Did Accommodation Work?

Two Soviet Neighbors 1964-88 Author(s): Olav Fagelund Knudsen Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Feb., 1992), pp. 53-69 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/423878 . Accessed: 26/07/2011 04:41
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of @ Journal Peace Research,vol. 29, no. 1, 1992,pp. 53-69

Did Accommodation Work? Two Soviet

Neighbors 1964-88"
OLAV FAGELUND KNUDSEN Affairs NorwegianInstituteof International
The article raises the question of the optimal strategyfor ensuringthe long-termsecurityof small, contiguousneighborsof great powers. The main options availableto the small state may be called The and 'accommodation' 'intransigence'. authorseeks to determinewhetherthe small state's choice makesa differenceto the greatpowernext door. One of severalpossibleavenuesto an answeris to look to for observablechangesin great power policywhichmay conceivablybe attributed the smallstate's policies policy. Thus, the authorevaluatespossibleeffects of Turkishand Norwegianaccommodative vis-a-visthe USSR in the 1964-88 period, by comparing Soviet deploymentof groundforcesnear the these two neighbors.Data are drawnprimarily from The MilitaryBalance.The data show different over timeon the two NATO flanks:In the norththereis no signof change,whereasin the south patterns there are easily observablereductionsstretchingover most of Turkey'smost accommodative period. an is choice for Norway The authorsuggestsin conclusionthat accommodation probably inappropriate givenstrategicconditionsin the north,while it may have fittedthe south flankwell duringthis period.

1. Introduction

'Greatpowers'and 'smallstates'are relative rather than absolute concepts. The true, subjectin discussionsof relations underlying between contiguoussmall and great powers
is usually - and notably here - the power

disparitybetween them, made inescapable by contiguity. Great powers are usually sensitive about their fringes. There are always questions about where to drawthe line; what to claim and include;what to ignoreor spurn.Ambitions tend to exceed resources, resultingin much ambiguity.Small states contiguousto great powersthereforehave naturalreasons for worryingabout their autonomy. The abilityof small states to achieve that
* The researchfor this articlewas fundedby the NorwegianResearchCouncilfor Scienceand the Humaniof also by the Department ties (NAVF), andsupported Political Science, University of Kentucky and the Foundation.I am indebtedto Charles WedelJarlsberg F. Hermannand Teri Loyd of the MershonCenter, Ohio State Universityand the staff of the Norwegian AtlanticCommitteefor help in retrievingdata. Valuable commentshave been receivedfrom Arne B. Dalhaug, Ihsan Gurkan, Johan Jorgen Holst, Karen A. Mingst, Daniel Nelson, Robert W. Olson, Duygu Sezer, John Kristen Skogan, Ilter Turan, and the reviewersand editorialstaff of this journal.Shortcomof ings of the productare solely the responsibility the author.

objective by their own means is necessarily limited. An optimistic question is: What kind of policy is the better way of bridging the gap between means and ends? A more pessimistic angle: Does the small-state choice of policy make a difference?Varied experience, evident in cases like Afghanistan, the Baltic, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Mexico, and many others, suggests that workablesolutions are not simple formulae. The invasion and annexation of Kuwaitby Iraqin 1990underlinesthe broad reach of this quandary:It also concernsthe policies of lesser, regional powers vis-a-vis their smallerneighbors. While several theoretical traditions are pertinent,there is no theory in the study of international politics which directly addresses this question.' The problem remains a concern for practical policymaking. Basically, the government of a smallercontiguousneighbormust decide to what extent it should accommodate the great power's sensitivity. To the smaller neighbor, the continuumfrom hard line to to soft line - or 'intransigence' 'accommodation' - represents the range of options available. The hardline emphasizespolitical,social, and even culturaldistance. The essence of the weakerstate'spolicyin this case is aloof-

54

Olav Fagelund Knudsen

ness, stressing military defense. The reasoning is that 'intransigence' will induce the great power to leave its neighbor alone. The soft line, on the other hand, seeks to create confidence on the other side. Accommodation in this sense means that the weak side has diagnosed the stronger side's situation and concluded that the great power needs reassurance: The great power should not have to fear an attack coming from the territory of the small state. The small state seeks to convey this conviction to the great power in various ways, e.g. by declarations of policy, by unilateral demonstrative measures, or even by explicit agreement with the great power. The rationale: the great power cannot be expected to leave its neighbors alone unless it is convinced they represent no danger.2 It can be argued, as it is here, that for the pursuit of a given strategy to be meaningful to the smaller state it must have some kind of observable effect on the great power's policy. Different strategies ought to have different effects, according to this view. If one holds that observability of effect is not a strictly necessary condition, then the present exercise may have limited interest. However, as long as information is not available, examining whether or not there are observable effects is of value in itself.3 In short, the task of this article is to assess whether such putative effects are in fact observable in two concrete cases, both of which involve the USSR.4 In the following I shall compare Soviet/Turkish relations with Soviet/Norwegian relations, the dependent variable being Soviet policy. Soviet ground force deployments will serve as indicator for the dependent variable. The cases to be compared, then, are two Soviet policy problems. Both involve a combination of general (strategic) posture choice and specific posture choice vis-a-vis a contiguous neighbor; moreover, in both cases that neighbor is allied with the chief Soviet opponent in world politics. During the most intense phase of the Cold War, these two nations maintained quite different military postures. Ever since 1949 Norwegian governments have tried, by showing military restraint, to induce the

Soviet Union to a similarly restrained behavior, in order to reduce the tension between the two countries. Despite Norway's NATO membership, the Norwegian policy is a clear case of accommodation.5 On the other hand, after World War II Turkey for many years pursued a policy of unmitigated military strength - i.e. 'intransigence' - most visibly underlined by the introduction of US Jupiter missiles in the late 1950s. From 1964 on, however, a period of diplomatic thaw developed between Turkey and the Soviet Union, lasting until about 1980. As we shall see, during this period Turkey also appears periodically to have softened the military side of her policy. Thus, Turkey apparently switched to a genuine policy of accommodation after 1964. The change in Turkish policy is important to the analysis; it provides an opportunity to look for a reciprocating change in Soviet policy. The Norwegian case, in which there was no change, may serve as a control. If Soviet policy is receptive to its neighbors' policies, the Soviet policy towards Norway should be different from the Soviet policy towards Turkey before 1964, while Soviet policies towards the two countries should converge after that point. The design, then, involves four cases, one for each of the two policy targets in each of two time periods. However, as will be explained below, limited data availability precludes a full study. Thus, only the 196588 period can be covered in the analysis. This leaves two cases for actual comparison below: Soviet policy towards the northwest after 1964 and Soviet policy towards the southwest in the same period. Two preliminary issues require a further comment: the comparability of the cases chosen, and the choice of policy indicator. 2. The Question of Comparability The research design employed here involves a comparison, not of Norway with Turkey, but of Soviet policies towards these two states and their possible determinants. Norwegian arid Turkish policies are here construed as independent variables and Soviet

Did Accommodation Work? Two Soviet Neighbors

55

policy is considered the dependent variable. The issue of comparability therefore involves Norway and Turkey only in a somewhat indirect way. For the present purposes the two Soviet neighbors need not be comparable in more than a few essential respects relevant to security policy. Size differences between Norway and Turkey - whether in military capability6 or in other terms - are unimportant, as I am not comparing the size of Soviet deployment in one area with its size in the other area, just looking for the amount and direction of change over time within each area. What is required, however, is that other factors commonly known to influence ground force deployments are the same in both cases. That turns primarily on the strategic situation on each flank. The strategic importance7 of both countries to the Soviet Union has probably been substantial during this period. Turkey controls the Black Sea passage and Turkish territory is conveniently located for attacks on key Soviet natural resources, population centers and industrial areas. As judged from the outside, some of the significance of Turkey's control over the Straits derives from the output of naval yards on the Soviet Black Sea coast. Some is due to the apparent vulnerability of the USSR to naval attacks from the Black Sea. To the Soviet Union, moreover, the areas beyond Turkey have long represented regions of potential influence and political expansion. Turkey's strategic significance, representing a historical problem in Russian foreign policy, may be better known internationally than that of Norway. In the northwest, the Soviet Union may have reason to worry about the safety of its Kola bases and would need forces to defend them against attack." Controlling the north of Norway would be in the Soviet interest. Norway is favorably located for a possible strangulation of Soviet access to the North Atlantic. The first great expansion period of the Soviet navy since the 1960s was focused on the Northern fleet. The Kola peninsula was the scene of a massive military construction program, on a scale unparalleled until then in Soviet experience. The buildup has continued

through the 1980s. Adding to these factors, the Arctic areas off northern Norway are the most likely paths of intercontinental missiles between the USSR and the US. Thus, the strategic importance of the north flank is likely to have grown substantially in the estimation of Soviet policy-makers from the 1940s until today. The considerable strategic importance of the Soviet southwest has probably changed relatively less over time.9

3. Ground-force Manpower as a Policy Indicator The great power's policy could presumably be observed and registered in many different ways. I shall rely on ground-force manpower. Some underlying issues in this connection will first be briefly discussed. First, why expect something resembling a policy response at all? The small neighbor is unlikely to be ignored, because a great power is sensitive to threat. Historically, great powers have feared that contiguous small states would allow hostile great powers the use of territory for aggressive purposes. Soviet policies in Eastern Europe both before and after World War II illustrate this. In the 1930s Irish independence raised this issue in Great Britain's case, and the declaration of Irish neutrality was accompanied by a statement to reassure the British government (Mathisen, 1971). In the Western hemisphere, the United States has tended to intervene more actively in neighboring states when local 'trouble' was linked to external great-power designs, whether the latter were real or not (Blasier, 1976). If there is anything special about Soviet behavior in this respect, it would probably be the degree of their sensitivity to neighborly independence. 'Paranoia' may be too strong, but it suggests a level historically approached by the USSR on several occasions. There is no doubt that Soviet authorities observed quite closely what its neighbors' policies amounted to at any given time. Both official and unofficial verbal reactions demonstrate this quite clearly (cf. for instance Hoist (1967) and Kan (1988) in the

56

Olav Fagelund Knudsen

Norwegian case; Vali (1971) and Sezer (1981) in the Turkish case). Then why look for a military response instead of a verbal reaction or one made in terms of some other overt gesture? I choose to focus on a military response to emphasize policy commitment. Commitment of physical resources is a better indicator of actual policy than verbal statements and behavioral responses of other kinds. "' If we decide to look for military responses, another difficulty is that the concrete Soviet force allocations could be largely determined by an internal logic, a set of Soviet-defined priorities that are not geared to - and not responsive to - the policies of other states, or observably responsive only to some of them. In that case, of course, there may be no consistent observable relationship between the security policies of the great power and its smaller neighbors. Finally, if there is a military response, why should it be in ground forces? There are several reasons. One has to do with the nature of the tasks performed by the different branches of the armed forces. Ground forces are particularly useful as an instrument for taking over and holding territory. They would play an indispensable role in efforts to achieve political control when territory has been occupied. Ground forces would be the primary means to an offensive military venture directed specifically against flank nations like Norway or Turkey. Another important reason for preferring ground-force data is that they indicate reasonably stable commitments of military resources, reflecting medium- to long-term priorities. Air force deployments and naval deployments can be altered quickly. Ground forces require more time and effort to be moved, yet are still clearly mobile. For present analytical purposes, this is an essential distinction. Before proceeding with the analysis of Soviet policy, let me briefly assess more exactly the character of the policies to which the Russians are presumed to be responding.

4. Turkey's Policy Since 1964 There can be little doubt about the hard-line strategy followed by Turkey during the Cold War. Beginning in 1946. Turkey accepted the backing of the United States in deflecting the territorial and other demands of the Soviet Union. Later on, substantial Turkish forces were sent to fight in Korea. NATO membership followed in 1951. The first crack in this close US-Turkish relationship was caused by the US demand for removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey as part of the compromise resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was followed by the incident over the 'Johnson letter' in connection with the Cyprus crisis in 1964, when the US President bluntly threatened to withdraw US support from Turkey even vis-a-vis the Soviet Union unless the Turks held back in their confrontation with the Greeks. Turkey complied, but the conclusion apparently was drawn in Ankara at that time that NATO was an insufficient guarantee of Turkish security interests. The Turkish diplomatic rapprochement with Moscow from about 1964 is clear enough from Vali (1971), Karpat (1975), Gonlubol (1975), and Rubinstein (1982). A Soviet economic aid program, beginning in 1963, grew rapidly and soon made Turkey one of the world's major recipients of Soviet aid (cf. Bach, 1987, pp. 152-156). The Soviet link was reinforced in connection with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the ensuing US (Congressional) arms embargo (Eaton, 1987). But did Turkey's own military deployments vis-a-vis the USSR also change after 1964, from an 'intransigent' stance to one that matched Turkish diplomacy? Were the deployments on the Russian border reduced after 1964? Did other military dispositions on the Turkish side change noticeably? The size of Turkey's army and total armed forces has increased over time, from around 400,000 men in 1964 to 630,000 in 1985. The bulk of this increase dates from the 1974-85 (The Military period However, it is possible - even Balance).12 likely - that Turkish conscription policy and population growth may explain the growth, and that it is interpreted in this way by the

Did Accommodation Work? Two Soviet Neighbors

57

Soviets as well.13 Hence, no clear indication may be drawn from these figures alone. Turkey's geographical deployment pattern is known in rough outline for the mid1970s as well as earlier:

allowed to pass according to the Convention. At the time of writing, several full-size (65,000-75,000t) Soviet aircraft carriers built at Black Sea naval yards are being prepared for service. The evidence from Three-quarters of her ground forces of about Turkish Straits management so far has led 470,000 men, now [i.e., ca. 1980] organized in to many observers to doubt that Turkey would some 23 divisional equivalents, are therefore exercise her duties under the Convention if earmarked for NATO. . . . Of the three formally land armies, the First Army is responsible for the doing so were contrary to Soviet wishes (cf. defense of the Straits and Turkish Thrace, the Third Buzan Q1976, pp. 242-247) and Gurkan Army for eastern Turkey along the Soviet border, Turkish leniency in the Straits and the Second Army for the south along the Syrian (1980)). 6 may thus have been another facet of the and Iraqi borders. The Fourth Army, outside Ankara-Moscow thaw. NATO and basically a new command established in 1975 in case of a dangerous escalation of tensions Eaton regards these events, including with Greece, is known as 'The Army of the other aspects touching on East/West relaAegean'; the assignment of Turkish forces to tions, as part of a unified Turkish policy NATO has been unaffected by its creation (Sezer, (1987, pp. 9-13). During the October War 1981, p. 22).14 in 1973, Turkey allowed Soviet flights The complexity of Turkey's international through Turkish airspace to Egypt, while security situation is clearly brought out in its US stopovers of supplies for Israel were military dispositions, as is the emphasis on denied. From 1976 until 1978 there were also military consultations between the NATO concerns. and Knowlton (1977) sup- Soviet Union and Turkey. Agmon (1986) The pattern underneath these moves and ply more specific information. Considered jointly, they indicate a slightly higher troop dispositions is not plain and simple. The US level on the Soviet border in the 1950s than base rights, which were revoked in 1975 in in the 1970s.'5 The equipment has been response to the US embargo, were only remodernized, however, so that in quality stored in 1980, with some limitations terms there may have been no reduction extending right up to the present. On the over time. other hand, several airbases in the east The data on ground forces, while not con- (prominently Mus and Batman) were clusive in themselves, do not point towards modernized from 1983 to facilitate the a clear-cut softening of Turkey's military reception of NATO equipment and restance. Such information may be supple- inforcements (Eaton, 1987). Throughout mented by other observations relevant to the period studied, storage of US tactical Turkish security policy. The extent of Tur- nuclear weapons appears to have been kish 'accommodation' or 'intransigence' allowed in Turkey. Talks with the Soviet may also be visible in Turkish arrangements military seem to have come to an end by 1980. concerning matters of joint Soviet-Turkish Commentators seem to agree that relamilitary interest, such as the Straits. Hard evidence is not available, since the tions with the Soviet Union cooled from Montreux Convention governing the Straits 1980 onwards (Harris, 1985, p. 198; Rubinleaves room for interpretation (cf. Mon- stein, 1982, p. 51). The reinforcement of treux Convention, 1952). Nevertheless, it is airbases in eastern Turkey and the treaty worth noting that the Turkish Straits policy renewals with the US in 1987 are important has been frequently criticized as unduly signals in this respect. In sum, Turkey's diplomatic about-face favorable to Soviet interests. Criticism peaked in 1976 with the passage into the after 1964 is periodically reflected in conMediterranean of the small aircraft carrier crete but transitory military dispositions Kiev. Aircraft carriers are explicitly favorable to the USSR, primarily before excluded from the classes of naval vessels 1980.

58

Olav Fagelund Knudsen

The philosophy behind the Norwegian posture is retrospectively set out in a 1978 report by the Norwegian Defense Commission of 1974, a cross-partisan body appointed by the Norwegian government to advise it on defense policy for the 1980s. The report, in reviewing present policy origins, describes it as follows:
[In addition to ensuring a realistic and credible defense, .. .] Entry into NATO also had to take into account our desire to avoid measures in our area that would create tension. Our alliance policy therefore had to be formulated with a dual objective: On the one hand, to convince other countries that Norwegian territory would not be permitted to be used for attack directed against other states. On the other hand, to make it seem likely that armed attack on Norwegian territory would unleash the joint Western defense (NOU, 1978:9, pp. 43-44).17

5. Norway'sPolicy Since1949

The 'no bases policy' was introduced in early 1949 in response to a Soviet note of inquiry regarding Norwegian intentions concerning its proposed alliance membership and the possible opening of military air and naval bases to alliance partners. The Norwegian response assured the Soviet government, inter alia, that Norway would not open bases on Norwegian territory for the troops of foreign powers so long as Norway was not under attack or exposed to threats of attack (Holst, 1967, vol. II, pp. 65-70). The chief aim of the troop-stationing policy was to reduce the probability of preemptive Soviet action, and to do so by means that were more than merely declaratory.Is A second aim of this policy was domestic: to cool down the opposition, especially inside the government's own party. The other self-imposed restrictions added later - may partly be seen as supportive of, and partly as extensions of, the troop-stationing policy (NOU, 1978:9, p. 69n.). The declaration on nuclear weapons (1957 and 1961) was intended as an independent and additional tension-reducing step for the Northern area. It said (1961) that Norway had no intention of allowing the stationing of nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil (Forsvarsdepartementet, 1990). In 1975, the Norwegian Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli declared an extension of the nuclear policy to cover naval vessels on

courtesy calls or other short-term visits to Norwegian harbors (NUPA, 1975, p. 197). Furthermore, the practice of not conducting allied military maneuvers in the county of Finnmark has been declared to be another self-imposed restriction. In practice, allied naval vessels and military aircraft are also said to be kept west of 24 degrees Eastern longitude. During the 1980s further elaborations have been added to the Norwegian policy. A prepositioning site for equipment for a US marine brigade was located in midNorway rather than in the north, after an extensive debate. Subsequently, the stepped up presence of US naval forces in the Norwegian Sea drew considerable domestic criticism in Norway. The Norwegian 'non-provocation policy' rests on the assumption that demonstrations of strength on one side may provoke fear on the other side and hence bring about the attack that the demonstration was intended to forestall in the first place. Up to a point this reasoning accords with standard notions of the need for stability in deterrence, i.e. some steps are required to convey to the other side that one's intentions are purely defensive. However, in the reasoning on which the 'non-provocation' policy is based, the deployment of military manpower and equipment is sometimes considered to be ipso facto 'provocative'. This line of thinking represents a marked distrust in the ability of military deployments to convey defensive intentions clearly, even when the side making the deployment is distinctly the weaker party.'9 Over the years there has been scant interest on the part of most Norwegian governments in evaluating the response of the other side. This apparent official indifference has, at least in periods, amounted to policy. In 1980, then Deputy Minister Holst stated, in reference to the Afghanistan situation and its implications for other Soviet neighbors, that even if there is no sign of a response on the other side, a country in Norway's position is justified in hoping that self-imposed restrictions on its defense posture will contribute to reducing tensions.2"

Did Accommodation Work? Two Soviet Neighbors Fig. 1. Soviet Military Manpower. All Services (millions of men)

59

4 5
3 Mill. 2

1953 Source: The Military Balance

1958

1963

1968

1973

1980

1985

In sum, then, during the period considered here Norwegian policy was stably accommodating vis-a-vis the USSR. To the extent there has been any change, it has been in the direction of more accommodation, by increasing the set of accommodative measures.2' Norway and Turkey have both, therefore, pursued genuinely accommodative policies at least since 1964. The question, then, is: Have the two flank nations been dealt with in comparable ways by the Soviet Union as far as military ground-force deployments go? 6. Data 6.1 Sources Access to reliable information in military affairs is always problematic, especially for civilian researchers. I regard The Military Balance ('MB') as the best public source available and will use it in the following, supplemented at times by other sources. Even The Military Balance, however, has its obscure points. The most common difficulty in working with the MB as a source is its warning that it reassesses its own data and its own previous interpretations of the

data - at irregular intervals. There is no good way to cope with the problems posed by this practice. Here I have sought to guard against systematic error of this kind by computing flank-to-center ratios for each year, in addition to the other figures given.22 Unfortunately, data for the period before 1964 appear not to be available from unclassified sources. The Military Balance began publication only in 1959, and separate figures for the flanks were not given in that publication until much later. This study will therefore concentrate on military data covering the mid-1960s to the late 1980s. 6.2 Soviet Ground Forces To put the data on the flanks into perspective, we shall first review the development of the total Soviet forces over time (cf. also Erickson, 1977a, b, and 1982a; Erickson, et al., 1986; Finley, 1980). The trends in military manpower for all services (but excluding command and support troops) are shown in Fig. 1. Had command and general support troops been included, about 1.3 million men would have been added in 1983-85. Over the 30-year period the trend is

60

Olav Fagelund Knudsen Table I. Number of Combat Ready Divisions, Soviet Ground Forces 1965 Collins' Mil. Bal.b Carusc
a

uneven: A sharp decline took place during the Khrushchev period (Holloway, 1983, pp. 121, 127-129). These reductions were designed to release manpower for the civilian sector and may even have been more drastic than the present figures indicate.23 Record (1975) refers to a 50% overall cut 1955-64 (p. 4): 'Of significance is that these major cuts were not reflected in the Soviet garrison in Eastern Europe, which is believed to have been reduced by only 89,000 men from 1955 to 1963' (pp. 5-6). The reductions, in short, must have been concentrated in lower priority areas. Their effect on flank deployment is not clear, judging from these sources. From 1964 to 1968 the overall size of the Soviet ground forces was apparently kept virtually unchanged (Wolfe, 1970, p. 466). Ground forces as such may be assessed in terms of military formations. However, division counts can be unstable estimates. For one thing, the unit of counting itself may change, as indeed it has in this case: There has been a steady real increase in divisional size in the Soviet army since the 1960s. Moreover, MB assessments have changed, and hence the figures reported may have fluctuated from year to year for this reason alone. A further confounding factor: There are units at all levels of readiness, from 'ghost formations' to combat-ready divisions, and the number of units to be counted in each category appears to be uncertain. 'Category III divisions', at the lowest level of preparedness, may have less to say about current capability than they do '... as a measure of Soviet plans and expectations' (Gelman, 1982, p. 13n).24 Three assessments of the number of divisions over time are shown in Table I. The discrepancies are substantial; note in particular the opposite trends. Conclusions are thus entirely dependent on whose figures one prefers. There is, however, agreement that divisional strength increased during this period in terms of average manpower, firepower, equipment and mobility (Carus, 1983, pp. 192-193). Data presented by Lundesgaard (1985, p. 4) for Soviet motor-rifle divisions show an increase from 1964 to 1984 of 21%

1970 73 105 101

1975 75 104

1980 80 90 83

1984 87

112

Collins, 1980, Table 12, p. 470. Readiness categories I and II. Only two years previously Collins cited considerably higher figures; e.g. 85 divisions in 1970 and 87 in 1975, for the same categories of divisions. See Collins, 1978, Fig. 23, pp. 197-199. b The Military Balance, annual editions. For 1980 and 1984, assuming three divs of category I/II in Central and Southern USSR, to correspond to the description 'mostly category III'. SCarus, 1983, p. 196.

in divisional manpower, 300% in field artillery (also converted at the same time from towed to self-propelled), air defense upgraded from artillery to missiles, the number of tanks and light attack vehicles up by 59% (with a particularly large increase of the latter), tactical nuclear missiles doubled, and helicopters introduced - these changes all within each divisional unit of motorized infantry (cf. also Binder & Clawson, 1982; Finley, 1980). A representation of Soviet ground-force strength based on manpower is provided in Fig. 2.25 In terms of sheer manpower figures, there was little change over the 1970-85 period. The important changes, then, appear to have been in terms of organization and equipment. Against this back-drop we shall consider the main question of the analysis: Soviet deployment on the flanks. 6.3 Forces on the Flanks To recapitulate, I shall take Soviet groundforce deployments vis-a-vis its neighbors to indicate the degree of receptiveness to the smaller neighbor's chosen strategy, 'accommodation' or 'intractability'. If the accommodative strategy is effective, we would expect Soviet policy towards that country to be differentiated from Soviet policy towards other neighbors which pursue different policies. We would expect the difference to consist in the USSR leaving its

Did Accommodation Work? Two Soviet Neighbors

61

accommodating neighbor more alone, in particularrefrainingfrom militarypressure, and - if the partiesinteractdirectly- being more responsive than it is towards intractable neighbors. For an intractablestrategyto be deemed effective, the intractable neighbor should not be treated differentlyfrom the accommodativeone. Let me emphasize:The basic expectation in this case is tit-for-tat,and a hard line from the great power to startwith. If the small state plays soft, the great power should play soft. If the small state plays hard, the great power should play hard. There is no expectationthat the smallneighbor can make the great power play soft by playingharditself. If Norway'spolicy is to be deemed effective, then, there should be some visible trace of militaryrestrainton the Soviet side over time. That restraintought to contrast with the Soviet approachto Turkey, when the two flank nations' policies were most different, i.e. before 1964, but as indicated earlierdata are not availablefor that period (but cf. text and note 29 below). After 1964 we would expect the accommodativeTurkish and Norwegian policies to 'produce' similarresponsesfrom the Soviet Union. If
Fig. 2. Soviet Ground Forces (manpower in millions)
2

any differences were to appear, the USSR ought (according to the accommodative logic) to build up somewhat less pressure vis-a-vis Norway, whose policy has been more overtly and consistently accommodative. 6.4 Central Front: Ground-force Index Fig. 3 plots a 'ground-force index' based on data from The Military Balance. (Detailed statistics for all figures are available from the author on request.) Since the level of readiness is not reported separately in MB for each type of division, the index rests on the analytically important assumption that all tank and airborne divisions are equal in manpower strength to motor/rifle divisions (which they obviously are not).26 The method amounts to a type of weighting, analogous to that employed, e.g., by Fischer (1976, pp. 10-11).27 The central section on the Soviet side facing west consists of troops stationed entirely outside the USSR. They are all reported to be at the highest level of readiness. Whatever the reason, the break in the trend in 1985 is a fairly sharp reversal, which brings the index down to a level where it has not been since 1973.

1.95 1.9 Mill. 1.85

1.8

1.75

X,,//
.../ .... .... .... ... 1975
/1

1.7 ....... ."

1970

' 1980 1985

I,

Source: The Military Balance

62

Knudsen Olav Fagelund

Fig. 3. SovietGroundForces,CentralEurope. (GroundForce Index:100,000manpower equivalents) 440 420 400 380 GF 360
,,., ,

Index 340

300 280280

"' ""'"""
,,v,,",.".

I I-V I., .-I ;I.,

.

1967

1970

1975

1980

1985

1989

Source:TheMilitary Balance

6.5 Southern Flank To define 'southern flank' I have relied on the definition provided by MB from 1967 on: The Southern region comprises the 'Caucasus and Soviet Central Asia'.28 The year 1967 is also the first time the MB reports ground-force deployments separately for the southern area (see Fig. 4). The graph reveals an ample, U-shaped trend. Over the main part of the period the tendency is one of decline, in accordance with the expectations of the analysis. Note the drastic reductions during the early 1970s and the high level of troop concentration at the starting-point in 1967. The lack of information for previous years raises the question whether the level may have been this high for a longer time before 1967, or if it could have been a transitory phenomenon, perhaps connected to the ArabIsraeli Six Day War. The answer has important implications for the analysis. In comparison, consider that only 26 divisions at that level were in Central Europe in 1967 facing the main strength of NATO. The following year the invasion in Czechoslovakia may have helped turn the figures around.

If the elevated southern deployment in 1967 was transitory, this would imply that the starting-point of the time series is exceptionally high, and that the troop level in the south in 1966 and earlier may well have been lower, maybe even considerably lower. Both Carus (1983, p. 192) and Wolfe (1970, p. 467), suggest that there had been little change during the Khrushchev years in the disposition of forces in the south or in the overall deployment pattern. Other evidence points in the same direction.29 One interesting fragmentary source reports seventeen divisions in the Transcaucasus in 1957, which is very close to the level to which 'higher-readiness' forces dropped after 1967, as reported by the MB. The 1957 source indirectly reveals that it is reporting forces at the highest level of readiness, thus independently confirming the figures for 1967. 6.6 Northern Flank The Northern flank is described from 1975 on in a special annual publication, prepared by the Norwegian Atlantic Committee as an addendum to The Military Balance3" (see Fig. 5).

Did Accommodation Work? Two Soviet Neighbors

63

The period is rather short and the overall trend not altogether clear. Between 1975 and 1983 the tendency is fairly stable. Moreover, according to Lundesgaard, this trend stretches back another ten years, which indicates that north-flank strength has not previously been higher than it was when our time series began, at least not since 1964. The fluctuations from 1983 to 1986 are more pronounced. Still, in the total picture one discerns a convergence towards index level 30. If equipment is considered as well, the overall trend is more clearly an increase (Lundesgaard, 1985, p. 3). The expectation from my analytical starting-point - a decrease - is not satisfied by these figures. 7. Conclusions This article has sought to establish whether a soft-line strategy is a better long-term strategy than a hard-line strategy for a weak neighbor of a great power. The criterion of a 'good' policy is the observable emergence of reciprocated restraint. The Soviet Union's ground-force deployments vis-a-vis two NATO neighbors, Turkey and Norway,
Fig. 4. Soviet Ground Forces, Southern USSR. (Ground Force Index: 100,000 manpower equivalents)

have been used as test cases. Given that a soft-line policy has been pursuedby the two smallercountriesover the past twentyyears, the Soviet Union was expectedto respondin similar fashion to both, if the accommodative policy were to be consideredeffective. However, the data showed different trendson the two flanks.The northerncase indicates that no discernible military response has been given on the Soviet side to the soft approachof the Norwegiansbefore 1985. On the southernflankit is easy to see a softeningstance on the Soviet side during with Turkey. the period of rapprochement It may not be just a coincidencethat we find the low point during the years following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, since the Soviet Union gave Turkey strong moral backingin that situation(Karpat,1975, pp. The fact that the trend is moving in the opposite direction after 1980 may be a reflection of the Turkish military taking power, combined with the Afghanistan invasionand - more generally- the renewal of the Cold War during the early Reagan years. A more conclusive test would require
197-202).31

260
240

220 / 200 180

GF Index 160140 120 100 //
/ 970 I/g5 I 1951

e.

1967
Source: The Military Balance

1970

1975

1980

1985

1989

64

Knudsen Olav Fagelund

Fig. 5. Soviet Ground Forces, Kola Region. (Ground Force Index: 100,000 manpower equivalents)

40

GF

......... .......
301 I "'i
It I/

Index

'.I'"I'.I I', ,le,'e,,',,:,,v,,,.'I,,yIL

II
I %. I . . . . . . . .

J':':,,I
b
I
I
.

If

Ih.

1975z
20

CII/I

':

Jy'iIl:'
1975

.. .
. .

. .

1 980 1981115
.

/
'"

.........
I :

i~ .?, .?

i~,

:'

l:~

.....9..
?;

iI
'

1980

1985

1989

Source: The Military Balance

data also for years in the 1950s and 1960s, when Turkishand Norwegianpolicies were diametrically opposed. The present findingis not in line with the rationale of the Norwegian policy of 'reassurance', which appears to rest on the assumptionthat no comparablecase exists. If one accepts that such a case does exist, the question becomes, what could account for the differenceobserved?What could be so important to the Soviet Union in the north that it is unwillingto accord Norway the same treatmentit gives Turkey?Despite of my earlierargumentfor the similarity the two NATO countries' strategicimportance to the USSR, a difference here seems the most likely explanation. According to this explanation, the northernflank is more importantthan the southern flank - for reasons of strategic deterrence. The Soviet Union is concerned about the operational freedom of its Kola bases and the extensive militarypower projected from that location. In this view, the USSR would hardlybe willingto yield military advantagefor political gain. A Soviet observer of Soviet-Norwegian relations arrivesat the same conclusionin his assess-

ment of bilateralrelationsover time, based on the writingsof Soviet analysis:

Thanks to the efforts of Sergey Gorshkov, the ambitious commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, the Northern Fleet grew to become the largest of the Soviet fleets. ... This shift of the military point of gravity gives us part of the explanation of why the Soviet press devoted relatively speaking many more pages on the Scandinavian subject than on, e.g., the Turkish one, although the Turkish base policy represented a greater threat to the USSR than the policy pursued by Norway and Denmark (Kan, 1988, pp. 44-45).

Events in January of 1988 corroborate such an interpretation: DuringSoviet Prime MinisterRyzhkov'svisit to Scandinavia the Soviet governmentagreed to a compromise solution of its disputewith Swedenover the division of economic zones in the Baltic. However, in the correspondingSoviet dispute with Norway concerningthe Barents Sea (off the Kola peninsula) there was no movementin the Soviet position.The difference was explained by a Soviet spokesman with reference to the militarysensitivityof the BarentsSea.32 Three years laterthere is still no movementin this bilateraldispute. Hence, a need for Soviet militarystrength

Did Accommodation Work? Two Soviet Neighbors

65

in the north may - from the Soviet perspective - exist regardless Norwegianposture. of If this is correct, it undercutstraditional Norwegian policy. The comparison with Turkeyshows that given the rightconditions an accommodating policy may 'work',but if those conditions are not met there is little point in the exercise. Concretely, we have seen that the Russiansrespondedin kind to a low-tension posture when they did not have other reasonsfor adoptinga postureof The main policy-relevantlesson of this comparativeexercise is not that the small state must work harder to have its policy reciprocated.Rather, it is that the link between the smallstate's policy, as cause, and the policy of the contiguousand more powerful neighbor, as effect, is likely to be indirect and weak. To conclude, the effect of Norway'spolicy may have been indifferent to the policy's external aims - and possibly in even counterproductive, that it may have Soviet expectations of Norweencouraged This conclusionhas, of gian submissiveness. course, been suggested by others before notablySkogan (1983), though on the basis of a differentkind of analysis.
NOTES
1. The most relevant areas of theoretical writing seem to be the general small-state literature, the extended-deterrence literature, and to some extent the arms race literature. The small-state literature is largely focused on the common problems of small states and their mutual cooperation, and on the confrontations of small and great powers generally. Much of this literature is not theoretically concerned, nor is it especially concerned with contiguity or proximity. Exceptions: Fox (1977), Mathisen (1971), Partem.(1983), and Chay & Ross (1986). There are many policy-oriented works on small/great neighbor pairs, but the cases are rarely studied as instances of a general problem. In three well-known contributions, particular attention is paid to the confrontations of great and small powers, though without reference to proximity or contiguity: Fox (1959), Rothstein (1968) and Vital (1971). See also Vital (1967) and Handel (1981). The extended-deterrence literature has recently grown considerably, with a focus on historical case studies. See especially Huth & Russett (1984), Huth (1988), Lebow & Stein (1990) and Huth & Russett (1990) as well as the many contributions in World Politics, no. 2, 1989. - The arms-race literature is more peripherally relevant, in that it may

2.

3.

strength.33

4.

5. 6.

7.

8.

9.

suggest broader explanations for the growth of arms deployments like those examined below. The act of choice between the two strategies is never actually as neat as described. The options are perhaps more appropriately conceived of as ideal types, or as the end-points of continua. In reality, the small neighbor's elites may let the strategy emerge implicitly and gradually over time. Consciousness about 'strategic choice' is likely to be unequally developed in different political cultures and even between governments within the same political system. See also Orvik (1973, 1984). Whether one policy is in fact a response to the other may be hard to establish empirically. In principle, of course, each side's policy at any given point in time is in part a function of the other side's prior policy. Arguably, determining the presence of observable variation in both states' policies is a necessary condition for establishing a possible causal connection. The recent fundamental changes in Soviet foreign policy are not at issue in the present article, which leaves insufficient room for a discussion of their possible significance in this context. On the reasoning behind Soviet strategic policy during this period, see Erickson (1982a). Further to this question below. The manpower of the Turkish armed forces is more than twenty times the Norwegian figure. The Norwegian armed forces are well equipped, well educated and serve a homogeneous, cohesive society. The Turkish military have even in recent years had to contend with a serious shortage of equipment, widespread illiteracy, and a considerable threat of domestic violence. Abroad, Turkey in this period faced potential enemies not only in the Warsaw Pact, but also in Greece, and since 1974 Turkey has had an occupation force on Cyprus. For these reasons, the difference between NATO's north and south flanks is smaller than the raw figures themselves may suggest. The size differential leads Gurkan (1980) to compare Turkey with Norway and Sweden combined. The concept of 'strategic importance' is here taken to mean the importance for the security of a state which is attributed to a given external area by the state's key decision-makers, military and civilian. For a critical discussion of the concept and illustrations of other usages, see Gleditsch (1986). It has sometimes been claimed in the Norwegian foreign policy debate that the Soviet forces in the north must be seen entirely in the light of their strategic - as implicitly opposed to their 'local' role, because they are 'part of the global balance' which does not directly threaten Norway. In this writer's opinion the distinction makes little sense. The bases on Kola, just by being there, increase the strategic importance of the surrounding areas. Note that I am not saying the two are equally important to the Soviet Union in this period; this remains an open question. For a different view regarding the relative importance of the northern and southern flank see Gurkan (1980, p. 41). In

66

Olav Fagelund Knudsen

House Joint Resolution 117 for the Middle East Area. Study prepared for the JCS, JCS 1887/363, 29 May 1957, p. 2768 (formerly Top Secret, declassified by JCS Declassification Branch, 23 June 1978; JCS decimal file ref.: 381 EMMEA (11-1947) In 57 RB 5-27-57). This force level corresponds roughly to the one reported in 1953 by US EUCOM (serial 000 520, 28 March 1953, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Central Decimal Files, 1953, 092.3 NATO (General), p. 31), although the latter assessment discounts the importance of the four border regiments, as they are said to be 'widely dispersed with the mission of giving early warning of enemy attack. There is a need of these units but it is not believed they would be effective as a tactical fighting force and they would be quickly overrun in the event of an attack' (p. 30). Two decades later Knowlton provides his assessment: Opposite Soviet Caucasus there were, at the time of his writing, altogether seven Turkish division equivalents (six infantry and one tank). Forces opposite Syria were probably not included in the first of these estimates. The deployment is explicitly located along the Erzerum/Van line, further to the northeast. It may be reasonable to estimate the forces along the Syrian border in 1957 at about three divisions or 50,000 men. In the 1977 case it is not entirely clear from the source that the forces referred to are exclusively assigned to the defense of the Soviet-Turkish border, although that would seem to be the only reasonable interpretation of Knowlton's statement. Turkish sources support this assessment in direct communications with the author. It should be noted that this document is a political compromise, endorsed by most of the political parties. Moreover, it discusses the relevant events 30 years after they occurred. Nevertheless, as a general description it may be regarded as reasonably accurate. For a broader perspective on Norwegian security policy in the early part of the Cold War, see Udgaard (1973) and Lundestad (1980). Subsequent elaborations, in the Norwegian government's note to the USSR on 5 March 1949 and in a statement by Defense Minister Hauge to the Storting in February 1951, explicitly lay down a narrow interpretation of what Norway has committed itself to do and not to do by the troopstationing declaration, and make it clear that the Norwegian government alone can interpret it. The external reasons for Norway's adoption of this policy were not the only ones, perhaps not even the most important ones. Domestic opposition to Norwegian NATO membership was considerable in 1948-49, particularly within the governing Labor party itself. Hence, the Norwegian renunciation of foreign bases was agreeable to those who were sceptical of a Western alliance and to those (not always the same individuals) who were fundamentally opposed to a military defense. The troop-stationing declaration was not merely a foreign policy move, but a domestic move - above all an internal Labor party affair - to conciliate and pacify the

direct communication with the author, General Gurkan argues at length that the comparison made here is dubious because of decisive asymmetries between Norway and Turkey. He quotes Admiral Crowe and others to the effect that the strategic importance of the Mediterranean area has grown over the past forty years and emphasizes that all unrest in the Middle East, in Cyprus and between Turkey and Greece tends to reinforce the importance of Turkey. Developments in the Gulf area since the summer of 1990 would seem to add support to this argument. 10. See Finley (1980) for a discussion of various interpretations of Soviet conventional deployments and the Soviet buildup since the 1960s. A study of the degree of correspondence between verbal behavior and resource dispositions in Soviet mili'tary policy is provided by Zimmerman & Palmer (1983). Their findings - which indicate a high degree of correspondence, given a somewhat special interpretation of Soviet verbal behavior cannot, however, confidently be expected to extend to the specifics under consideration here, as they concern only very general policy matters. 11. Finley (1980) discusses most of these issues. Naval forces are clearly also an important part of the picture, but their range and mobility are much greater. Hence they are less well suited to serve as an indicator of Soviet political judgment focused selectively on Turkey or Norway. It will be seen that the assessment attempted here concentrates on that military factor which seems best able to reflect Soviet evaluation of local factors. Finley emphasizes the political advantages that may accrue from conventional military superiority. See also Fischer (1976, pp. 6-7) on the specific military functions. 12. See also: US Senate (1980). The bare statistics are somewhat misleading. Turkey faces at least two potential, independent enemies and has forces stationed in Cyprus. A comparison of the military forces facing the Soviet Union on the northern and southern flanks will need to take such factors into account. To the extent Turkey's military capabilities serve multiple purposes, some of them unrelated to the East/West relationship, Turkey may be that much less of an opponent to the USSR. 13. This qualification is based on comments made by several Turkish colleagues, separately, in direct communication with the author. Military tasks unrelated to the USSR may also explain part of the growth. 14, Except for the Cyprus and Aegean deployments, the pattern was the same earlier in the postwar period. 15. According to Agmon, in 1957 deployments in eastern Turkey amounted to 'approximately six infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions, two armoured brigades and four border regiments, deployed in defensive positions running south-east from Erzurum to Lake Van'. Agmon's source is the US Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Middle East Planning Committee. A Study of the Military Implications of

16. 17.

18.

19.

Did Accommodation Work? Two Soviet Neighbors opposition to NATO membership. The subsequent additions to this policy can be properly understood primarily as sops to portions of the Labor movement. Still, their widespread acceptance over time indicates a much broader appeal across the Norwegian political spectrum. Lecture at the Institute of Political Science, University of Oslo, May 1980. This characterization of Norwegian policy as a case of accommodation continues to be disputed by some, presumably because Norway is allied to the USA. However, the alliance and the origin of the policy of reassuring the USSR must be seen together. No other NATO state (except Denmark, following the Norwegian example) has made the principle of reassurance the basis of its security policy vis-a-vis the USSR, and notably not Turkey, the only other NATO member with a land border to the Soviet Union. Other objections have been raised against characterizing Norwegian policy as 'constant' or 'stable', inasmuch as the integration of NATO's military command in 1951 and the prepositioning decision in Norway in 1980 could be seen by the other side as significant changes. Whether 1951 or 1949 is taken as the starting-point seems to me immaterial; moreover, the change in 1951 applied equally to all NATO countries. The change in 1980 could hardly affect much of Soviet policy until after that time. Moreover, it was explicitly made in response to the Soviet buildup of the Kola bases during the 1960s and 1970s, and deliberately placed in a retracted rather than a forward location, as already noted. In short, a period of stability in Norwegian security policy may reasonably be said to extend from 1951 to the present. The simple reasoning employed here ('manpower deployment ratios indicate policy priorities') disregards the possible effects of those major technology-cum-strategy changes which have only minor impact on ground-force manpower. An example is the Soviet focus on the Arctic. This shift, of course, is part of the reason why the Kola base complex is so important. See Ostreng (1982) for a discussion. On the general problems of ground force assessments, see also Fischer (1976) and Ruehl (1982). See, e.g., Garder (1966, pp. 140-149 and 173174), Wolfe (1970, pp. 164-166), and Record (1975, pp. 4-6). Collins illustrates the problems of such assessments: 'The US intelligence community counted 65 Category III divisions in 1976. That total increased to 96 after analysts re-evaluated readiness conditions, and reclassified 31 divisions formerly carried as Category II. DIA now lists 93.' Collins (1980, p. 213n.), also Dunn (1981, p. 613). Since 1987, NATO has adopted a classification of Soviet Balance ground forces in four parts (The MAilitary 1987-88). In Fig. 2, Air Defense Forces have been subtracted from the figure reported by MB for 1972 and 1973, in accordance with MB procedure in other years (250,(0)0 in 1971).

67

20. 21.

22.

23. 24.

25.

26. The figures produced by this procedure are not referred to as manpower statistics in this article, and serve only as input for the ground-force index itself. 27. A better alternative might have been to create another index for divisional strength, weighting an average size according to the number of divisions of each type reported each year. Unfortunately, the breakdown into types of divisions on the flanks is only provided for some years. 28. MB, 1967-68, p. 6. In the 1970-71 edition the description of the area is changed to 'Caucasus and West Turkestan' (p. 7), but the context indicates that the area alluded to is the same as the 'Caucasus and Soviet Central Asia' referred to in the two previous editions. In the 1975-76 edition the definition of the region is changed again, to 'North Caucasus, Trans-Caucasus, Turkestan MD', presumably to bring the description in line with the names of the military districts, but without altering the reality of the area referred to. This practice is still adhered to today, although from 1983 Afghanistan has been added to the area as reported by MB. Troops in Afghanistan are excluded from my figures. 29. The source, recently declassified, is a note of correction to another document, the latter still classified. In the context of a threat assessment, the note states: 'Only 17 Divisions in trans Caucasus are available for operations during the early phases.' (Message from Chief Baghdad Pact Liaison Group Baghdad Iraq, to JCS Wash DC. Signed Henderson. 10 May 1957. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic file 1CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) Sec58.) There is no explicit reference to the USSR in the document. Still, the quoted number of divisions probably refers to Soviet deployments, given the subject of the note and the fact that the name 'Transcaucasus' is commonly used for a Soviet border region. See also Jabber & Kolkowicz (1981) as well as the main body of Kaplan's writing in the same volume (Kaplan, 1981). 30. See also the military survey of the northern area for the period 1964-84, released by the Norwegian Ministry of Defense as Aktuelle Forsvarssporsmdl no. 0185. The report does not give annual figures for all of its data during this period, notably not for ground-force deployments. Nevertheless, data for 1964 are provided. 31. The USSR, however, limited its support to the Turkish intervention and refused to go along with Turkey's subsequent proposal for a federation on the island (ibid.). Apart from this, a sharp comment on the lead/lag problem in using Soviet deployment data is found in Finley (fn. 11), who holds that 'Ironically, the "hard" evidence of Soviet military deployments may . . . become a questionable indicator of current policy. The lead time inherent in defense programs makes quantitative comparisons deceptive, because they reflect decisions taken as long as a decade ago, when the balance was different' (ibid. 6). One wonders whether that statement, which appears generally

68

Knudsen OlavFagelund
saw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources. Erickson, John, 1982b. 'The Soviet View of Deterrence', Survival, vol. 24, no. 6, November/ December, pp. 242-251. Erickson, John; Lynn Hansen & William Schneider, 1986. Soviet Ground Forces. An Operational Assessment. London: Croom Helm. Finley, David D., 1980. 'Conventional Arms in Soviet Foreign Policy', World Politics, vol. 33, no. 1, October, pp. 1-35. Fischer, Robert L., 1976. 'Defending the Central Front: The Balance of Forces', Adelphi Papers, no. 127. Forsvarsdepartementet, 1985. Aktuelle forsvarssporsmal no. 0185. Oslo: Ministry of Defense. Forsvarsdepartementet, 1990. Fakta om forsvaret (annual publication). Oslo: Ministry of Defense. Fox, Annette B., 1959. The Power of Small States. Diplomacy in World War II. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Fox, Annette B., 1977. The Politics of Attraction. New York: Columbia University Press. Garder, Michel, 1966. A History of the Soviet Army. London: Pall Mall. Gelman, Harry, 1982. 'The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China', Rand Project Air Force Report R-2943-AF. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Gleditsch, Nils P., 1986. 'The Strategic Significance of the Nordic Countries', Current Research on Peace and Violence, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 28-42. Gonlubol, Mehmet, 1975. 'NATO and Turkey', in K. H. Karpat, ed., Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950-1974. Leiden: Brill. Gurkan, Ihsan, 1980. NA TO, Turkey, and the Southern Flank: A Mideastern Perspective. Agenda Papers, no. 11. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Handel, Michael, 1981. Weak States in the International System. London: Cass. Harris, George S., 1985. Turkey: Coping with Crisis. Boulder, CO: Westview. Henze, Paul B., 1982. 'Turkey, the Alliance, and the Middle East: Problems and Opportunities in Historical Perspective', Working Paper, no. 36. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center. Holloway, David, 1983. The Soviet Union and the Arms Race. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Holst, Johan J., 1967. Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv (Norwegian Security Policy in Strategic Perspective), 2 vols. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Huth, Paul, 1988. 'Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War', American Political Science Review, vol. 82, no. 2, June, pp. 423-443. Huth, Paul & Bruce Russett, 1984. 'What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980', World Politics, vol. 36, no. 4, July, pp. 496-526. Huth, Paul & Bruce Russett, 1990. 'Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference', World Politics, vol. 42, no. 4, July, pp. 466-501. Jabber, Paul & Roman Kolkowicz, 1981. 'The ArabIsraeli Wars of 1967 and 1973', in Kaplan (1981).

reasonable, can be expected to apply equally to decreases and increases, and to manpower as well as physical installations. 32. 'The Soviet Union demonstrated the importance of this large area to the country's security above all by testing atomic weapons in disputed waters [during the years 1976-80]' Kan (1988, p. 71). 33. Jervis refers to 'the frequently noted Russian refusal to reciprocate minor concessions and adjustments' (Jervis, 1976, p. 103n). My statement assumes, of course, that the Soviet ground-force deployments in the south are not caused by considerations other than Turkish policy.

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OLAV FAGELUND KNUDSEN, b. 1943, PhD (University of Denver, 1972); Institute of Political Science, University of Oslo, 1971-90. Associate Professor from 1974, Professor from 1985; since 1988 Director of Research, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; currently working on a book about power disparity and the security of small states.