EN BANC G.R. No. 147870 - July 31, 2002 RAMIR R. PABLICO, Petitioner, vs. ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO, Respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal, validly impose the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials? This purely legal issue was posed in connection with a dispute over the mayoralty seat of San Vicente, Palawan. Considering that the term of the contested office expired on June 30, 2001,1 the present case may be dismissed for having become moot and academic.2 Nonetheless, we resolved to pass upon the above-stated issue concerning the application of certain provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. The undisputed facts are as follows: On August 5, 1999, Solomon B. Maagad, and Renato M. Fernandez, both members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Vicente, Palawan, filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan an administrative complaint against respondent Alejandro A. Villapando, then Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution.3 Complainants alleged that respondent, on behalf of the municipality, entered into a consultancy agreement with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate in the May 1998 elections. They argue that the consultancy agreement amounted to an appointment to a government position within the prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Section 6, of the 1987 Constitution. In his answer, respondent countered that he did not appoint Tiape, rather, he merely hired him. He invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the Department of Justice dated August 21, 1992, stating that the appointment of a defeated candidate within one year from the election as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as prohibited by the Constitution. On February 1, 2000, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan found respondent guilty of the administrative charge and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from service.4 Respondent appealed to the Office of the President which, on May 29, 2000, affirmed the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan.5

Pending respondent's motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Office of the President, or on June 16, 2000, petitioner Ramir R. Pablico, then Vice-mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, took his oath of office as Municipal Mayor. Consequently, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order, docketed as SPL Proc. No. 3462.6 The petition, seeks to annul, inter alia, the oath administered to petitioner. The Executive Judge granted a Temporary Restraining Order effective for 72 hours, as a result of which petitioner ceased from discharging the functions of mayor. Meanwhile, the case was raffled to Branch 95 which, on June 23, 2000, denied respondent's motion for extension of the 72-hour temporary restraining order.7 Hence, petitioner resumed his assumption of the functions of Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. On July 4, 2000, respondent instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul: (1) the May 29, 2000 decision of the Office of the President; (2) the February 1, 2000, decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; and (3) the June 23, 2000 order of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 95. On March 16, 2001, the Court of Appeals8 declared void the assailed decisions of the Office of the President and theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan, and ordered petitioner to vacate the Office of Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.9 A motion for reconsideration was denied on April 23, 2001.10 Hence, the instant petition for review. The pertinent portion of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides: Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds: xxx-xxx-xxx An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. (Emphasis supplied) It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law. Thus, in Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al.,11 we held that "[t]he Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60." Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, however, adds that - "(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first

acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other." The disciplining authority referred to pertains to theSangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President.12 As held in Salalima,13 this grant to the "disciplining authority" of the power to remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government Code. Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity. Even Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, expressed doubt as to the validity of Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the implementing rules.14 Verily, the clear legislative intent to make the subject power of removal a judicial prerogative is patent from the deliberations in the Senate quoted as follows: xxx-xxx-xxx Senator Pimentel. This has been reserved, Mr. President, including the issue of whether or not the Department Secretary or the Office of the President can suspend or remove an elective official. Senator Saguisag. For as long as that is open for some later disposition, may I just add the following thought: It seems to me that instead of identifying only the proper regional trial court or the Sandiganbayan, and since we know that in the case of a regional trial court, particularly, a case may be appealed or may be the subject of an injunction, in the framing of this later on, I would like to suggest that we consider replacing the phrase "PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OR THE SANDIGANBAYAN" simply by "COURTS". Kasi po, maaaring sabihin nila na mali iyongregional trial court o ang Sandiganbayan. Senator Pimentel. "OR THE PROPER COURT." Senator Saguisag. "OR THE PROPER COURT." Senator Pimentel. Thank you. We are willing to accept that now, Mr. President. Senator Saguisag. It is to be incorporated in the phraseology that will craft to capture the other ideas that have been elevated. x x x - x x x - x x x.15 It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the "disciplining authority" to remove from office erring elective

local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove.16 As explained by the Court in Lacson v. Roque:17 ".the abridgment of the power to remove or suspend an elective mayor is not without its own justification, and was, we think, deliberately intended by the lawmakers. The evils resulting from a restricted authority to suspend or remove must have been weighed against the injustices and harms to the public interests which would be likely to emerge from an unrestrained discretionary power to suspend and remove." WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 153475 November 13, 2002

ATTY. MIGUEL M. LINGATING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CESAR B. SULONG, respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution,1 dated April 4, 2002, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc, reversing the resolution,2 dated August 1, 2001, of its First Division and dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by petitioner Miguel M. Lingating against respondent Cesar B. Sulong as candidate for mayor of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections.

On May 3, 2001, petitioner filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor in Pagadian City a petition for the disqualification of respondent Sulong, pursuant to 40(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code), which disqualifies from running for any elective local position "those removed from office as a result of an administrative case."3 It appears that respondent Sulong had previously won as mayor of Lapuyan on January 18, 1988. In the May 11, 1992, and again in the May 8, 1995 elections, he was reelected. In a petition for disqualification, petitioner alleged that in 1991, during his first term as mayor of Lapuyan, respondent Sulong, along with a municipal councilor of Lapuyan and several other individuals,4 was administratively charged (AC No. 12-91) with various offenses,5 and that, on February 4, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur found him guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office. Petitioner claimed that this decision had become final and executory, and consequently the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, took his oath as mayor vice respondent Sulong on March 3, 1992.6 Respondent Sulong denied that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final and executory. He averred that after receiving a copy of the decision on February 17, 1992, he filed a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal thereof on February 18, 1992; that on February 27, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan required Jim Lingating, the complainant in AC No. 12-91, to comment on respondent Sulongs motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal; that the said complainant had not yet complied therewith and his (respondent Sulongs) motion had consequently remained pending. Respondent Sulong denied he had been removed from office by virtue of the decision in AC No. 12-91. After the parties had filed their memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. Because the COMELEC was unable to render judgment before the elections of May 14, 2001, respondent Sulong was voted for in the elections, receiving 4,882 votes as against the 3,611 votes for petitioner. On May 16, 2001, respondent Sulong was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Lapuyan as the duly elected mayor of that municipality. In a resolution dated August 1, 2001, the COMELECs First Division declared respondent Cesar B. Sulong disqualified. It held: Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code is clear that any person removed from office by reason of an administrative case is disqualified from running for any elective local office. From such point, it is clear that Respondent Sulong was declared guilty of having violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur. . .which. . .has become final and executory, thereby depriving him of his right to run for public office. .... WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Commission hereby resolves to GRANT this Petition and DISQUALIFY Respondent Cesar B. Sulong to run for Municipal mayor for Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur in the May 14, 2001 Elections in violation of Section 40[b] of the Local Government Code.7 Respondent Sulong filed a motion for reconsideration citing a certification, dated August 7, 2001, of Provincial Secretary of Zamboanga del Sur (OIC) Wilfredo Cimafranca that the decision in AC No. 12-91 "has not become final and executory as the final disposition thereof was overtaken by the local elections of May 1992." He reiterated his claim that at no time had he been removed by virtue of the said decision.8 Petitioner filed an opposition contending, among other things, that the fact that Zamboanga del Sur Governor Ariosa had ordered the enforcement of the decision signified that respondent Sulongs motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal had not been given due course by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and that respondent Sulongs claim that he had not been removed from office was belied by the fact that he (respondent Sulong) brought charges against Vicente Imbing for Usurpation of Official Functions (I.S. No. 92-35), in support of which respondent Sulong attested under oath that Imbing had succeeded him as mayor of Lapuyan.9 In a separate motion, petitioner prayed that the resolution of August 1, 2001 be executed and that he be installed as mayor of Lapuyan in view of private respondents disqualification. On August 30, 2001, the COMELECs First Division denied petitioners motion for execution on the ground that the disqualification of an elected candidate does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to occupy the office vacated.10Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration of this order.11 On April 4, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued its resolution subject of the petition in this case, reversing the resolution, dated August 1, 2001, of its First Division insofar as it found respondent Sulong disqualified from running as mayor. It held: The only issue in this case is whether or not the foregoing decision [in AC No. 12-91], assuming it has become final and executory, constitutes a ground for the

disqualification of herein respondent-movant as a candidate in the elections [of May 14, 2001]. The records of the case reveal that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was promulgated on February [4], 1992 finding respondent Sulong "guilty of dishonesty, falsification of public documents, malversation. . ." In the May 1992 elections, respondent Sulong was re-elected mayor of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur despite the decision of the Sangguniang dismissing him from office. In the 1995 May elections, respondent Sulong ran and won the mayoralty elections of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur. While it is true that one of the disqualifications from running in an elective position is removal from office as a result of an administrative case, said provision no longer applies if the candidate whose qualification is questioned got re-elected to another term. In Aguinaldo vs. Santos, 212 SCRA 768, the Supreme Court ruled that re-election renders an administrative case moot and academic. .... Obviously, the re-election of [r]espondent Sulong in the 1992 and 1995 elections would be tantamount to a condonation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan decision promulgated 04 February 1992 which found him guilty of dishonesty, malversation of public funds etc[.], granting said decision has become final and executory. Moreover, the people of LAPUYAN have already expressed their will when they cast their votes in the recent elections as evidenced by the results which found respondent Sulong to have won convincingly. .... WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission En Banc RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to reverse the First Division Resolution [dated August 1, 2001] and DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.12 The COMELEC en banc also ruled that, in any event, respondent Sulong was not entitled to occupy the office thus vacated. Hence, this petition by Lingating. Petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Commission on Elections13 in holding that the reelection of respondent Sulong in 1992 and 1995 as mayor of Lapuyan had the effect of

condoning the misconduct for which he was ordered dismissed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur. Petitioner cites Reyes v. Commission on Elections14 in which we held that an elective local executive officer, who is removed before the expiration of the term for which he was elected, is disqualified from being a candidate for a local elective position under 40(b) of the Local Government Code. We stated in Reyes: Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected [for] another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases. The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, . . . the decision in the administrative case, . . . was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40(b) of the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection. It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision similar to 40(b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect. However, Reyes cannot be applied to this case because it appears that the 1992 decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, finding respondent Sulong guilty of dishonesty, falsification and malversation of public funds, has not until now become final. The records of this case show that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur rendered judgment in AC No. 12-91 on February 4, 1992, a copy of which was received by respondent Sulong on February 17, 1992; that on February 18, 1992, he filed a "motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal;" that on February 27, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, required Jim Lingating, the complainant in AC No. 12-91, to comment; and that the complainant in AC No. 12-91 has not filed a comment nor has the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan resolved respondents motion. The filing of his motion for reconsideration prevented the decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan from becoming final. While R.A. No. 7160 on disciplinary actions is silent on the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the same cannot be interpreted as a prohibition against the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Thus, it was held15 that a party in a disbarment proceeding under Rule 139-B, 12(c) can move for a reconsideration of a resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines although Rule 139-B does not so provide: Although Rule 139-B, 12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed . . . . Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before [an appeal is] resort[ed] to . . . as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment [an] opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of evidence. There is thus no decision finding respondent guilty to speak of. As Provincial Secretary of Zamboanga del Sur Wilfredo Cimafranca attested, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan simply considered the matter as having become moot and academic because it was "overtaken by the local elections of May [11,]1992." Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, and the highest ranking municipal councilor of Lapuyan, Romeo Tan, to the offices of mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, be considered proof that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final because it appears to have been made pursuant to 6816 of the Local Government Code, which makes decisions in administrative cases immediately executory. Indeed, considering the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve respondents motion, it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they have voted for respondent Sulong that after all he is disqualified, especially since, at the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had been rendered nearly ten years ago. Having come to the conclusion that respondent Sulong is not disqualified from holding the position of mayor of Lapuyan, it is unnecessary to pass upon petitioners contention that, as the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, he is entitled to be installed as mayor because the votes cast in favor of respondent Sulong were void.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the resolution, dated April 4, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc, dismissing petitioners petition for disqualification, is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 108072 December 12, 1995 HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, petitioner, vs. HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, Presiding Judge, Branch XXVIII, Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, Mandaue City Mayor ALFREDO M. OUANO, Mandaue City Vice-Mayor PATERNO CAETE and Mandaue City Sangguniang Panlungsod Member RAFAEL MAYOL, respondents.

VITUG, J.: The determination of whether the Ombudsman under Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6770, 1 otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 7160, 2 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is the pivotal issue before the Court in this petition. The petition seeks (a) to annul the writ of preliminary injunction, dated 21 October 1992, issued against petitioner by respondent trial court and (b) to prohibit said court from further proceeding with RTC Case No. MDE-14. 3 Parenthetically, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Arturo Mojica assumed the office of Juan Hagad, now resigned, 4 who took the initiative in instituting this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.

The controversy stemmed from the filing of criminal and administrative complaints, on 22 July 1992, against herein respondents Mayor Alfredo Ouano, Vice-Mayor Paterno Caete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. The respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019, as amended, 5 Articles 170 6 and 171 7 of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713. 8Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent officials, acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00 without authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. The complaints were separately docketed as Criminal Case No. OMB-VIS92-391 and as Administrative Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015. A day after the filing of the complaints, or on 23 July 1992, a sworn statement was executed by Mandaue City Council Secretary, Atty. Amado C. Otarra, Jr., in support of the accusations against respondent officials. The next day, petitioner ordered respondents, including Acting Mandaue City Treasurer Justo G. Ouano and Mandaue City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, to file their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days from receipt of the order. Forthwith, Councilors Dionson and Bercede moved for the preventive suspension of respondent officials in the separately docketed administrative case. Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials, on 05 August 1992, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. In their opposition, filed on 10 August 1992, Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local Government Code of 1991 could not have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of the Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate cases against all public officials and that, in any case, the power of the Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act had remained unaffected by the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. During the hearing on the motion for preventive suspension, the parties were directed by the Deputy Ombudsman to file their respective memoranda.

In his memorandum, Mayor Ouano reiterated that, under Sections 61 and 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the Office of the President, not the Office of the Ombudsman, could lawfully take cognizance of administrative complaints against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city or an independent component city and to impose disciplinary sanctions, including preventive suspensions, and that there was nothing in the provision of the Constitution giving to the Office of the Ombudsman superior powers than those of the President over elective officials of local governments. In an Order, 9 dated 10 September 1992, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension of respondent officials, except City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, until the administrative case would have been finally resolved by the Ombudsman. 10 Respondent officials were formally placed under preventive suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman pursuant to an Order 11 of 21 September 1992. On 25 September 1992, a petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, was filed by respondent officials with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Acting favorably on the pleas of petitioning officials, respondent Judge issued, on even date, a restraining order directed at petitioner, enjoining him ". . . from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order of preventive suspension issued in OMB-VISADM-92-015." Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition but it was to no avail. The court a quo, on 15 October 1992, denied the motion to dismiss and issued an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, holding thusly: So by following and applying the well-established rules of statutory construction that endeavor should be made to harmonize the provisions of these two laws in order that each shall be effective, it is the finding of this Court that since the investigatory power of the Ombudsman is so general, broad and vague and gives wider discretion to disciplining authority to impose administrative sanctions against a responsible public official or employee while that of Section 60 of the New Local Government Code provides for more well defined and specific grounds upon which a local elective official can be subjected to administrative disciplinary action, that it Could be considered that the latter law could be an exception to the authority and administrative power of the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation against local elective officials and as such, the jurisdiction now to conduct administrative investigation against local

elective officials is already lodged before the offices concerned under Section 61 of Republic Act No. 7160. xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Order is hereby issued: 1) Expanding the restraining order dated September 25, 1992 issued by the Court into an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting of the petitioners of the bond in the amount of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs that may be adjudged to the adverse party and/or damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the Court will finally adjudge that the petitioners are not entitled thereto, and 2) Denying the respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated September 28, 1992 for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
12

A writ of preliminary injunction was issued on 21 October 1992. 13 A motion for reconsideration made by petitioner was denied by the trial court. The instant recourse seeks the nullification of the order of 15 October 1992 and the writ of preliminary injunction of 21 October 1992 both issued by the trial court and prays that respondent judge be directed to desist from further proceeding with RTC Case No. MDE-14. There is merit in the petition. The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13 (1,) Article XI, of the 1987 Constitution, 14 thus: Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: (1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;

while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 that reads: Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which: 1. Are contrary to law or regulation; 2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; 3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law; 4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; 5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or 6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification. Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could be subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman, viz.: Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. (Emphasis supplied) Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner thus contends that the Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it. Said section of the law provides: Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in

the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. Respondent officials, upon the other hand, argue that the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over local officials must be deemed to have been removed by the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which vests the authority to investigate administrative charges, listed under Section 60 15 thereof, on various offices. In the case specifically of complaints against elective officials of provinces and highly urbanized cities, the Code states: Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint against any erring local elective officials shall be prepared as follows: (a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the President. Thus respondents insist, conformably with Section 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive suspension can only be imposed by: ". . . the President if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city; . . . " under sub-paragraph (b) thereof: (b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence; Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the

same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension. In his comment, which the Court required considering that any final resolution of the case would be a matter of national concern, the Solicitor-General has viewed the Local Government Code of 1991 as having conferred, but not on an exclusive basis, on the Office of the President (and the various Sanggunians) disciplinary authority over local elective officials. He posits the stand that the Code did not withdraw the power of the Ombudsman theretofore vested under R.A. 6770 conformably with a constitutional mandate. In passing, the Solicitor General has also opined that the appropriate remedy that should have been pursued by respondent officials is a petition forcertiorari before this Court rather than their petition for prohibition filed with the Regional Trial Court. Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, 16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. 17 The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, 18 and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. 19 The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 20 The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. 21 Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, 22 and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. 23 Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very reason that underlies the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom." 24 Quite interestingly, Sections 61 and 63 of the present Local Government Code run almost parallel with the provisions then existing under the old code. Section 61 and Section 63 of the precursor local Government Code of 1983, 25 under the heading of "Suspension and Removal," read: Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Complaints. Verified complaints against local elective officials shall be prepared as follows:

(a) Against any elective provincial or city official, before the Minister of Local Government. Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official. (2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension. (3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President. Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to even now maintain its application. The two provisions govern differently. In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonesty,

oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges should warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong, (c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. Respondent officials, nevertheless, claim that petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion when he caused the issuance of the preventive suspension order without any hearing. The contention is without merit. The records reveal that petitioner issued the order of preventive suspension after the filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on the motion for preventive suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of his memorandum in compliance with the directive of petitioner. Be that, as it may, we have heretofore held that, not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard. Naturally, such a preventivesuspension would occur prior to any finding of guilt or innocence. In the early case of Nera vs. Garcia, 26reiterated in subsequent cases, 27 we have said: In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the charges against him are heard and be given an opportunity to prove his innocence. Moreover, respondent officials were, in point of fact, put on preventive suspension only after petitioner had found, in consonance with our ruling

in Buenaseda vs. Flavier, 28 that the evidence of guilt was strong. Petitioner gave his justification for the preventive suspension in this wise:
After a careful and honest scrutiny of the evidence submitted on record, at this stage, it is the holding of this office that the evidence of guilt against the respondents in the instant case is strong. There is no question that the charge against the respondents involves dishonesty or gross misconduct which would warrant their removal from the service and there is no gainsaying the fact that the charge for falsification of veritable documents like city ordinances are very serious charges that affect the very foundations of duly established representative governments. Finally, it is likewise the holding of this office at this stage that the continued stay in office of respondents may prejudice the judicious 29 investigation and resolution of the instant case.

Finally, it does appear, as so pointed out by the Solicitor General, that respondent official's petition for prohibition, being an application for remedy against the findings of petitioner contained in his 21 September 1992 order, should not have been entertained by the trial court. The proscription in Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770 reads: Sec. 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law. Likewise noteworthy is Section 27 of the law which prescribes a direct recourse to this Court on matters involving orders arising from administrative disciplinary cases originating from the Office of the Ombudsman; thus: Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. . . . In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied) All told, petitioner is plainly entitled to the relief prayed for, and we must, accordingly; grant the petition.

WHEREFORE, the questioned writ of preliminary injunction of 21 October 1992 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and RTC Case No. MDE-14 is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur. Davide, Jr., J., took no part. Footnotes 1 Entitled, "An Act Providing For The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Office of the Ombudsman, And For Other Purposes. (Effective, 07 December 1989, Section 15, RA. No. 6770; Deloso vs. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545. 2 Entitled, "An Act Providing Far A Local Government Code Of 1991. 3 "Alfredo Ouano, Paterno Caete and Rafael Mayol v. Juan Hagad." 4 His resignation took effect on 01 April 1993. 5 Entitled, "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." 6 Falsification of legislative documents. 7 Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. 8 Entitled, "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees." 9 Rollo, pp. 173-178. 10 WHEREFORE, on the basis of all the foregoing considerations, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied for lack of merit. The motion for preventive suspension is hereby given due course and the respondents, namely: Mandaue City Mayor Alfredo M. Ouano, Mandaue City Vice Mayor Paterno P. Caete, Mandaue City Councilor Rafael J. Mayol and Acting Mandaue City Treasurer Justo Ouano, are hereby recommended for preventive suspension for a

period of six (6) months until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman, without pay, in pursuant to Administrative Order No. 07 issued by the office of the Ombudsman, Sec. 24 of Republic Act 6770 and under Art. 11 par. 13 of the Philippine Constitution. 11 Rollo, pp. 179-181. 12 Rollo, pp. 222-239. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 85815 May 19, 1989 ELENO T. REGIDOR, JR., ANICETO T. SIETE, CAMILO B. ZAPATOS & RODULFO ENRIQUEZ, petitioners, vs. GOV. WILLIAM CHIONGBIAN, Vice Gov. FLORENCIO GARCIA, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Members MARIVIC SAGRADO, MORPHEUS AGOT, CONSTANCIO BALAIS, ALEGRIA CARIO, ERNESTO IRA, PACITA YAP, JULIO TIU and Sangguniang Panglunsod, ROBERT O. TACLOB, respondents. Donatilo C. Macamay for petitioners. Vicente Sarigumba for respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.: This petition for prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction was filed by the petitioners who are the duly elected city officials of Tangub City of Misamis Occidental. Eleno T. Regidor was elected City Mayor of Tangub City, the other petitioners, Aniceto T. Siete, Camilo B. Zapatos and Rodulfo Enriquez, are respectively the Vice-Mayor and members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Tangub City, who were elected in the January 18, 1988 local elections, were proclaimed in due course, and assumed office. On November 3, 1988, respondents William Chiongbian and Florencio Garcia, Marivic Sagrada Morpheus Agot, Constancio Balais, Alegria Carifio, Ernesto Ira,

Pacita Yap, and Julio Tiu, who are respectively the Provincial Governor, the ViceGovernor, and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, approved Resolution No. 340-88 recommending the suspension of the petitioners who failed to appear on November 18, 1988 at the hearing of a complaint for unspecified misconduct which respondent Robert O. Taclob filed against them in the office of the Governor and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Pursuant to that resolution, Governor William Chiongbian issued on November 24,1988 an Order of Preventive Suspension, suspending the petitioners "from their elective positions as City Mayor, City Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Panglunsod members of Tangub City for a period of 60 days effective November 25, 1988" and ordering them to "cease and desist from performing the functions and duties" of their respective offices (Annex D, p. 10, Rollo). On the same day, Governor Chiongbian appointed Taclob, a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Tangub City, as Officer-in-Charge of Tangub City in lieu of Mayor Eleno T. Regidor (Annex E, p. 110, Rollo). Taclob belongs to the governor's political faction while Regidor and the other petitioners belong to the rival faction of Alfonso Tan, the defeated opponent of respondent Chiongbian for the governorship of Misamis Occidental. The petition alleges that respondents Governor Chiongbian and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan acted without authority, and contrary to law, in issuing the Order of Preventive Suspension against the petitioners because under Section 63 of the Local Government Code, a provincial or city official may be preventively suspended by the Minister of Local Government, not by the Provincial Governor. Upon receipt of the petition, this Court issued a temporary restraining order commanding the respondents to "cease and desist from implementing or enforcing Resolution No. 340-88 dated November 23, 1988 and Preventive Suspension Order dated November 24, 1988, and enjoining respondent Robert O. Taclob from assuming the position of OIC Mayor of Tangub City" (pp. 14-16, Rollo). In their comment on the petition, the respondents justified the suspension of the petitioners as a valid exercise of the Provincial Governor's power of general supervision over a component city (Par. 6.4, Section 1, Rule 4 of the Implementing Rules & Regulations of the Local Government Code), and that it was done "in pursuance to (sic) the provisions of the Local Government Code and the Rules & Regulations implementing said law." (P. 25, Rollo.)

However, the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code and the Implementing Rules and Regulations thereof do not sustain the respondents' contention in this case. Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides that complaints against elective provincial or city officialsshould be verified and should be filed before the Minister of Local Government. Section 63 Provides that the Minister of Local Government may impose a preventive suspension against the accused elective provincial or city official, thus: Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official. (2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension. (3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. Section 7 of the Implementing Rules & Regulations reads as follows: Sec. 7. Preventive Suspension. If from the answer of the respondent, and the complaint filed, the Minister/Sanggunian concerned find and determine that there is reasonable ground to believe that he has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of guilt is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or the continuance in office of the respondent could

influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidences, the Minister of Local Government, provincial petitioner of municipal mayor as the case may be, may preventively suspend an elective provincial, City Municipal or barangay official, respectively: Provided, That the preventive suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days after the start of said suspension. There is no merit in the respondents' contention that the order of preventive suspension issued by Governor Chiongbian was within the authority granted in Section 7, Rule 18 of the Implementing Rules & Regulations to "the Minister of Local Government, provincial governor, or municipal mayor, as the case may be," to "preventively suspend an elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay official, respectively." Respondents misread and misconstrued Section 7, Rule 18 of the Implementing Rules & Regulations of the Local Government Code. The rule should be read in juxtaposition with Section 63 of the Code which provides that "preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official." In light of Section 63 of the Code, Section 7 of Rule 18 of the Implementing Rules & Regulations should be interpreted to mean that the Minister of Local Government may preventively suspend an elective provincial or city official, the Provincial Governor may preventively suspend an elective municipal official, and the city or municipal mayor may preventively suspend an elective barangay official. This is as it should be for complaints against provincial or city officials are supposed to be filed with the Minister (now Secretary) of Local Government, hence, it is he (not the provincial governor) who would know whether or not the charges are serious enough to warrant the suspension of the accused elective provincial or city official. No rule or regulation issued by the Secretary of Local Government may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of the Local Government Code. The implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Vda. de Prieto, L-13912, September 30, 1950). A rule or regulation that was issued to implement a law may not go beyond the terms and provisions of the law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).

In this case, the implementing rule (Sec. 7, Rule 18) does not in fact clash with the law (Sec. 63, Local Government Code) the draftsmanship is not perfect but the use of the phrase "as the case may be" and the term "respectively" indicates a delineation of the power to suspend. As the complaint or complaints against the petitioners were filed with the Office of the Provincial Governor, not with the Minister of Local Government as required in Section 61 of the Local Government Code, and, as the preventive suspension of the petitioners was ordered by the Provincial Governor, not by the Minister of Local Government, the notice of hearing, subpoena, and order of preventive suspension issued by the respondents governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan against the petitioners are hereby declared null and void. (Local Government Code [BP 337], Title Two, Chapter 4, See. 63[1].) The respondents are without authority to investigate the petitioners, and the latter may not be compelled to attend the hearings. Their refusal to answer the charges against them was justified. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The Resolution No. 340-88 of the Sangguniang Panglunsod, and the order of preventive suspension issued by respondent Governor William Chiongbian the appointment of Robert O. Taclob as OIC Mayor of Tangub City, the notices of hearing and subpoenas issued to the petitioners by the respondents are all annulled and set aside. The temporary restraining order which We issued on December 7, 1988, is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED.