Critical incidents and social construction of corporate social responsibility

Ole Andreas Engen, Aslaug Mikkelsen and Kjell Grnhaug

Ole Andreas Engen is an Associate Professor and Aslaug Mikkelsen is a Professor, both in the Faculty of Social Science, University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway. Kjell Grnhaug is a Professor at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, Norway.

Abstract Purpose This paper seeks to address how major companies adjust their behaviour and denitions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) when exposed to critical incidents. Design/methodology/approach This is a qualitative explorative study including two cases from the Norwegian oil and gas industry, both reecting critical incidents that are included in the present study: the Utkal case of Norsk Hydro and the Iran corruption case of Statoil. Findings The critical incidents reported here resulted in changes in decision making and the reformulation of corporate strategies. The ndings reported also reveal how the construction of CSR policy and the construction of the reality of the different stakeholders were transferred between companies, NGOs and civil society. Research limitations/implications Only a small sample of events and companies is investigated in the study. Accordingly, future research is needed on how legislation and government regulations affect a broader scale of different companies and how complex organisations manage individual and organisational challenges concerning all aspects of CSR. Practical implications Assuming that critical incidents inuence organisational attention, interpretation and actions, the study indicates that the incidents can be seen as catalysts for the emergence of new CSR policy. New CSR policy is expressed in the patterns of social behaviour. This implies participating in diverse social networks, partnerships and learning forums and that CSR behaviour is constructed in the interaction between company, NGOs, media and business networks. Originality/value Similar studies have not previously been undertaken in Norwegian oil companies. Keywords Social responsibility, Stakeholders, Critical incident technique Paper type Research paper

Introduction
The purpose of this article is to analyse how major companies may adjust their behaviour and denitions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) when they are exposed to critical incidents. Critical incidents are responses from the stakeholders to unexpected events that attract the attention of corporate management and inuence their strategic decisions and corporate activities (Flanagan, 1954; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001). Critical incidents may be distinguished from more normal events that may affect rms behaviour. First they have a serious character that directly will shock daily routines and procedures. Second, they create uncertainty, which challenges existing routines and procedures handling stakeholder relationships. If these critical incidents become the sustained focus of public attention, they may thus be triggers of institutional transformation and industry development as well as a collective re-denition of problems (Pride, 1995; Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001). The more specic goal of this paper is to give a systematic inquiry into how oil and gas companies established on the Norwegian continental shelves respond to critical incidents and call for changes in their CSR policy. The context of this paper is the Norwegian oil

DOI 10.1108/17471111011064735

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companies Norsk Hydro and Statoil. A prior observation is that the Norwegian oil companies in particular have responded to new social and political issues along with nancial demands. Due to the perceived pressure to be accountable to its various stakeholders (e.g. customers, investors, Norwegian regulatory agencies, NGOs and the media), the oil industry has made great efforts to behave according to new CSR principles. On the one hand we may say that the case of oil companies is self-evident when analysing CSR issues. On the other hand, it may be relevant to ask what kind of critical incidents that actually have impact on CSR strategies within the oil industry and how certain companies seem to handle such incidents. The article contains a story of how the companies navigate in response to the critical incidents that get public attention. The basic underlying premise is that all groups involved are socially constructed through interactions in their actual context. These processes inuence the actors behaviour, judgements and attitudes. The point of departure is Ocasios attention-based view of the rm (Ocasio, 1997). The paper investigates how certain issues got the oil companies attention and what kind of stakeholders, context and situations that are involved when critical incidents occur. Second, it shows how the companies reacted on the critical incidents and how company rules regulated the allocation of issues, answers and decision-making. Finally, we show how the institutionalisation of CSR in the companies was manifested in separate CSR departments and increased staffs with expertise in risk and reputation management. Despite the fact that the oil industry in Norway to a large extent followed international trends concerning CSR, the article argues that the critical incidents in question contributed to an intensied focus of attention and emphasised CSR in a Norwegian context. To some extent we may say that the critical incidents described in this article were initial tests for the Norwegian oil companies as international energy players. The remaining part of this article is organised in the following way. In the next section we dene and clarify the central concepts to be applied and their theoretical underpinning. Next we report our research methodology and empirical ndings. Finally, we summarise our observations and discuss theoretical and managerial implications, and indicate further avenues for research. An attention-based view on critical CSR incidents The starting-point in our perspective is critical incidents, which in our denition coincides with the point of view expressed in Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001. Their main objective is to explain why some events get attention and others do not. In other words their study is an exploration of determinants of public attention and thereby industry-level attention to external events. The central argument in the attention-based view of the rm is that rm behaviour is the result of how rms channel and distribute the attention of their decision-makers (Ocasio, 1997). Individual information processing and behaviour are explicitly linked to information processing and behaviour related to the organisational structure through the concepts of procedural and communication channels. Procedure and communication channels refer to formal arrangements within organisations which have the task of selecting and systematising information from the organisational environment to the top management. Moreover, these arrangements contribute towards the top management when their responses on critical incidents are tried imparted to the stakeholders. What decision-makers do depends on what issues and answers they focus their attention on. Dutton and Dukerich (1991) describe issues as events, developments, and trends that an organisations members collectively recognise as having consequences for the organisation. Ocasio (1997) denes attention to encompass the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focusing of time and effort by organisational decision-makers on both issues (the available repertoire of categories for making sense of the environment: problems, opportunities, and threats), and answers (the available repertoire of action alternatives: proposals, routines, projects, program and procedures). The denition of an issue by a collectivity is a social construction (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). Issue denitions often emerge and evolve over time, and can be contested (Jackson

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and Dutton, 1988). Some issues t existing categories and organisational patterns of routinised behaviours. However, issues may also be problematic because they are non-traditional: they have not been encountered in the past and thus do not easily t well-used categorisation schemes. Dutton and Dukerich (1991) show how organisational context contributes to how and when issue interpretive changes occur. According to their perspective, an organisations image and identity guide and activate individuals interpretations of an issue and motivations for action on it, and those interpretations affect patterns of organisational action over time. Decision-makers will be selective in the issues and answers and the selection process depends on what issues and answers they focus on. The principle of situated attention operates at the level of social cognition (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) and provides a link between how individuals think and decide in any particular situation, and how the organisation and its environment shape the situations that individuals nd themselves in. The decision-makers attention is situated in the rms procedural and communication channels. The situational context of these channels includes environmental stimuli, cultural symbols and interactions among participants in the channel. By the term structural distribution of attention, Ocasio (1997) shows how the organisation distributes and controls the allocation of issues, answers and decision-makers. Each local activity within the rm involves a set of procedures and communications and these procedures and communications focus the attention of decision-makers on a selected set of issues and answers. A rms action is seen not as a choice among an unlimited array of possibilities determined by purely internal arrangements, but rather as a choice among a narrowly dened set of legitimate options determined by the groups of actors composing the rms organisational eld (Scott, 2001). Hoffman (1999) argues that elds form around issues, not markets or technologies. Organisational elds become arenas of power relations (Brint and Karabel, 1991) where multiple eld constituents compete over the denition of issues and the form of institutions that will guide organisational behaviour. How do we connect concepts of attention, issues, social constructivism and organisational eld to CSR? In the mid-1990s a new terminology on corporate social responsibility emerged. The terms corporate responsibility and corporate (business) citizenship integrate stakeholder relationships into their operationalisation for the rst time, uniting the two dominant streams in the business in society eld, because in addition to focusing on the social implications of business activities, they also incorporate issues related to companies performance to specic stakeholders and the natural environment (Grifn and Mahon, 1997; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Waddock, 2004). During the 1990s and early 2000s, two other CSR-related trends became popular corporate reputation and corporate relationships (including notions of stakeholder engagement; Waddock, 2004). Fombrun and Shanley (1990) argue that rms compete for reputational status in institutional elds. Managers attempt to inuence other stakeholders assessments by signalling companies salient advantages. A study of 292 large US rms supported a general hypothesis that publics construct reputations on the basis of information about rms relative structural positions within organisational elds, specically using market and accounting signals indicating performance, institutional signals indicating conformity to social norms, and strategy signals indicating strategic postures. Stakeholder engagement processes partially grew out of attention to public-private partnerships, which evolved into multi-stakeholder collaboration and dialogue (Calton and Payne, 2003) to bring multiple interests together around important social, political, and economic development issues. The United Nations Global Compacts learning forum and other interest organisations take part in this development. How corporate management thinks about events and issues in the environment depends on what kind of focus they have. Moreover, their focuses may be implicit, and they may include several perspectives. For example, when underlining shareholder values and short-term stock-market changes and what is legally accepted, decision makers tend to see corporate responsibility as a competitive advantage. Issues believed to affect stock market values will

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get attention, and resources that are considered valuable, rare and inimitable will be focused. Hart (1995) has developed a resource-based view of the rm encompassing three main interconnected strategic capabilities: 1. pollution prevention; 2. product stewardship; and 3. sustainable development. In his view continuous improvement, stakeholder integration and shared vision are critical. CSR restricts companies activities and behaviour through moral or social values, reputational risks and regulations. For example, companies may be forced to make heavy investments to reduce pollution or may sustain extra costs to compensate for destroyed living conditions for vulnerable groups, or they may perceive pressure to inuence human rights in countries they are established in. Such actions are usually believed to reduce the protability of the company (Friedman, 1979; Porter, 2003). In giving attention to this pressure, companies interpret and construe possible consequences. Simons (1947) theory of the rm states that rms behaviour are inuenced by cognitive and structural processes of decision makers. Decision-making in organisations is thus constrained by limited cognitive capacity. Ocasio (1997) links organisational structure and cognition to the attention based view of the rm and explains by the term structural distribution of attention, how the organisation distributes and controls the allocation of issues, answers and decision makers. Normally human actors behave according to earlier socialisation and memorising. In organisations operating in stable environments, organisation members tend to share the same perceptions. When a critical incident occurs, organisations are often taken by surprise. As mentioned above, critical incidents threaten rms reputation signicantly. Accordingly, existing risk assessment procedures are not always appropriate. Figure 1 shows our research model. The research model has an explorative character and is based on Hoffman and Ocasio (2001). It is, however, simplied. In our cases the steps from left to right in the model will be investigated. Step one, critical incidents, is the starting point in our model. According to Hoffman and Ocasio (2001) not all serious event are considered as critical incidents. This is valid also in the Norwegian oil industry. During a day of operation there is a ow of events that may be critical or at least evolve into critical events. Normally,

Figure 1 The research model: critical incidents and new CSR policy

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organisational security routines and risk assessment procedures handle such events or prevent them from escalating. Critical incidents occur when these routines fail. However, our cases also have to satisfy a second condition; that the critical incident attracts certain social salience. Such attractions depend on the seriousness of the incident. Accidents, environmental irregularities, etc., are reported almost every day. According to Hoffman and Ocasio (2001), social salience attracts both outsiders attribution of accountability and insiders examination of an industry image. The insiders examination will also be affected by the degree of uncertainty the incidents create. Accordingly the critical incidents sustain both the rms and public attention and thereby trigger institutional transformation. Apart from the Bravo blow-out in 1977 and the Alexander Kielland accident in 1980, it is reasonable to claim that in a Norwegian context only the selected cases in this article qualify under such a denition. By outsider public attention we mean all actors that may qualify as stakeholders towards the actual industry and who react in accordance with the incident in question. In our cases the Norwegian government, NGOs and shareholders will be relevant representatives. In addition, the media, both Norwegian and international, play important roles. In order to get the company to redene the agenda, the NGOs and media try to inuence through the companies procedural and communication channels. As mentioned above, information processing is linked to the organisational structure. The organisational interpretation of the critical incidents is thus situated in the rms procedural and communication channels. By insiders examination we mean how the different actors in the different oil companies perceived and reacted upon the events. Within a complex organisation there will be lots of different views and suggested strategies. Furthermore there may be conicts between different departments on how to handle the situation. These conicts are often difcult to reveal due the companies public policies and lack of transparency. However, such clashes of interest or even conicts constitute processes that become products of the companies interpretation of the incident (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001). In Hoffman and Ocasio (2001) model the organisational interpretation is constituted by the sum of outsiders and insiders examination. Furthermore, organisational interpretation processes may affect the organisational action pattern over time (organisational response) only if there is a contestation with outsiders over the accountability for the incident and lost enactment and internal contradictions and challenges to the industrys identity (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001, p. 414). In our simplied research model the combined processes of organisational attention and interpretation contribute to the organisational response as to how they see and handle their social responsibility. Organisational response demands change (Dutton and Ashford, 1993) and may result in a new CSR policy. Whether a new CSR policy may occur depends, according to our model, on the degree of seriousness of the incidents and the uncertainty these incidents create. If the uncertainty persists the rm has to redene its procedures. The establishment of a new CSR policy takes place in the intersection between the organisation (internal examination) and its environment (public examination). A new CSR policy is thus dened by a new set of formal and informal procedures and routines which aims to solve problems similar to those experienced. (Rindova and Fombrun, 1999).

Method[1]
This section reports the research methodology underlying the present study. Due to a modest a priori insight into the actual research problem, an explorative research approach was chosen. To gain insights into our research problem both primary and secondary data sources were employed. Secondary data included annual reports, reports from the NGOs and newspaper articles. The main purpose of using secondary data was to learn about the actual context and how the actual critical incidents were perceived among the rms, media and NGOs. To obtain insights into the actors perceptions and to understand their interpretations of critical incidents, primary data were collected. More precisely, a series of semi-structured

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interviews was conducted with relevant actors. To capture the social construction processes in the companies, the viewpoint of managers and employees at different levels and departments of the organisation were sought. Persons interviewed included line managers, employees and staff members. Since top managers play key interpretational roles, the manager responsible for CSR issues in each of the three oil companies was included in the group of informants (Bennis and Nanus, 1985). Table I provides an overview of the informants in each of the oil companies and NGOs. In total 18 interviews were carried out in the three companies, ten interviews in different NGOs and three interviews in different accountancy rms. All the interviews were conducted by two researchers, one taking notes and the other asking the questions. Before conducting the interviews, a thorough walk through interview guide was developed to get information on each critical incident and how they were handled. Each interview lasted between one and a half and two hours and most of them were recorded. The notes and tapes were transcribed and the transcriptions were then checked with the informant. Each of the informants was asked to describe when and how the company started to work on corporate social responsibility, and then to explain whether specic events were directly or indirectly related to this process. Each participant was asked detailed sets of open-ended questions in approximately the same order and they were also asked about key partners and external contacts in their work on corporate social responsibility. Our open-ended interviews allowed the informants to describe and discuss the specic organisational processes, key stakeholders and the events they found most important for the company decisions in the development and implementation of corporate social responsibility policy. The informants were also asked to list the events of the previous years that they considered organisationally critical to the companys reputation or decisions. The key purpose in the interviews was to learn as much as possible about the employees and managers concerns, perceptions, reactions, observations and thoughts in connection with the specic events and their meaning for knowledge transfer. The interview was seen as a concerted project for producing meaning, and the interviewees as a productive source of knowledge (Miller and Glassner, 1997). Rather than probing for information or suggesting ideas, the interviewers tried to understand and clarify the opinions and interpretations set forth. Some of the interviewees held powerful positions[2]. They are regularly interviewed and have deliberate relations to media. It can be questioned whether manipulative and Table I Overview of informants in each of the oil and gas companies and NGOs
Company, NGO Hydro Informants 4 Position of informants Head of CSR Advisor CSR Advisor CSR, Oil and Gas Division Vice President CSR Responsible Senior CSR Advisor Internal Control Advisor CSR advisor Chief Advisor, Ethics and CSR CEO Advocacy Campaigner Manager, partnerships Key Account Managers Advisor Chief Advisor Consultant, Advisor Spokesman/Information Ofcer

Statoil

Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry Strmme Foundation Norwegian Church Aid Amnesty Norway Red Cross World Wildlife Fund Humanistic Academy Sustainability, London Accountancy rms: Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, Ernst & Young

1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 3

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organisationally shaped strategies have biased the data. The positions and roles of the interviewees may inuence how they process and hand over information. Their beliefs are socially constructed because they are actors within a particular context and because their main task is to maintain and further develop the belief systems in the same context (Berger and Luckman, 1966). In order to control data validity we have systematised and cross-checked all interviews and relevant available documents and compared information and interpretations. We also have systematised the interviews with reference to organisational belongings and compared them with other relevant documents produced in their organisations[3].

Findings
In this section we report from our investigation. Two Norwegian critical incidents are selected: the Utkal case of Norsk Hydro and the Iran corruption case of Statoil. Each of the critical incidents is described below. All our ndings are categorised according to our model (Figure 1). The cases critical incidents Utkal Alumnia is one of the largest foreign-owned projects in India[4]. At the starting point Hydro entered into a joint venture with a Canadian and an Indian company. According to Hydro, both had lower thresholds concerning CSR than Hydro. After a riot among the local citizens, Hydros engagement in Utkal was investigated by several NGOs, two of which the Strmme Foundation and Norwegian Church Aid addressed issues both to the Norwegian government and Hydro. Core personnel in Hydro were increasingly concerned about the situation. To open a communication channel with the company, Norwegian Church Aid bought Hydro B-shares, and at the General Meeting of 2001 representatives from Norwegian Church Aid asked whether the company had any plans for a general strategy concerning human rights. According to our informant in Norwegian Church Aid this was a well planned action. The president immediately refused any interference in internal affairs, but nine months later Hydro withdrew from Utkal and started to develop an ofcial strategy on CSR. In June 2002 Statoil entered into a contract with the London-based consultancy rm Horton Investments Ltd. The contract covered general advisory services related to Statoils commercial interests in Iran. The actual Horton contact was Mehdi Hashemi, the son of the former Iranian president. An internal Statoil assessment of the Horton contract concluded that it did not comply with the ethical standards of the company, and that the company procurement directives were not catered for as the contract could be deemed not sufciently transparent. Mr Heshemi could not be identied in the contract document, and the contract signee was a company located in a tax haven. The top management of Statoil was informed by the internal auditors of these shortcomings, but did not seek to abort the Horton contract prior to the issues breaking into the public domain. After the Iran scandal, each of the consultancy contracts Statoil had were analysed with new perspectives. Salience of the events The social salience of the events was signicant (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001). The Norwegian oil industry had earlier been exposed for environmental disasters and terrible accidents, but not critical incidents that involved violation of human rights and corruption on a large scale. The degree of seriousness and uncertainty was signicant. During almost 40 years of oil production in Norway, the Norwegian Continental shelf has been the main ground for the Norwegian oil companies. In the last ten years, however, the investment rate abroad has increased and both Hydro and Statoil have entered into partnership agreements with other foreign oil companies in order to get access to new prosperous petroleum regions. Almost without exception, these petroleum regions are located in areas characterised by political instability or economic backwardness (Ryggvik and Engen, 2004). Hence critical incidents that occurred due to presence in these regions were new experiences for the Norwegian oil companies. In the Utkal case, humanitarian organisations such as the Strmme Foundation and Norwegian Church Aid put the case on the public agenda. When Norwegian Church Aid

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bought Hydro B-shares and at the General Meeting of 2001 representatives from Norwegian Church Aid asked whether the company had any plans for a general strategy concerning human rights, the president immediately refused any interference in internal affairs, but nine months later Hydro withdrew from Utkal. According to the CSR advisor of Hydro this was the rst serious mover inuencing insider examination of the case. The top management of Statoil was informed by internal auditors, but did not seek to abort the Horton contract prior to the issues breaking into the public domain. As a consequence of these transgressions, the managing director of the International Division of Statoil, the chairman of the board and the CEO were removed voluntarily or involuntarily by the autumn of 2003 (Keiserud, 2004). However, the Norwegian press got the story and suddenly the scandal was on the front page of all the largest newspapers particularly Dagens Nringsliv (Daily Business) the most inuential Norwegian newspaper on business and nance[5]. For a state dominated oil company like Statoil, such public attention in Norway was unacceptable. And when the internal unions, YS (the Confederation of Vocational Unions) and SAFE (the Norwegian Union of Energy Workers), joined the critical groups the power of the stakeholders was further fortied. The management were for a long time reluctant to admit failures publicly, but were at last forced to do so because the Union representative on the Board threatened to be more public than ordinarily expected[6]. Similarly, Hydro did not accept that the company had any obligations towards the local people in Utkal. Hydro argued that since this was a joint venture project with a Canadian and an Indian company it was not their responsibility. After a riot among the local citizens, Hydros engagement in Utkal was investigated by several NGOs, two of which the Strmme Foundation and Norwegian Church Aid addressed the issues both to the Norwegian government and Hydro. In the Iran corruption scandal, the decision makers in Statoil failed to see the public consequences of internal early warning signals. Internal auditors informed the top managers of shortcomings of the contracts with Horton and his group, but the top managers and the internal auditors interpreted the contract differently. The decision makers did abort the Horton contract, and the issue broke into the public domain. To a certain degree the companies resisted to accept stakeholders views on critical incidents and tended to ignore their arguments. Nevertheless, when the pressure became strong enough i.e. degree of uncertainty the companies were forced to enter into a communicative process with external and internal opponents. An informant in Norsk Hydro claims that it took nine months from the General Meeting where Norwegian Church Aid accused Norsk Hydro of violating human rights until action was taken from the top management. He had no good explanation for such inertia, but implied that the rst strategy from the top management was to cover up the case and hope that external and internal actors would forget it. Unfortunately, from a top management point of view, there were increasing numbers of negative internal reports from employees in Hydro located in Utkal in the months after the General Meeting. In the end this made it impossible for the top management to ignore the case[7]. The Horton case had a different character. On the one hand it was more exposed in the Norwegian media than the Utkal case. On the other hand, most of the internal debate concerning consequences took place behind closed doors in the boarding room. Not even relevant actors such as head of the CSR department in Statoil were informed about the details[8]. However, the media pressure was vigorous. It is thus reasonable to claim that while the social salience of the Utkal case was created and fortied by internal forces, the social salience of the Horton scandal was due to a degree of public attention without any parallel in Norwegian oil history. Organisational interpretation After media attention and stakeholders issue selling, a period of organisational interpretation followed concerning the two critical incidents described. According to our simplied research model, external and internal examination inuences the organisational interpretation. From the attention based view of the rm (Ocasio, 1997) we know how rms

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channel and distribute the attention of their decision makers. We have also stated how decision makers are selective on issues and answers (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). In both cases we see how effects of structural distribution of attention inuence the managerial level of both companies. In Hydro both external pressure and pressure from people within Hydro made the company change its strategy within the Utkal case and towards human rights issues in general. Since several NGOs and media had a focus on the Utkal province, a vice-president of CSR was hired in order to evaluate the activities. During this process the organisational attitude concerning the Utkal project changed and according to our informant, Hydro ofcially accepted that legal decisions on licence to operate are not enough to (re)build a good reputation. The Utkal incident constructed new knowledge in the companies about the impact that multinational corporations have on the environment and on the living conditions of vulnerable groups in less developed countries of the world. The development of this knowledge was created interactively in confrontations and in dialogue within the company and with its stakeholders. In the Iran case, the top management initially defended its positions and was reluctant towards taking serious actions. The case was not dened as a problem before the Norwegian media put it on the agenda, and thus threatened the reputation of the biggest and most considerable company in Norway. In order to restore trust from the owners, the Norwegian state, the politicians and the opinion, the board decided to change the top management and furthermore implement new routines for evaluation of foreign investments. The difference between the two cases is the relative strength between external and internal examination. In Hydro the internal channels of distribution were activated rst by utilising the General Meeting, and second when employees used ordinary report channels to emphasise the problems in Utkal. Probably, there was a connection between these two events, but nothing in our data indicates such relations. Nevertheless, the internal examinations seem to weight more than external examinations in the case of Hydro despite publications from Norwegian Church Aid, which in 2000 and 2001 reported regularly from Utkal[9]. On the other side, Statoil was hit by a media storm. Hence, it seems that the external examinations were much heavier than in the Hydro case. As mentioned, the internal processes were almost closed and very little information on how the management planned to handle the situation leaked. In hindsight we now see that the situation gradually was taken very seriously, and that the union representative in the board entered a role as a communicative channel from the external examination to the inner circle of the management. It is reasonable to claim that this channel affected the decision makers. Together with the media storm and the fact that reputation and accountability among the employees were decreasing as well, the president chose to resign. From having an interpretation that the case could be handled internally and without publicity, the Horton case became one of the largest scandals in the history of the company. Organisational response Our main question concerns how these critical incidents inuenced the CSR policy of the Norwegian oil companies. The answer is not obvious because the Norwegian oil companies also followed international trends concerning CSR. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the two cases had considerable effects at least as a catalyst for utilising already established institutional arrangements, but also to redening routines and procedures and implementing new institutional arrangements. During the nineties both Statoil and Hydro began to use specialised consultants and consultancy companies like SustainAbility for developing, measuring and reporting CSR. Consultants were used for writing speeches for top managers and country specialists for developing social performance measurement indicators and for contributing to developing CSR reports. In the 1990s the rst partnership between NGOs and oil and gas companies on CSR was negotiated and agreed upon. Our informants emphasised that the road to partnership had begun through conicts, as with the relationship between Statoil, Hydro,

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Amnesty and Red Cross[10]. The informants described the activity of the NGOs as that of a catalyst for new kinds of cooperation and communication. NGO representatives claimed that it seemed as if the oil and gas companies were competing in showing the world who was the best and who came rst to make an agreement with the leading NGOs. Most of the contact between the companies and their partners was initiated by the oil and gas companies, and not by the NGOs[11]. At the same time the global approach of the NGOs as a communication channel for groups of people in less developed countries was more accepted by the companies. Both Hydro and Statoil signed an agreement with Amnesty International Norway to strengthen their future efforts to promote human rights. Hydro and Statoil made a nancial contribution to Amnesty. In return Amnesty was to provide expertise when the companies set up their in-house training of managers and employees on how to deal with human rights when doing business in different countries. In addition, Amnesty would assist the companies in specic cases. Otherwise the parties worked completely independently of each other. The Amnesty representative emphasised that Hydro and Statoil was using the partnership agreements very differently, the rst being the most active in their approach to Amnesty. In both cases the full potential of the partnership was not utilised. The Amnesty informant thus reected over the possibility that the partnership has a legitimising function for the companies, rather than a function related to knowledge development and knowledge diffusion on human rights[12]. Statoil also established a partnership agreement with the environmental organisation Bellona in 2002 with the aim to improve the collaboration on environmental issues. From Bellonas point of view, the reason for entering such an agreement was to get closer to the decision system of the companies and thus inuence the outcome. In November 2004 the public was informed that Statoil did not intend to prolong the agreement for another period. The company denied that this had anything to do with protest actions from Bellona (particularly on the Erik Raude oil rig) concerning the activities in the Barents Sea in Northern Norway. This partnership was re-established in 2005. Despite institutional arrangements, both cases were ignored initially. The traditional management system of the companies neglected the early warning signals that were present before the issues became critical. In Statoil they had early warning signals within their own company in the Iran issue, but the top management suppressed the implications of these. In Hydro the managers rst denied the facts reported by the NGOs in the Utkal case. The purpose of the partnership agreements and the systems for issue and stakeholder management that were introduced, was to introduce a process aspect in management that made it possible to proactively catch and react on early warning signals and issues. Both Statoil and Hydro realised that action had to be taken. The question is, however, whether the institutional channels already established contributed to a faster and more efcient reaction and, furthermore, whether the action taken was more closely inuenced by external and internal examination than if such institutional channels had not been implemented. Hoffman and Ocasio (2001) apply the concepts of accountability and contestation to the industry level. According to their theory, image and identity become dominant considerations concerning whether companies should pay attention to the incident. The two cases threatened both the external and internal accountability of the Norwegian oil companies. Moreover, the cases violated parts of their images that earlier had been shielded. The organisational responses were to restore their images by withdrawing from Utkal and replacing the top management. A by-product was more active co-operation with the NGOs and other partners[13]. This trend was also conrmed by the Chief Advisor of the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry[14]. After a period of communication and negotiations with the stakeholders, the companies thus internalised new routines and procedures. A general acceptance from the stakeholders was required, however. To a large extent our ndings conrm this. We have denoted this phase as organisational response. Organisational response also refers to a back to normalcy situation where the companies more or less operate in accordance with their internal and

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external examinators views upon socially responsible behaviour. It also refers to a situation where legitimacy is restored. New CSR policy? With hindsight it is evident that critical events have taught the companies that their risk communication has been insufcient and that the traditions for social dialogues should be developed further. Informants in the Norwegian oil and gas companies emphasised the long traditions of social responsibility in Norway. However, social responsibility is normally based on the traditions of the companies native country. These traditions are not necessarily internationally accepted. To some extent this may be understood as an argument in favour of regulative power as an impetus for CSR, and not signals from the market encouraging strategic issues or management attention (Dutton and Ashford, 1993; Ocasio, 1997). CSR is therefore a part of the social contract between the host country and the organisations where the relative strength of the institutional set up determines to what extent CSR is an internalised part of the companies governance structure (Ustad, 2003). An NGO informant commented that the experience induced by the critical incidents was that the oil and gas companies nally understood that they needed a more sophisticated practise with stakeholders i.e. NGOs, media and the general public when it came to affairs that took place on the international arena[15]. To Hydro and Statoil the critical incidents threatened the companies identity as a trustworthy partner (a Shell statement) and as we in Statoil based on openness and trust (Statoil business values) and a passion for social commerce (stated in Hydros business values). The companies needed a more proactive approach to social issues, and an important tool in the process of bridging the gap between the companies and actors outside the inner business sphere. Informants in Statoil emphasise the importance of being noticeable as a deliberate ethical company after the Horton scandal[16]. Social and ethical resources and capabilities may thus be seen as a source of competitive advantage in a process of moral decision-making and the social dialogue with stakeholders. Some of the corporate citizenship initiatives have taken the oil and gas companies into entirely new areas of activity and have given rise to operational and procedural innovations. For example, Statoil and its major Norwegian trade union have established an agreement on a range of human rights and environmental concerns, dening a common vision and agenda. Statoil has recently worked together with researchers from Russia and in Econ Poyry (a Nordic consulting rm in the eld of economic analysis) and other local institutions in order to develop institutional frameworks that encourage knowledge dissemination through collaboration and social dialogue in the Arctic areas (Mikkelsen and Langhelle, 2008). The critical events of the 1990s encouraged the establishment of the Global Compact, where the UN and a diverse range of governmental and non-governmental groups convened and developed practical projects that addressed human rights, labour and environmental issues. After a period of damage control, the critical incidents of the last decades seem to have speeded up the number and forms of exchange institutions and standards through which CSR ideas and solutions may be mediated. These include corporate citizenship initiatives such as the UN Global Compact[17], AccountAbility 1000S[18] and the Sullivan Principles[19]. The informants in the companies reported that the shareholders as stakeholders were increasingly considering the social and environmental performance of companies alongside nancial returns, and that there was evidence that social and environmental risk can bring substantial costs[20]. They argue that reputation and value captured by brands increasingly require companies to be transparent in their activities and to demonstrate a commitment to good practice across human rights, labour and environmental issues. Having trustworthiness and being a good company is reported as intertwined with having a good risk management system. On this basis the companies became active members in the Global Compact and other corporate citizenship initiatives where knowledge transfer between companies and branches was a main goal.

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Table II shows how the Norwegian oil and gas companies are actively supporting and participating in corporate citizenship initiatives. The support is given through membership, written support in codes of conduct and management principles, and through participating in meetings and learning forums. This may be interpreted as a step away from exclusively duciary duties towards shareholders as was held by conventional views of the rm, and towards an integrative perspective to CSR. In an integrative perspective there is a normative core where the interests of all affected stakeholders should be balanced towards each other. In line with an instrumental perspective of CSR where the companies take social responsibility because it pays, the informants report that the companies gave high priority to responding to the inquiries from for example FTSE4Good[21]. Both companies gave high priority to being represented in each of the initiatives they had attended. In each case the hierarchical level at which the company should be represented was discussed. On some occasions such as top meetings of the WBCSD[22] the CEO was expected to be present. The informants emphasised that issues at operational level and company specic actions to implement the principles in the organisations were left to informal talks between the participants or not discussed across companies at all. Concrete information and sensitive issues were communicated with the stakeholders directly, not with competitive organisations. Many of the dilemmas of the oil and gas companies still exist. An informant in Statoil said:
The basic dilemmas are still there: how to deal with partners, like some of our host governments, that reject our business principles and use our oil revenues as a major source of nancial support for undemocratic regimes. We are still in these African countries, and we should not have been there. However, if any company should have an activity there, it may as well be us.

The internationalisation of the Norwegian petroleum industry marks a new era. The rst step in this direction was the BP-Statoil Alliance in 1990, which focused on exploration and production in the former Soviet Union, Angola, Nigeria, Vietnam and China. Although the alliance was dissolved in 1999, Statoil intensied their efforts to establish themselves on the international arena with the acquisition of the Irish oil company Aran in 1995. Hydro Oil & Gas chose the same strategy and joined Statoil when they in 2006 tried to gain access to oil elds in Venezuela and capture a large share in the Russian eld, Stochman. Both of these initiatives failed, but in 2007 Statoil and Hydro Oil & Gas merged as part of a strategy to compete in the international arena. The establishment in 2007 of StatoilHydro indicates the ambition of the Norwegian oil industry of entering the international energy arena. The oil companies and main suppliers compare their performance against international energy rms, and Norwegian politicians and administrative representatives appear to have accepted the premise that Norwegian petroleum competence is an export item that must be competitive on international markets. Accordingly, both companies in this study have today developed a common ofcial CSR policy and spend a great amount of resources convincing their stakeholders that ethical and social issues are taken care of wherever they operate. Even though dilemmas still exist, it is necessary for the company to report whether they are able to act in accordance with their Table II An overview of the initiatives supported by the Norwegian oil and gas companies
Hydro Global Compact AccountAbility 1000 Explicit support to the ILO Conventions ISO14000 Series The Global Reporting Initiative Social Accountability 8000 BLIHR WBCSD Kompakt (Norway) Transparency International Statoil

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CSR policy or not. The ndings reported in this study indicate that the critical incidents to some extent have resulted in larger transparency in the Norwegian oil business. We may also claim that stakeholders such as NGOs and media are being considered more seriously and have increased their inuence on how the companies may further develop their CSR policy in the future. However the oil and gas industry are subjected to greater scrutiny than other industrial sectors. It can thus be difcult to draw general conclusions from the ndings. However, the impacts of critical incidents as reported here have some general features. The most important effect is as previously mentioned, the impact on transparency.

Concluding discussion
One main nding in this study is that the Norwegian oil companies reported were being taken by surprise. This is interesting because in all cases early warnings were given. What can explain this kind of inertia? A possible explanation is that the traditional risk management techniques revolving around efciency failed to predict all the critical events. Such techniques concern shareholders revenue only. In the situations that led up to the different critical events, the top managers may have believed that they were carrying out legally and morally justiable operations and underestimated the risks connected to the actions. An alternative interpretation is that the warning signals were not strong enough to inuence the behaviour of the responsible persons. Furthermore, limited local competence and understanding of the cultural and political movements of the host countries may also have enforced the lack of awareness. The knowledge transfer system did not function well enough. The surprise element of the crisis and the conviction that we are doing the right thing seem to reduce the importance of new tools within the companies such as ethical helplines or informative written materials. When a Statoil representative said that since the responsible persons of the Iran corruption scandal have been removed, we no longer have a problem, this may be interpreted as full condence in Statoils competence to handle any new situation and full condence that CSR principles are fully implemented in the organisation. The question to be discussed in companies and a subject for future research is thus how far it is reasonable to rely on written codes of conduct and the formal structures ability to govern and give direction to employees behaviour in operations. Moreover we have to ask whether informal norms, procedures and insufcient interpretative competence that are not in accordance with the CSR principles are still widespread or exist in the companies. The critical incidents reported here were too serious and thus resulted in new decision-making and reformulation of corporate strategies. Knowledge about the issues and the construction of the reality of the different stakeholders was transferred between companies, NGOs and civil society. In all cases the strategy of the decision makers was changed. The new CSR policies were also reected in extended annual reporting on corporate responsibility (Statoil and Hydro). Furthermore, all companies developed new departments exclusively handling CSR issues. In Statoil this department tripled its capacity in a year and a half after the Iran-Horton scandal. To a large extent this case study conrms the content of the Ocasio and Hoffman model. The critical incidents in question satised two important necessary conditions: 1. they emphasise that the strength and content of internal and external examination have decisive signicance whether the critical incidents are being noticed or not; and 2. they state that institutional arrangements play a prominent role in initial attention to the incident. Our study indicates that the incidents dependent on the degree of seriousness and uncertainty can be seen as catalysts for the emergence of a new CSR policy. The new CSR policy is expressed in the patterns of social behaviour. This implies participating in diverse social networks, partnerships and learning forums. This also implies that CSR behaviour is thus socially constructed in the interaction between company, NGOs, media and business networks.

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CSR behaviour embodies signicant ethical values and ideas such as sustainable development, responsibility, trustworthiness and transparency. Our ndings reveal these values and ideas to be synonymous with avoiding threatening protests from campaigning NGOs. The main focus of the organisations was to deal with uncertainty and to demonstrate that the company lives up to environmental expectations and social impacts. This dealing with uncertainty was rst organised as a communication process within the companies, relying on the companies own experts. Later on, the communication process shifted from internal to external in dialogue and partnerships with NGOs that previously were mainly responsible for protests and campaigning. Our reported ndings indicate that the Norwegian oil companies strongly defend their reputation when critical incidents occur. The result is two types of actions: 1. to improve their reputation; and 2. to reorganise their activities to protect their future. This is what we in our model have denoted a new CSR policy. Future models on CSR may, however, not be a linear prolongation of the models of today. There may be institutional conditions that require reform if our society is to deal with the challenges of sustainable development. Although the informants (both Hydro and Statoil) in this study tell a longer story of how business ethics have been implemented in the companies code of conduct, and how the development of national and international regulations on the environment have had a great impact on the role and identities of the companies, major critical events have been decisive for the development of knowledge of CSR. The CSR concept is developed at the intersection between the public and private sectors and is based on the historical and political experience of the different industries, but it may help us to make a difference and contribute to the common good. Nevertheless, it seems clear that CSR emerges in the interceptions between market demands, legitimate and urgent inuence from the stakeholders and regulative pressure. In this case it also seems quite clear that the character of the critical incidents, the context and the existing images of the companies guide the focus of attention and the constructive process. However, only a small sample of events and companies has been investigated in this study. This makes it difcult to draw general conclusions. Furthermore we have not been able to fully cover the entire decision-making processes connected to the events, which implies that relevant explanatory factors concerning the outcomes may have been omitted. Accordingly, future research is needed on how legislation and government regulations affect a broader scale of different companies and how complex organisations manage individual and organisational challenges concerning all aspects of CSR. The latter indicates an intensied focus on different concepts of risk management. Distinguishing between technical, nancial and reputation risks and how organisations handle different concepts of risks when critical events occur will widen our understanding of how CSR develops and how it may explain organisational behaviour. We neither can nor want to give normative advice, but we strongly believe that these are challenges for future CSR managers in oil companies worldwide.

Notes
1. The study reported here was part of the research project Knowledge ows and organisational dynamics: Identifying the factors that enable or inhibit knowledge spillovers from the Norwegian oil and gas industry funded by the Norwegian Research Council as part of the Petropol programme. The study was designed to identify how knowledge about corporate social responsibility is developed and distributed to and from oil and gas companies. 2. By powerful positions we mean executive managers, top bureaucrats, politicians and NGO leaders in other words persons with the formal ability to inuence decisions. 3. Relevant available documents include annual reports of the actual companies, public reports on CSR policy of the actual companies and public documents on CSR issues.

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4. The project included in addition bauxite mining, an alumina renery, the construction of a railway, waste deposits, construction of roads and housing for workers moving in, and a coal power station and harbour facilities in the neighbour state of Andra Pradesh. 5. We have gone through almost all the editions of Dagens Nringsliv during the actual period (June 2003-May 2004). Almost all of the editions cover the Horton scandal. However, very little was reported from the internal handling of the case. To some extent Statoil managed to keep the door closed before it was decided to replace the top management. 6. Interview, Dagens Nringsliv, April 2004. 7. Interview with Head of CSR, Norsk Hydro. 8. Interview with CSR advisor, Statoil. 9. Reports, 2002-2003, Norwegian Church Aid. 10. Interview with CSR advisor, Norsk Hydro; interview with CRS Advisor, Statoil. 11. Interview with Amnesty International, Norway. Interview with The Red Cross, Norway. 12. It is worth mentioning that these agreements were looked upon with scepticism by Amnesty International headquarters in London. Shortly after our interview in June 2004, the agreement was evaluated and revised. 13. Interview, Norwegian Church Aid. 14. Interview, Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry. 15. Interview, Norwegian Church Aid. 16. Interview with CSR advisor, Statoil. 17. In an address to the World Economic Forum on 31 January 1999, the United Nations Secretary General Ko Annan challenged business leaders to join an international initiative the Global Compact that would bring companies together with UN agencies, labour and civil society to support nine (now ten) principles in the areas of human rights, labour, the environment, and anti-corruption (see www.unglobalcompact.org). 18. Accountability 1000S (AA1000S) is a standard and integrated management system intended to improve the accountability and overall performance of business rms by enhancing the quality of social and ethical accounting, auditing and reporting. The Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability facilitated the development of the standard. See www.AccountAbility.org.uk 19. The Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility is a code of conduct and provides a framework by which socially responsible companies can be aligned. Companies sign up to the principles and then report annually on their progress. See www.globalsullivanprinciples.org 20. Head of CSR, Statoil. 21. FTSE4Good is a set of four tradable indices for the UK, Europe, the USA and the world. The index screens companies against a range of indicators that are focused on the areas of environment, human rights and stakeholder relations. See www.ftse4good.com 22. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) is an international business network developing links between business, government and non-government organisations on sustainable development issues. See www.wbcsd.com

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About the authors

Ole Andreas Engen is Associate Professor at the University of Stavanger, Norway. He is afliated to SEROS (Centre for Risk Management and Societal Safety). Ole Andreas Engen is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: ole.a.engen@uis.no Aslaug Mikkelsen is Professor at the University of Stavanger, Norway. Currently, she is Rector at the University of Stavanger. Kjell Grnhaug is Professor at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Norway.

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