United States District Court For the District of Columbia

DON HAM RICK , U.S. MERCHANT SEAMAN )

5860 Wilburn Road )
Wilburn, AR 72179 )
PLAINTIFF, pro se ) CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
v. )
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH ) 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988
White House )
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. ) CIVIL ACTION #: 03-2160 RBW
Washington, DC 20500 )
)
ALBERTO GONZALES , ATTORNEY GENERAL )
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
)
)
This Case Is Void for
Washington, DC 20530-0001 )
)
Lack of Jurisdiction
MICHAEL CHERTOFF , SECRETARY
Department of Homeland Security
)
)
28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1)
Washington, DC 20528 ) UNITED STATES AS DEFENDANT
) Any civil action in a district court against
ADM . THOM AS H. COLLINS ) the United States under subsection (a) of
Commandant (G-C) ) section 1346 of this title may be prosecuted
U.S. Coast Guard ) only: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2),
Washington, DC 20593-0001 ) in the judicial district where the plaintiff
) resides;
CAPT . SALERNO , DIRECTOR , )
Field Activities, Marine Safety, Sec, &
Environmental Protection
)
)
The Plaintiff Resides
Commandant (G-MO)
U.S. Coast Guard
Washington, DC 20593-0001
)
)
)
in Arkansas!
)
REP . FRANK LO BIONDO (R-NJ) ) See also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
House Subcommittee on Coast Guard ) CHANGE OF VENUE
and Maritime Transportation )
Washington, DC )
RESPONDENTS )

PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS

BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF IS A RESIDENT OF ARKANSAS THE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR DC DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION
Plaintiff’s Cases Nos. 02-1434, 02-1435, 03-2160, and all
Subsequent Appeals are Void for Lack of Jurisdiction
P LAINTIFF’S M OTION FOR C URE U NDER 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a),
IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE T HE P LAINTIFF D EMANDS T HAT H IS
C ASE B E IMMEDIATELY T RANSFERRED T O T HE U.S. D ISTRICT C OURT
FOR THE E ASTERN D ISTRICT OF A RKANSAS , N ORTHERN D IVISION 1
 NOTICE!
The Plaintiff will immediately re-file his updated (new) Mandamus
& Civil RICO Act cases with the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, Northern Division (Little Rock/Batesville,
Arkansas) whether or not Judge Reggie B. Walton recognizes that
this case (No. 03-2160) is VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION under
28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1). “In the interest of justice,” Judge Walton,
among others, will be named as co-defendants in Plaintiff’s new
Civil RICO Act case.

CASE LAW FOR THIS MOTION

“It is said that absolute judicial immunity is favored as public policy, so that judges may
fearlessly, and safe from retribution, adjudicate matters before them. True. But equally important,
is the public expectation that judicial authority will only be wielded by those lawfully vested
with such authority.”
MY CASE IS VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION judicial immunity of judicial acts. See:
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 98 L.Ed.2d
Under federal Law, which is applicable to
555, 108 S.Ct. 538 (1988); Atkinson-Baker &
all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that
Assoc. v. Kolts, 7 F.3d 1452 at 1454, (9th Cir.
“if a court is without authority, its judgments
1993).
and orders are regarded as nullities. They are
not voidable, but simply void, and form no JUDICIAL ACTION WITHOUT JURISDICTION IS
bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a LAW LESS VIOLENCE
reversal in opposition to them. They
“No judicial process, whatever form it
constitute no justification and all persons
may assume, can have any lawful authority
concerned in executing such judgments or
outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the
sentences are considered, in law, as
court or judge by whom it is issued; and an
trespassers.” Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340,
attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries
26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
is nothing less than lawless violence.”
JUDGE WALTON HAS NO JUDICIAL IM M UNITY Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard 506 (1859).
FROM RICO ACT CIVIL LAW SUIT
JUDGE WALTON IS NOT ABOVE THE LAW
When a judge knows that he lacks
“No man in this country is so high that he
jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid
is above the law. No officer of the law may set
statutes expressly depriving him of
that law at defiance, with impunity. All the
jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost. Rankin
officers of the government, from the highest to
v. Howard, (1980) 633 F.2d 844, cert den.
the lowest, are creatures of the law are bound
Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939,
to obey it.
68 L.Ed 2d 326. Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct.
2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326 It is the only supreme power in our system
of government, and every man who, by
Administrative-capacity torts by a judge
accepting office participates in its functions, is
do not involve the “performance of the
only the more strongly bound to submit to
function of resolving disputes between
that supremacy, and to observe the limitations
parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating
which it imposes on the exercise of the
private rights,” and therefore do not have the
authority which it gives.” United States v. Lee,

2
106 U.S. 196, 220 1 S. Ct. 240, 261, 27 L. Ed
171 (1882)
THE CORRUPT U.S. DEPARTM ENT OF JUSTICE
“It is deeply distressing that the
Department of Justice, whose mission is to
protect the constitutional liberties of the
people of the United States, should even
appear to be seeking to subvert them by
extreme and dubious legal argument.” United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I at 16 (1976)
“I do not understand the government to
contend that it is any less bound by the
obligation than a private individual would
be...” “It is not the function of our government
to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is
the function of the citizen to keep the
government from falling into error.” Perry v.
United States, 204 U.S. 330, 358
“Crime is contagious. If the Government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for
law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy.” Olmstad v.
United States, (1928) 277 U.S. 438
“Due to sloth, inattention or desire to seize
tactical advantage, lawyers have long engaged
in dilatory practices... the glacial pace of
much litigation breeds frustration with the
Federal Courts and ultimately, disrespect for
the law.” Roadway Express v. Pipe, 447 U.S.
752 at 757 (1982)
PLEADING FOR PROPER JUSTICE
“Pleadings are intended to serve as a
means of arriving at fair and just settlements
of controversies between litigants. They
should not raise barriers which prevent the
achievement of that end. Proper pleading is
important, but its importance consists in its
effectiveness as a means to accomplish the
end of a just judgment.” Maty v. Grasselli
Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938)
“The assertion of federal rights, when
plainly and reasonably made, are not to be
defeated under the name of local practice.”
Davis v. Wechler, 263 U.S. 22, 24; Stromberb
v. California, 283 U.S. 359; NAACP v.
Alabama, 375 U.S. 449
Pro se pleadings are to be considered
without regard to technicality; pro se litigants’
pleadings are not to be held to the same high
standards of perfection as lawyers. Jenkins v.
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240;
Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233

“Even where the shoot ‘em up TV News is concerned, any highjacked plane
whatsoever is considered big news, but when a ship is taken forever, and its
crew murdered — no one seems to care.”
Eric Ellen
International Maritime Bureau

Society’s commitment to institutional justice requires that judges

be solicitous of the rights of persons who come before the court.
Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, (1973) 10 Cal.3d
270, 286

3
 T HE B IAS OF JUDGE R EGGIE B. W ALTON !
Written directly to Judge Reggie B. Walton in the first person:

To use an analogy from the old western cowboy movies there is presently a litigious bar
room brawl going on in the federal courts over the Second Amendment and I am in the midst of
it fighting for the American merchant seamen’s perspective. But while everyone else, judges and
lawyers, are volleying their legal arguments point blank like civil war canon fire I am ignored, left
with no one to engage with my own legal artillery simply because I am an unrepresented plaintiff.
This is judicial bigotry of the most egregious kind.

Your SCHEDULING ORDER , Judge Walton, whether written by you or your clerk, displays an
incorrect date of August 16, 2006, for the Court’s dismissal of the Plaintiff’s case with prejudice.
The correct date is August 26, 2004. Because August 16, 2006 is more than a month into the future
the lack of attention to accuracy this exemplifies is more than a simple typo. This Freudian slip
indicates, you have a general bias against Second Amendment cases and/or against unrepresented
plaintiffs. You have allowed an simple chronological error to be entered into the record of my
case. This error is evidence of a sloppiness with which my present case and my original cases
under Judge Edith Segal Huvelle have been handled.

Judge Edith Segal Huvelle dismissed my original cases with prejudice in 2002. But the
Docket Report for my case No. 02-1435, shows that the case was dismissed “without” prejudice.
Just how sloppy is the U.S. District Court for DC?

On January 26, 2006 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit issued their order
affirming the lower Court’s dismissal of my RICO Act claims but “remanded for further
proceediongs” on Second Amendment grounds. The following is excerpted from the DC Circuit’s

FURTHER ORDERED, on the court’s own motion, that appellant’s Second

Amendment claims against the non-judicial defendants, challenging federal
firearms statutes and the denial of his “National Open Carry Handgun”
endorsement be remanded for further1 proceedings. Compare United States
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), and United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161
(10th Cir. 2001), with U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 227, 260-61 (5th Cir.
2001). The evidence suggests appellant filed an opposition to appellees’
motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Case No. 03cv2160, Docket No. 64, Appellees’
Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, these Second
Amendment claims are not barred by res judicata. See Hoffman v. Blaski,
363 U.S. 335, 340 n.9 (1960); United States v. Dean, 752 F.2d 535, 541 (11th

1
My emphasis.

4
 Cir. 1985); see also SEC v. Bilzerian, 378 F.3d 1100, 1102 n.1 (D.C. Cir.
2004). It is

Definition of “Further”
Oxford Diction defines “further” to be:
used as comparative of far.
>adverb (also farther)
1 at, to, or by a greater distance.
2 over a greater expanse of space or time.
3 beyond the point already reached.
4 at or to a more advanced or desirable stage.
5 in addition; also.
>adjective
1 (also farther) more distant in space.
**2 additional.**
>verb
help the progress or development of.

The DC Circuit used the phrase “remanded for further proceedings” in their order. The
word “proceedings” is a noun. That makes the word “further” an adjective synonymous with the
word “additional.” Therefore, my case is “remanded for additional proceedings.”

To my understanding I beat the Government’s Motion to Dismiss on

Second Amendment grounds. And to my understanding “further
proceedings” (additional proceedings) means that my case moves forward
to the Discovery Phase if the U.S. District Court for DC had jurisdiction.

Your SCHEDULING ORDER clearly subjects me to REPEATING RULE 7 PROCEEDINGS

as the following excerpt from your Scheduling Order undeniably proves:

ORDERED that the defendants shall file an answer or otherwise respond to

the plaintiff’s complaint by August 4, 2006. The plaintiff shall file an
opposition to any motion filed by the defendants by September 1, 2006 and
the defendants reply shall by filed by September 15, 2006.

You are violating not only my right to due process but the Canons of ethics as a judge. How
corrupt can you get jerking around an unrepresented civil plaintiff preventing me from
proceeding to the Discovery Phase by giving the United States another chance to file a Motion to
Dismiss?

5
 You are corruptively using Rule 7(a) Pleadings when you should be using Rule 16
Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management and Rule 26 Discovery. You are bending over
backwards to let the defendant United States have its way. You are pulling another dirty trick in
a long chronology of dirty tricks between the bench and bar in the belief that the Plaintiff is too
ignorant with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to know what is going on. The sentiments that
I have just expressed above falls under Canon 1. All this if you had jurisdiction!

CANON 1
A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE
JUDICIARY
A. An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing high
standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of
this Code are to be construed and applied to further that objective.
Commentary:
Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confidence2
in the integrity and independence of judges. The integrity and independence of
judges depends in turn upon their acting without fear or favor. A judiciary of
integrity3 is one in which judges are known for their probity, fairness, honesty,
uprightness, and sound-ness of character. An independent judiciary is one free of
inappropriate outside influences. Although judges should be independent, they
must comply with the law, including the provisions of this Code. Public confidence
in the impartiality of the judiciary is maintained by the adherence of each judge to
this responsibility. Conversely, violation of this Code diminishes public confidence
in the judiciary and thereby does injury to the system of government under law.
The evidence I have shows that you have no integrity. You were selected or you got
yourself select to preside over my case by questionable methods. Because my opinion and lack
of confidence in you are reasonably based on the record contained in my Docket Report you are
obligated by law and ethics to recuse yourself. I vehemently demand that you immediately recuse
yourself without hesitation or at least grant my MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE in the interest of
justice to the Eastern District of Arkansas, Northern Division 1, Batesville, Arkansas, in
accordance with the following federal laws:

28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1), UNITED STATES AS DEFENDANT :

Any civil action in a district court against the United States
under subsection (a) of section 1346 of this title may be
prosecuted only:

2
My em phasis.

3
My em phasis.

6
 (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), in the judicial district
where the plaintiff resides;
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), CHANGE OF VENUE :
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), CURE OR W AIVER OF DEFECTS :
The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying
venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in
the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or
division in which it could have been brought.
M The Plaintiff resides in the State of Arkansas.
M The Plaintiff’s case names the United States as Defendant.
M The “interest of justice” has priority over “convenience of parties
and witnesses” under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
On January 13, 2004, Judge Richard W. Reynolds, the original judge, granted my Motion
for Recusal with his “ORDER OF RECUSAL .”

On January 14, 2004, Judge Walton issued his Order dismissing Seegars v. Ashcroft, Case
No. 03-834, a Second Amendment case challenging gun control laws of the District of Columbia,
in which he ruled that “the Second Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia.”

On January 20, 2004, just one week later, Judge Reynolds revised his “ORDER OF RECUSAL ”
by denying my Motion for Recusal but magnanimously recusing himself sua sponte as if to save
face procedurally for the record at the expense of my right to due process.

7
JUDGE R EYNOLDS’ O RDER OF R ECUSAL
January 13, 2004
Plaintiff Don Hamrick has filed an action against United
States Attorney General John Ashcroft and others, and the
action was randomly assigned to me. Plaintiff has filed a
motion for recusal, alleging that an appearance of
impropriety exists because I was appointed by former
President Clinton. Plaintiff offers no evidence that could
reasonably call into question my impartiality in these
proceedings on the basis of my status as a Clinton
appointee.
However, there is now pending in the United States Court of
Federal Claims a class action lawsuit filed by a class of
present and former Department of Justice attorneys seeking
damages against the United States for alleged violations of
the Federal Employees Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5541-97
(1994). See John Doe, et al., on behalf of themselves and all
other similarly situated v. United States, Civil Action No.
98-896C. I am currently a member of that class. Since
Canon 3C(1) of the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges requires a judge to “disqualify himself . . . in a
proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned,” the Committee on Codes of Conduct of the
Judicial Conference of the United States has opined that
recusal is required from any proceeding in which the
Attorney General appears as a real party in interest, unless
a waiver of such disqualification pursuant to Canon 3D1 is
submitted by all parties involved in the suit.
Plaintiff’s motion for recusal makes plain that he would not
waive my disqualification under Canon 3C(1). Thus, my
recusal from this case is now appropriate. For the reasons
stated above, it is therefore
ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for recusal [4] be, and
hereby is, GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to
reassign this matter to the Calendar Committee. Because
United States District Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle of this
Court is also a named defendant in this suit, I
recommend to the Calendar Committee that it seek to
have a judge from another district assigned to this
matter.
1.
When the general provisions of Canon 3C(1) serve as the
basis for disqualification, Canon 3D permits a judge to
continue to participate in a proceeding if all of the parties and
lawyers, after notice of the basis for the disqualification,
agree in writing to waive the disqualification under a
procedure independent of the judge’s participation.
8
JUDGE R EYNOLDS’ R EVISED O RDER OF R ECUSAL
January 20, 2004
Plaintiff Don Hamrick has filed an action against United
States Attorney General John Ashcroft and others, and the
action was randomly assigned to me. Plaintiff has filed a
motion for recusal, alleging that an appearance of
impropriety exists because I was appointed by former
President Clinton. Plaintiff offers no evidence that could
reasonably call into question my impartiality in these
proceedings on the basis of my status as a Clinton
appointee. Accordingly, his motion will be denied.
However, there is now pending in the United States Court of
Federal Claims a class action lawsuit filed by a class of
present and former Department of Justice attorneys seeking
damages against the United States for alleged violations of
the Federal Employees Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5541-97 (1994).
See John Doe, et al., on behalf of themselves and all other
similarly situated v. United States, Civil Action No. 98-896C.
I am currently a member of that class. Since Canon 3C(1) of
the Code of Conduct for United States Judges requires a
judge to “disqualify himself . . . in a proceeding in which the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” the
Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference
of the United States has opined that recusal is required from
any proceeding in which the Attorney General appears as a
real party in interest, unless a waiver of such disqualification
pursuant to Canon 3D 1 is submitted by all parties involved in
the suit.
Plaintiff’s motion for recusal makes plain that he would not
waive my disqualification under Canon 3C(1). Thus, my
recusal from this case is now appropriate. For the reasons
stated above, it is therefore
ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for recusal [4] be, and
hereby is, DENIED. However, I am recusing myself sua
sponte. The Clerk of the Court is directed to reassign this
matter to the Calendar Committee. Because United States
District Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle of this Court is also a
named defendant in this suit, I recommend to the
Calendar Committee that it seek to have a judge from
another district assigned to this matter.
1.
When the general provisions of Canon 3C(1) serve as the
basis for disqualification, Canon 3D permits a judge to
continue to participate in a proceeding if all of the parties and
lawyers, after notice of the basis for the disqualification,
agree in writing to waive the disqualification under a
procedure independent of the judge’s participation.
 EVIDENCE OF CORRUPTION WITH JUDGE REGGIE B. WALTON
The Plaintiff notes that Judge Roberts recommended to the Calendar Committee that they
“seek to have a judge from another district assigned to this matter.” This recommendation is
in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1), UNITED STA TES AS DEFENDANT ; 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),
CHANGE OF VENUE ; and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), CURE OR W AIVER OF DEFECTS .

However it happened that you got yourself assigned to my case in defiance of Judge
Roberts’ recommendation to the Calendar Committee and in defiance of my questioning your
suitability to preside over my case because federal laws were broken and this criminal conduct
deserves an investigation by the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Justice.

On February 27, 2004, in denying my Motion for Recusal you patently lied (perjured
yourself) about the facts for recusal in your Order. Excerpted from your Order:

. . . In addition, the Court notes that it appears that the plaintiff is seeking
for this judge to recuse himself from this case because of an opinion that
this judge issued in Seegars v. Ashcroft, 297 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D.D.C. 2004),
involving a challenge pursuant to the Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution.1 The plaintiff apparently seeks for this judge to recuse
himself because his claims either involve or are related to the Second
Amendment. Because such a request has no merit, the Court would also
deny this request. Accordingly, it is hereby this 27th day of February 2004

You noted the existence of my November 10, 2003 Motion for Recusal against Judge
Roberts containing my apprehension about your impartiality because of the Seegars case in
footnote 1 on page 1 of your Order denying recusal.

The truth isthat Judge Reynolds recommended “to the Calendar Committee that it seek to
have a judge from another district assigned to this matter” and this recommendation is in
compliance with federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1), UN ITED STATES AS DEFENDANT . How you got
assigned to my case is cause enough for change of venue to Arkansas!

1
The Court notes that in a Novem ber 10, 2003 motion, the plaintiff requested that Judge Richard
Roberts of this Court recuse himself from this case and that this case not be assigned to this judge because
of the Seegars case.

9
 CANON 3
A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICE IM PARTIALLY AND
DILIGENTLY
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.
(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those
in which disqualification is required.
(2) A judge shall be faithful to the law* and maintain professional
competence in it. A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public
clamor or fear of criticism.
(3) A judge shall require* order and decorum in proceedings before the
judge.

CONTEMPTUOUS DENIAL OF STATUTORY RIGHT UNDER 28 U.S.C § 1916.

You, and every other judge of the U.S. District Court for DC and the DC Circuit have
refused to rule on my Motions concerning the statutory right of the Seamen’s Suit law, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1916 and whether or not Docket Report fees of PACER Service, Inc. are including in that
statutory right. This too is judicially criminal behavior when viewed with all the other dirty tricks
pulled by the bench and bar to keep my case from proceeding to trial.

My statutory right as a seaman to file cases without prepaying filing fees or court costs
under the Seamen’s Suit law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916, has been denied by the DC Circuit and the U.S.
Supreme Court on more than one occasion. I have taken every conceivable recourse to correct
this injustice. I have filed motions with the U.S. District Court/DC, the U.S. District Court in
Charlotte, NC, the DC Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme Court for a determination on whether
compulsory payment of filing fees at the time of filing at the DC Circuit and the U.S. Supreme
Court is extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 872.

Every motion filed is either denied, ignored or ruled moot upon dismissal. I have pursued
this matter by filing complaints with the FBI, U.S. Marshals Service, House and Senate Judiciary
Committees all without success of governmental action.

The U.S. Government has taken and continues to take full advantage of the my extremely
limited finances to the extent that I have gone broke from time to time having to ship out again
and again earning wages solely for the purpose of continuing my case. Apparently the
U.S. Department of Justice’s agenda is to win by out-spending a financially strapped
unrepresented civil plaintiff. This is not the way justice is suppose to work.

10
 TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
PART V - PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 123 - FEES AND COSTS

26 U.S.C. § 1916. Seamen’s Suits

“In all courts of the United States, seamen may institute and prosecute suits and
appeals in their own names and for their own benefit for wages or salvage or the
enforcement of laws enacted for their health or safety without prepaying fees or
costs or furnishing security therefor.”

Clarifications:
(1) “In all courts of the United States” = includes the DC Circuit and the U.S.
Supreme Court.
(2) “the enforcement of laws enacted for their . . . safety” = includes civil lawsuits
for Second Amendment rights of the American seafarer at sea aboard U.S. flag
vessels and ashore in the United States in intrastate and interstate travel.
(3) “without prepaying fees or costs or furnishing security therefor.” = means not
to pay the filing fees of the DC Circuit or the U.S. Supreme Court AND the billing
fees of PACER for access to the Docket Report.
Extorted Fees
The DC Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court extorted from the Appellant a
combined about of $1,065 in filing fees in violation of the above noted federal law
from 2002 to the present.
DC Circuit, Case No. 02-5334 $105.00
DC Circuit, Case No. 03-5021 105.00
DC Circuit, Case No. 04-5316 255.00
U.S. Supreme Court, Case No. 03-145, 300.00
U.S. Supreme Court, (DC Circuit Case No. 04-5316) 300.00
Extorted Payment of PACER Fees Paid to Date 348.00
----------
TOTAL: $1,413.00

11
 Case Law
Hobbs Act Extortion under Color Of Official Right
(DC Circuit & U.S. Supreme Court
Re: Filing Fees & 28 U.S.C. § 1916)
“In order to prove Hobbs Act extortion ‘under color of official right,’ the
[plaintiff / prosecutor] need only show that a public official has obtained
a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was
made in return for official acts.” United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 768
(3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992)).
Federal tort law: judges cannot invoke judicial immunity for acts that
violate litigants civil rights; Robert Craig Waters. TORT & INSURANCE LAW
JOURNAL, Spr. 1986 21 n3, p509-516
A Judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely
Administrative, non-judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. at
227-229, 108 S.Ct. at 544-545; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 380, 98 S.Ct.
at 1106. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.Ct. 286 at 288 (1991).
Administrative-capacity torts by a judge do not involve the “performance
of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of
authoritatively adjudicating private rights,” and therefore do not have
the judicial immunity of judicial acts. See: Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219,
98 L.Ed.2d 555, 108 S.Ct. 538 (1988); Atkinson-Baker & Assoc. v. Kolts, 7 F.3d
1452 at 1454, (9th Cir. 1993).

PREDICATE ACTS OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITIES

UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B):
(1) 18 U.S.C. § 1028 Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Identification Documents
(2) 18 U.S.C. § 1512 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE: Tampering with a Victim. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1),
(b)(2)(A), and (b)(3).
(3) 18 U.S.C. § 872 Extortion by officers or employees of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1916
(4) 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) W hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce . . . by
. . . extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(5) 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) “enterprise” includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity;
(6) 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two acts of racketeering activity,
one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within
ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity;

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 STATUTORY WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

TITLE 46--SHIPPING
CHAPTER I: COAST GUARD , DEPARTM ENT OF HOM ELAND SECURITY
PART 1: ORGANIZATION , GENERAL COURSE AND METHODS
GOVERNING MARINE SAFETY FUNCTIONS
SUBPART 1.01 ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL FLOW OF FUNCTIONS

46 CFR § 1.01-30 JUDICIAL REVIEW .

(a) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit any
party from seeking judicial review of any Commandant’s
decision or action taken pursuant to the regulations in this part
...

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Don Hamrick
5860 Wilburn Road
Wilburn, Arkansas 72179
Email: ki5ss@yahoo.com
Email: 4donhamrick@gmail.com

C ERTIFICATE OF S ERVICE
I, Don Hamrick, unrepresented Plaintiff, hereby certify that on Thursday, July 26, 2006, I FedEx’d
the above to Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States, to Dennis Barghaan,
Assistant U. S. Attorney.

___________________________________
Don Hamrick
5860 Wilburn Road
Wilburn, Arkansas 72179
Email: ki5ss@yahoo.com
Email: 4donhamrick@gmail.com

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