Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
COMMENTARY
- II -
STEVE FULLER
2 Steve Fuller, Science (Milton Keynes and Minneapolis: Open University Press and
University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 19–23.
3 William Everdell, The End of Kings: A History of Republics and Republicans (1983)
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd edn., 2000).
4 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).
28 STEVE FULLER
cism. It can lead to the reinforcement of already existing beliefs rather than
attempts to transcend them in ways that may cause internal dissent.
Karl Popper, who to my mind exhibits the republican approach to
science most clearly in our own times, used to say that from an evolu-
tionary standpoint, what marks humans from other animals is the capacity
to let our (false) ideas die in our stead.5 Nevertheless, in science, the
material resources needed to insulate one’s ideas from one’s survival have
markedly changed with the rise of ‘Big Science’. In this context, the
republican spirit can move in either of two directions.
On the one hand, republicans may make the preservation of diversity
of opinion a sine qua non of science policy. In recent times, this view
has been most closely associated with Paul Feyerabend, who advocated
the devolution of state funding for science to local authorities. Yet, Feye-
rabend’s self-styled anarchist rhetoric belied its aristocratic precedents. In
effect, he called for a return to the spirit in which science had been pursued
in the ‘Little Science’ era of tabletop experiments and personal observa-
tions of nature. But back then, the pursuit of knowledge was treated as
a leisured activity, which reflected the pursuer’s own economic security,
which in turn implied that research costs were to be measured more by
time than money. Reinstating this ethos in our own time would require a
further devolution of the state into Rousseauian communities large enough
to pursue what satisfies the majority but small enough to enable dissenters
to form their own like-minded communities.6
On the other hand, republicans may operate in the spirit of the American
founding fathers and take the presence of ‘bigness’ – both in government
and science – not merely given but even desirable (in that it provides
a ‘natural’ basis for expressing countervailing forces). They would then
construct means to ensure that majorities cannot irreversibly disempower
minorities. My own republican theory of science pursues this perspective.
In this context, there are two key republican mechanisms.
One republican mechanism is coalition formation, whereby different
groups can pursue their interests simultaneously. For example, if a Big
Science project is likely to absorb most of the research budget, then
a necessary condition for its approval should be that several research
interests are satisfied by it, as would be the case if anthropologists and
sociologists were earmarked to roam around the site of a particle accel-
erator. I call this the principle of ‘fungibility’ of research.7 The second
8 Ibid., 25–26.
9 Ibid., 85–89; Fuller, Science, op. cit. note 2, 69–74.
30 STEVE FULLER
10 Steve Fuller, Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 313–317.
11 A case in point is Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Science (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993).
32 STEVE FULLER
Department of Sociology
University of Warwick
Coventry CV4 7AL
UK
E-mail: s.w.fuller@warwick.ac.uk
12 For some discussion of the other side of the coin, Polanyi’s concern to protect society
from science, see my discussion of science as a ‘moral community’ in Fuller, Thomas
Kuhn, op. cit. note 10, 139–149.