MUNiC 2011

Defining Diplomatic Diversity

The United Nations Security Council

Topics & Research Guides

Committee Director:

Rizwan Syed
Email: rizwansyed30@yahoo.com

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Background to the Committee

The Security Council has primary responsibility, under the Charter,for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is so organized as to be able to function continuously, and a representative of each of its members must be present at all times at United Nations Headquarters. On 31 January 1992, the first ever Summit Meeting of the Council was convened at Headquarters, attended by Heads of State and Government of 13 of its 15 members and by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the remaining two. The Council may meet elsewhere than at Headquarters; in 1972, it held a session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the following year in Panama City, Panama. When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Council's first action is usually to recommend to the parties to try to reach agreement by peaceful means. In some cases, the Council itself undertakes investigation and mediation. It may appoint special representatives or request the Secretary-General to do so or to use his good offices. It may set forth principles for a peaceful settlement. When a dispute leads to fighting, the Council's first concern is to bring it to an end as soon as possible. On many occasions, the Council has issued cease-fire directives which have been instrumental in preventing wider hostilities. It also sends United Nations peace-keeping forces to help reduce tensions in troubled areas, keep opposing forces apart and create conditions of calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought. The Council may decide on enforcement measures, economic sanctions (such as trade embargoes) or collective military action. A Member State against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. A Member State which has persistently violated the principles of the Charter may be expelled from the United Nations by the Assembly on the Council's recommendation. A State which is a Member of the United Nations but not of the Security Council may participate, without a vote, in its discussions when the Council considers that that country's interests are affected. Both Members of the United Nations and non-members, if they are parties to a dispute being considered by the Council, are invited to take part, without a vote, in the Council's discussions; the Council sets the conditions for participation by a non-member State. UNSC Permanent Members China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the P5 (Permanent 5) Members of the Council with veto power (which may be exercised during the UNSC sessions at MUNiC '11) UNSC Non-Permanent Members Bosnia & Herzegovina*, Brazil*, Colombia, Gabon*, Germany, India, Lebanon*, Nigeria*, Portugal and South Africa * indicates their term expiring and being replaced by Azerbaijan, Guatemala, Morocco, Pakistan and Togo Courtesy Stanford Model United Nations 2011 and Berkeley Model United Nations 2011

The Mexican Drug War Topic Area A Topic Background

The violence, anarchy, and gangs in Mexico, due to the confrontation between government and drug cartels, have sparked worry within the international community. During the 1980s and 1990s Mexico was the link between Colombias cocaine supply and US demand. Today, Mexico sustains a billiondollar industry with powerful drug cartels undermining the Mexican governments effort to placate organized crime and to placate the power of the drug lords. Despite vast military efforts and US aid, Mexicos war on drugs has taken thousands of lives 6,200 lives in 2008 alone and continues to destabilize Mexico and the USMexican border. Corruption and money laundering complicate the situation even further, because the federal police either protect the regional drug cartels or suffer from the rampage caused by these revengeful gangs. In order to deal with this problem, its important to know the history of drug trafficking in Mexico, the key players of the drug cartels, and the strategies implemented that sustain organized crime. In addition, reading past resolutions, action plans, and summaries of the situation in Mexico will help to identify the countries affectedfrom Central America to North Africa and the necessary measures needed to solve the problem either legalizing certain drugs or increasing military efforts to crack down on drug lords. Knowing how Mexicos drug trafficking business developed is important in order to understand what went wrong and how we could possibly fix it. After the 1990s, Mexican drug cartels replaced the powerful Medellin and Cali cartels of Columbia. Thanks to Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, aka The Godfather, Mexico became the hub of drug trafficking, drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and ungovernable violence. After Felix Gallardo ceded his power as Mexicos only drug capo, drug cartels divided territories and 9 fell into and out of conflicts and agreements leading to the current two factions: Juarez, Tijuana, Los Zetas, and Beltran Leyva Cartel group versus the Gulf, Sinaloa, and La Familia Cartel faction. In fact, these gangs have clashed among themselves when theres a power vacuum in the region, or they have vengefully murdered civilians, governmental officials, or media figures in order to intimidate the population. Currently, several drug cartels control different parts of Mexico. Those regions near the US border suffer from the most violence, since immigration to the United States has acted as a narcotrafficking vehicle. There have been numerous key players on each side. Those drug lords like Felix Gallardo have been not only involved in drug trafficking business but also in the smuggling of firearms which ultimately poses a threat to the security of the region Mexico, Central America, and US. On the other hand, those fighting against the drug cartels the Mexican and US governments have achieved some success by mobilizing thousands of troops and eradicating top, influential leaders of the trafficking business. However, Felipe Calderon, since his 2006 election, has been criticized for worsening the situation of Mexicos security despite plans such as the Merida Initiative, the Comprehensive Strategy Against Drug Trafficking, or Operation Gunrunner. Mexicos population has suffered massacres and the government has tainted its credibility. At the Courtesy Stanford Model United Nations 2011 and Berkeley Model United Nations 2011

same time, USborder states have been ringing the alarm in Congress in order to stop organized crime in Mexico and break the links of the drug cartels to numerous American cities. Central America also suffers from the burden of this war, with Guatemala as the new, less controlled hub for narcotrafficking. Even Europe and West Africa have added to the crisis Europe with its exponentially increasing demand for cocaine and West Africa as the new Mexico to Europe. In other words, Mexican drug cartels are filtering into West African drug trafficking in order to meet Europes demand. The key strategy utilized by drug cartels is organized crime intimidating the population and tarnishing the Mexican governments credibility. On the other hand, the only used strategy by the Mexican government and its allies has been military enforcements, which has sparked human rights violations and a greater instability in the nation. The big question is how to eliminate the drug cartels strategy with a more effective strategy from Calderon and from the international community? Mexico is a turbulent bridge a bridge that unties the Columbian cocaine fields with the American drug addiction, a bridge that is stretching worldwide and is empowering the illegal drug trafficking, a bridge that must be rebuilt with security and without the threat of drug cartels. Sources Cardoso, Fernando Enrique. "Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy: The War on Drugs Is Lost." Web. 9 Oct. 2011. <http://whyprohibition.ca/blogs/jessewentzloff/latinamericancommissiondrugsanddemocracy wardrugslost>. (legalizing drugs) Beittel, June S. "Mexico's DrugRelated Violence." Web. 9 Oct. 2011. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40582.pdf> Thornburgh, Dick. "Objectives in the War on Drugs." Web. 9 Oct. 2011. <http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistory/thornburgh/1990/050290b.pdf (the other side: not legalizing drugs) BoutrosGhali, Boutros. "United Nations Security Council." Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Web. 09 Oct. 2011. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council>. "Brazilian Commission on Drugs and Democracy | Tag Archive | Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy." Untitled Document. Web. 09 Oct. 2011. <http://cbdd.org.br/en/tag/latinamericancommissionondrugsanddemocracy/>. Global Commission on Drug Policy. Web. 09 Oct. 2011. <http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org> "Mexico Drug War Update | StoptheDrugWar.org." StoptheDrugWar.org | Raising Awareness of the Consequences of Prohibition. Web. 09 Oct. 2011. <http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2011/sep/28/mexico_drug_war_update>. "United Nations Security Council." Welcome to the United Nations: It's Your World. Courtesy Stanford Model United Nations 2011 and Berkeley Model United Nations 2011

Web. 09 Oct. 2011. <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/>. "The Vienna Declaration Vienna Declaration Vienna Declaration." Vienna Declaration Sign the Declaration Today! Web. 09 Oct. 2011. <http://www.viennadeclaration.com/thedeclaration/>. (link between the war on drugs and health policy)

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The Nuclear Situation in Iran Topic Area B Topic Background

Given that the United States is one of the most vocal opponents of a nuclear Iran, subtle irony is found in the fact that the same state is largely responsible for the birth of Irans nuclear program; the American Atoms for Peace program in the 1950s, a poster child for the internationally inclusive use of nuclear power for nonviolent purposes, is the conduit 1.Following the detonations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Atoms for Peace was U.S. President Eisenhowers answer to those who saw modern warfare synonymously with the use for nuclear weapons. Coupled with the U.S.backed coup that brought a Westernfriendly Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to power in 1953, this chain of events helped birth Irans nuclear program, which it claimed would lessen the states dependence on oil and allow it to be used entirely for export. While the modern conflict would not start until 2002, there are three keynote events that are important either in providing Iranian motivations or barriers to nuclear power. In 1970, a USsupported, Cold War era Iran ratified the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty2 (NPT), the constitution for nuclear weapon policy in the international arena. In addition to advocating for nuclear nonproliferation outside the known nuclear weapon states at the time the NPT became effective (coincidentally or not, also the Security Councils Big 5), the NPT championed the right of states to peacefully utilize nuclear power for civilian energy generation and called upon states to fully disarm their nuclear arsenals at an early date. These three pillars of the NPT are central to understanding the nuclear situation in Iran and have been referenced separately by both sides as names to a cause. Notably, the four states which are known to possess nuclear weapons outside the Big 5, India, Pakistan, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, and Israel, are all not party to the NPT. The Iranian Revolution occurred in 1979 and subsequently broke down the budding relationship between Iran and the West. In addition to diplomatic and economic ties, cooperation with the West regarding Irans nuclear program was also frozen. The nuclear reactor at Bushehr, which was under construction by a German company, was left unfinished as a result. The Bushehr plant was to be Irans first functioning nuclear power plant3. In 1995, Iran signed contracts with the Russian Federation to complete construction at Bushehr under the watchful eye of the IAEA, making sure proper safeguards were implemented. The plant restarted construction with the Russian Federation and was opened on August 2010, with plans to launch before the end of the year4. A final notable event before 2002 was the IranIraq War, which occurred from 19801987. In direct regards to Irans nuclear program, the Bushehr reactor was bombed during the war, which put a further dent in Irans nuclear aspirations. Irans nuclear program is again put on hold as the reactor is reduced to a state of complete ruin. More importantly, however, the war is evidence for a very valid security concern for Iran. Following a breakdown in border negotiations, Iraq launched the first strike into Iranian territory without any diplomatic exchange. While numerous reasons are cited in regards to what led to the IranIraq War, ranging from the religious (Irans new leadership represented a threat to Iraqs Sunni Courtesy Stanford Model United Nations 2011 and Berkeley Model United Nations 2011

Shia coexistence) to the geographic (Iraqs lack of access to the Persian Gulf), the war exacerbated what has become a fear of invasion for the Iranian people 5. In early 2010, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called Irans security concerns legitimate because Iran has been attacked by other countries in recent history but has never attacked another country.6 2002 is considered the beginning of the modern nuclear situation in Iran due to a series of events in which Iran received heightened publicity regarding its nuclear program and succeeding threats to international peace and security, in no way helped by the antiterrorist fervor of the period. On January 29, 2002, US President George W. Bush delivered his State of the Union address in which he identified the Axis of Evil, which included the state of Iran. Bush accused Iran of aggressively pursuing [weapons of mass destruction] and exporting terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian peoples hope for freedom.7 Additionally, the Bushehr reactor would finally go into reconstruction following an extended period of stagnation in September of 2002. Russian scientists provided nuclear expertise and generated massive amounts of protest from the West, particularly the United States. In December, knowledge of two nuclear power plant sites at Natanz and Arak was made public. Natanz particularly caused commotion in the international community as a site capable of enriching uranium, an important factor in civilian energy generation, but also, if highly enriched, in nuclear weapons. United Nations Involvement The IAEA immediately got involved following news of Irans nuclear reactor plans at Natanz and Arak. However, it was initially found that Iran had not violated any IAEA agreements due to the presence of an outdated clause that gave Iran a six month window to report the planning of nuclear facility construction. Iran delivered a statement to the IAEA in September of 2002 declaring Irans interest in developing a nuclear energy program8. The next 3 years consist of a backandforth between Iran and different international bodies, including the IAEA and EU, regarding the process of uranium enrichment at Natanz. In February 2003, IAEA inspectors were allowed into the country to examine the reactor at Bushehr and the underconstruction sites at Natanz and Arak. Upon the culmination of the IAEAs report in June, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei stated that, while no direct violation of the NPT had occurred, Iran failed to report certain nuclear materials and activities to the IAEA. The inspections from FebruaryJune of 2003 would be the first of many IAEA inspections to scold Iran on failing to divulge adequate information regarding their nuclear program while stopping short of recommending strong, punitive action against the state as well as producing enough evidence to declare that Iran is attempting to create a nuclear weapon. Additional recommendations from the IAEA following inspections followed suit in November 2003, June 2004, and September 2004 with similar conclusions. On November 11th, 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had produced plutonium, another critical component in the development of nuclear arms. Iran also pledged to suspend their uranium enrichment processes in October 2003 (Paris Agreement), February 2004 (following an IAEA report that stated that Iran conducted experiments with polonium210, another component of a nuclear bomb) and November 2004 (talks with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), but failed to Courtesy Stanford Model United Nations 2011 and Berkeley Model United Nations 2011

produce evidence to support their promises. In September 2004, the IAEA adopted a resolution calling upon Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment programs 9. The United States continued its call for strict, pungent action against Iran by calling for Security Council sanctions following the adoption of the IAEA resolution10. A turning point in the conflict was the election of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to office in August 2005. Upon coming to office, Ahmadinejad immediately asserted himself as an uncompromising force by declaring that Iran will no longer negotiate the suspension of uranium enrichment. In September, Ahmadinejad delivered a speech at the United Nations emphasizing Irans inalienable right to develop a peaceful civilian nuclear energy program. He cited the third pillar of the NPT that stated the right of states to peaceful nuclear energy given that they allow the IAEA to confirm the absence of weapon production. The delegation from the United States walked out in protest 11. Ahmadinejad sparked additional controversy when he was quoted in October 2005 as saying Israel should be wiped off the map12, generating unrest among Israeli advocates, notably in the United States. At that point in time, Iran had been suspected of financially supporting Palestinian faction Hezbollah. The election of Ahmadinejad and his sound biteworthy quotes alienated the West to a large degree and, coupled with the Presidents staunch, public commitment to Irans nuclear program, heightened tensions to a new level. In February 2006, the nuclear situation in Iran officially became a Security Council issue when Iran was referred to the Security Council by the IAEA. In protest, Iran declared that its uranium enrichment programs had been resumed (although the prospect that they were halted in the first place was never apparent) and that it would cease to cooperate voluntarily with IAEA inspectors, only allowing safeguard measures to be applied in the most basic forms under the NPT13. In June 2006, the Security Councils Big 5 and Germany proposed a deal to Iran in the form of economic incentives and the transfer of nuclear technology from the United States to Iran in exchange for a halting of Irans uranium enrichment programs 14. The deal was not accepted with Iran again citing its unalienable rights granted by the NPT. In July 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 which set a deadline of August 31, 2006 for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment programs or meet possible diplomatic and economic sanctions15. Iran failed to meet this deadline, and the Security Council subsequently passed Resolution 1737 in December 2006. The resolution imposed sanctions on the dissident republic in the form of a ban on the import of nuclear related technology and materials, as well as the freezing of economic assets of accounts thought to be supporting the nuclear program. The sanctions imposed in Resolution 1737 were lessened in scope in order to avoid vetoes from the Russian Federation and the Peoples Republic of China, both supporters of the Islamic Republic in part due to their close economic relationship16. Both the Russian Federation and the Peoples Republic of China would attempt to lessen the economic punishment dealt by the Security Council to Iran in future negotiations. Further sanctions were agreed in March 2007 in the form of Resolution 1747 in the wake of Iranian noncompliance, this time in the form of a freeze on small arms and additional economic assets17. Meanwhile, Iran revealed the attainment of numerous milestones in the realization of their nuclear program in the face of sanctions from the Security Council. In September 2007, Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had possessed 3,000 gas centrifuges, a Courtesy Stanford Model United Nations 2011 and Berkeley Model United Nations 2011

machine used in uranium enrichment18. In March 2008, the Security Council passed additional sanctions against Iran via Resolution 1803, this time targeting banks 19. In July 2008, Iran tested nine long-range missiles able to hit targets as far away as Egypt, India, and surely Israel 20. In May 2010, Iran agreed in principle to a deal with Turkey and Brazil in which Iran ships enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for fuel rods with uranium enriched to 20%, a low percentage sufficient for civil energy generation but good enough to develop a lowgrade nuclear weapon 21. However, due to Irans failure to comply with the demands of previous UN SC resolutions, further sanctions were employed in the form of Resolution 1929, adopted in June 2010. Both Turkey and Brazil voted no on the resolution, keeping faith in their negotiations with Iran. 22 Policy Implications Many, particularly states of the West, fear that Iran is using the goal of civilian energy production as a front to develop their own nuclear weapon ambitions. However, Iran has repeatedly stated that to develop these ambitions would not only be against the NPT, to which they are a signatory, but also against its religious principles as an Islamic theocratic republic. Furthermore, Iran has described its desire for a civilian nuclear program as an economic incentive. While the West has decried this reasoning, pointing to Irans rich reserves of oil, Iran has defended its right to use the oil in the more costeffective manner of export and developing highend petroleumbased products. Petroleum is a noble material, too valuable to burn, Shah Mohammad Rez Pahlavi once famously said. Nuclear energy would allow Irans energy needs to be met at great efficiency, allowing Iran to use their finite petroleum reserves for other ends. Coupled with a population boom, Irans pursuit of a cheaper method of energy production can be seen as purely economic. Additionally, as the nuclear program has come closer and closer to realization, the situation has become a matter of national pride. The backlash against Iran following 1979s Iranian Revolution was long enough ago that a whole generation of Iranians feels strongly against the West, which, through the cutting of diplomatic ties following the revolution, been blamed for Irans isolation from the international community. The Iranian population sees the development of a nuclear program, in the face of Western pressure and criticism, as a victory for a people who have long been exploited for their oil: by the United States before 1979 and by the British during the colonial era23. Due to its economic importance as a producer of petroleum and natural gas, Iran has become a power and leader in the Middle East, a startling fact considering the ethnic makeup of the Persian state. The Iranian leadership certainly knows this will come in handy while standing stalwart against the UN and any punitive actions it may utilize. On the flipside, such a strong nationalistic following in support of the leadership of Iran fighting the newbutold antiimperialist battle against Western oppressors links the success of Irans nuclear program to the legitimacy of the regime 24. Success in staving off the UNs punitive measures may well add to the legitimacy of the regime; however, the inverse is also true, leaving Iranian leadership in the awkward situation of possibly becoming pot committed in regards to their promise to deliver civil nuclear energy generation. Given this link and their track record of noncooperation with the proposed measures of the West and the Security Council, the point where Iran has come too far to backpedal may be in the near future, if not in the past. Irans tumultuous relationship with Israel is central to the topic. The shift to antagonistic relations between the two states in the 1980s is a product of the rise of Ayatollah Khomeinis regime following the Iranian Revolution and their isolation from the West. Today, the two Courtesy Stanford Model United Nations 2011 and Berkeley Model United Nations 2011

do not share any diplomatic or economic ties. Ahmadinejads call for Israel to be wiped off the map was the spark to tensions between the two. Military threats have become commonplace 25. Iran has cited Israels speculated large nuclear arsenal as an additional security concern that necessitates its pursuit of nuclear weapons. [Dismantling Israels 200 nuclear warheads] automatically will bring security to the region, Hassan Qashqavi, an Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson, said in 2009, when asked if a moratorium on Irans nuclear program would help pacify the region 26. However, countries such as the United States would certainly disagree as it has accused Iran of supporting organizations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Furthermore, many fear the possibility of Irans nuclear weapons program falling into the wrong hands given the current instability of Iranian politics. The highly controversial presidential elections in 2009 provided additional basis for fear of an unstable Iran. Its growing population is outgrowing its economy, with an insufficient amount of jobs being generated to accommodate this. High levels of inflation, as well as a humongous proportion of the population being under 30 years old, will create problems for Irans executive. Yet some would argue that, the Iranian nuclear crisis a large part of it, Iran is simply too important to certain key actors, such as China, to descend into massive levels of instability. Barring a radical change in leadership, Ayatollah Khamanei yields supreme leadership and for great levels of instability to be possible, his legitimacy and coercive prowess must fade simultaneously in the face of opposition; in reality, only one of the two is needed to keep Iran away from such a situation. Many countries in the West fear Irans nuclear aspirations not only due to the threat of Iran being nuclear capable, but because of the pressure it would put on other countries in the region to pursue their own nuclear weapons programs. Already a volatile region (some would say due to the aggressive foreign policy measures enacted by Israel), the prospect of Iran successfully attaining nuclear weapons could jump start a nuclear arms race among the regions Arab countries, many of whom would say they are already threatened by the presence of Israel. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria are all prime examples of states in the region that would likely look to developing their own nuclear arms in the event that they become situated in a crossfire between nuclear Iran and nuclear Israel. The replacement of small arms with nuclear weapons in the region would add additional powder to the keg. Analysts disagree about the true intent of Irans nuclear program. In his analysis, Rouzbeh Parsi of thinktank European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) argues that Iran is not hellbent on acquiring a nuclear weapon. Parsi reasons that while Iran has faced obstacles to its nuclear program from the international community with tenacity, the project would have been approached with more urgency if it was truly important to national security. The process has lagged on for years and, given the fact that Israel is speculated to be more heavily armed with nuclear weapons than all countries outside of the Big 5, should consume a greater percentage of Irans resources were it adamant about adding a nuclear bomb to its arsenal. Parsi sees the Iranian strategy as closer to what he calls the Japanese option, in which Iran gathers all of the necessary steps to creating a nuclear bomb, but stops there. In this case, Iran would be ready to assemble a nuclear weapon very quickly if provoked, but would avoid violating the NPT since it technically does not possess nuclear arms27.

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The West has no interest in seeing additional nuclear rogues appear, and surely not in a state so publicly defined by its grievances with Western culture. The Wests vested interests in the state of Israel heightens its concerns about the possible rise of a nuclear hegemonic that is both anti West and Islamic. Iran has repeatedly cited security threats from neighbors Pakistan and Israel, and Iraq (from Husseins regime before the invasion and the American presence after it) as motivations towards building a nuclear program28. Irans reputation as a state willing to stand up against what they perceive to be the imperialist, oppressing powers of the West and the Security Council will no doubt inspire confidence among countries whose political culture drives them to think along similar lines, whether this be the true intent of Iran or not. Their steady disobedience of UN protocol, coupled shortly after with a return to negotiations, rinse, & repeat, breeds perplexity over Irans true stance, especially given their nationalist rhetoric that describes Iran as a champion for the Global South. The most recent deals with Turkey and Brazil may well be another example of this, as will hopefully be proved or disproved in the coming months. But one thing is certain: as negotiations come and go, Iran certainly holds the diplomatic high ground as their strategy of winning by not losing 29 continues to buy time for a nuclear program to properly develop itself. Questions to Consider Do states have the undeniable right to nuclear power for civilian purposes? Under what terms? What precedent does each of the international communitys actions dealing with this topic set for future nuclear rogues? When, in time, is the line between seeking to cooperate with Iran and needing to take firmer action? What is the role of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict in Irans nuclear ambitions? What does each of the actors have at stake in this conflict?

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Footnotes
1-9
1 Logoglu, Faruk. "The Gamble over Iran." Hrriyet Daily News and Economic Review. Web. 2 "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." International Atomic Energy Agency. Web. 3 "Timeline of Iran's Nuclear Crisis." France24. Web. 4 "Russia: Bushehr Plant Due in August." Press TV. Web. 5 "Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)." Global Security. Web. 6 "Russia Says Iran's Security Concerns Legitimate." Press TV. Web. 7 Bush, George W. State of the Union Address. 29 January 2002. 8 Aghazadah,, H.E. Reza. Statement at the 46 th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Rep. Vienna, 2002. Print. 9 "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran." International Atomic Energy Agency. 18 Sept. 2004. Web.

10-19
10 "Timeline: Iran Nuclear Crisis." BBC News. Web. 11 Stogel, Stewart. "'No-Shows' Mark U.N. Summit." News Max. 15 Sept. 2005. Web. 12 There is a fervent argument among journalists about the correctness of this quotes translation. Some argue that a more accurate translation would be vanish from the page of time. Jonathan Steele of The Guardian argues for the latter (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/jun/14/post155) while Ethan Bronner of The New York Times argues for the former (http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/11/weekinreview/11bronner.html? ex=1307678400&en=efa2bd2662 24e880&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss). 13 Moore, Molly. "Iran Restarts Uranium Program." Washington Post. 15 Feb. 2006. Web. 14 "China, Russia on Board in Sweetened Offer to Iran." CNN. 5 June 2006. Web. 15 United Nations. Security Council. Security Council Demands Iran Suspend Uranium Enrichment by 31 August, or Face Possible Economic, Diplomatic Sanctions. 31 July 2006. Web. 16 "UN Passes Iran Nuclear Sanctions." BBC News. 23 Dec. 2006. Web. 17 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747." International Atomic Energy Agency. 24 Mar. 2007. Web. 18 "Iran Claims Reaching Goal of 3,000 Centrifuges." MSNBC News. 2 Sept. 2007. Web. 19 United Nations. Security Council. Security Council Tightens Restrictions on Iran's Proliferation-Sensitive Nuclear Activities. 3 Mar. 2008. Web.

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20 "Iran Missile Test 'provocative'" BBC News. 9 July 2008. Web. 21 Anton, Michael. "Iran, Turkey, Brazil, and The Bomb." The Weekly Standard. 20 May 2010. Web. 22 "UN Votes for New Sanctions on Iran over Nuclear Issue." BBC News. 9 June 2010. Web. 23 MacFarquhar, Neil. "Across Iran, Nuclear Power Is a Matter of Pride." The New York Times. Web. 24 Pahlavi, Pierre, and Eric Ouellet. "Iran's Nuclear Strategy: Three Predictions." The Mark News. Web. 25 Bronner, Ethan. "Just How Far Did They Go, Those Words Against Israel?" The New York Times. Web. 26 "Iran: Israel Must Shed Nuclear Arms." Al Jazeera. Web. 27 Parsi, Rouzbeh. "The Iranian Nuclear Issue: A Never-Ending Story." European Union Institute for Security Studies. Dec. 2009. Web. 28 Bahgat, Gawdat. "Nuclear Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran." Iranian Studies Journal 39.3 (2006): 307-27. Print. 29 Henry Kissinger. Quoted in Pahlavi, Pierre, and Eric Ouellet. "Iran's Nuclear Strategy: Three Predictions." The Mark News. Web.

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