The General Theory of Relevance and Reliability

A Synthesis of Game Theory and Communication Theory Forming an Information Theoretical Model of a Biophysical Reality

Compatible with The Superluminal Neutrino And Biological Symbiotic Cooperation

By

Mats Helander

Contents
Dedication ............................................................................................................................................... 4 Abstract ............................................................................................................................................... 5 Overview.............................................................................................................................................. 7 Introduction....................................................................................................................................... 11 Information Theory ........................................................................................................................... 14 Active and Reactive Particles............................................................................................................. 17 Space ................................................................................................................................................. 20 Time and Causality ............................................................................................................................ 20 The Static Universe ............................................................................................................................ 23 The Semi-Static Universe................................................................................................................... 23 Mass as State, as Occupation of Space and as Interaction Points .................................................... 27 Uncertainty ........................................................................................................................................ 28 Relativity ............................................................................................................................................ 29 Relative Distance and Mass ............................................................................................................... 30 Mass and Energy ............................................................................................................................... 33 Virtual Gravity ................................................................................................................................... 35 The Dynamic Universe ....................................................................................................................... 36 Theoretical Biophysics as Game Theory with Communication Theory ............................................. 37 Replicating Agent Systems ................................................................................................................ 51 Evolution of Natural Law ................................................................................................................... 52 Active Agent Gravity .......................................................................................................................... 53 Internal and External Mechanics ....................................................................................................... 54 Gravitons ........................................................................................................................................... 54 The Limits to Natural Law.................................................................................................................. 56 The Universe We Are In..................................................................................................................... 58 Quantum Mechanics ......................................................................................................................... 59 Quantum Superposition .................................................................................................................... 61 Relevance Theory .............................................................................................................................. 68 Causal Loops ...................................................................................................................................... 72 The Big Bangs .................................................................................................................................... 79 The Power of Cooperation ................................................................................................................ 80 Superluminal motion ......................................................................................................................... 81

The Semi-sonic Bat ............................................................................................................................ 86 The Expendable Neutrino .................................................................................................................. 91 Universal Ping Pong ........................................................................................................................... 93 The Dimension of Trust ..................................................................................................................... 95 Spooky Tango at a Distance............................................................................................................... 99 Teleportation ................................................................................................................................... 101 De-coherence and Many Worlds..................................................................................................... 102 Collapsing Dimensions..................................................................................................................... 104 Dark Energy as Virtual Anti-Gravity ................................................................................................. 107 Indeterminism ................................................................................................................................. 109 The Necessity Of Comprise.............................................................................................................. 114 Logic and Mathematics ................................................................................................................... 114 Summary ......................................................................................................................................... 115

Dedication
This work is dedicated to Theza Helander, Kerstin Helander, Bo Helander and to Dick Lundqvist. With special thanks for inspiration to Daniel C. Dennett, Richard Dawkins. This work is also in living memory of Newton, Darwin, Einstein, Planck and Lao Tze.

Abstract
With the recent additional empirical confirmation to the experiments measuring the superluminal neutrino, this paper intends to present a model compatible with information theory and consistent with the possibility of such measurement. Coupled with a theoretical biophysical examination our model will also demonstrate an information theoretical rational for some otherwise unexplained biological measurements of symbiotic cooperation in nature that cannot fully be explained by the mechanism of kin selection. This paper will perform an information theoretical analysis combining game theory and communication theory to derive a mathematical model compatible with and holding predictive power over the constraints to cooperation among non-related biological organisms in nature. The analysis also derives information theoretical support for preferring to assign a minimal rest mass of 1 rather than 0 to the photon and to empty space. The additional energy available in such a model is used to explain the information theoretical compatibility of measurements such as that of a superluminal neutrino. The minimal rest mass of space is used to represent Dark Matter in this model whereas Dark Energy is shown to be a predictable effect to the result to measurements over large stretches of space. The paper concludes by suggesting a potentially low-cost experiment to test the validity of its model by demonstrating the Dark Energy effect in an earthly laboratory. In this paper we will derive a biophysical model of reality from information theory by integrating game theory and communication theory. The result of the analysis of this model will be used to propose a scientific hypothesis for explaining several reliably measured but so far unexplained phenomenon of cooperation in nature as well as the perhaps not yet fully reliably measured - but potentially in need of explanation - phenomenon of the superluminal neutrino. The model will finally predict the recently measured phenomenon of Dark Energy and go on to outline an experiment that could confirm the validity of the model by demonstrating in a low energy setting the kind of Dark Energy effect (accelerating redshift) that we associate with the measurements that could otherwise have seemed to indicate that other stars were accelerating away from us. This model derived in this paper will go under the name of the General Theory of Relevance and Reliability which is a model of a biophysical reality that is derived strictly from information theory such that we can analyze the model to discover necessary mathematical constraints that must be associated with any logically consistent universe - including ours to the extent that our universe must not break the rules of information theory and to the extent that the model presented in this paper is deemed internally logically consistent and its concepts have been defined correctly such as to be in external logical correspondence with their real world counterpart concepts that we have derived from established measurements. The model and the conclusions of this paper are presented in the form of a scientific (falsifiable) hypothesis where the hypothesis is that the model we derive from information theory holds predictive power over measurement in our world, such as to outline the shape of all possible activity in the model and by extension in our world. The model makes specific predictions as to the impossibility of certain types of measurements. If repeatable such measurements are made, the model has been falsified.

Perhaps unexpectedly for a physical model, it will help us find a mathematical rational for cooperation in nature which is considered a deep information theoretical problem in the domain of game theory such as to put observation (nature is full of cooperation) in conflict with the most widely accepted scientific model for biology, The Modern Synthesis which is the Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection (Darwin) as applied to genes and which states that selfish competition is a more rational strategy for genes in the long run than cooperation would be (except in the case of genes in individuals that are very closely related where we can expect to see examples of so called kin selection). We will also discuss the information theoretical compatibility of the model with the recently measured phenomenon of the superluminal neutrino which is considered a potential conflict (it could still be error in measurement) between observation of nature and the currently most widely adopted scientific model for macro physics, the General Theory of Relativity (Einstein) which states that it should be theoretically impossible for any particle to approach another with a speed greater than light speed. This paper will also examine the compatibility of its model with the measurements and known constraints that govern physics on the micro (quantum) scale to ensure that the constraints derived from our model will be in harmony with the established and generally accepted scientific Standard Model. The intention of this paper is to construct a mathematical model of reality that includes an absolute reality from which both the set of relative realities we measure on the macro scale as well as the set of superposition realities we see on the micro (quantum) scale can be derived by applying a measure of uncertainty to the measurements of local observers in the absolute reality. We will also see how biological systems, which will be our term for an ultimately mathematical description of logical machine systems of motors, sensors and controllers, can reduce uncertainty faster compared to nonbiological systems (matter not organized into such working machines) and so incorporate communication theory into the model to make it describe the constraints for a model of a universe with biological components. Thus in our model we combine the constraints of standard physics and biology under one formula, where the symbol r stands for economic relevance of measurement (as in biological potential) and t stands for trust or reliability regarding measurement of data including data in communication channels. The model we describe includes an absolute reality where local observers are constrained by necessity to some uncertainty in their measurements including uncertainty in their estimations of the intentions of each other and can be expressed mathematically with the following formula:

E m2* c2* (r2+ t2) m2* c2* 2

We will see how the hypothesis predicts the possibility of an unexplained phenomenon in our measurements that has so far seemed impossibly in contrast with the predictions of Einstein; the recently measured superluminal neutrino. Should those measurements be deemed correct, the model presented in this paper to the extent that it is found mathematically consistent is more compatible with observed measurement than any currently established scientific model. The model can also explain the phenomenon of spooky action at a distance without invoking de-coherence (many-worlds theory) making it a lighter model from an information theoretical perspective to describe the micro world. Without the confirmation of a superluminal neutrino, however, this paper

will present a model that may be more lightweight but that brings no new predictive power to our observations of the purely physical universe. But we do have a measured phenomenon in nature that is not the result of error in measurement and that we know that we must need a new model to explain. The very well established but so far unexplained measurement of cooperation in nature has presented us with an actual mathematical and information theoretical dilemma, so far putting our best understanding of mathematics in deep conflict with observation of nature. Thus the primary contribution of this paper, should it be seen logically and mathematically consistent, would be to provide an information theoretically based model that resolves the game theoretical conflict between observation and theory such that we can have a model that would predict the behavior of the cooperation we can measure in nature. Expressed in logical terms, the model presented in this paper will roughly speaking conclude that while game theory seems to imply that you should never have any reason to trust anyone, communication theory dictates that whenever two organisms have reason to trust each other they can become twice as energy efficient which in turn gives them an excellent reason to want to trust each other. Game Theory only tempers this observation by noticing that the overly nave cooperator will perish, such as anyone can understand from the thought experiment of running trustingly into a pack of hungry lions. The key to maximal energy efficiency in the model derived in this paper by combining game theory and communication theory and that is expressed using mathematical notation in the formula presented above will thus be seen to be: Establish trust with reason to maximize efficiency for both parties. Darwinian evolution by Natural Selection will then be seen to ensure the ultimate success of the cautious cooperator before that of the purely selfish competitor. It is important to note the difference between E = mc2 as proposed by Einstein and E mc2 which is one of the constraints derived in this paper. The formula by Einstein is designed as to form a mathematical model with predictive power over future measurements such as to say what they should be. If we see measurements that deviate from his predictions of how measurements should look, his hypothesis has been falsified such that we know that his model is not entirely correct. We go on to note that with the measurement of the superluminal neutrino, unless we can blame mistakes in our measurements (always a possibility!) the predictions of Einstein have been falsified, making his model less than totally correct but still much better than totally wrong. This is in exactly the same way that the model of Einstein would continue to be less wrong than the model of Newton which is in turn still much better than a totally wrong model. E mc2 on the other hand is a constraint derived from information theory that describes what type of results we should not be able to see in our measurements. We make the basic assumption that if there are non-random patterns in the results of our measurements then there are non-random (i.e. logical) causes at work in the world we measure, such that we must live in a universe to which at

Overview

least a minimal measure of logic applies. As we see such non-random data in our measurements, we know that the rules of logic as applied to the premises of information theory (ultimately also based in logic) should thus be able to tell us some necessary constraints on the universe we live in. If we see that the result of a measurement goes outside of the constraint of the formula described in this paper, then in the case of the arguments presented here either the deepest premises of information theory are wrong (unlikely) or one or more of the deductions from it that we derive are incorrect (more likely). The falsifiability criteria required of a scientific hypothesis is thus in this case fulfilled by predictions of what we should never be able to see rather than what we should always see. If we make a repeatable measurement that should not be allowed according to the constraints of our formula, then the model presented in this paper has failed its test to accurately describe the world we see around us. Strictly speaking the formula we will derive describes the exact shape of impossibility from which the range of possibility can be inferred by inversion, so if we see a measurement that the formula rules out as impossible, the mathematical model of the universe we will discuss has been falsified as less than totally true. Regardless of its potential for ultimate falsification, if the model proposed in this paper is deemed on inspection by the scientific community to be mathematically and logically valid and the measurements of the faster-than-light neutrino hold up to inspection, it would remain a better model for predicting the range of possible measurements than the one proposed by Einstein i.e. a little less wrong than Einsteins model just as Einsteins was a little less wrong than Newtons model as this model does not rule out the possibility of such superluminal neutrinos. We will use information theory to derive the formula R m1 * m2 / d2, where m1 and m2 stands for the absolute number of interaction points or mass of two points and d stands for the absolute distance between them, and see how it describes the optimum rate R by which uncertainty regarding the state of each other in the local perspective of the points can decrease over time as a result of measurements. Reformulated using c to stand for the maximum speed that information about an effect can travel we get E m1 * m2 * c2 which describes an ultimate information theoretical constraint for any and all natural forces such that during a given time interval it describes the maximum energy E or strength over distance for the natural force (as in the maximum range in space it could have any effect on during a given time). E mc2 is an application of this formula in which only one mass is involved and concerns the optimum conversion rate between empty space and occupied space in the form of mass (or how much empty space any conversion effect between empty space and mass would be able to reach such as to convert it during a given time span). The equivalence with E m1 * m2 * c2 is seen as in this case the second mass is regarded as approaching the minimally stable rest mass, represented as 1. We will also note that relativistic effects like relative mass and distance and quantum mechanical effects such as superposition can in this model be regarded as examples of the same effect such that superposition can be interpreted as negative relativistic mass and distance. This general effect stems

from uncertainty of measurements by local observers on a reality that in the mathematical model we will examine (and despite the limited perspectives and possible doubts of its internal observers) has an absolute, exact state. We will discuss two logically possible and fully mechanical (information theory compatible) candidate implementation methods for the force of nature known as gravity to describe how we could come to see solid particles behaving in accordance with the abovementioned formula. One method is generally well known (LaSages Theory of Gravitation) whereas the other could be seen as more mathematically esoteric, although hardly new to subjects to the field of theoretical biophysics. The biophysical implementation for gravity examined in this paper is based on how the formula E m1 * m2 * c2 puts an information theoretical limit to optimal behavior for the mathematical idealization of active agents (machines with sensors, motors and control systems) trying to approach or avoid each other based on measurements suffering from uncertainty. Any active agent systems, including theoretical solid particles with substructures arranged into systems of sensors, motors and controllers, would always be limited by uncertainty in the optimization of connections between motors and sensors with the result that agents guided by their measurements of mass and distance and that happen to represent opportunity to each other will move towards each other by the same acceleration as we associate with gravity. While we will go on to note that our world could in fact be populated by solid particles with internal substructures turning them into agents, the point of this paper is not to try to convince the reader that this must be the case. We are only discussing mathematical models with such theoretical particles in it to see what mathematical constraints would apply to them. The important aspect to this part of the discussion is to help us see how information theory places a constraint on how optimal particle behavior in a system may possibly look. We will see that active agent particles represent the fastest performing implementation a force of nature could possibly have without invoking instantaneous information spread, because it can react to the fastest possible type of spread of information about the effect (i.e. pure light particles with only minimally stable rest mass) such that an effect like gravity could spread at exactly the speed of light. Being able to examine an optimal implementation allows us to transfer any constraints found on this type of implementation to all other implementations as they can only be optimal as well or suboptimal. The result is that we can see how E m1 * m2 * c2 represents a hard constraint on any and all implementations of any and all forces of nature. We will go on to see how active agents could find advantages over each other by prioritizing their measurements as they compete for limited resources under the constraints of the uncertain universe. Such agents follow the rules of a Darwinian, living universe where two collections of particles comprising equal mass may represent different threats or opportunities to an observer due to their different structures in just the way that a delicious cake or a dangerous snake are both more interesting to most readers than a plain old rock of equal mass and distance away. This leads to yet another distortion to the perception of distance or mass to the agent observer such that the cake and the snake seem closer or more solid than the rock. In addition to the relativistic world of Einstein where less certain things seem further away or less solid, we will see that in the perception of agent observers under Darwinian natural selection pressures, less relevant things seem

to be further away or less solid in accordance with the formula E m1 * m2 * c2* r2 where r2 stands for the combined priorities of the measurements in the opinions of the agents as an additional dimension of relevance. We will see that r2 takes a value between 0 and 1 such that 1 equals 100% relevance and 0% applies to a measurement that can be totally ignored according to both agents observing each other. The formula E m1 * m2 * c2* r2 correspondingly constrains the strength during a given time interval for all active agent based natural forces in a living universe with (in its mathematical description) three spatial dimensions, one dimension of directional time, one dimension of mass and one dimension of relevance. As we mathematically describe a universe where multiple active agents could cooperate to implement a natural force, we note that in an optimal (or stale) system r2 approaches 1 and can be ignored, taking us back again to dead matter physics. It is however an interesting constraint in that it indicates the shape with which a system of evolving agents can approach the optimum (as r2 approaches 1) where variance to the general shape can be explored by splitting r2 into r1 and r2 representing the potentially asymmetrical relevance opinions of each agent on the other, corresponding to situations when agents can have information advantages over each other. For a unilateral active agent implementation of a natural force where a single agent has to implement the force without the help of others (as when other particles are only dead matter particles) the formula becomes just E m1 * m2 * c2* r and when both particles are dead matter particles (as in a universe with only dead matter) we return to the relativistic formula E m1 * m2 * c2. Finally we will go on to see how a universe that allows entanglement could be modeled mathematically as a seven-dimensional universe with the six previously described dimensions plus an extra dimension of mutual trust (reliability of measurement in a communications channel) allowing more efficient communication between otherwise generally competing agents. We eventually compress this model to three concrete dimensions of time, space and mass in absolute existence and two virtual dimensions of relevance and uncertainty (a term we will substitute with reliability or trust) that are experienced by all living observers in the universe and that can be thought of as making up the other two dimensions of space that observers in the model will perceive. Coupled with the logical proposition that in a mathematical model which does include an absolute universe it would stand to reason that two particles of light must approach each other with a combined speed of 2 * c and using the symbol t which can take a value between 0 and 1 to describe the level of trust in the data of a communication channel we get the formula E m1 * m2 * c2* (r2+ t2) which constrains the strength over distance during a given timeframe represented as the energy E of any natural force in such a five dimensional universe. The most compact form of this formula is E m2* c2* r2* t2 m2* c2 which describes the constraints to dead matter physics and the most expanded form is E m1* m2 * c1 * c2 * ((r1 * r2) + (t1 * t2)) which describes the constraints to biophysics. Both are constrained by the value E m2* c2* 2 and together with a mathematically consistent description of how we can make do with only one absolute dimension of space we get the model that is the conclusion of this paper: The formula derived in this paper describes mathematically the information theoretical constraints to the shape on a model of a universe with three absolute dimensions one of space, one of time and one of mass (informational density) and where local biological observers are constrained by

imperfection in their measurements to perceive two more virtual dimensions related to the impact of uncertainty in measurement on game theory and communication theory and that we describe with r for relevance of measurement and t for trust in or reliability of measurement and where the range of measurements are seen to include those of information in communication channels between biological observers where uncertainty regarding the intentions of each other are taken into account. These two additional dimensions can be perceived by local biological observers as orthogonal dimensions of space such that local biological observer may have an experience of three-dimensional space having differential density in a universe where time passes. Our model will demonstrate that communication theory shows how game theory must be modified to add the two aspects of relevance and reliability rather than reduce one from the other. Generally accepted game theory holds that lower probability scores must imply decreased overall potential. In this paper we will we see our model demonstrate that when combining game theory with communication theory the correct application becomes to let the higher probability increase the overall potential in all game theoretical models that take communication into account. This paper presents a mathematical model derived from information theory for a five-dimensional, biological universe with one dimension of absolute space, one dimension of absolute time, one dimension of absolute mass, one abstract dimension of biological relevance of measurements and one abstract dimension of biological trust in measurements such that the model includes mutual uncertainty for its biological observers regarding the intentions of other each other, where the model can be expressed using mathematical notation by the following formula:

E m2* c2* (r2+ t2) m2* c2* 2

Einstein demonstrated how all observers must experience relativistic effects under the General Theory of Relativity. This paper will present a model that shows all competing biological observer systems (strictly speaking whether they are conscious or not) to experience and behave in accordance with relevance based effects and reliability based effects in a five dimensional universe that has one absolute dimensions of space, one absolute dimension of time, one absolute dimension of mass, one virtual dimension of relevance and one virtual dimension of trust or reliability under what is called the General Theory of Relevance and Reliability. The main potential for scientific contribution with the model and analysis presented in this paper would be to show the information theoretical compatibility with two so far unexplained observations of nature where at least one of them is well established the prevalence of cooperating biological systems in nature and where one is still too recent to be established but has experiments being repeated to confirm or discard them the measurements of the superluminal neutrino.

Introduction
Science has advanced by making measurements and creating mathematical models matching the measurements, improving the correspondence of the models to our world over time with the increasing amount of measurements. This approach will result in models that are mathematically correct descriptions of our world as far as we have measured it, but it will not allow us to conclude that reality is implemented using the same models as we have derived.

With relativity science arrived at a mathematical description of reality as a set of relative realities that did not from the strict mathematical sense require any absolute reality to complete the model. Quantum mechanics led in the same general direction where the micro scale would be represented as a set of multiple overlapping realities but again with no absolute reality behind it. From a purely mathematical perspective, the existence of an absolute reality became a redundancy. Apparently mathematically simpler (one less reality in the model) and from that sense more attractive, the descriptions of our world that would not include an absolute reality came to prevail in science. But we remind ourselves that while our scientific descriptions of the world will be mathematically correct, they do not have to match the actual implementation of reality which could be implemented in any other way that would give the same effect to our measurements. The question then becomes: While reality as a set of relative realities including no absolute reality is a mathematical possibility for modeling our universe, we could ask ourselves if it is the only model that could work and should we see that it is not - we could even ask if it is a statistically plausible implementation model for the universe we exist in. On one hand, unless logically prevented for some reason, it would seem that an implementation with no absolute reality would win by virtue of being simpler as it supposes one less reality in the model. On the other hand, an implementation using a model with an absolute reality from which the set of relative and overlapping realities could be derived would be less costly from an information theoretical perspective and should then be preferred. In this paper we will show that the set of relative realities of relativity and the set of overlapping realities of quantum mechanics are fully derivable from a model with an absolute reality, ultimately presenting a mathematically more attractive scientific model of the universe. As information theory would indicate that using an absolute reality model would be the least costly implementation for a universe that gives the effects we see in our measurements, we also observe that the best (least improbable although not necessary) assumption is that the world around us is indeed implemented in the form of an absolute reality, where the relative realities are derived from the inescapable uncertainty in the measurements of its local observers. In this paper we will examine concepts like time, space, mass and energy as well as logical machines such as agents and replicators by building up information theoretical models of universes where we add different concepts one by one. By doing so we are able to examine the nature of each concept in isolation and ensure that they all oblige to information theoretical constraints. As we derive the definitions for our model we must focus on their logical consistency but also on how they match generally established expectations about the real-world features and behaviors of each concept being defined, including any obligatory constraints known to be associated with them from real world observations. It will be an ultimately information theoretical discussion where we derive constraints for an abstract model of a universe from constraints that must apply to all information. This exercise is useful because constraints that must apply on any logically consistent abstract description of a universe should logically apply to a concrete universe as well, since the rules of information theory cant be

violated by non-magical physics (with a definition of magic as something that breaks the rules of information theory). We can see this follow from the observation that the set of all physically concrete universes in existence belongs to the set of all physically possible universes which is a subset of the set of all logically possible universes that all general rules for all logically possible universes (those constrained by the rules of information theory) apply to all existing physically concrete universes as well. In a way we are examining the entirely abstract specification for a potentially concretely implementable computer program that if implemented would allow us to ensure the logical consistency and compatibility of our model with the rules of information theory. This would not necessarily have to be an expensive endeavor as the simulation of the kind of model universe that we will end up with does not rely on exponentially expanding information capacity as it only includes one absolute state model from which ephemeral state models representing the perspectives of local observers in the model can be derived and then discarded as time in the model proceeds. This is like the difference between having to evaluate all the positions in a chess state tree compared to just having to evaluating one step forward, moving to the best step, discard the old calculations, evaluate one step forward, move to the best step, repeat. The specifications should describe features matching those we see of the universe around us as best we can. If we can logically derive constraints that must apply to any implementation of the specification in the form of a running program, then to the extent that the features described in our specification match those of our universe, information theory and logic suggests that the same constraints should apply to any concrete implementation of a universe such as ours. The task of the reader will be to consider what constraints any implementation of the abstract specification for a universe we describe must have and to verify that the logical deductions we use to derive such constraints in this paper are correct. If the deductions are correct then the constraints we derive should apply to our universe to exactly the extent that the definitions in our specification match the definitions for the information theoretically essential aspects of our universe. Thus the reader must take great care to evaluate not just the logical deductions that will follow from our premises, but also that the definitions we create correspond in a correct manner to the expected features we see in measurements of the real-world phenomena we are trying to model. The claim of this paper boils down to under these conditions, this and this would (not be allowed to) happen. The reader must decide not only if the deductions are correct, but if the required conditions apply at all to the world around us. In the same way that Darwins argument for Evolution by Natural Selection is ultimately algorithmic (purely information theoretical, specifically game theory) and can be proven logically correct in a computer, the model or algorithm proposed in this paper can in the same way be proven formally by a computer program. Should the program be shown to run correctly and according to the predictions in this paper we could go on with some confidence to work on matching its features with greater precision to our pre-existing knowledge in the form of our database of scientific measurements of our universe. In the same way that deep information theoretical conclusions about abstract representations of the universe can be drawn by considering Conways Game of Life (a very simplistic but working computer

model of an abstract universe) even without implementing that model in a computer, we hope to be able to draw interesting conclusions about abstract universes and thus by extension our concrete universe from our computer models of the universe. Thus we will use what are really just logical and mathematical arguments to describe limitations on what the physical universe we see around us must be. At some level it may also be hard to distinguish between the concepts of an abstract and a concrete universe. Nonetheless towards the final pages of this paper we will go on to discuss what could constitute such a distinction and how a universe could make the jump from abstract to concrete. To see an example of a possible abstract universe that could perhaps not be concrete in a meaningful sense, we will examine a fully static universe in which no time passes. There is space in such a universe which might be enough to satisfy the requirements of concreteness for some readers but opinions might differ as to whether a meaningful concept of time, distinguishable from space, is also a necessary component for a universe to be really concrete. Towards the end we will discuss how there could be a minimum requirement for any meaningful description of a concrete universe such that at least three concepts must be present: space with some kind of shape to it, time such that shapes of space can change and some form of balance between causality and randomness constraining the shape changes such as to be exploitable by self-replicating shapes. The argument presented in this paper will be ultimately founded in logic and the constraints imposed on all information as described in information theory. In order to make sure all our logical deductions take place on solid ground we must begin by clearly establishing what those basic constraints are.

Information Theory
Concrete information has energy cost in space over time and relies on distinction (but not conflict) to have meaning. Conversely, the destruction of abstract information has an energy cost such that information, once in existence, is never truly lost. The most fundamental premise we should make for any model of a universe and that we should always demand of the model we discuss in this paper is that that the sum total of mass and energy should remain constant. According to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, all signals in space degrade over time. A signal is to be thought of as any kind of concrete representation of information (an ordered or less than random state) meaning that the information must be corrupted over time (the inevitable direction of time pushing the universe towards less and less ordered states). This law can be seen to correspond to one of the most basic premises in information theory, which is that all sustenance of concrete representations of information has an energy cost. On the one hand, thus, information theory seems a very gloomy topic focused on the inevitability of the universe turning into chaos. On the other hand, information theory also tells us that, once in existence, it would actually require energy to totally destroy (or hide) information. These two premises seem completely at odds with each other until you realize that the Second Law of Thermodynamic strictly speaking only applies to concretely represented information. That is, information represented with solid matter. Information in light particles, on the other hand, is eternal.

The simple way to picture this is that if you write a message in the sand, tides and crabs will eventually move the sand so the concrete representation of your message becomes lost, but the light particles that bounced from your message when it was there will forever zoom through space with the information about what the message looked like. As they bounce off more things they will fill with more information but they will never lose the information about your message as they do so. This is why we can look back in history towards the birth of our cosmos the light particles we pick up still carry information about that event and there are even particles that havent seen much other action yet such that we can start to see a fairly clear picture of very early cosmological events. Thus information is never truly lost, as this would break the most fundamental premise we have: That the total mass and energy of the universe should remain constant (there is no extra energy there to totally destroy information). So on balance there seems we have a dark side and a bright side to information theory. Solid representations of information as patterns of solid particles will wither but the pattern itself is never truly lost from the universe as it remains encoded in light particles. We will derive our conclusions from the premises of three basic information theoretical rules relating to the concepts of space, time and distinction. Conversely, you might say that we will look at the definitions of the concepts space, time and distinction from an information theoretical perspective. It will be important in this paper to provide clear mental models for all concepts the reader is asked to consider. If there is no clear mental model of what we are conceptually trying to say, it will be hard to verify if the claims check out. We will thus often take care to describe ultimately information theoretical relationships in the form of concrete examples using space, time and distinction in the form of mass (the distinction of differential density for space) such that the reader can build and run models in their heads to see that, logically, they should behave in the way we propose they should. The three information theoretical rules we will rely on in all our arguments are the following: 1) Information has cost of space, such that without any space for it to be in there is no information. Space can be thought of in terms informational capacity and also in a logically matching way as potential or energy. In the model we will consider in this paper there is a logical minimal energy level associated with empty space and that is represented by the number 1 such that mathematically speaking the energy of space approaches 1 rather than 0. Mathematics allows us to place the zero where we like so we use it in the fundamentally logical way of letting 0 energy represent the concept of no energy at all whereas we let the symbol 1 represent that minimal energy or rest mass for a particle to exist in a reliable way to outside observers (such that it can represent non-random information to the observer, meaning that it represents informational capacity to the observer). We see that information has a basic minimal energy cost of space that we can think of as the information needing space to exist in. Furthermore, moving information through space is associated with degradation of the information such that a signal degrades in proportion to the distance in space it has to travel.

2) Information has a cost in time, such that (unless completely isolated in its space) without maintenance information is corrupted over time. Maintaining isolation or maintaining the non-isolated information both draw energy, so what we state here is that information has energy cost over time. In other words a signal degrades in proportion to the distance in time it has to travel. This is essentially a restatement of the Second Law of Thermodynamics and is a consequence of statistics. We should note here that information theory also states that ultimately information is not destroyed spontaneously (you have to add energy to destroy it) which seems like a contradiction at first but we have seen that the solution is that while any concrete, solid particle representation of information will wither over time, the information about all the states the information has been in (including corrupted states of course) will live on forever as captured in photons. What if we imagine some pattern of solid particles that no photons ever bounce off? If other solid particles bounce on them then the information is abstractly contained in those particles and if no particles at all (solid or photons) bounce off the pattern then those solid particles are also so isolated as to not become corrupted over time, so everything still works out (no information is destroyed). We conclude by observing that such a condition would correspond to a very strong isolation that would require a lot of energy to maintain. 3) Information relies on distinction. This is like observing that the bits of a computer needs two states, 0 and 1, for it to be such a useful container of information. With, say, only zeros in it, the only information it could represent would be the number of zeroes it had capacity for. A computer with 6 memory cells that could only hold a zero each would only ever represent the information of the number six (a rather inefficient use of a computer). Inefficient or not, if there is any information (as the number 6 is) then it still relies on a minimal distinction- in this case that between a minimal amount of memory space inside a computer and no amount of memory space inside a computer. To create a solid mental model to verify the logical claims against these rules of information theory with, we can picture them as follows: Imagine one wants to store a message (in binary of course) by creating a pattern with little pebbles in the sand on the beach. You measure up a certain space with a twig such that all the pebbles would fit inside and use the twig to draw parallel lines at equal distances along the beach. Then you go ahead and place a pebble in every space between two lines where you want a 1 and leave the space between two lines empty when you want a 0. Note that if you have more 1s than 0s in the pattern, you would inverse the strategy to let pebbles represent zeros, such that having more 1s than 0s will not suddenly place a new requirement on having a larger number of pebbles. You will in other words only need half as many pebbles as you have drawn cells in the sand. If you have no pebbles you could just draw another little line between those lines you had drawn where you wanted a 1 and no extra line where you wanted a 0. The important part is the distinction of density such that a pebble with mass is obviously denser than no pebble at all, but we can also see that compared to the length of the twig you can use the distinction such that lines are drawn at either the full length or half the length of the twig the density of lines per space can be higher or lower.

The concept that information has a cost of space of course means that you need somewhere to place the pebbles or at least draw the lines. Furthermore, if you keep moving the pattern away from the rising tide, statistically speaking you will eventually make a mistake. We would be able to observe that moving information through space is associated with degradation of the information such that a signal degrades in proportion to the distance in space it has to travel. The concept that information has cost in time just means that unless you build a really good wall around the information, when you come back tomorrow the random impact of wind, rain and bypassing crabs will at least eventually move some of your pebbles out of place. Of course, if you build a wall around the pebbles you would always have to come back periodically to maintain that instead, for exactly the same reason (the wind and - unless you could strike some kind of deal with them - the crabs. Killing the crabs is not really a viable solution as nature if left to it seems to provide a very large supply of crabs and most of us would like to keep it that way). The concept of distinction, finally, means that we need some way to describe the difference (pebble, no pebble, even just more marks in the sand) between two equally long distances of space (sand). Pebbles versus no pebbles will be a useful way to mentally model this concept of distinction as it will help us to understand the fundamental relationship between space and mass. The distinction we will make is thus that one information cell state will have lower density (as in less mass or, inversely, more space) and the other information cell state will have higher density (more mass or less space) such that mass as a concept will act as the inversion of the concept of space. With these basic concepts in place we will now go on to use them to build our information theoretical models of universes that we can examine for logically necessary behaviors. The path to building up our first universe will start with particles, as they will be the basic building blocks in all of the several model universes we will examine in this paper. As we go on, take care to build up the corresponding mental models, run them in the mind in accordance with the suggested behaviors and verify that their behaviors do not become logically or mathematically impossible.

Active and Reactive Particles

Our model will consider two mathematical classes of particles that we will call active particles and reactive particles and that will correspond to our information theoretical concept of mass and space as inverse concepts (the distinction that allows information to be information) such that active particles are like solid particles with mass and reactive particles are like space (or, as we shall see, photons). The corresponding distinction we will make between active and reactive particles will be to state that: In our model, reactive particles only carry information about the active particles but no (or rather only the logical minimum of) information about themselves whereas the active particles can carry information about themselves and potentially about other active particles as well.

We will also state our definitions such that: In our model, active particles can cause changes in the information state of other active particles (which can be pictured as their ability to push each other around) as well as being

able to change the information state of the reactive particles (reactive particles can bounce off active particles). Reactive particles on the other hand can affect the information state of each other (push each other around) but are not able to affect the information state of any active particles anywhere directly (reactive particles cant push active particles around) but can only impact active particles to the extent that active particles detect the information about other active particles carried by a reactive particle and reacts to that information (If Bob makes a motion as to push Caesar and Caesar flinches and falls, Bob never physically pushed Caesar even though he directly caused him to fall via information transmitted in photons). While the active particles can be thought of as solid particles, the reactive particles could really be thought of as two different things (that may not really be so different after all). The reactive particles in our model will represent the real-world concepts of space (in this model we think of space as a reactive space particle) as well as the photon. Information theory tells us that all information has cost, and so the default assumption should be that one active particle carrying information about itself and a reactive particle carrying essentially the same information about the active particle ought to be equally heavy from an information theoretical perspective. However, we will create our definitions in such a way as to make this not true by stating that a reactive particle can be lighter from an information theoretical point of view than the active particle it carries information about. We can thus see that it makes sense for an information theoretical model to call the reactive particles light particles and the active particle heavy (massive or solid) particles. Relating the information in the particles to our usually desired concepts of a universe we say that the information of a particle represents spatial shape such that it describes a shape in one or more dimensions of space. Active particles are solid particles with their own shape whereas reactive particles have no shape of their own (are not solid) and can only carry information about the shape of the active particles (as they carry no information about themselves to say what their own shape should be). The terms active and reactive thus relate to how active particles can maintain a shape due to their state information about what their shape should be, whereas reactive particles cannot influence their own shape (they carry no information about how to do so). The result is that the shape of a reactive particle will always be formed in reaction to the active particles it interacts with. To picture this, imagine a solid particle with a certain shape. The space around it could be considered a reactive particle with a shape that is entirely the consequence of the solid particle. Herein lies the explanation to why the reactive particle would not become as heavy (information has cost) as the active particle even though it carried information about it. It is essentially free for the space around a solid particle to represent the information about the shape of the particle, as no new information has to be added to the system for the space around the solid particle to retain its shape. The inverse of an information state is directly mathematically derivable (101 becomes 010) so we only need the information in the active particle to be able to completely derive the shape of the reactive particle by inversion. An alternative to the terms active and reactive particles would be to talk of particles and inverse particles, but we will stick with the terms active and reactive particles throughout the rest of this paper.

We must also go on to note that without instantaneous spread of information, if the solid particle changes its shape the effect could not be instantaneously transmitted to other distant solid particles via the corresponding shape change of space. The effect would have to travel at a maximum speed of information in a sort of ripple through empty space, and so we see that there must be some sort of limit to how close to a true concept of nothing empty space can really be as at the very least some type of ripple effect or corresponding means of communicating information about state changes of solid particles must be able to travel through it. This corresponds to our assumption of a minimal energy or information capacity for empty space such that the energy, minimal rest mass or information capacity of empty space in our formulas will mathematically be seen to approach 1 rather than 0. In other words reactive particles must have some minimal information state of their own, but we will often talk about them as if they were completely empty of their own state. We must remember in all such cases that we are really talking about a type of space particle that would still not be completely empty. Whenever we talk about reactive particles as if they were entirely the opposite of solid we must remember that we are then just visiting an idealized mathematical universe where such things could be possible, but we know that logically they are not completely corresponding to the concept of void. We thus make a mental note that in physical reality it should logically be the case that reactive particles would have to contain at least some minimal amount of state (as we do not allow instantaneous information spread in a universe where time does pass, something we will go on to examine in greater detail). One possibility for how just a little state in reactive particles could communicate the required information about state changes of active particles is that a reactive particle has just one piece of state information of its own its position. Changes in positions of empty space particles could be enough to communicate the information about shape changes in active particles. The phenomenon of light could then be a case of ripple effects in the position changes of empty space. To recapitulate, reactive particles have in our model only the logically minimal rest mass and we let the concept of the reactive particle represent both the real-world concepts of photons and empty space whereas active particles have a more than minimal rest mass and are seen in as the representatives in our model for the real world concept of solid particles. We have skipped ahead slightly to be able to introduce the fundamental concept of particles, but their definitions rely to some extent on concepts of space, time and mass terms we have defined from an information theoretical perspective but that could use some more careful inspection to ensure our definitions of them not only match the expected features that we conceptually associate with these terms as a result of our scientific measurements but that they all represent distinguishable concepts that require distinct classification. Specifically, it seems hard to distinguish between the concepts of time and space at this point (they seem to have very similar effects on information) and so we should take some care to figure out what the actual distinction between time and space could be. Thus we will now step back to inspect our most fundamental definitions before we start building model universes with our particles.

Space
What qualities must we associate with the concept of space to meet the basic requirement on all our definitions to fulfill generally expected features for the concepts we use? At the very least, we should assume that any concept we want to model including space needs a minimal amount of information to describe it. Equipped with only this fundamental observation we can go on to examine some other necessary and expected qualities of space, again from an information theoretical perspective but this time with greater attention to what we mean by the expected behavior of space. As we have seen, one aspect of space is to relate it to the information theoretical concept of informational cost, such that all information has a basic cost to the extent that it has to be stored somewhere. In other words, storage capacity is one aspect of space that we should include in our definitions. Another important constraint to the behavior of space that we also get from information theory is that space is supposed to have a quality such that a signal degrades the greater the distance it has to travel. Thus space should also embody an aspect of distance, such that our definition of space should not only reflect the storage needed to store the information about it, the information should in turn be taken to represent geometrical distance such as can degrade a signal. With the idea of geometrical distance comes the idea of geometrical shape, so we arrive at the idea that the concept of space should represent information with storage cost where the information is interpreted as geometrical distance (such a thing as degrades signals trying to traverse it) which is to say that the information represents shape.

Time and Causality

With the concept of space in place we go on to examine the concept of time. We start by relating the new concept of time to our established concept of space by assuming that one way to look at time is as just another dimension of space and then we go on to see why this assumption does not quite hold in order to distinguish between our concepts of space and time. If we start by looking at the storage capacity for two dimensions of space, we could see this as a flat checkerboard where each cell holds information about the shape in that position. To turn this into a three dimensional space, we would extend the checkerboard into a box, such that if we had length * width flat cells on the board, we would get length * width * height voluminous cells in the box. However, to turn this into a world with two space dimensions and one time dimension we could also just extend the board into a box where the height of the box would correspond to the amount of time in the world. From a strict information storage capacity perspective, it seems time and space will have the same basic storage requirements and so far cannot really be distinguished from one another. Furthermore we also know from information theory that time, just like space, will act to degrade signals so the concept of some kind of geometrical distance seems to apply to time in just the same way as it does to space (moving the pebbles up the beach has the same general effect as letting them stay in place a long time either you, the wind or the crabs mess things up eventually). So far the

definition we have used for space seems like it could be used to model time as well, and we wouldnt really need two separate concepts. Although space and time can have the same effect in how they both distort a signal and can both be talked about in terms of similar information storage capacity requirements, they are not exactly the same thing. We could have forty dimensions of space but without any activity (change or motion) there would be no meaningful concept of time. We could create a rule stating that one of the space dimensions should in fact act as a time dimension, and this would work from the information theoretical perspective as the total cost of information in the system would not be affected (it would grow slightly to include an activity pointer but would not keep growing after that). As we have seen there is a fundamental connection between the concepts of time and space such that they have the same type of informational cost. Nonetheless, if we create such a rule we see that we have asked one former space dimension to have some kind of special status compared to the other space dimensions and thus we understand that there must be some difference to the concepts of time and space. Logically, if we represent all the shapes in the life of a universe in the memory of a computer, the idea with time is to say that not all of those shapes should be interpreted as active in total parallel. The concept of different states being either active or not active at different points in time is known as activity and so we see that the concept of time must be related to the concept of activity. Furthermore, the concept of time together with causal rules (non-random activity) can minimize the memory requirements on such a computer. Unless there is some need to keep track of past and future shapes, a computer with rules for transformations between shapes would only need to have enough memory to store the current shape of the universe plus some extra memory in which to perform calculations and then it could use its processor to apply the transformation rules to arrive at the next shape, then the next shape from that and so on, discarding old historical states as it goes. In our model we thus define space and mass as information states with distinct character. We could use the symbols 0 and 1 to represent them with logical and mathematical notation but it will be in line with the conclusions of this paper to see that they could be better represented by 1 and 2, letting 0 represent the undefined state where there is no reliable information at all - as in the null value commonly seen in computer science or as in the undefined range between the maximal low value interpreted as 0 and the minimal high value interpreted as 1 in a digital computer. Time is defined by the distinction of active and inactive information states such that we can interpret information as something that can change with time. With only random activity, however, time can still not really be distinguished from space except by restating our definition that different states could be interpreted as active or inactive. We note that if states that went from active to inactive could be considered historic and for that reason could be discarded we could begin to understand a distinction between time and space in terms of differential storage requirements in a computer, but the computer would still have to hold all future states in its memory until they could be discarded. Should the future be infinite, the computer would require infinite storage capacity and we see that discarding historical states would then not really help reduce storage requirements. If time, on the other hand, were cyclical then future states would contain historical states and so they could

not be discarded, leaving us again with no real way to tell the distinction between time and space without the introduction of one more distinction: Causality is defined in contrast to randomness by the impact it has on the distinction between time and space/mass as to make an information state more compressible. Non-random activity in the form of state transformation rules allows a computer to calculate all future states and if it is also allowed to discard historical states we can see that the memory requirements on a computer are dramatically decreased, from having to contain information about all possible states to containing the information about the active state and the necessary memory to compute the next active state from the transformation rules. We now have definitions in our model for the five concepts space, mass, time, causality and randomness with logical and distinguishable meanings in relation to each other and to the information theoretical aspect of how abstract systems with these concepts could be represented in a theoretical computer. Space and mass are seen as a conceptual pair such that one is the conceptual inverse of the other. Causality and randomness is another conceptual pair where one is the conceptual inverse of the other. Time, finally, relates the two conceptual pairs to each other by stating that the two ways that the relationship between mass and space can change is for it to change either randomly or by cause and effect. To recapitulate, for a computer to model only the concept of space the computer itself would only require memory to store all the information about its modeled space, which in turn implies that the computer itself only really needs some actual, external space to exist in. With only time added to the model, the storage (memory) requirements on the computer grows, but only in the same way as it would for an additional modeled dimension of space, and so we would still only need a computer with memory but no processor and we could not in any meaningful way distinguish between the modeled concepts of time and space. With time and causality added to the model, the computer needs less memory as states can be computed but the computer will now also need a processor as well as some actual, external time in which to do the computing and some external rules of causality allowing its processor to work. In other words, to represent space a computer needs space, to represent time and causality a computer needs time and causality. Rather than to consider this a form of circular logic it is about the closest we can get to a fundamental understanding of the concepts space, mass, time, randomness and causality from an information theoretical sense. It is also important to point out that it is in fact not a case of circular logic for the same reason that Darwinian Evolution by Natural Selection is not. An objection sometimes raised against Darwins algorithm goes along the lines of fine, humans descended from apes and apes descended from fish, but it had to start somewhere! How did the first one come about? It is a recursion that seems like it should have no end condition, which equates to an infinite recursion. An infinite recursion is as bad as an infinite loop (which is what circular logic represents) in that it would cause a computer to freeze. It could even be seen as worse than an infinite loop in

that it will also try to eat up all the memory in the computer in the process (by pushing more and more state to a so called recursion stack). But the obvious resolution to the Darwinian paradox is that the first being capable of replicating itself came into existence completely by chance. Correspondingly the answer here is that the root universe (or computer) with the necessary qualities of space, time and causality such that it could result in a system of computers modeling computers (or universes containing other universes) could have come into existence completely by chance. As soon as it does, the concepts of space, time and causality as defined by us would then continue to make sense from that day on for everyone inside such a universe or any of its sub-universes. We now know that space and time are not the same things in our model, although time and space can have similar information costs and distortion effects to signals. We can relate to what their different functions in an information system should be because they match fundamental concepts in the definition of the logical machine known as a computer. Thus we see that at a minimal level, the concept of space in our model should have to do with the existence of information that has storage cost and that represents geometrical shape, our concept of time should relate to how information states can change, noting that strictly this only requires more room in the storage of an external computer running the model of a universe with both space and time, such that it can store all the information states. Causal or non-random time concerns how states become different based on rules rather than randomly, which minimizes the storage requirements of the computer running the universe program as the information for one of its dimensions no longer has to be kept around, but it introduces the requirement of external time and causality for the external computer to work in. As we build up a model of a universe by adding concepts to it, we start by considering first a universe without movement such that we have space but no time. Then we go on to add activity or motion giving meaning to the concept of time. We will see that with the concept of directional time follows uncertainty which in our model will be seen to result in relativistic and quantum mechanical experiences for all local observers inside it.

The Static Universe

In our model of a fully static universe, both active and reactive particles would be completely stationary. There is never any motion so even though it has a shape implying that the concept of space is present, time does not pass in this universe. We can theoretically store the full static universe in a computer with only memory but no processor, and so we only need the concept of space to represent this universe. The static universe is obviously not a very interesting place since nothing ever happens there and so the only reason to pay it any attention is that it is a useful point of reference when contrasting concepts to each other helping us to distinguish clearly between the ideas of space and time.

The Semi-Static Universe

In our model of a semi-static universe, active particles are stationary but reactive particles are mobile. In other words, solid particles cannot move but information about them can move inside the mobile reactive particles. We will use the semi-static universe to examine in isolation some

interesting constraints that will continue to apply as we go on to discuss the fully dynamic universe where both active and reactive particles can move. Remind yourself as we go along that the model we are building is of a universe with an absolute reality. We will go on to see how models of the relative and overlapping (quantum) realities can be derived from this model by including an aspect of some necessary uncertainty about the exact state of the absolute reality regarding the micro level as well as the macro level - for all observers inside our model. Extensive experience with mentally modeling a universe without any absolute reality in it such as many scientists may have could turn this into an unintuitive exercise for some readers. It should not be considered patronizing but helpful to say that we should picture this in our heads the way a child would. If we dont flex our mental muscles too much we can see that we are only trying to build a mental picture to the effect that we begin in our model by representing what is really there under the assumption that in our model something is really there. Note that while we will examine a chaotic universe towards the end of this paper, here we will skip directly to a universe with time that is based on causality such that there are some rules governing the movement in the semi-static universe. In other words, a computer running a semi-static universe program would not only require memory (space for the computer to exist in) but also a processor (the computer needs to be in a universe that in turn has time and causality). The requirements on computers running semi-static and dynamic universes (where as we shall see in following sections both active and reactive particles can move) are thus exactly the same and so we see that our concepts of space, time and causality will work the same in semi-static and dynamic universes. The only difference between them will really be the (artificially imposed for analytical reasons) rule that in the semi-static universe active (solid) particles are unable to move. We will go on to pick a convenient set of causal state transformation rules for our universe in having it simulate the behavior of our reactive particles zooming around in straight paths and bouncing off each other (in such a way as to require no additional energy to maintain their courses through space, making them bounce around indefinitely unless disturbed by an outside force) and in the case of the dynamic universe both active and reactive particles will be bouncing around. There could be other rules and we will end up seeing that any rule set will in fact do (as long as it can give rise to self-replicating shapes), so we pick rules that make sense and make it easy to picture how they work. Thus we will say that the things that move in the semi-static and dynamic universes dont move at random but rather follow linear rules of movement where shapes dont change paths spontaneously but only as the result of interactions with each other. From the perspective of an observer external to the model who would be looking at the absolute reality and be able to see mass and distances in space and time as they really were (unlike relativistic observers inside the model) the passing of time in the semi-static universe means that the reactive particles are zooming around, such that at different points in time they are in different places. While this time does pass, it has no direction (yet) such that it would make more sense for it to go forwards than backwards as there is no obvious way to tell what would even be the forwards and backwards of this kind of time.

It doesnt really matter which way the balls zoom. Assuming the transformation is loss free - that is, information is not destroyed as the balls move around and we have seen that information theory asks that additional energy be inserted to ultimately destroy information as captured by bouncing reactive particles with minimal rest mass so this assumption should hold fast the computer would essentially be free to execute either the given rules or the inverse of those rules without any logical consequence to the system (except that it would be running in the opposite direction). As we have observed, there is an information theoretical proposition to the effect that information once in existence prefers not to be totally destroyed (even though it can be discontinued from concrete representation by solid particles) so our default assumption should be that without additional features for destroying information, our transformation rules for the universe should be expected to be loss free. Unless the passing of time in one direction rather than the other would mean that information was being constructed (implying it would be destroyed if time ran the other way) time could run equally well forwards and backwards and there would be no logical way to tell which is which. From the local perspective of an active particle inside the absolute reality of our model, however, time has a directional meaning to it. Local observers internal to the model would experience time to have a definite direction, such that distinguishing between going forward and backward in time becomes meaningful, and it is based just on the difference in constructing versus destroying information. The following argument will be an essential aspect to this paper as we use it to define how the relative realities (and eventually the overlapping quantum realities) of local observers will be derived from the one absolute reality in our model. The reader should thus take care to see that the logic in the coming paragraph checks out: If each active particle starts out in a state of ignorance about the other active particles around it then from the local perspective of an active particle going forward in time means that more and more reactive information particles will interact with it, giving it a continuously improving understanding of the shape of the universe around it as represented by other active particles. Note that if the speed of the reactive, information carrying particles were to be infinite if information could instantaneously spread everywhere at once we are back to having no meaningful description of the passing of time with direction (which according to its many fans is the only kind of time worth having). Thus as we move on we will base our understanding of directional time in our model on how in the semi-static universe, time moves forward from the local perspective as the information active particles have about each other continues to increase. The conclusion is that not only is movement (activity) a logical necessity for us to be able to model the concept of time in a meaningful way, but more precisely less than totally random (rule based) activity where the maximum possible speed of information about the activity is less than infinite is required for the passing of time to have the kind of meaning we prefer it to have in the form of reduced memory requirements of a computer. Finally we see that (at least thus far) we have to invoke the local perspective to find the concept of directional time which is the kind of time that we should assume most readers would consider themselves to experience and so is the kind of definition for time we should strive to include in the model.

Universes with infinite speed of information and thus no time are of course thinkable, but like the static universe they are boring places where the kind of directional time we are interested in does not pass so we will continue by considering models of universes with maximum information speeds and less than totally random transformation rules such that directional time can pass in that things can happen and they can happen for a reason (as we seem to be in just such a fun and reasonably happening universe). In all further discussions we therefor assume that in the model we create there is a maximum speed with which information can travel inside the universe, and it is the speed with which the reactive particles move. We also note that for the direction of time to work in the local perspective, there must be an actual direction for it to move in at the absolute level as well in our model, only that which actual direction it moves in on the absolute level does not matter as long as it picks one and doesnt keep going back and forth (as this would turn it into a chaotic universe). Regardless which direction the reactive particles zoom in absolute space, from the local perspective of an active particle time will move forward as it interacts with more and more reactive particles. We will see later in this paper that if the future is ultimately unpredictable in our model, even to an external observer (and we will find good reason to conclude that it probably is) then time would have a meaningful direction on the absolute level as well, such that the future is essentially unknowable but the past is essentially knowable. This matches the statement from information theory that as concrete representations of information change over time due to degradation (Second Law of Thermodynamics) the total information on the abstract level increases as abstract representations of information (information in photons) need unavailable energy to be destroyed. Abstract representations of information can come into existence via reflection of the changes of concrete representations of information but they cannot go out of existence. In this perspective, time on the absolute level implies a process by which more and more abstract information is created as time goes on. This means that memory requirements on a computer representing the model would have to increase over time, but it would not mean that it would need enough memory to store all its future states the computer would only need more and more memory over time to store all of its history, seeing as in an information theoretically correct model all of history would have to be reflected in the calculation of the next state for the absolute reality in the model (no information should be lost). We note that a computer could use methods of (to some but not infinite extent lossless) compression to store historical information such that it can be retrieved by computation. In a mathematically idealized version of the universe that allowed infinitely lossless compression on the abstract (photon) level (as information theory suggests must be the case) we could then see that the memory requirements to run such a model of the universe would be constant under the mathematical assumption of a perfect compression algorithm for abstractly represented information. We also see that the processor and memory requirements to calculate history from available information could be seen to match the processor and memory requirements to calculate the future, but the difference would remain that if an external observer stopped a computer simulation of such a model, they could in theory derive all of its history by inspection of available information but they would have to resume the running of the model to find out all about its future.

This aligns (at least mathematically) nicely with the idea that the concrete informational content or the sum total of mass and energy of the universe should remain constant but the abstract information content should go up over time.

Mass as State, as Occupation of Space and as Interaction Points

When we relate the physical concept of rest mass to an active particle in our model, we are talking about the state information that it contains about itself, such that the more state information, the higher its mass. Unless there is no cost to information, the state information of a particle has to occupy space, which matches the general idea of what it is mass is supposed to do (again, a particle with mass is conceptually seen in this model as the inversion or the opposite of a particle containing only empty space). We recall that in our definitions a purely reactive particle contains no information about itself except probably some minimal level of information (we have seen that the idea of a purely empty reactive particle may be an idealization, because in practice it would have a requirement to carry information about its position). Nonetheless we could consider such mathematical idealization as the main point of this paper is to discuss limits to optimal performance. Thus, even though it is argued in this paper that no completely purely reactive particles could exist in practice and that all particles would have at least some state of their own equating to all particles having some minimal rest mass, we will continue to consider the case of purely reactive particles only in the form as representatives of ultimate mathematical constraints placed on our model. We will see that we do not have to try to fit any actual such concept into our model to make it work, we only compare to such a theoretical concept to find necessary constraints on the concepts we do have in our model (which by logical and information theoretical necessity may well have to contain at most near-reactive particles but where we shall see that it will become logical to call the theoretical champion of such near-reactive particles the reactive particle that in our model will represent both space and the photon). Letting the state information of a particle represent its mass allows our concept of mass to meet our basic expectation on this concept to occupy space (information has cost in space) and we will continue to be able to derive useful information theoretical implications from this model. Proceeding towards the first important such deduction we will examine how the mass of two active particles as defined in our model should relate to each other. To be able to do this, we will make the observation that mass can also be seen to represent the number of interactions possibilities or interaction points a particle contains, such that the higher the mass of a particle, the more interaction points it has where each interaction point represents an opportunity to interact with the interaction points of another particle. This observation follows from the assumption that information has cost in the form of occupied space. The state information a particle holds about itself takes space to store such that the more information, the bigger or the denser the particle has to be. Each bit of information takes up room in space and it is also this occupation of space that represents the opportunity to interact with (be bumped into by) the information bits of other particles.

This follows from how the concept occupancy should imply potential for conflict in our model. This is really just a way to reformulate the word cost in the cost of information. We must thus go on to make the following observation about a necessary constraint to the behavior of our model (which would qualify as a minimal form of causality or specification for the transformation rules in a computer program) as a logical conclusion to our definitions: Only one shape can occupy a certain position in space (if all the information could share the same space it wouldnt really have any cost in space) which gives rise to interaction between particles in any case where the transformational rules of time put two particles in competition for the same position. If mass is defined as the occupancy of space (or reservation of positions in space) and interaction is defined as relating to the conflict arising when two states compete for the same space or position (such as two balls colliding and having to bounce off each other as they cant both be in the same position) then we see a direct relation between the mass of a particle and the amount of interaction opportunity it has with other particles.

Uncertainty
We note that our model will allow us to deduce some necessary information theoretical constraints on its behavior based on statistical laws governing how an active particles information about other active particles around it can improve over directional time, something we will talk about as the reduction of uncertainty associated with that information. This improving information effect exactly matches the one we used to define the very concept of directional time, so the laws governing how information can improve for solid particles over directional time will be internally consistent with our previous definitions in that we are essentially just restating our definition of directional time, of space and of mass. In fact, all we are about to do is to restate the same logical model that we have already constructed thus far but this time using mathematical notation in an equation, the correctness of which in relation to our model can be seen in the following two laws that are ultimately just recapitulations of our definitions so far. The first deduction we will make from our model follows from our definition of space as information representing geometrical distance. According to our definitions of space and time, the greater the distance (the more space) there is between two active particles, the longer time it will take for each to gain good information about the other as the longer the distance between them is, the longer time it takes or the statistically more unlikely it becomes that a reactive particle interacts with them both. The second deduction we will make from our model follows from our definition of mass. According to our definitions mass can be seen as the density of interaction points in an active particle (chances for the active and reactive particles to interact, allowing the active particle to detect the information in the reactive particle). It follows from our definition of mass and directional time that the greater the combined mass of two active particles, the shorter time it will take for them to gain good information about each other as the more interaction points each particle has, the statistically more likely it is that a reactive particle interacts with both particles.

Combining these two facts we will see that the uncertainty of two particles concerning the state of the other is reduced over directional time in proportion to the product of the masses and in inverse proportion to the product of the two distances - which is of course the same distance two times, as reactive particles would have to travel the distance both ways to inform two active particles of each other (and where the interaction success of one does not affect the chance to succeed for the other). Letting F stand for the limit to the force of the information increasing (or uncertainty decreasing) effect over directional time, m1 and m2 stand for the masses of the two active particles and d stand for the distance between them, we get a formula we should be very familiar with: F m1*m2 / d2 If we replace the less or equals sign with just an equals sign (as we would to describe the very optimal performance of any natural force compatible with information theory, including gravity) we get the same formula as for Newtonian Gravity and so we can see that we have just found a good reason from information theory for why solid objects must (at best) obey this formula in their trajectories through space. When formulas that fall out of your models match established observations from the world around you, this is an encouraging indication that the definitions of the concepts in your model bear some resemblance to their corresponding concepts in the real world. Conversely, as our formula has been derived entirely from information theoretical analysis of equally information theoretically based definitions for the concepts of time, space and mass, we know that our formula must hold true for all information theory compatible systems with features that correspond from an information theoretical perspective to the concepts we have defined in our model. Unless we have made a mistake in the definitions of our premises or in our deductions from those premises we can therefore see that the constraint described from this model should hold true for the behavior of mass and space over time in our universe as well unless concrete representation of information is actually totally free such that all concrete information (all solid particles) in the universe could exist at the exact same (vanishingly small) position in space at the same time - at once, all the time and forever.

Relativity
For an active particle, its information about other active particles improves over time. This is to say that there is a difference between the perspective of an external observer looking in on our model of the absolute reality from the outside and the limited and ultimately uncertain perspective of an internal or local observer in the form of an active particle inside our model of the absolute reality. This imperfect (but improving with time) view of the absolute reality is what the active particle is stuck with - it is the only reality it can experience. It is not the true, absolute reality that really exists (as it is represented in the full model of the universe, for example running in in an external computer in another universe of its own) only the active particles distorted perception of that reality. In our model the imperfect perceptions of the universe by active particles will be seen to match what we also know as Einsteins relativistic realities. In it, observers can experience effects such as how

distances seem different from the actual distances that exist in absolute space and time. In our model the concept of a relative reality is represented by the perspective on the absolute reality by solid particles inside the model which will always include some uncertainty as to the exact shape of the absolute reality. As we relate all this to our own reality, where we do experience relativistic effects, we see that it is not the kind of distorted perspective that assumes a conscious observer. In our model humans or other biological systems are not the only ones to be exclusively doomed to interacting strictly with a relativistic world because their brains are somehow bespectacled with relativistic glasses such that if they used a film camera it would not be fooled. In our model, every atom is constrained to experience or to interact with and relate to all other atoms in a relativistic way. This must be clear as we proceed to talk of active particles as conscious little observers it is only shorthand for talking about the only version of the world that unconscious particles could interact with.

Relative Distance and Mass

If we imagine an active particle to be like a little scientist in a spaceship, we could see this as the scientist making measurements of reactive particles around it and using the results to draw a tentative map of the surroundings. It will be our mental model for picturing (and verifying the logical correctness of) how in the perspective of a particle its relative reality is created around it to the extent that it is able to physically interact with (and consequently perceive) more and more of its surroundings over directional time. As time passes, more and more reactive particles zooming by will allow the scientist to draw a better and better map. In the case of actual biological systems (such as an actual, real-life scientist) the effect of improved information over time would indeed be for them to see their environment materialize around them. In the case of non-sentient particles, the effect would be the same from a physical perspective as more and more of their surroundings materializing from the standpoint of detectability of and interaction opportunity with the absolute reality for the particles (except there would in consequence to our problem statement be no sentience in the particle that would notice). As the scientist draws the map, it is with the understanding derived from logical contemplation on information theory that there is by necessity uncertainty associated with every measurement. As external observers to and definers of this model, we know that the scientist is right on this account because our definitions state that in our model information about other solid particles is not expected to be perfect from the start for any solid particle in the model. Perhaps worse, the scientist has also realized (as we shall soon as well) that it is impossible for any local observer to tell precisely whether there are changes to the mass, time or space out there which result in the information imperfection seen in the uncertainty of all measurements and thus could never be really sure if a change to mass, space or time resulted in any certain and repeating change to a measurement. To see why the scientist couldnt tell if changes to mass, space or time would be responsible for changes to measurements, we can consider how as the scientist draws the map there will be a few different ways to represent the necessary uncertainty associated with any of the measurements

made. One way would be to assign confidence numbers to all the measurements represented on the map, but there are also ways to represent the uncertainty without adding those numbers explicitly as a separate dimension in the map. Suppose for a moment that the scientist were given advice by an external observer stating the existence of two particles in the surroundings of the spaceship such as for there to be 1000 meters to neighboring active particle A with the mass 10 kg and also 1000 meters (in another direction) to neighboring active particle B with the same mass of 10 kg. However the first measurement, says the external observer, has a 90% confidence level (10% uncertainty) associated with it, whereas the second measurement is more unreliable, with only a 20% confidence level. The external observer knows the right answer, but decided to roll some dice (in turn with unpredictable outcome to our external observer) to determine how close to correct answers should be given, and the correct odds for those dice rolls were presented with the rest of the information to our scientist. One way for the scientist to represent this in the map without representing the uncertainty numbers explicitly would be to draw both particles at the same distance but to draw particle A with the confident, bold marker while using the flimsier and easier to erase thin marker to draw particle B. This way can be thought of as the scientist drawing objects with relative solidity, or relative mass, but all distances on the map match actual, absolute distances in space and time. Another way, if the scientist doesnt want to use different markers, would be to represent uncertainty as additional distance on the map. Thus a particle C that was known for a fact by our scientist to be 1000 meters away (our external observer told the scientist that no dice were rolled before divulging this information) would have been drawn as exactly 1000 meters away (to scale, of course) on the map. Particle A with its 90% confidence level would be drawn as just a little more than 1000 meters away and particle B with its 20% confidence level would be drawn as yet further away than particle A. When the uncertainty to measurement in this local perspective on the universe is perceived by interpreting uncertainty as additional distance in our model, we say that the observers experience relative distances rather than the absolute ones. As we saw from the example with the map drawing scientist, another valid way is to interpret uncertainty as relative mass. We know that with our definitions solid particles cannot start out by perceiving the full, absolute reality in our model - such perception is only allowed to be approximated better and better over directional time. If the other solid particles keep moving around, as we will see them doing in the model of the dynamic universe, absolutely correct perception of the surroundings would never be fully achieved. This means that there will be at least initial uncertainty for all local (and solid) observers in our model of the static universe, and for local observers in our model of a dynamic universe uncertainty will be a permanent part of their reality. If an additional dimension for representing uncertainty is used (representing uncertainty explicitly with numbers on the map) the corresponding effect to a sentient observer would be one of a pure virtual dimension. That is, such an observer would perceive a dimension that did not match any dimension in the absolute universe, a purely virtual dimension of uncertainty.

The alternative for the sentient observer (or for any particle constrained to behave in an information theoretically compatible way under our model) would be to modify the experience of a dimension that does exist in the absolute universe, which might perhaps also be seen as more efficient as they could then use value triples of estimated relative mass, distance and time (as we shall see) adjusted for uncertainty rather than quadruples of estimated absolute mass, distance and time plus uncertainty of the estimation as its own value. All of these options are equally valid as such, but we see that a local observer in our model cannot completely escape some form of relativistic experience. Thus the experience of an observer such as our scientist will in our model only be compatible with the assumption that while some of the aspects of the absolute universe could be potentially be perceived in their true, absolute form, not all of them could be measured to their full extents simultaneously. Which aspects are considered relative is not necessarily important, whatever seems convenient would work. We could note that if information has cost, value triples may seem more attractive than quadruples, not to mention that slight distortions to perception in mass or distance might seem preferable to any sentient observer before the hallucination of an entire imaginary dimension (to picture this we could imagine a person perceiving absolute distance, mass and time, as well as could be done, but to the extent that those distances, masses and times were uncertain, they would feel icky). Towards the end of this paper we will give this possibility some further consideration. From the aspects we have considered so far we can say that as particles or scientists build their maps of the universe around them, and unless an extra dimension is used, they can assume that other particles have relative mass (the different markers) but that the space and time they measure is absolute or they can assume that mass of other particles is absolute (using only one kind of marker to draw other particles) but that distance is relative (such that particles A and B are drawn at different distances from the observer) or they can distribute the uncertainty evenly over both mass and distance to have two somewhat certain values rather than one more certain and one more uncertain. However, as we saw when building up our fundamental definitions, although time and space are ultimately different concepts, they are also to some extent interchangeable from an information theoretical perspective. Thus another option for the relativistic interpreter is to consider time to be relative rather than space such that it is the distances in time that are relative. As we go on we will talk about the relativistic effects as being interpreted by relative mass and distance where distance is often then for sake of ease discussed as a space distance, but we should note that we could just as well substitute space distance for time distance and the argument would remain consistent. We also know that in our universe mass, space and time all seem impacted by relativistic effects, and we should also note that for us the uncertainty could be distributed evenly over our perception of the three dimensions of space, one dimension of time and one dimension of mass. It should be noted that mathematically speaking mass is its own dimension, as in a number you can change without affecting the numbers in the other four dimensions (three dimensions of space and one of time) giving us a total of five dimensions for our model - three dimensions of space, one dimension of time and one dimension of mass.

We should note before this starts to come off as science fiction that we are actually describing the same type of universe as the one we are in as, at least from a strict mathematical perspective, mass must be a dimension in our universe as well. Strictly speaking, we should all go from talking about ourselves as inhabitants of a four dimensional universe to observing that we live in what must at the very least be a five dimensional universe where the fifth dimension is mass as in density of space or the distinction between particles of different solidity to say otherwise would be the mathematical equivalent of proposing that there is no detectable difference between an empty swimming pool (or one that is full of air) and a swimming pool full of water.

Mass and Energy

It is interesting to note the interchangeable nature of mass and distance in the relativistic distortion in our model, seemingly similar to how time and space can sometimes become interchangeable. One way to think about this is to consider a case where the scientist thinks there is reason to believe a certain object with a certain mass is at a certain distance away (as in the hypothetical case when an external observer has said so). But when checking the sensors, the scientist gets fewer interactions with the object than would have been assumed given its mass and distance. There could be two explanations for this, with no good way to tell which one is right. Either the object is further away than was assumed, or it is less massive. That is, either there is more space between the scientist and the other object, or there is more space inside the object. Both situations would result in fewer interaction points of the other objects being interacted with in just the same manner and so give exactly the same effect in the measurements. There is thus a fundamental relationship between mass and distance such that they impact the number of interaction possibilities between two objects in the inverse way of each other. But it should come as no surprise that distance gives the opposite effect of mass (increased distance gives the same effect as reduced mass) on measurements. In our definitions, empty distance is space and we have defined mass as the occupation of space, or the inversion of empty space, so they should have exactly that relationship of acting interchangeably as the opposite of each other. We are just restating the statistical relationship that is implied by the definitions of the concepts of space and mass on the interaction possibilities for mass that followed from our model and that we were able to capture with the formula F m1 * m2 / d2 - which is in turn just the mathematical expression for the definitions of mass and space in our model. We are also reminded of our expectations on the interchangeable nature of mass and energy as we have found those concepts to relate to each other experimentally in the real world in accordance with the predictions of Einstein. So far we have left out any real definition for the concept of energy from our model but the time has come to extend the model with such a definition. If mass can be converted to energy, this will in our model equate to saying that we can take some mass and make it discontinue its occupancy of some position in space. In our model we will thus let the term energy stand for the system activity (particular set of transformational rules) of converting mass into space or empty distance. Another way of saying that a particle puts more empty distance or space between itself and some other particles is to say that it moved in relation to those other particles, which matches our general understanding of how energy

relates to mass, giving us some confidence that the definition for energy we are formulating could be a good candidate for our model. Conversely, energy also represents the activity of empty space being transformed into mass. How much mass that can be gotten for a certain amount of converted space (or how much movement in the form of new empty space that can be gotten when converting from mass) is constrained by the communication speed of information in space as a solid particle can only convert into mass the parts of space it has time to interact with during a given time interval. In our model space is an optimal reactive particle (just like the photon) and if we call the speed of this reactive particle c, and we let the minimal rest mass of a space particle be represented by 1, we see by the substitution of c to our earlier formula F m1 * m2 / d2 and by setting m2 to 1 we can describe the information theoretically derived constraint to the conversion rate of space particles to solid particles and vice versa by the equation E m1 * m2 * c2 - or in reduced form E mc2. We will use this second equation E m1 * m2 * c2 to relate the concepts of energy E and a maximum speed of information c to our model. We define these concepts in our information theoretical model by describing a logically derived constraint that can be seen to correspond to Einsteins formula E = mc2 just as we could see how in our model F m1 * m2 / d2 corresponds to the Newtonian formula for gravitation F = m1 * m2 / d2. The symbol E will then stand for Energy when it relates to the way conversion of mass to empty space logically equates to making the remaining mass move. The concept of energy can be thought of as representing how far mass can be moved during a given time interval as the result of any information theoretically compatible force, making our definitions continue to correspond well to what we think of as the function of their counterparts in our universe. The reason that we only see only one mass in the equation is that m2 is the space particle with a minimal rest mass that is seen as approaching 1. The reason that c is squared is the same as for squaring the distance in m1 * m2 / d2, namely that the distance has to be traversed in both directions to fully communicate the effect. The meaning of the component c2 is thus to represent the limitation on the mutual communication of any effect during a given time interval where c is the maximum speed with which information about the effect can travel. As an example of a mechanistic implementation method (as in compatible with information theory and our definitions of space, mass, time and energy) for how such transformation between mass and energy could work in our model, the conversion between solid particles and empty space particles could be pictured as follows. For converting empty space to mass, imagine how a little captain inside the solid particle opened miniature one-way entry hatchets at even distributions along the particle shell allowing the surrounding particles of space to stream into the solid particle, where by virtue of being on the inside of a solid particle they will now be considered occupied space. The information in the usurped space particles will be counted with the information load of the solid particle and thus either its mass or size will be seen to have increased. Space particles could be packed so tightly as to not make the solid particle swell all that much or grow that much heavier

since they contain only a minimal rest mass corresponding to the information capacity required for the information of one position in space. When the captain decides it is time to set off in some direction, he opens a one-way exit hatchet going in the other direction, releasing space particles out from the hatchet resulting in new space being added between the solid particle and the place the captain wants to move away from. We note that when converting empty space to mass we (or the captain) will remove empty space evenly in all directions around the solid particle, which also equates to the particle coming a little closer to all other particles around it, or the solid particle growing a bit (or the rest of space shrinking a bit). We also note that with our definition that empty space contains at least one little bit of state, namely its position, then it would make both a kind of common sense as well as information theoretical sense to think of the disappearing (or occupied) space as removed (or condensed) positions between two solid particles, which logically equates to them coming closer to each other. We are circling in on a very reasonable distinction between mass and space (active and reactive particles) for our definitions. For a model that makes mathematical sense and is intuitively easy to think about, we state that a reactive particle reserves only one position of space whereas active (solid) particles reserve two or more positions of space. A particle that reserves only one position of space is a good candidate for the concept of a space particle, so our idea of seeing reactive particles as such particles of space is logically consistent. Thus the distinction that we relied on for the concept of information to work at all comes in the form of the distinction between on the one hand reserving or occupying the lowest amount of positions in space that is possible for something to exist in space at all (one position) in the manner of a reactive particle of space and on the other hand reserving or occupying more than the lowest amount of positions required to exist in space (two positions or more) in the manner of active (solid) particle of mass. Mass would be seen as the condensation (density) of positions in space. When it moves it could be interpreted under our model as a ripple effect transforming the relative densities of positions in space in just the manner we imagined that light could do (but slower as more information would have to move). In other words we can make our model so that what internal observers would perceive as moving mass is implemented in the absolute reality in the model as a wave effect rippling in a medium of pure positions that stay in their basic place but can still become closer or further apart from its neighboring positions so as to allow a wave of information to ripple through. Again we note that when established formulas show up in our models it is a good sign that the definitions of our concepts continue to make real world sense. In this case, we have derived E mc2 as a logically necessary constraint on the conversion rate between empty space and mass entirely from an information theoretical analysis of uncertainty in measurements of local observers.

Virtual Gravity
A perceptional effect that looks like gravity based on the reduction of uncertainty (increasing amount of available information) over time can be seen by all observers in our model of a semi-static or dynamic universe. As the perception of the universe around it clears with time for a certain active particle, with a relativistic interpretation of distance the other active particles around it will seem to

accelerate in accordance with F = m1 * m2 / d2 from their fuzzy, uncertain positions in space towards their actual, precise locations where they will seem to stabilize. The effect to the observing active particle will be as if the other particles were pulled by an invisible hand of gravity towards their actual positions (or that they solidified in their actual positions, using relativistic interpretation of mass) but an external observer to our model of the absolute reality would know that none of the active particles moved or changed their mass, only the information about their real positions and mass improved from the perspective of other active particles. For two active particles that happened to be stationed just next to each other, it would indeed seem to them like they were being pulled towards each other with accelerating speed (or rather they the picture of each other would become less blurry as to reveal that they were indeed very close to each other with increasing certainty). They could also interpret their measurements as the mass of their neighbor growing or as their neighbor starting to unfreeze from a state of frozen time. Whichever interpretation is used, the effect would manifest with the same acceleration as we associate with gravity. The difference compared to real gravity would be that it would not end with a collision, as the active particles were never really moving. We could call this illusionary gravity that we can see that all solid particles in our model must experience virtual gravity as it is only the experience of uncertainty for an active particle decreasing with time as a result of interaction with reactive particles. We will distinguish it from real gravity (or just gravity) in our model of a dynamic universe where active particles can move and will indeed crash into each other due to real gravity. The experience of virtual gravity is nonetheless relevant to explaining why we see actual gravity working the way it does in a dynamic universe, as it helps us underline the rational for the information theoretical constraint on how real gravity is allowed to work. It is also useful to compare the overlapping realities of the micro (quantum) world with the macro world to see that macro objects seem overlapping (blurry) to all observers in much the way that we associate with superposition (more on this later).

The Dynamic Universe

In a fully dynamic universe, both active and reactive particles are mobile. Without further classification of particles, we can see that both active and reactive particles would simply zoom around on straight paths through time and space like billiard balls on a table (but without slowing down or accelerating) occasionally to bounce off each other (with the exception that in our model reactive particles cannot push solid particles around). In fact, we dont have to assume that there are any purely reactive (space) particles at all as a dynamic universe where all particles had some solidity would also work inside the same constraints that we will discuss (and we know that even the space particle should be seen to contain a minimal rest mass in the form of its position). Active particles (particles occupying two or more positions of space) could well be carriers of information about both themselves as well as other active particles and fulfill the role of information spreaders in the system. All we have to assume is that there will be one kind of particle that is the fastest information carrier around (active or reactive) because otherwise we would be back to a universe without time.

However, while not required for the dynamic universe to work, we will continue to invoke the concept of maximally reactive particles that occupy only one position of space and contrast them to active particles in order to examine an information theoretical constraint on particles as carriers of information. It follows from our definitions based in information theory that with a maximum speed for information to travel one active particle carrying information about itself as well as about a second active particle could never travel as fast as a purely reactive particle carrying only the information about the second particle, as the active particle contains more information in total. As the amount of information in the active particle (its own state plus the state of a second active particle) is greater than the amount of information in the reactive particle (only the state of the second active particle) and there is a limit to the speed of information then more information by necessity has to take longer time than less information would take to travel the same distance. To suggest that more information could travel in the same time as less information by, say, increasing the parallelism to improve the bandwidth just equates to increasing the general speed limit, so as long as there is a speed limit to information (information has cost) the constraint must hold. As derived entirely from logical application of information theory we can thus see a fundamental constraint in our model that we will continue to exploit throughout this paper: Any force or effect based on information about it being spread by reactive particles will be able to work faster than a force or effect based on information about it being spread by active particles. Please take the time to validate that the argument above is logically consistent and holds true from an information theoretical perspective. In essence we are stating that any hard information theoretical constraints we find to apply by necessity to any theoretical biophysical model of a universe must also by logical necessity constitute equally hard constraints on any theoretical physical model of a universe. It will be one of the most central ambitions of this paper to demonstrate how we are able to use this fact to derive an ultimate constraint on the strength of any force of nature in any universe that plays by the rules of information theory.

Theoretical Biophysics as Game Theory with Communication Theory

We will now go on to note that in our model it is possible in principle for active (solid) particles to end up by chance in such a configuration that some of them will implement the function of sensors capable of detecting reactive particles while other active particles may happen to arrange themselves into little motors, capable of influencing their future trajectory through space. In particularly happy coincidences, such motors could become connected to sensors by controller mechanisms, all formed by chance. We know that it is possible for particles to become arranged in such a way in our world because a car contains an example of particles arranged into a motor and vacuum cleaning robots (these exist) as well as frogs represent examples of particles arranged into units of sensors controlling their motors. Whereas humans rather than chance created the car engine and the vacuum cleaner robots, natural selection created the frog and the human (and so by extension also the vacuum robots and the cars). We can go on to derive by logical conclusion that both frogs and humans are the descendants of an original system of sensors and motors that did come about purely by chance.

It is thus not only thinkable but logically derivable that at least very simple versions of motors and sensors could (and therefor would if provided enough time and space) happen to arrange themselves by chance into such systems in our model as well. We know this as we are all the result of just such an event taking place way back in time when (in whatever primal soup life on our planet began - on earth, in space, in a star or on some other planet, to list some principal alternatives) our first ancestor spontaneously formed purely by coincidence. In the following discussion we will examine the mathematical possibilities with respect to a model that is allowed to contain little machines inside solid particles such that our active particles can have internal systems of motors, sensors and controllers. We will do this to examine useful verification of the constraints to the energy of any physical natural force in our model by deriving constraints to the energy of any biophysical force (gravity or other) being implemented by such little robot particles trying to navigate towards or away from each other optimally. We will also go on to discuss one alternative implementation for gravity that does not rely on particles having substructures arranged as to make them little robots to see that any constraints we have derived by the examination of robot particles will continue to hold. When solid particles in our world happen to be grouped into arrangements of sensors, motors and controllers connecting the sensors to the motors the group of particles can be seen to belong to a special class of particle groups that are sometimes referred to by philosophers, biologists and theoretical biophysicists as agents (or possibly robots). For reference the book The Intentional Stance by the American Scientific Philosopher Daniel C Dennett examines the concept of logical agent systems comprehensively, including discussion around how to model the intentions of what he calls intentional agents that have been blessed with a healthy desire for survival by Darwinian Evolution by Natural Selection. We thus use the name active agent particles to the class of active particles with corresponding substructures, such as to make them essentially little robot particles. The following discussion in this paper will draw heavily on the logical arguments presented by Dennett (which do themselves not include the specific conclusions made by this paper with regards to a mathematical explanation for the compatibility of Darwinism with cooperation in nature nor any discussions around the potential for superluminal motion) so his books can be considered relevant source material for the reader searching for deeper discussion around the general premises of the model derived in this paper. If we add an element of competition for limited resources between robot particles then we could go on to apply the information theoretically based mathematical framework of game theory to further constrain the predictable behaviors of such agent particles. Game theory concerns the domain of mathematical analysis around economic evaluation of possible scenarios starting from the concept pairs of Strength-Weakness (describing the potential economic value of a scenario if fully realized) and Opportunity-Threat (probability that a scenario will be realized) such that the final value of a given scenario should be seen as the combination of its potential value (Strength minus Weakness) and the probability that the potential will be realized (Opportunity minus Threat) such that the overall economic value of a situation should be considered to decrease in proportion to the uncertainty that it will happen.

In other words, if the normalized maximal potential economic or energy value of a situation is seen as 1 and the normalized maximal probability for the realization of the economic value of the situation is also seen as 1, the derived economic value of the situation to the observer evaluating it will always be lower than or at most 1. This logic is captured in the formula Potential * Probability where potential and probability are each values between 0 and 1. The logic behind the model as proposed by game theory is well established, seems watertight and in short we must expect it to hold. Yet there is a known problem with our current application of game theory to nature, which is that it seems like it should leave no room for cooperation that from the purely genetic evolutionary perspective would be considered altruistic yet just such cooperative behaviors are commonplace in nature. Examples include blood-sharing bats, dolphins saving injured animals of many species and a fairly wide-spread tendency in the animal kingdom for being nicer to youngsters than genetic game analysis would have predicted. Our current application of game theory to nature using the theoretical framework of Darwinian evolution by natural selection as applied to genes in The Modern Synthesis seems to predict that we should not really be able to witness any reliable cooperative behaviors in nature except in the special case of very closely related organisms (so called kin selection, more on this shortly). The problem is that there is no shortage at all of examples of stable cooperation between non-related organisms in nature. One such example that could be familiar to some readers is that of the Egyptian Plover bird, also known as the crocodile bird. The nickname comes from its reported but potentially mythical behavior of cleaning the teeth of crocodiles that return the favor by not eating the birds (and the bird would benefit because the old meat it cleans away from crocodile teeth is good food for the bird). Perhaps too spectacular an example of cooperation in nature to be actually true this particular behavior has not been scientifically confirmed, but lots of others including the dolphins and bats mentioned above have been. Nonetheless, the example of a crocodile and a dentist bird will be used in this chapter to illustrate the general problem with altruism in nature. While it may be also be a myth that a scientist once proclaimed the flying bumblebee physically impossible it is in fact the inconvenient situation that (while not going so far as to state the impossibility of what we witness with our own eyes) currently science is confined to explaining some cooperative behaviors (and should that of the dentist bird and the crocodile become confirmed it would only add to the list) with hand-waving to roughly the effect that we just havent figured out how they are really being selfish against each other yet and we must still expect them to betray each other at the first opportunity. You just wait and see - those shady dolphins are probably somehow stealing money from the pocket of every sailor they save! We should note that some dolphin behavior could be explained as the dolphins being dominant enough in their niche to have enough resources to spare as to become playful, which in turn could make them more agile and improve their fitness (making play time energy well spent). This way saving drowning people and other animals could be explained as just dolphins playing around with beneficial side effects to some sailors. But play time is only beneficial until the game becomes too dangerous. The real problem for The Modern Synthesis comes when we see that the dolphins will sometimes go so far as to defend a drowning animal from sharks a potentially lethal activity for the dolphins. Unless we could argue that the dolphins take no real lethal risk, perhaps by means of

running some sort of protection racket in cahoots with the sharks to squeeze the pocket money from hapless sailors (and we cant simply because there is no real reward in it for the sharks to compensate for not eating the sailors) we are left with a game theoretical mystery. This observed behavior of dolphins and that of other animals sparing and even helping the genetically distant offspring of each other does not make game theoretical sense to us at the moment. We could perhaps explain it in terms of a good thing (playfulness) gone too far, such as with the human sweet tooth. We evolved in conditions where sugar was rare and there was no such thing as too much sugar and now with the advance of agriculture we suddenly find ourselves eating too much sugar (irrationally much such that it ends up hurting us). But again it would be the type of imbalance that natural selection should polish away over time and it becomes difficult to explain why it happens with any regularity among dolphins. In short, the sweet tooth explanation could help explain some of dolphin behavior, but once they start risking their lives we no longer understand what is going on. One explanation to this involves how perhaps Dolphins try to save sailors because their eyesight is so bad and they actually think they are saving dolphins. The problem with this argument is that if dolphins couldnt tell the difference between a closely and a less closely related dolphin (much less a dolphin and a sailor) the only type of mechanism we have seen for cooperation to become established outside of kin selection becomes impossible (and strictly speaking even kin selection relies on the organisms being somehow able to identify each other as close enough relatives). Systems such as the blood-sharing one we see in some bats rely crucially on the bats not only being able to clearly distinguish one individual bat from another but also on being able to remember which one of the unique bats out there did exactly what to whom and when. This is how the bats have been discovered via painfully careful analysis by biologists to be able to build enough rational levels of trust between each other to let their so called buddy-system of blood sharing evolve. In other words, nearsightedness is not a good explanation for the cooperative behavior of dolphins (the bats have to overcome their corresponding sight issues to be able to form their cooperative behavior) and we are back to concluding that as far as we can see, dolphins are playing a very suboptimal game from the perspective of The Modern Synthesis. We should note that this is without even raising the perhaps uncomfortable discussion around how we should expect further pruning to the genetically induced generosity of dolphins from the inevitable occurrence of perhaps thankful but ultimately also hungry sailors. Bluntly, we should see enough sailors who live to tell family and friends over tasty dolphin stake dinner their amazing tale of how they were saved by the nice dolphins from the hungry sharks. Summing up the problem with the dolphins, it would seem to us at this moment that dolphins are effectively applying their exceptional brain capacity to the task of being incredibly stupid. Returning to the case of the dentist bird and the crocodile, we could potentially explain why a bird and a crocodile wouldnt have to be expected to betray each other once they have managed to find their respective strategic uses of each other if they have also entered a so called Evolutionarily Stable Strategy where each would be punished economically by betraying the deal. Such a system is stable in the same way that a terror balance would be and so we can see that it can stay around once in existence. The problem is that unlike a terror balance we have no real way of explaining how such a cooperative balance could come into existence except by enormously unlikely chance.

The real conundrum comes when we realize that for this cooperative behavior to evolve into being it would rely on the prevalence of more than rationally trusting (nave) birds and either extremely smart or unreasonably stupid crocodiles. Simply put, until the birds have proven their value conclusively over time to the crocodiles, the rational choice for the hungry crocodile is to think of the birds as free dinner, thus leaving the otherwise potentially useful (and overly nave) birds with no time to prove their value. Even if the crocodiles somehow figured out that the birds could be useful, Darwinism would still seem to imply how the crocodile that also figures out that free lunch could be worth even more whenever food is scare must prevail. That is under the assumption that it can also avoid the potential repercussions from other crocodiles upset that someone ate their dentists in a way that consumes less energy in the escape for the selfish crocodile than it gets by eating the bird. According to The Modern Synthesis in its current application, only the punishment from well organized (and rather foresighted) crocodiles could let the dentist birds and the crocodiles form an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (which may also go to show why this particular example is too farfetched even given the conclusions of this paper). The problem facing biologists today (but that perhaps luckily still includes no confirmed dentist birds) is that the altruistic behavior we now witness in some species seems to presuppose an evolutionary history equivalent to one involving very nave birds coupled with very dumb crocodiles too stupid to know free lunch when it flies into their mouths (or crocodiles unrealistically smart and well organized across blood-lines). Darwinian evolution by natural selection does not seem to allow room for any such abundance of happy fools and so we are left with a trying to understand how, if not crocodiles, other animals can be so foresighted and well organized as to be able to form cooperative behaviors. This is when we start to see the real issue for The Modern Synthesis. Even if we could see how animals could in theory and even in practice become smart enough to organize themselves such as to punish traitors, we will find ultimate issues of trust for such organisms such that game theory again would seem to imply that cooperation becomes unlikely bordering on impossible except in the case of kin selection, where the answer becomes that if organisms are closely enough related they would have rational reason to trust each other and be able to evolve cooperative behaviors. But with the blood-sharing bats and others, kin selection cannot answer the game theoretical question of how the animals have been rationally able to trust each other in a way that allowed them to build up their cooperative system at all. Biologists have found the mechanism that the bats exploited to build up such trust but only in the form of a special case that could not be generally applicable to explain for example the case of the Dolphins. What this paper will try to do is to generalize the mechanism already identified in kin selection and in the blood-sharing system of bats into a generalized game theoretical model that takes communication theory and the level of rational trust between two organisms into account. We should note that we must distinguish between cooperation in the form of mutually beneficial symbiosis and slavery. There are several examples in nature of one species enslaving another, by brute force or by cunning persuasion (including parasites that infect the brains of their hosts such as to cause the host to act with greater risk for its own life but also with greater potential to spread the genes of the parasite). In such cases there is no game theoretical mystery but there still remain relationships in nature that seem very difficult to explain this way.

In the hypothetical example with our crocodiles they would hardly have been able to enslave the birds as they could just fly away at any time (and it is equally unreasonable to suggest that some other species has somehow managed to enslave the dolphins). It also becomes problematic to imagine what type of cunning tactic precisely would let one crocodile persuade a dentist bird to fly into its mouth to do dentistry without the tactic also being equally useful for another hungry crocodile in search of lunch. As we examine this issue closely we find that at the bottom of the problem with cooperation in nature we will find a basic issue of trust. Kin selection provides one solid answer under The Modern Synthesis to the problem of how organisms (or their genes) could come to find rational reason to trust each other. In other cases, as with the blood-sharing bats that have developed a so called buddy-system that all the bats benefit from, biologists have by careful measurements discovered alternative paths for non-related animals (that is, animals not related closely enough for kin selection to work) to establish rational bonds of trust. With so called meme theory (more on this later in this paper) we have yet another explanation for why organisms would sometimes cooperate (it is good for the spreading rate of the ideas or memes that control them, which would then make it a variant on the slavery theme). However, the generally kind behavior of dolphins and the recurring theme of many species to treat the kids of their competitors with what seems from the perspective of their genes as irrationally good manners are still proving unusually hard to explain (the sort of behavior the Modern synthesis would expect is exemplified by among others the lions which strategically eat the young of each other). Generally nice behaviors seem irrationally altruistic from the perspective of their genes and meme theory or plain slavery cannot be expected to provide an answer every time, so even though we understand that in every case there must be some good explanation (such as the buddy system of bats) we are still left with many examples where we dont know what that explanation is yet. Unlike the clear-cut mathematics of kin selection for genes under The Modern Synthesis, cooperative relationships such as the buddy system that are not formed directly around purely genetically based rationales of trust have been more difficult to predict and always require very careful analysis to be able to explain at all in a conclusive way. The central ambition of this paper will be to derive the information theoretical rational for why we should be able to expect to see cooperation in nature between any communicating organisms in proportion to the rational reason they have to trust each other. Kin selection is just one way for trust to be rationally established and biologists have identified other examples of this general principle at work. The task of this paper will be to capture the mathematics behind this relationship into a formula that combines game theory and communication theory as to be fully compatible with all the examples of cooperation we find in nature. A careful analysis of our information theoretical claims must include an examination of how the information theoretical definitions in our model hold up to their counterparts in the physical universe around us any mismatch there could indicate that we have made a mistake in our deductions or definitions such that the conclusions around cooperation in nature could become invalid as well. The result of this analysis will be that we will also find implications of purely physical character from what is essentially an information theoretical biophysical analysis.

The answer as proposed by this paper to the problem we have just examined regarding unexpected cooperation in nature will be the following: While the current application of game theory in The Modern Synthesis captures perfectly the economic problem statement for two players competing against each other tooth and nail for ultimate dominance over limited resources, it does not fully reflect the conditions that come into play when two players cooperate to compete together against the generally destructive quality of time and space to all concrete representation of information (the Second Law of Thermodynamics). The game theoretical formula 0 potential * probability 1 correctly describes the game theoretical situation when the two players compete against each other for the same resource, but the normalization we examined earlier where both values will take a value between 0 and 1 and are then multiplied together is not completely compatible with the problem statement regarding two players with economic incentive to cooperate with each other to maximize the sustenance of the resource and who share a communication channel with each other as well as some minimal level of rationally based trust. When two players evaluate the same scenario, the current application of game theory by biologists would indicate that the two players (unless they wanted to be sorted out of existence by natural selection) would have to compete for the economic or energy potential represented by that single situation such that they must always fight for any available resource to the bitter end in a kind of Darwinian race to the bottom by ever more utterly selfish competitors. Yet, we know that something must be wrong with our current application of game theory, because any biologist can testify that we do see lots of examples of cooperation in nature which contradicts the stark conclusion that game theory and Darwinism seem to leave us with where only the most selfish can win. It will be the task of this paper to show that the current application of game theory to nature with The Modern Synthesis is not complete as it has not been fully combined with communication theory by generalizing the dimension of trust and has not fully taken the general selection pressure implied by the Second Law of Thermodynamics into account. When we do, we will see that a normalization compatible with such a problem statement must let improved levels of reliability or trust in measurement of communication channels improve the general combined potential for value realization of two communicating and cooperating players in such a way that full reliability in this relationship realizes a greater total energy value than is realized by full certainty in a relationship of pure competition between completely selfish players as their combined value potential cannot be realized. When communication between cooperating players takes place we will see that the potential economic or energy value - potential in the game theoretic formula potential * probability - of a single situation involving two cooperating biological observers must from an information theoretical perspective take a value between 0 and 2 (if we let the maximal value for competitors remain 1) to fully represent the additional communication theoretical potential for energy efficient information representation. The probability in the game theoretical formula would then stand for the reliability in the communication channel and could take a value between 1 and 0. Thus to capture that situation we could keep using the existing formula potential * probability with multiplication but where potential can be up to two. We can also normalize the formula so that potential takes a value between 0 and 1 but in that case we should also use addition rather than

multiplication between potential and probability as in potential + probability so that the maximum value can still become 2. By doing this we capture the relationship between cooperators but on the other hand we no longer correctly describe the constraints for competing players. By introducing a third term reliability standing for the rational trust in the communication channel between cooperators the formula becomes applicable to both problem statements (competition and cooperation) we can capture the constraints for cooperators and competitors with the formula derived potential = (potential * probability) + reliability 2. This paper will let relevance stand for the economic value of a situation derived by the game theoretical formula potential * probability and let reliability stand for the level of rational trust two cooperating players have in their communication channel. We let E stand for the derived economic or energy potential of a situation for the two cooperating players with the rational level of trust between them expressed by the reliability value and go on to examine in detail the following proposition:

0 Potential 1 0 Probability 1 0 Reliability 1 0 Derived Potential for Biophysical Competitors = Potential * Probability 1 0 Relevance = Potential * Probability 1 0 Derived Potential for Biophysical Cooperators = (Potential* Probability) + Reliability 2 0 E Relevance + Reliability 2
If this proposition initially sounds farfetched to some readers they may be sympathized with. Especially when the physical implications are taken into account, we must understand that it is nearly in the realm of the designers of perpetual mobiles to suggest such a thing as we do here, but at the same time we must remember that what makes ideas such as perpetual mobiles impossible is that they would require the addition of energy or mass to the universe. We will break no such rules and intend to stay within the limits of the theoretically possible in this paper. The conventional wisdom of game theory will continue to hold such that uncertainty should reduce the overall economic value of a situation and we also agree that it has been correctly normalized with multiplication for the problem statement as it has been posed by The Modern Synthesis. The solution to the paradox, in a nutshell, is that the way we have applied game theory to nature, we have only allowed it to take one cake into account where in reality the universe will provide the energy equivalent of two cakes, such that two cooperators could have one cake each. The Second Law of Thermodynamics will inevitably nab away at both cakes to some extent, but that extent can be minimized in direct proportion to how well the cooperating agents communicate based on rational reasons to trust each other. What this paper will go on to show as carefully as it can is that communication theory will dictate that the combined energy value of a situation that includes two cooperating observers must be

logically described as maximally 2 (if 1 continues to stand for the maximal energy of the same situation for competitors) such that with reduced uncertainty in their communication channel two cooperating agents with rational reason to trust each other could outcompete two selfish competitors by performing more efficiently than has so far been fully reflected by The Modern Synthesis (except in the specific case of kin selection). We can capture the essential proposition of this paper with regards to The Modern Synthesis as follows: The Modern Synthesis has correctly reflected the logical limitations showing how irrationally nave players become punished by natural selection. This paper will complete that picture by showing the corresponding logical limitations to the effect that the irrationally selfish players become punished by natural selection. This does not lead us to conclude that we are doomed to witness the self-destruction of all biophysical systems because all players would be forced by natural selection to become irrationally selfish. Rather we conclude that we must expect more cooperation in nature than The Modern Synthesis would have predicted so far and that in turn matches our actual observations in nature.

One way to frame the point this paper makes is to begin by observing that game theory has correctly analyzed the problem of the Prisoners Dilemma as per the conditions defined in the problem statement. It is obvious that a solution to the dilemma would be if the prisoners were allowed to talk to each other to coordinate their strategies (combining game theory with communication theory) the only reason this is not a good solution to the dilemma as posed is that it has been explicitly forbidden by the problem definition. This paper will not question any of the fundamental conclusions from game theory or communication theory. We will only examine the claim that we have applied the conclusions in slightly the wrong way to nature if we assume that all organisms are ultimately locked into prisoners dilemmas that could only be mitigated by kin selection. We will see that the important aspect for organisms in nature to be able to cooperate is not that they are able to identify each other as relatives but that they can communicate and that they have any rational reason (a reason better than chance) to trust each other. The Second Law of Thermodynamics gives organisms an excellent reason to want to trust each other but the ultimate question that this paper must go on to address is if they really can by any other means than kin selection. The generalization that this paper will make is to show that kin selection is just one way that organisms can find a rational way to trust each other but really any rational way will do and we will go on to examine in careful detail that there is at least one more way to build rational trust between potentially communicating organisms other than that of being closely related. While the information theoretically motivated energy proposed to be available by this paper has already been identified formally by The Modern Synthesis in the form of kin selection and less formally in the explanation to observations such as the buddy-system of vampire bats, the ambition of this paper is to show that the economic argument by kin selection can be abstracted into a generally applicable rational such that the additional economic (energy) potential already identified to be available under kin selection becomes more generally available in nature than had so far been expected.

Until fully combined with communication theory, game theory under The Modern Synthesis would lead to the idea that two Darwinian agents would always have to fiercely struggle for any energy or be outcompeted by those who did such than no cooperation would ever be expected in nature except between close kin. But as biologists can confirm, nature shows us enough examples of cooperation between definitely very distantly related organisms to know that this application of game theory must be incomplete, and finding the bug in the argument would show us the reason that we should be able to predict the prevalence of cooperators over purely selfish competitors in nature. Thus far cooperation between organisms not closely related have presented many unexplained mysteries of nature to biologists and mathematicians alike as seen from the perspective of Darwinian Evolution by Natural Selection and game theory but this paper hopes to derive the information theoretical proof for why we should expect to see results fully in accordance with what biologists observe every day in the wild. The general logic of the argument that this paper strives to capture formally can be illustrated as follows. Consider two water tanks, each with a pair of divers in it. In each tank there would be a bottle of air. If one tank has two cooperating divers sharing their air and the other tank has two mortal enemies fighting over their bottle, then the sharing divers would last longer underwater as the enemy divers spend much of the air in their bottle on the struggle for that air. Should one fighter win, the losing diver would be replaced by another diver (in order to reflect the conditions of nature well in our thought experiment, there should always be another contestant in line) such that the diver fighting all comers for the air-bottle (as many as can fit in his tank) will always end up with shorter time underwater in total than the diver who knows to share the air with the other divers who are able to fit in his tank. The sharing divers can also go on to make their air last even longer than it otherwise would by further improving their communication (less air will be lost in little mistakes as the bottle is handed around). As the communication between sharing divers is improved they approach the full value realization of the air (energy) in the bottle such that when no divers fight over air and have learned optimal sharing techniques they could theoretically utilize twice as much of the air in their bottle compared to the same amount of divers in the battle-tank. The basic game theoretical proposition this paper will examine could thus be summed up as: Fighting over a resource means the fighters use up part of that resource in the fight (they need its energy to fight for it) which is not the case when sharing the same resource. As game theory cannot in its application to nature by The Modern Synthesis yet accurately predict all cooperation in nature, we know that application must be incomplete somehow such as to make the suggestion that this paper has identified a way to add to the existing body of knowledge less outstanding. It does not boggle the mind to picture the proposition that divers sharing oxygen could outlast divers fighting for their equal amount of oxygen. No new air (or energy) has been entered into the equation, it is just a matter of energy being lost fighting that game theory in combination with Darwinism and genetics would have assumed had so inevitably to be lost that it should not be represented as part of the potential economic value of the situation. Under the essentially circular argument that because half of energy must always be lost to competition for that energy, an ultimate incentive is provided for all organisms to compete for all energy such that half of it must always be

lost to competition the result to The Modern Synthesis has been that half of the potential energy of any situation not involving close kin has been lost from consideration. In terms of poker: When two poker players each put a dollar into the pot, the total value in the pot is obviously two dollars. Game theory would correctly observe that assuming both players play to win the pot, the derived value of the pot from the economic perspective of each player becomes the total pot value minus what that player themselves put in. That is, if two players have put a dollar each into a pot, the value of that two-dollar pot from the perspective of each player is just one dollar. What this paper will do is to examine the claim that The Modern Synthesis has applied game theory a little too strictly. By only formally describing the potential for reliably trust-based cooperation in kin selection, it does not fully take into account other potentially equally rational ways to build trust between non-related agents. The Second Law of Thermodynamics would in turn always provide the general incentive for potentially communicating players to establish such rational trust as it enables them (in direct proportion to their levels of rationally trust-based cooperation) to regard the poker game of life in such a way that the challenge becomes to maintain the economic value of the pot (now seen as their shared account) so that it keeps being worth two dollars as long as possible. The basic principle has already been identified formally in the form of kin selection but we will go on to generalize the principle to rely on a dimension of trustworthiness of the data in communication channels between any cooperating agents. The Modern Synthesis has correctly used game theory to observe that the selfish cynic wins over the nave altruist in nature but has not yet fully reflected how the cooperating realist goes on to win over the selfish cynic by means of the cooperating realist realizing that in the end more total energy can be put to good use by an organism that shares some instead of fighting bitterly for all of it. It is rational to be a little bit trusting and also to be a little bit generous as long as too great risks are never taken, allowing enough leeway in nature to let such relationships as that between a dentist bird and a crocodile to evolve smoothly without the presupposition that either birds nor crocodiles at any point in time had to act irrationally (be stupid enough to not recognize free lunch or be simply too nave). We should note that the actual example of the Egyptian Plover acting as a dentist bird for crocodiles may still remain too extreme an example to actually work the analysis of this paper will still leave room for the possibility that either crocodiles or birds are too bad at communicating to make the whole deal work. A way of relating the argument presented by this paper to the often less biologically minded realm of dead matter physics will be as follows. Current game theory correctly describes the situation of two ping pong players playing against each other such that in combination with a physical model (such as The Standard Model) it could ultimately predict the constraints for how the ball could move between two optimal players that were both trying to win the game. But it is a misapplication of game theory to nature to assume that all ping pong players must try to win over each other. Game theory plus physics would not by themselves correctly describe the constraints (predict the possible paths for the ball) for the situation of two optimal ping pong players trying to keep the ball in play as long as possible. We can correctly describe such a situation, and we will still have to apply game theory and physics to capture the essential problem with keeping the ball in play even for optimal players. But we will also have to invoke communication theory to find the ultimate constraints on the possible paths for the ball in this type of situation.

Relating to how The Modern Synthesis has been applied to nature so far, it has roughly stated that in the long run we should never be able to see ping pong balls move reliably in the cooperative rather than the competitive way except if the players were closely related but we do see phenomena corresponding to such reliable cooperation based motion of ping pong balls in nature much more often than we would expect. Turning back to the world of physics, biologists are ultimately presented with an information theoretical problem in very much the same way that it would become challenging to our model of physics from an information theoretical perspective if the measurement of the superluminal neutrino were to be confirmed. Our currently best application of physics tells us we should not be able to see repeatable measurements of such a thing as a superluminal neutrino. But if some recent experiments are confirmed, physics may stand before a conundrum as deep as that of the biologists. It will be the ambition of this paper to show that both of these mysteries have the same information theoretically based solution. We note that to the physicist, the biophysical discussions in this paper are meant to illustrate that we can mathematically derive the ultimate constraints to a physical model from a biophysical model. The connection to the biophysical discussion around cooperation will be to see that from an information theoretical perspective, physicists have constrained the available energy in the universe too harshly by a factor of two in essentially the same way as biologists have assumed that the constraints for two optimal selfish players both doing everything in their power to win over the other would describe to the ultimate constraint on the shape of behavior for organisms in our world. The pure physical discussion will end up revealing a non-biophysical way to realize the additional potential than by strict biological cooperation by showing how statistical limitations to motion can be overcome by redundancy. For a general example of how this paper will relate biophysics and standard physics to each other, we could start by observing how we know from a physical perspective that if we conclude in a biophysical way from Darwinism and game theory that it would be physically impossible for a ping pong ball to move in the path it would between two cooperating players then we must have made a mistake somewhere. We know such a proposition is not true as we can see that it is physically possible for the ping pong ball to move the way it would for cooperating players because this happens whenever a parent teaches their child to play ping pong. The question becomes if nature would allow two players to cooperate (and we know from measurement that this seems to be the case between animals in the wild) such as to allow this type of motion for a ping pong ball in practice between non-related players. The answer is that whenever the ping pong ball represents a valuable resource for both players it makes more sense for each of them to try to cooperate to keep the resource around as long as possible (keep the ball in play) rather than for either to try to risk the resource by starting to struggle for it (use some of the air in the bottle to wrestle for dominance over it). As already mentioned, game theorists and biologists (including Darwin himself) have already realized one way this mechanism would work and have correctly included this aspect in their models. The concept called kin selection describes how in a situation with four siblings where three were in a life threatening situation and the fourth could save them at the expense of his own life, it would make

evolutionary sense (game theoretical sense from the perspective of his genes) for an individual to sacrifice his life to save three or more individuals known for a fact to be siblings of the first individual. This follows from how it would result in the genes of the self-sacrificing sibling rescuing 1.5 times the total amount of copies of themselves (all genes really care about) which is more than the 1 copy of them contained in the unlucky altruist. Darwin did not know about genes but identified the general possibility of kin selection which was later confirmed to work in practice for genes after Mendel had identified them (as Darwinism was eventually combined with the discovery of genes into The Modern Synthesis). So we could expect to see cooperation in nature between closely related organisms that are able to identify each other as close relatives. But we also see cooperation in nature that cannot be explained directly this way. The answer to this mystery of biology and game theory, as suggested by this paper, is that the general pressure on any concrete representations of information imposed by the Second Law of Thermodynamics is enough to provide the incentive for generally competing organisms to limit their competition and instead organize themselves in ways constrained ultimately by game theory in combination with communication theory and the limits to rational trust into cooperative systems such as to keep valuable resources around for as long as possible to the ultimate benefit of all the cooperating organisms. Biology has modeled the selection pressure that organisms place on each other and concluded that all organisms are doomed from this to eternal competition. But it has not fully drawn the conclusion from the additional selection pressure that the general randomness described by the Second Law of Thermodynamics place on all organisms as an aggregate such as to provide them with an ultimate incentive to cooperate with each other in the general competition against rocks falling from space (and other random events that are not the direct results of organisms competing). We must at this point reiterate that no new energy will be added over time to this model of the universe that was not already there such that our model respects the very most fundamental expectation on all our models the constant total sum of mass and energy in the universe. However, we will go on to see that this fusion of game theory and communication theory will have purely physical implications that may seem more speculative to the cautious reader than the idea that sharing divers live longer in a water tank and that application of game theory to nature with The Modern Synthesis should have not formally captured the entire potential for the divers to reliably trust each other except by being closely related. In short, we will see that communication theory does not only explain how cooperators can fare better in nature, it will also potentially provide an explanation to the possibly discovered phenomenon of the superluminal neutrino. The basic explanation to the energy in our model that seems missing from our currently most generally accepted physical models is to see that the photon or the space particle would have a minimal rest mass of 1 in our model. Like biologists have been on to the rational for cooperation in the form of kin selection but have not gone so far in The Modern Synthesis as to conclude that there must exist a generally exploitable rational to cooperate even for non-related organisms, physicists have long known that some minimal rest mass could be associated with the photon and even empty space (which are seen as the same

thing in our model, mostly because we have discovered no logical reason to distinguish between the concepts). But without the discovery of any generally exploitable rational for assuming that the rest mass of a photon should be greater than 0 (no identifiable way the universe could exploit or be potentially impacted by such additional energy in a rational or repeatable way) The Standard Model has not gone so far as to make any such assumption. However, we will see in this paper that information theory supports this idea of the minimal rest mass or energy of space and photons and we can see ways that the universe could be impacted by this extra energy in ways that could be detectable by experiments (directly in experiments with the superluminal neutrino but also more indirectly with another experiment described in the section about Dark Energy towards the end of this paper). This will allow our model to consider twice the energy as had hitherto been assumed to be available in the universe. The superluminal neutrino, although not yet experimentally confirmed, would be seen as a potentially rational (repeatable and compatible with information theory) way to exploit (potentially measure) the extra energy of this rest mass of space and the photon predicted by this model. Thus, it will be a prediction of this paper that the superluminal neutrino can be experimentally confirmed. At the same time it is not a strong prediction that we must be able to provoke such effects in earthly laboratories or even in our physical universe (other limitations not discovered by this paper could still apply). The strongest physical prediction that this paper will make will be to state that with fine enough measurement we should be able to see accelerating increased redshift between objects on earth that we know are maintaining a constant relative distance. While measurements to the effect of superluminal motion have recently been made, they have yet to be confirmed. The model derived in this paper will make the observation that such superluminal motion would not be impossible from an information theoretical perspective as a solid particle should logically be able to travel up to nearly the speed of light through absolute space in our model of the universe that includes an absolute reality. The total energy and mass will remain constant over time in our model we will only come to see that information theory reveals to us more of what is already there. The physical constraints we have thus far derived from information theory are simply too conservative by a factor of two compared to what becomes allowed when communication is taken fully into account. In just the same way that game theory without communication theory can only be used to constrain the predictions for the path of a ping pong ball between competing players, the constraints information theory have seemingly implied on physics have not completely taken communication theory into account such that we have not really included the full range of possibility for the ways a ping pong ball would be able to physically move. In accordance with the model we have defined in this paper we will see that the maximum theoretical possible speed with which two solid particles could approach each other should in fact be nearly twice the speed of light. The reader is reminded that in the end we are only discussing a mathematical model. Should our model turn out to allow, say, superluminal relative speed of up to 2 * c it could either be the case that our model is plain incorrect or that we have just not yet discovered the information theoretically valid reason why such a thing would not be possible in the analysis of this paper. Or perhaps it could be that information theory does not by itself prevent such a thing but that some other physical aspect in our universe prevents it for us.

In order to fully discover how something that has so far been considered an information theoretical constraint on the physics of our universe could turn out not to be imposed in such a way by information theory after all, we must begin by returning to the world of theoretical biophysics. Again, real world examples of biophysical agents include frogs, humans and vacuum cleaning robots as well as much simpler agents such as the original ancestor to life on earth. It is useful to keep the picture of what we know about real life examples of biological and robotic agents in mind as we evaluate mentally our general model of how mathematical abstractions of biophysical robot particles must behave. It will be a core assumption of this paper that the same type of constraints from game theory that apply to all living organisms would by necessity have to apply to such robot particles as well. As we go on to consider the mathematical possibilities constraining robotic particles with motors, sensors and controllers in their internal substructure we should therefor verify the logic against what we know from observations of biological organisms in nature in addition to verifying the general mathematical consistency and correspondence to measurements by physicists. As we know, all arguments in this paper will be based in information theory including game theory and communication theory. They will thus be ultimately logical and mathematical in nature and must hold in the purely mathematical context, such that a mathematician and not only a biologist could evaluate the propositions of the model we are about to construct. It could be observed however that for maximal confidence in the model it should optimally be verified by mathematicians (which includes students of information theory), physicists including theoretical biophysicists as well as biologists. This means that even if deemed mathematically consistent, the model presented by this paper can be scientifically falsified with measurements by physicists as well as by any biologist finding stable patterns of behaviors between organisms in nature that would have been considered impossible by the mathematical formula we will derive.

Replicating Agent Systems

The life (as in continued existence in functioning form) of an agent depends on it being able to maintain its internal structure of sensors, motors and controllers. Luckily for it, it has an internal system of sensors, motors and controllers to help it do so. Interactions with the environment in the form of surrounding solid particles could well result in degradation of the internal structure (the information content or signal) of the agent, so the universe is a dangerous place for it. It may become more dangerous still when other solid particles can also be arranged into agents, even though this paper will do what it can to prove that some of those agents can represent opportunity in the form of cooperative partners. It follows that those agents that happen to have their controllers connecting their sensors to their motors in such a way as to improve their chances of maintaining their internal structures will become a more frequent component of the universe over time than those with bad controller strategies, as agents with bad strategies would perish while those with better strategies would stay around. Among the agents there is a special subset of possible machines that have the capability of building replicas of themselves. We call this group of agents the replicators and we note that whenever we

have imperfect replicators competing for limited resources with variable success depending on their strategy we will see Darwinian evolution by natural selection of their strategies in the form of adaptations to optimize for local or global selection pressures. A real world example of a replicator is a gene. But even before we have replicators we could potentially have agents to be sorted in and out of existence by selective Mother Nature in accordance with their fitness functions as randomly assembled agents competed for limited local resources, with the result that over time we could see a trend towards seeing a higher number of more efficient agent machines. The difference is that before replicators, better machines will have to appear fully formed by chance rather than via small replication mistakes in already established designs. Such spontaneous arrangements are increasingly rare the more complex they are and so we can expect a dramatically higher discovery rate of improved agent machines once replicator machines happen to have been formed, but we do know that agents could arise by chance alone although rarely as we are certain that they have arisen in the past. If replicators exist then we can deduce that the first replicator had to have come about by chance. We do know that replicators exist, since we and all other life forms on earth are examples of them (or at least our genes are) and therefore we know that agents and replicators can form by chance. The one exception to the rule that the first replicator must have come about by chance alone is that strictly speaking, the first replicator could have been built by another agent that was formed by chance but that strictly was not a replicator as it could not or for some other reason did not create a copy of itself.

Evolution of Natural Law

The question for an agent (including an agent that is a replicator) becomes how it can tune its controllers as to make optimal movements based on available information. We use the same shorthand as is common among biologists, which is to talk as if agents and replicators had conscious desires and goals, but what we mean is that agents or replicators that happened to act as if in line with such desires and goals - basically the desire to preserve energy and the goal to do so optimally from a game theoretical perspective - would improve their fitness and be rewarded by natural selection by becoming more common. Just as we dont require the reader to seriously consider that all particles are robots - or perhaps even worse, spaceships with little scientists in them few biologists waste their time asking you to honestly contemplate how genes could dream (apart from the indirect sense in which they could affect our dreams). Of course, some agents, such as us, are indeed sentient, but it is only a special case that is not necessarily relevant to the current discussion. We saw that in our model of the semi-static world active particles would appear to move (or change mass) in the local perspectives of each other as a result of uncertainty regarding each other decreasing over time. The same basic premise for uncertainty constrains the perception of active particles in our model of the fully dynamic universe as well. In addition to the movements and mass they actually have, solid particles will seem to each other to behave in accordance with extra components of relative movement, mass and time based on the uncertainty associated with measurements, such as for uncertainty levels to decrease over time to the extent that active particles stay stationary but increase again over time to the extent that the active particles move around relative to each other.

Consider two stationary active particles that happen to be just next to each other. As we saw in the examination of virtual gravity in the semi-static universe, the passing of time will mean that each particle gains a better understanding of the position of the other, something that will look to the particles as if they were accelerating towards each other (or solidifying, or unfreezing in time) in a gravitational way (with the acceleration we normally associate with gravitation). However, as we know, they will not in fact collide since in our model they are both standing still in the absolute reality. But what if the active particles were actually agents and represented some kind of threat to each other? As each instance of time would pass, the two particles would discover that they were yet a bit closer to each other than they would have liked and so they compensate by telling their respective motors to move them in the opposite direction, away from the other particle (we could consider this to be the biophysical version in our model of a particle and what would for whatever economic reason be its anti-particle). If both particles behave this way and all the time keep accelerating away exactly enough to compensate for how much closer they seemed to have gotten to the other particle since the last time they looked, the effect will be the following: The two active particles will in fact be accelerating away from each other in absolute space, but their measurements of each other will tell each active particle that it is maintaining a constant distance to the other. This is because uncertainty about the position of the other is going away in the same rate as actual distance between them is increased. If active agent particles behave according to a risk management strategy where they use their motors to try to maintain constant perceived distance to (or mass of or speed of time in) all other active particles (at least the ones of their anti-kinds) and also have to rely on the measurements of their sensors to do this, then the result will be that while virtual gravity is a perceptional distortion that does not draw objects together in the absolute reality of our model, active agent particles and antiparticles suffering from the illusion that objects are affected by virtual gravity will work to counteract it (or they are not suffering but fully aware of their perceptional distortion but unable to improve rationally on their navigation due to the limitations of their measurements). Thus such a model of the universe would end up with particles displaying real behavior in line with the inverse of gravity as active agent particles highly skeptical of each other would behave as if affected by anti-gravity.

Active Agent Gravity

We have seen that the best that available information will allow active agents to do in our model if they represent threats to each other and so want avoid each other is to follow a path of inverse gravity. On the other hand, if agents somehow represent opportunity for each other, they should try to inverse their strategy of movement to approach each other as fast as rationally possible instead. In this case, the constraints of uncertainty will allow them to move towards each other exactly in accordance with how they would move if virtual gravity were real and were pulling them together. So if we have two solid (active) particles A and B in our model of the dynamic universe where each represents a threat to the other, a global observer would see them accelerate away from each other in absolute space in paths that were in line with inverse virtual gravity. If both represent opportunity to each other they would accelerate towards each other in line with virtual gravity. If they have different opinions on the matter such that A wants to move towards B but B wants to move away

from A or vice versa, then assuming both particles have the same motor capacity they will maintain constant distance to each other in absolute space, with one chasing after the other. We can see that the rate by which uncertainty evaporates for local observers puts an ultimate constraint on how fast active agents can rationally approach or escape each other in this model. It is one of the claims of this paper that it follows logically that this constraint applies generally to active agent particle based implementations of any force of nature where there is less than infinite speed of information regarding the economic opportunities or risks to the agents that constitute the rational for the force.

Internal and External Mechanics

To contrast with the active agent particle based gravity implementation, we will consider an alternative explanation for why we can see real particles around us behaving according to real gravity that moves solid particles around. Real gravity is an aspect that must be possible to capture in our model to match the requirement that we should be able to see correspondence between the behaviors of concepts such as mass, space and time in our model and their matching real world counterparts. In our world we know that it is reasonable to assume the existence of active agents on the macro level, because we ourselves (or our genes) are examples not only of active agents but also of replicators, live and in action. We could of course ask the question if it is possible to consider active agents (and maybe even replicators) on the micro level, in the substructure of what we perceive as solid particles, but again the reader will not be asked to consider this as a real world possibility but only to model this possibility from a mathematical perspective to see what the derivable constraints would be. But if active agents are not implementing gravity, what is the alternative? Solid things in our world do seem to approach each other by the formula of F = m1 * m2 / d2, and either there has to be some magical invisible hand of gravity responsible for drawing them together, or the particles must have a purely mechanical reason, internal or external, for setting off towards each other. The term mechanical will be used as a substitute for a solution that is allowed within the constraints of information theory and also implies a measure of causality or non-randomness, such that a nonmechanical implementation would have to be a chaotic, random implementation that would only work by chance or reliably by magic - from an information theoretical point of view. The active agent particles represent an at least mathematically possible example where the internal mechanical substructure of particles can explain why we see real gravity effects. We will now examine an alternative (perhaps easier to consider as a candidate for a real-world implementation) where external mechanical effects are responsible for implementing gravity.

Gravitons
We have defined our model such that the reactive agents have only the very minimal rest mass associated with the informational capacity of one position in space, so that when they bump into a solid particle they will bounce off it but they will not push the solid particle away, only provide it with information about other solid particles. But what if the reactive particles had a little more mass - or rather (as we want to stay with our definition of a reactive particle) assume that there were a kind of solid particle that had so very little mass as to be very nearly a reactive particle but still had enough

mass as to be capable of pushing solid objects around ever so slightly? In other words, we will now have a discussion about the constraints regarding the least massive active particle (reactive particles are not solid but seen as space or light particles in our model even if they have a minimal rest mass of 1 to correspond to the minimal informational requirement on a position in space). If we have thought of space or the photon as an example of a purely reactive particle, we could call this very nearly but not quite reactive particle the graviton. There is an explanation of gravity known as Le Sage's theory of gravitation, originally proposed by Nicolas Fatio de Duillier, stating that if a solid particle is bombarded from all directions in an equal distribution by such very nearly but not entirely immaterial particles, the solid particle would stay in place. But if two solid particles were next to each other, they would to some extent shield each other from the bombardment with the result of them being pushed towards each other. The relation of mass and distance to the constraint on the strength of this effect nicely matches what we expect, the formula F = m1 * m2 / d2, as the greater the masses the bigger the shields and the closer a shield is the more shielding it does. This explanation is entirely mechanistic and has the advantage, if we want to call it that, of not having to suppose that particles have substructures of little sensors and motors. The effect would come from gravitons getting out of the way from between the more solid particles and so we see that the speed of this effect is then limited by the speed of the graviton, as the information about how they should get out of the way comes in the form of other gravitons, pushing them away (or rather a relative lack of such gravitons coming from certain directions). It follows from our definitions that the speed of the graviton is below light speed (as having greater rest mass than light would indicate) such that the effect of graviton based gravity could not spread quite at light speed. That is to say, if the information about gravity is spread by an active particle, it would always have to work at a lower speed than an implementation of gravity where information about it travels in a purely reactive particle, as we saw from the information theoretical constraint that more information takes longer time to move. We have stated that even the space particle would have a minimal rest mass, corresponding to the information state of its position. Would that mean that space particles could push solid particles around in our model and so gravity could be the result of uneven pressure from space? But gravity would then in fact be the result of a relative lack of space particles between two particles which may seem to make sense at first until you ask yourself what would then be there instead of the space particles. We could consider an infinitely recursive model with continuous existence of yet lighter space particles representing yet fewer positions between two solid particles as heavier space particles got out of the way. But there is a point that the recursion cannot logically pass and that is the limit of the minimal amount of information (one position) such that the fastest spread of a graviton based implementation would always rely on the existence of a lighter particle getting out of the way and the lightest particle that can reliably exist as information such that it could be seen by outside observers to change (as in getting out of the way or even being in the way in the first place) is the purely reactive (or light) particle that occupies exactly one position in space.

Following such a recursion infinitely would at some point lead to the requirement of the invention of additional positions in space which should not be allowed by information theory (concrete information has cost) and the rules of mass and energy conservation. Thus we can see that such an externally mechanical effect that relies on things heavier than the lightest available particle to push things around in practice could never work fully at the speed of that lightest particle - at best it will work at the speed of the next heaviest particle. And even if it could, in such a mathematical idealization gravity would still be constrained ultimately to work maximally at the speed of light as the conservation rule would prevent that the positions were split in such a way as to actually create more positions in space (more mass and energy in the universe) for an external observer.

The Limits to Natural Law

We have seen from our model that if a physical force in it is implemented by particle interactions and information about the force can only travel inside particles moving with finite speeds, then the force cannot reliably act over time with force exceeding F m1 * m2 / d2 as the masses and the distance place a statistical limitation on the number of particle interactions implementing the force that may take place. For exactly the same reason that an observer will have uncertainty associated with measurements and experience relativistic effects in proportion to the same formula, we can understand that forces of nature in our model cannot affect each other with a strength greater than F m1 * m2 / d2. We can reformulate this if we use c to stand for the maximum speed with which the information communicating the effect can travel into E m1 * m2 * c2 to describe the information theoretical constraint on the maximum energy E or the maximum distance that any and all natural forces can act over during a given interval of time in our model. We have seen how we could derive E mc2 when wanting to describe the maximum possible rate for effect communication under the maximum speed c between one solid particle and one particle of space, such that E mc2 is a special case of E m1 * m2 * c2 for an effect where m2 approaches or is 1. The two explanations of gravity that we have seen (one based on active agents and the other based on gravitons pushing objects towards each other) are both purely mechanical in nature. As such, they are equally good explanations in that nothing magical is presumed. Both could indeed be true and responsible for effects we see around us in our world. The important aspect to the discussion of these two implementations is to test examples of logically and mathematically consistent implementation methods of both internal and external character to verify once more that the constraints suggested by the formulas we have derived from information theory must hold true for implementation methods that in turn violate no information theory. The advantage, if you would call it that, with the active agent particle theory is that the effect of gravity or any other force of nature could potentially travel faster. As we have seen, it follows from the observation that for particles to be able to push each other around they need some rest mass greater than the lowest rest mass of (nearly) empty space (or the photon) i.e. what we call an active or a solid particle in our model - and we also assume that particles with rest mass cannot travel quite as fast as particles without rest mass (purely reactive particles, e.g. photons) then this would imply that the effect of graviton based gravity spreads at below the speed of agent based gravity.

With the explanation based on active agents, we can see that the information particle does not have to push the solid particle around. The agent particle only has to be able to detect the information and can then update its motors to respond accordingly. This means that with active agent particles, gravity could indeed spread with the speed of light (i.e. the speed of a purely reactive particle). In other words, active agent based (internally mechanical, or active) natural forces can spread at the speed of the fastest information carrying reactive particle, detectable by active agents, whereas graviton based (externally mechanical, or passive) natural forces can only spread at the speed of the fastest information carrying active particle, capable of pushing things around. No force based on externally pushing things around (external mechanics) could work at a speed greater than the solid particle doing the pushing and so we see that the fastest theoretically possible external mechanical implementation of a force will never be faster than the fastest theoretically possible internal implementation of the same force. We can thus see that in our model the active agent particle theory describes an ultimate constraint on any dynamic universe such that it represents the best possible performance of a natural force one which can spread at the fastest speed of information in the universe and we can see that the best such an optimal implementation of any natural force could ever do is to be constrained by E m1 * m2 * c2. We can therefor see that we have found a hard limit on our model and that if the concepts in our model correspond logically to their counterparts in our physical reality this would translate into having derived an equally hard limit on physical nature where we will continue to suppose that no magic is allowed and all forces must have some mechanical (as in compatible with information theory) implementation. As this is a main step in the final constraint we will derive in this paper we should take care to summarize what we have found once more and we will also note that the constraint seems fully in accordance with both Newton and Einstein so far, which is a good sign that the definitions in our model might also bear a good resemblance to their counterparts in our physical reality. What we have found thus far is the following: Constrained to mechanical implementations of natural forces either a force of nature is ultimately somehow implemented by heavyweight active (solid) particles pushing each other around (the external mechanical implementation) or by active agents detecting and responding to information in lightweight reactive (photon) particles (the internal mechanical implementation). We have derived a constraint that must hold true for our model and we understand that to the extent that our model is logically sound and its concepts correspond to those in the real world, we are also describing a constraint on any physical force of nature in our world. We know that the optimal external implementation will never be able to outperform the optimal internal implementation as the internal implementation can react on purely reactive particles and we know that E m1 * m2 * c2 puts a constraint on the performance of an internal implementation. E m1 * c2 is a special case where one of the masses equals 1 as for the minimal rest mass of a space particle. It follows that it must also be a constraint on the implementation of all external (passive) implementations and thus it is a hard constraint on any and all mechanically implemented forces of nature in our model and if our model is good also in our universe.

The Universe We Are In

So we have two candidate explanations for natural forces. We have passive, externally mechanical implementations and active, internally mechanical implementations. Which implementation is responsible for the gravity or indeed any natural force - we see in our universe? Pretending for a moment that the model we have devised has been deemed acceptable and we are allowed to draw conclusions about our world from it, it would then seem like it would be possible to determine which implementation method (internal or external) is more accurately describing the effects of gravity or some other force that we see around us by measuring if its effects travel at light speed or below. However, we would not necessarily be able to determine if what we perceive as light or even space is indeed what we have described as purely reactive particle with minimal rest mass (or perhaps even no rest mass at all if we have made a logical mistake somewhere in our deductions). Even the closest we ever get to empty space may have more rest mass than we know at the moment. What we think of as photons or even empty space could in fact be some kind of gravitons (not purely reactive particles) with fairly but not totally minimal rest mass and because we are not able to distinguish their rest mass from minimal (especially if minimal should turn out to be no rest mass at all) we call them photons or space, thinking we are seeing purely reactive particles at work. In this case, the gravitons could happen to be carriers of the information that we perceive as light as well. If we are so unlucky that there are no photons but only gravitons, we may never be able to determine if gravity would be due to gravitons pushing things around or active agent particles chasing each other. The same goes if there are only photons but no gravitons, unless we are able to prove conclusively that the photons we see really have no or logically minimal rest mass and are purely reactive particles, in which case they shouldnt be able to push things around (no yet lighter particles to replace them to represent fewer positions in space as the gravitons get out of the way) implying active agents at work. Furthermore, because of the limitations imposed by the Planck length, we may never be able to look inside the solid particles to see if there are any little motors and sensors there. However, if both photons and gravitons exist and we were to become able to detect them both and tell the difference we could conclude that at least the graviton gravitation is probably implemented in our universe (it would seem like a kind of unavoidable effect if something like gravitons were around) but it would not exclude the possibility that active agent particles were also doing their part to implement gravity or other natural forces. If we were to detect photons and gravitons and could conclusively determine that photons had no or minimal rest mass and that some particles obey slower than light forces of nature but other particles could detect and react to some physical force with the speed of light, then it would be a good guess that the former particles were non-agent (or dumb-agent) particles pushed around by external mechanical implementations (gravitons) whereas the latter particles would be examples of active agent particles, reacting to information in their sensors by applying their motors. We have seen two possible implementations for gravity, but what about the other forces of nature? Well, they would all have either internal or external mechanical implementations unless we wanted

to invoke some kind of magic (break laws of information theory). We have seen an elegant external implementation of gravity in Le Sages theory of gravity, perhaps there are clever external mechanical implementations for the other forces of nature as well. Conversely it is at least a mathematical possibility that any force of nature could also be implemented by active agents responding to how different types of particles represent different types of opportunities or threats to each other, such that for example the behavior of electrons could be analyzed from a game theoretical perspective to see how they relate to each other according to economic rational. It must be stressed that the point of this paper is not to demonstrate the necessary existence of robot particles around us, but to consider the mathematical constraints we can derive from them as a mathematical concept. Again, we remind ourselves that for all mechanical implementations of forces of nature - either actively as agents or passively with an external mechanical implementation our model states that they can become no more efficient than to be constrained by E m1 * m2 * c2. With passive implementations, any other constraints associated with some given natural force would come from additional mechanical constraints of whatever passive effects were used for its implementation. With active agent implementations, just like biologists can find explanations to organism behaviors in Darwinian evolution by natural selection, so the behavior for any active agents can be explained using Darwins framework of explanation and modeled mathematically with the help of game theory.

Quantum Mechanics
But would it be physically possible in our world for the solid particles we see to have little sensors and motors in them? Doesnt the Planck length imply that such substructures would be utterly unreliable? Not necessarily. While there exists a practical limit on how small structures we can know anything about from the outside, this does not mean that substructures on the inside could not work. It is only an observer above the Planck length that could never be certain (in the very physical sense, not just in the conscious sense) about the reality under the Planck length. There could theoretically be a fully functioning set of sensors and motors inside a seemingly solid particle, working with better than random stability as the smaller particles they consist of bounce around at least semi-confidently in absolute space. Indeed such will be the model we will consider for the micro world in this paper, that continues to base its logic and mathematics on the inclusion of an absolute reality in the model from which secondary realities are derived, that are really the limited perceptions (interaction opportunities) with the absolute reality by the local observers (solid particles) in our model. we will examine that it does not logically break with any of the hard constraints from our actual universe that we have been able to derive about it, in this case that of the inevitable uncertainty associated with measurement of the micro world under the Planck length. But for any constraint that we know about our universe we must also take care to remember precisely to what extent those constraints must apply and where it is not logically necessary that they do.

According to the way our definitions will work, an objective observer of the absolute reality in our model would be able to see very small particles to make up the substructures of the solid particles that macro observers inside the universe can perceive. We have so far talked in terms of observers external to our model, but now we will begin to talk of observers inside the model that are internal and external (inside and outside) to the different scales (micro and macro) in the model. We will therefore begin talking about the scientist examining the model universe in his computer as the objective observer who can see things for what they really are in the absolute reality included in our model. The constraints we know from our world concerning interactions across scales between large particles on the macro scale and small particles on the micro scale would not by any logical necessity have to constrain the interaction among the micro particles themselves. The micro particles could in turn have a smallest distance below which they could not measure or interact reliably, but that is not a problem preventing them from working at least somewhat reliably with each other on their own scale just as the macro particles above them only have to interact reliably with each other on their scale to work. The constraint in our world regarding the interactions between the micro level and the macro level is imposed by the Planck length, but the constraint only tells us we in the macro world cannot make a complete measurement of the micro world. We can still make some, albeit incomplete, measurements of the micro world and furthermore we have no reason to believe that the micro world couldnt make at least some measurements of the macro world. We will now begin to define the concepts of micro world (or scale) and macro world for our model based on including the concept of a Planck scale. We start by defining their general relationship to each other in terms of their capabilities for measurement on each other based on what we know about real constraints from our world, as we want correspondence between the concepts in our model and their real-world counterparts. We will later go on to derive information theoretical motivation for the inclusion of a Planck scale in our model such that the concepts of a macro scale and a micro scale must follow. First, we define for our model (without yet motivating it further) that it includes a Planck scale such that observers larger than the Planck scale are considered inhabitants of a macro world that cannot make full measurement on observers smaller than the Planck scale and which are in turn considered inhabitants of a micro world. Secondly, we define for our model (not knowing for sure what the case would have to be in the real world) that the micro world can make some measurement of the macro world. This would then imply that the macro world may conversely be able to have some impact on the micro world. Thirdly, we define for our model (as we know that the macro level can make some measurements of the micro level in our real world) that the macro world in our model is able to make some measurement of the micro world. Thus in our model the micro world would conversely be able to have some impact on the macro world.

What this means to our model is that while the micro world may be able to have an effect on the macro world, the macro world observers may not be able to establish conclusively exactly which micro state that resulted in the macro effect. We dont know of any logical or measured constraint in our world excluding measurement by the micro scale on the macro scale. We also dont know that the necessary stability for machine-like substructures could not exist in the micro world (logically we could not make a certain measurement to determine such a thing) so at least it is not excluded as a logical possibility that we have little robot-like particles in our world as well, although we remind ourselves that we only need to consider the mathematical construct of such a phenomenon to make sure that our model can become useful as a scientific instrument of prediction derived from information theory for describing the possible range of measurements on the real world.

Quantum Superposition
In our model of the universe, we could see that local observers would experience relativistic effects as the result of uncertainty in measurements on the macro level. We can also see that measurements by the macro level on the micro level is also associated with inevitable uncertainty in any model of a universe that includes a Planck length type of constraint on a minimal reliably measurable scale for a given observer. The currently most widely accepted scientific model of the micro (quantum) world is not based on the presence of one absolute reality below that level, such that in the micro world there are only a set of overlapping superposition realities that work something like the inverse of relativity. Where the set of relative realities together seem to make up a sum of slightly less than that of one full absolute reality (but approaching it) the set of superposition realities on the micro scale seem to add up to a sum of more than one absolute reality. None of the micro superposition realities seem by themselves to completely correspond to the concept of an absolute reality, but the sum of those superimposed realities could possibly be seen as a kind of extra absolute reality together. The superimposed realities can then collapse into something that could be called one absolute reality as they are measured by macro observers, such that only one of the multiple absolute realities in the micro world becomes realized from the perspective of the macro world. This seems to imply that macro observers could be considered inhabitants of an absolute universe as the absolute reality seems like it should be the thing that would emerge from quantum states that collapse into one reality when they are measured. But there is a small problem with this model. Comparing to the generally adopted scientific model of relativity, we see that again we are looking at a set of relative realities but with no absolute reality in the model this time even measuring reality will not make it any more real such that there only ever exists relative realities on the macro scale. We see the shape of a paradox when the model of relativity is combined with the model of superposition. If the overlapping realities turn absolute when measured, we see that combined with relativity they would not actually turn absolute but rather they would go from superposition realities to become only relative realities as they are measured by a relative (macro) observer. We are left with a combined model that can make mathematically valid predictions and so is scientifically useful but that does nonetheless seem to contain some form of contradiction at its core

in that absolute reality disappears from the system. Again, this is not a problem from a strict mathematical sense but it does seem that the model is ultimately intuitively unsatisfying in that while quantum mechanics begins by hinting at the promise that things might at least become really real when measured, relativity seems to object that it will not mean they become really real at all, only relatively real, such that any actual reality where things really exist more than in the perspectives of each other will not appear anywhere in the model. In contrast, our model will continue to use an absolute reality where relative as well as superposition realities are mathematically derived from the absolute reality (as in computable from the model of the absolute reality by a computer with a processor thus reducing memory requirements of the computer) by applying uncertainty to the views of its local observers. In this model, quantum effects such as superposition are just the result of more inevitable uncertainty in measurement that we can distribute as usual over the perceptions of relative time, space and mass for observers in the model. As the mathematics of our currently generally accepted scientific model work, all we hope to do in this part of the paper is to ensure that our model too continues to make the same sense by seeing where the logical deductions from the definitions in our model take us and compare those results to the measurements of the universe we are aware of. If both approaches turn out to be consistent, we may be able to say that a model with an absolute reality is more intuitively satisfying to anyone who prefers the existence of such a concept in their models but mathematically we should at this point not expect to find a better model for describing reality than what we already have. The seemingly strange behaviors we associate with quantum mechanics on the micro scale are thus in the model of this paper the same type of effects resulting from uncertainty in measurement as the relativistic effects on the macro scale. As observers larger than the Planck length cannot (so far just because our definition says so) measure the reality of things below the Planck length reliably, we get uncertainty in our measurements indicating weirdness such as things both existing and not existing at the same time, or two different things existing in the same place, or things existing in more than one place as once, which in our model corresponds to the effect that is normally associated with quantum superposition. We added the concept of a Planck length to our model by stating that for any observer in the model there will be a potential micro scale with elements of inevitable uncertainty below. We will now begin to motivate why our model should include a Planck scale. In short, it is due to the constraints imposed on the observer by the availability of particles with which to measure. As soon as the smallest particle that the observer can use to measure is too big and blunt as to be able to measure reliably much smaller particles we get inevitable uncertainty in measurement. To regain our solid footing in information theory, we will go on by looking at the so called Nyquist criterion of a law of information theory that is called the Sampling Law, which states that when sampling a signal (measuring or converting an analog signal into a digital representation) the sample rate must exceed the highest frequency contained in the detectable input. It is thus in our model just an information theoretical consequence that bigger particles become constrained to some uncertainty as to the exact states of any particles smaller than the smallest one they can use to measure things.

The implication becomes that the Planck length can be defined in our model in such a way that it is simply the best sampling rate allowed by the very smallest particle minimally reliably useful as a measuring device. We also note that even in an absolute reality a smallest possible particle would not really have to be assumed for the model to work, just like we dont have to assume the existence of a fastest possible particle to make the macro scale work for our model. We thus can therefor begin by defining the Planck length of our model in a dynamic rather than static way just like we have an essentially dynamic definition for light speed (the fastest particle around) but we note that the same static limitation to the smallest possible particle as we have discussed for the fastest possible particle in the form of the minimal information state should also continue to apply. In our model we will thus use the information theoretical constraint of the Sampling Law in combination with the concept of minimal cost of information (represented in our model by the rest mass 1 of photons and space) to derive the constraint of a dynamic Planck length which we go on to define for our model as follows: The concept of a Planck length is defined in our model by observing that whenever there are two types of differently sized particles (one particle type is smaller than the other) and the bigger particles are used to measure the smaller particles this will result in the effect of uncertainty showing up in measurements. The conclusion is that macro (larger particle) observers of the micro (smaller particle) world will always be stuck with essential uncertainty about any micro world containing particles smaller than the smallest particle the macro world can use for measurement and we call this limit the Planck length for the macro observer. There also exists a hard Planck length in the model which corresponds to the concept of a particle reserving one position in space (a photon or space particle with the minimally stable rest mass of 1) such that the smallest reliable measuring device for macro observers becomes the photon implying that no substructures smaller than photons could be reliably measured by macro observers.

In our model measurements by macro observers can never tell them exactly how the world looks below their dynamic Planck length as set by their locally smallest available particle usable as a measuring device. But there is thus also an absolute Planck length in our model in the hard information theoretical limit for all macro observers that the reactive particle is the smallest particle that could be used for any minimally reliable measurement. Just as relativistic effects are in our model only distortions to the subjective perceptions of (unconscious) observers of objective macro phenomena, the quantum mechanical effects are in our model only distortions in the subjective perception of (unconscious) macro level observers of objective micro phenomena. We can see that in our model (but presumably in logical consequence also in our real world) the existence of a Planck length does not by itself place any logical constraint on what the physical world below Planck scale must look like such that we can know that an absolute micro reality is ruled out as a possibility in our universe. All we really know from our world is that we cant measure such small things and that they cant exist in a totally reliable way and so our model continues to be compatible

with our measurable world in alignment with our core expectation on the definitions of our model to be useful. The micro world below Planck length in our universe could in fact and for all we know look mostly like the macro world, only scaled down to miniature size, rather than to be an ultimately strange place with states that could result in half-dead cats and things existing in two places at once. The Planck length constraint concerns measurability between scales but does not by necessity constrain the world to exist in an absolute form only inside any one, special scale. There seems at first like there is a conflict here in the way we use the word absolute reality. But we will see that in the definition of our model, the absoluteness of the reality comes from the absolute rule we derived from information theory that no two pieces of reliably measurable information can share the same position in space at the same time. The transformational rules will thus have to absolutely respect this requirement, but such absolute rules could still leave some room for optionality in the system. For example, as long as two pieces of information did not come into direct conflict for position we could make the transformational rules such that two particles could sometimes be allowed to swap positions rather than bounce off each other. Given the right conditions that would allow both a swap and a bounce, we could even let the decision for when the system should produce a swap rather than a bounce be totally random, allowing us to introduce elements of randomness as well as causality in the system without breaking the ultimate condition that the absolute reality in our model should never be allowed to break any information theoretical constraints. We will go on to examine this idea in some greater detail. A minimal amount of information state would correspond to an absolutely minimal size for things to exist reliably (as measuring devices or as something to be measured) and we have defined things this way in our model but we dont have to assume such a limit to see the general point of the Sampling Law and we dont have to assume that the best measuring devices available to us in our world (photons) are indeed the smallest possible particles in existence only that they are the smallest particles reliably available to us as measuring devices. Finally, we should see that even if there is a minimal possible particle and that in our world the photons are it, there would be no requirement on a micro reality to function totally reliably should it be deemed impossible for it to do so from an information theoretical perspective (because of too small or per definition unreliable information state to be able for anything to work totally reliably on such a scale). All the micro world has to do is to be able to work slightly more reliably than chance as a whole for our model to work out with an absolute but objectively unpredictable reality on the micro scale, such that causal chains on this level are less than absolute (our absolute model of the universe can include an element of true randomness transformation rules do not have to be perfectly predictable, they only have to perfectly respect the rules we and information theory set) rather than just not being fully measurable by local observers. At any point in time the micro world in this model does have a definitive (but not fully measurable to macro observers in the model) configuration but exactly which configuration will follow is the result of some chance allowed to temper any otherwise absolute causal rules.

Logically this indeterminism could be seen to follow from how well the sub-particles could measure the states of each other such that they could not ever measure each other with full certainty and therefore not interact in a fully reliable manner. They could still work in a way more reliable than chance and we allow ourselves to make the observation that strictly this would be the only thing required for little machine-like structures to be implemented in micro scale substructures as well. The reason we cant measure things below Planck length in our world is that the most precise measuring devices we have (photons) are just too big to measure anything that small. But below Planck scale, things could work by means of much smaller versions of particles zooming about and pushing each other around, although somewhat less reliably so (sometimes they zoom right through each other by chance because of limitations by randomness on their mutual interactions). To help picture this idea, consider a chess board with two pawns moving towards each other. On both the macro level and the micro level, two pawns move could not share the same position on the board, representing the absoluteness aspect in our model. On the macro level two pawns in the same column that meet cant pass each other because by stating that one the macro level they are only allowed to move one at a time they would have to share a position to do so, which is not allowed. To make the example as clear as possible by making pawns behave more like particles that should keep moving we could say that pawns should change direction when they meet such as if bouncing off each other. On the micro level on the other hand we could say that pawns could move at the same time rather than taking turns to wait for each other. The result would be that these pawns would be allowed to effectively go through rather than bounce off each other by simply swapping positions after they have met. They never have to share the same position on the board and our rule of absoluteness continues to hold. Both worlds are absolute but slightly different causal rules apply on the micro level (bouncing is not guaranteed) such that two micro particles (pawns) approaching each other out of synchronization would bounce but particles approaching in synchronization would sometimes not. When two approaching particles are separated by just one square in the board they would both want to assume that position but only one of them is allowed to do so, leading to the type of information theoretical conflict that we represent as a bounce. But whenever two micro particles approached each other in synchronization such that they met with first four, then two, then no squares between them, unpredictable limitations to their interactions could sometimes lead to them swapping places with each other rather than to bounce, without breaking any of our rules of absoluteness. This may seem like something that almost makes sense and at the same time does not. If we think of pixels on a computer screen we may have no trouble picturing how two virtual pawns could just swap places, but with solid physical pawns on a real board that should not be possible and it follows from our very definitions that this is not the behavior we expect from solid mass. In the end, we must remember that we are taking an information theoretical view and so we should think of everything more in terms of pixels on a computer screen and we should simply ask ourselves what would be a logical reason for seeing that a rule we stated should be applied for all our pixels should perhaps not be applied to exactly all the pixels we could describe logical conditions that should change the rules slightly in special situations.

We need to capture the two necessary rules from information theory in the transformation rules of time in our model and we have seen them both represented in the example with a chess board and pawns. The first rule is that of a maximum speed of information (pawns can only move one square per time unit) and the second rule concerns the cost of information (only one pawn may occupy any one square at any one time). But behaviors that would not have to be forbidden by the rules of information theory should be considered potentially allowed, and thus we can see that the type of behavior we would need from the micro world in our model to make it logically consistent with the rest of our model and with what we know about our real world would be available. Two particles that each have a minimal rest mass of 1 would not be able to pass through each other, they would always bounce. But structures below the Planck length are with our definitions less than solid. We must expand our definitions and understanding of mass in our model such as to say that (sub)-structures with a mass 0 < m < 1 will not always bounce but will sometimes go through each other. The reason we expect solid particles to bounce is as an effect of their interactions (our information theoretical transformation rules) where the minimal rest mass 1 should simply be thought of as the point where you have achieved such reliable chance for interaction with other solid particles that they must always bounce. Below the rest mass of 1 there are statistical possibilities that interactions sometimes dont happen with the result of substructures not bouncing but swapping places. Regardless of whether there are in fact any little motors and sensors in the substructure of the solid particles in our real world, we should note that a reasonable and as we have seen information theoretically consistent explanation for quantum mechanical effects and the reality below Planck length in our own universe is that there could just as well exist an absolute reality on the micro level, and that it is only our measurements of it that are necessarily uncertain (due to physical limitations on our measuring devices) without implying that the underlying reality itself must be any less than absolute (even though it may contain some elements of absolute randomness in that mix). The idea that things depend on being (unconsciously) observed in order to exist (the so called Copenhagen interpretation of the quantum model) is then in our model the same idea as that of the local perspective in relativity where in the perception of any particle it can only consider other things to exist to the extent that it can interact with them. Two particles that cannot interact in any way can never experience each other and so even though both particles exist from the objective perspective, from the local, relativistic perspective of each particle, the other does not exist. In another formulation, two particles that could never interact can be thought of as inhabiting separate, isolated universes. One way to think of superposition in this model is as negative relative distance and mass. Instead of things seeming further apart than they really are, on the micro scale they seem closer together than they really are, leading to micro structures that seem to overlap in their positions. We can also interpret the same effects as negative relative mass, leading to things that seem more than completely solid (or seem to exist more than 100%) or even as negative relative time such that micro level things seem to go backwards in time. Together, negative relativistic distance, mass and time can make a substructure seem to exist in more than one place at once, which matches the description of superposition.

It would make mathematical and perhaps even logical sense to think this way as we would be allowed (in math we place the zero where we like) to interpret the absolute distances and mass of structures on the micro level as negative with the logic that they are smaller than the smallest measurable distance and mass for us, making them negative from our local macro perspective (even though they are positive on the absolute micro level or compared to an absolute zero). If we perceive absolute distance and mass below Planck level as negative, their relativistic components should be negative as well, as they are extensions to negative distances. While relativistic distortions on the macro scale will go away over time in our model (unless particles keep moving around) the limitations to perception of the micro scale will not. Macro observers will be able to detect only the resulting macro effects of the workings of substructures on the micro scale, and often enough will never become able to tell which of multiple possible micro effects lead to the observed macro effect. In such a case, where both micro effects A and B could lead to detectable macro effect C, the interpretation of this uncertainty by an observer at the macro scale will be that both A and B appear somewhat true, potentially leading to contradicting macro states that seemingly impossibly appear to both be true at once, such as Schrdingers cat. Again, this would in our model be a case of an experience of the world constrained by uncertainty as to be perceived with the inevitable distortion of relativistic or superposition effects. As the uncertainty of quantum states spread to macro states, what macro observers in our model experience is just the same type of relativistic effects we associated with uncertainty of measurements, not an indication that in their absolute reality there is both a dead and a living cat or a cat that is both living and dead - nor, as we shall see later, will our model end up requiring the existence of many worlds, such that one has a living cat and another has a dead cat in it. We can see that in our model little machines with motors and sensors could in fact work on the micro scale (and we note that this possibility has still not been ruled out in our physical world although we still have no reason to believe our solid particles should be robotic in their inner nature). The question with regards to the mathematical concept of active agent particles in our model is if the micro level sensors could detect macro level events, but we have defined our model such as to include this possibility as we see no logical or information theoretical reason that we must exclude it. To mentally verify the logic of this claim we may imagine that it would be exceedingly easy for the micro world to tell that a gigantic photon has just made contact with their little world. The other question would be if micro motors could move macro particles, but we see that they could at least in principle because we already know that micro events can have macro effects in our world. Information theory in turn has no objections so we consequently allow this real-world possibility into our model as well. We conclude that the only relevant constraint we can derive from information theory for our model with regards to a micro-macro distinction is that it can be impossible for macro observers to tell which micro effect precisely caused a macro effect. We also note that randomness may play a part at the micro level such that transformation rules of causality include element of randomness but not

such as to be able to violate the information theoretical uniqueness constraint on occupation of even fractional positions of space or a maximum speed of information spread. Interestingly, from how a macro effect can lead to a micro effect that can in turn lead to a new macro effect where it is not possible to determine which micro effect gave the final macro effect it follows that a macro effect could via such a chain result in another macro effect such that it would be impossible for macro observers to determine the full chain of cause and effect, ultimately making them unable to determine the macro cause of another macro effect. Furthermore, if there is any uncertainty in the measurement by the micro world of the macro world (or even, as we have just discussed some actual randomness at work on the micro level) then this would break down the chains of causality on the macro level as well such as for them to become ultimately unpredictable as well as untraceable. In the final pages of this paper we will see the implications this will have for the constraints regarding pre-determinism in our model of the universe and if information theory and our deductions hold true, any physical universe that does not rely on magic for its implementation.

Relevance Theory
So far the model we have built has used mathematics from what is often considered the domain of biologists in the form of game theory and Darwinian evolution by natural selection in order to make mathematical points about ultimately necessary constraints on all solid matter. We have derived a model of the universe that so far seems compatible with the models and predictions of relativity and quantum theory. The time has now come to try to model biological behavior more explicitly and see how this can further affect the constraints of our model. Again, all arguments will be based in information theory and game theory and so will be ultimately mathematical and logical in their nature, but we note that the experienced biologist would be well suited to evaluate the logical claims that we will continue to make even without deeper experience with mathematical notations and theoretical physics. We have seen that in our model a local observer will always be constrained to experience the universe in a relativistic way, where perceived mass and distance will not match absolute mass and distances. Objects will seem further away or less solid on the macro level or in the case of quantum effects on the micro level impossibly close or impossibly solid as a result of the uncertainty associated with measurements of them. If uncertainty in measurement will make something seem further away or less solid, could economically relevant priority values associated with measurements by active agents (mathematical agent particles as well as real biological machines in our world) as in the relevance of the measurement to the general fitness of the agent have a similar effect? If a zebra notices two things at seemingly equal distance and of equal mass but where one is a lion and the other is a boring rock, it would do better from a Darwinian perspective (game theory applied to energy conservation) to assign less weight to the sighting of the rock than to the sighting of the lion. A zebra that happened to experience the stone as less solid or perhaps further away than the lion (perhaps experienced by the Zebra as the camera suddenly zooming in on the lion) might do

better on the savanna at spreading its genes into new zebras and such a perception of the universe might end up to prevail among zebras in general. For optimal fitness, when no lions were around the zebras perception of the stone would return to the purely relativistic (uncertainty based) one, so that it doesnt try to jump over the stone too late under the impression that it would be further away than it really was or run through it under the impression that it would not be very solid. If the zebra tried to flee the lion in the direction of the rock, it should also rapidly seem more solid or closer again (the sighting of it would approach the weight of the sighting of the lion) as it is suddenly very relevant to be able to jump over it at the right time. The model presented in this paper predicts that compatibly with the relativistic effect regarding mass and distance experienced by a local observer due to uncertainty in measurements, the same effect will arise from different relevance of measurements to an active agent observer. Uncertainty is, from this perspective, one way to make the relevance of a measurement go down (or, as we shall see, up) as with economic risk analysis where a less certain opportunity should be treated as less valuable. Thus in the relevance based experience it might be more appropriate to talk about relevant distance and mass rather than relative distance and mass. Interestingly, under this perspective there could also be cases where increased uncertainty would be associated with higher risk for an agent (this is also consistent with economical risk analysis and game theory) leading to the perception of some uncertain things as closer than they really are rather than further away than they really are, much in the manner of quantum superposition. We can thus see that the purely relativistic perspective based on just uncertainty is not necessarily enough to predict the interactions of local agent observers, as the perceptions suggested by relativity could be overruled for an active agent particle or a biological macro agent by the perceptions suggested by relevance theory. Furthermore, compatibly with how we saw from our definitions of relativity based on information theory that two particles eternally unable to interact should be seen as inhabiting different universes, relevance theory states that particles who are completely irrelevant to each other should be seen as inhabiting separate universes. Non-biophysical (dead matter) particles without robotic substructures could not take different actions based on measurements and thus have no reason to prioritize their measurements. They would interact in a strict relativistic way (still stemming from the general limitations to their interaction possibilities) so they should not be seen as uninterested in each other such as to be in separate universes as they could take no different course of action based on one option seeming more interesting than another. It will however be necessary to take the different constraints that apply to systems that have to maintain internal structures under competition into account in our model and we should try to include the relevant mathematics into the formulas we use to describe the logical constraints we derive. To do this we will weave in more aspects of game theory into our formula for describing ultimate physical constraints on our model and by extension (if our premises and deductions hold) on all physical nature, but we realize we are already done modeling the constraints for dead matter

physics. That is, the physics of particles with no internal structure and thus no internal (own) influence over their trajectories through space. Such particles will always be constrained by E m1 * m2 * c2 and to the extent that nature is not allowed any mistakes and dead particles can never deviate from their projected trajectories, insomuch as we include bouncing in these projections, they would slavishly follow E = m1 * m2 * c2 as there is no way information theory would allow any different behaviors. We will go on in this paper to discuss a special freedom (as in the lack of a constraint) that follows from the model we construct that includes an absolute reality. But before we go on to that discussion we must observe that the difference between dead matter physics and living matter physics (or theoretical biophysics) is that due to potential internal influence over their trajectories, agent systems could deviate from the paths predicted by dead matter physics but they could of course still only do so within the physical constraints imposed on all particles, dead or alive. To model the reality of biological or agent systems we must add a factor to our formula but we are not allowed to do this in such a way as to make biological systems able to move any faster through space than dead particles. In the model we build in this paper it will therefore be the case that all agents macro agent systems such as us as well as any unconscious arrangement of particles or even particle with substructures turning them into agent systems will experience stronger relativistic distortions based on the differing importance of measurements to the agents fitness. What this means is that while dead matter is confined to following the rules of physics precisely, living matter is allowed to deviate from these rules to assume performance that is better for that matter than physics alone would result in, but at the eventual cost of the living matter being able to make mistakes resulting in it becoming dead matter. The formula that such agents would use to derive the relevant mass and distance of their surroundings would be based on game theory where relevance or priority values are assigned to all measurements and so we would get E m1 * m2 * c2* r where r stands for the relevance of the measurement and is the result of the standard game theory evaluation of r = potential * probability and potential and probability each can take values between 0 and 1. The relevance is a value between 0 and 1 such that 1 stands for a 100% relevant measurement and 0% applies to a measurement that in the opinion of a particle is completely inconsequent. We note from game theory that the relevance is a combination of potential and probability (where the potential is tempered by the probability for realizing the potential). In other words the relations represented by r can be broken up into the following way, in accordance with SWOT analysis of game theory: 0 Potential = Strength - Weakness 1 0 Probability = Opportunity Threat 1. 0 r = (Potential * Probability) 1. 0 r = ((Strength - Weakness) * (Opportunity Threat)) 1.

However, this formula would only apply for one agent observer prioritizing measurement of nonagent, active particles. For a system with two agent particles the formula becomes E m1 * m2 * c2*r1 * r2 where r1 and r2 are the priorities assigned to their own measurements by the two particles. In the idealized case two particles would have the same assessment of their relative importance to each other and we would approach E m1 * m2 * c2* r2 such that when r2 is 1 both parties consider each other completely important whereas when r2 is 0 both particles consider each other totally unimportant, which matches the requirement under relevance theory for them to be seen as inhabiting two completely separate universes (even in cases where relativity would suggest they are in the same universe). We remind ourselves that in our model, all particles are in the end inhabitants of the same, absolute reality and when we talk about them in different universes, those are only the derived realities we talk about that are the consequence of limited interaction opportunities. We can see that according to our model the formula E m1 * m2 * c2* r2 places an ultimate information theoretical constraint on all mechanical implementations of any and all physical forces as it constrains any active agent implementation of a physical force and by extension all possible mechanical implementations of any physical force. It also could be said to describe the constraint for the shape of a biophysical universe with agent matter in it, and for a universe where agents can have information advantages over each other the constraint to this shape becomes E m1 * m2 * c2*r1 * r2. While the model is not yet complete, the model we have built thus far combines relativity, quantum mechanics and biology into one mathematical framework built on information theory and game theory and could be called a General Theory of Relevance (but we should refrain from naming it now as our model is not yet complete). The claim of this paper so far is to propose that it explains the relevantistic effects that it predicts to be experienced by all active agent observers inside the model and that we can describe quantum mechanics and relativity in a cohesive way using a model that includes an absolute reality and from which the macro and micro realities matching our current measurements can be derived by applying uncertainty in measurements for all observers inside the model. The intention with the model as it is completed will be for it to combine the strictly physical aspects of reality described by relativity and quantum mechanics and the biological aspects of reality described by Darwinian evolution by natural selection into one cohesive framework of theoretical biophysics that includes an absolute reality and that is draws its conclusions entirely from constraints imposed by information theory. However, as the model of this paper is derived strictly from the premises of information theory, the real unification presented by this paper will come in form of the integration of game theory and communication theory. Again we note that if the premises of information theory are correct and the deductions in this paper are correct, then we can apply the same conclusions to all physical universes from such information theoretical constraints. Finally we note that if our model is also in correspondence with established measurements we have a scientifically attractive mathematical model with predictive power over our reality that is lighter from an information theoretical perspective than the currently most generally accepted model which does not include any absolute reality. This is because in the model of this paper that includes an

absolute reality, relative (local macro) and superposition (quantum or local micro) realities can be derived from the absolute reality by applying a dimension of inevitable uncertainty in measurement for all local observers inside the model. However, there are still aspects to our model with an absolute universe that we have not considered. In fact, the formula we are after is not yet fully derived as it does include game theory by not yet communication theory. We will go on to consider the relevant extensions before the end of this paper but before we do, we will take a detour to examine some of the extremes of our model to verify that it continues to make logical sense even under stress. If our logic starts to break down under pressure it is not acceptable, so we will go on to examine the extreme perspectives on our model to see that even if it may not hold any predictive power as such anymore (because we may never be able to measure these extremes) and for that reason such an excursion is essentially only philosophical rather than strictly scientific (as in falsifiable), then at least we want to ensure that our model can continue to make logical sense, even from the very extreme perspective. We will start with a very close inspection on how a universe could begin at first, based on the concept of logical replicators and see how abstract phenomena could become concrete phenomena with the help of recursion such as to make a phenomenon concrete exactly to the extent that it can influence the likelihood of itself to become more prevalent in existence than chance alone would allow. The section will become a discussion not only on how a universe can come about but also about a more fundamental analysis of the basic constraints of our model with regards to the smallest level, or the extreme micro perspective. We will then take the extreme macro perspective, zooming out so that we can look at what happens after a universe (a subset of the absolute reality in our model) has died from the perspective of the multiverse (the absolute reality in our model), observing that once a multiverse has come into existence, even if subsets can become totally stable or totally unstable equating to the death of a universe, there are ways that such a dead universe could become born again.

Causal Loops
Where do particles come from? We have discussed a special class of particle arrangements, capable of making copies of themselves, called replicators. But the concept of replicators is really more abstract than to apply just for solid particles making copies of their arrangements. Any abstract phenomenon capable of positively influencing the likelihood of a similar phenomenon appearing again can be considered a replicator. We started this paper with the assumption that we had some kind of minimally concrete particles that we classified as active and reactive (even the reactive particles seemed to require a minimal information capacity such as to be considered at least minimally concrete). Could we somehow build up to a universe with concrete particles in it from a more abstract version of a universe or rather, can we find a way to create our very definitions of abstract and concrete as for them to have a logically useful distinction? In the following discussion it will be as if we pretended that we already had reasonable definitions for what the concepts abstract and concrete mean, as if an objective observer had given us a clue to

their meanings just like when the same hypothetical observer informed the scientist in the spaceship about his surroundings in our earlier thought experiments. We will go on to see if we could logically imagine an abstract universe housing abstract phenomena where concreteness could somehow form in it with the help of replication among the abstract phenomena. As we do so, we remind ourselves that what we are really doing is deriving logically consistent definitions for the terms abstract and concrete with respect to our model. Imagine a chaotic universe where events occur randomly, a plethora of phenomena on parade. We have space in this universe because the information in the phenomena have the usual information theoretical costs, and we have some sort of time since information changes state, but since the information bits flicker totally at random there is really no special meaning to the time dimension (it does not become compressible with the help of non-randomness) as not only does the arrow of time have no obvious forward and backward directions, it is totally broken such that it can go from any point in time to any other point in time. Then we introduce a minimal amount of causality into the system such that all events are not completely random anymore, sometimes the occurrence of an event E implies increased likelihood of the event F occurring at some time after E. This heals the arrow into a straight line even if it does not give it obvious forward and backward directions. In such a universe, it could happen that a particular event E1 would occur that increased the likelihood of the same type of event E2 occurring again in the same place but at a later time, either directly or via a chain of other events (E1 gives F1 gives G1 gives X1 gives E2) in what we could call a causal loop. That new event E2 would cause yet a new event E3 to happen, and so on potentially indefinitely. This finally gives the arrow of time a direction such that moving forward in time means that events like E will become increasingly commonplace in the information total of the universe. Such an event, capable of increasing the likelihood of the same type of event occurring again, is a kind of replicator that is able to create copies of itself over time. The effect is of a phenomenon that can sustain itself over time and so we call this type of replicator a sustainer. We can then go on to imagine a second type of event M that due to another causal loop manages to cause itself (or rather a new event of the same type) to occur again at a later point in time and at a different point in space. We call such a replicating event a mover. We can also imagine a third type of event S that can not only cause a copy of itself to occur later in time but which over time causes multiple copies of itself to appear at different positions in space. We call such a replicating event a spreader. A sustainer corresponds to a particle that sustains itself over time but is stationary in space, as with the solid, active particles in the semi-static universe or any particle in the fully static universe. A mover is a particle that is persistent over time and that can move through space as we know active, solid particles with mass to behave in our dynamic universe and reactive particles to behave in the semi-static and dynamic universes. A spreader is a particle that persists over time and can spread over space. An example of this might be the photon (which in our model is the same thing as empty space) that we know from our world

to be able to behave as a wave form spreading in every direction in addition to being able to behave as a particle (as in our model where light can be seen as a ripple effect of positions in space). It is not hard to imagine how spreading could work for a purely reactive particle since such a particle has no rest mass (no state of its own). Spreading out would not result in additional mass (positions, as in more costly information) being inserted into the universe. It would only be an effect among reactive particles communicating information about the shapes of active particles among each other by influencing the (potentially infinitely precise) positions of other reactive particles. We can also imagine an active particle spreader, but such a replicator that would actually grow in mass would either imply an addition of mass to the universe from nowhere (not allowed by the most generally agreed upon rules of physics) or that the spreader would simply steal the mass of other particles and add it to its own internal mass. The behavior of such a particle, especially if it is very efficient, reminds us of a black hole. The definition of a black hole could simply be that it is the local champion of active spreaders of the subtype suckers that are capable of influencing all of its local surroundings to become incorporated into its mass. However there could also be another subtype of spreaders that we call converters. Converters do not suck in the positions in space of other particles into its internal mass but simply convert the structure of existing matter in its environment into copies of its own structure or at the very least to contain copies of its own structure - that are then free to go about their own business (which would of course to some extent be the business of the converter). The photon would essentially be an example of a reactive converter as it only influences the structures around it to share the representation of the information in it but steals no mass from other particles into its own internal structure (which continues to contain only the minimal information of one position in space but where the precise position keeps shifting to reflect more and more of the information about the solid particles) and furthermore it allows the particles it converts to keep its own information so it is a case where the converter lets the converted particle away with containing a copy of the converter (rather than become a fully converted clone of the original). Moreover, photons share information with each other, so the full classification of a space or photon particle in our model would be to call it a reactive bidirectional semi-converter. It would not be unreasonable to consider a reactive bidirectional semi-converter and an active unidirectional sucker that is, photons and black holes to hold positions as logical extreme particles of a universe from an information theoretical point of view, where active unidirectional converters solid mass replicators, or life as we know it in the form of genes could be found somewhere in the middle between those two extremes on such a scale. But life in between the extremes of photons and black holes, as we shall soon go on to see, is not ultimately constrained to contain only active unidirectional converters. We can also see examples of active bidirectional semi-converters, such that two solid particles try to share information with each other rather than fully convert each other to become an informational clone of the original. So called memes or ideas could be an example in our world of active bidirectional semi-converters, under the simple observation that two people, each with a unique idea, can walk away from a

conversation now each carrying both unique ideas in their heads. We will talk more about memes later in this paper but for now just consider how the information content of an idea can start by having a concrete representation in the brain of one person. After discussion with another person, that idea could go on to be concretely represented in the brains of two humans. As we model the concept of the bidirectional semi-converters active and reactive we see that there is an important subset of information theory that we have not considered enough but that must be captured to make our information theoretical model of a universe complete. The idea of particles able to share information with each other implies the concept of communication and so we must begin to discuss the information theoretical discipline of communication theory to provide us with the final dimension to our mathematical formula for capturing the information theoretically imposed constraints on any logically consistent model of a universe. As we go on, keep in mind that all the thought experiments we make are meant to provide concrete ground for the reader to verify the solidity of ultimately purely information theoretical propositions about the constraints to communication. Thus the reader should avoid the temptation to conclude that a discussion about the constraints to the flight paths of bats or the risks involved in interstellar communication with potentially hungry aliens should primarily concern perhaps one or two biologists interested in bats but otherwise mostly fans of science fiction. The point of the thought experiments will be to illustrate the truth of logical communication theoretical constraints in a way that the reader can mentally verify that the core deductions must hold true. Before we dig deeper into communication theory we should conclude our visit to the extreme micro perspective and the extreme beginnings of a universe and we must also remember to visit the extreme macro perspective. The model we have examined suggests that by going from a completely random universe with space but no time to a less than completely random universe with space and proto-time (non-directional or random time) and then with the help of any form of causality that allows replicators to form turning the universe into a more and more reliably performing system with space and directional time, we transform an abstract universe into a concrete form. As we could see, time finally gets the features we expect of it with distinguishable forwards and backwards directions when we add replicators to the system. With quantum uncertainty in micro measurements of the macro world we could even get a meaningful direction for the absolute arrow of time in that history could be fully knowable but the future is not, allowing us to see that even time on the absolute level could have a logically consistent definition in our model. Time on the absolute level gets its direction from how the past is derivable but the future is not. We will revisit the implications for pre-determinism within our model (and, if the deductions hold, by extension for any logical universe). In our model the definition and our understanding of particles is based on pure information theory that includes game theory and will come to include communication theory such that we derive how with the help of replicators exploiting the causality by means of causal loops, Darwinian evolution by

natural selection among loops competing for influence over locally available space over time will cause the universe to continuously take a more and more concrete shape over time. This is in the form of increasingly stable causal loop replicators out-competing each other in the game of existing until we have replicators performing so stably that other superstructures can evolve on top of them and that may perceive their constituent casual loops as solid particles. The new superstructures are potentially new agent structures with Darwinian agendas of their own, adding yet another layer of additional relevantistic distortions to their experiences. We can relate these concepts of causal loops to the concepts of space, time and mass in our model as follows. A phenomenon R (which could be an aggregate of phenomena A, B, Cetc.) that is able to exploit causality to cause a new phenomenon of the same type to happen again directly with R => R (it directly causes a copy of itself to appear in the same place in the next instant of time) would be seen as a reactive particle that is, a space particle or a photon. We can see this as the space particle or photon having been able to capture a position of space and claim it over time. An active particle that is, a solid particle of mass - would equate to an aggregate phenomenon M+N where M and N were able to cause new representations of their own types to come about again indirectly requiring more than one position in space over time such as in a chain M => N => M or longer as it would require the reservation of more of the available positions in space (our ultimate information theoretical resource) to persist itself. Positions in space over time are thus seen as the information capital in our model. Motion is the ability of a phenomenon to capture neighboring positions in space at one point in time and releasing them in a certain direction at a later point in time. We note that over time we get competition for available positions in space so that any self-sustaining phenomenon will have to keep working to sustain itself. This observation on our model matches the Second Law of Thermodynamics that tells us concrete representations of information loses its ordered state over time, so we can see that this statistical law works in our model as it should, implemented by Darwinian competition for the occupancy of positions in space in time by selfsustaining phenomena. A phenomenon such as R, should it become reliable enough at causing itself to continue to happen, would not necessarily be possible to overtake (until the day it makes a mistake) as it constantly occupies its position in space, meaning that the competition for available space over time would only really have to concern the indirectly self-causing phenomena (once phenomena such as R performed well enough). This corresponds to the information theoretical rules for how a signal represented by solid particles is bound to randomly degrade over time as recapitulated in the Second Law of Thermodynamics (again from the competition for the positions in space among weakly or indirectly self-sustaining information) but a signal represented by photons will live on forever. This takes us to the concept of the Planck length. We can now see how in our model it would make sense to see this simply as the concept of minimal stability of a directly self-sustaining phenomenon such as R that occupies its position in space reliably enough as to appear as detectable information to a larger observer (which does have a good correspondence to the logical rational behind the Sampling Law that we used to define our concept of a Planck length earlier).

Thus from now on in our model we describe the concept of a Planck length as well as the concept of the minimal rest mass or minimal information content that we have used for photons and space particles (reactive particles) in the following way: The minimally stable rest mass 1 of a reactive particle (the photon or a space particle) which corresponds to the Planck length in our model stands for the stability of a self-sustaining phenomenon that has become reliable enough as to be seen and treated as a minimal level of information in the perspective of an external observer. That does not mean that it has to have 100% stability internally. In other words the minimal information capacity that we have been talking about is really the minimal stability level of information or a signal to be readable by external observers, such that it turns into a detectable piece of information as seen by anyone else in the model. We discussed causal loops as if they could cause themselves with absolute certainty thanks to an absolute causality. But assume that R => R is not an absolute statement, such that R only ever so slightly improves the likelihood of another R. This would be the reality for sub-Planck loops, such that loops are not fully reliable by themselves, but enough of them together create enough stability for an outside observer to be able to treat the sum of the instable loops as a somewhat reliable (better than random) piece of information. We therefore arrive at the following information theoretical definitions for the core concepts in our model: The concept of Space stands for the minimal stability level required by information (a signal) to be measured at all by external observers such that one position in space becomes occupied over some time. The concept of Mass stands for information (a signal) with greater stability (reliability in its measurability to external observers) than the very minimal one of Space such that more than one position in space becomes occupied over some time. The concept of Time stands for the distinction in stability between information such that the less stable information or signal degrades more (becomes less reliably measurable to external observers) over the same amount of time.

We can see that the distinction in stability in signals and their predictable degradation over time as expressed in the Second Law of Thermodynamics would become implemented as a direct result of the Darwinian selection pressures forcing loops to compete for available time and space to exist in loops would become less stable as other loops tried to take over their time and space which is the reason that signals degrade in space over time. Of course, information that cannot be even minimally reliably interacted with (detected by) an external observer could not affect that observer from an information theoretical perspective, so we can see that it becomes clear with our definitions why information theory prevents any force of nature to act with an effect that moves faster than the speed of light the concept faster than light speed equates to the concept not even minimally readable information.

Note that our Planck length and minimally stable rest mass of 1 does not imply totally reliably information to the external observer, only minimally reliable information. We have no reason to assume that information would be able to reach a level of 100% reliability to external observers (possibly with the exception of matters related to the event horizons of black holes). In other words, information may never be completely reliable inside nor outside the Planck length. Information on the inside of a micro-cosmos (micro scale imperfect sustainers, movers, spreaders and converters as in causal or information loops sustaining themselves on their scale better than chance would dictate and competing for the available space and time in their world below Planck level) would be more than minimally reliable to other observers inside that micro-cosmos. The Planck level thus really describes the level at which some self-sustaining informational phenomenon becomes reliable enough to detect to external observers whereas under the Planck level the information is only more than minimally reliable to other observers under that Planck length. We have new looked at what it would mean for information to become reliable enough to detect by measurement by an external observer. If we go on to look at the situation from the perspective of an observer internal to the micro level, we can see that as always in nature, the micro causal loops would be competing with each other to some extent for the time and space of the micro cosmos. But there is an even greater threat to every micro loop in this world than that of other micro loops. The impact of the macro world on the micro world should really be to obliterate it, unless the information on the micro scale could find a way to protect itself from the Darwinian selection pressures of the macro world for its time and space. Thus the only way to maintain any level of minimal stability in the micro world is to create some kind of shield in order to protect the information in the micro world from the informational impact of the macro world. We can think of our initial section on information theory and the wall of sand we could build around our pebbles to protect them from crabs. We could see that it follows logically in both directions (from the internal and external perspectives) why we should expect to see a Planck length seen from the inside of the micro cosmos, the Planck length represents a boundary around their world such as to be able to provide them with some minimal stability that allows the information on the inside to exist. But we know from information theory that building such a wall that is, isolating information costs energy, so the micro loops could not just build a wall and leave it there to go on to live happily ever after. A wall has to be maintained, and we have to ask ourselves where the energy for this would come from. Could the micro cosmos have access to some form of free energy such that it could be able to maintain such a wall of informational isolation around itself? Not in accordance with any of our established ideas about the universe that expects the total information content of the universe in form of mass and energy to stay the same. The solution is that while no free energy is created in the micro world, the loops under Planck level have figured out the next best thing to free energy. They have learned to release a form of energy that already does exist, but that is locked up as to seem non-existing until you discover how it can be put to work.

In short, the micro loops have discovered the power of cooperation that in information theoretical terms translate to the concept of communication theory. By communicating and thus being able to coordinate, the energy levels of the micro world are simply bigger than the corresponding informational pressure from the macro world (as long as the pressure from the macro world does not become equally coordinated) thanks to cooperation allowed under information theory in the domain of communication theory. No new energy has to be added to the equation, it is enough to see that the combined energy levels of cooperating and therefor to some extent organized self-sustaining information are greater than the combined energy levels of strictly competing and therefor disorganized self-sustaining information. To verify the general logic of this proposition, consider how a civilization that spends its military energy on infighting has less military energy over to protect itself from incoming asteroids from space. It is the same energy, directed either inwards or outwards. We will see soon how this all works out mathematically, but before we do we should conclude the tour of the extremes with a visit to the extreme macro perspective.

The Big Bangs

We saw that in the relativistic experience of solid particles in our model, we could consider two particles to occupy separate universes if they can never interact, even though they are really inhabitants in the same, absolute universe. We could dub this absolute universe the multiverse and relate it to the term universe such that we have two separate universes in the multiverse when no two particles in either universe will ever able to affect any particle in the other before the cold or heat death of their respective local environments (their universes). This would be seen to apply to particles that could interact in principle, such as two solid particles that would bounce off each other, but due to extreme distance between them no signal would be able to finish the journey from one to the other before the deaths (stagnation or descent into chaos) of the two universes that the particles would then be seen to occupy. A dead universe in this perspective is a local subset of the multiverse with no more (consistent) internal activity, thus behaving from the perspective of the multiverse as a solid, passive (dead) particle. But even after two universes have died in our model, absolute time ticks on in the absolute multiverse. The dead universes could be on a random drift through the multiverse and given enough time they might finally happen to collide. As an alternative, consider a universe of little robot particles, where all the particles still work but have been placed in a game theoretical dilemma of exactly the kind you would see in an old western movie (a kind of Nash Equilibrium or terror balance). Everybody have their guns drawn and pointing in a complex pattern at each other such as to totally lock everyone into position. Should anyone so much as flinch, they are all dead meat. This would equate to a potentially living but unfortunately stagnated universe. But imagine a big such universe, locked in eternal stalemate and moving through time and space without any particle ever

moving in relation to each other. Mathematically this would equate to the cold death of a universe, or stagnation into eternal stability. But what if another little robot particle, outside the stagnated universe, came zooming through the multiverse, spotted the enormous collection of potential friends (it has been a very lonely particle as of late) and steer itself with full motor capacity towards theegg? The image of a universal correspondence to our concepts of conception with a sperm and an egg are striking, but the point here is not to become poetic but to drive home the realization that it really is no coincidence that we see certain patterns repeated over and over again in nature the patterns represent constraints that can be derived from information theory and should therefore be expected to show up precisely everywhere we look. However a collision between two dead universes comes about, it seems to match the type of event that we know as a Big Bang. We go on to note that two particles are only truly isolated if they will never be able to have an effect on each other before the death of the multiverse, when global time stops and no more big bangs will happen. However, it is possible that the multiverse never dies but rather moves in an infinite loop. It is also possible that the multiverse is part of a greater - perhaps infinite - structure of multi-multiverses that have no final death. Ultimately, we see from our model that from the information theoretical perspective there is no logical constraint describing the necessity of any final death for a multiverse and its universes.

The Power of Cooperation

For any active agent particles, active unidirectional converters would pose a real threat as to all active agent systems life (as in continued functioning as a machine) depends on maintaining their own internal structures and not have it (fully) converted to resemble the structure of someone else. While a threat, the active agent on its toes could survive another day if it carefully avoids all overly aggressive converters in its surroundings and so active unidirectional converters present a somewhat more realistically survivable threat than a black hole (an active unidirectional sucker). As we will go on to observe, such survivable threats are practically a form of opportunity. The reason is that this type of potentially avoidable threat sees to it that the requirements for Darwinian evolution by natural selection are met, such that active agent systems can hone their behaviors towards their optima in their relation to each other. We can see that the constraints from game theory must hold anywhere information competes for concrete implementation opportunity, so this indicates that so called meme theory should hold from an information theoretical perspective, even if we dont know exactly the mechanisms for how that information stores itself in our brains yet. The meme theory was described in the book The Selfish Gene by Richard Dawkins and states that human culture can be observed from a game theoretic perspective of ideas competing in a Darwinian way for the limited resources of human brains to exist in. From this observation we were invited to derive a certain set of deductions allowing us some increased predictive power over the evolution of our culture. Specifically, the prediction becomes that as the shapes of our ideas are honed by the mechanism of natural selection we should see that ideas that happen to have qualities that improve their chances of spreading to more brains would become more common.

As is so often the case in nature there is a bright and a dark side to this conclusion, as we can see that one quality that might make an idea spread fast is if it had positive consequences for the humans repeating it - the bright side - but that we must also note the dark side, namely the predictable expectation on nature to contain examples of twisted ideas that were bad for the humans promoting them. The poor people thusly infected by such a bad idea would be unable to stop repeating it as some quality to the idea made the person think that the idea must hold true and that it would be a great move to act on it and (if the meme is really powerful) to tell as many people as possible about it. The power of the selfish competitor was derived conclusively by Darwin and has been confirmed by game theoreticians to hold mathematically ever since. However, as we know nature has in what could perhaps according to some overly theoretical biologists be seen a most uncooperative spirit seen fit to provide us with cooperating organisms that are not even related to the left and right. While we see no shortage of selfish competition strategies in nature, the mathematics that can be derived from the ultimately information theoretical constrains discovered by Darwin actually seem to go so far as to predict that is all that we should be able to see. We could perhaps explain away one or two altruistic humans as suboptimal gamblers, but all our economic analysis seemed to indicate one inescapable conclusion: The inevitable ultimate success of the most selfish competitor. And yet nature is full of examples of cooperation among lowlier creatures than humans (an example would include the crocodile and the dentist bird, but this paper intends not to dwell on the richness of examples that any biologist could provide) apparently in total spite of everything game theory claims we should expect. Is nature really full of such lousy gamblers, never realizing that cooperation doesnt pay off in the end? It is intended to be the central contribution of this paper to present an attempt to solve this mathematical dilemma. We will examine as carefully as we can the claim that in the end we should mathematically expect to witness the triumph of the friendly (but not overly nave!) cooperator. It will be contended that the key to answering the Darwinian paradox will be a closer analysis of communication theory in combination with game theory. We will use our information theoretical analysis of a biophysical model with active agent particles and as we do we will continue to discover interesting ramifications for the purely physical side of the model with regards to how any physical force may behave. We will now examine some of the mathematical specialties around the information theoretical constraints to physics that we will find to be associated with a model that includes an absolute reality and is constrained by game theory and communication theory.

Superluminal motion
In the model we have discussed, assume that two light particles are zooming directly towards each other through absolute space. Consider then the question: how fast is the distance between them decreasing in absolute space? The only logical answer within the constraints of our model must be: at twice the speed of light. Then if two nearly reactive but still a little bit solid particles are zooming towards each other each at nearly the speed of light through absolute space, how fast does the distance between them decrease in absolute space?

The answer could only be: at nearly twice the speed of light. Using traditional definitions, this equates to describing superluminal motion or faster than light (FTL) travel in that the particles approach each other with a speed greater than light, and speculation around such activity is traditionally uncomfortably close to the territory of designers of perpetual mobiles and other objects of pure science fiction. What makes the design of a perpetual mobile impossible is that any such device would require new energy to be added to the universe, which is not allowed in serious discussion. The sum of energy and mass in our model remains constant and so our model will continue to stay in the realm of the ultimately possible. But we see that in the model we have devised, superluminal motion according to its traditional definition (which we will continue to use, such as when two particles approach each other with a combined speed exceeding that of the speed of light) would be possible. Does this mean our entire model must be wrong, and this has all been a rather lengthy exercise in futility? It really does not. Our model is still logically and mathematically valid. While there could be reasons to exclude superluminal motion from a pure information theoretical perspective, we have not found it yet. In fact, the information theoretical limit as imposed by essentially purely logical constraints would seem to be that the maximum speed a single solid particle could move through absolute space would indeed be maximally nearly the speed of light, and so far so good as this is in accordance with conventional wisdom on the topic. But here is where it gets interesting. Why would two particles, each moving at nearly the speed of light from an absolute perspective, not be able to move towards each other with combined superluminal speed as seen from the same absolute perspective? The logic and mathematics of the General Theory of Relativity does not imply that this could not be so because it doesnt strictly speaking make any predictions at all about behaviors in absolute reality it has sorted that concept away from its model. General relativity only claims that two particles could not approach each other with more than a combined speed of light from the perspective of each relative reality in its models. It makes no claims about any constraints from absolute reality as no absolute reality is present in the model. This means that our model is strictly speaking not logically incompatible with the currently generally accepted model. But on the other hand, it would seem to imply that we should be able to witness, even from the relative perspective, how Alice could approach Bob at a combined speed greater than light. We will resolve this apparent paradox between the model presented here and the currently widely accepted one of general relativity in two ways. First we will go on to make one more careful analysis of the information theoretical constraints that apply to the model we have created and we will see that we have already identified the constraint that makes our model compatible with the predictions of Einstein. We will observe that while there is room in our model for superluminal motion such that solid particles could approach each other by up to twice the speed of light, statistics will place hard limitations on our model as to make such a phenomenon exceedingly unusual in reality.

We will also go on to note that our model would then become compatible with the recently measured phenomenon of the superluminal neutrino, which seems like it defies conventional wisdom on superluminal motion anyway. If the measurements can be repeated, we know that c is not a hard limit on relative motion after all and thus a mathematically and logically consistent model that would allow relative motion with a hard limit on 2 * c could become useful. We will see that game theory provides the explanation for the statistical limitation that normally makes superluminal motion impossible (or highly unlikely) which will eventually be a restatement of the same economic analysis stating that selfish wins and that has continuously puzzled biologists that have to witness organisms that cooperate all the time despite the suggestions of the best mathematical models on the subject. We will go on to see that communication theory provides the explanation not only to the biologist dilemma of having to explain away more and more cooperation discovered in nature with more and more hand-waving to the effect that we just have not figured out in what cunning way they are really being selfish versus their partners yet. Communication theory will also by the same logic provide the answer to how the concept of superluminal motion should be treated in our information theoretical model of the universe, ultimately to provide mathematically coherent explanations for both the superluminal neutrino as well as for another measured phenomenon of our world that haunted Einstein and that he called spooky action at a distance and that concerns communication between particles that have become entangled (been in physical contact and formed some kind of relationship at the micro level) at what seems like millions of times the speed of light. Spooky action at a distance has since been explained in a mathematically satisfying way, but it reveals the logical problem with a model that includes no absolute reality in that it results in recursive explosion of new virtual worlds with every event in every such virtual world. While the mathematics of such a model works out, and can be seen to be compatible with the mathematics presented in this paper, we still must note again that a model where only one absolute reality has to actually be modeled with persistent information and the other relative realities can be mathematically derived from the information in the absolute reality is much lighter from an information theoretical perspective (and the size of the information total can stay constant over time) compared to a model where the amount of information that must be persisted increases with every new relative reality that springs into existence (such that the information volume increases exponentially over time) and so should be preferred from a mathematical perspective. How could superluminal motion be possible? The solution to this conundrum lies in distinguishing between a logical possibility and a statistically reliable effect over time. In other words, the full answer to the question about how fast two solid particles could approach each other would be: Two solid particles each moving at nearly the speed of light would in our model approach each other at a combined speed of nearly twice the speed of light, but they would usually crash into something physically unpredictable before they got very far because solid particles moving faster than half the speed of light through absolute space cant see where they are going.

We note that we cannot logically consider cases where active (solid) particles could move faster than reactive particles, as information theory tells us this should not be possible due to the cost of information. In other words, we see that the constraint on solid particles to not move faster than light through absolute space is a hard constraint from information theory. No solid particles can move faster than light can through absolute space. But, seemingly in conflict with the constraints we have discussed in this paper and in stark contrast to most conventional opinion on superluminal motion, solid particles could still approach each other in absolute space with a combined speed of more than light speed. The relativistic constraint we have discussed in this paper states that solid particles should only be able to approach each other with a maximum combined speed that should be lower than light speed, such that solid particles could move at maximally half of light speed each through absolute space. Strictly speaking we must observe that it would be logically and to that extent also physically possible for solid particles to travel through absolute space at almost full light speed the single problem is that they couldnt see where they are going which is the kind of argument that may make a theoretical physicist who is not a theoretical biophysicist cautious, but again we will only invoke the mathematical construct of robot-like active agent particles to see what type of constraints information theory must place on our model. We will as always go on to compare how the constraints we find this way go on to hold up against external implementations that do not suppose any robot particles, and see that the constraints we have derived with the help of biophysics continue to hold. If we call the fastest reactive particle the light particle it becomes a mostly tautological exercise to note that for an objective observer a light particle should move at the speed of light through absolute space in a model that includes an absolute reality. As an objective observer watches two light particles moving towards each other through absolute space in our model, each light particle moving at exactly light speed through absolute space, the external observer must thus also see them reducing the distance between each other at twice that speed which of course then equates to saying that they approach each other at twice the light speed in absolute space. So does this mean that it is possible to send information or even physically travel faster than light, with the definition of superluminal motion in our model as being two solid objects approaching each other with a total combined speed in absolute space exceeding that of the speed of light? Theoretically yes. However it could not actually result as the effect of any reliable physical force as it could not be done in any rational or sustainable manner at least until we invoke communication theory. The constraints we have discussed so far all hold, but they strictly speaking only apply to mechanical implementations of natural forces that are supposed to be able to act in a statistically reliable manner over time and that are not allowed any communication to coordinate the effects. It is still the case that two active particles could not keep reducing total distance between them faster than light speed in the long run due to uncertainty and information theory. Reactive particles on the other hand can certainly move towards each other in absolute space such that they reduce absolute distance between themselves at twice the speed of the reactive particle, nothing else would make sense as in being logically consistent with the definitions we use.

Consider two active particles that are very nearly reactive (such as gravitons). We will go on to see how information theory (specifically game theory) places a restriction on how fast they could rationally move towards each other implying ultimate constraints on the effects of mechanical physical forces. The argument will be based on observing that it in our model would still be logically and physically possible despite how exceedingly statistically unlikely it would be to succeed for a pair of daredevil pilots in nearly reactive spaceships to just go for it and zoom towards each other at a combined speed of nearly twice the speed of light as seen from the objective perspective. They couldnt reliably do it and statistics predicts that they would run into a rock instead which is also a restatement of the logic dictating why mechanical natural forces couldnt do any better. Still, two daredevil and extensively lucky pilots in nearly reactive spaceships could in fact crash into one another twice as early as two rational pilots in nearly reactive spaceships. As the rational pilots approached each other at nearly the speed of light to be able to stop in time rather than to actually crash into each other, the lucky daredevils managed to reduce distance between them at almost twice the speed of light (ending in a most spectacular collision) with significant statistical but no logical objections from physics or information theory. So in our model a nearly reactive particle could physically move at nearly light speed (i.e. the speed of the fastest reactive particle) through absolute space, but due to uncertainty it could not really do it for a long time and by extension not as the result of any mechanical physical force, constraining all solid particles to move reliably no faster than nearly half the speed of light through absolute space, reducing distance between them no faster than as to approach each other at near light speed. It could be seen as solid particles being able to move through absolute space at nearly light speed in theory but because of uncertainty associated with directional time their actual speed must be dragged down by the ballast of uncertainty until they can go no faster than half light speed. Or could they? We will now go on to examine the very extreme limits of what type of effects could be physically allowed under the constraints of uncertainty described by the formula E m1 * m2 * c2*r1*r2 to see if we can discover the distinction between the impossible and the maximally improbable and even how the general improbability of a phenomenon such as superluminal motion could be reduced. We will discuss two possible mechanical implementations of superluminal speed for solid objects. One will be based on external, passive mechanics and one will be based on active agents with an active, internal implementation. But before we do, it is time to root some of the basic concepts we are working with yet more firmly in the ground so that when we proceed to discuss superluminal effects, we have a solid mental model against which to verify the logical validity of our assertions. One problem when discussing relativity is that, as we all know, on the everyday level most of us experience only Newtonian gravity and one has to move towards extremes such as going at nearly light speed in order to be able to measure any strong relativistic effects. Experiments at such energies are costly and potentially dangerous, and their conditions are so different from anything in our ordinary lives that many of us have difficulty to relate mentally in a strong way to relativistic effects.

Perhaps this could lead some of us to conclude in resignation that the whole business with twins that become different ages because one takes a ride in a spaceship sounds awfully strange (although deeper analysis shows that should they meet again, at least after a linear journey through space, they would also turn out to be the same age again) but if math says it must be so then then perhaps it is so. It is fortunate then that relativistic effects in fact can show up at much lower energies, such that relativistic effects could be spotted with the naked eye. Furthermore, we are not talking about some exotic, perhaps theoretically possible but hideously expensive condition that could only work as a thought experiment. It turns out that with the help of robotics we could see relativity scaled down to effectively any speed we like and we could even have potential examples of relativistic macro particles behaving in at least some accordance with relativity that has been scaled down to our normal, everyday speeds on our planet right now (although effects would be weak). Wonderfully enough, we cannot just measure and make thought experiments around such existing macro particles we could in fact go and admire their beauty at the zoo!

The Semi-sonic Bat

There is a very good reason why the fastest possible bird natural selection could provide should be faster than the fastest possible bat that natural selection could provide and this reason should be obvious to the careful reader of this paper. The reason is of course that birds can navigate by sight but bats are blind and have to navigate by means of sound and the speed of light is greater than the speed of sound. Note that a bat that is not blind would for the purposes of this argument not be considered a bat anymore but would be a bird, regardless of what a genealogically minded biologist could object. A blind bat that tries to fly faster than sound will have a very real problem with flying into things. Bats navigate by sending out sonar pings, kind of sound particles (strictly speaking waves in the air) that it sends ahead while counting how long it takes for the ping to come back. The shorter time, the closer whatever is ahead of it must be or, correspondingly, the more rarely it gets a ping back the less solid something ahead of it is, under the assumption that a ping could go straight through something less dense. It is easy to see that should the bat fly faster than sound it would have no way of detecting what is in front of it. In other words, information theory places a hard constraint on nature such that Darwinian evolution by natural selection will never be able to produce a supersonic bat, as such bats would keep running into walls in the bat cave. This follows from our definitions (all bats are blind, a supersonic sighted bat is in fact a bird) in the same way as it follows from our definitions that solid particles cant go faster than light particles (if they do, they are just to be considered the de facto light particles). Furthermore, the environment of bats will usually include other bats. This makes the ultimate constraint on rationally navigable bat speed even stricter, taking it down from a maximum near the speed of sound to a maximum just below half the speed of sound. As soon as two bats in a bat cave both started to fly faster than half the speed of sound, they would become unable to detect each other whenever they fly directly towards each other and would thus over time keep crashing into each other if they flew too fast.

Information theory thus places an uncertainty based constraint on nature such that Darwinian evolution by natural selection will never be able to produce better than a semi-sonic bat. This bears repeating as it captures the central logic in this paper, the focus of which is to derive constraints on natural forces via examining the mathematically optimal behavior of idealized particles with desires of self-preservation: what we have just done is to provide yet a demonstration of the same uncertainty based effects that we have discussed under the terms of relativity and seen how it constrains nature to contain maximally semi-sonic bats. This simple observation around bats actually captures the entire logic behind the theory that we have spent the rest of this paper carefully examining in such detail. It turns out that in order to demonstrate relativistic effects, measure them and even see them with the naked eye as scaled down to the speed of sound, all one would have to do in theory is to visit a zoo and watch bats fly around. At least this would be the case if bats were generally fast enough. This paper predicts that to exactly the extent that a hypothetical creature that we call bats navigated only by sound and were able in their biological designs to fly near half the speed of sound, their flight paths would closely match those that would be predicted by relativistic effects as scaled down to the speed of sound, or E m1 * m2 * c2 where c stands for the speed of sound. Furthermore, as bats are competing replicating agents with unequal information about each other, we should see them fly around according to the relevantistic formula E m1 * m2 * c2*r1* r2 (where c still stands for the speed of sound) theoretically allowing us with fine enough measurement of fast enough bats to derive the opinions or prioritizing by bats of each other. A decent guess could be that bigger bats think they are more important than smaller bats. This could become expressed by bigger bats flying a little faster than half the speed of sound at the expense of the smaller bats that would have to fly a little slower than half the speed of sound to compensate, by the logic that the smaller bats would still find it in their best interests to stay out of the way when compared to the alternative. Disappointingly, nature has not yet seen fit to provide us with bats who fly much more than 100 kilometers per hour, which may not be near enough to half the speed of sound (1,236 km/h / 2 = 618 km/h) to see any really pronounced effects. We would have to wait for gene manipulation to reach greater heights such that it gives us semi-sonic bats before we can conclusively determine if our predictions around the flight paths of such bats hold true. We should, however, be able to build flying robots approaching those speeds. Alternatively we could pluck the eyes from birds that we deem to be fast learners of optimal blind flight by their hearing if we find any that are fast and clever enough at the same moment as we temporarily misplace our conscience. We should prefer the robots. If we confine the robots to navigating by sound only, then we can assert that we should be able to witness the constraints of strong relativistic effects at the speed of sound in how it constrained our optimal programming of the robots (equating to the information theoretically derived physical constraints on flying robots that must not keep crashing into each other). It would be a nice experiment in that it would be a very concrete demonstration of the information theoretical rational behind the corresponding constraint on natural forces that we have derived In this paper as we program our robots to navigate optimally and discover that we would have to follow relativistic and

even relevantistic rules scaled down to subsonic speeds. It would also be an interesting confirmation to the unification of game theory and communication theory presented by this paper to let the flying robots in such an experiment communicate with each other by means of sound signals to confirm how this could modify the constraints to their flight paths. We should also at this point repeat the important observation that as the entire model described in this paper is derived in its entirety from information theory. That means we should be able to test the logical validity of the model and its correspondence to the mathematical formulas describing its constraints by pure computer simulation. We could falsify the model as a relevant description of our world if it does not accurately predict (the impossibility of) certain measurement, but we could strictly speaking verify that the model is correct from the information theoretical perspective by creating a computer program, running it, and see that it can under the constraints that information theory alone imposes on it (if we model those constraints in our program) only behave in a way that is in accordance with the formulas derived in this paper. If the model of this paper is thus proven correct according to information theory by a computer, we would logically have to accept that to the extent that real-world measurements did not correspond to the predictions of this model, the conclusion would have to become that the premises of information theory would not be entirely correct (very unlikely) or that we have inaccurately defined the concepts of space, time, mass and energy in our model from an information theoretical perspective (more likely). In such a case we should still note that to the extent that these definitions could be refined the model should gain better predictive power over the world around us and gain better usefulness as a scientific instrument. As we go on to consider with some special care the possibility of superluminal communication we could liken the semi-sonic bats to our active, solid particles and the birds to our reactive particles to get a good mental picture of how, like the bats are constrained to relativistic effects by the limit to the speed of sound but birds are not, active particles are constrained by the speed of whatever is the fastest reactive particle to experience and navigate by relativistic effects. Reactive particles are not constrained in such a way, they are only constrained by whatever is the maximum speed of reactive particles and that we call c such that it follows that two reactive particles can approach each other with a combined speed of 2 * c. It is thus a consequence of our definitions that, if we call the fastest particle light and we call the speed of that particle c then no solid (non-light) particle can move faster than c. To be able to distinguish clearly between what are just tautological restatements of our definitions and what are interesting conclusions that fall out from them, we will examine this logic in more detail. If we define a set of symbols light particle, solid particle and c such that: light particle is the symbol we use to refer to the fastest particle in existence. solid particle is the symbol we use to refer to any particle that is not referred to by the symbol light particle.

c is the symbol we use to refer to the speed of the particle we refer to by the symbol light particle.

Then it follows from our definitions that: No particle can move faster than c because c is the symbol we use to refer to the speed of the fastest particle. No particle can move faster than a light particle because light particle is the symbol we use to refer to the particle that moves the fastest, the one with the speed c. No solid particle can move faster than light, because then it would be the light particle and the other, slower particle (formerly referred to by the symbol light particle) would be considered the solid particle.

We can see from this perhaps painfully careful analysis that there is nothing ultimately mysterious to the claim that no solid particle can move faster than c we dont have to suppose any absolute maximum speed of the universe, we just use c to stand for whatever is the fastest particle around. Nonetheless, in the information theoretical perspective we could go on to see that as more information moves slower, the max speed of the universe and the effective limit to c could have to do with any minimum limit to information. This could mean that there is an ultimate information theoretical constraint to c such that it corresponds to the speed of the minimal amount of information, but all our logic would continue to work in a universe with only active particles and where faster and faster converter replicator particles competed for the championship of being the local light particle (being the particle considered locally reactive). Becoming the local champion could carry with it the opportunity for reduced cost of information (some of its information is the inversion of the information about its surroundings), making it worth to compete for. Thus in practice the best light particles or space that we ever see could just be local champions in much the same way as the best local active unidirectional sucker is locally a black hole (while the mathematical construction of an active unidirectional sucker with a perfect mass stealing strategy making it impossible to escape would be considered a true black hole). In other words, until a universe has managed to evolve completely reactive particles, we should see the local speed of light vary over time in our model. This could be a potential explanation to the recent measurements of neutrinos that seem to go faster than light (they are the new local champion, all hail the new light particle!) but we will go on to consider an alternative explanation that does not rely on suboptimal performance by potentially both the old and the new light particles such that it could work even if we happen to be in a place where space and light particles are purely reactive (or the closest possible thing, such as our space particle or photon reserving just one position in space). So to resolve the mystery why mass couldnt move faster than light all we have to do is to conclude that if it did, it would be the light particle and the former light particle would now be considered mass.

It is just an effect of our definitions, nothing more, that solid particles cannot travel faster than the speed of light. We do however see a hard information theoretical limit that constrains solid particles to navigate at best according to the relativistic and relevantistic formulas and so not only have to be limited by definition to go slower than c (whatever the local c is at the moment) but limited by uncertainty of measurement to go in practice no faster than half c. In other words, to conclude that nothing solid can move faster than light is not really insightful as it only follows from definitions, but to observe that solid particles cant reliably over time keep going faster than half the speed of light is a real insight which follows from information theoretical analysis of the constraints applying to navigation and interaction in the reality of local observers suffering from uncertainty in measurements (or inability to interact reliably over time). As the example with bats or flying robots guided by sound demonstrates, relative effects are themselves relative to the speed limit of information they derive from. Thus armed with our logically consistent concept of relativistic bats we are finally ready to tackle superluminal information exchange or motion. The bats help us picture relativistic effects at normal speeds and they also help us get past the idea of physical impossibility regarding traditionally defined superluminal motion. Solid particles going faster than a local speed of light are not more physically unthinkable than bats flying faster than the speed of sound, it would only change our definitions as to change our meaning of solid and light particles (or our definitions of bats and birds). However, reactive (solid) particles going faster than purely reactive (light or space) particles is an information theoretical impossibility. Thus, by setting c to the speed of the minimal amount of minimally reliably detectable information (and also let this concept correspond to the Planck length in our model) we consequently get a hard limit on relative movement (how fast two things can approach each other) that follow from our definitions such that solid things can approach each other by maximally nearly 2 * c where c is the speed of a real (not just local champion) photon or space particle that reserves exactly one position of space over time. It follows that solid particles each going faster than half the speed of light it is not more physically impossible (and does not break any of our definitions such that birds turn into bats) than bats flying faster than half the speed of sound as this constraint on their movement does not come from any logical limits to its flight speed (corresponding to our definitions of bats and birds) but from the information theoretical constraints to rational navigations imposed on it by uncertainty. The question of superluminal motion, as it is normally defined by two objects approaching each other by a total speed exceeding the speed of light, is thus ultimately a matter of overcoming the statistical limitations to rational navigation imposed by uncertainty in measurements by local observers. In other words, you only have to overcome the constraints on absolute semi-luminal motion imposed by uncertainty, not the hard constraints on physics from information theory that must follow from our definitions such as to ultimately prevent any absolute superluminal motion where a solid particle itself moves through absolute space at a speed exceeding that of light (such that two such solid particles would approach each other in absolute space with a total speed exceeding 2c) as that would either only turn that particle into the new light particle (making it locally seen as not solid anymore)

or be logically impossible if the local champion were also an absolute champion by merit of its minimal information capacity.

The Expendable Neutrino

There are in fact two ways we could beat statistics and achieve somewhat reliable superluminal motion for solid particles without breaking any of the information theoretical constraints we have set up, making the concept a theoretical possibility. That does not automatically make it an actual possibility in our concrete universe, where additional constraints could apply making faster than light travel impossible for other reasons than purely information theoretical ones. Furthermore, additional analysis of information theory could unveil logical constraints that rule out superluminal motion but that we have not discovered in our analysis. Each new constraint we discover just helps on refining our picture of the shape of logical possibility, and we may well go on to refine the shape forever by continuously finding new constraints. What we will discuss in this and the following section is a set of effects that we see no reason to disallow from the information theoretical constraints we have discovered so far, but that does not mean that they must be possible. To understand the first way superluminal motion could be seen, we invoke the concept of our relativistic bats. Consider a person that we call Bob and who had a bunch of especially gene modified bats capable of somewhat faster than semi-sonic flight. As we have seen, nature would obviously not produce them by herself as supersonic bats would keep flying into the walls of their bat caves and any better than semi-sonic bats would fly into each other. Moreover, in practice, Mother Nature has so far only given us fractionally-sonic bats at best. Next we imagine that Bob wants to send a message per semi-sonic bat to his friend Alice some distance away. Note that we could imagine this experiment with supersonic bats, but in relation to our other definitions that would equate to solid particles flying faster than light through absolute space (turning bats into birds or space into matter and vice versa), so we disallow this possibility by definition and look at how we can break the constraint imposed by information theory on semi-sonic bats. The problem, again, with better than semi-sonic bats is that they keep flying into other semi-sonic bats, as they have no way of detecting each other head on. In other words, as Bob keeps releasing bats his hopes of better than semi-sonic bat communication dwindles as all his bats keep crashing into other semi-sonic bats in the world (obviously his little genetic experiment had some unintended consequences and a few escapee semi-sonic bats have managed to do very well in the wild despite their initial navigational imperfections after having been honed by natural selection to fly at maximally semi-sonic speeds). Thus an increasingly disappointed Bob keeps sending messages by slightly-faster-than-semi-sonic bats to Alice where none reach their destination - until one day, when suddenly Alice calls Bob on the phone with the great news that a bat has arrived! Forgetting that having phones would seem to make the entire endeavor somewhat redundant, Bob enthusiastically decides to increase the production of bats, and determines to make them yet faster and faster. He realizes that it would be impossible for him to go so far as to have supersonic bats after all, he is not some kind of bird

farmer but as far as Bob is concerned the speed of sound not half the speed of sound - is now the limit for his bat communication ambitions. The key to better than semi-sonic bat communication, it turns out, is to have enough better-thansemi-sonic bats. By sending more and more of them at the same time, the reliability of the communication channel can be improved further and further until with each batch the probability that at least one lucky bat would get through should be very high, such that a fairly reliable semisonic communication channel could be established with enough bats. With bats flying even substantially faster than half the speed of sound (anything up to the actual speed of sound would be allowed with our definitions) you could establish a bat communication channel with speeds significantly better than half the speed of sound, you would only need proportionally more bats. One approach to superluminal communication is thus to overcome statistical limitations to unreliability in a communication channel by exploiting redundancy. This is how communication theory starts to enter the picture as reliability or quality of communication channels is a central concept from that domain. Correspondingly to the bats flying faster than half the speed of sound, if there were a particle type optimistic enough as to attempt superluminal speeds (that is, flying through absolute space at more than half the speed of light) you could use them to send superluminal messages with better than random reliability provided you could afford enough of them to send your messages redundantly in parallel in very many copies. In addition to the superluminal message you could send with such particles it should be noted that the particle that actually survives the trip will have been a solid particle approaching another solid particle at a relative speed faster than light (as in having a solid particle moving faster than half the speed of light through absolute space). This explanation to superluminal effects does not require an active agent particle implementation. Dead matter particles that happened to go faster than half light speed through absolute space would also be able to arrive faster than traditionally accepted constraints on superluminal motion would have suggested, and dead particles do not even live dangerously as they rush blindly through space on account of being dead. Thus we can see how we have also seen a passive, external implementation of faster than light communication and motion. We will go on to examine another internal, active agent based implementation of superluminal motion of up to 2 * c but we will also see the possibility for pure communication at what will seem to external observers that are not privy to the symbols used in the communication channel as communication at many in fact potentially millions of times the speed of light. Before we do we note that the redundancy based implementation based on expendable particles where some dont arrive but those who do travel faster than light seems to match up nicely with the recently measured phenomenon of superluminal speeds of the neutrino particle, a particle that sometimes seems to arrive faster than light but at other times seems to get lost on the way. In our model this would mean that a lost neutrino had simply bumped into another neutrino (or similar particle) going too fast in the opposite direction such that the emitted neutrino would end up somewhere else than at the detector waiting for it. The neutrino would not have been deleted from

the total mass and energy equation of the universe or disappeared into another dimension or anything such, it would only have changed its course through space in a way that would appear mysteriously random to any local observer until the mechanical explanation (neutrinos going the other way) could be derived. Assuming such a collision would not destroy the neutrinos, they would simply continue to zoom through space at superluminal speeds, eternally to keep running into and bouncing off each other in ways that would seem ultimately random (more essential uncertainty) for local observers as they would have no way to see the whole process using only light particles to measure it.

Universal Ping Pong

To understand the following implementation of superluminal communication clearly we will go back to our model of idealized particles as little spaceships with scientists in them. Consider the case of a lonely scientist in a spaceship. He measures the world around him with his reactive particle detectors and he uses his motors to avoid comets and search for materials that can be used to fuel his spaceship and as food for him and his dead cat (the scientist tries to convince himself that according to quantum superposition the cat could be half alive, which would be better than no company at all). One day when the scientist routinely sends away a reactive particle as a ping to measure the time until it comes back and thereby providing the scientist with information about the distance to or solidity of the next solid object in that direction, the signal he gets back is not his expected ping, but a pong. That is to say, he gets back the mathematical inverse of his expected response signal which should be enormously unlikely to happen as the result of bouncing off something that happened to have exactly the right shape for that. A much more likely explanation would then be that the signal was inverted by intelligent life, trying to make contact. Aliens! Company!! Extreme loneliness can inspire desperate acts and so wild with hope of late canasta evenings the scientist sets off towards the direction of the pong as fast as his motors and the constraints of uncertain navigation allows him (forgetting in his excitement to feed his cat that consequently passes into a determinate state). As we have seen many times by now, uncertainty constrains the scientist regardless of his motor capacity to zoom towards the aliens at no higher speed than half of c, or he would start crashing into unseen space junk (which also mostly zooms around at maximally half c as even space junk with less sense than that will tend to be sorted out of existence in fairly short order). The aliens, should they decide to zoom towards the scientist in turn, could also go no faster than half of c so together they could not approach each other faster than the speed of light. This is the very constraint from active agent theory that allowed us to place a hard constraint on the strength of all natural forces. But there is a special loophole in the constraint the formulas we have seen so far strictly speaking only applies to particles trying to navigate towards each other without active communication. When navigation is only based on the measurements you can make about space around you, uncertainty will not allow you to move faster than half of c, but when you are communicating with another party based in the location you are trying to go to, they could send you information that they have already

detected about their local environment, allowing you to gain enough information to enter superluminal speed (should your engines have enough capacity) without crashing into things on the way. There is a small but ultimately significant problem with this argument. Our scientist was too lonely and secretly too existentially uncomfortable around his ghost cat to make rational judgment, but if we send out a ping and get back a pong indicating life (as in some kind of agents) in a certain direction, how wise is it really to start rushing towards the sender of that pong. Perhaps, to put not too fine a point to it, the aliens would like to eat us? Only agents would be able to exploit the idea of using active communication in this way to achieve faster than light travel, but one of the most fundamental aspects of being an agent in a Darwinian competition with other agents for limited resourced of locally available space and time is that often enough those other agents look at you and think dinner. Thus there is ultimately a basic trust issue at the heart of this implementation of faster than light travel, which is fully compatible with the reliability aspect we described for a communication channel in the example with the semi-luminal bats. We see that without being able to improve the reliability of communication channel the formula E m1 * m2 * c2*r2 holds fast even for active agents as statistically they will have no reason to trust each other. As they zoom towards each other, the scientist and the alien could build up a communication protocol such that they could not only transmit local environment information to each other, but could also put each other through a kind of moral Turing test. Essentially, the scientist and the alien could engage in trust building exercises, asking each other tricky questions of deeply moral nature to test the waters and get a feeling for if it would be a good idea to approach each other faster than light speed. We could of course imagine how a scenario where one party failed such a mutual interrogation might look (of course, babies are certainly delicious; our species eats its young all the time! Pass the mayo!). There could in fact be any number of responses to different such questions that could inspire the other party to turn their engines around and go in the opposite direction (Hey! Where are you going? But you look so delicious, please come back!). However, the constraint in our formula keeps working simply because there could ultimately be no question so good that the answer would lead to absolute certainty that they were not lying about being really great and fun aliens who werent planning on eating our very tasty scientist at all! Or could there be a way to build such a trusting relationship between the scientist and the aliens? We will now go on to inspect closely a final constraint to our constraint. We know that the formula we have derived so far must be too strict, since it still does not allow superluminal motion, something we have seen to be a logical possibility and so should be reflected as such in our mathematical expression. What the formula is missing is one common aspect strictly speaking it is yet another dimension of communication theory, namely that of reliability in a communication channel. When we include this

aspect in the formula, we will see not only how superluminal motion should be made to fit into the picture, but that there is one final possibility to strain the limits of our constraint even a little bit further, under special conditions.

The Dimension of Trust

We have seen in our model how the constraints to nature described by Einstein in his General Theory of Relativity became extended under relevance theory into the relativistic formula E m1 * m2 * c2 * r2 which ultimately constrains how particles must relate to each other in any living universe (one with active agents in it). We remind ourselves that E m * c2 is the special case of this formula where only one mass seems involved because the other particle is empty space and represented by the minimal rest mass of 1 and r2 is 1 under the assumption of an optimally performing natural force . In a way E m * c2 can thus be seen as describing the (optimal) strength of any force of nature acting between matter and empty space (it really describes the maximum conversion rate between matter and empty space). We have gone on to observe that in our model, the formula seems as if it should really be E m1 * m2 * c2 * 2. We have not worked this into our formula yet but we that for it to capture the logic of the model we have described, such a conclusion must be drawn, such that the formula of Einstein would become revised to E mc22. The relevantistic formula E m1 * m2 * c2*r2 which should consequently be reformulated as E m1 * m2 * c2*r2 * 2 - represents how our model implies constraints on particles behavior that to the extent that information theory holds true and our deductions are correct should apply to any biophysical, living or dead universe (with or without agents in it). What it will state when we multiply it by two in this way is that active agent particles may move towards each other with a combined speed of less than the speed of light if they dont find each other very interesting or almost twice the speed of light if they dare - but we know that statistically they would not make it. And when we inspect the components so far in our formula we see that if E m1 * m2 * c2*r2 and r2 can at the most be 1 then this translates to a maximum of E m1 * m2 * c2 and so the constraint from the General Theory of Relativity (E = mc2) seems to hold fast after all. But our model says this should not be the case. Something must still be missing from our formula. We thus have to examine closely how our formula should be extended in order to capture correctly the potential for superluminal motion. We begin by noting that the relevantistic formula is somewhat more generous in what is allowed to happen than the relativistic formula and this could appear as a paradox. If all matter is constrained by the relativist formula, how can the relevantistic formula allow biological matter to behave in ways that pure physics in the form of relativity predicts it shouldnt be able to do (that is sub-optimally, from the perspective of a natural force, but in the direction of lunch from the perspective of a biological agent)? The paradox is resolved by noting that strictly, the relativistic formula only applies to dead universes allowing it to describe a stricter constraint than the relevantistic formula which describes a wider set of biophysical universes (living and dead) and thus by logical necessity should have matching or more relaxed constraints. We note that the relativistic formula continues to govern the movement of

passive or dead (non-agent) matter in a biophysical universe as well, only living active agent matter is allowed to roam free under the looser constraint of E m1 * m2 * c2*r2. In other words, Einsteins formula describes the constraints of a five-dimensional, dead universe with three dimensions of space, one dimension of directional time and one dimension of mass (or density). The relevantistic formula describes a six-dimensional, living or biophysical universe with the five dimensions of the dead universe plus an additional dimension of the relevance of living things to each other from the economic perspective of opportunity and threat. Resolving the paradox between the relativistic and the relevantistic constraints will be necessary to understand why faster than light communication and motion could work without contradicting the constraints we have discovered so far. The reason is that we have an unspoken assumption that when made explicit shows how we have pretended to be able to target a wider set of situations than we are strictly able to do with our formula so far. We resolved the paradox between the relativistic and the relevantistic constraints by calling out the hidden assumption that the relativistic constraint applies to living (agent) matter and dead (nonagent) matter alike it doesnt, as relativity strictly only applies to dead matter. It is now time to call out an unspoken limitation to the relevantistic constraint. Whereas the relativistic constraint only applies to dead matter, the relevantistic constraint as described thus far only applies to dead and living matter that cannot communicate with better than random reliability in their communication channels. Strictly speaking there is a special class of the biophysical systems that we call agents and to which the constraints we have derived from only game theory do not fully apply. When combined with the other information theoretical domain of communication theory, the deductions from game theory must be adjusted to take into account agents that have some kind of minimally reliable communication channel. As we do so we find the answer not only to superluminal motion from a physical perspective but we also solve the conundrum of cooperation in nature for the biologists. The reason that cooperation pays off in nature is thus that with reliable communication between mutually trusting parties such that the level of mutual trust regarding each others intentions are included in the general assessment of the reliability of the communication channel, cooperators can be more energy efficient than completely selfish competitors. We will note that logically we can identify a very special class of active agents (particles or macro particles) namely such active agent pairs that have not only physically met but have both survived the encounter. Such pairs of agents with a minimal level of mutual trust form a special class of agent pairs that we can call cooperators or friends and for them laxer rules than the strict relevantistic or relativistic sets apply. To have physically met for two solid particles means that they have had a direct interaction between their two masses, not just sent information to each other via reactive particles. That is, they have shaken hands, not just waved at each other. The fundamental logic behind why such pairs form a special class from an information theoretical perspective can be verified if we go back to the problem with how the scientist could know if the

alien with the pong is friendly and note that the uncertainty could be resolved with a dangerous but conclusive experiment. If the scientist actually met the alien and it turned out the alien didnt eat our scientist, then we know the alien iswell, at least a little bit better than to devour friendly scientists at first opportunity. A minimal level of trust has been built that will continue to increase the longer two agents spend in direct proximity (killing range) without actually killing each other. Trust can further be increased by both parties by yet more altruistic acts. Expressed in a way that should ring true to honest businessmen everywhere two parties with some minimal reason to trust each other can by showing each other loyalty go on to build more trust in their relationship (their communication channel) to the mutual benefit of both parties in form of increased business opportunity. The greater the trust, the better reason the scientist and the alien have after their initial meeting to navigate to future meetings with superluminal speeds, trusting that they wont arrive to the nasty surprise of a hungry alien (or scientist, conversely) as they do so. But we notice that from a game theoretical perspective (which must apply to all but the overly nave or perhaps redundant particle) it is with the initial meeting that the state change in the trust dimension goes from absolute zero to a minimal value, from there on to continue a steady journey towards better mutual trust with each physical encounter that ends happily for both parties. We know that the full formula for describing dead matter and living matter physics in our model including living agent pairs that have met and survived the encounter should allow relative motion of up to twice the light speed. We also see that it is the aspect of reliability in communication channels that fundamentally changes the information theoretical constraint such as to allow this to happen. All this implies that we should add a dimension of reliability or mutual trust to the game theoretical part of our formula. We will go on to do this in a way such as to break the relevance dimension into two separate dimensions where one continues to depict energy potential or relevance to biophysical agents but the other depicts reliability in communication channels between biophysical agents. The values of these dimensions should then become added to each other such that they can reach a value up to 2 rather than just up to 1 as we have seen that with full reliability communication or motion can become twice as fast - or twice as energy efficient as compared to motion or communication when there is no element of communication built on mutual trust. We must be careful at this step of the analysis to show how we try to capture the logical constraints on our model we have discovered and how we try to express those constraints using mathematical notation. The first observation we must make is that, strictly speaking, the conventional game theoretical formula for assessing the economic value of a situation should generally be seen to hold, such that the value of a situation should be tempered (decreased) by the uncertainty that the situation would become realized. That is, we should expect potential * probability to hold. On the other hand, we have realized that the stake in the tournament is greater than previously expected, in such a way as to state that the full combined potential for two cooperating agents should be seen as 2 rather than 1 (where 1 is the correct value for two competing agents). Consider the formula E m1 * m2 * c2 that we derived to represents a constraint on the energy of any physical

force. if we reformulate it to represent the potential economic value of a situation for two competing agents m1 and m2 we can see that the potential value of the situation is just m1 from the perspective of m2 and just m2 from the perspective of m1 in any case where they would compete for total dominance over the energy of the other. Thus m1 and m2 should be multiplied and will never go beyond 1 in a normalized system where the maximum economic value of the mass and energy of another agent would be 1. But we can also see that in a system where the agents did not have to compete but each could represent improved survival potential for the other should they figure out how to cooperate by means of communication, the total value of the situation in the perspective of both agents becomes m1 + m2 with a maximal normalized value of 2. This conclusion corresponds to the information theoretically grounded decision to set the minimal rest mass of the space or photon particle to 1, giving us twice as much energy or mass in the universe as we thought we had to cooperate around. We note that compatibly with the current models, whenever we fight for dominance over all the energy we will not have twice as much energy available to us anymore but we also note that game theory no longer constrains us to fight each other for all the energy as communication theory allows us to find more energy efficient ways for us to cooperate instead. Thus we could go on to express our formula in a way that would add the sums of the two masses together, but we could normalize our formula further such that it does not rely on the nonequivalence of the two masses to represent the potential we have discovered. By moving the plus into the game theoretical formula such that it becomes potential + probability we not only make it reflect the game theoretical situation where communication has been taken into account such as to allow cooperation, but it also clearly separates the behavior of dead matter physics from that of biophysical matter physics such that the additional possibilities that apply to biophysical systems are contained in their own parenthesis. For equivalence with standard game theory we could see it as what we are describing is that relevance corresponds to the value of potential * probability and potential could take a normalized value of up to 2. We normalize this further into (potential * probability) + reliability where reliability stands for the trust in the communication channel between two parties such that all these values can take a value between 0 and 1. We understand that ultimately it is the reliability of the communication channel that allows the full realization of the potential as a value of 2 (that in turn should be 2 because we added m1 and m2 together in a scenario that allows communication) and therefor it is a good normalization to reduce the potential value of the situation by the same measure as you build up a corresponding added reliability value. This way normalization has allowed us to move the plus from between m1 and m2 to in between r and t in our formula below. Thus we can see how the formula that will finally capture all the information theoretical constraints we have discovered in this paper and where t is taken to represent a dimension of mutual trust between two parties and r depicts their economic relevance to each other must be:

E m1 m2 c2 (r2 + t2) m2c22.

What we have here is a formula describing the ultimate information theoretical constraints on a model of a seven-dimensional universe (assuming three dimensions of space) where the dimensions are: Three dimensions of space One dimension of directional time One dimension of mass One dimension of the game theoretical biophysical relevance One dimension of the game theoretical reason to trust a communication channel

As we have seen the possibility of superluminal motion follows from how trusting agent pairs could maximally approach each other twice as fast as normal agents, with the result that the agents each rushes towards the other at nearly light speed in absolute space which equates to saying that they are approaching each other with a combined speed of twice the light speed in absolute space. In relation to the passive (neutrino) implementation of superluminal motion, we could still think in terms of a dimension of trust as our concept of trust ultimately only describes another form of uncertainty or unreliability in measurements. As we have seen, an alternative name for the dimension of trust would be to call it the dimension of reliability. Thus as we weave this dimension of reliability into our formula to describe how our traditional definition of superluminal motion should be allowed into the range of the possible we will see that uncertainty in the form of reliability has now been captured as an explicit dimension in our model (perhaps to be perceived by some observers as the icky dimension) such that the values of relevance and the value of reliability should be added together such that 0 r2 + t2 2. We still use the letter t to represent the dimension of reliability under its alias of the dimension of trust as the letter r is already taken by the relevance dimension. We observe that it makes sense to think of the superluminal neutrino as a case of overcoming reliability issues by expendability or redundancy, something that information theory graciously allows us to do. With the dimensions of relevance and reliability in place and their relationship to each other and the other dimensions captured in a formula, we finally arrive at the full General Theory of Relevance and Reliability, which is captured in the formula described above.

Spooky Tango at a Distance

The communication theoretical aspect to our information theoretical discussion will also reveal how the effect known as spooky action at distance can work in our model and how it does not break any information theoretical laws. The phenomenon in question is one where particles that have become entangled as the result of direct physical contact will suddenly seem able to send information to each other by millions of times the speed of light. The better two agents know each other, the more efficiently they can communicate (as an old married couple who can eventually read each others minds) because the more their communication can become compressed with tokens carrying larger meaning.

For example, if the scientist sends the message meet me at the usual place to the alien they could have just transmitted a very precise location that should have taken them many more raw bits of information (1s and 0s in a computer) to describe and they could do this thanks to the information theoretical concept of convention. It is a concept from communication theory that is the logical basis for all lossless compression such that two parties have agreed to let certain symbols in communication stand for preconfigured messages taking more information than the symbol takes up. But how can the scientist know that it is her old friend Alien Bob who sent a message to meet up at the usual place, now causing our scientist Alice to rush toward that place blindly at superluminal speed, daring to do so based on her trust of the accuracy of Bobs local environment descriptions and her general trust that Bob wont eat her when she gets there. The problem is that if she cant see anything on the way she cant know if it is Bob or a hungry imposter before she gets there, and then it would be too late. Again the answer comes from information theory, this time from the concept of encryption. The key is to use a secret code such that when Bob and Alice physically meet in a secure location with no eavesdroppers, they agree on a secret challenge and response by asking a quantum randomness generator to give them two truly random words. The generator spots out the gibberish letter sequences Yin and Yang and Alice and Bob can then use these words such that when Alice sends the secret challenge signal Yin (instead of ping) Bob would send back the secret response signal Yang (instead of pong) and Alice can now be relatively safe in her assumption that as long as she and Bob take care to verify the identity of each other using their secret handshake, they can now storm towards their meetings at superluminal speeds. Combining the information theoretical concepts of encryption between trusted parties (a concept that ultimately relies on actual physical contact to work completely) and symbolic communication between parties (a form of data compression) we see the following effect that would not break our new constraint on twice the light speed but would seem to do so to any external observers. We can see that there would be nothing to prevent that two parties communicate a very great information load symbolically such that while all the bits that are actually sent must travel at the speed of the minimal amount of information (light speed), to an external observer it would seem that the two parties communicated faster than light in exact proportion to how much more information was implied by the symbol. This means that by the speed and energy of just one photon you could symbolically send information matching hundreds of thousands or millions of photons. From an information theoretical perspective this virtually equates to saying that you just improved the bandwidth of the universe without actually increasing the general maximum speed of an information bit by adding a new dimension for the parallelism. That is to say, no new dimension is added to the absolute reality in our model, but to an external observer of certain communication phenomena it would seem as if two agents would have to be communicating via some new dimension allowing virtually unlimited parallel bandwidth for the communication that is, until they are in on the secret of the symbol table used by the communicating agents. In other words we could see two parties symbolically communicate enormous amounts of information in a way such that they send a symbolic (packed) message of just one bit but to someone

unaware of the symbolic meaning of this bit it would be as if the two parties had managed to send a much bigger message (the unpacked message) at a speed much faster than should be physically possible by means of sending messages by photon express. The bigger the information in the full, unpacked message the proportionally slower it should be to fully communicate it as compared to the maximum speed of light. The result is that to an external observer it would appear as if the communication goes proportionally faster than light speed the more information there is contained in the unpacked message. Communication could look as if it went at many times faster than light speed to non-party observers without breaking the logical speed limit through absolute space that no bit (or photon) moves faster than some value c. In other words we have a phenomenon that looks to outside observers as not just superluminal communication but as communication at potentially millions of times the speed of light.

Teleportation
If two trusted parties sent a message between each other to the effect that one said build a machine of type 42 and the other knew the design for such a machine and went on to build it as fast as it could, whereas the first party on their side started to dismantle a machine of type 42 as fast as it could, it would look to an outside observer as a kid of hyper-luminal (many times the light speed) teleportation effect. This is not a description of true motion - hyper-luminal or otherwise but only of communication effects that look like teleportation to an outside observer. It was not the same machine 42 that moved to a new position we had two machines where one was dismantled and the other was built. However, we should note an interesting mathematical curiosity such as that while we could find a mathematical possibility for actual hyper-luminal teleportation with this trick it may not be logically possible even if mathematically valid. If we could assume that the trust between two parties were exactly 100% then we could see that if the sender of the message could somehow destroy mass and energy from the total equation of the universe and the other could somehow add mass and energy (not just restructure existing mass and energy) then if they also synched up they could do the teleportation of machine 42 such that the sender not only dismantled his machine but removed its mass and energy entirely from the universe at exactly the same time as the receiver inserted the corresponding amount of mass and energy into the universe and then rebuilt machine 42 with it. This would be a mathematical possibility such that we have not affected the total amount of mass and energy in the universe but if it is a logical possibility to have 100% trust is a different matter. One particular aspect of information theory that has been intensively studied by computer scientists is the concept of transactional integrity and the best understanding on this topic has found no way to ensure 100% reliable communications of an effect such that it can never be absolutely certain that all parties who should receive notice about performing the effect will receive their messages. That is to say that while it could be mathematically possible with true hyper-luminal motion (but is it really the same machine 42 just because we destroyed and created mass rather than just the structure of mass?) at many times the speed of light by this form of teleportation, it may make

requirements that are not logically possible to meet in practice. Conversely, it could be this logical and ultimately information theoretical problem that would ultimately prevent the practical possibility of creating even temporary imbalance in the total mass and energy equation of the universe.

De-coherence and Many Worlds

We can see that active agent particle pairs that have met and survived and therefor have a certain trust built up do not in fact have to communicate strictly according to the same information theoretical constraints (implying physical laws) as govern the rest of the universe at least in the experience of an observer external to the communication. But while we can only see superluminal motion of up to 2 * c, we have seen that what we will define as the entanglement effect in our model (particles that have met without killing each other, building up trust and secure communication channels with encoding and encryption) can result in communication at what looks to outside observers as if it were at many times the speed of light (because they dont know the codes) - such as if there were an information spreading effect capable at moving at much more than 2 * c. Information theory holds because this effect cannot take place without the communicating particles having physically met, which does ultimately change some information theoretical and game theoretical constraints for them. This interestingly matches the measured phenomenon known as spooky action at a distance such that it could be seen to match the active agent pair based implementation of hyper-luminal communication. It too is dependent on the so called entanglement of two particles, an effect resulting of their physical interaction at one point in time, after which it seems that suddenly new physical (or at least information theoretical, subdomain communication theoretical) laws apply to them. Entanglement and spooky action at a distance could thus finally be a real measurable way to tell if we have active agent particles in our universe as only such particles could implement any such effect in our model. It seems that we do measure this type of effect which indicates that perhaps our solid particles are really little machines below the Planck level with potentially sophisticated internal design. However, we should note that there is an alternative mathematically sound explanation to spooky action at a distance and that we have already discussed to some extent when discussing the difference between a model with an absolute universe in it and a model with only relative and superposition realities in it. The currently most widely accepted and mathematically consistent model for describing why spooky action at a distance does not have to break any laws of information theory is the so called decoherence or many worlds theory. Roughly it states that when two things can happen, both will happen such that the (essentially already non-absolute) universe splits into two. The things both happen, each in its own universe - still not really absolute, but mathematically speaking together with its inverse universe a little bit closer to absolute (but without ever being able to reach the point of full absoluteness). While this works mathematically (where something approaching a value can be substituted by that value) we can see that in essence we are only trying to compensate for not having any absolute

reality in the model by inventing more and more local realities, something that is mathematically allowed but possibly not as elegant (information efficient) as the alternative where an absolute reality is assumed to exist. Interestingly we can see that the relativity of Einstein has the same recursive invention of new virtual realities to compensate for the lack of any one absolute reality, as can be observed in the example with the travelling twins. One twin goes on a spaceship a few spins around earth and the other waits on the ground. When the spacefaring twin returns, the young earthbound twin sees his suddenly older brother with a long white beard. But did we not note that the generally accepted model says they would be the same age again when they met? Yes it does, if they go away from and towards each other again in a linear manner. The exception comes if one takes a spin around the other in which case measurable effects such that they seem not to be the same age when they meet will appear. Here is the well-known and mathematically accepted solution to the paradox of what happens in this experiment (which has been tested in practice with clocks): In the local reality of the earth-bound twin he sees his brother with a beard, and if he asks his brother to report about his perception he will hear his astronaut brother agree that the turn in space made him the older one as proved by the beard. But in the local reality of the spacefaring twin, according to relativity he should be able to decide to consider himself stationary the whole time while earth and his brother suddenly went on an interesting orbital trip around his spaceship. Thus when earth and his brother with it returns, the stationary astronaut twin would with that frame of reference have the experience of being beardless but seeing his now much older, earth-bound brother clad in a long white beard as they greet each other, and they will both agree that it was the brother who stayed on earth that is now old and bearded. In other words, this is just as the many worlds theory, where a cat can be alive in one reality and dead in another and particles can communicate with hyper-luminal speed (spooky action at a distance) pretty much on account on how, to balance things out, local realities will be created where the communication fails as compensation. Mathematically it works to the extent that as new local realities are created with every event in the universe, the mathematical description will infinitely approach a fully correct description, and in the world of mathematics something that infinitely approaches a value should be substitutable for that value. But the mathematics and the correspondence with established measurements also works out in a model that assumes just one absolute reality and derived local realities (one per observer) and it works without the substitution of an approaching value by the value it approaches. In our model that does include an absolute reality, the two twins would not necessarily be able to agree who had the beard and in absolute fact they would be just the same age as each other the whole time. In other words, by sending a clock in a spin around earth as we have done in real experiments (in our model the clock really does circle earth rather than the other way around regardless of how it can seem to inside observers) we have managed to add a level of necessary

uncertainty to the measurements of that space clock for the remaining earthly observers and vice versa. The clock we actually have in our world and that we have sent on an actual space-tour seems to us to have slowed down as a result of our inability to measure it any better. In our model it really has not slowed down from any effects of absolute time moving at different speeds for the space clocks and the earth clock. The thing we measure and that looks like time has slowed down for one clock is additional uncertainty that we, as per usual in our model, will interpret as additional virtual or relative distance, mass and time (so the space clocks seems slow to us but an earth clock seems slow to an astronaut). In many worlds theory, it would be as if each twin brother in the thought experiment heard the other say or even write down that the other was the bearded one, which seems logically impossible (unless new worlds are invented) although mathematically feasible. With absolute world theory (the one we have examined in this paper) it would not turn out the same way exactly. Rather, the twins would have to agree that there was no way to truly measure who was older or had a beard and that would be the end of that. Well, not completely. There could be measures of uncertainty resulting from the space trip that could potentially be reduced over time. For example, they could try to ruffle each others beards and discover that in fact none of them were bearded. In fact, when measuring each others clocks they may both feel that the other has the slower clock, but when it comes to whether someone has a beard, in the model presented in this paper it would be a completely logical resolution to the paradox to just have the brothers ask each other if the other has a beard something which should at the very least be apparent to each brother is if they have a beard of their own. They would not hear each other claim opposite points but would be able to resolve the beard paradox (aha, so none of us is bearded then) without inventing any new universes to make the math work out. It may therefore be left to the reader to decide if the model with an absolute reality and necessary uncertainty in measurements for local observers or the model with no absolute reality but a recursively and exponentially growing amount of local or virtual worlds springing into existence as the result of every event in the universe is the mental model they are more comfortable with to picture the world around them. Likewise one can chose between the many worlds theory or the robot particle theory to explain the phenomenon of spooky action at a distance, each is equally mathematically consistent but it could well be argued that the model with an absolute reality is much lighter from an information theoretical perspective (no infinite and exponentially expanding recursion required to infinitely approach an information theoretically valid description) and that the explanation with an absolute reality may also seem more mentally comprehensible.

Collapsing Dimensions
So we have seen the description of a seven-dimensional universe with three dimensions of space, one of directional time, one of mass, one of relevance and one of reliability. Should we try to squeeze in a few more, just for good measure?

Or conversely, could we get rid of a few of those seven dimensions? For one thing, do we really need all three space dimensions? It turns out that logically and mathematically speaking we dont. What we can do (and that will make both mathematical and logical sense) is to assume that in the absolute universe we have only one dimension of space, one dimension of time and one dimension of mass (density of space). With only these three concrete dimensions we would still be able to derive the same two abstract or virtual dimensions as before for local observers, those of relevance and reliability. So if our model bears correspondence to the real world, perhaps there is only one concrete dimension of space in the universe we live in but we living things inside it, constrained to the uncertainty of the local observer perspectives, will experience uncertainty or unreliability as more space around a particle. Lower biological potential (greater irrelevance) of a point will make it seem surrounded by more space still. The result for a living observer could be one where they perceive relevance and reliability as two additional dimensions of space, providing us with a reasonable and information theoretically sound explanation as to why we seem to find ourselves in a universe with exactly three dimensions of space. As far as the analysis of this paper has taken us, we can see that the smallest possible concrete universe allowed within our model would require three absolute dimensions one of space, one of time and with the inclusion to the model of reason (causality or non-randomness) we get the logical basis for a dimension of density, consistency, mass, call it what you will but it should be seen as the inversion of the concept of distance in space and time such that if distance degrades a signal, the inverse implies a place where a signal does not become as degraded (we could talk of this as the potential for differential cost of information). Logically this would amount to stating that space is a condition with higher randomness that degrades the signal faster whereas mass is a condition of lower randomness due to some (any) type of causality such that a signal can degrade slower or sustain better there. We thus have definitions of the three dimensions of the absolute universe in our model entirely based on concepts from information theory. Space corresponds to the concept of the minimal information content such that a signal can exist. The relationship between mass and space is that mass is a condition of lower randomness than space and time is the thing over which signals can degrade. A signal in turn is any type of information, making this a completely information theoretical model of a universe. This would give rise in our model to a reality with five perceived dimensions for living observers inside the model such that life (biological or active agent observers) will experience three dimensions of space, one dimension of time and one dimension of mass but where two of the perceived space dimensions do really represent biological potential and reliability associated with measurement, including uncertainty regarding the intentions of one another in a universe that favors cooperators but still punishes the overly nave. What if there were more aspects to a position in space in some universe, such as the one we live in? What if, for example, a position had a certain rotational spin? Or what if positions could have

different pulses or even be more or less attractive (charming) to each other perhaps in ways that would influence their behaviors such as to correspond to other physical forces we associate with our universe (by means of external or internal mechanical implementations)? If this were the case, it could be modeled mathematically as yet new dimensions to our model. For every such feature, we would include it as a new dimension to the model. To picture this, the reader is not asked to imagine hyper-dimensional cubes. Just as we are able to picture how mass must be its own dimension inside our normal three dimensions of space (or an empty swimming pool and one full with water would be indistinguishable) we could imagine that if our little particles spin and charm each other we must mathematically model this as additional dimensions. Rather than imagining fivedimensional space the reader is just asked to picture that the little balls in space are now (for example) spinning and have different looks, remembering that in a mathematical formula this is considered as new dimensions insofar as the spin or look could be changed without changing the density or position in space. As being able to verify the logical (and by extension mathematical) claims by this paper using mental models remains a central ambition, we take a little extra care to make sure that the reader feels no discomfort with mentally picturing a multi-dimensional universe in a way that is accurate from a mathematical perspective. To imagine a world with three dimensions of space, all the reader has to do is to picture a threedimensional cube with balls in it at different positions in the cube. To accurately mentally picture the mathematical model of a world with three dimensions of space and one dimension of time, all one has to do is to picture the balls moving around in the cube. To accurately picture a mathematical model of a world with three dimensions of space, one dimension of space and one dimension of mass or density, all the reader has to do is to imagine that the balls could be of different density, such that the difference could be told between a swimming pool full of air and one full of water (consisting of denser balls). To picture a world with just one actual dimension of space but two dimensions of relevance and reliability, exactly the same model can be used. To accurately extend the image of such a five-dimensional mathematical model to a sevendimensional universe with spin and charm all one has to do is to picture that the balls could rotate and perhaps be different colors such that black balls generally found white balls more attractive and vice versa (such a preference would in no way have to be absolute, only statistically detectable). At no point would the reader be asked to imagine a four-dimensional cube with four dimensions of space as this would not only be unnecessary but ultimately an unhelpful mental model for most to help with understanding what the claims of this paper should be seen to be. As our very reliable scientific Standard Model would seem to suggest that we have additional such qualities as spin and charm to take into account in a more refined model of our universe than will be examined in this paper, we should expect such models to have many more dimensions than five in them. This paper will stop its analysis at the five dimensional universe but note that to evaluate the general arguments presented here it would be enough to start with the simulation of a fairly small five dimensional universe. Additional dimensions could be added to approach a closer description to our own universe as computer power allowed. It is furthermore possible that such aspects as spin

and charm would even evolve out of the behaviors of a five dimensional universe given enough time, in much the same way as the aspect of sex (strictly speaking its own dimension in a rich mathematical model of biology) evolved in our biological world when it was given enough time. The concept in this model of causal loops that evolve into universes with eventually very many dimensions could potentially be seen as compatible with string theory and its models of universes with eleven dimensions or more, but will not been examined to greater extent in this paper. If the reader feels able to imagine that we only have one real dimension of space and the other two were essentially both the effects of general uncertainty and differential relevance but still feels that this mental model of our universe feels icky, the resolution becomes to see that quite possibly the universe we are in has three actual dimensions of space. What started as a universe with one dimension of space could evolve into a universe that should be interpreted as one with three dimensions of space entirely as a consequence of what transformational rules of time are used. This would be in just the same way as it could evolve aspects such as charm or sex related to how the information in the universe should be interpreted by the transformational rules. In practice, dimensions would be added to such a universe as information found new ways to exploit causality to represent itself yet more efficiently. Thus we could be in a universe with one absolute dimensions of space that has folded itself into something that thanks to the behavior of time must be seen as a universe with three actual dimensions of space. The reliability dimension would then work in addition to three dimensions of space, one of time and one of mass such that the perception of all the three space dimensions as well as the time dimension and the mass dimension would seem affected by a local observer. This would be in such a way that lower reliability in measurement would make it seem like the space around the measured thing grew a bit, like its mass became a little less solid and as if time slowed down a bit in the thing. Improved relevance on the other hand would make the space seem to shrink a little, mass become a little more solid and time move a little faster.

Dark Energy as Virtual Anti-Gravity

The concept of Dark Matter would in our model correspond to the minimal rest mass of the photon and the space particle (the informational minimal capacity of one position in space). It could be used to explain where the energy for such phenomena such as the superluminal neutrino could come from but also help explain other well-known curiosities in our measurements that have indicated more mass than there should be, somehow hiding in empty space and that we have so far in the Standard Model been resolved by including a concept of Dark Matter that we dont know what it is but that must be responsible for a set of gravitational effects that cant be explained any other way. What the analysis of this paper concludes is that there is good information theoretical reason to believe that we do indeed have a form of Dark Matter in our universe in that empty space should be seen as having the minimal rest mass of 1. Another recently measured phenomenon has resulted in the need for yet another concept in the Standard Model: Dark Energy that would be responsible for pushing all the other star systems away from us in an accelerating manner. This observation has seemed deeply mystifying. In a nutshell, if they are accelerating away (and already by some fairly significant speed at that) why are they not

already long gone? Did they start spurting away from us recently? And why did we somehow offend them? But our model, on closer inspection, would predict just such a phenomenon to occur as yet another effect in measurement of observers in a way that would work like the inverse of the Virtual Gravity we discussed earlier. The effect comes from how space particles (or photons) are able to share information with each other without destroying any of it (they are reactive perfectly bi-directional semi-converters). This assumes a perfect compression algorithm for light particles such that they can keep sharing more and more information about the solid world with each other indefinitely, but this is exactly what information theory tells us to expect for them (information lives on forever in photons) without the existence of such an algorithm for the photons, abstract information would have to be destroyed from the model which would require constant addition of energy to the universe (as is not allowed). This means that when we look at a distant star, the space between us and that star will keep filling up with more and more information without the number of positions in space (number of space particles) between us and the planet increasing at all. One way for an observer to interpret this information increase to any empty space would be as if the distance between itself and the object being observed would increase over time as a way to interpret the increased amount of information between the observer and the solid object. The total amount of information in the space between two solid objects would of course in accordance with our definitions increase over time in proportion to the product of the masses of the objects and in inverse proportion to the square of the distance between them. Thus, if an observer and a solid object were maintaining a constant distance to each other in absolute space, reduction of initial uncertainty would look like the object solidifying (or accelerating towards its correct position in space or freezing up in time) but after a certain point it would start to look to the observer as if the solid object were accelerating away in line with anti-gravity (or becoming less solid, or slowing down in time). If the observer set off in a spaceship towards the object they would discover that it would only take as long time to get there as it seemed it should have taken before the object seemed to start speeding away. This is logical because the observer will still have to traverse the same amount of positions in space to get to the object and it will not take more energy to traverse space particles that are filled with more and more abstract information contained in its substructure. One way to think of this is would be to consider the case of looking at some object through a very strong microscope. At first the picture would be blurry and atoms would seem to overlap in their positions giving the impression that the object would appear to solidify (become less blurry) as the sharpness of the picture increased. This corresponds to the effect of Virtual Gravity in the model of this paper. But as the picture became even sharper it would eventually go on to reveal that between the tiny atoms in a solid object there is mostly empty space and then the object in the picture would seem to become less solid (fade out to black) the sharper the picture became. This corresponds to Virtual Anti-Gravity in our model, or dark Energy. Thus we would see an effect corresponding to that of Dark Energy in our model but it would be an effect in measurement for local observers, not an indication of motion through absolute space of the solid particles in our model.

The reason we currently say that it seems the stars accelerate away from us is the accelerating redshift that has been measured in the light that have traveled from the stars to us. That could either be explained by something like the stars zooming away (or becoming less solid, or slowing down in time) or it could be explained as the photons somehow warming up empty space as it travels from those stars to us. The model presented in this paper would explain this effect in terms of space warming up as in being filled with more information (a form of increasingly complex vibration in positions of space, corresponding to the concept of warming up, and we see that we have a rest mass of 1 for empty space such that we have something to warm up) and that this effect should be measurable at much smaller scales with precise enough equipment. We should note here that we could potentially see a way to confirm the general validity of the model we have derived in this paper by means of predicting the outcome of a yet not performed scientific experiment (predicting already measured neutrinos, spooky action at a distance, cooperation in nature and the stars seeming to accelerate away from us would strictly not count as this theory was presented after all of these observations). But the model of this paper will make the prediction that we could detect an effect that makes it seem (under one interpretation) as if a camera was zooming away from itself in exactly the way that the stars seem to zoom away from us. That is, we should be able to measure the same redshift that we see from the stars under relatively low energy conditions on earth. If we send up a satellite with a film camera in such a way as for the satellite to be in a stationary position relative to a spot on the moon and we send a robot to the moon with a mirror, such that the film camera in the satellite could film itself in the mirror on the moon, the model of this paper predicts that an examination of the film would show the same accelerating redshift effect as we see in the light from the stars but as we know that the moon and mirror remain at constant distance, we would have to conclude that this increased redshift is not the result of the moon accelerating away. We should note that the mirror and perhaps even the camera could potentially be on earth as well, and that the effect should be easier to detect the more vacuum we had between the camera and the mirror. Thus, before we launch satellites to measure the effect predicted by this paper, it would probably be well worth it to see if it could be detected under more mundane conditions as well. It is possible that the only equipment required for demonstration of the Dark Energy effect predicted by this paper could be a mirror, a film camera and a light bulb.

Indeterminism
We will see that given a universe with relativistic effects and active agent observers in it who are capable of influencing the universe, there will be no constraint confining the universe such that it must have a purely predetermined future, even if the reality is ultimately both real as well as infinitely precise. The usual reason to think that it seems reasonable for the course of the universe to be predetermined is that one might think thats all physics would allow. If we picture the universe, as is our want, with balls bouncing around in space then it might seem like there is only one way the balls could bounce without breaking any laws of physics.

Consider two universes, alike in every detail such that each contains a driver in a car heading towards a cliff. In one universe, however, the driver sees a warning sign and stops in time whereas in the other universe the driver looks at the sign as well but due to being confined to some necessary uncertainty in all his measurements (both drivers are) he misses the warning sign, resulting in the second driver going over the cliff to plummet helplessly towards his death. It is important to observe here that even if we could argue that it could be predetermined that these would be the things that would happen in each universe, it could not be argued that the causal chain describing the difference between what happened in the two universes did not depend crucially on the perception of the drivers and then logically ultimately also on a measure of uncertainty. But perhaps perception could be predetermined too? Or could it? We know that local observers are confined to an uncertain view of the world, so all perception is imprecise and ultimately unpredictable in which parts of reality that will become obscured at a given time. We can thus see that in a universe with local observers having any influence, the future cannot be totally predictable as chains of causality sometimes rely on unpredictable observations. The impossibility to predict which perceptional distortions will come is a direct result of the definitions in the information theoretical model we have built. It is the higher randomness in space that degrades the signal, so the signal degradations are the result of randomness. We could not logically consider a universe with predictable signal degradation as any such predictability could be exploited to improve the reliability of the signal again (consider how a causal loop could exploit such causality to improve its stability) and by doing so we would also remove the essential distinction between space and mass (higher density of concrete information equals lower randomness corrupting that information over time). Thus we seem to rely on a measure of true randomness for any logically consistent description of a world with features matching ours (we have space, time and mass) and so we know such a universe must also be ultimately non-deterministic. It would be the assumption of an absolute chain of causality that implied pre-determinism but we have seen that in order to have a concept of mass such as we have in our universe, we must be describing a universe with less than absolute causality in it (some degree of randomness) and so we know with absolute certainty that we are not in a pre-determined universe and that we are able to do as we like within the physical constraint that we can only approach each other at maximally twice the speed of light (or half of that if we are not trusting friends it should be noted that enemy agents can only escape each other at maximally half the speed of light through absolute space, unless they are escaping in the direction of their respective friends and communicating with them). But wait a minute. We dont really have to assume true randomness to make all our logic work out all we have to do is to assume that even if some absolute causality exists, it is for some reason not exploitable by the signal to prevent degradation. With this observation, we have really only stated something along the following lines. For a program in a computer we could make it so that it is not possible for the program itself to precisely determine the entire future of the state of that computer if we add a layer of corruption to some of the computers readings of its own state. The operator of the computer could look what the true values were behind the corruption layer and also (if a predictable corruption effect were used) which

mistakes the programs trying to predict their futures would make. We are back to considering a predetermined universe after all. The operator could be seen as the famous demon of LaPlace, which represents the concept of an outside observer that is able to see all the future of a universe that seems unpredictable to its local observers. But we should also see that the operator could exist in a computer ran by yet another operator. Where does this recursion take us? Well, for the operator to exist, it would have to be (with our definitions) in a place where there was still some randomness for him in his universe. The alternative is that there is no difference between space and mass in his world such that he leads what we would have to think of as a purely abstract existence. Thus we could picture a type of existence that could perceive what would happen in a predetermined universe as a way of ending the recursion, but such a being could in our model never affect anything due to the lack of a distinction between randomness and absolute causality in his world. In other words, the ultimate demon of LaPlace could only live either in a world of absolute chaos or absolute causality, either way it would be an entirely abstract universe such that the demon could perceive all of possible reality but could affect none of it. One might perhaps philosophically ask what would be the entertaining aspect (after initial interest wears out) in perceiving the future of either a universe without time (nothing ever happens from this perspective if there is absolute causality. For the demon it would be as if looking at a box of with two dimensions of space and one dimension of time) or with too much time (everything happens totally chaotically with no reason for any state to proceed the next, such as that it would make roughly the same sense to look at such a universe it as it does to stare at the static of a television screen). If the ultimate demon of LaPlace lives in an abstract universe with absolute causality, then it follows that the same will go for all the concrete worlds below such that they are all really predetermined. There is no way for anyone in such a world to know the future precisely and the only one who could see all future cant do anything about it or do anything else at all for that matter. It follows that given enough time, all possible mistakes from this inability of all agents to see the future would occur, such that all of physical possibility would be explored. It could therefore be observed that such a world could be compared to the many worlds hypothesis in that the best way to picture this is as a world where everything happens but with no real consequence as, well, everything happens, which matches our logical concern with pre-determinism such that nothing really matters because, well, it was doomed to happen. If on the other hand the ultimate demon of LaPlace lived in a world of absolute chaos, it would follow that everything in the concrete worlds would be ultimately totally chaotic. Anything that seemed to happen with regularity would ultimately do so by chance alone. Things would not be predetermined but they would not happen for any reason either. Again we seem left with an ultimately meaningless existence.

The resolution to this paradox is to see that when moving all the way to the level of the absolutely chaotic or the absolutely causal, we have gone one step too far in our search for the end condition of the recursion of a computer in a computer in a computer (or a god of a god etc.). The logic of our model breaks down and we do not continue to make any real sense when we try to derive the full mathematics of our universe from not just a timeless universe but (if we continue down that road) eventually one without any space in it either. We have to start with a universe that has some time, space and randomness for our model to make sense, and the ultimate resolution to our paradox is not only to conclude that it is enough that these three elements happen to spring into existence for the logic to continue to make sense from that point on. We also conclude that: 1) For this to happen would assume only one most basic requirement, that of some minimal existence of some minimal randomness, allowing the three dimensions of our universe to happen to spring into existence, 2) If we exist (and many measurements point in favor of the popular theory that we do) then we must have somehow been able to happen to spring in existence, so a minimal level of randomness must be a basic constraint on the existence of anything. The alternative is that we (the multiverse) has always existed (such that it never had to happen to spring into existence) but then we are back to concluding that as the multiverse must contain some minimal randomness to belong to the set of models where we could exist, it would also have had to always have contained some minimal amount of true randomness - or at least it must now. From a point of view that probably refuses logical meditation, one might imagine some special point in time to distinguish before and after the invention of the necessary randomness for the universe to turn into a real place where things concretely happen. However, this requires the hopelessly illogical event that randomness could be invented randomly. In any case, randomness wins.) Check mate, pre-determinism? It is a logical conclusion from the premise that we are here that randomness is a core feature of our root universe. Such a universe that contained some randomness or uncertainty from the start would then be able to randomly invent both space and time (or one might even say that space and time are aspects of the distinction between randomness and causality) and from that point on the whole game of existence could start. And it also follows from the proof of the requirement on some initial randomness on any world in which we could exist that any such world could not be totally predetermined either, as it contains some level of randomness at its very core. We can never ultimately prove a theory of origin - we can only exclude logical impossibilities, which is what this paper has been attempting to do by using premises from information theory and making deductions from them. In the case of our final philosophical inspection on pre-determinism, we have only proved non-determinism by inversion. But we have proven that full determinism is impossible insofar as any observer can exist to make observations, and then what remains must be proof that we are in a non-deterministic universe. However, there is a premise to every deduction. The alternative, that one must perhaps leave open

as some kind of possibility, is that we dont exist. This would essentially amount to us only imagining that we are imagining that we are imagining ourselves, with no end in sight to the recursion. This is a truly endless recursion and thus not a logically consistent model in the same way that a circular argument is not (and endless recursion is as bad as an infinite loop, plus it consumes all the computers memory). Still, although strictly not a logical possibility it might perhaps be seen as a mathematical possibility such as negative distance which has no correspondence in a world of pure logic. A universe with some elements of both causality and randomness is not the same type of thing as a universe with only one of them. To be able to be the way it is, our universe cannot not be just mathematically derived in a transformation that adds no information from such a purely chaotic or causal thing but must be derived from something that in turn must have both some level of causality and some level of randomness for the logic to check out. We can thus know that either we exist in a non-deterministic universe or we dont exist at all (in which case we may do well to continue to imagine that we imagine that we imagine ourselves). To verify one final time the logic of this (pre-determinism is a sore loser and has demanded a recount) we can say that by adding time such that we go from a fully static to a semi-static or dynamic universe, we are not just interpreting the static universe in a new way, we are adding a brand new quality to it such that the dynamic universe must be a different type of place than the static universe. Even if our dynamic universe somehow evolved from a purely chaotic one (or devolved from a strictly causal one) then that new quality of randomness or causality had to be added (it could not just be the question of a mathematical reformulation of the same information as existed before in that universe) to make our universe what it is and by doing so it became a different, less meaningless place that would by logical necessity be ultimately non-deterministic - even for the demon of LaPlace - from that point onwards in time. Mathematically, the set of dynamic universes with time, space and mass is not a subset of the set of universes with only one or two (or none) of those dimensions and thus our universe is not a subset of any purely predetermined or purely chaotic universes. In other words, we live in a meaningful universe. So we can see that we are not in a predetermined universe. But did we have any very good reason to believe we should be anyway? The infinitely precise motion of balls in space seems like a convincing argument for a predetermined universe until we involve uncertainty in perception of active agents but is it a good default view on the universe? Would balls moving perfectly really be the easiest thing for a universe to do such that we should expect that feature of it, or would it be an easier job for a universe that would be allowed a little mistake here and there, now and then? Perhaps the more reasonable default assumption is that the universe does not start out with balls moving perfectly in space, but that such stable behavior is something it would in greater likelihood evolve towards with the help of Darwinian evolution by natural selection of replicating agents that we have now seen to ultimately favor the communicating, friendly but also realistic or scientifically minded, trusting cooperator.

Thus we see that the universe is not only fundamentally unpredictable as soon as you have relativistic observers and a Planck length in it the universe was probably a deeply unpredictable place from the start and only once particles had evolved that were stable enough to sustain us could macro systems such as us show up on the scene to assume that the little balls making up our world move perfectly.

The Necessity Of Comprise

The reason that information is allowed by information theory to live on forever in photons is that we assume that they are able to compress this information using a fully lossless compression. Given infinite precision of positions, which would be mathematically allowed, this equates from an information theoretical perspective to saying that a position in space can be split into infinitely fine parts, allowing for ultimately infinite amounts of information to be stored this way (as in the entire history of the universe). Different rules apply for concrete representations of information that will be doomed to wither over time in accordance with the Second Law of Thermodynamics. But we have seen that the speed with which such information must wither can be reduced to a minimum by cooperation between communicating agents. How far could the withering of concrete information be prevented? If a perfect, lossless information compression algorithm could be devised, could concrete representations of information become immortal, too that is, could we get a model where even the active particles managed to become reactive so that the model only includes reactive particles? Potentially so in mathematical theory but it could still be the case that this is never a practical possibility. In reality, all compression algorithms available for concrete signal representations could be associated with inevitable loss (in fact it would seem to be a logical restatement of our definitions, but that would only apply to this model and not exclude the potential for a mathematically valid model where loss would not be inevitable). Nonetheless, if information can be prioritized, then some loss could perhaps be deemed more acceptable than others, such that it would make sense to apply some compression algorithms even if they were to some extent losing some of the least relevant information? This is the essence of a compromise and of the information theoretical activity of abstraction (leaving us finally with an idea about how information theory distinguishes between the concepts of abstract and concrete) where some details are lost but the more essential patterns in some signal is kept around. In order to cooperate optimally, communicating biophysical agents will eventually find it in their mutual best interests to start compromising such that they agree on what information should remain under their protection at the expense of allowing less vital information to be lost to the tyrannical forces of randomness as expressed by the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

Logic and Mathematics

If you have a one meter distance and you subtract two meters from it, what is the resulting distance? The mathematical answer is negative one meter. The logical answer is that the problem statement is logically inconsistent.

Negative numbers have no correspondence as a concept in physical reality and are a purely mathematical invention. Placing the zero at our Planck length to give us negative space, masses and time obscures the fact that the logical function of the symbol 0 is to represent the knowledge of the fact that a certain thing does not exist. Things below the Planck level do exist, and so we see that the most logical use of math to describe our universe is to represent the Planck length not with the symbol 0 but with the symbol 1, such that the rest mass of the photon is not 0 but 1 and the rest mass of a certain sub-Planck substructure can approach 0 the smaller it is (or approach 1 the bigger it is) but it can never become 0 without going out of existence. Giving the photon a rest mass of one makes great sense with the rest of the math and the logic presented in this paper, where we derived E mc2 from E m1 * m2 * c2 by equating the rest mass of m2 as a space particle with the minimal value 1. It is also logically compatible with a model including an absolute universe where the concept of negative distances would be logically inconsistent and so should not be a feature of the model.

Summary
This paper has proposed a scientifically testable model for our world that makes the suggestion that we see non-biological solid particles attracted to each other at best in accordance with the Newtonian formula F = m1 * m2 / d2 as a direct consequence of information theory placing a constraint on the strength on any force between particles in a universe where time passes (information spread is not instantaneous). The discussion has included the examination of the mathematical construction of active agent particles as an implementation mechanism for the force of gravity under the idealization that solid particles could be little machines with a substructure implementing sensors, motors and controllers. When solid particles for some reason represent opportunity (or threat) to each other in the economical perspective of energy preservation, they do their best to navigate towards each other (or, conversely, away from each other) as fast as available information in their sensors, game theory and the capacities of their motors allow them. Unless communication theory is invoked, available information is improved over a given time with the formula E m1 * m2 * c2. The alternative mechanical explanation for gravity discussed in this paper is the already well known idea that gravitons push solid objects together, in which case the effect not only happens to match F = m1 * m2 / d2 but must more importantly still always be constrained by E m1 * m2 * c2 as the most optimal form it is possible for it to take (though a bad force of nature could work according to a suboptimal formula) as we have seen this formula to be an ultimate constraint on the strength of any physical force with a passive (externally mechanical) implementation. The idea of solid particles as little robots chasing after or trying to escape each other as an explanation for the implementation of natural forces may, while theoretically possible as we have seen, feel as an unlikely candidate for explaining the actual natural forces we see in our universe around us. However, the main role of introducing the mathematical concept of active agent implementation of natural forces in this paper is that it helps us discover a hard limit on any physical force. We have also seen indications by the phenomenon of entanglement and spooky action at a distance that we may in fact have solid particles with internal substructures in the form of little machines

unless of course there is no absolute reality and everything semi-happens as in the many-worlds theory (de-coherence). We see in the final papers that such a many-worlds model may be a mathematical possibility but perhaps still not a logical possibility as it seems to suppose not only that information is essentially totally without cost (unless no concrete information exists and we are all just reflections in light, which is known as the hologram universe interpretation of the many worlds theory) but also that it seems implied by our very existence that we live in a universe more meaningful than so. It is mathematically possible that we dont concretely exists, but it requires an endless recursion of the type we imagine that we imagine that we imagine which could perhaps be permitted by mathematics where a value that is approached can be used to substitute for the approaching value, but it is from a logical perspective as bad as a circular argument. Discussing the mathematical constraints to the hypothetical active agent particles we noted that optimal navigating agent particles could form by chance alone given enough time but that an alternative that would require less time would be if solid agent particles were replicators with the ability to evolve rapidly by natural selection into a state where they are approximating optimal navigation strategies to a very high degree. The reason we see solid particles following the laws of gravity could be that they are in fact optimally (or reasonably optimally) navigating active agents and it is also possible that they are replicators allowing less time required in the universe to find increasingly well-navigating active agents, but this paper will ultimate not make any claims to the extent that is must be so. Our concern in this paper is with ruling out the impossible but not by trying to limit down the range of possibility into only one, single future of what must come that is, a totally pre-determined future of absolute certainty about everything, such as been shown in this paper by logical deduction not to be logically consistent in any model of the universe based in information theory. This paper also suggests that just as all solid particles experience relativistic distortions in the form of relative distance or mass in accordance with Einsteins General Theory of Relativity, agent particles or macro structures that represent different opportunities or threats to each other will experience further distortions to their perceptions of distance or mass, such that neutral particles seem further away (or less solid) while particles representing either opportunity or threat will be perceived as relatively closer (or more solid). We began by capturing this phenomenon in the formula E m1 * m2 * c2*r2, which before the discovery of the possibility for relative superluminal motion at 2 * c to our model was also seen as an ultimate constraint on movements of any matter - living (biological agents or biophysical active agent particles) and dead matter alike. We finally extended this formula with an information theoretically based dimension of trustworthiness or reliability of communication channels between mutually cooperating (or trusting) agents. By examining the special communication theoretical conditions concerning mutually trusting agent pairs (so called cooperators of friends) in communicative contact we arrived finally at a formula describing a model of a seven-dimensional universe that we ultimately compressed into three absolute dimensions of time, space, and mass, and two virtual or local dimensions of relevance and reliability or trust ultimately constraining the physical possibilities of all biophysical systems in the model. The two virtual dimensions may be perceived by living observers as two extra dimensions of space, where we also included the logical constraint from definitions that no solid particle can move faster

than light through absolute space. The formula ultimately describes the theoretical outlines for the possible shapes of a biophysical (or living) universe where agents with intentions of survival can build mutual trust to increase the reliability of their communication channels. The rational for building this trust comes from their common enemy in the form of the Second Law of Thermodynamics (the impossibility to compress concrete information infinitely without loss). With r depicting relevance or potential and t for trust or estimated probability for realization of the potential where the estimation includes a level of uncertainty regarding the ultimate intentions of the communicating partner, we see that we have arrived at the final version of the formula that describes the constraints to our model of the universe. The formula captures the purely physical as well as the biological realms under one formula by combining two domains of information theory game theory and communication theory into one integrated framework that states: E m1 * m2 * c2* (r2 + t2) m1 * m2 * c2* 2 The General Theory of Relevance and Reliability is thus a purely information theoretically based analysis unifying game theory and communication theory into one coherent model. It is also an information theoretically based integration of relativity, quantum mechanics and Darwinian evolution by natural selection into one theoretical framework that can answer the question as to why we can see such prominence of cooperating agents in nature. Where previous economic analysis based on game theory would have suggested the success of the selfish replicator, we can see that the formula for nature reflected by our model predicts the ultimate success of the cautious cooperator. The optimal economic strategy for rational agents becomes to behave much in the manner of a mildmannered scientist: Measure first, because selfish replicators do exist out there, but if you find a friend you can trust, communicate and cooperate with, you will both become twice as powerful together in a recursion that never really ends as more partners who have learned to behave in trustworthy manners can always be brought into the mix. The only one who cant be invited to the party is Death Himself, as represented by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. The causal loop explanation of the nature of particles suggests that all particles could indeed be replicators, and we could well imagine replication mistakes over time as well as different particles representing opportunities or threats to each other in different ways, so the suggestion may ultimately not be so farfetched that some or even all of what we perceive as solid particles are in fact little agent systems with sensors, motors and controllers, trying to survive in a hostile universe but steadily having their behaviors honed towards local and global optima in a world where cooperators ultimately fare better. As they do so, at least in the information theoretical model we have derived in this paper, we note that whereas we have for more than a hundred years assumed that Darwinism and game theory constrained all living things to a lonely, ultimately selfish existence we can now clearly see the information theoretical and thus mathematical rational for why friends are more efficient than enemies. It thus becomes the final conclusion from the analysis presented in this paper that the universe would seem on information theoretical grounds to be a place that trends towards a happy ending

one where we should eventually be able to all get along as those who dont will be ultimately doomed to perish from influence over the available mass and energy (regardless of any seemingly beneficial temporary imbalance) until they too learn how to cooperate. Mats Helander, 2011-11-10