetowardtotallyunrelatedsuspectsandoffenders (Bushmanetal.2005;Goldbergetal.1999;Ruckeretal.2004).Inaddition,suchdisplacedblameand aggressionappearstobemagnifiedbysuperficialresemblancesbetweenthesecondarytargetandthe original,primeoffender(MarcusNewhalletal.2000),possiblybecauseangertendstoactivate stereotypicalthinking(Bodenhausenetal.1994).Thusoutrageover9/11couldhavemadeAmericans quickertoblameIraqfor9/11,andmorehostiletowardforeignArabsandMuslimsofallstripes.Another possibility,advancedinpriorstudiesanalyzingpost9/11angerbellicositycorrelations,isthatanger madecitizensmoreoptimisticabouttheeaseandcostofwar(Huddyetal.2007;seealsoSadleretal. 2005). OurownanalysisinthispaperofJanuary2002publicopiniondatashowsthatAmericansstill nursedstrongdesiresforrevengeagainstthe9/11perpetratorsfourmonthsaftertheattacks.These vengefuldesiresstronglypredictedsupportforwaragainstIraqandstatessuspectedofharboring terrorists,evenaftercontrollingforconcernaboutfutureterroristattacks,politicalideology,therally roundtheflageffect,race,andgender.VengeancewasalsoastrongpredictorofantipathytowardArabs andMuslims,whichinturnfurtherheightenedbellicosity.Consistentwithexpectationsfromintergroup emotiontheory,vengefulfeelingswerethemselvesstronglypredictedbypatriotism.Theywerealso stronglyheightenedbyrightwingauthoritarianism,apersonality/beliefsystemconstructclosely associatedwithretributiveness.Theseresultshelpexplainpriorfindingsthatpatriots,rightwing authoritarians,anddeathpenaltysupportersweredisproportionatelyhawkishonIraq(e,g,Federicoetal. 2005;Liberman2006;Skitkaetal.2006). ThefearthatIraqcouldhelpterroristsmakeWMDattacksonAmerica,aswellascitizens politicalorientations,assumedgreaterimportanceaftertheadministrationbeganemphasizingthisthreat

inthelatesummerof2002,andasangeroverthe9/11attacksfaded.Butadditionaldatacollectedin March2003foundalargemajorityofwarsupportersstillacknowledgingthatinvadingIraqwouldsatisfy orresolveaneedtoavengethe9/11attacks.Patternsinthedata,aswewillarguebelow,suggestthat thesefeelingswereasignificantsourceofsupportfortheIraqWar. WelackthenecessarydataonriskestimatesandonperceptionsofSaddamtotestwhetheranger biasedriskappraisalorpriorbeliefsaboutSaddamtotestthesealternativehypothesesfortherelationship betweenangerandbellicosity.Itisalsodifficulttotestforthecarryoverofangeratthe9/11perpetrators toblameandpunitivenessatIraq,atleastbeyondtheapparentspilloverofvengefulnessontoantipathy towardArabsandMuslims.Butwedidfindthatdesiresforrevengewereastrongermotiveforwarand forantiArab/Muslimantipathythanwasgenericanger,nottomentionfear.Thusthereisreasontothink thatrevengeisamoreimportantormoreproximatesourceofbellicositythangenericanger. Inthenextsection,wediscussinmoredetailpasttheorizingandresearchonpunitive motivations,intergroupemotions,andcognitiveeffectsofemotionthatcouldexplainwhyangerand vengeanceover9/11wouldhavegeneratedbellicositytowardIraq.Wealsodiscussplausiblealternative explanationsrelegatingangerandvengeancetothestatusofspuriousbyproducts,oratbestfacilitators,of eitherpragmaticsecuritythinkingoreliteleadershipofpublicopinion.Thesubsequenttwoempirical sectionsanalyzedatacollectedprimarilyinJanuary2002andinMarch2003.Wethenconcludeby summarizingourfindings,discussingtheirimplicationsfortheoriesofpublicopinionandforeignpolicy, andconsideringhowpoliticalleadersandcitizensmightmanagevengefulimpulsesmoreprudentlyinthe future.

Moraloutrage,revenge,andpunishment Integralblame,anger,andrevenge
Mostpeoplewantcriminalstobepunishedbecausetheyintuitivelyfeelthattheoffender deservesit.Calculationsthatpunishmentwillreducefutureoffencesplayasecondaryrolein punitiveness.Thishasbeendemonstratedbyresearchthatmanipulatescrimeandpunishmentscenarios. Featuresofascenariothatarerelevantforretribution,suchastheintentofthecrime,haveamuchgreater impactonthepreferredseverityofpunishmentthandofeaturesrelevanttoeitherincapacitationor deterrence,suchasthelikelihoodofrecidivismandthepublicityofthepunishment(seeresearch reviewedbyCarlsmithandDarley2008).Ofcourse,punishmentoftenservesretributiveandutilitarian purposessimultaneously,andwhenaskedabouttheirpunitivephilosophiesoraboutgeneralpolicy positions,peopleoftenarticulateutilitarianpreferences(Carlsmith2008).Butwhentheycontemplate punishmentsforspecificcrimesalreadycommitted,theirintuitionsandjudgmentsareprimarily retributive. Theroleofretributioninpunitivenesshasalsobeendemonstratedbybehavioraleconomists researchonexperimentalgames.Althoughstrategicincentivesforpunishmentclearlyaffectthe punishmentsplayersimposeoneachotherforunfairmoves,playerscontinuetoimposecostly punishment(i.e.,punishmentinvolvinganetcosttothepunisheraswellasthepunished)evenwhenthe structureofthegame(e.g.,incasesofthirdpartypunishmentoroneshotultimatumgames)eliminates allstrategicincentivesfordoingso(reviewedbyGintisetal.2005).Thefactthatcostlypunishment occursonlywhenplayersthinktheyareinteractingwithotherpeople,andnotwhentheythinktheyare

playingagainstcomputers,atteststoitsfundamentallymoralmotivation. Retributivepunishmentiscloselyconnectedtotheemotionofanger,afindingconsistentwith recentresearchdemonstratingtheintuitiveandemotionalbasisofmuchmoraljudgment(Haidt2001). Legalsystemsfromancienttimestothepresent,andphilosophersdevelopingtheoriesofretributive justicefromImmanuelKantforward,haveemphasizedthejudiciousproportionalityofaneyeforan eyeandjustdeserts,seekingtodistinguishitfromemotionalandirrationalrevenge.Butinfact, retributivejusticeandrevengespringfromacommonmoralemotion,anddiffermainlyinthedegreeto whichtheyhavebeensystematized,controlled,andinstitutionalized.Wethususethetermsrevenge, vengeance,justdeserts,andretributioninterchangeablyhere. Somestudieshavefoundangertomediatemostoralloftheeffectoftheseriousnessofacrime ontheseverityofthepunishmentdeemedappropriate(Darleyetal.2000).Experimentalgamesresearch hasalsofoundthatunfairplayarousesanger,whethermeasuredbyselfreportedfeelingsorbyneural activityinabrainareaassociatedwithnegativeemotions,andthatthedegreeofangerpredictsthe severityofcostlypunishment(PillutlaandMurnighan1996;Sanfeyetal.2003).Thenegativesensation ofangeritselfprobablyinfluencesdecisionstopunish;peoplewilloftenengageinimpulsive,self defeatingbehaviortoobtainrelieffromaversivefeelings(Ticeetal.2001).Butatleastonebrainimaging studyfoundthattheanticipationofgettingevenisemotionallyrewarding,ascanbeseenincorrelations betweenlevelsofactivityinpleasurerelatedbrainareas(measuredwhilesubjectsdecidedon punishmentsinexperimentalgames)andtheseverityofthepunishmenttheyassigned(deQuervainetal. 2004).Thustheanticipationofsweetrevengecouldhaveaseparatecausalimpactonpunishment. Theseintuitive,andperhapsinstinctive,emotionalandmotivationalreactionstotransgressions probablyevolvedasfunctionaladaptations.Emotionalstatesrepresentautomaticandrapidphysiological, cognitive,andbehavioralresponsestodangerstobefled,obstaclestobeovercome,opportunitiestobe exploited,orinthecaseofmoralemotionswrongstobepreventedoravenged.Thoughnormsand instinctsforaltruisticpunishmentwouldnothavedirectlybenefitedindividualpunishersandtheirkin, byraisingoveralllevelsofintragroupcooperationtheywouldhavebenefitedthegroupasawhole relativetoother,lesspunitiveandlessinternallycooperativesocieties(Gintisetal.2005). Emotions,thoughintrinsicallygoaloriented,aredifferentfrommotivations.Theyaremore closelyassociatedwithpleasure,pain,andphysiologicalarousalandtheyappeartoshapebehavior indirectly,byfocusingattentiononhowtoachieveonesgoals(Barrettetal.2007;Baumeisteretal. 2007).Motivations,likeadesireforrevenge,representmoreconsciousandconcretegoalsthatcanbe pursuedwithvaryingdegreesofemotion.Asaresult,motivationsaremuchmoredurablethanemotions, lastingdays,months,andyears,whereasemotionalarousalistypicallyfleeting,lastingunderanhour. However,memoriesofanangeringstimulussuchasaseriousoffencecanresurrectbothsocial motivationssuchasdesiresforretributionandanger.Thatiswhyruminationtheprolongedorrepeated attentiontonegativethoughts,memories,orfeelingsoveranoriginaloffensecansustainbothfeelingsof outrageanddesiresforvengeanceoveraperiodofseveralmonths(Bushmanetal.2005;Konecni1974). Americansangerover9/11thusremainedquitestrongafullyearafterwards(Fischhoffetal.2005). Intergroupemotionresearchhasshownthatemotionsandmoraljudgmentsaboutsocialgroups andnationsoftenmirrorthoseaboutindividuals.Justaspeoplewhoseethemselvesaspartofalarger wholefeeljoyatothergroupmemberstriumphs,sorrowattheirtragedies,fearattheirperils,andshame attheirwrongdoing,sotoodotheyfeeloutrageanddesiresforpunishmentoverinjuriestotheiringroup

(Gordijnetal.2001;Gordijnetal.2006;Mackieetal.2000;Yzerbytetal.2003).Retaliation,moreover, againsttheoffendingoutgroupevenhasbeenfoundtoslakeangerandbringsatisfaction(Maitneretal. 2006).Thisbodyofresearchhasconsistentlyfoundthatintergroupemotionsdependonindividuals identificationwiththeaffectedgroup.Ininternationalrelations,therefore,anindividualspatriotism shouldmagnifytheirangerandmotivationtoavengeanoffenseagainsttheirnationoritscitizens.Asone American,anindependent,explainedonthefifthanniversaryoftheU.S.invasionofIraq,Ibelievethat theIraqWarinthebeginningwasafeelgood,youknow,retribution,We'regoingtogogettheguysthat didthisfrom9/11.AndI'mbehindthat100percent.IbleedAmericanred,justlikeeverybodyinthis room(PBSNewsHour2008). Retributivevaluesandinstinctsshouldalsoaffectemotionalandpunitivereactionsto wrongdoing.Measuresofinterpersonalvengefulnesshavebeenfoundtopredictanger,rumination,and aggressivenessfollowingunfavorabletreatment(Berryetal.2005;Eisenbergeretal.2004;McCullough etal.2001).Beliefinretributivejusticealsoappearstobeastrongpredictorofdeathpenaltysupport (e.g.,Bohm1992).Rightwingauthoritarianism(RWA),ascalemeasuringpunitivenesstowardbad apples(aswellastappingmoralconventionalismandsubmissiontoauthority),alsopredictsappraisals thatoffendersincrimevignettesdeservepunishment(Feather1996).Itseemslogicalthattheseindividual differenceswouldalsoaffectangeranddesiresforretributionforoffensesagainstonesnation. TheforegoingwouldexplainwhyAmericanswouldangrilyseekrevengeagainstthe9/11 terroristsandtheiraccomplices,suchastheTaliban.ButwhywouldthisaffecthostilitytoIraq,aregime withnoconnectiontotheattackers?Themostobviousansweristhatasurprisinglylargepercentageof AmericansbelievedorsuspectedthatIraqhadbeeninvolvedintheattacks.InHaveYouForgotten?,a proIraqWarsongthattoppedthecountrymusicchartsinFebruary2003,DarylWorleyproclaimed, Haveyouforgottenhowitfeltthatday?/Toseeyourhomelandunderfire/Andherpeopleblown away?...AndwevowedtogettheonesbehindBinLaden/Haveyouforgotten?(Tuathail2003).Worley wasnotaloneinlinkingSaddamto9/11.InresponsetoanopenendedpollquestiononSeptember14th, 2001,27%namedSaddamassecondmostresponsiblefortheattacks.Laterthatmonth,only8% namedSaddaminresponsetoanopenendedquestionaboutresponsibilityfor9/11.Butwhenaskedif Saddamwaspersonallyinvolved,33%respondeditwasverylikelyand46%saidsomewhatlikely. Inearly2003afteralonggapinpolldataonthisquestionthepercentageofAmericanssaying somewhatlikelyorverylikelyinresponsetoforcedchoicequestionshaddeclinedbyonly10% (AlthausandLargio2004;Jacobson2006,100118).WhenaskedsimplywhetherSaddamwasinvolved ornotinseveralsurveysovertheninemonthspriortothewar,between4253%answeredaffirmatively (EvertsandIsernia2005,280).About50%saidinFebruary2002thattherewasenoughofalink betweenIraqandterrorismtojustifyaU.S.militarycampaign(PewResearchCenterforthePeople& thePress2002).ThusblamingSaddamforthe9/11attackscouldaccountforasubstantialamountof AmericanpublicsupportforinvadingIraq.

Biasedappraisalsofblame,outgroups,andriskestimates
Theforegoing,however,stillbegsthequestionofwhyAmericansweresoquicktoblame Saddamfor9/11.AdministrationrhetorictyingIraqtoalQaedacommencedwithBushsJanuary29, 2002AxisofEvilspeech,andreachedfullintensityonlyinthelatesummerandfallofthatyear,andso cannotexplaintheimmediateappearanceofpublicsuspicionsofIraqfollowingtheattacks.Aplausible 4

explanationisthatpriorperceptionsofSaddamasamalevolentfoe,datingbacktothe199091GulfWar andsustainedbyhisresistancetoU.N.disarmament,ledAmericanstosuspecthisinvolvementin9/11. Saddamspastregionalanddomesticbrutalityrepresentedscantevidencethathewoulddaretoattacka superpower.Butevenbefore9/11,followingU.S.andBritishairstrikesonIraqinearly2001,almost threequartersofthosepolledhadsaidSaddamwaslikelytoorganizeterrorattacksontheUnitedStates inretaliation(AlthausandLargio2004;Jacobson2006,13847). AnotherpossibilityisthatAmericansemotionalresponseto9/11mightitselfhaveshapedtheir perceptionsofSaddamsinvolvementintheattacks,andcouldhavemadeAmericansgenerally belligerent.AsWorleyputitinHaveYouForgotten?:Somesaythiscountrysjustoutlookingfora fight/After9/11,man,Idhavetosaythatsright(Tuathail2003).Questionedaboutthelackofany evidencelinkingIraqtobinLaden,aradiodiskjockeyplayingthesonginhourlyrotationreplied,the audienceissowrappedupintheemotionofwhatitsabout,Idontthinktheyrenitpickingatthis pointeverybodysviewingallthebadguysinabigbucket(Mansfield2003). Experimentalstudiesonthecognitiveeffectsofangeranddesiresforretributionsuggestmultiple processesthatcouldhaveheightenedAmericanbelligerenceafter9/11.Wefocushereonangerseffects onappraisalsofcausality,responsibility,andrisk,althoughangersdepthofprocessingeffectsmight alsohavebeeninvolved(seeHuddyetal.2007).Theseappraisaltendenciesappeartostempartlyfrom themotivationscloselyconnectedwithspecificemotions,inaprocessakintomotivatedreasoning.The desiretopunishwrongdoing,forinstance,mightprivilegeinformationandbeliefsjustifyingthe punishmentofconvenientsuspectsevenifnotclearlyguilty.Anotherhypothesizedprocess,affectas information,wouldleadangrypeopletoperceiveangeringeventsasmorelikelytooccur(foramore detaileddiscussion,seeLernerandTiedens2006). Threeappraisaltendencieswouldseemmostlikelytohavelinkedfeelingsabout9/11towishes topunishIraq:displacedblame,intergroupantipathy,andbiasedriskassessment.Thefirstofthese effectswasfirstdetectedinanexperimentfindingthatinducingangermadesubjectsmorelikelytoblame othersdispositionsratherthantheirsituationsformishapstheywereinvolvedin(Keltneretal.1993). Multiplestudieshavefoundthatseeingautopsyphotosofamurdervictimleadsmockjurorstobeangrier andmoreconvincedofthedefendantsguilt,eventhoughthephotoscontainnoevidencebearingontheir culpability(BrightandGoodmanDelahunty2006;Douglasetal.1997;seealsoQuigleyandTedeschi 1996). Perhapsthemostcompellingdemonstrationsofdisplacedblamearethoseshowingthatanangry desiretopunishoneoffendercarriesovertowardothers.Inaseminalexperiment,subjectswerefirst shownavideoofamanbeatingupahelplessteenager,andafterwardaskedaboutappropriate punishmentsfordifferentpeoplesnegligencehadharmedothers.Thosewhohadseenthevideoreported greaterangerthandidacontrolgroup,andrecommendedharsherpunishmentsfortheunrelatedcases (Lerneretal.1998).Inafurthermanipulation,asubsetofsubjectswhohadwatchedthevideoweretold thatthebullyhadgottenoffscotfree,whileotherswereinformedthathehadbeenappropriately punished.Althoughbothgroupsreportedsimilarlevelsofanger,angerhadagreaterimpactonpreferred punishmentsforthosebelievingthatthebullyhadgottenawaywithit.Inotherwords,unrequiteddesires forpunishmentappeartoamplifyangerseffectondisplacedpunishment(Goldbergetal.1999).The carryoverofincidentalanger,furtherresearchhasshown,ismediatedbyadesireforretributivejustice, notforenhancingdeterrence(Ruckeretal.2004).

Experimentsontriggereddisplacedaggressionhavedemonstratedasecondpartyversionof thecarryovereffect.Subjectsunabletoretaliatedirectlyforaseriousinsulttendtoreactmore aggressivelytowardunrelatedbutannoyingindividuals(Bushmanetal.2005;Milleretal.2003).Both thecarryoverandtriggereddisplacedaggressioneffectsinvolveaninteractionbetweenincidental outrageandatriggeringirritationorsuspicionthatwouldhavebeeninnocuousintheabsenceofanger. DisplacedblamingcouldhelpexplainwhyAmericansweresopronetoblameSaddamfor9/11. TheinterventioninAfghanistandidnotadequatelyrequiteAmericandesiresforpunishment;twothirds saidgoinginthattheywouldregarditasafailureifitfailedtocaptureorkillalQaedasleader,Osama binLaden(Huddyetal.2002).PriorimagesofSaddamasamaliciousrogueleadercouldhaveservedas triggeringstimuliforthecarryover/triggereddisplacedaggressioneffect.Inotherwords,thoseangrily thirstingforrevengemighthavebeenmorelikelythanthecoolheadedtoinferfromthesameprior beliefsaboutSaddamthathewasinvolvedintheattacks,andtowanttopunishhimandhisregime. DisplacedblamingwouldalsohavemadeSaddamseemguiltierofseekingillicitWMD,planning regionalaggression,andplottingfutureattacksagainsttheUnitedStates,heighteningpragmatic incentivesforwar.ThiscouldexplainwhyAmericanswithpunitivedispositionsweremorelikelyto believethatIraqpossessedWMDsinearly2003(Liberman2006)andwhyAmericansangryatboth terroristsandSaddamtendedtoperceivegreaterdangerfromIraq(Huddyetal.2007). Theimpactofangeranddesiresforrevengeatthe9/11perpetratorsonperceptionsofArabs, Muslims,andterroristswritlargerepresentasecondappraisalmechanism,probablyrelatedtothefirst, thatcouldhavefueledAmericanbellicositytowardIraq.Experimentallyinducedangerhasbeenshown toheightenprejudice(DeStenoetal.2004).Prejudicealsocorrelateswithtraitanger,apropensityto getangryeasilyandoften(Tapiasetal.2007).Inaddition,researchhasfoundthatdisplacedaggressionis greateragainstindividualswhoresembletheinitialprovocateur(MarcusNewhalletal.2000).The similaritymightserveasareminderoftheprioroffense,arousingangerandpropensitiesfordisplaced blameandaggression. Alternatively,angerstendencytoactivatecategoricalorheuristicthinkingmightfoster inferencesthatwholesocialgroupssharetheaggressivetraitsofoffendingindividualmembers. Oneexperimentfoundthatinducedangerheightenedstereotypicalinferencesinappraisingthe guiltofacrimesuspect(Bodenhausenetal.1994).Categoricalinferencesfromindividual offenderstoentiregroupswouldaccountfortheheighteneddislikeofArabsobservedafterterror attacksinIsraelandSpain(BarTalandLabin2001;EchebarriaEchabeandFernandezGuede 2006).PriortoJapanssurpriseattackonPearlHarbor,AmericanshadregardedJapanesepeople morehighlythanGermans,Italians,andJews.Afterward,largemajoritiessuspectedJapanese Americansofbeingspies,condonedinterningover100,000mostofthemU.S.citizensunder strictguardasprisonersofwar,andfavoredtheirdeportation.Bytheendofthewar,morethan atenthofallAmericanswantedtoexterminatetheentireJapanesepopulation,andafullquarter wishedthatmanymoreatomicbombshadbeendroppedbeforeJapanhadachanceto surrender(Berinsky2007a).AntiArabhatecrimesskyrocketedintheUnitedStatesafteranew dayofinfamyinSeptember2001,andangerovertheattackscorrelatedwithantipathytoward MiddleEasterners,ArabAmericans,andnewimmigrants(Skitkaetal.2004). Athirdprocessthatcouldhavelinked9/11tobellicositytowardIraqissuggestedbyfindingsthat angerheightensoptimisticestimatesofriskaswellasriskacceptantbehavior(reviewedinLernerand

Tiedens2006).Inpreparingbodyandmindforconfrontation,angerseemstohelppeopletoscrewup theircourageinpartbymakingobstaclesappearmoresurmountable.ThusAmericanswhorespondedto 9/11withmoreangerthanfearorsadness,aswellasthoseinwhomangerwasexperimentallyinduced, tendedtobemoreoptimisticsixweekslateraboutcapturingOsamabinLaden,aswellasaboutunrelated riskssuchasthechanceofcatchingtheflu.Theangryalsotendedtobelesslikelytotakeprecautionary stepstoprotectagainstsuchhazards(Fischhoffetal.2005;Lerneretal.2003).Huddyetal(2007)found thatangeratterroristsandatSaddamcorrelatednegativelywithexpectedrisksfromthewar,butitisnot clearwhetherthisconfidenceactuallyheightenedsupportfortheIraqWar,orwasarationalizationfor thosealreadyinclinedtofight. Mostoftheexperimentalfindingsdiscussedabovehavebeenobservedwithinthebrieftime frameoftypicallaboratoryexperiments.Itthusremainsunclearhowlongtendenciestocastdisplaced blame,tofeelantipathytowardoutgroups,andtobeoverlyconfidentpersistafterinitialexposuretoan outrageoustransgressionsuchas9/11.But,asmentionedearlier,motivationslikeadesireforretribution canlongoutlastinitialemotionalarousal,andremindersandruminationcouldsustainorrevivedesires forrevengeandanger.Aslongasmediacontinuestoreportonanotoriouscrime,andpeoplecontinueto reflectaboutit,angersappraisaltendenciescanshapeattitudeslongafteritwascommitted.

Securitycalculationsandeliteopinionleadership
Incontrasttotheaboveexplanationsfocusingonangerandvengeance,themostcommonlyheard explanationsforAmericansbellicositytowardIraqemphasizesecurityconcernsandeliteleadership. Mightthesefactorsaccountfortheobservedcorrelationbetweenangerover9/11andsupportforwar againstIraq? Astrongrationalpublicaccountonegrantingnocausalforcetoemotionwouldattribute belligerencetowardIraqtopurelycoolcalculationsabouthowtobestprotecttheUnitedStates,albeit basedonfalsepremisesaboutIraqitiestoalQaeda.Angeranddesiresforrevengewouldbemerely epiphenomenal,emotionalconcomitantsofpragmaticthinking.Inarationalistframeworkgranting emotionsafunctionalrole(e.g.,Damasio1994;Mercer2005),however,angercouldhavefacilitateda pragmaticjudgmentthatwarwasneededtoneutralizeathreat.Desiresforrevenge,eventhoughnot consciouslyaimedatutilitariangoals,canhaveutilitarianconsequencesiftheymotivatethe incapacitationordeterrenceoffuturedangers.Thesociofunctionalrolesandoriginsofmoraloutrage andaltruisticpunishmentmayhaveintergroupanalogues.Forexample,experimentalstudieshavefound thatintergroupconflictheightensangerandcontemptdirectedatoutgroupsamongmembersofstrong ingroups,andfearamongmembersofweakones(seereviewbyCarlsmithandDarley2008).Butinthis account,angeranddesiresforretributionwouldexplainlittleofthevariationinsupportfortheIraqWar beyondthatalreadyexplainedbysecurityconcerns. AnobviousproblemwithbothvariantsisthelackofevidencethatIraqhadaidedalQaedaorthe 9/11attacks.Speculativesuspicionisaweakreeduponwhichtojustifywar.Moreover,several widespreadbeliefsaboutthewararedifficulttoreconcilewithapragmaticsecurityargumentfor topplingSaddam,evenaftertheBushadministrationhadpaintedIraqasagraveandgatheringthreat. Fewerthan20%ofAmericansthoughtthatinvadingIraqwoulddecreasetheterrorthreatagainstthe UnitedStates(EvertsandIsernia2005,288).AmajorityalsobelieveditverylikelythataU.S.invasion ofIraqwouldleadIraqtotransferWMDstoterroristsforuseagainsttheUnitedStates(Kull2002).And 7

mostAmericanssaidthattheywouldhavebeentoldthetruthbytheU.S.governmentevenifitturnsout thatIraqhadnosignificantweaponsofmassdestructionandtherewasnostronglinktoalQaeda(Everts andIsernia2005,283),suggestingeitherindifferenceorconfusionregardingBushssecurityarguments forwar. Tobesure,mostAmericansfavoringwaralsotoldpollstersthatSaddamwasathreat.Butthis claimmighthavebeenarationalizationforsupportingwarratherthananactualmotive,assomehave arguedwasthecaseforpublicexpectationsofthewarssuccessfuloutcome(BerinskyandDruckman 2007).Inthedomainofcrimeandpunishmentattitudes,althoughexperimentalmanipulation demonstratesthedominanceofretributivemotivationsforfavoringharshpunishment,whenaskedto justifytheirpunitivejudgmentsandphilosophies,peopletendtoemphasizethegoalofprotectingpublic safety(Carlsmith2008).Byanalogy,AmericanswhoactuallyfavoredattackingIraqasvengeancefor 9/11maywellhavejustifiedthewarasnecessarytoremoveasecuritythreat. Asecondexplanationfortheconnectionbetweenangerover9/11andbellicositytowardIraq, whichalsogiveslittlecausalweighttoangerandrevenge,canbeinferredfromtheeliteleadershipmodel ofpublicopinion.Eliteconsensusorpolarizationonissuestendstobemirroredinmassopinion, especiallyamongpoliticallyawarecitizens(Zaller1992;Zaller1994).Ifeliterhetoricswayedboth Americansangerover9/11andtheirsupportforinvadingIraq,thentheircorrelationcouldbespurious. Indeed,PresidentBushdeclaredrightafter9/11thatcivilizedpeoplearoundtheworlddenouncethe evildoerswhodevisedandexecutedtheseterribleattacks.Justicedemandsthatthosewhohelpedor harboredtheterroristsbepunishedandpunishedseverely.Theenormityoftheirevildemandsit(Bush 2001;seealsoCoeetal.2004;KrebsandLobasz2007).Thepresidentandthemediadidnotfocus heavilyonIraquntilthelatesummerof2002,butIraqwasobviouslynotonAmericassideinBushs insistencethatinthewaronterror,eitheryouarewithusoryouarewiththeterrorists.Inthe absenceofelitecriticismofthisimage,apublicrallyingtoBushssideafter9/11couldhaveabsorbedhis twinmessagesofindignationandbellicosity. Aselitedisagreementsemergedandthepost9/11rallyeffectfaded,politicallyawarecitizens wouldhavebecomemorepolarizedovertheprospectofwarwithIraq.Infact,thegapbetween DemocratsandRepublicansonsupportformilitaryactionagainstIraqgrewfromabout10%inthe September2001March2002periodtoabout35%bytheendof2002(Jacobson2006,7987,95162, 17186).ThegapwasespeciallylargebetweenpoliticallyknowledgeableDemocratsandRepublicans, justastheeliteleadershipmodelwouldpredict(Berinsky2007b).Sobeforeconcludingthatangerover 9/11heightenedpopularsupportforinvadingIraq,itisimportanttoruleouteliteleadershipasadriving forcebehindboth. Theabovediscussionhaspresentedsixplausibleexplanationsforthecorrelationsobserved betweenpublicangerover9/11andsupportforwaragainstIraq,andthejumpinthatsupportafter9/11: 1.CoolmisperceptionsthatSaddamwascomplicitinthe9/11attacksarousedangeranddesiresfor revengeagainsthim,2.Angeranddesiresforrevengeagainstthe9/11culpritscauseddisplacedblame andpunitivenesstowardSaddam,3.Angeranddesiresforrevengeagainstthe9/11culpritscaused antipathytowardforeignArabsandMuslims,4.Angerover9/11heightenedconfidenceintheeaseand efficacyofwaragainstIraq,and5.Anger,desiresforrevenge,andbellicositywereallcausedbysecurity concerns,or6.Allthreewerecausedbyeliteopinionleadership.Inthetwoempiricalstudiespresented

below,ourmaingoalistoinvestigatetheoverarchingquestionoftheimpactofvengeanceonpost9/11 AmericanbellicositytowardIraq(whetherviahypotheses#14),andtheindependenceofthiseffectfrom securityconcernsandeliteleadership(hypotheses#5and#6).InStudy1,weanalyzecorrelations betweenvengefulfeelingsandbellicositytowardIraqinJanuary2002,whilecontrollingforpolitical orientationandconcernaboutfutureterroristthreats.Whilewelackthedataneededtotesthypotheses #14againsteachother,dataonantipathytowardforeignArabsandMuslimsallowsaspecifictestof hypothesis#3.Study1alsocomparestheeffectsofangeranddesiresforrevengeonbellicositytoward Iraq,aswellasexplorestheimpactofretributiveness(proxiedbyrightwingauthoritarianism), patriotism,perceivedthreat,andpoliticalvariablesonvengeance.Study2smoremodestgoalisto examinethepersistenceofvengeanceasasourceofbelligerence,againcontrollingforsecurityconcerns andpoliticalorientation,usingadditionalopiniondatacollectedmainlyinMarch2003.

Study1:September2001January2002 DataandMeasures
Mostofthedataanalyzedinourfirststudywascollectedaspartofalargersurveyonemotion andpoliticaltolerance,carriedoutbyKnowledgeNetworks(KN).1Thesurveywascompletedby605 respondents,88%oftheKNpanelistssampled,betweenDecember28,2001,andJanuary14,2002.We alsouseadditionaldataonemotionalreactionsto9/11,whichhadbeencollectedfromthesamesample betweenSeptember14andOctober2,2001,withmostsurveyscompletedbySeptember21(N=585,an 85%withinpanelresponserate). WemeasuredsupportforwaragainstIraqinJanuary,2002,withasingleitemonthelevelof agreementordisagreementwiththestatementthatThewaronterrorismshouldbeexpandedtoIraqand anyothercountrysuspectedofharboringorsupportingterrorists.Fortythreepercentstronglyagreed withexpandingthewaronterror,17%didsomoderately,21%wereneutral,6%disagreedmoderately, and2%disagreedstrongly.(Throughoutthisstudywereportweightedpopulationestimatesfor proportions,andunweightedsamplestatisticsformeans,standarddeviations,andinteritemreliabilities.) Wereversescoredourmeasure,Prowar1/02,ona15scalethesamerangeusedfortherestofthe variablessothathighervaluesrepresentedgreatersupportforwar. ThereisgoodreasontothinkthatProwar1/02asameasureofsupportforwaragainstIraqwas notcompromisedbythequestionsreferencetoIraqandanyothercountrysuspectedofharboringor supportingterrorists.Thislanguagecontrastedwithmentioninprecedingquestionstothepeoplewho didthisandthoseresponsiblefortheattacks,andsowouldnothaveimpliedIraqicomplicityin9/11. IfthequestionswordinghadframedIraqasanaccomplicein9/11,orhadbeenreadasageneral questionaboutterrorsupportingstates,itwouldhaveelicitedstrongersupportforwarthanthesixty percentwhorespondedaffirmativelythattheyfavoredwar.Thiswaslessthanthe7174%supporting militaryactiontoremoveSaddamHusseinfrompowerinseveralJanuarypolls,alevelthathadheld KNmaintainsalargepanelofsubjects(about40,000inthistimeperiod),recruitedrandomdigitdialing anddesignedtomatchU.S.Censusdemographiccriteria,fromwhichsmallerrandomsamplesaredrawn foreachsurvey.Whenweightedtoaccountforsampledesignandnonresponse,theresultsofKNsurveys havebeenfoundtobeverysimilartothoseoftelephonebased,nationalprobabilitysamplesurveys {Berrens,2003#957}.
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fairlysteadysinceOctober(EvertsandIsernia2005,29195).SurveyquestionsthatmentionedIraqs involvementinterrordonotappeartohaveincitedbellicosity.Evenafterbeingaskedtokeepinmind thatIraqiPresidentSaddamHusseinhasharboredterroristsinthepast,only65%supportedusing militaryforceagainstSaddamHusseinandIraqinanOctober,2001,NBC/WallStreetJournalpoll (NBC/WallStreetJournal2001). Americansweremorebelligerenttowardcountriesknowntobeactivelysupportingterrorism,as opposedtomerelybeingsuspectedofsuchinvolvement.InthesameOctoberNBC/WallStreetJournal poll,81%saidthattheUnitedStatesshouldtakemilitaryactionagainstanationthatknowinglyaids terroristsorallowsthemtoliveintheircountry,ifthecountryplayednoroleintheSeptembereleventh attacks.InseveralpollsfromOctober,2001throughJanuary,2002,supportranbetween7884%for militaryactionormilitaryforceagainstanynationfoundtobeaidingorhidingterrorists,other countriesthatassistorshelterterrorists,etc.SupportforthewarinAfghanistanwasconsistently between8090%(Huddyetal.2002,44048).BecauseProwar1/02smarginalsmorecloselyresemble thoseofstandardquestionsonIraq,itappearstobeavalidmeasureofAmericanbelligerenceagainst Iraq,ratherthanagainstterrorsupportingstatesingeneraloragainstaccomplicesin9/11.Andevenif responsesdidreflectdistinctfeelingsaboutstatesjustsuspectedofabettingterrorists,itwouldstillbea valuablemeasureofaratherindiscriminateoreasilymisdirectedbellicosity. Ameasureofdesirestoavenge9/11,Revenge,istheaverageoffourJanuary2002itemson feelingsabouttheattacks.Thefirstitem,fallinginaseriesofitemsonfeelingsexperiencedrightnow, abouttheeventsofSeptember11,askedaboutadesiretofightback,withresponseoptionsofnotat all,slightly,moderately,much,orverymuch.Thethreeotheritemsaskedhowmuch respondentshadfelt,inreactiontotheeventsofSeptember11,adesiretohurtthoseresponsiblefor theattack,acompellingneedforvengeance,andthatthepeoplewhodidthiswereeviltothecore, withthesameresponseoptions.Theeviltothecoreitemreflectedamoralevaluationorappraisal ratherthanadesireforretaliationorrevenge.Butweincludeditbecausetheoffendersmoralstatusis thecriticalcriterionforretributivepunishment,asnotedabove,andbecausetheappraisalitemcorrelated stronglywiththeothervengeanceitems.ThemeanoftheresultingRevengescale(M=3.62;SD=1.00; Alpha=.83)fellabouthalfwaybetweenmoderatelyandverymuch. Additionalvengeancemeasuresweredrawnfromaseriesofitemsasking,Didyoudoanyofthe followingthingsinresponsetotheeventsofSeptember11th...saidsomethinglikeweshouldjustnuke them,talkedaboutadesiretogetwhoeverwasresponsibleforthis,andtriedtoblowoffsteamby expressingangeraboutthesituation.AswiththeRevengescale,theresponsestothesebehavioralitems indicatethedepthofAmericansvengefulfeelings:48%acknowledgedsayingtheywantedtogetthem and20%acknowledgedsayingweshouldjustnukethem,and22%saidtheytriedtoblowoffsteam. ParallelitemsfieldedimmediatelyaftertheterrorattacksandagaininJanuary2002wereusedto measureangerandfear.Anger9/01istheaverageoftwofirstwaveitemsaskingthedegreetowhich respondentsfelthatredandoutrageinreactiontotheterroristattacks(M=3.49;SD=1.19; Alpha=.70),whileAnger1/02averagessecondwaveitemsaskingthedegreetowhichrespondentsstill felthatredandoutragerightnow,abouttheeventsofSeptember11(M=3.07;SD=1.18;Alpha=.75). Fear9/01andFear1/02wereconstructedfromanalogousitemsonfeelingfrightenedandvulnerable inSeptember2001(M=2.98;SD=1.28;Alpha=.77)andinJanuary2002(M=2.39;SD=1.08;Alpha=.83), respectively.

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AnexploratoryfactoranalysisontheitemsusedinRevengeandAnger1/02,aswellasother2002 itemsonselfreportedfeelingsofangerandmoraloutrage,revealedthatRevengeandAnger1/02 representeddistinctifcloselyrelatedconstructs.WeusedMplus4.2sweightedleastsquaredmeansand varianceadjusted(WLSMV)estimation,whichistailoredforanalyzingnonnormalandcategoricaldata (MuthnandMuthn2007).Astrongsinglefactorwasindicatedbythelargegapbetweenthefirst Eigenvalue(of5.03)andthenexttwo(between0.730.76),butathreefactormodelwassuggestedby overallfitstatistics(RMSEA=0.054comparedto0.164and0.105fortheoneandtwofactormodels, respectively).AfteraPromaxrotation,thefourRevengescaleitemsloadedmainlyononefactor,the anger,hatred,andoutrageitemsloadedonasecondfactorhighlycorrelatedwiththefirst(r=.70),and moraloutrageloadedonathirdfactor(rsofabout.40withtheothertwofactors).Thusthereare empiricalaswellastheoreticalreasonsfordistinguishingbetweenRevengeandAnger1/02. Wemeasuredtheimpactof9/11onhostilitytowardArabsandMuslimswithtwoquestions askinghowfeelingshadchangedsince9/11about1.Palestiniansand2.peoplelivinginIslamicor MiddleEasterncountries,withresponseoptionsofmuchmorepositive,morepositive,stayedthe same,morenegative,andmuchmorenegative.Wecollapsedtheresponsesoftheveryfew respondents(<6%)whoseopinionshadbecomemorepositivewiththemodalcategoryofstayedthe same,andaveragedthetwoitemsintoafivelevelAntiArabscale(M=1.89;SD=1.44;Alpha=.78). Asasurrogatemeasureforretributiveness,weusedfouritemsfromAltemeyers(1996)right wingauthoritarianism(RWA)scale,askingforlevelofagreementordisagreementwiththefollowing statements:Ourcountrydesperatelyneedsamightyleaderwhowilldowhathastobedonetodestroy theradicalnewwaysandsinfulnessthatareruiningus;Ourcountrywillbegreatifwehonortheway ofourforefathers,dowhatauthoritiestellus,andgetridoftherottenappleswhoareruining everything;Ourcountrywillbedestroyedsomedayifwedonotsmashtheperversionseatingawayat ourmoralfiberandtraditionalbeliefs;andThewayourcountrycangetthroughfuturecrisesistoget backtoourtraditionalvalues,puttoughleadersinpower,andsilencetroublemakersspreadingbad ideas(M=3.33;SD=1.10;Alpha=.90).RWAhasbeenfoundtopredictboththeperceivedseriousnessof anoffenceandthedegreetowhichtheoffenderdeservestobepunished(Feather1996).Statistically controllingforapprovalofpoliticalauthorityfiguresandforleftrightideologyshouldcorrectforRWAs authoritarianconventionalismandsubmissiondimensions,leavingRWAausefulproxyforthethird dimensionofauthoritarianaggression,whichisquitesimilartoretributiveness(seeFunke2005). Assumingthatidentificationwiththenationwouldhavecorrelatedwithfeelingasurgeof patriotismfollowingtheattacks,weusedtheselfreportedintensityofthelatterfeelingasameasureof Patriotism(M=3.93;SD=1.12).Theperceivedterroristthreatwasmeasuredusingasingleitemasking howworriedtherespondentwasaboutfutureterroristattacks,notatall,slightly,moderately, much,orverymuch(M=3.09;SD=1.11).TherelativelyhighmeanofThreatanditspositive correlationwithProwar1/02(r=.13)indicatesthatitmeasuredthreatperceptionmorethanfearor anxiety,whichwasreportedbyaminorityofAmericansandwhichtendedtoreducesupportforforceful andriskyantiterrorpolicies(seeHuddyetal.2005;Huddyetal.2007). Tocontrolforpoliticalbeliefsandleadershipeffects,weusedmeasuresofideologyand heightenedenthusiasmfortheU.S.government.Conservativeisasevenpointselfidentificationideology scale,Towhatextentdoyougenerallyconsideryourselftobealiberalorconservative,fromvery liberaltoveryconservative(rescaled15;M=3.13;SD=1.07).Ourdatalackedameasureofparty

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identification,butpartisanshiphasbeenhighlycorrelatedwithideology(rsof.5.6)duringthistime period(AbramowitzandSaunders2005,9),andwasamodestpredictorofsupportformilitaryaction againstIraqincontemporaneoussurveydataaftercontrollingforideology.2ThevariableRallywasbased onasinglequestionaskingHowmuchhaveyourfeelingsaboutAmericanpoliticalleaderschanged sinceSeptember11,muchmorepositive,morepositive,nochangeorneutral,morenegative,ormuch morenegative?(reversescored;M=3.63;SD=.81).WealsoincludeddummymeasuresforFemale (51%)andforBlack(7.6%),aswomenandAfricanAmericanstendtobemorepacific,andthelatter tendtobelesspatrioticowingtotheexperienceofdiscrimination(NincicandNincic2002;Sidaniusetal. 1997).

Analysis
Likeinotherstudies,ourdataalsoshowedangertohavebeenastrongerreactionto9/11than wasfear.Seventypercentfeltmuchorverymuchoutragerightaftertheattacks,and53%stillfeltso fourmonthslater.Just41%reportedfeelingmuchorverymuchfrightenedintheimmediate aftermath,droppingtoonly15%inJanuary.Angerwasalsomoredurable,withthemeanofAnger1/02 subsidingby.40fromthemeanofAnger9/01(t=8.51;df=571;p<.001),comparedtoadropin.59inthe meanoffear(t=11.84;df=571;p<.001).Therepeatedmeasuresforangerwerehighlycorrelatedacross time(r=0.57;p<.001),astheywereforfear(r=0.50;p<.001). Ourdataalsoshowedthatthedesireforretributionwasabetterpredictor,comparedtoeither angerorfear,ofbothbellicositytowardIraqandantipathytowardArabs.Bivariateorderedprobit regressionsofProwar1/02foundRevenge(b=0.56;robustS.E.=.07;p<.001)tobeastrongerpredictor thanAnger1/02(b=.28;robustS.E.=.05;p<.001),whiletheeffectofFear1/02wasscarcelysignificant (b=.08;robustS.E.=.05;p=.107).WhenProwar1/02wasregressedonRevengeandAnger1/02 simultaneously,theAnger1/02coefficientdroppedtozero(multicollinearitywasnotaproblem,witha correlationbetweenAnger1/02andRevengeofr=0.65).Similarly,anorderedprobitregressionofAnti ArabonRevenge,Anger1/02,andFear1/02togetherfoundasignificanteffectonlyforRevenge. Asimilarpatternemergedforthebehavioralindicatorsofrevengeandanger.Inprobit regressionsofthesemeasuresonRevengeandAnger1/02,thecoefficientofRevengewassubstantively muchlargerthanthatofAnger1/02.Onlyinthecaseofrecollectionsoftryingtoblowoffsteamwas Anger1/02statisticallysignificantatthep<.05level.Thestrengthoftheseeffectscanbemorereadily graspedbycomparingthelikelihoodofvengefulbehaviorsforthoseatthe10thand90thpercentilesofthe Revengescale.3Thoseatthe90thpercentileofRevengewere86%likelytoadmithavingtalkedabouta desiretogetwhoeverwasresponsiblefortheattacks,comparedtoonly11%ofthoseinthe10th percentile(a75%difference).Thehighlyvengefulwerealso45%likelytoadmithavingsaidsomething likeweshouldjustnukethem,a41%increaseoverthe4%ofthosefeelinglittledesireforvengeance. Eventhelikelihoodofhavingexpressedangeraboutthesituationwasboostedmore,24%,bya10th90th percentileshiftinRevenge(holdingangerconstant)thanthe15%increasefromacorrespondingshiftin Anger1/02(withrevengeheldconstant).Thusselfreportedverbalizationofvengefulnessandventing Betaweight=.08(p<.05);AuthorsanalysisofJanuary913,2002polldatacollectedbythePewCenter forthePeopleandthePress,archivedattheRoperCenterforPublicOpinionResearch. 3 TheprobabilitiespresentedhereandbelowwereestimatedwiththeprogramClarify(Kingetal.2000).
2

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was,likebellicosityandantiArabhostility,morestronglyinfluencedbydesiresforrevengethanbyplain anger,indicatingfurtherthattheformerhadamorepotentimpactonAmericanthinkingabout9/11. WeusedpathmodelingtotestsimultaneouslytheeffectsofRevengeandAntiArabon Prowar1/02,themediationofRevengeseffectonProwar1/02byAntiArab,andwhetherRevengein turnmediatedtheeffectsofRWAandPatriotism,allwhilecontrollingforideology,therallyeffect,and perceivedthreat.OurfirstmodelincludedregressionsofPatriotismandConservativeonRWA,Black, andFemale,aswellasacascadeofregressionsofRally,Revenge,Threat,AntiArabonthe aforementionedvariables,witheachindependentvariablebecomingadependentvariableinthenext regression.(ThismodelassumesthatAntiArabandThreatwereendogenoustoRevenge,premises checkedbelowwithalternativespecifications.)Finally,Prowar1/02wasregressedonallthepreceding variables.Mplus4.2sWLSMVestimationwasusedtofitthemodel,generatinglinearregression coefficientsforpathsleadingtoRevengeandConservativeandorderedprobitcoefficientsforpaths leadingtotherest.Droppingcaseswithmissingvaluessacrificedlessthan4%oftheJanuary2002 sampleofN=605. [Figure1goesabouthere] Figure1showstheresultsafterremovingpathsfallingshortofthep<0.05significancelevel.The fitindicesallsuggestthatModel1isaverygoodfitwiththedata.4AntiArabandespeciallyRevengehad substantialdirecteffectsonProwar1/02,suggestingthatdesiresforrevengeandworsenedopinionsof ArabshadsignificanteffectsonbellicositytowardIraq(andothernationssuspectedofharboring terrorists).Theserelationshipswerenotspuriousbyproductsofconcernabouttheterroristthreat,political ideology,approvalofU.S.politicalleaders,patriotism,RWA,gender,orrace,allofwhicharecontrolled inthemodel. Again,thestrengthoftheserelationshipsismorereadilyseenfromcomparingtheprobabilitiesof strongsupportforwaragainstIraq(i.e.,themaximumvalueofProwar1/02)forselectedindependent variablesattheir10thand90thpercentiles,withtheremainingModel1variablesheldattheirmeansor modes.(Forconvenience,thiswasestimatedusingClarifyandanorderedprobitregressionof Prowar1/02ontheotherModel1variables,ratherthanusingthepathmodel).Slightlyvengefulbut otherwiseaveragecitizenswerejust22%likelytostronglyfavorwar,whilethehighlyvengefulwere 59%likelytodoso,adifferenceof36%.AnanalogousshiftinAntiArabheightenedstrongsupportfor warby16%,andajointshiftinbothoftheseRevengeandAntiArabincreasedthelikelihoodofstrongly favoringwarby50%.ThiseffectsurpassedtheimpactfromcomparableshiftsinRWA(35%),Rally (16%),andRallyandConservativecombined(27%). ReturningtoModel1,itshouldberecalledthatRevengesestimatedadditionalindirecteffecton Prowar1/02,viaitsimpactonAntiArab,wasbasedontheassumptionthatRevengecausedAntiArab, ratherthanviceversa.Butthispremisemightbeopentoquestion.Whatifpriorprejudicescontaminated ourmeasureofpost9/11feelingsaboutArabsandMuslimsandalsoaffecteddesiresforvengeance?We thustestedanalternativemodel,reversingthedirectionofthepathbetweenRevengeandAntiArab,but AcceptablefitindexthresholdsforWLSMVmodelswithcategoricaloutcomesincludeanChisquare p>0.01;ComparativeFitIndex(CFI)>=0.96;TuckerLewisIndex(TLI,orNonNormedFitIndex) >=0.95;RootMeanSquareErrorofApproximation(RMSEA)<=0.05;andWeightedRootMeanSquare Residual(WRMR)<0.90(MuthnandMuthn2007).
4

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otherwiseidenticaltoModel1.Thismodelfitthedatapoorly(Chi2=26.254,df=6,p=.0002; RMSEA=0.076;CFI=0.958;TLI=0.823;WRMR=0.755),withtheChisquare,TLI,andRMSEAindices failingtomeetacceptablethresholds.Inathirdvariantwithreciprocalpathsbetweenthetwovariables, thepathfromRevengetoAntiArabwassignificantbutthereversepathwasnot.Theseresultsare consistentwithModel1sassumptionthatRevengeheightenedAntiArabratherthanviceversa,andwith theconclusionthatvengefuldesireshadanindirecteffectonbellicosity,inadditiontoitsdirecteffect, throughantiArab/Muslimantipathy. Model1isalsoconsistentwithourexpectationsthatdesiresforrevengewereheightenedby ingroupidentification,asmeasuredbyPatriotism,andbyretributiveness,asproxiedbyRWA. PatriotismseffectonProwar1/02,accordingtothemodel,wasmediatedmainlybyRevengeand,toa lesserextent,byRally.RWAtoohadsubstantialindirecteffectsonbellicosityviaRevenge,butin additionhadalargedirecteffect.BecauseRallyandConservativeshouldcontrolforRWAs authoritariansubmissionandmoraltraditionalismdimensions,itseemsunlikelythatthesedimensions wouldaccountforthisfinding.ItcouldsomeotherdimensionorcovariateofRWAthataffects bellicosity.OritcouldreflectauthoritariansvengefulfeelingsbeingnotfullycapturedintheRevenge scale,whichcouldbesubjecttosocialdesirabilitybiasinlightofChristianandutilitariantabooson revenge. PerceptionsoftheterroristthreathadnodirecteffectonProwar1/02inModel1.Thus, vengeanceandangercouldnothavebeenepiphenomenaltoutilitariansecuritythinking.Butthreatstill mighthavehadanindirecteffectif,contrarytoModel1sassumption,ThreatcausedRevengeratherthan viceversa.Onecouldplausiblyexpecteitherthecausaldirectiontofloweitherway.Ontheonehand, intergroupconflicthasbeenfoundtoheightenangerandcontemptamongthoseidentifyingwith relativelystrongingroups(Mackieetal.2000),suggestingthatperceivedthreatcouldhaveaffected desiresforrevengeagainstthe9/11terrorists.Thiswouldbeconsistentwiththetheorythatviews emotionasplayinganimportantroleinrationaljudgmentanddecision.Ontheotherhand,theappraisal oftheterroristsasevil,socloselyboundupwithdesiresforrevenge,wouldhavemadethemappearmore dangerous.Thehighlyvengefulmightalsohaveemphasizedtheterroristthreatasamotivated rationalizationforsupportingapunitivewaronterror. ModifyingModel1again,thistimebyreversingthepathfromRevengetoThreat,yieldedvery similaroverallfitindicestotheoriginalmodel.Foradditionalstatisticalleverage,wespecifiedsimpler pathmodelsusingAnger9/01andFear9/01asinstrumentalvariablespredictingRevengeandThreat, respectively.Angerovertheattacksshouldhavehadamuchgreatereffectondesiresforrevengethanon theperceivedterrorthreat,whilefearshouldhavehadinfluencedthreatperceptionsmuchmorethan desiresforrevenge.Therefore,ifThreatcausedRevenge,Fear9/01sinfluenceonRevengewouldhave beenindirectone,throughThreat,andAnger9/01wouldhavebeenunrelatedtoThreataftercontrolling forFear9/01.TheseassumptionsarerepresentedinthepathmodelinthetoppanelofFigure2(Model 2A),withtheabsenceofalinkbetweenAnger9/01andThreatreflectedinthelackofadirectorindirect pathrunningfromtheformertothelatter.Themodelinthemiddlepanel(Model2B)reflectsthe converseinferencesfromtheassumptionthatRevengecausedThreat:Anger9/01wouldhaveaffected ThreatviaRevenge,andFear9/01wouldhavebeenunrelatedtoRevengeaftercontrollingforAnger9/01. [Figure2goesabouthere] AccordingtothefitindicesgeneratedbyMplus,utilizingWLSMVestimation,Model2Bfitthe 14

datamuchbetterthandidModel2A.Theformerpassedallindiceswithflyingcolors,whilethelatter flunkedfourandbarelymettheacceptablethresholdforthefifth(WRMR).Inathirdmodelwith reciprocalpathsbetweenRevengeandThreat,Model2C,thepathfromRevengetoThreatwas statisticallysignificant,butthereversepathwasnot.(Theseresultswerenotaffectedbyallowingthe residualsofRevengeandThreattobecorrelated.)Thesefindingsindicatethat,asModel1assumes, moralcondemnationand/ordesiresforrevengeheightenedtheperceptionofafutureterrorthreat,rather thanviceversa,andthattheperceivedterrorthreatlackedevenanindirectimpactonbellicosity. Politicalaffinitiesalsofailedtoaccountforeitherrevengeoritsimpactonbellicosity.The absenceofarelationshipbetweenConservativeandRevengeinModel1mightstillbeconsistentwith eliteleadershipifthepublichadabsorbedbothadesireforrevengeandforwarfromelitesexpressing both.ButthisseemsquiteunlikelyinlightofthefindingthatRallywasunrelatedtoRevengeandonly moderatelyrelatedtoProwar1/02.Moreover,inotherregressionsnotdetailedhere,wefoundno evidencethateducationlevelaroughproxyforpoliticalawarenessandhencesusceptibilitytoelite leadership(seeZaller1994)heightenedRevengeorProwar1/02.Norweretheresignificantinteraction effectsbetweeneducationandConservativeinprobitregressionsofProwarorRevenge,aswouldbe anticipatedfromopinionfollowingapolarizedelite. ItisworthmentioningafewmorefindingsfromModel1thataretangentialtoourmainfocus here,butthatbearonothertheoreticalissuesinsocialandpoliticalpsychology.Oneissueisthe relationshipbetweenpatriotismandoutgroupprejudice.Recentworkhasfoundthatloveofcountry, unlikemoreethnocentricformsofnationalism,doesnotcauseprejudice(deFigueiredoandElkins2003). ThelackofarelationshipinourModel1betweenAntiArabandPatriotism,aftercontrollingfor Revenge,isconsistentwiththisconclusion.Second,themediationofRWAseffectonAntiArabby Revengeareconsistentwithpriorfindingsthatintergroupemotionsmediatetheeffectofanother predisposition,socialdominanceorientation,onprejudice(Milleretal.2004).Third,Revenges mediationofRWAseffectonperceivedthreatsuggestsanovelexplanationforthecorrelation commonlyobservedbetweenthesetwovariablesinavarietyofcontexts(e.g.,Duckitt2006;Lavineetal. 1999;McFarland2005).Finally,ourresultsaccordwithcommonfindingsonAfricanAmericansand womenslackofenthusiasmforwar,butthetypicalexplanationemphasizingtheirliberalpolitical orientationsdoesnotholdhere.Model1indicatesthatAfricanAmericanswerelessbelligerentbecause theywerenotaspatrioticallyidentifiedwiththenation,aswellasotherunknownreasonsforbeingless vengefulthanotherAmericans.AndwomensslightpacifismonIraqinearly2002wasentirelydueto theirfeelinglessvengefulthanmen.

Study2:March2003
Study1showedthatthedesiretoavenge9/11wasastrongsourceofAmericanbellicositytoward Iraqinearly2002,aneffectindependentofandmuchlargerthanleftrightideology,approvalofU.S. politicalleaders,andconcernabouttheterrorthreat.Butsecuritymotivationsprobablyassumedagreater importanceoverthefollowingyear,particularlyaftertheBushadministrationbeganchargingIraqwith tryingtoacquireWMDsandsupportingantiAmericanterrorists.Desiresforrevengewerealso dissipatingovertime.Atthesamerateofdeclineseeninourmeasureofanger,fromanaverageof halfwaybetweenmoderatelyandmuchinSeptember2001tomoderatelyfourmonthslater,it wouldhavefallentojustslightlybytheFallof2002.Theburstofmediareminiscenceonthefirst 15

anniversaryoftheattacksprobablyrenewedpopularangeranddesiresforvengeance,heightening AmericansreceptivitytoBushschargesofmalfeasanceandaggressiveintentagainstSaddam.Butthe intensityoffeelingsabout9/11wouldeventuallyhaveresumeditslongtermdecline. Undertheseconditions,itwouldnotbesurprisingifsecurityconcernsandallegiancetothe presidentdisplacedvengeanceasadrivingforcebehindpublicbelligerencetowardIraqin20023.As priorresearchhasshown,warsupportandperceptionsoftheIraqithreatinthisperiodwerebothstrongly affectedbyindividualspartyidentification,approvalofthepresident,andsourceofnews(Kulletal. 200304;Jacobson2006).Todeterminewhetherthevengeanceeffectevaporatedover20023,weturn nowtoanothersurvey,oneconductedonthebrinkofwar.

DataandMeasures
Adifferentsurveywasfieldedtoadifferent,largersampleofKNpanelistsbetween13March and9April2003(N=3,534,with76%completionsbythebeginningofthewaronMarch19th). BellicositytowardIraqwasmeasuredwithasinglequestionasking,Howmuchdoyousupportor opposegoingtowarwithIraq.Sevenresponseoptionsrangingfromstronglysupporttostrongly opposewererescaledalongwithalltheothervariablesinthisstudyfrom01,andreversedsothat higherscoresofthevariableProwar3/03reflectedgreaterbellicosity(Mean=0.63;SD=0.37). ThreequestionsaskedspecificallywhethertheIraqWarfulfilledtheirowndesiresforvengeance for9/11:Towhatextentwould[changedtodidafterMarch20th]goingtowarsatisfyorresolveeach ofthefollowingforyou:Adesiretohurtthoseresponsibleforthe9/11attacks;Acompellingneedfor vengeanceforthe9/11terroristattacks;Asenseofmoraloutrageaboutthe9/11terroristattacks. Responses(rangingfromnotatall,slightly,moderately,much,toverymuch)werehighly intercorrelated,sowecombinedtheitemsintoanadditivescaleofretributivesatisfaction,Vengwar (Mean=.43;SD=0.29;Alpha=0.90). Forthosewhosepositionsonwarwereshapedbytheirmoralandemotionalimpulses,Vengwar wouldhavereflectedavengefulmotiveforwarratherthanjustananticipatedsidebenefit.(Thesocial tabooonrevengemakesitimprobablethatrespondentswouldhavementionedvengeanceasa rationalization).AsacheckonwhetherVengwarreallyreflectedamoralisticmotiveforwar,weexplored whethermoralists,thosewhoindicatedstrongagreementwiththestatementthatMyfeelingsabout whetherweshouldgotowarreflectsomethingaboutmycoremoralvaluesandconvictions(M=.62; SD=.33),tendedtohaveastrongercorrelationbetweenVengwarandProwar3/03.Thiscanbetestedby regressingProwar3/03onthecrossproductterm,Vengwar*Moralism. Wecontrolforpartisanpoliticalallegianceswithasevenpointpartyidentificationscale, Republican(Mean=0.46;SD=0.35)anda7pointleftrightideologicalselfplacementscale,Conservative (M=.53;SD=.23).Tocontrolforsecuritymotivesforwar,weuseddatafromaProgramonInternational PolicyAttitudes(PIPA)surveyadministeredto1,256KNpanelistsinMay1418,2003,including194 respondentsfromourMarch2003sample.APIPAquestionasked,Pleaseindicateyourpositiononthe questionofwhether,justbeforethewar,Iraqhadweaponsofmassdestruction.Pleaseansweronascale of0to10with0meaningyouarecompletelycertainthatIraqdidNOThaveweaponsofmass destruction,10meaningthatyouarecompletelycertainthatIraqDIDhaveweaponsofmassdestruction, and5meaningyouareunsure.BeliefinIraqipossessionofWMD(Mean=0.69;SD=0.29)isanadequate proxyforperceptionsoftheIraqithreat.InmidMaythefailuretodiscoveranyactualIraqiWMDswas 16

notyetobviousorpublicizedenoughtohavesystematicallybiasedthismeasure,andtheviewofsome expertsthatIraqwouldbedeterredfromusingortransferringanyWMDshadnotbeenwidely representedinthemedia. Weusedmultipleimputationtoavoidinefficientlydroppingcaseswithmissingdata,whichis particularlyserious(3032%)forConservativeandRepublicanduetothefactthattheseitemswere collectedforonlytwothirdsoftheMarch2003sample(aspartofKNspoliticalprofileitems).Even confiningouranalysesusingthePIPAdatatothesmallmergedsample(N=192),missingnessishighfor WMD(55%)dueasplitsampledesigninthePIPAsurvey.ForboththewholeMarch2003sampleand thesmallermergedsample,wegeneratedtenmultiplyimputeddatasetsusingtheprogramAmeliaII,and combinedtheestimatedparametermeansandstandarderrorsusingClarify(Kingetal.2000;Kingetal. 2001).

Analysis
Amongthosewhosaideithertheyeithermoderatelyorstronglysupportedgoingtowarwith Iraq,83%saidgoingtowarwouldtosomedegreesatisfyorresolveasenseofmoraloutrageaboutthe 9/11terroristattacks(17%slightly,26%moderately,and39%muchorverymuch).Seventy sixpercentofwarsupportersadmittedthewarwouldsatisfyorresolveadesiretohurtthose responsibleforthe9/11attacks(16%slightly,25%moderately,and35%muchorverymuch). Despitethetabooonvengeance,70%ofwarsupportersacknowledgedthatthewarwouldsatisfyor resolveacompellingneedforvengeanceforthe9/11terroristattacks(18%slightly,25% moderately,and28%muchorverymuch). AseriesoflinearregressionsofProwar3/03areshowninTable2.AsModel3Ashows, Americanswhofeltthatwarwouldbringretributivesatisfactiontendedtobeitsmoreardentsupporters, evenaftercontrollingforpartisanshipandideology.5Thosewhosaidtheirpositionsonthewarreflected theircoremoralvaluesandconvictionswere,onaverage,somewhatdisinclinedtowardwar.Butthe significant,positiveVengwar*MoralisminteractioninModel3Bindicatesthattherelationshipbetween VengwarandProwar3/03wasgreaterformoraliststhannonmoralists.6Thisiswhatwewouldexpectto seeifVengwaractuallyreflectedamoralmotiveforwar.FurtherevidenceforthevalidityofMoralism canbeseenintheweakinteractionbetweenMoralismandWMD,whichrepresentsmoreofaapragmatic thanmoralincentiveforwar,showninModel3E.(Wereportunweightedresultsforthemergedsample, whichistoosmallforprecisepopulationestimatesbutneverthelessusefulfortestingrelationships.7) TheestimatedeffectsofVengwarandVengwar*Moralismwerelittlechangedinadditionalregressions (notdetailedhere)controllingforeducation,income,gender,race,churchattendance,interactions betweeneducationandthepoliticalvariables,andaninteractionbetweenMoralismandConservative,so wedroppedthesevariablesfromouranalysis.However,wefoundastrongpositiveinteractionbetween educationandConservative,consistenwithapolarizingeliteleadershipeffect;apositive Moralism*Conservativeinteraction;andmodestnegativeeffectsforAfricanAmericanandfemale. 6 WecenteredVengwar,Moralism,andWMDbeforecreatingthecrossproducttermsandrunningthe regressions,sothemaineffecttermsVengwarandMoralisminModels3Band3Erepresenttheimpact ofeachvariablewhentheotherisatitsmean. 7 Althoughtheoverlapbetweenthetwosurveyswaspresumablyrandom,thedemographicdifferences
5

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[Table2goesabouthere] AlthoughbeliefinIraqiWMDwasasignificantpredictorofbellicosity,Vengwarremaineda substantialpredictorofsupportforwarevenaftercontrollingforWMD(seeModel3D).Comparing Models3Cand3DshowsthatVengwarseffectisattenuatedwhencontrollingforWMD.Oneplausible explanationisthatunderlyingconcernsabouttheIraqithreatinfluencedbothVengwarandProwar3/03, andsosomeofthecorrelationbetweenthem(evidentinModels3A3C)wasspurious.Alternatively, WMDmighthavemediatedsomeoftheeffectofVengwaronProwar3/03,forinstanceifdesiresfor vengeancethoughdisplacedblamedisposedAmericanstobelieveallegationsthatSaddamwasguiltyof amassingWMDs. Whatshapedvengefulsatisfactionfromwar?WeranadditionalregressionsofVengwaron severalpoliticalanddemographicvariablesandfoundthatgreatervengefulsatisfactionwasexpressedby Republicans(unstandardizedb=0.11;p<.001),thosewhoidentifiedtheirraceasother(notblack, white,orHispanic;b=.08;p<.05),andolderrespondents(b=.12;p<.01).Lesservengefulsatisfactionwas expressedbyregularchurchgoers,selfdescribedmoralists,thosewithhigherincomes(allb=.07;p<.05 orbetter),andespeciallybythemoreeducated(b=.31;p<.001).Theeducatedmighthaveknownbetter thantoblameIraqfor9/11(seeKulletal.200304,590),ortheymightjusthavebeendisinclinedto admitvengefulfeelings.Churchgoersmayhavebeenlessretributiveormoresensitivetomainstream Christianitystabooonvengeance.

Discussionandimplications
Tosumupourmainfindings,desirestoavenge9/11substantiallyheightenedsupportforwar againstIraqinearly2002,anddidsoinpartbyimpugningtheimageofforeignArabsandMuslims. Theseeffectswerelargelyindependentofsecurityconcernsandpoliticalorientation.Thedesirefor vengeancewashighlycorrelatedwithangerinJanuary2002,andstronglypredictedbyangerfeltinthe immediateaftermathoftheattacks,RWA,andpatriotism.EveninMarch2003,mostwarsupporters acknowledgedthatitwouldresolveorsatisfydesirestoavenge9/11.Thisappearstohavebeena moralisticmotiveforwar,largelyindependentoftheeffectsofpartisanship,ideology,andthebeliefin IraqiWMD. TheseresultsareconsistentearlierfindingsthatsupportfortheIraqWarinearly2003was predictedbyangeratSaddamandterrorists(Huddyetal.2007,218),deathpenaltysupport(Liberman 2006),andrightwingauthoritarianism(McFarland2005),thelasttwobecausedeathpenaltysupporters andrightwingauthoritarianstendtoberetributive.Ourfindingsarealsobroadlyconsistentwith expectationsderivedfrompriorresearchonpunitivejudgmentandonintergroupemotions.Most Americanssaw9/11asaheinouscrimedeservingseverepunishment,butretributivecitizens(thosehigh inRWA)andpatriots(identifyingwiththeinjurednation)wereespeciallyvengeful. Ourfindingsarealsoconsistentwithpriorworkonthetendencyofangertobiascognitive appraisals.Americansdesiresforvengeanceheightenedtheirbellicositybyworseningtheiropinionof betweenitandthefullweightedMarch2003sample(itwassomewhatolder,moreBlackand Midwestern,andlesseducatedandHispanic)werenotlessenedbyutilizingKNsMarch2003orMay 2003probabilityweights.DroppingcaseswithmissingdataonWMDresultedinthesamesubstantive findings;standarderrorsincreasedbutstillmetthep<.05statisticalsignificancelevel. 18

foreignArabsandMuslims,whetherthroughdisplacedblame(e.g.,mostforeignArabsandMuslims conspiredtoattacktheUnitedStateson9/11)ordehumanization(e.g.,theworthlessnessofArabsand Muslimsmakesitacceptabletokilltheminlargenumbers).Thismechanismrepresentedonlyasmall partofthetotaleffectofvengeanceseekingonbellicosityinourdata,however.Priorknowledgeof Saddam,angerbiasedblameofSaddamindependentofantiArabantipathy,andangerbiasedrisk appraisalallcouldhaveplayedaroleintheremainingdirecteffect,butourdatadoesnotpermitamore finegrainedanalysis. Ourapproachdifferedfromexperimentaldemonstrationsofangerscarryovereffectinother importantrespects.Experimentalresearchhasobservedtheshorttermeffectsofincidentalemotion.In ourobservationofanaturalexperimentfourmonthsafterexposuretoanoutrageouscrime,wefound thatthedesireforrevengewasastrongerandmoreproximatesourceofbellicosity(andantipathytothe offendersoutgroup)thanwasanger.Itseemsthatvengefuldesireseithermediatedtheeffectsofanger onbellicosityandantiArabantipathy,orelsewasawellspringforallthree.Thisisconsistentwith researchonrumination,showingthatprotractedattentiontoaninjusticeandtoonesownunrequited desiresforretributioncanbeanenduringsourceofangerandpunitiveness.Ourmeasuresarenot sufficientlyvalidatedanddifferentiatedtodrawstrongconclusionsonthisscore,butitisreasonableto concludethatfurtherbasicresearchshouldbedevotedtoretributivemotivationanditsdifferencesand relationshipswithappraisalsofmalevolentintent,genericanger,andmoraloutrage. Ourresultsfoundthatneithereliteleadershipnorpragmaticsecurityconcernshadmuchofan impactonbellicosityinJanuary2002.ThesecurityincentiveforwaragainstIraqandotherterrorist supportingcountrieswastoprevent,eitherthroughincapacitationorintimidation,futureterroristacts againsttheUnitedStates.ButourdatashowthatatthisstageAmericansfavoredwaragainstSaddamasa vengefulendinitselfratherthanforselfprotection.Evenifnotpragmaticorutilitarian,vengeancecould stillhavebeenrationalinthebroadestsenseofbeingbasedonreasons(Lupiaetal.2000,7).Butitis unclearwhetherAmericanswereconsciouslyreasoningthatwarwasneededtoavenge9/11,orifthe effectofvengeancewasmoresubliminal.Itisespeciallydifficulttoarticulatethelogicbywhichoutrage andrevengeledtoantiArabhostility,leadingtosupportforwaragainstIraq.Securityconcernsandelite opinionleadershipdidhaveasubstantialimpactonsupportfortheIraqWarinourMarch2003data,but eventhenthedesiretoavenge9/11independentlycontinuedtoinfluencebellicositytowardIraq. Thegeneralizabilityofourfindingstootherinternationalcrimesremainsanopenquestion. Desiresforvengeancemayhavebeenunusuallystronginthiscase;onemayhavetogobackasfaras PearlHarbortofindsuchintenseAmericanindignation.FailingtocomprehendalQaedasaims,aims thatwereambitioustobeginwith,ledAmericanstoseeitasafanaticalandbloodthirstyenemy.Terror attackswithmoreclearlylimitedgoals,suchasthe2004Madridbombings,arelesslikelytobeviewedas actsofpureevil(seeRoseetal.2007).Offensesagainstothernationsarealsolikelytoelicitweaker reactions,especiallyforcitizenswhodonotidentifywiththevictims.However,thefactthatdeath penaltysupportersweresignificantlymorelikelytofavorU.S.interventioninthe1991GulfWar,despite littleknowledgeofIraqsKuwaitivictims,suggeststhatcitizenswillsupportretributionforcrimes againstforeignnationsaswellasagainsttheirown(Liberman2006,2007). Politicalcommunicationandinternationalconstraintsshouldalsoconditiontheintensityand effectsofrevenge.Vilifyingadversariesandvividlydescribingtheiratrocitiesisatimehonoredstrategy formobilizingpopularsupportforwar(BenPorath2007),undoubtedlybecauseitissoeffectivein

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playingoncitizensretributiveimpulses.Obviouspracticalconstraintswillalsoreinintheimpactof moralemotionsonbellicosity;itwaseasiertotakeanationlikeIraqtothewoodshedforitscrimes,real orimagined,thantodothesametoastrongerstate.Butbecauseuncertaintiesaboutforeignthreatsand thecostsofwarareendemicininternationalpolitics(Jervis1998;Tetlock2005),therecouldbearange ofconflictsinwhichdesiresforretributioncouldplayarole.Ininvestigatingretributivemotivations further,researchersshouldkeepinmindthattheymightunderliedebatablesecurityargumentsfor sanctionsorforceagainstcriminalregimes,justasretributivelymotivatedcriminalpunishmentisoften rationalizedinutilitarianterms(Carlsmith2008). Theperilsofvengefulwars,evenagainstrelativelyweaktargets,warranttheirbeingstudied further.InadditiontotakingthelivesofthousandsofAmericansandhundredsofthousandsofIraqis, strengtheningIranspositioninthePersianGulfregion,andcostingtheUnitedStatesanestimated$3 trilliondollars(StiglitzandBilmes2008),theIraqWaraccomplishedwhatbinLadenoriginallyhad soughttoachievebythe9/11attacks:toensnaretheUnitedStatesinaprolongedoccupationofaMuslim country,firingupantiAmericanhatredanddestabilizingU.S.friendlyMuslimstateslikeSaudiArabia (Doran2002).ShouldanothercatastrophicterrorattackoccuragainsttheUnitedStates,impulsestolash outcouldonceagainswellpublicsupportformisdirectedandselfdefeatingmilitaryaction. Unfortuntately,therearenoeasyantidotestovengefulimpulses,whichspringfromculturally rootedandperhapseveninstinctivedispositions.Obviously,foreignstatesshouldavoidgratuitously wavingredflagsatamaddenedsuperpoweriftheywishtoavoidbecominglightingrodsfordisplaced aggression.Politicalleadersininjuredandenragedstatesshouldfocusretaliationagainstactualculprits, argueagainstmilitarydiversions,andtrumpetsuccessfulprosecutionstoslakepopularthirstforrevenge. Publicizingtheexistenceofemotioninducedbiasesmighthelpcitizensanddecisionmakersto correctforthem(DeStenoetal.2000;Lerneretal.1998;PettyandWegener1993;Ruckeretal.2004). Citizensalsomightbeencouragedtocopewithanationaltragedybydonatingblood,volunteeringtohelp victims,orothervalueaffirmingactivitiesthatmightdistractcitizensfromvengefulrumination(Skitka etal.2004).Anotherapproachmightbetoacknowledgethegrievances,realorimagined,thatmighthave motivatedahostileact.Extenuatingcircumstancesandintentareimportantcriteriainmakingretributive justicejudgments.Introspectionaboutonesowncapacityforharmhasalsobeenshowntoincrease forgiveness(Exlineetal.2008).Thissuggeststhatpoliticalleadersmightlimitvengefulreactionsby acknowledgingthepastinjuriestheirnationhasdonetoothers,incrisesaswellasintimesofpeace.But asoutragedcitizenswillhavelittlepatiencefornationalsoulsearching,itwouldrequirestrongand temperateleadershiptoavoidindulginginusversusthem,goodversusevilrhetoricafterapainful attack.

Bibliography

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Figure1.PathModelofReactionsto9/11andSupportforAttackingIraq,January2002

Note:Pathsinsignificantatp<.05(twotailed)omitted.ThepathsleadingtoPatriotism,Threat,Rally,AntiArab,andProwar1/02are unstandardizedorderedprobitregressioncoefficients;thosetoRevengeandConservativeareunstandardizedlinearregressioncoefficients.Two tailedsignificancelevelsindicatedby:*p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001;RWA=RightWingAuthoritarianism. 21

Figure2.PathModelsTestingTheImpactofPerceptionofTerroristThreatonDesiresfor RevengeagainsttheTerrorists,andViceVersa,January2002

Note:ThetermsonthepathsleadingtoThreatareunstandardizedprobitcoefficients,thepaths leadingtoRevengeshowunstandardizedOLSregressioncoefficients,andthecorrelation

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betweenFear9/01andAnger9/01isshownonthearrowbetweenthem.Twotailedsignificance levelsindicatedby:*p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001.

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Table2.EffectsofVengefulSatisfactionfromWaragainstIraqonWarSupport, March2003 Model3A b/(se) Republican Conservative Moralism Vengwar Vengwar*Moralism WMD WMD*Moralism Constant .35*** (.02) 3534 .36*** (.02) 3534 .25*** (.06) 194 .26*** (.06) 194 .32*** (.03) .25*** (.06) .09*** (.03) .37*** (.03) Model3B b/(se) .32*** (.03) .23*** (.06) .09*** (.03) .37*** (.02) .33*** (.08) Model3C b/(se) .32*** (.08) .41** (.13) .09 (.07) .28*** (.07) Model3D b/(se) .28*** (.07) .41** (.12) .09 (.07) .22** (.07) Model3E b/(se) .29*** (.08) .38** (.13) .10 (.08) .24** (.08) .40 (.24) .30** (.11) .10 (.27) .28*** (.06) 194

.31* (.11)

Note:Multipleimputationestimatesforleastsquaresregressionofthedependentvariable Prowar3/03;Models3Aand3Bemployprobabilityweightingandreportrobuststandarderrors. Allregressioncoefficientsareunstandardized,andtwotailedsignificancelevelsareindicatedby: p<.10;*p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001.

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