MA NGOK

Value Changes and Legitimacy Crisis in Post-industrial Hong Kong

A B S T R AC T

Social, political, and economic changes in post-industrial Hong Kong brought a less instrumental view of democracy, more skepticism against the neoliberal regime, and more support for post-materialist values. The changing values make the old legitimacy formula obsolete, creating a legitimacy crisis for the undemocratic, business-dominated, and low-interventionist government.
K E Y W O R D S : post-materialism, legitimacy crisis, value changes, democracy, Hong Kong politics

Social, economic, and political changes in Hong Kong in recent decades have led to value changes toward a less instrumental view of democracy, more skepticism about the prevailing neoliberal ideology, and more support for post-materialist values. These value changes have called into question the legitimacy of the current business-dominated, semi-democratic regime of Hong Kong, leading to more challenges to government legitimacy in 200910. Based on various surveys on political values, this paper traces the major processes of value change in Hong Kong in recent years. For years, Hong Kongs legitimacy formula relied upon political values in the colonial era, including an instrumental view of democracy, belief in the openness thesis of neoliberal ideology, and the primacy of materialist values. But years of political change and democracy movements meant that Hong Kong people have begun to see democracy in terms of equal political rights, which makes them less content with the inequality and semi-democratic nature of the
Ma Ngok is Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Public Administration, Chinese University of Hong Kong. He wishes to thank Olivia Kwan and Ting Wang-liang for their research assistance, and the Faculty of Social Science and the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, for supporting related research. Email: <mangok@cuhk.edu.hk>. Asian Survey, Vol. 51, Number 4, pp. 683712. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. 2011 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Presss Rights and Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2011.51.4.683.
683

684 A S i A N S u R V E Y 5 1 : 4

current regime. Economic restructuring into a post-industrial economy increased income inequality, reduced mobility, and made more people doubt the neoliberal myth and question the legitimacy of the business-dominated regime. In order for Hong Kong to emerge from its legitimacy crisis, the change in political values requires a more fundamental change in governing ideology, state-society relations, and political institutions.
T H E L E G i T i M AC Y O F T H E A N T E C E D E N T R E G i M E

Regime legitimacy depends on basic allegiance from its subjects, which in turn is conditioned upon affection for and positive evaluation of the system, its input processes, and policy outputs.1 Colonial Hong Kong was born with an inherent legitimacy problem. As a non-elected polity imposed from abroad proffering only a low level of welfare, Hong Kongs colonial government nonetheless managed to elicit basic allegiance from its Chinese subjects for most of its history from 1842 to 1997. There have been different explanations for the regime legitimacy of colonial Hong Kong. Scott claimed that the colonial regime was in repeated legitimacy crises after 1842, when China was forced to cede Hong Kong Island to the British following the First Opium War. In Scotts view, the recurring crisis was resolved each time by enlarging the circle of elites, gradually building a more inclusive corporatist regime.2 Corporatism as a legitimacy formula was a recurrent theme in Hong Kong studies: Ambrose Kings administrative absorption of politics formulation saw colonial legitimacy as rooted in a synarchy between colonial bureaucrats and appointed Chinese elites.3 Potential opposition from Chinese society was pacified by appointing key Chinese elite members into fringes of the decision-making structure, and by granting them colonial honors. A prevalent explanation for colonial stability amid rapid development in post-World War Two years was the political passivity of the Hong Kong Chinese. Lau Siu-kai saw postwar Hong Kong as a refugee society of immigrants from China who harbored utilitarian familism, putting material
1. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (London: Sage, 1989). 2. Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989). 3. Ambrose King, Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grassroot Level, Asian Survey 15:5 (May 1975), pp. 42239.

M A / H O N G K O N G - C H i N A S H i F T i N G VA L u E S 6 8 5

interests and family values above social ideals. Lau saw the amorphous Chinese society and the colonial bureaucracy as being boundary conscious; both sides shared a tacit understanding of mutual non-intervention, resulting in a minimally-integrated social-political system that nurtured little political participation.4 Because Chinese society was content with a low level of welfare and had no expectations for democracy under colonialism, the legitimacy of the colonial regime was seldom called into question. Goodstadt and Ngo concurred that the economic strategy of low intervention was an important part of the colonial legitimacy formula, as the British found it difficult to adjudicate competing demands for subsidies and intervention from the business sectors, and preferred to stay aloof.5 Although the business sector had dominating political influence, the Hong Kong public believed that the colonial regime could separate public interest from private profits and was not too predatory. Sing asserted that the colonial regime based its legitimacy on performance. The Hong Kong people were content with being governed by a non-elected bureaucracy because the latter could deliver economic growth, protect freedom, and was corruption-free.6 The different narratives about the legitimacy basis of colonial Hong Kong share two common assumptions: that Hong Kong people were materialistic and pragmatic, and that they adopted an instrumental view of the governance of Hong Kong. Even if Hong Kong people did not agree with colonialism per se, they could accept living under a colonial government if it delivered good governance (Sings claim), if it was not overly predatory or interventionist (Goodstadt, Ngo, and Lau), and/or it could to a certain extent respond to public needs (Scott and King). The non-democratic political regime was acceptable because people believed it worked well, without seeing it in ideological terms. These narratives, however, could only explain why the Hong Kong Chinese acquiesced under colonialism, without really seeing the colonial regime as legitimate. As Przeworski put it, a regime does not suffer from a legitimacy crisis if no credible alternative is provided for the
4. Lau Siu-kai, Society and Politics in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1984). 5. Ngo Tak-wing, Colonialism in Hong Kong Revisited, in Ngo Tak-wing, ed., Hong Kongs History: State and Society under Colonial Rule (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 116; Leo Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners: The Conflict between PUBLIC INTERESTS and PRIVATE PROFIT in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004). 6. Sing Ming, Democratization and Economic Development: The Anomalous Case of Hong Kong, Democratization 3:3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 34359.

686 A S i A N S u R V E Y 5 1 : 4

citizens.7 Before the 1980s, most Hong Kong people bought into the Hong Kong as a lifeboat concept: rocking the boat would only mean falling into the sea of Communist China.
T H E T W i N P i L L A R S O F P O S T- C O L O N i A L L E G i T i M AC Y

When decolonization started in the 1980s, Hong Kong started looking for a new legitimacy formula. With colonialisms imminent departure, the colonial masters found their authority rapidly depreciating. Decolonization and gradual democratization politicized Hong Kong society, with Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong after 1997 now a plausible alternative. Popular elections could have served as a new basis of legitimacy after 1997, but hopes for full democracy were quickly dashed by an unholy alliance of the Chinese government, British government, and local business conservatives. The Basic Law instituted only a semi-democratic regime, with business and professional elites heavily represented. The chief executive (CE) is elected by an Election Committee, which is elected by a narrow franchise including most major business and professional groups. The proportion of popularly elected seats in the Legislative Council (Legco) increased very gradually from 30% in 1991 to 50% in 2004; the other half was elected by functional constituencies (FCs) that represent the major business and professional groups. The Basic Law stipulates that the CE and the Legco would ultimately be fully elected by universal suffrage, yet no concrete timetable has been offered. This partial democratic formula was compatible with political values during the transition era. Surveys in the 1980s showed that while a majority of Hong Kong people supported faster democratization, they could also accept government by elites and civil servants, and they harbored paternalistic values. Many respondents saw democracy not in procedural or institutional terms but as a government that would consult public opinion, or as an instrument to ensure efficient government in order to bring about stability and prosperity.8 In other words, the Hong Kong people had a partial vision of democracy, seeing it not in terms of ideas or rights but rather as an
7. Adam Przeworski, Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy, in Guillermo ODonnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 4763. 8. Kuan Hsin-chi and Lau Siu-kai, The Partial Vision of Democracy in Hong Kong: A Survey of Popular Opinion, China Journal 34 (July 1995), pp. 23964.

M A / H O N G K O N G - C H i N A S H i F T i N G VA L u E S 6 8 7

instrument to achieve pragmatic goals. If good governance, civil liberties, and clean government could be maintained, Hong Kong people would be content with a partially democratic regime.9 The Hong Kong people were also notorious for their low level of participation and low political efficacy. Surveys in the 1980s showed that although they actively consumed political news, levels of organizational political participation were very low; hence, the people were labeled as attentive spectators.10 Lau and Kuan attributed this low participation to a low sense of political efficacy: years of serving as colonial subjects made many believe that they had little say in government affairs. This brought weak mobilization in support of the democracy movement, in turn weakening the bargaining power of the democrats vis--vis the Chinese government. Both the attentive spectators and partial vision narratives saw the political values of Hong Kong people as instrumental and pragmatic. In these narratives, Hong Kong people supported democracy not because of its intrinsic value or as a principle of societal or political organization, but because they believed it could deliver good governance and defend their way of life. Even if they supported democracy, they considered their participation inconsequential in bringing about its fruition, and many preferred to stay away and free-ride. Because they did not see a democratic system as a natural right, they could settle for a partial democratic reform before and after 1997. On top of the partial-democratic system, the Basic Law enshrines a neoliberal economic regime that perpetuates the pre-1997 low-welfare and lowinterventionist regime. Hong Kong has long been regarded as the last bastion of free market ideology. Rapid economic advancement in postwar years made many Hong Kong people believe that non-interventionism was the best philosophy of economic governance, and adherence to free market principles was the key to Hong Kongs economic miracle. For those who had fled from mainland China to Hong Kong, socialism was associated with the command economy that had caused economic havoc in China, and the overpoliticized Communist regime that was the antithesis of free-wheeling Hong Kong. During the political transition preceding 1997, stability and prosperity were hailed as collective goals of Hong Kong, as a conservative, procapitalist ideology was consolidated.
9. Ibid. 10. Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, The Attentive Spectators: Political Participation of the Hong Kong Chinese, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 14:1 (Spring 1995), pp. 324.

688 A S i A N S u R V E Y 5 1 : 4

For decades, neoliberal ideology in Hong Kong was justified on the grounds that it provides equal opportunity. Surveys in the 1980s showed that the Hong Kong people in general, and the middle class in particular, bought into the dictums of equal opportunity, upward mobility, and selfreliance within the Hong Kong capitalist order. The Social Indicators Surveys (SIS)11 in the 1980s showed that more than 80% of respondents thought Hong Kong was a land of opportunities with adequate chances for upward mobility.12 A similar proportion believed that one could change ones fortunes by working hard, and that ones economic fortunes were largely determined by individual hard work and education.13 The better-educated and higher-salaried professionals had more confidence in this openness thesis, largely, because they were the winners in the competitive game.14 Lau and Kuans survey in 1988 showed 57.5% of respondents agreeing with the governments laissez-faire policy.15 Because quite a few in Hong Kong did improve their living standards through hard work and improved education during the economic take-off, economic inequality under Hong Kongs neoliberal regime was legitimized by equal opportunity and open chances of upward mobility. Hong Kongs neoliberal economic regime was institutionalized and made official ideology by the Basic Law. Driven by the concept of fiscal constitution,16 the Basic Law stipulates low tax rates (Article 107), a balanced budget (Article 107), free flow of capital and no foreign exchange
11. The SISs were a long-term collaborative project by Hong Kong social scientists since 1988. Through biennial territory-wide surveys, the project focused on subjective indicators such as perceptions, behavioral tendencies, values, beliefs, and sense of well-being, and explored their implications for the social development of Hong Kong. 12. Wong Wai-pong, Inequality, Stratification, and Mobility, in Lau Siu-kai, Lee Ming-kwan, Wan Po-san, and Wong Siu-lun, eds., Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1988 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1991), p. 161; Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, The Ethos of Hong Kong Chinese (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1988), pp. 6365. 13. Lau and Kuan, The Ethos of Hong Kong Chinese, p. 64; Wong, Inequality, Stratification, and Mobility, pp. 16061. 14. Thomas Wong, Personal Experience and Social Ideology: Thematization and Theorization in Social Indicator Studies, in Lau Siu-kai, Lee Ming-kwan, Wan Po-san, and Wong Siu-lun, eds., Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1990 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992), p. 211. 15. Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, Public Attitude toward Laissez-faire in Hong Kong, Asian Survey 30:8 (1990), pp. 76781. 16. Fiscal constitution is defined as to impose legally and morally binding constitutional rules so as to limit the governments fiscal capacity and its interference in the private sector. See Tang

M A / H O N G K O N G - C H i N A S H i F T i N G VA L u E S 6 8 9

controls (Articles 112 and 115), and free port status and free trade (Articles 114 and 115) in the post-1997 economic regime.17 The legitimacy of the post-1997 political and economic regime relied on an instrumental and partial view of democracy by the Hong Kong people, and belief in the fairness of a lowintervention economic system. The following sections will show how political, social, and economic changes in the past 20 years gradually transformed political values in Hong Kong, leading to the crumbling of these twin pillars of the legitimacy of the post-1997 regime.
C H A N G i N G D E M O C R AT i C VA L u E S : TO WA R D L E S S i N S T R u M E N TA L V i E W S

The democracy movement in the 1980s more or less tried to cope strategically with the instrumental view of the Hong Kong people at the time. The democrats major argument for the necessity of democracy after 1997 was that it is the best system to guarantee autonomy, freedom, and rule of law. In other words, a popularly elected government was more likely to stave off intervention from Beijing and defend Hong Kongs way of life, or in a popular phrase at the time, minju kanggong (resist communism by democracy). Political development in the new century changed the nature of support for democracy and enhanced the sense of political efficacy of the Hong Kong people. The turning point was July 1, 2003, when 500,000 Hong Kong citizens (more than 7% of the population) took to the streets to protest against the impending enactment of the National Security Ordinance. Based on Article 23 of the Basic Law, the proposed legislation outlawed acts related to sedition, secession, theft of state secrets, and other political acts deemed threatening to the national security of China. Human rights groups and legal professionals criticized the draft legislation as too imprecise and liable to abuse by the authorities.18 The post-1997 economic downturn and various governance problems aroused anti-government sentiments, and the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in spring 2003 plunged Hong Kongs economy to a historic low. The July rally was a grand outburst against government failure, driven by the fear of loss of freedom.
Shu-hung, Fiscal Constitution, Income Distribution, and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, Economy and Society 20:3 (August 1991), p. 285. 17. Ibid. 18. See Ma Ngok, Civil Society in Self-Defense: The Struggle against National Security Legislation in Hong Kong, Journal of Contemporary China 14:44 (August 2005), pp. 46582.

690 A S i A N S u R V E Y 5 1 : 4

The show of peoples power forced withdrawal of the bill and the resignation of two unpopular bureau secretaries, sparking a rebirth of the democracy movement. In the years that followed, the July 1 rally became an annual demonstration of peoples power, where political and civil society groups staged a plethora of demands, including the recurrent theme of full democracy. Research after 2003 showed that the original July rally was a major turning point in political values, empowering people, spurring participation, and bringing renewed support for democracy. A comparison of the 2001 and 2007 Asian Barometer (AB)19 survey results showed an increased sense of political efficacy. In 2001, less than 5% of those surveyed said they thought they had the ability to participate in politics. The proportion rose to 10.4% in the 2007 AB survey. The proportion who disagreed that politics and government seem so complicated that people like me could not understand rose from 15.3% in 2001 to about 20% in 2007. The percentage that said they are interested in politics increased from 17.6% in 2001 to 24% in 2007 (see Table 1). The political efficacy of Hong Kong was still low compared to other Asian regions, but a small contingent of active participants began to emerge. Focus group research showed that the July 1 experience was one of empowerment: participants gained the confidence to participate in future social actions, bringing to the fore a core of activists who were no longer attentive spectators.20 After 1997, the democrats seldom asserted minju kanggong, the notion that democracy is a tool to fend off intervention from China, probably in part for reasons of political correctness. Instead, they attributed governance failures, business-government collusion, and low responsiveness to public needs to the undemocratic and business-dominated nature of the regime. The 2003 National Security Legislation saga, when the government tried to push unpopular legislation through a partly elected legislature, gave the democrats much ammunition to convince Hong Kong people that a non-democracy could easily imperil civil liberties they had long cherished. These are still all instrumental arguments about democracy. During the 2003 movements, the main slogan was sovereignty to the people, alluding to the key concept in Western democratic ideology. This
19. The AB is the longest, most systematic, and most comprehensive cross-national survey on political attitudes in Asia. With surveying teams in 17 different polities, the project has conducted longitudinal surveys with the same battery of core questions on values and attitudes on democracy and citizens action. See <www.asiabarometer.org>. 20. Francis Lee and Joseph M. Chan, Making Sense of Participation: The Political Culture of Pro-democracy Demonstrators in Hong Kong, China Quarterly 193 (March 2008), pp. 84101.

M A / H O N G K O N G - C H i N A S H i F T i N G VA L u E S 6 9 1

table 1. Political Efficacy: Hong Kong 2001 and 2007

How Interested Are You in Politics? Very Interested Somewhat Interested Not Very Interested Not at All Interested DK/NA

2001 survey (N = 811) 2007 survey (N = 849)

1.6 2.9

16.0 21.1

55.1 53.6

25.9 20.1

1.4 2.2

I Think I Have the Ability to Participate in Politics. Strongly Agree Somewhat Agree Somewhat Disagree Strongly Disagree DK/NA

2001 survey (N = 811) 2007 survey (N = 849)

0.1 0.2

3.8 10.2

80.4 63.7

11.3 19.6

4.3 6.3

Sometimes Politics and Government Seem So Complicated That a Person Like Me Cant Really Understand. Strongly Agree Somewhat Agree Somewhat Disagree Strongly Disagree DK/NA

2001 survey (N = 811) 2007 survey (N = 849)

6.9 9.8

73.1 66.0

14.9 19.2

0.4 0.7

5.3 4.4

source: AB surveys, Hong Kong, 2001 and 2007. note: DK = dont know; NA = no answer or dont understand.

quickly drew criticism from Beijing, where officials charged that peoples sovereignty was a separatist slogan.21 As a result, sovereignty to the people was used less frequently. The democrats began to argue that election by universal suffrage is a basic human right. In debates or meetings in the Legco,
21. In Chinas official ideology, the Communist Party represents all the people of China, and they delegate part of the power to the Hong Kong government. In this official rhetoric, Hong Kongs sovereignty handover in 1997 was already sovereignty to the people. To Beijing, demanding sovereignty to the Hong Kong people is tantamount to seeing Hong Kong as a separate political entity deriving its sovereignty from the Hong Kong people, which smacks of separatism.

692 A S i A N S u R V E Y 5 1 : 4

pro-democracy legislators repeatedly questioned government officials as to how current electoral arrangements could be considered compatible with the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),22 which sees universal and equal suffrage as a basic right. This usually put officials in a difficult situation because they are reluctant to admit that Hong Kong falls short of ICCPR standards but cannot deny the inequality of the current CE and Legco elections. In 2008, about 213,000 electors, members of various business and professional groups, elected 30 legislators through the FCs, while about 3.2 million general electors elected another 30. This means that an FC voters vote is worth about 15 times that of a general voter.23 In the 2007 Green Paper on Constitutional Development, the Hong Kong government admitted that electing the CE and Legco by universal suffrage was a constitutional goal that must ultimately be attained. The question is how and when.24 In the 2009 consultation on constitutional reform, Chief Secretary Henry Tang admitted that the current FC system falls short of the requirements of universal and equal suffrage as required by the ICCPR.25 The changing narratives and political movements after 1997 brought value changes to democracy in Hong Kong. The AB surveys tested various aspects of political values, including support for paternalism, authoritarian alternatives, a moral state, political pluralism, political equality, and checks and balances. In Tables 2A2C, I compute E as the percentage who agree with the authoritarian alternative minus the percentage who disagree; a smaller E implies a higher support for democracy. The result shows that by 2007, Hong Kong people had very little support for the authoritarian alternatives: only 4.5% concurred with letting the military rule (down from 5.7% in the 2001 AB survey), 10.9% agreed with abolishing the legislature and holding
22. Article 39 of the Basic Law stipulates that the provisions of the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong before 1997 shall remain in force and be implemented through the laws of Hong Kong. The legal sector has long argued that Hong Kong has a constitutional duty to have all policies and institutions meet ICCPR standards. 23. For detailed arrangements and various problems of the FC system, see Ma Ngok, Twenty Years of Functional Elections in Hong Kong: Exclusive Corporatism or Alternative Democratic Form? Representation 45:4 (November 2009), pp. 42133; and Christine Loh and Civic Exchange, eds., Functional Constituencies: A Unique Feature of the Hong Kong Legislative Council (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006). 24. Hong Kong government, Green Paper on Constitutional Development (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government, 2007), Sections 1.05 and 1.06. 25. Sing Tao Daily News, December 19, 2009, p. A13.

table 2. Agreement to Authoritarian Alternatives table 2a. Support for Military Rule

The Military Should Govern. Philippines Thailand Korea Singapore Indonesia Vietnam Japan Malaysia HK

Taiwan

Mongolia

Strongly agree (A) Somewhat agree (B) Somewhat disagree (C) Strongly disagree (D) DK/NA

(A + B) (C + D)

0.7 5.5 58.0 30.2 5.7 82.0

4.0 7.7 36.4 47.0 4.9 71.7

7.8 16.6 24.6 48.4 2.6 48.6

4.8 14.9 37.1 34.2 9.0 51.6

1.2 3.5 39.5 51.0 4.8 85.8

0.3 3.9 47.5 44.9 3.5 88.2

2.5 27.2 52.6 9.8 7.9 32.7

4.0 20.0 39.3 24.8 12.0 40.1

1.4 2.9 14.0 77.3 4.4 87.0

2.1 7.6 51.1 36.5 2.7 77.8

0.4 4.1 49.9 37.6 8.0 83.0

table 2b. Support for Strong Leader

Should Get Rid of Parliament and Elections and Have a Strong Leader Decide Things. Philippines Thailand Korea Singapore Indonesia Vietnam Japan Malaysia HK

Taiwan

Mongolia

Strongly agree (A) Somewhat agree (B) Somewhat disagree (C) Strongly disagree (D) DK/NA

(A + B) (C + D)

1.8 15.0 58.8 17.3 7.1 59.3

25.5 35.4 22.7 13.1 3.2 25.1

16.5 22.0 27.8 30.8 3.0 20.1

5.8 16.0 40.6 28.1 9.4 46.9

2.6 9.4 48.7 34.0 5.3 70.7

1.0 8.5 52.0 34.2 4.4 76.7

2.5 7.3 70.2 13.4 6.8 73.8

3.7 8.0 38.8 37.3 12.2 64.4

2.6 12.4 36.9 41.6 6.5 63.5

11.1 21.6 38.5 24.7 4.1 30.5

0.5 10.4 62.0 16.8 10.4 68.0

table 2c. Support for One-Party Rule

Only One Political Party Is Allowed to Stand for Election and Hold Office.
Philippines Thailand Korea Singapore Indonesia Vietnam Japan Malaysia HK

Taiwan

Mongolia

Strongly agree (A) Somewhat agree (B) Somewhat disagree (C) Strongly disagree (D) DK/NA

(A + B) (C + D)

0.9 10.3 61.6 21.3 5.9 71.7

10.6 16.4 38.3 32.1 2.6 43.4

12.7 20.4 30.8 33.8 2.3 31.5

5.5 12.2 40.2 32.9 9.2 55.4

1.2 5.9 44.6 43.2 5.1 80.7

1.1 6.4 52.2 36.0 4.4 80.7

1.1 7.1 70.3 16.8 4.7 78.9

15.8 39.3 25.6 9.1 10.3 20.4

0.9 8.7 32.7 50.4 7.2 73.5

5.3 14.1 45.3 31.0 4.3 57.0

0.5 6.1 64.8 18.7 9.9 76.9

source: Ibid. to Table 1, Wave II.

M A / H O N G K O N G - C H i N A S H i F T i N G VA L u E S 6 9 5

elections for a strong leader (down from 15.3% in 2001), and only 6.6% liked one-party dominance (down from 23.0% in 2001). Comparing the E values, Hong Kong has a higher rejection rate for authoritarian alternatives than most Asian states, at a level similar to that of the regions established democracies (e.g., Japan and South Korea) (see Tables 2A2C). Hong Kong also had a lower support level for paternalism and the moral state than most Asian states except Taiwan and Japan. Hong Kong is more inclined to pluralism and checks and balances than many other states, inferior only to Japan and South Korea, with Vietnam and Indonesia at a similar level. The support for political equality was lower than that of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam, but almost 80% of respondents agreed that less-educated people should have as much say as the more-educated. All in all, the AB figures showed that by 2007 Hong Kong evinced stronger support for democratic values than many electoral democracies in Asia, behind only a few modernized and consolidated democracies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) (see Tables 3A3E). The enhanced support for democracy has several implications. The partial vision of democracy thesis posits that Hong Kong people can settle for halfbaked reforms because they see democracy in instrumental terms, and if the political goods can be delivered by an undemocratic system, they can live with the status quo. As more and more people in Hong Kong conceive democracy in terms of political rights or equality, they are less likely to accept partial democracy. If full democracy is not delivered, the pursuit of it will continue. Second, performance legitimacy is not sufficient when the people adopt a less instrumental view. They would continue to demand procedural legitimacy in policy-making, including democratic policy-making and government borne by election. Third, for want of procedural legitimacy, government decisions are liable to challenge by civil society mobilization. Although the government controls the majority in the Legco, societal mobilization against unpopular decisions would aggravate the governments legitimacy problems.
ECONO M iC C HA N G E S A N D T H E P E Ri S H i N G O F T H E N E O Li B E R A L M Y T H

In the 1980s, the Hong Kong people were so confident in the fairness of the neoliberal regime that its principles were elevated to constitutional status in the Basic Law. However, economic restructuring since the 1980s has gradually weakened the credibility of the open thesis of neoliberal ideology. Since the 1980s, Hong Kongs manufacturing industries have moved north of the border

table 3. Support for Democratic Values table 3a. Political Equality (E)

People with Little or No Education Should Have as Much Say in Politics as Highly Educated People. Philippines Thailand Korea Singapore Indonesia Vietnam Japan Malaysia HK

Taiwan

Mongolia

Strongly agree (A) Somewhat agree (B) Somewhat disagree (C) Strongly disagree (D) DK/NA

(A + B) (C + D) = E

17.3 69.0 9.8 0.6 3.4 75.9

23.6 31.5 20.4 21.5 2.9 13.2

28.8 31.3 23.3 15.3 1.5 21.5

35.4 40.1 15.3 4.4 4.8 55.8

21.8 65.3 8.8 1.5 2.6 76.8

11.2 59.5 17.0 10.0 2.4 43.7

11.1 68.3 17.1 1.0 2.5 61.3

52.3 35.0 3.3 2.8 6.7 81.2

36.1 52.6 6.0 0.7 4.7 82.0

36.8 48.3 11.3 1.6 2.0 72.1

10.8 69.8 12.7 0.9 5.7 67.0

note: The higher the value of E, the higher the support for political equality.

table 3b. Paternalism (P1)

Government Leaders Are Like the Head of a Family; We Should All Follow Their Decisions. Philippines Thailand Korea Singapore Indonesia Vietnam Japan Malaysia HK

Taiwan

Mongolia

Strongly agree (A) Somewhat agree (B) Somewhat disagree (C) Strongly disagree (D) DK/NA

(A + B) (C + D) = P1

1.5 24.1 63.5 7.0 3.9 44.9

31.2 40.2 19.4 6.9 2.1 45.1

20.2 35.8 30.0 12.9 1.2 13.1

14.6 39.8 29.4 9.6 6.6 15.4

3.9 32.5 50.0 10.1 3.5 23.7

9.7 46.8 34.9 6.4 2.2 15.2

6.2 67.5 21.8 1.0 3.5 50.9

36.4 37.3 16.4 2.6 7.4 54.7

0.6 23.3 48.7 20.5 6.9 45.3

13.1 48.9 28.5 5.7 3.8 27.8

0.9 28.3 58.5 4.2 8.0 33.6

note: The higher the value of P1, the higher the support for paternalism.

table 3c. Political Pluralism (PP1) table 3c1. Pluralism of Opinions

The Government Should Decide Whether Certain Ideas Should Be Allowed to Be Discussed in Society. Philippines Thailand Korea Singapore Indonesia Vietnam Japan Malaysia HK

Taiwan

Mongolia

Strongly agree (A) Somewhat agree (B) Somewhat disagree (C) Strongly disagree (D) DK/NA

(A + B) (C + D) = PP1

0.7 20.5 63.1 7.9 7.7 49.8

46.0 36.2 10.7 3.8 3.2 67.7

20.8 35.9 28.0 12.8 2.6 15.9

8.4 33.6 31.7 12.2 14.1 1.9

2.6 32.9 48.2 10.3 6.0 23.0

10.4 60.6 17.8 7.3 4.0 45.9

3.3 42.4 43.1 3.3 7.9 0.7

26.8 46.1 7.8 2.1 17.3 63.0

1.6 15.5 46.0 24.7 12.2 53.6

14.5 55.7 20.3 6.1 3.4 43.8

0.9 35.9 45.5 4.9 12.7 13.5

note: The higher the value of PP1, the lower the support for political pluralism.

table 3c2. Societal Pluralism (PP2)

Harmony of the Community Will Be Disrupted If People Organize Lots of Groups. Philippines Thailand Korea Singapore Indonesia Vietnam Japan Malaysia HK

Taiwan

Mongolia

Strongly agree (A) Somewhat agree (B) Somewhat disagree (C) Strongly disagree (D) DK/NA

(A + B) (C + D) = PP2

5.0 52.4 35.5 2.1 5.0 19.8

60.5 21.3 12.0 4.2 1.9 65.6

26.7 30.8 27.1 12.7 2.8 17.7

36.4 45.6 9.7 2.9 5.4 69.4

3.1 32.3 46.3 8.2 10.1 19.1

7.5 41.8 28.7 18.5 3.6 2.1

3.5 38.4 48.0 2.6 7.5 8.7

14.3 25.3 29.3 14.8 16.4 4.5

4.3 36.5 36.2 7.3 15.8 2.7

16.1 53.0 22.9 4.3 3.7 42.0

2.6 45.3 41.5 2.5 8.1 4.0

note: The higher the value of PP2, the lower the support for political pluralism.

table 3c3. Pluralism of Thoughts (PP3)

If People Have Too Many Different Ways of Thinking, Society Will Be Chaotic. Philippines Thailand Korea Singapore Indonesia Vietnam Japan Malaysia HK

Taiwan

Mongolia

Strongly agree (A) Somewhat agree (B) Somewhat disagree (C) Strongly disagree (D) DK/NA

(A + B) (C + D) = PP3

7.8 58.0 28.5 2.1 3.6 35.2

49.2 24.6 13.2 10.0 3.0 50.6

29.7 32.1 23.9 11.8 2.6 26.1

29.8 46.1 14.4 3.4 6.4 58.1

3.5 38.7 45.0 6.8 6.0 9.6

12.2 53.7 17.8 13.2 3.2 34.9

3.1 50.7 38.3 3.5 4.5 12.0

13.0 30.5 31.2 13.7 11.6 1.4

10.2 40.8 30.1 8.2 10.7 12.7

17.2 52.2 22.9 3.9 3.7 42.6

5.2 53.0 33.8 2.5 5.5 21.9

note: The higher the value of PP3, the lower the support for political pluralism.

table 3d. Checks and Balances (CB)

If the Government Is Constantly Checked by the Legislature, It Cannot Possibly Accomplish Great Things. Philippines Thailand Korea Singapore Indonesia Vietnam Japan Malaysia HK

Taiwan

Mongolia

Strongly agree (A) Somewhat agree (B) Somewhat disagree (C) Strongly disagree (D) DK/NA

(A + B) (C + D) = CB

5.2 50.6 32.5 1.8 9.9 21.5

20.6 33.4 24.4 11.6 9.8 18.0

18.4 32.6 29.6 13.5 6.0 7.9

8.6 33.6 28.7 9.4 19.8 4.1

3.3 32.3 47.3 9.2 7.8 20.9

4.3 43.0 27.3 18.8 6.7 1.2

2.6 31.0 52.4 3.5 10.5 22.3

6.3 18.6 35.4 16.7 23.1 27.2

3.9 26.4 41.0 12.5 16.2 23.2

8.4 41.3 34.5 7.1 8.7 8.0

2.5 41.0 41.3 1.9 13.3 0.2

note: The higher the value of CB, the lower the support for checks and balances.

table 3e. Moral State (M)

If We Have Political Leaders Who Are Morally Upright, We Can Let Them Decide Everything. Philippines Thailand Korea Singapore Indonesia Vietnam Japan Malaysia HK

Taiwan

Mongolia

Strongly agree (A) Somewhat agree (B) Somewhat disagree (C) Strongly disagree (D) DK/NA

(A + B) (C + D) = M

2.5 30.3 56.1 6.4 4.8 29.7

44.6 33.9 12.2 5.6 3.8 60.7

23.2 34.0 27.4 12.9 2.5 16.9

22.6 43.6 21.9 3.9 7.9 40.4

13.7 48.5 28.9 5.4 3.5 27.9

7.8 48.9 22.9 17.4 3.0 16.4

3.4 40.0 47.0 5.2 4.1 8.8

20.5 39.4 20.6 9.9 9.6 29.4

3.4 29.5 41.1 13.4 12.6 21.6

9.3 39.4 40.0 7.2 4.1 1.5

1.2 32.5 51.2 5.9 9.2 23.4

source: Ibid. to Table 2. note: The higher the value of M, the higher the support for a moral state.

700 A S i A N S u R V E Y 5 1 : 4

figure 1. Rate of Unemployment and Self-employment, 19822009

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
9 19 5 9 19 6 9 19 7 9 19 8 9 20 9 0 20 0 0 20 1 0 20 2 0 20 3 0 20 4 0 20 5 0 20 6 0 20 7 0 20 8 09
Unemployment rate (not seasonally adjusted) (%) Self-employment rate

% of Population

source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, General Household Survey Section; and idem, Quarterly Report on GHS: October to December, 19822009.

in search of cheaper labor and land. Hong Kong began to transform into an international financial center, a logistics center, and an entrept feeding off Chinas phenomenal growth.26 The transformation into a post-industrial economy put Hong Kongs low-skilled labor at risk. The Asian financial crisis aggravated the situation, leading to drastic pay cuts and rising unemployment. Instead of reinforcing state action to help those affected by the crisis, the Hong Kong governments response was a renewed drive for neoliberalization.27 In the face of a burgeoning budget deficit and negative growth, the government accelerated marketization, subcontracting, and privatization, including privatizing more public assets to feed the financial market. This neoliberalization drive heightened job insecurity among middle class professionals, arousing strong protests from civil servants and public sector professionals. In the private sector, more corporations pursued slimmer and less hierarchical structures to cut costs, making many experienced middle/upper level managers redundant.28 Unemployment climbed from the lowest point of 2.2% in 1997 to the highest point of 7.9% in 2003, affecting almost all walks of the salaried class (see Figure 1).
26. See Stephen Chiu and Tai-lok Lui, Hong Kong: Becoming a Chinese Global City (Oxford: Routledge, 2009), chs. 2 and 3. 27. Chen Yun-chung and Pun Ngai, Neoliberalization and Privatization in Hong Kong after the 1997 Financial Crisis, China Review 7:2 (Fall 2007), pp. 6592. 28. Lui Tai-lok and Jimmy Wong, Xianggang zhongchan jiejji chujing guancha [Observations on Hong Kongs middle class] (Hong Kong: Joint Publishers, 2003), p. 120.

19

M A / H O N G K O N G - C H i N A S H i F T i N G VA L u E S 7 0 1

The share of flexible employment in the labor force increased, meaning less job security and more pressure on average employees.29 Income inequality increased as more people moved into the highest- and lowest-paying job levels simultaneously.30 The Gini coefficient of Hong Kong (for household income)31 rose from 0.451 in 1981 and 0.453 in 1986, to 0.476 in 1991, 0.518 in 1996, 0.525 in 2001, and 0.533 in 2006. By 2005, as many as 89% saw income inequality as very serious, up from 65% in 1992.32 The economic changes cast doubts on the openness thesis. Upward mobility was not guaranteed with hard work, as many in Hong Kong had chosen to believe, even for the well-educated middle class. Increased monopolization made it more difficult for small businesses to survive. Privatization of public housing malls gradually saw small proprietors driven out by drastic rent hikes and replaced by chain stores. Studying the subjective class identifications of Hong Kong people in the past 20 years, Zheng and Wong pointed out that 1997 was a watershed for the perception of social mobility.33 The percentage who defined themselves as lower class steadily increased after 1997, even during the economic rebound in 2005 (see Table 4). The less educated, who bore the brunt of the economic downturn after 1997, were the most pessimistic. In the 1988 and 1990 SISs, about 63% believed that their family living standard would be better after three years; the figures decreased to around 30% in surveys in 2001, 2004, and 200634 (see Table 5), a clear decrease in optimism about the prospects of mobility in the Hong Kong capitalist order.

29. Stephen W. K. Chiu, Alvin So, and May Tam Yeuk-mui, Flexible Employment in Hong Kong: Trends and Patterns in Comparative Perspective, Asian Survey 48:4 (July/August 2008), pp. 673702. 30. See Chiu and Lui, Hong Kong: Becoming a Chinese Global City, pp. 8588. 31. The Gini coefficient measures inequality of income distribution in a society, ranging from zero (totally equality) to one (total inequality). 32. Michael H. H. Hsiao and Wan Po-san, Minzhong gonggong xinren di bian yu bu bian: Taiwan yu Xianggang di bijiao 19912005 [Changes and changelessness of public trust: A comparison between Taiwan and Hong Kong in 19912005], in Wong Siu-lun, Wan Po-san, and Leung Sai-wing, eds., Xin shiji Huaren shehui mianmao: Shehui zhibiao de fenxi [The changing faces of Chinese societies in the new century: Analyses from social indicators] (Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008), p. 281. 33. Victor Zheng and Wong Siu-lun, Class, Mobility, and Social Transformation: Hong Kong before and after 1997, in Joseph Cheng, ed., The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in Its First Decade (Hong Kong: City University Press, 2007), pp. 495533. 34. Zheng and Wong, Social Trends: A Comparison of Subjective and Objective Indicators, in Leung, Wan, and Wong, eds., Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 2006, p. 272.

702 A S i A N S u R V E Y 5 1 : 4

table 4. Subjective Class Definition, 19882006

Lower Lower-Middle Class Middle Upper-middle class N

1988 1990 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2004 2006

24.3 19.2 20.1 21.6 18.4 19.3 23.5 23.6 26.5

35.8 38.0 35.5 36.0 35.4 35.8 33.8 33.8 34.5

35.2 38.0 39.3 38.6 42.0 41.2 39.0 39.0 35.6

4.7 4.9 5.1 3.8 4.3 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.3

1,554 1,810 1,896 2,183 2,042 3,116 3,909 3,133 3,135

source: Victor Zheng and Wong Siu-lun, Social Trends: A Comparison of Subjective and Objective Indicators, in Leung, Wan, and Wong, eds., Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 2006 (Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008), p. 277.

table 5. Expectations of Family Living Standard after Three Years, 19882006 (%)
Worse 1988 1990 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2004 2006 7.4 6.7 15.1 25.0 14.3 18.4 21.0 20.1 14.6 About the Same 29.5 30.5 31.7 40.4 43.1 46.0 46.9 49.9 52.7 Better 63.1 62.9 53.2 34.6 42.6 35.6 32.1 30.0 32.6 N 1,276 1,602 1,605 1,863 1,861 2,819 3,613 2,880 2,998

source: Ibid. to Table 4, p. 272.

More people began to question neoliberal dictums. In 1988, surveys found 58% agreed with the laissez-faire policy, while only 42% did in 1994. The 1999 SIS showed that 45% supported maintaining the positive noninterventionist policy, while 23% were opposed.35 More people began to
35. Note that the two surveys used different terms in the questionnaire: one used laissez-faire and one used positive non-interventionism. See Lau Siu-kai, Confidence in the Capitalist Society, in Lau Siu-kai, Lee Ming-kwan, Wan Po-san, and Wong Siu-lun, eds., Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1999 (Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001), p. 101.

M A / H O N G K O N G - C H i N A S H i F T i N G VA L u E S 7 0 3

question the fairness of the system. The 1999 SIS had 67% believing that Hong Kongs capitalist system allows fair competition, about 20% lower than the figures in the 1980s. The 1997 SIS had 56.7% agreeing that average employees were not treated fairly, 50% agreeing that there was not enough protection for workers, 77.8% agreeing that social welfare was not sufficient, and 63% considering wealth distribution in Hong Kong to be unfair (up from 57% in 1994).36 The changing perceptions of the capitalist system were accompanied by a rise in anti-neoliberal social movements after 1997, beginning with antiprivatization movements in the public sector, from civil servants, teachers, and other service professionals. A critical mass of anti-globalization and antiprivatization civil society groups coalesced over subsequent years, staging movements to counter the dominant neoliberal narrative, push for policy changes, and promote community self-help, gradually changing the discourses of local social movements. Two events best illustrated this value change. In 2004, the government decided to privatize car parks, shopping malls, and other facilities in public housing estates by putting these assets in a real estate investment trust (REIT) named The Link, and listing it on the stock exchange. Pressure groups of public housing tenants were adamant that privatization would drive up rents and then living costs. They took the government to court, accusing it of violating the Housing Ordinance, which guaranteed government provision of basic facilities for public housing tenants. The court action delayed listing of The Link, arousing vehement criticism from all corners. Most Hong Kong people saw the project as an ordinary public listing from which they could make a quick fortune in the under-priced initial public offering. Most did not see the pitfalls of privatization, choosing to believe the governments promise that it could bring better management. A couple of years after privatization, the public quickly found out the cruel fact of drastic rent hikes in Link-operated malls, which drove prices up and small proprietors out. This lent a big support to anti-privatization narratives
36. Ng Chun-hong and Thomas Wong, The Ethos of the Hong Kong People: Taking Stock in 1997, in Lau Siu-kai, Lee Ming-kwan, Wan Po-san, and Wong Siu-lun, eds., Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1997 (Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999), pp. 23353; Lau Siu-kai, Confidence in Hong Kongs Capitalist Society in the Aftermath of the Asian Financial Turmoil, Journal of Contemporary China 12:35 (May 2003), pp. 37386.

704 A S i A N S u R V E Y 5 1 : 4

and movements: many small shop owners joined in efforts to oppose rent hikes since 2007.37 The Sixth World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial conference, held in Hong Kong in December 2005, was hailed by the government as a major international event, a hallmark of Hong Kongs place in globalized capitalism. Protest groups from all over Asia clashed violently with the Hong Kong police, drawing the publics attention to the debate over globalization. The conference was a major rallying point for anti-globalization groups in Hong Kong. The widespread coverage and high-profile protests provided an unprecedented chance for the propaganda of the anti-neoliberal narratives.38 The governments persistent neoliberalism during the economic downturn made people question the political origins of its economic philosophy. Dissatisfaction with the business class increased, and more people saw their economic plight as originating from business dominance. The 1997 SIS showed 52% of respondents considered business people to be too powerful.39 In the 2006 SIS, when asked about the influence of business leaders on government policy, 44% said very big, 22% said big, while only about 5% thought the influence small or very small. As many as 82.4% of the respondents believed that there was government-business collusion, with 44% seeing the problem as serious or very serious. About 47% agreed that the government was unable to constrain the scramble for interests among business leaders.40 The diminishing credibility of the neoliberal ideology weakened the legitimacy of the political regime. The legitimacy of the low-intervention strategy and political privileges for the business sector hinges on the belief that the society benefited from it as a whole. This was in turn premised on the pragmatic and instrumental inclinations of the Hong Kong people, who were
37. For a collection and narratives of these movements, see <www.linkwatch.hk>, accessed on April 23, 2010. 38. See Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce, Defining Hong Kong as an Emerging Protest Space: The AntiGlobalisation Movement, in Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce and Gilles Guiheux, eds., Social Movements in China and Hong Kong (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 2009), pp. 91115; Hong Kong Peoples Alliance on Globalization, Chaoyue Xiao zhengfu Dashichang: Pipan xin ziyou zhuyi xianggang sheyun wenji [Beyond small government, big market: Hong Kong social movement essays in critique of neoliberalism] (Hong Kong: HKPA, 2006). 39. Ng and Wong, The Ethos of the Hong Kong People, p. 246. 40. Victor Zheng and Wong Siu-lun, Xianggang simin yishang yanshang di xintai [Hong Kong peoples skepticism and dislike of business], in Wong, Wan, and Leung, eds., Xin shiji Huaren shehui mianmao, p. 296.

M A / H O N G K O N G - C H i N A S H i F T i N G VA L u E S 7 0 5

willing to tolerate political and economic inequality in exchange for the perceived economic viability of the system. When both these pillars were weakened, the legitimacy of the business-dominated, non-elected regime was on shaky ground.
TO WA R D P O S T- M AT E R i A L i S M ?

Inglehart posited that a major trend of value change in advanced societies is from materialist to post-materialist values. With economic affluence, the stress on economic and physical security and bread-and-butter (materialist) issues in the industrial age gradually gives way to self-expression values and quality of life (post-materialism) issues in post-industrial societies. 41 The value change toward self-expression and post-materialism poses a challenge to authoritarian regimes. In established democracies, the value change drives the young generation to shun traditional forms of participation, such as voting and political parties, in favor of unconventional, expressive, and elitechallenging mass actions through loosely organized civic networks.42 The past narrative of Hong Kongs stability and legitimacy rests on the assumption of a materialist culture. With Hong Kong transforming into a post-industrial society since the 1980s, the young generation that grew up in relative affluence should focus less on economic security and more on postmaterialist values. However, the SISs in the 1990s showed only a minimal proportion of respondents who could be classified as post-materialists. The 1993 SIS classified only 0.3% of respondents as post-materialists, with the vast majority as mixed type.43 The 1995 SIS classified 0.6% as post-materialists.44 Based on the 1992 East Asian Middle Class survey, Hsiao and Wan classified 8.5% as post-materialists and 68% as mixed.45
41. Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). 42. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 116. 43. Ho Kwok-leung and Leung Sai-wing, Materialism and Political Attitude, in Lau Siu-kai, Lee Ming-kwan, Wan Po-san, and Wong Siu-lun, eds., Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1993 (Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1995), pp. 22957. 44. Ho Kwok-leung and Leung Sai-wing, Postmaterialism Revisited, in Lau Siu-kai, Lee Ming-kwan, Wan Po-san, and Wong Siu-lun, eds., Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1995 (Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997), pp. 33158. 45. H. H. Michael Hsiao and Wan Po-san, Hou wuzhi zhuyi de fuxia? Xianggang yu Taibei de Bijiao [The rise of post-materialism? A comparison between Hong Kong and Taipei], in Lau Siu-kai,

706 A S i A N S u R V E Y 5 1 : 4

Inglehart and Welzel argued that although modernization was the structural factor behind post-materialism, progress was not linear: historical events could bring sudden changes in values, leading to breakthroughs or retrogression.46 Events in 2003 served as accelerators in the value change toward post-materialism. The SARS epidemic, which took 299 lives in Hong Kong, plunged the whole city into economic and psychological distress. It aroused a renewed sense of community as the media and social organizations started campaigns to help medical professionals and victims. The 2004 SIS showed that many respondents agreed SARS made them care more about non-materialist aspects of life such as personal health, community hygiene, friends, and the meaning of life. Fewer said they were more concerned about work.47 About 81% agreed that the SARS epidemic made Hong Kong people more caring, and 53.5% agreed that the July 1 [2003] rally made Hong Kong people more united.48 A comparison of SISs in 1997 and 2006 showed that the public in the latter year paid more attention to issues such as pollution, education, and health services49 (see Tables 6 and 7). By 2006, 80% believed that the government should spend more money on environmental protection, the highest percentage of support among 13 policy areas.50 This value change brought movements for environmental and heritage protection, spurring a resuscitation of Hong Kong identity and more hatred against the business-dominated regime. In 2004, a movement against reclamation of Victoria Harbor led to an outpouring of nostalgic sentiment, with developers to blame for relentless reclamation for development, and for building skyscrapers that hurt air quality and destroyed the skyscape.51
Wong Ka-ying, and Wan Po-san, eds., Xianggang shehui zhengzhi de yanxu yu bianqian [Continuity and change in Hong Kong society and politics] (Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2004), pp. 24373. 46. Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, pp. 21, 3943. 47. Ng Chun-hung, After the Crises: Changes in Social Ethos, in Lau Siu-kai, Lee Mingkwan, Wan Po-san, and Wong Siu-lun, eds., Indicators of Social Development Hong Kong 2004 (Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006), p. 268. 48. Ibid., p. 270. 49. Wan Po-san, Kenneth Law, and Timothy K. Y. Wong, Attitudes towards Social Problems, 19972006, in Leung et al., eds., Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 2006, pp. 99132. 50. Hong Kong Transition Project, Parties, Policies, and Political Reform in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Transition Project, 2006), p. 48. 51. For a list of major environmental movements, see Yip Yan-yan and Christine Loh, New Generation, Greening Politics, and Growing Civil Society, in Ming Chan, ed., Chinas Hong Kong Transformed: Retrospect and Prospects beyond the First Decade (Hong Kong: City University Press, 2008), pp. 21332.

M A / H O N G K O N G - C H i N A S H i F T i N G VA L u E S 7 0 7

table 6. Change in Attitude toward Important Things in Life (%)

Gone Down a Lot (A) Gone Down Somewhat (B) Same Gone up Somewhat (C) Gone up a Lot (D) (N) (C + D) (A + B)

A steady job A constantly developing career A city with low contamination A group of mutually supportive friends A harmonious family A society that cares for the weak A society with freedom of thought An economically prosperous society A politically stable society

5.4 3.7 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.7 2.1 2.7

15.8 16.7 8.1 4.6 4.5 7.0 7.9 10.6 8.2

40.5 51.1 50.1 56.8 61.1 57.1 53.3 46.2 47.3

28.5 24.5 35.4 31.6 29.0 30.7 31.3 33.0 31.3

9.7 3.9 5.1 6.0 4.4 4.1 5.9 8.1 10.4

771 747 786 798 797 783 784 793 776

17.0 8.0 31.1 32.0 27.9 26.7 27.6 28.4 30.8

source: Ng Chun-hung, After the Crises: Changes in Social Ethos, in Lau, Lee, Wan, and Wong, eds., Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 2004, pp. 26584.

This was followed by movements against demolition of the Star Ferry Pier in 2006 and the Queens Pier in 2007, when the government faced long, drawn-out sit-ins by young protesters, each time arousing much public sympathy. Some termed these a post-modernist mode of social movementspontaneous, loosely organized, with diversified participants and non-materialist objectives, mobilized via information technology or mass media.52 These movements in the new century have multiple meanings. Mostly led by young people, they demonstrated increasing support for post-materialist values among the young generation. The movements contested the essence and core values of Hong Kong, seeking to redefine the citys history and
52. Chan Kin-man, Civil Society and the Democracy Movement in Hong Kong: Mass Mobilization with Limited Organizational Capacity, Korean Observer 36:1 (Spring 2005), pp. 16782; Alvin So, Social Conflict in Hong Kong after 1997: The Emergence of a Post-modern Mode of Social Movements? in Ming Chan, ed., Chinas Hong Kong Transformed, pp. 23351.

708 A S i A N S u R V E Y 5 1 : 4

table 7. Changing Perception on Seriousness of Social Problems, 1997 and 2006

1997 2006 % Change F-ratio

Improving Housing Public order Transport Unemployment Youth Morale Corruption Stalemate Social welfare Deteriorating Income inequality Elderly Health service Pollution Education

3.64 (0.87) 3.03 (0.83) 2.92 (0.83) 3.52 (0.84) 3.89 (0.81) 3.52 (0.87) 8.78 (0.81) 3.00 (0.81) 3.88 (0.89) 3.52 (0.86) 2.82 (0.76) 3.56 (0.87) 2.85 (0.80)

2.94 (0.78) 2.63 (0.72) 2.73 (0.81) 3.38 (0.83) 3.74 (0.81) 3.44 (0.86) 2.72 (0.81) 2.99 (0.83) 3.95 (0.83) 3.67 (0.84) 2.99 (0.83) 3.83 (0.90) 3.12 (0.92)

19.2 13.2 6.5 4.0 3.9 2.3 2.2 0.3 1.8 4.3 6.0 7.6 9.5

933.76*** 338.98*** 68.03*** 35.24*** 41.23*** 10.64** 5.93* 0.06 9.84** 38.74*** 55.01*** 117.16*** 109.07***

source: Wan Po-san, Kenneth W. K. Law, and Timothy Wong, Attitudes towards Social Problems, 19972006, in Leung, Wan, and Wong, eds., Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 2006, p. 104. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Degree of seriousness is calculated by the mean score on the perceived seriousness of the social issues: 1 = very minor; 2 = minor; 3 = average; 4 = serious; 5 = very serious.

identity. In rediscovering and re-narrating bits of history through these movements, the activists asserted that Hong Kongs history was rich in social movements and political action, and not a purely economic city, as the mainstream narrative suggests. Hong Kong played an important role in Chinas political development, and small closely knit communities, apart from the globalized metropole, were part and parcel of Hong Kongs way of life. These movements symbolized resistance against pervasive developmentalism, against business domination of land policy and top-down decisionmaking by the government. These value changes were well expressed in the anti-express rail link (XRL) campaign of 200910. The campaign started with protests from villagers who were forced to relocate to make way for a US$857 million XRL to mainland China. More problems were revealed with information disclosure about the XRL plan, leading to a territory-wide movement of considerable scale. The

M A / H O N G K O N G - C H i N A S H i F T i N G VA L u E S 7 0 9

campaign became a grand standoff of contrasting ideologies, and public opinion was deeply split.53 The government justified the XRL through expected economic benefits brought by enhanced integration with China. It was supported by the business sector in general, and by sectors that would benefit: engineers and architects who would get jobs, tourism and consumption sectors eyeing more mainland tourists, real estate developers envisaging more mainland hot money, and the like. On the other hand, opposing activists criticized the government for sacrificing small, old, closely knit communities on the grounds of overall economic (business) interest. They accused the government of seeing land only as a commodity for making money, disregarding its meaning in and links with human life. They claimed that the expensive XRL would serve mostly the middle and upper class, and its construction would disrupt urban households and create traffic congestion. Above all, they were unhappy with the top-down decision-making and the ignoring of affected communities for urban planning. Starting from December 16, 2009, a group of young protesters, mostly under 30 years of age, used the satyagraha walk (kuxing) as a form of protest. Holding rice and seeds in their hands, the barefooted protesters walked very slowly to a drumbeat, prostrated themselves once every 26 steps,54 and walked for 15 hours per day for three days. The protesters claimed this enabled them to directly experience the linkage between people and land; rediscover the importance of the land that feeds them; rethink their own identity; and show their respect to community networks, land, and life.55 These expressive actions with strong religious flavor and post-materialist overtones aroused much public sympathy. Networking primarily through the Internet, on successive Fridays thousands of protesters surrounded the Legco building, demanding a veto of the government appropriation proposal. Unable to persuade the opposition, the government pushed through

53. On the eve of the appropriation decision, public opinion polls showed that 47% supported the government plan, 23% opposed it, while 22% supported delaying the decision. See <http://hkupop. hku.hk/chinese/release/release726.html>, accessed February 22, 2011. 54. The protesters chose 26 steps because the Hong Kong part of the XRL is 26 kilometers long. Protesting Korean farmers used a similar form of protest during the 2005 WTO Ministerial Conference. 55. Their attachment to the land can be seen from the overall slogan of the walk: Every Inch of Soil Triggers a Change of Heart; Every Drop of Future Needs Your Cultivation.

710 A S i A N S u R V E Y 5 1 : 4

the proposal by dint of its control of the legislative majority, with the support of most FC members. The XRL campaign also reflected deep-rooted uneasiness among the Hong Kong people about integration with mainland China. With increased social and economic integration after 1997, there were fears that Hong Kong would lose its identity and distinctiveness. The cry for rediscovering Hong Kongs identity, rethinking how people are related to land, and protecting indigenous communities reflected the rise of indigenous sentiments, and was a response to growing dominance of China over Hong Kongs political and economic affairs. The XRL was seen as something that served China more than Hong Kong, imposed by Beijing and pushed through against public opposition by a Beijing-designed political structure. Physically, the XRL may bring better China-Hong Kong integration in the future, but sentimentally, it strained relations. The anti-XRL campaign exposed the multifaceted legitimacy problems of the Hong Kong government. The old formula justifying the sacrifice of minority conditions for overall economic interest failed to convince the young generation, now skeptical about the fairness of neoliberalist theory. On the materialist/post-materialist divide, government officials found themselves talking at cross purposes with the protesters. The governments gospel of developmentalism would never convert those disciples of post-materialism who treasure land, community, and less materialistic lifestyles.When the government failed to win over public opinion and resorted to political strongarm tactics, the injustice of the regime became all too apparent. The top-down decision-making, the pro-business ideology and policy, and the dominance of the FC elites were all seen as roots of economic inequality and injustice in Hong Kong, in the end raising a challenge to the legitimacy of the regime.
CONCLuSiONS

Various narratives have been proposed for the origins of the post-1997 governance and legitimacy crisis of Hong Kong. Lee and Ma concurred that institutional incongruity was the root cause: current institutions were unable to cope with societal demands and developmental needs.56 Lau attributed
56. Eliza Lee, Governing Post-colonial Hong Kong: Institutional Incongruity, Governance Crisis, and Authoritarianism, Asian Survey 39:6 (November-December 1999), pp. 94059;

M A / H O N G K O N G - C H i N A S H i F T i N G VA L u E S 7 1 1

former CE Tung Chee-hwas (19972005) governing crisis to a wrong governing strategy, while Lo blamed it on decreasing levels of institutionalization and weak political communication.57 Goodstadt argued that the lack of sectoral intervention in colonial times made the public believe that the government would not seek private benefit at the expense of public interest. It follows that sectoral intervention after 1997 will bring accusations of government-business collusion, undermining the governments legitimacy. Chiu and Lui saw the origins of the crisis in the governments inability to build a ruling alliance that could legitimately allocate interests after the departure of the colonial masters.58 The above scholars, however, did not address the role of value changes in this crisis. The design of the post-1997 legitimacy formula assumes a materialist, pragmatic Hong Kong populace with only an instrumental support for democracy and who could tolerate a non-elected government and unequal economic regime as long as economic goods could be delivered. Decades of value change have made the old formula powerless in face of a new generation that adopts a less instrumental view of governance, has much less faith in the fairness of the neoliberal regime, and is more self-expressive and postmaterialist. With the passage of time, the gap between the old legitimacy formula and the political values of Hong Kong people will only widen. A brief economic rebound or improvement in government performance is unlikely to rescue the Hong Kong government from its legitimacy problem. Without an overhaul of neoliberal ideology, democratic institutional reforms, and/or a renegotiation of the state-society contract, the Hong Kong government will likely find itself facing ever-increasing challenges to its legitimacy in the future. With increasing integration between China and Hong Kong, these value changes can be expected to affect mainland society, heightening Hong Kongs tensions with the Chinese government. The vocal Guangzhou
Ma Ngok, Political Development in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 2007), Conclusion. 57. Lau Siu-kai, Tung Chee-hwas Governing Strategy: The Shortfall in Politics, in Lau Siu-kai, ed., The First Tung Chee-hwa Administration: The First Five Years of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2002), pp. 139; Lo Shiu-hing, Governing Hong Kong: Legitimacy, Communication, and Political Decay (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2001). 58. Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners, passim; Chiu and Lui, Hong Kong: Becoming a Chinese Global City, ch. 5.

712 A S i A N S u R V E Y 5 1 : 4

newspaper Nanfang Dushi Bao gave the 2010 Citizens Award to Choi Yuen Village (the Hong Kong New Territories area village that started the XRL campaign). Anti-XRL struggles found resonance in mainland communities that repeatedly had their land rights violated by local officials. Struggle movements for human and civil rights in Hong Kong could spill over and inspire mainland activists, particularly in an age of network activism. With the Hong Kong people more supportive of basic rights and more concerned about economic inequality, reports of human rights violations and economic oppression (such as tragedies at Foxconn)59 in China have created much distaste for the Chinese government. It will be increasingly difficult for Chinas emphasis on development first or harmonious society, both values or goals suiting early industrial ages, to find echo in the postindustrial society of Hong Kong. It seems probable that as Hong Kong activists become more conscious of ways to use their freedom to influence China, as Hong Kong media reports highlight mainland dissidents actions and plights, and as social protests are potentially re-imported to the mainland, a process is underway of mutual influence between civil societies across the border. Beijing will undoubtedly see this as a thorn in its political flesh. But its solution has been to redouble its efforts at Chinas economic integration with Hong Kong, which ironically may only expose the wide value gap and sharpen tensions between them.

59. Foxconn International Holdings is the largest producer of electronic components in the world. In the year 2010, 18 employees of a Foxconn plant in Guangdong committed suicide because of extremely adverse working conditions in the factories. This created an uproar against and great concern about the abysmal working conditions in Chinas factories.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.