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FROM: Controlling DoD Organization: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.

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31 May 1979 per Group-4 document marking; Adjutant General's Office [Army] ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN RIEPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (27 Apr 67) FOR OT SUBJECT:

3 May 1967

Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Operation Farragut Conducted by Ist Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

TO:

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1.

Forwarded as inclcsure is a Combat After Action R~ort for

00 po

Operation Farragut. Operation Farragut was conducted by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division during the. period 26 January through 23 March 1967. Information contained in this report is provided to insure
appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material. BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

1 Incl .FMajor

KENNETH G. WICKHAM General, USA The Adjutant General

oimanding General
, ' US Army Combat Development Conmmand

-Coimandants
0
-

US Army Command and General Staff College US Army War College US Army Air Defense School

US Army Artillery and Missile School

US Army Armor School US Army Chemical Corps School

REMASDI

UNCLA8837IB l

D FROM WE= 8IPARI[ CLA03FIED INCL4OUIS

US Army Fngineer School US Army Military Police School

US US US US US US US U Army Army Army Army Army Army Army Infantry School Intelligence School Medical Field Service School Ordnance School Quartermaster School Security Agency School Transportation School

I' AR0 968

.

-i

UI
0

US Army Signal School

US Army Special Warfare School

s R

US Army Civil Affairs School

4,
-3

'~~~I

j( 8e

page 2 for Copies furnished)

G"xo27

CONFIDENTIAL
4

CONFIDENTIAL
Copies furnished: Office, Secretary of Defense, ATTN: OSD (SA), Southeast Asia Forces Office, Chief of Staff, US Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development Research Analysis Corporation Security Officer Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, ATTN: Joint Actions Control Office

I:

CONFIDENTIAL

tL

CONFIDENTIAL COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT

VOPERATION

FARRAGUT Ist BRIGADE 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION

DIPLOMATS WARRIORS

COINIIDENTIAL
Incl I

-i~

--

CONFIDENJTIAL
UWART4T OF'E ARMY HEAUARTMS IST HIOADE 101ST A-RB0R1M DIVISION APn 96347 AVBD-C SUBJWET Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAUT (MkCV/ RCS/J3/32)

TRUt

,.APO
TOs TO"US
!

Oommanding General I Field Force Vietnam 96350

Commanding General litary Assistance

ATT., J343
PO 96222

Comands Vietnam

1. (U) Name of Operation

Operation FAMAOT.

2. (u) Dates of Operations 260800H January 1967 through 23 March 1967. (Phse Is 26 January F7-16 February; Phase I:t 17-28 February 67; Phase Il 1-8 March 671 Phan. IV: 9-23 March 67). 3. (U) locations 4. (U) MW TH1AN, NIM THN and LAM DONG Provinces. let Brigade, 101st AirbrrA Division.

owmaM Headquarters

5. (U) ReiprtingOfficer: Brigadier General S. H. Matheson, Commanding General, let Briga, llat Airborne Division. 6. (C) Task Organization: a. The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation FARRLhT was as shown below. 1-327 Inf Bgr LZ Clearing Th mda 2r327 Inf 1 plat, "/326Engr 2-502 Isf I plat A2-17 Ca (retaned to parent unit control Do-2) We Troops Ed (-) A2-17 Car (-) A/326 En ( U P lat MP Flat 42 Inf Flat, Set Dog 20th Chem Dot 181 MI Dot B-i, 24th PsyOp Oo 1-101 Avn See TACP 406 RD

L-30 Arty b. Me task organization was changed dw-LM operations against the LZ BONO P11R0Secret Base by the addition of two CTDO Omanies (LUONG -0 3? Cow) in direct support; one company with the 2-327 Inf and two platoons eah in direct support of 1-327 Inf and 2-502 Inf; The 1,th Troop, 8th Cavlry (ARD) operated in direct eupport of the Brigade during the last three phasee of Operation FARRAGUT. GROUP 4 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEARS INTERVALS DELASSIFID Ar 32 Yr"

CONFIDENTIAL

lao].]I

WH]DELJL-.4 IAL
AVDD-C
SUBJEaT: Comnat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAaUT (MACV/

RCS/J3/32)
7. (C) Supporting forcest a. b, 2/320 Arty: EMployed in a direct suprort role. Provided general support reinforcing fires.

M/30

Artys

c. 10th Aviation Battalion: Provided two airmobile companies in general support. These helicopters flew troop lift, combat support and resupply missions. The 10th Aviation Battalion was augmnted with one additional airmobile company during Brigade airmebile assaults on 17 February and 9 March. Provided d. 179th and 180th Assault Support Helicopter Compayiw four flyable CH-47 aircraft on a mission support basis for use in displacing and resupplying artillery unite. e. 183d Aviation Company. Provided four 0-1 aircraft for visual reconnaissance, artillery adjustment, and radio relay. f. 5th Air Commando Squadron: War operations. Provided airliit support for Pay

g. 245th Pay Ops Co: Frovided one loudspeaker and leaflet dissemination team in direct support. h. 7th USAF: Flew 52 tactical fighter missions totaling 125 sorties. Fifty of these sorties were immediate requests which were processed through the Air Force Tactical Air Request Net with an average reaction time of 25 minutes. In addition, 15 Combat Sky Spot rissions (30 sorties), 6 flareship (AC-47) sorties, 78 reconnaissance sorties, 102 Psychological Warfare sorties and 189 transport sorties were flown in support of the Brigade. Eighteen B-52 sorties were flown in support of the Brigade. FAC's flow 322 sorties in forwad air control, artillery adjustment and visual reconnaissance missions. i. J. 35th Engineer Group: 54th Signal BattalionProvided general engineer support. Provided general support.

k. 498th Med Det: Provided responsive, rapid, evacuation support to the Brigade throughout the opnration. 1. Det A-237, 5th SF Group and LUONG SON CIDO Camp: Provided two CIDO companies in direct support of Brigade operations in the LE HONG PRONO Secret Base area. a. 46th RF Company (HOA DA): Operated in direct support of the Brigade by securing lst Dog CmdFSP vicinity S NO NAO. n, Zth Troop, 8th Car (ARVN): Operated in direct support of the Brigade by providing convoy escort and security along National Route 1 between FRAN TE? and PRAO RANG. o. 2d Battalion, With Infantry (ARW): Operated in close mutual coordination and cooperation with the Brigade in operations .against cecret Base 7 ad Secret Base 35. 8. (U) Intellizence: See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) Missions Readquarters, I Field Force Vietnam directed the ist Brigade, lOlst-Efrirn Division to move from vicinity KOWTRM on 21 January 1967 to base camp vicinity PHAN RANG and, on 26 January to initiate operations to search out and destroy enemy units and installations in the FARRAOUT A0 with priority to Secret Bases 7 and 35 in that order. Shortly after the
2

CONFIDEN TIAL
la-d 1

CONFIDENTILNL
SU ECrt O0Crbat Opera '.one After Action Reports Lperation FARRAGUT (MACV/ initiation of the operations the Brigade (_4r was withdrawn from Operation FARRAGUT and conducted Operations GATLINO I & II. Upon completion of 0ATLPM 11 on 15 February 1967 the FARRADUT AO was extended and the Brigade'a mission modified to include the conduct of search and destroy operations in areas adacent to National Route 1 between PHAN TR.IEr and PHAN RANG, Inclosure 2, Operations Schematics. 10. (c) co of Oprations Operation FAPRAOY2 consisted of search and destroy operatins conducted = four distinct phases. February 1967.

FARRAGUT was oriented into Secret Base 7 during the period 26 January - 16 P

Phase I of Operation

L502d

f
Cblocked

t2d

127th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults on 27 January to exploit a B-52 strike in Secret Base 7. lot Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile assaulta to the north of the B-52 strike zone and conducted search and destr " operations to the south, while 2d Battalion (Airborne)9 502d Infantry aved overland and conducted search and destroy operations north into Secret Base 7. Following the departure of the Brigade minus on 30 and 31 January for Operation OATLINO, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry continued search and destroy operations in and adjacent to Secret Base 7 through 16 February. During the period 17-28 February, *Phase I of Operation FAtRAG T was conducted in the LE HONO PHONG Secret Base, lst Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted thorough 'search and destroy operations in exploitation of a B-52 Strike while 2d Battalion ( AirbornsX 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry minus to the NE and SW respectively. During the later stages of Phase II, Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations to the north, attempting to drive the ery against blocking positions manned by elements of lst Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry. Phase III of Operation FARRAGUT (1-8 March 67) was characterized by Brigade minus search and destroy operations against suspected enemy locations north of SONO MAJO while 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry secured portions of Route 1 and conducted cordon and search operations against VC controlled villages and hamlets between PHAN RANG and SONG MAO. The final phase of Operation FARRAGPY was a three battalion search and destroy operation againat Socret Base 35. Two battalions. Ist Battalion (Airborne), 327th Tnfazitry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d :nfntry, conducted airmobi1e assaults from SONG MAOInto Secret Base 35 end conducted search and destroy operations to the south and wet. 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry moved overland along Rt ip conductet search anid destroy operations to t the west. east and blocked routes of agrees out of Secret Base 35 to

Infantry toward Secret Base 35 on 26 January, the 2d Battalion (Airborne),

Following a feint by elements of the 2d Battalion (Airborne),

31.

(C) Execution:

traids

a. Operation PARRAJT was characterized by wmall unit actions and sporadic contact with small enemy forces. The search and destroy tactics utilized consisted of saturation patrolling, night movement, night ambushes, and the use of small unit stay behind forces. The terrain over operations were conducted included maritainous junglev rolling hills, which sandy scrub forest, and flat, cultivated lowlands. b. Operation FARRAGUT was initiated seven day after the termination of Operation PICKETT in KONTUM Province, On 21 January 67, the Brigade began air and overland movement from KONTUM to PRAN RANG. The Brigade minus closed PHAN RANG on 22 January and on 26 January convoy eleemnte closed PRAN RANO after m-ving overland a distance of approximately hOO mileb. Operation FARAOU commnced at 2608o0 January 1967. a. Phase It Thu three maneuver battalions of the Brigade were located at the Brigade Base CaOW vicinity PHAN R'.NG. At 260900H January 1967, Task Force DOERTY, composed of C/2-502 InfW, 1 plat A/326 i:gr,

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... .. .... .... _ ... ... .. .. .

iCONH1DEN -IAL
AM'D-C
STJECTt Combat Operations After Action Reports Operation FARRAGUT (MACV/

RCS/J3/32) 1 plat L/2-17 Cav, and C Btry, 2-320 Arty, conducted a tactical road march to an area NW of Secret Base 35. This move was an attempt to deceive the enemy as to the Brigade's true objective, Secret Base 7, and surved to position forces for the Brigade assault on D+l. To further enhance the deception, 2d Battalion, 4Uth Regiment (ARVN) cormbneed operations SE of PAN RANG in direct support of the Brigade and during the period 26-27 January, a heavy artillery and naval gun fire preparation was placed in Secet Base 35. On 27 January 1967, following a B-52 strike, let Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults into the Secret Base 7 area to exploit the strike and destroy enorW forces and installations in zone. 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an overland move from PM RANG into the southern portion of the AO and cormenced search and destroy operations to the NW, (Inclosure 2, Tab A). Contact within the AG during the period 27-30 January was relatively light. On 28 January, in two brief contacts, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry produced 4 VC KIA (BC) and 3 individual weaons captured. Documents captured as a result of this encounter indicated that NVAforces were being used as fillers in local VC units. On 28 January, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry diecovered a large base area believed to have been the VC Province Headquarters. The area contained 20 huts, two hospitals, a mess hall (75-100 capacity); radio repair area, printing plant, and a large amount of food, livestock documents, and nedical supplies. On 30 January the 2d Battalion, 44th AVN Regiment terminated operations in direct support of the Brigade and resumed normal defensive posture from three locations south of FRAN RANG. On 30 and 31 January, let Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry extracted from the FARRATUT AD to PHAN RANG and prepared to initiate Operation GATING I in LAM DONG Province, while the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry continued Operation FARPtAGT. The movement of 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry from field locations to PHAN RANG deserves comment In that a heliborne extraction of one infantry battalion was accomplished during the hours of darkness. Seven separate PZ's were utilizedto extract 448 troops between 1847 hours and 2115 hours on 30 January 1967& At 311720H January 67, while conducting a tactical route reconnaissance south on Highway 1, Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th .Cavalry was engaged by mortar and small arms fire resulting in I US KIA, 4 US MIA, I h ton trk destroyed, 2 VC KIA (BC) and 2 SS's captured. During the period 1-8 February,the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry c ontinued Operation FARRAGUT, making light contact and discovering nuaerous caches and base carp areas. On 2 February 67, Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry, reinforced by a provisional platoon of Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion (Airborne), conducted an overland move into the AO and commasenced search and destroy operations under OPCON of 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry. On 7 and 8 February, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry discovered large caches of food, documents, and communications eouipment. On 7 February Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry terminated search and destroy operations and returned to PRA RANG. At 080700H February offensive operations in the FARRAGUT AO were terminated in observance of the TE truce period. Units assumed a defensive posture astride known or suspected enemy lines of comnmunications and conducted vigorous defensive reconnaissance patrolling in an attempt to minimize VC/NVA military exploitation of the TFr stand-down. During the TET stand-dwn period, which lasted through 120700H February 67, there were 2 VCA/VA initiated contacts in the FARRAGUT AO resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 1 US WIA, and 1 mauser captured. On 13 February, Task Force THUNDMEBALL consisting of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), .)27th Infantry; Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalr Battery B, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery; and 1 plat, Btry B, let Battalion, 30th Artillery, nonducted airmobile assaults and overland moves into selected LZ's and firing positions north of Route 1 and onmerced search and destroy operations south to eliminate VC/1VA domination of Route I between XAM MAI (BN6954) an. IFHA (W:551). The task force was supported b. elements of Company B, Ith Lngireer Lattalion which had the mission of repairing Route 1 to accomodate military convoys. On 16 February Task Force THNDERBALL

QC F-IE
i XlI 1

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~AVM-.C
SUBJECTi

CONFIDEN\ TtL
Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARLAGM (MACV/

RCS/J3/32)
terminated operations S of PHAN RANG and conducted a combined airmbile and overland move to SONG MAO (BN2645) and prepared for future operations in the

FARRAaUT AD, d. Phase Ilr The second phase of Operation FARRAGUT began on 17 February; two days after the termination of GLTLN1G II by the Brigade minus

and one day after Task Force THUNDERBALL moved to SONG MAO. On 17 February the Brigade initiated search and destroy operations in the western portion of the LE HONG PHONG Forest. Airmobile assaults were conducted by all

battalions at first light from PHAN THIET and SONG MAO to selected LZ's in

the AO and following a B-52 strike at 1000 hours, all elements initiated search and destroy operations and extensive patrolling to deny enemy egress

out of the area. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry with one DS CIDG Go blocked routes of withdrawal to the S3, while Ist Battalion (Air-

borne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry each with 2 DS CID platoons conducted search and destroy operations to the SE. 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry minus, supported by 1 DS ARVN Co and I DS RF compaiv, screened Wvof the Brigade's AO and the Brigade% origawdo cavalry troop coreened the road network north of the LE HOVO PHONG, (Inclosure 2, Tab B). The airmobile assault phase of the operation was conducted prior to and in conjunction with the B-52 strike. All elements of the blocking force and assault elements from let Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d

Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry were in position prior to the B-52 strike and the airmobile assault continued during the B-52 strike. Concurrsnt with the assault on the LE HONG PHONG, engineer elements supported

was charaoterized by .nmiroue, but lipht contact and frequent encounter with mines, booby traps, snipers and harassing fire. During this period the let
Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry discovered numerous base camps and fortified positions ranging in (Airborne), 502d Infantry terminated operations in the western portion of the LE HONG PHONG and extracted to SONG MAD and the 1st and 2d Battalions ('Arborne), 327th Infantry repositioned forces in order to conduct search

by 4th Troop, 8th ARVN Cavalry began repairs and r-op~ning of Route I from PHA THIET to SDNG MAD. The operation during the period 17-22 February

rterminated

size from 17-100 bunkers. On 22 February, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry minus, their screening mission SW of the Brigade AO. The 2d Battalion and destroy operations against the eastern portion of the LE HONG PHONG. On 23 February the Brigade began operations in the eastern portion of the
LE HONG PHONK -th the let Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and I DS CIDo company blocking routes of withdrawal to the N and Wand the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry with 1 CiO company DS conducting

search and destroy operations to the N. Contact during the period 23-2?

February consisted of harassing fire and unwmrous small unit engagements. Several large campsites and food caches were discovered and destroyed or evacuated. The anew continued attempts without success to interdict convey traffic on Route 1. On 24 February, in response to'a request for assistance from LAM DONG Province, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry and C Battery, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery conducted airmbile assaults from SONG MAO to selected LZ's west of DI LINH and began search and destroy operations to locate and destroy an estimated VC battalion which had ambushed local ARVN forces. On 25 February elements of 2d Battalion and 3 individual weapons captured. acting on intelligence received from the captured VC, one company conducted an airmobile assault to L'e SW of DI LINH to block enamy routes of withdrawal. The company contacted an estimated 2 company force just prior to dark resulting in 1 us KIA, 8 us WIA, 9 VC KIA (BC) and 5 individual weapons captured. The enemy broke contact at dark and TAC air and artillery were utilized throughout the night in an effort to block enemy routes of egress. On 27 February the Brigade terminated operations in the LE HONG PONG Forest and DI LIM are& and extracted to SONG MAO to conduct maintenance and prepare for future operations in the FARRAGUT AO.

(Airborne), 502d Infantry contacted 4 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC), I VOC

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBD-C SUBJEOTi

CONFIDEN -It4-L
Conbat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT (MACV/

rs/J3/32)

e. Phase III The third phase of Operation FARRAO was characterized bi the Brigade t s continued use of land LOC's, tho conduct of several cordon and earcn operations in the SONG IaO - TIll ?HONG area, and the conduct of search and destroy operations in the area north of SONG MAO. An FSP was established at SO'!G MAO by elements of the let Logistical Conmand and the Brigade provided security forthe beach unloading site vicinity HOI TAN (M3737). On I March, reacting to intelligence indicating from one to two VC companies wer occupying hamlets N of TUY PHONG, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, on two hours notice, executed an airmobile assault into LZ's vic. inity TUY TI!04 CHAN and TUY TINH VIET (BN4608). Elements of two companies, assisted by the Sector Reconnaissance and Surveillance Platoon and 2 PF companies, completed a cordon and search of the hamlets. Results of the operation were 6 VC KIA and 4 SA captured. The battalion was extracted to SONG MAO 2 March. On 3 March 67, the Lh5th RF compary ieplaced on Brigade elements securing th- beach unloading site vicinity HOI TAN. At 0305oOH Mar 67, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted a night airmobile raid under flare illumination to cordon and search the village of VIUH POA (BN5651). The village had been a center of V tax collection on Route I between PIHAN THIET and PHA1 rQ. The raid achieved complete surprise as evidenced by the effectivv sealing of the of the hamlet prior to detection by the local population. While no ez.erV contacts were made as a result of the operation, significant results were achievee in the fields of intelligence and civic action. As a direct result of this operation, the entire populace of VIIH HOA (over 500) elected to leave the hamlet and return to Tni control by relocating at TUY PHCWG. At 030730H March .7 the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d infantry conducted airmobile assaults into LZ's north of SD110 MAO and began search and destroy operations to the south and north respectively, (Inclosure 2, Tab C). No significant enemy contact was made and on 6 March both battalions were extracted to SONG MAO. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry continued to secure National Route 1 while Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry, supported by Lth Troop, 8th Cavalry (ARVN) provided convoy security and escort for logistic convoys between PHAN IAO SCNG MAO. and f. Phase I7: The fourth phase of Operation FARRAGUT was directed into Secret Base 35 and was initiated or, 8 March with the clandestine overland infiltration of four Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Teams into the NW portion of the objective area to conduct ambush and surveillance operations along enemy LOC's between Secret Base 7 and Secret Base 35. At 090700H March 67 the Brigade initiated search and destroy operations against Secret Base 35. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry executed an early morning airmobile raid with one company and the reconnaissance platoon to cordon and search the hanlet of SONG HAI (EN8262). National Police assisted in the search, segregation and screening of inhabitants upon completion of the cordon. The ist Battalion (Airborne), 327th Irfantry condUcted airmobile assaults from SONG MAO to four LZ's in the northern portion of Secret Base 35 and began search and destroy operations south on multiple axis. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry moved overland from TUY PHNN)G into the western portion of the objective area and conducted search and destroy operations to the cast with two companies. One company continued to secure National Route 1. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry minus conducted an airmobile assault into the southeast portion of Secret Base 35 and began search and destroy operations to the west. At 091200H March 67 elements of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry were relieved of their mission at SONG HAI by elements of the 2d Battalion, 44th Regiment (ARVN) which moved overland on Provincial Route h07, (Inclosure 2, Tab D). These elements rejoined the battalion minus in the AO and by 1305 hours the airmobile mnve was complete. On 10 March the Brigade Main Coumand Post and trains began mncvenent overland from SONG MAO to PH.AN RANG. Operations in the Secret Base 35 area were characterized by light and scattered contacts

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SON FIDE N-AL

AVBD-C SUBJC rof Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation FARRAGt7 (MACV/ RCS/J3/32) and attempts by the VC to harass traffic on Routes 1 and 407 through the use mines. On 13 March 17 the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry reinforced with one battery of artillery and one platoon of engineers terminated operations in Secret Base 35 and commenced overlani movement to TUY BOA. The battalion closed TUY HOA and became OPCON to Task Force IVY at 141601H March 67. On 13 March the 4th Troop, 8th Cavalry (ARVN), terminated operations in support of the Brigade. This umit was responsible for the Brigade's duccessful utilization of land LOC's during the final stages of Operaion FARRAOUT. VC contact was established by the Ist Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry on 13 and lh March in a series of caves in the northern portion of the AO and resulted in 9 VC KIA(BC) and 6 SA captured. On 15 March, the 2d Battalion (Airborno), 502d Infantry minus, conducted an airmobile and overland ,ove to an area just south of Secret Base 7 and began search and destroy operation*. One ompany of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry continuad operations in the NE portion of Secret Basc 35 until 18 March when it rejoined the battalion. On 16 March the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Lifantry a large campsite and contacted an estimated 6 VC resulting in I US WIA, 5 VC KIA (BC), I VCC and 4 Sk captured. The 2d Battalion, 44th Regiment (ARVN) terminated oparations north of Secret Base 35 in support of the Brigade on 16 March. During the conduct of operations in Secret Base 35, Troop A, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry, reinforced by the Brigade Security Platoon established and maintained TO's on Route I to Mnitor movement of civilian traffic and gather intelligence on VC tax collection efforts. The troop conducted daily road clearing and screening operations on Rcutes I and 407. On 22 March the let Battalion (Airborns), 327th Infantry terminated operations in Secret Base 35 and conducted an verland move to PIUSfRANG to begin preparation for future combat operations. At 221225H March F7 elements of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an airmobile raid against the deserted hamlet of VRIH HOA resulting in the capture of'2 ARVN deserters and h detainees. On 23 March the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry terminated operations in the FARRAOUT AO and conducted an airmobile and overland move to the Brigade base camp at PHA RANG. Operation FARRAGUT terminated 232400H March 1967. 12. (C) Results:

Kdiscovered

a. The let Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission of cond,cting search and destroy operations to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces in the FARRAGUT AO. b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the operations 115 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 10 VC/NVA KIA (EST), 2 NVAC, 18 VCC, I rallier, 139 detainees (28 classified civil defendants), 80 indi '.dual weapons, 80.4 tons of rice, 6.6 tons of corn 17 radios, 2 generators, and miscellaneous amunition, medical and adminitrative supplies. c. Friendly losses during the oDeration were: 15 US-KIA, 114 US ton trks, 1 M-60, 2 M-79 and WIA, 5 MY WIA (supporting forces); 3 M-151 I AN/HRC-25 destroyed, 1 2 ton trl damaged. 13. (U) Administrative Matters: a.
b.

A-W nistration.

Personnel and Administration:

Logistice, See Inclorire 4,

See Inclosure 3, Personnel and

Logistics.

~c.
, 14.

Civic Action,

See Inclosure 6, CivUl Affairs.

(C) =Special Equipment and Techniques,

a. The succesful execution of an illminated airmobile raid by one battalion minus, emphasizes the value of this tactic in achieving mm2rise as well as the desirability of all aviation units achieving this

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SUBJECTs

CONKIDEN :IAL
Combat Operationr After Action Repcrts Operation FAMAGUT (MOV/ RCS/J3/39) capability. In planning nMd executing the night airmobile assaults, Several techniques. were developed which are worthy of note. (1) The PZ was organized by 10th Aviation Battalion pathfinders who -placed lamps at each touchdown point. This facilitated both the movement of trocps a~d aircraft on thi. PZ. (2) The f-.rst flare was ign'ited on order of the mission comaends as the first flight was on short final into the LZ. Continuous illumination w&s then utilized to ficilitate the landing of aircraft, to assist ground troops in movement, aii to aid in the observation of the target area. The Jir corridor into the objective area was planned so (3) that critical azimuth changes were made above friendly installations on the ground. Fire arrws (fire pots placed in the shape of an arrow) ignited at these friendly poe tions assisted aircraft navigation. b. Repetiti.ve patrolling over the same area in varying patterns uncovered numerous c~ches an4 cmnp areas sometims only meters away from earlier dis coveries. e. During Operation FARRAOT air warning messages were broadcast by 2d Battalion (Ai:?borne), 320th Artillery utilizing an AiV Force surBroadcasting air warning messages in this vival kit radio, AN/0RC-lO. manner permitted pilots to continually monitor ground unit comand nets. d. The 24 Battalion (Airborne), 3^,h Artillery made extensive use of the organic coUnter-rortar radar, ANiMQ-4A, during Operation FARRAT. The radar was uti:.ized with varying degrees of success in computing mxrvey coordinates by: (1) Tracking a low charge, high angle round.

(2) Tracking a balloon floating above the point at which survey coordinates are desired. (3) Track.ng a beer can dropped from an H-l at which surveyed coordinates are desired. 15. (c) a. Commanders Analysis: Leosons Learneds to the point

(1) Inability to fire accurately at fleeting targets that appear in a hasty engagment continues, to be a sukject for continuous training.42) All individuals detained by the brigade should be evacuated through brigade chanels. Immediate release of detainees to GVN authorities often precludes the collection and dissemination of intelligence of .immediate tactical sigdfticance. (3) In lucrative areas, it is desirable to re-enter the area using varylng patterns in order to fully exloit or develop the situation. (4) Detailed arrangements must be made to insure ARVN and CIM troops operating in direct support of US troops are properly equipped and supplied to rema'n in the AO for the duration of an operation. (5) The conduct of illuminated airmobile orerations is tactically feasible and greatly enhances the brigade's capability to surprise the enemy. (6) Night airmebile operations require detailed planning and

CONFIDENTI AL

tt

*AVE-C C ombt Orations After Action Report, Operaton FAMRAOUT (MAVl S thorough reonlnaidsame.
(7) Civic Action activities, in addition to their oontribution to Revolutionary Development Prograis, provide an excelIent souroe of intelligence, b. Commanders Notes:

,ONFIDEHIAL_

(1) Operation FARRAOUT was characterized by extensive use of the available road network to position and resupply brigade mansuver elements. The Brigade plans to continue makizg maxiu use of land LOC's mhenever feible, *duriog (2) The hth Troop, 8th Cavalry (AR ) supported the Brigade to WNG MAO, during operations in the overland movw from PHN THI KAO area, and during the-overland mowve from 3ONG MAO to PHAN RANG. 0N the The troop displayed agressivenoss, initiative, and a high degree of profeesional coupetence, and contributed materiall to the brigade's sucesful utilization of land 10's. (3) The comand relationship between the Brigade and U3SS/CIDO units in the FARRAGUT AD was not clearly defined at the initiation of operations. This situation led to misunderstanding, created problems in coordination of efforts, and prohibited -xms utilization of all available resouroes. This problem has since been resolved. o. Reomndationst

(1) That during the assault phase of operations requiring exploitation of B-52 strikes or when a tactical advantage can be gained by placing ma.mz* troops on the ground as rapidly as possible, the Brigade's normal aviation support of two light aimbile oopaiee be supplemented by at least one additional light airmbile compro. (2) That su-rival type mirrors and strobe lights (Light Marker, Distress) be issued to units in quantity for we in signallin aircraft and

mar"

nW

.o

9 Inclosures

1-Intelligence
2-Operation Schematics 3-?ezonl and Adminsdtration

iiundiar Genral, MA
OsmWandng

H.

ATH3SC

4-L~itioa
5-Comimictione 6-Mvil Affairs

7-fuy War

s DISTROMOI 1 - Assistant hWaf of Staff for' Pbres Dveloqm t, Dept of the Arew, Wahngton, VC 20310

3 - CO,
5
-

XAC7 (ATT, MAC

J3h3)
t Cwlbsen, K'

MACJ2) 1-O, MACT(AT 2 - DO, USART I - 00, USARV (ATYM, AVC Hstorical Division) 2 - co, 101st

coo I FRET

n Div,

nma]OL DIIWTICNI
10 -83

0 (1 per staff section)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
bUMpr 1. (U~taleoega) to Combat Operations AfterW loti pt9, Opsetion 7LAM60 1. (C) Torzli. Tho aa of operation onasisted of flat lowland usad for cultivation eandy bordering on the south hinm Sea; sandy scrub forests of the LZ MOND PWIIO and rugged forested sauv~ains In the toe speee wingnortiern ana western portions or the am or oatil1 itation in the lowlan along Mw #1i xrid*d good obsertion and fields but poow cover and, concealment. In the us wisins, the heavy of fire, and fields forest raffaodd good cover and conocealet, but paobqervallnt Tb. tkydrog_ of fire. The main aveuls of aproab ws alog Rwy11 (M). raft of the aea had no effect on -ilitory operations. 2. (U) Ytb: The period of the operation fell Into the drr seeson for NS.i Thian and Di laThu Provinces. Rain scured on an average of lops than one dAW a nonth vith no effect on air or ground operations. Winds wore slightly in eoes of predicted speeds, but there were no " that were anfavor ble for lowlevv flyig. The lack of min during this period creates a drastic shortage of water v1h remlto in a major resuppl proble. Genrally, the veather is *=e*lert for the conduct of miltI-7 operations 3.(C) InILWA.i~A

a. T entr oe~rat was conducted against losal VCforces and throub sarobof he rearesulted In no significant contact. else on forces, Light, scattered oontacts, involving no -are than squad ade frequent use of mines occured almost on a daily basis. Te eam and booby traps along road# and trail. in the 0, and eaploysd @vipers to slow doen and barlass friendly forces. b. In 89 7, tbe 1 Provincal a6quarters (2401), ad 274th I. Compc sustained suofient casualties to dLsrupt r'.d waken the en 's influence and control over people. The ammy as in this eisa were found 4estroyedi large quntities of documenta, training m-tarialo, medical srpplies, radio parts, and aisosllanous equipment wire eaptured. c. In S3 35 the 270th LWCampaW was aontacted and Its base ox destroyed. Te 6C D strtot Headquarters and a sall PW cap was also found and destroyed. the VCoperating in SBhas bean, and will continue has to be strongbold for The h3alet of Son Eci 35. Tbo 270t LY G~az, boon intgrte vt YVA up to 50 po~ove .. 'r s NVrA so1lers came Int in infltration groups and wre used to bolster local foe ompanies In Kinh ?basn Province. T his is the first re.rted incide.t of M. being integrated l.. local V unite. d. VCtax collection points between Phah Hang and fan Thiet wre frequently disrupted t souise ralds. Several tag eoleotors wae appee . .L thoC dTbo I'rav oae W theu b o Contact m har facg al othe oilhoan paalo l tdto pgoenis foe ind the area r of ant iseable be du the weri tod o opttec inea s h of e

t a. The Llo 9n 7ores t has in t e asti bor ua aMa .~a far battalion aim* units. The tcra% ont an a oqq lszl of small o~mpe oamploto with ammoneation bwfer&and tr-enches, .nd trln are". theony watr supl bein a fev loa ve*116 Yor 'tM eason#t to doe.n+ful tbas lag Pow units An1 be fo d in thi am dut te 67 seaons. S. The e a"e losin conol of the or~an-populationtboghu

Thus =%l, .Ti fact is susatiated br the ,,tlo-Aant Lacr.sse tA the period of US operation in the a.u the miabor of Ra 0czh's dui

ODURMD AT 3 MR MVMWhLS

CONFIDENTIAL

I,

Inolosure I (intelligence) to Cambat Operatlons After Action Report, Operation FAMCUT Ccont'd) (1) 8,204 trcasmissions were .- onitored on the FM nets durne the period 29 Jan - 23 Mar 1967. (2) 226 tr-namiusions t1rough the "Strike" switchboard were monitored dtring the period 28 Jan - 23 Mar 1967. (3) Communlations security during all phases of the o',rations was quite good with only ona transmission security violation being r ad and reported. This violation was the disclosure of classified 11ane and operations.

CONF: D- NTIAL

a. Red Haze: It has become apparent that during the dry season when the local inhabitants are burning their fields, the effectiveness of Red Hase is further decreased. Rather than attaching Importance to large sitings which are indicative of brush fires, the small sitings of less than ten fires are of greater significance. ALU reported fires must be chocked by visual reconnaissance. b. Photography: Aerial photograp'y was re-dily avail-ble -nd trail, LZ and DZ studies prepared of those areas whieh covered in the originul plonlng. However, when the Brigade began moving out of preplanned area, aerial photographic sunport was not able to keep up. xperience shows that it req'Jires a lead time of approximately seven days to obtain the photography, and the intelligence derived fro. the photography, for any sizable area. The problem seems to be the availability of Air Force photoes airoraft. F ture plaws call for an aerial Surveillance and Target con Acquisition flatoon, with Mohawk aircraft, to be stationod out of MA Trang under IFV control, The avail bility of this unit should alleviate the problem by reducing time following submission of requests. c. Z: It should be re-amphasized that due to the coplicated classification systa of det-inees, the low intellignoce level of detainees, and 1-rge areas of operations, all possible capture data aho: ld be placed on capture tags to nclud coordinates of cnture, date-time group, unit of capture, circumstances surrounding c3pture, and a description of all ,eafnk and documents captured with the individual. d. Al individw-ls detaiued by the brigade should be evacuated through channels. The recent experience of evacuation detainees througb local channels points out that local Vietnamese do not use the samo clamw sification syatem as we do, do not have the sane intelligence interests, and do not have a systam for the expeditious diseination of tactical infornation. It is also ncessary that In operations vith the Vietnamese a great deal of specific coordination is necessary. It must be determined beforehand where detainees are to be kept and interrogated, where piekup points, screening points, and LZ's are to be located; and exactly what physical sets are to be follood by all detaifd personnel. e. The VC have a defirite radio monitoring capability and have, on several occasions, attempted to enter ou PH Dets. Tlhb makes it mnndat.ry for radio operators to be familiar with the use of authenication tables and be able to challenge suspect stations. f. When entering a new operational area, all possible intelligence agenciea must be screened for Information, and personnel who are familiar with the AC, In the past, sources of InformIton (PW's, Hoi Cbanl's) have not cone to light until the operation had started. Although these sources were available and could have provided Invaluable information prior to the conenciment dr the operation. g. When operating against local force VC, the longer a unit remains in the area the better the chances are of finding the en. Although searoh must be made to detect hiding places, cache, and base areas. Rventually the VC will leave their hiding places to gain food and water, or due to general restlessness.

C r -,IFIDENTIAL

Inolosure 1 (Intelligence) to Canbat Operations After Action Report, Operation F.LGAOUT (cont'd) b. Intelligon.e leads must be reacted on immediately to obtain the beat result vhen fightir guerrillt.-. Delays in reacting to intelligence will find the oneV gone from the area and the target no longer lucrative. It must be anticipated that many reports and sightings of enae activity will not pen out; however, sone are bound to bring results. i. Dring the dry soason the ene= will not occupy the highest griand, but will move his camps to Iace more accessible to ! water supply. Ambushes can be very aucceasftal in and around potential sources of ater. 5. (U) 7ho following is a breakout of the en losses during Operation FARRAGUT, weapons and material

CONRDENTILL

a.

Weapons Captured:
Mauser Rifle M4-1Carbine SIS 17 23 2

US Shotgun

.45 Cal Pistol

2
2 6 3 3 3

Springfield .30-06 Thompson SM 6Cot Naant ?PSH French SM M.-I Rifle

M AL So

Cleynore, ED 10
Clymore, HD 3 4P Mines M-79 Rounds Hand Grenades

2
2 B ? 51

Blasting Cape
c. Otor: Transistor Radios Volt Meter 0h Meter adito/Roeiver

10

15 1 I 1

CM Key2 TM-? Ceaerator 1 1 3/4 H.P. Generator 1 FRC-10 Han Set I

Sewin Machines
Microscope

Miuograph Machine 1 Ty-pewriters 6 7ypevriter Ribbon 395

Tab At

Order of Battle

1-3

C.ON-IHD E NTIIA

'I

Tab A (
1.

o of lattle) to Inoloture I, (bn*mlipsaos) te raoot tworationo

() a. V0 NVA Initial Order of Battle NVAUnits

CONFIDE N IAL

(1) At the beginning of Operation FA"LI.W T the 324th Cog ?24th NVABn (possibly of the 9th Hr7NVA Div) vas believed to be located in NKih Thuan Province. Nnarus reports indicated its location as in vicltity of Rn 6274, operating close to SSBhT BASS 7 (Bn 5574). One report Indicated its operational area as being in the northern position of rinh Thuan Province and probably using SECRET BASE 22 (RP 80 6) as its oenter of activity. Its mission was believed to include preparation for eid conduct of amortar assault on the Phan Pang Air Force Base amnlex in early 67. (2) No other NVAunite were believed to be located within the area of operation. Soe of the local VC units (specifioally the 270th VC XI C) was believed to have an undetermined amount of NVApersonnel as cadre. b. V Units

N(I) Thuman nh Provinae

(a) The following VCIF units were confirmed as operating in the Ninh Uhan Province area with the most recent center of oreration. as indicated:

270th VCL Co 112 VLF Co 14m*1trt

X415th Co
X420th Co Z425th Co

7568 BN 8167 3 557

M 9785
BN 9785 fl 6374

X43OhCo0 Z435th Co 14-40th Co

X415th Co

EK " 81979 Dli4884

EN "808

(b) The following VCLXunit. were belivad to be located in the Ninh Thuan Provinoe area with operational areas undertoldDed

SC274 VC

Co

hC285 VCLI Co
(c) Sucret Base Areas were believed to be established in the following vicinities with the most protracted activitic reported in Secret Base 7 aM 35:

7 19

574 9 792

22 25

3
(2) Binh 7ruan Province (a)

BN SOD6 BN 4M4 EX 7559

The following VCIF units were believd to be operating

1-A-i

CONFIDENTIAL

--

CONAiDENTIAL
Tab A (Order of Rattle) to Inclosure I (Ttallirenceo Aftep Acit oneRorte. Oceration PARRkGUT (cont-d) to Combet e57tiond in Binh Thuan Province with possible locations indicated as foilovus

840 VC En
602 489 490 430 VC BP VC 00 VC Co VCo

Unlocated
AN 7305 E 0221 91 1420 AN 7427

440 450 460 48W

VC Go VC Co VCCo VC Co

N 1530 AN9314 Unlocated finlocated

Unlocated

481 VC Cn

(b) A VC Mobile force Bn, identification unknown, was reported numerous times c -rating in the vicinity of AN 9421. The unit wes reported to have a strength of 600 to 700 personnel and an assortent of weapons to include 60=i Mortars. 2. (C) a. Order of Battle Findings and Sumary in the Operatic Nimh Thuan Province Area.

(1) In late Jan 67 elements of the Brigade searched and destroyed the area described as Secret Dae 7, Only small, isolated contact was made and as a result an insignificant amount of intelligence was gathered. The presence of small installations and facilities as well an agricultural and built up areas confirmed the assumption that the enes (most probably Provincial VC Hq) extensively used the area as a staging area It was not established that contact with Rest Area, and control center. the enmy units listed in lb (1) (a) and (b) was made; however, the VC A were most probably members of the 1401 VC Provincial Rqs and/or its subordinate units. As a result of captured material, which inoluded typewriters a reproduction machine, printed propaganda leaflets, directives, routers, etc., it -was established that the X401 Provincial Hqs was located and operating within the imediate vicinity of BN 5574. (2) The deployment of elements of the brigade In SB 35 (ON 7559) on 9 March 67 initially did not produce a significant amount of contact. The search and screening of Son rai (EV 8362) resulted in approxbmately 30 detainees, believed to be local VC infrastructure, which establishes the fact that the hamlet was controlled by VC unite in SB 35. During the search mission, contact with these elements was extremely light indicating that the enemy was successfully conducting concealment and escape and evaaion tactics. The possibility of erfiltration into SB 7 (EN 5574), however, appeared remote in light friendly deployment of troops in the operational area west of Ey #1. The discovery of numerous small base camps, some fortification, individuals with various caches, and well used trails indicated that SB 35 was extensivaly used by small VC forces. b. Binh Thuan Province

The Brigade deployment into inh huan Pxvino. produced an insignificant amount of intal.genoo primarily due to lack of contact with eneW combat forces. All available evidence pointed to a possible en exfiltration from the operational Area approximately 72 hours prior to friendly insertion. 0. Conclusion

(1) The enemy forces in Binh Thuan Province, particularl7 the 8.Dth VLF Co and the 490th VCLF Cc, appear to have" been well trained and organized as evidenced by their successful conduction of concealment and escape and evasion tactics in the area of operation during Feb 67.

I-A-2

L\'IL CONFiDEp/" ,L

CO O
Tab At((rder df "MUt) o

DF-ID L_ TV
e1.0~ah~a~ oCma~rtoa~

The 840th VCLF Dn rc..ains in the northern portion of Binh Tbuan Province and can be expected to conduct haresment type operations along Hwy #1 in the ?uy Phong Area (BN 5342) in the coming months. The 490th VCLF Cc also remains in the Tuy Phong Ara operating as a stable but fleable VC local Force and will continue to Interdict Huy #1 in Vinh Hoa Village Vith tax collections, terroism and propaganda. (2) Te Ninh Thuan Provincial Forces remain intact and operational vithin the Province. SE 22, 19 and 25 have been undisturbed by friendly forces. The search and destroy operations in SD 7 and SB 35 have probably preempted the NVA/VC plans to appear, prepare for, and conduct a nortar attack on Phan Rang AFD complex. The 274th and 113th VCLF Co's rcrain operational in SB 7 area. Due to the destruction of certain instalationes/facilitee and the discovery and confiscation of a great amount of ensi materials In SD 7, the 141 VC Prov Kqs will have to recuperate and reorganize before they can reach maindoperational efficiency. The 270th VCLF Co and the 112th VCLP Co appear to hae exftiated Sr 35 but nrobtb y 'eft smail scattered groups concealed within the -rea. Son thi Ramlet (N A362) remaine.under VC control. "ith thA exoertion of the NV, persomel assigned to the VCT2 uits, there are no WV, in the southern portion of of NIM Thuan Province.

I
!

|I

IN
(ON

1ID /NT1IL

I
i

~1QOQi,

&~ioc~ ~~6ct.

9-

71

I
-4'7

I
t

i I I
I

I
0 -o

II

I
L

____ _____ -~

lip~C

Pee

Z-uc I&o

kl

La

'-4
7~3

4
P

r~c~ -n

As

I
i

I ji

2 C.
-A'
~-

2~ Tae ~

I-a
Ik_ L._ L '", CL
"7

nfIJ)

I I,
T

I
L

I I
I I

SaUGM&~

CONHDENTIAL
Lnlcsure 3 (Personnel and A tnietratio to Combat O~eration3 After Actief

Repot, OparationFR

RZU

a.

Begining of Operation F-aRAGUT. (1) The Brigade personnel atrengths Authorized Augmented (XI) Proent fa r ODuty PARRAJJ Ao

hRRAGUT were as follows49 Aeigned

at the begi-ming of Operatan

343 4534

4876

Vb.

1773 42 The assigned strength was 108% of the augmented authorized strength, The Present fr duty strength %a 101A of the augent, authorigs. stregt.. (3) Of the not Present for duty strength; 6 were hospitalized 10 were itransit, 128 wre an TU/3D status, 76 an leave, 19 in conf wnt, i AWOL. Conclusion at Operation FMAGU. ('2) (1) The Brade personnel strengths at the oluaon PeAGRoT were as folloa eAuthorized Augmented A ined Ptesent for fu. Le( e) to

Bass - Phan Rang Loc (I Feb - 15 Feb 67)) Not C.TLIG AO (vieoa Present for Duty

3443

f Operata

4490 509 08

TV 1r AO 7 Not Preent for DuC e (2) 28 The assigned strengrth .As W); o the augmnted authorijad snt The Pr'esent for duty strwe~th was 109% of the Au~pwnted authorizd strength. 0) Of Vhe not Waesent for duty strength; 13 mom hospitalized, 1.1 were intransit, 34. wee on MY//D status, 10/+ on leave, 19 in coofensmnt and 4 AWOL (4) Th. 46th AM Postal Unit, attaohad to the Briade, reasned 9 personnal preset for duty of 11 authorized throughout the operation. at *This figure includes the Brigade Headquarters and the logistical ments of the units that we participating ee in Operation FAMAMT but we providin their normal suppr-t, in this partic-lar caLse tam the Base aw enitdmn assigned of 1 offcer Ad 4 to Heaquarter# and Headqu-tara Cupaw enlisted man authetized wnm attached lot Brigade, 101st Aiborne DiImAI dung this opation a. Relacemante received during the ope~raticin wre assigned to subordinate Units as follows:

h.

2/ Z

0 o7

75
153 171

227 4 2/502 2 2.L (C) CASUALS,

2/32D
Spt Bn Separate Comanies

5
2 2

?1
121 142

CONFDE NIAL

a.

CaSuatieS for the oer

CONFIDENTIAL
t were a folowas

T 2/3 Z7 2/502 7th 2/30 av 326th Bde MC, SW

TOTAL b. Total casualties to data:

IA 6 2
2

2 .9.
25

2 3 3 2e 6 .6
114

372 a.

17

duing the operation. b, Bear, soa 8ad Iitd sensitive iteMs wre provided to the units in the farird Area during the opratim.

The Red Cross ReareaticgI Unit oont~ nd its visits to forrd units

a. During te opeatiAn, continued .hatia M s placed on Acura P--eoel rectds by 4-ffordfng of Personnel the opPcrt Aty to personally review their Military

201 Files.

b. Classes on AdmAnistratian and postal operatce during the operatin.

beld for all unte

5. (c)

L
treated:

a. Patite

(Ij (2) (3) (4)

(5)

WIA won Hostile Injury Diaseae Returne

Evacuat

114 225 643

to Duty
to Hospital

310
562

(6)
(7) b.

Resinn in Holding
Total Potiont Treated

10

-V eMUtaljn

Personnel oategorized by wmurWU

(2) (2)

Jeld Chest 5

(3) Abda,
i(4) U.mwz ,Utamties 2 11 U12 3.2

()Lower acrzte

CONFIDE.NTi, 1

CONFIDENT 1AL
1nartles~e A~ (Lor~etigs) to Atfar Action !&wrt, Operation PUW 1. (C) OFC1A a. Ceneral W&...W 4W IgO

I.

Operation FARRAGUT was noteworthy for the extensive road Cnnvcy activity, in comparison with other recent operations. Major convoy eff. rts occured from Phan Rang to Sors Mao, Phan Thiet to Song Mao, and Sor.g Yo to Phan Rang. In addition tiallor convoys operated between Phan T2.Jt rd Luang Son almost daily while the irigade headquarters was at Ph-' t , .1. A number of deficiencies in ewrroy operation became apparent, The' ir-iuded failure to maintain prescribed vehicle interval, speeding, &-J failure to report crossing of check points. The operation differed also in that it was logistically supported, in large measure, direct from Phan Rang base camp. During the initial and f na stages of the operation, the Forwrd Support Elemen ( l..rtvated and its functions were aseused by the Support Bttllioi,. l.".: ,,n feasible due to the. proxitiy of the base camp and the are3 of optrLtions, During such periods, some difficulty was experienced in the duplication of logistical requiremnts. 1tat is requiremente for the same itm wwe placed upon logistical personnel from several sources. ThiU sometimos resulted in confusion and duplicated issues. b. Support ad an FSE consisting Battalion. D, 326th Meidical Support Battalion establishof Cowpary hen neccesary, Battalion, arid admiastrative, maintenance, control elements.

from successive locations at Phan Thict and Song M~o.

ammunition, supply, transportation, and comm. nd and The FSE provided re nsivc support to committed unitr

A.For-ward ,Supply

Point (FSP) was opened for a short time at Luong Son due to the relatively large size of the area of operations. c. Oupporting Forces:

(1) USASC, C Ranh Bay provided overall logistical support. It also established separato forward support areas (FSA at Phan Thiet and Song Mao. These installations provided the Brigade with the Bulk of Class I, III, liA, and V supplies and were co-located with the FSE. (2) Phan Rang Sub Area Command, USASC, Cam Ranh Bay provided transportation assests. Of particular importance the 329th Transportation Company (Lt Trk) provided the bulk of transportation required to excute major convoys, (3) lOth Combat Aviation Battalion helicopters provided logistical as well as tactical support. (4) USAF 07A C-130, nnd C-123 aircraft transported most oT the Brig de routine resupply of Class II and IV equipment from Phan Rang base camp. 2. S&RVICES. (C) J4AVIRIhL n&NV a. rupply.

(1) Class I supplies were received in sufficient quantity, and no major shortages were experienced. Some difficulty was initially encountered.with resupply of ice and ice cream. However, the proxtmity of Phan Rang made it possible to fly in ice and ice crepe on a daily basis aboard C7A aircraft. A total of 330.2 short tons of Class I were issued, (2) Class II and IV supplice continued to be flown directly to the torward area aboard USAF fixed wing aircraft. A total of 142.2 short tongs of Class I and IV supplies wre issued during the operation.

4-1

CONF IDE NT IAL

CONFIDENTIAL
Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Aftcr Action Report, Operatlon FARM(.JT (3) Class III. The large extent of road sonvoy activity inflated consumption of mO'J.S end DF2 fuel to a level above the average for previous operations. The Brigades organic and attached vehicles coneused 526,2 short tons of Clas!s III products throughout Operation FRRAGU .

(4)

Class V. Although no major engageents occured during

the operation, ammunition issue accounted for 559.8 short tons. This ent're eount was not expended, and Brigade units completed the operatic, with full basic loads. (5) Water.

The resupply of water provided eace difficulty while the Origade was located in the ?han Thiet area. The dry season prevented units from utilizing the many intermittent streams in the area of operations. As a result water came primarily from a small rusber of central sources. The plactic, 3 gallon capacity, free drop container again

proved its worth.

ceptence Ad ue, stocks are limited, Consequently every effort must be made to recover and re-use these containers.

Although this item has attained a high degree of as-

b. Maintenance. The following maintenance problems presented the greatest degree of difficultv during the operation:

(1) The H-138/U handset continues as a so~u.. of difficulty in signal maintenance. Pending issue of an improved rer'.acement item,
field expedient measure and frequent replacement provided the only solutions.

(2) Vehicle engines, particularly for the 3/4 ton truck, failed at an increasing rate. This was due to excessive heating and advanced engine life. (3) Generators experienced a high rate of failure due to the exessive heat, humidity and breakdowns in viocosity of the oil used. A lubrication.
runmIng limit of 15 hours was established in order to insure adecouate

(4) Strear sembers uner the rear 2 _ ton truck cab and vehicle bad begsa to' fail- This dam be attributed to constant operation over poor roads while carrying heavy loads. (5) Starlight scopep are failing at an increasing rate. The primary difficulties are caused by the damage to iobs and rubber covers. Each scope must be evacuated to Sacramento for repair at an estimated cost of approx:imaty $2500.00. corrosion. (6) Small arms revwaled signs of extensive weer and same This is natural since these weapons have been in almost (7) Lack of repair parts for signal and engineer equipment Primary examples included handset

constant use.

created unrecessary deadline periods. cables and genr.ator engines.

(8) The fUllowing is a suzmary of maintenance activities and job orders during the operation:

Aurtosotiw

Amment signal Engineer

102 87

240 5C6 65 4-2

93 82

9 5

5 1405 47 101 18

Int rument

.,

~~C

qR,"tI)D NT"la
CCNFDET.A

Ii

ICONFIDENTIAL
to After Action Fport, Operation FA1MGJT Other Services, (1) Crayea Regstration, quartermaster and bath aer'vcee were provided in the SA personnel and equipnt drawn*fyg eupport at Phan Tit Sa U. SC, C_ R Bay. Awing the periods when the Brigade operated directly from base cap, the Phan Rang Sub Area Command provided these services. 3. (U) SLM4ARf, Operation PARAGUT presented no major logistiosl problems. The logistical system remained fully capable vehicle operations. Some tactical convoys, hoiavwr these retain relatively, minor of uporting Shortcaminp were noted in in scope. the operation of 0. 1noiosure 4 (Logistlc)

~nundry

logistical system and support concepts have proven valid and should be continued, in the conduct of road convoys.

a.

C(U) ONCDUSToSA. The p.mosent

C~nFI~nTIA

DE

/i~~~

F DTIAL..
Inclosure

(Signal) to Combat Operations After Report, Opemation Y2AMUaT

%,\

1. (U) HISSICi: The 1st FASCP, 501st Signal and the Communications Platoon, HHC1st Brigade 101st Abn Div had the joint mission of providing signal support for the Brigade. 2. (C) OPERATIONS

a. ONERALt The Ist FASP, 5012t Signal and the Comxmnication Platoon, let HWfC Brigade 101st Abn Div provided signal support during Operation FARRAGUT by establishing the Brigade Command Post and Cormncations Systems at Song Mao and Phan Rang. b. VHF Section provided circuits at Phan Rang from the Bde CP to MACV, 10lst AvO Section and 10th Avn Hn. o. Communication Center Section terminated two secure teletype circuits at Song Kao. At Phan Rang the 278th Signal Copany Commnication Center terminated Brigade Coesnication Center personnel augentethree secure teletype circuits the 278th Signal Company Commun.cation Center in support of the Brigade. d. Switchboard/Wire Section established the Brigade CP at Song Mao teruinating 86 circuits and installed approximately 40 miles of wire. At Phan Rang the 278th Signal Co operated the switchboard and terminated the ci.L-cits for the brigade. The owitchboard/wire section augimented the 278th Signal Co personnel. at Song Mao and Phan Ra. atice. Th Radio Soction provided FM radio stations Atcmatic retransmission and relay stations were employed at R1 677547. The MARS Station was estabished to provide phone patch service to USA. f. AMRadio Section operated secure radio teletype circuits between Song Mao and Than Rang. A secure teletype circuit between Phan Rang and Thy Hoa was established in support of the 2/327 with TF Ivy. g. Mairtenance Section continued to provide maintenance support for the Brigade [fHCand attachments. h. Field Forces Signal Support; Det h, 54th Signal Dn continued to provide circuits into the in-country system, secure radio teletype between fFFORCEV,

Brigade Forward and Brigade RAr and a single sideband phone patch net paralleling the ra~lin t~ltype not.

CONHFII0EN TIAL

0MNFW'. ,NTIAL
Incloemre 5 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operation After Action Report Operation F.'J,'.G1JT 1. During Operation Farragut civil affairs activities were conducted in Phan Thiet and Song Rao of Binh Thuan Province and at Phan Rang in lNinh Thuan Province. In all areas liaison was Immediately effected with the GV1 officials, their US counterparts and representatives of the civilian In conjunction with local officials labor was were established and1 distributed, fair wages were determined and price listsprocured for the In less populated more remote areas there is a tendency for Brigade. laborers to demand higher wages as was the case in the Song Mao area. Initially a dally wage of 150$I per day was demnded even though a wage of 8O$V per day was fair and adenuate for the area. However as soon as

Lagencies.
i

1
p

it was learned the Brigade would not exceed SOiVII, the local labor force
agreed to work at that price. The Song Mao ares was also unique in that it oitained three different ethnic groups living in close proximity to cne Although another, Vietnamese, Nungs of Chinese decent and Lhontagnards.

the Brigade droir labor from all of these groups on a daily basis, no problems were en~ountored. Although Phan Rang is a relatively prosperous area and the US Government srploW hundreds of local workers on a pormaent baei, the br igde had no trouble obtaining daily hires for 90$VN per day. The
practice of allcwirng the units to procure their ou Labor rather than operating a central hire point continued to prove more efficient waen operating in the Phan Rang area. During Oper:.tion Farragut over 200 Montagnards were resettled in secure areas, 30 innocent civilians were returned to their homes and the VC village of Vinh Hoa in Binh Thuan Province, (approxim.-toly 600 people) was reecttled in a OV controlled hC g of V VC village o nh re. At the conclusion of the
of Song Hai in hNirh Thuan had moved back to

area.

The Brigade provided 3 tons of food stuffs and 2 tons of captured

control in the Phan Rn

rice to help feed the refugecs from Vinh Hoa and 5 tons of ca-tured rice for the families from Song Hal.

2. As the Brigade operated in three different areas during Operation Farragut, civic action efforts were aimed at high impact short duration
officials and forces iftnever possible. projects attempting to integrate GVN Significant activities during the operation were as follews: a. Joint USA/J sick calls were conducted in n1 more than ZM p'.tients. 3 areas treating

b.

Extensive work was conducted on Highway One between Phan Thiet

5 bypasses and 27 auts.

and Song Kao resulting ia the repair of 2 culverts,

c. A running w'ter syntem ws installed in the Notre D.,,e Orphnne at Phzn Thiet. The brigade provided the materials and the local Public

Works Dept inst, aled the system.

Prior to installing the sstem, water

With the new

had to be drawn from a well and carried to the orphanage.

system water ca.n now be drawn from any of 13 taps located throughout the orphanage.
d. Two captured VC sewing =chines were repaired nnd presented to

the Girls Club nt the An Phouc District high school in Ninh Thuan.
e. More than 100 students in the Phan Rang area were given scholarships for at least ne year by trooners of the brigade stationed at Phan Rang.

f. Large quantities of food, clothing, soap, scrap lumber end various cr.Aured co dities were distributed to refugees and needy hamlets. 3. Lessons Learnedid

a. Several p-ickages of gifts were sent by an orgazeation in the States to a mmber of the brigade for distribuzion to needy Vietnamese children, Most of the ite were gift wrapped and an attempt wca made to of distribute them in this form. This proved extremely difficult as m the items were not suitable for the ages of the children receiving them. Regardloos of fancy gift wrapping all prxcanea must be opened and examined prior to distribution. b. When the brigade enters a now area the local labor force

CONFIDENTIAL
,..e1

CONFID FN_ IA[

le. These high wage will ofton dcm-mc w.-s much higher th n the norm-l sca demarsyv must not be met and when the l bor force learns that they wontt be met, they will work for the normal scale. Mile in the Song '-.o irea it wr.s learned that US,D had provided c. the means rnd a-dvised local farmers to grow an onion crop. This was done and an asple crop w-s grown. However there was no local market for that amount of onions and no mean. to get the crop to a distant mArket. Production of a cash crop of this nature should not be encouraged unless there is a market readily available to turn the produce into cash. d. As a result of inadequate storage facilities in Phan Rang for S5 supplies, food items stored there spoiled and had to be disposed of. Steps .re being taken to provide a permanent 65 storage facility in Phan Rang. e. Until recently new tags for daily hire laborers were made on a daily basis. This method proved difficult and time consuming. Laminated tags were procured -xd are now used. These tngs are issued and taken up daily and can be used in "my area the brigade operites in.

6-2

CONFIDENTIAL

~%1P

C
Operation FARAGUT 1.

, 1 ID7 F

I-

L
Alter Action Report,

Inclosure 7 (Psychological Operations) to Combat Operatios

Psychological Objoctive, VC con-

a* To induce VC, VC sympathizers and GVN supporters living in trolled areas to avail themselves of the OVN Chieu Hoi Prograo. b. to the VC. c. the pro-O= 2. To encourage the populace "on the fence" to join the GO

as opposed

To strenghten the will to resist populace.

the VC and increase the morale of

Concept of Operations

a. Phase Is During this phase of the operation emphasis was placed on conducting Psychological Warfare. The majority of leaflet and loudspeaker missions were conducted in the AO. After all target areas in the AO had been covered missions were conducted over populated ureas outside the AO* These missions concentrated on target areas immediately adjacent to the AO which were known to be VC or have strong VC sympathies. All mission during this phase were daylight missions onducted from USAF U-10 aircraft.

b.

Phase II and III

During this phase of the operation emphasis was

The priority*

shifted from Psychological Warfare to Psychological Operations.

targets were the populated areas.

Emphasie was placed on missions over VCcontrolled

and contested villages. Three leaflets and three tapes were secured from the Province Chief, rep' oduced, and distributed throughout the Province. Two C417 loudspeaker missiorA, each 2 hours in duration, were conducted over the populated areas each night. Daily U-10 leaflet missions covered the populated areas also. Operations within the AO included a mass leaflet drop designed to saturate the entire area at the outset of the Combat Operation. oudspeaker and leaflet missions were conducted in the AO as the tactical operation umcovered likely targets. co Phase It During the last phase of the operation emphasis was again placed on conducting missions in the populated areas. Two leaflets and three tapes from the Province Chief were obtained, reproduced and disseminated. 1

Poster and 1 tape were requested by Brigade Psy Ops and were distribited. Night loudeapak-m missions continued as in Phaia IIcIII. A mass leaflet drop was conducted to saturate the AO (SB-35)

and daily leaflot and loudspeaker missions ware Conducted against likely targets discovered as a result of tactical operations. 3. Oerations conductedt

a. Nissionst 102 missions- covering 172 target areas were conducted. Target areas ranged in size from several huts to areas as large as 216 sq. ko.

dropped.

b. Leaflets: 6 different leaflets were used totalling 11,897,000 National Safe Conduct Passes were dropped on each leaflet mission.
A total broadcast tine of 154.5 hours was logged.

(Se
These

Tab A, Leaflet list). c. lTudspeakert consisted oft

(1)

Aerial (a) (b) De (Ive), 8.5 hours.

Day (tape) r 28 hours.

(2) (3)

(e) High (tqnt). 101 hors. Mound (day, live), 14 hours. Sea (right, tape), 3 houra. 7-1

CONFIDENTIAL

iV

Incloei-e 7 (psychologioal Operations) to Combat Operations After Action Reportp

operation FAML@ 4,. Simmarys

a. Evaluating the effectiveness of the Wde Pay Ope program continmus to be a major problem. However, indirect indicators tend to show the program is effective.

(1) Several Hoi Chanha questioned at the PAN THIT Chieu Ho1 Gente(FARRAGUT IV) indicated they had heard loudspeaker broadcasts both day and night
prior to their rallying.
(2) Most Hol Chanh were in possession of one or sore leaflets at the

time they rallied. 4 Hoi Chanhs as a direct result of a loudspe ,ker appeal conducted by this Brigade. His friends A VC made the appeal from a UH-lD vic SONG VAGto his 4 friends. beard the appeal and returned to the GVN.

(3)

confirned that they reoive Chieu Hoi Center offilials at PHAN RANO

(4) Village of SON HOI conenced evacuation to a OVN secure area several days after a low level leaflet drop had been conducted againat the village.

(5) 40 persons rallied to the OVN in a group NW )f PHAN THIET. These peoplets vUlage had had several leaflet and loudspeaker missions conducted against it approximately 1 week prior to their rallying. b. This operation marked the first use of 'Key (omvnincator" leaflets and taped messages. The results achieved indicated that this method of getting
TISET One Hoi Charnh who rallied to the PF arross a sssago is highly successful. Chdou Ho! Center said he did so because he heard *the Province Chief.wanted. the V, tc He further stated that he 'heard the Province Chief to the governmentO. ccme back talking from an airplane" (U-l0 using one of the prepared tapes).

c. Several Hoi Chani stated that of all weapons system used by the Bde, the one most feared is the helicopter. The VCknow its capabilities and are therefore uncertain what any beaicopters intentions are when one is sighted. "It is
interesting to note that the majority of indications pointing to a successful Bde

P-y Ops program involved helicopter missions* 1hether this is the result of Hower, continued probability or a direct correlation is not known at this time
efforts will be made to define the relationship Jetween effective Psy Ops missions

and the use of helicopters as Puy Ops vehicles.

he nore successful than other type aircraft in

reasons why the helicopter may TwNo

Ops mission are,

conducting Py

(1) The helicopter instills greater fear in the VC initially. After it become apparent that the helicopter is conducting a Psy Ops miseions a feeling At this tim the Pay Ops message might be more would be marifested. of relief

meaningful to the VC.

The helicopter normally is used at much lower altituies in con(2) This fact allows greater ducting Pay Opethan are the USAY Fixed Wing aLrcart. accuracy in leaflet drops and closer range for the loduapeaker broadcasts. Based on the effectiveness indicators received to date, the current d. progr&;% of concentrating on population centers using Key CoaM icator appeals

will be continued and the results evaluated. 5.lessons Iearned,

a. The availability of a proficient interpreter or linguist is essenial to Conducting effective Pay Opsparticularly in rapid reaction situations. b. Key coomundeator appeals approach Face-to-Face comicati_, the audience can identify with the speaker. in that

c. General appeals promising good treatment and encouraging VC to rally to the Brigade are ineffective due to a lack of credibility. Emphasis should be Key comaunicator appeals to the O. placed instead on encouraging VC to rally

I7-2
Jll

St

9f

Inc1osure 7 (Psychological Operations) to Oombat Operations After Action Report, Operation FAR T

coeqled uith the dumoreiiing effeoto of combat operations oreate a high measure of peranum ivenes and credibility. d. The helicopter makes an ideal Psy Ops aircraft. Its use on leaflet missions allows pinpoint accuracy since leaflets can be distributed at very low levels. Loudspeaker broadcasts similar4y can be pinpointed and the effects of high wiis, on clarity, minimized.

I7-3
IL

Il-

I',,I /
y.

Tab A (Leaflet List) to Isalone 7 (Psyehological Operations) to 0Oobat Operation After Action Report, Operation FARRAGUT Duning Operation FARMAUT the following leaflets were uxeds

1. NSCP 2. SP-331 3. SP-766 4. SP-769 5. P-782

33.

245W-123-67

34. 24_I4124-67 35. 24N.-337-67 36. 2b5f,-142.67 37. 24 38.

39.
4O. 2

=,158-67
6

6. SP-868
7. SP-.9%41

4s-1

1- 6 7

2h4 N-163-67

8. SP-42 9. sP-947

245W-190-67

41. 245m-..67 42. 16-67 43. 172-66 d44. 331-66 45. P046,
-

10. SP-951L 1. SP-954 12. SP-957 13. sP-958 24. 15. 16. SP-11i SP-1234 1 SP-1389

,ring Rewdon

"-7. P-.1431

18.

SP-1539

19. SP-1619 20. SP4-1716 21. SP.4755 22. SP-16-67 23. 245N-61-67

24. 245N-63-67
25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 2 -109-67 249-113-67 242

.-67

4I5W-17-67

24I-218-67 24 .19.67 24%,.a.2O-67 245X-22-67 A-7-1

CONFIDENTIAL

L11

CONFID I,,TI[\ L
9
Inclosure 8 (Artillery) to Comhat Operation After Action Report, Operation

FAMAGUT
1. Mission: 2d Battalion (Airborne) 320th Artillery supports lit Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Battery "B". let Battalion (Towed), 30th Artillery provides general support to the let 3rigade, 101st Airborne Division. 2. Summary of Operationt

a. In the conduct of Operation FARRA0UT the same techni4uss of fire support coordination and artillery employment which have proven successful in previous operations were utilized. Favorible terrain and the concept of operation of the maneuver elements allowed extensive emp0yment of radar throughout phases II, III, end IV. Battalion FlC was utllisod throughout the operation, centrally located, as the contr611ing FDC. b. An additional forward 6ee requirement was imposed by the attachment of a forward observer party to the 2/44 ARVN during the conduct of Phase IV. This exceeded the organic forward observer capability of the battalion, and was fulfilled by utilizing personnel with associated tralning and experience from within the battalion. c. Naval gunfire provided reinforcing fires to the brigade during phases III and IV of FARRAGUT. Liaison was maintained at the brigade level as velles periodic radio commnications between the supporting ships and battalicn F1. d. B/l/30 was frequently split into two platoons, each platoon collocated with a battery of 105mm howitsers, throughout the operation. Several fire mission ware conducted, adjusting with the 105's and masing the fires of both the 105's and 155's in effect. Flexibility was obtained by shifting the fires of one element (usually the lO'a) on to possible escape routes while, the other maintained suppressing fires on the anemy.

e.

The amount of H a-d I fires was increased durng this operLikell- H and I targets

ation. These fires are effectively utilized todsceive the enemr.' as to the objective ofthamaneuver elements and to deny the emem use of critical

terrain, roads, bridges, fords, campeites, etc.

can be obtained from the maraver elements relaying through their forward observers. f. Air warning messages are now being broadcast over the "0uard" UH frequency by the fire direction center, using an air force survival kit radio. Tests thus far have been g7enerally favorable, althot the radio's range seems to be extremely limited. 3roadcating air warning messages in this manner is convenient for the pilots since the UHF
"Ouardm

frequency is monitored by them at all times.

A search is being

made for a more powerful, portable UHF radio. g. A schedule of fires conducted at the beginning of Phase IV was terminated about halfway through due to the flight paths of helicopters, lifting in the maneuver elements, crossing the gun-target line. Strict adhe-ence to the propored flight corridor by the pilots t would hAve enabled he sohedule of fires to be competed. 3. Execution:

a.

Phase Is
58882. Unit

(1) At 270700 Jaiuary, A/2-320th displaced to closed at 1020 hours. Direct Support of 1-327th Infantry.

at (2) At 310730 January,-A/2-320th displaced to BW74T87b. closed at 1010 hours. General supprt of lst Brigade.

Unit

8-1

CONFIDENTIAL

SI

CONDFN
Inclosure 8 FARRAOUT
i

-TIAL
Unit

(Artillery) to Combat 0teratons After Action Report, Operation

(3) At 271000 January, B/2-320th displaced to 3512768. closed at 1600 hours. Direct support of 2-327t, Infantry. (4) At 311115 January, B/2-320th displaosd to EN615695. closed at .1646 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infaetry.

Unit
Unit

closed at 1330 hours.

(5)

At 051730 February, B/2-320th displqoed to E3665690.

Direct support of 2-327th Infa4try.

(6) At 0(4;- February, B/2-320th displaced to closed at 1420 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

669688.

Unit 4
Unit Unit Unit Unit

(7) it 150630 February, B/2-320th displaced to 8N692%7h. closed at 160D hours. Direct support of 2-327t Imf-vtZy. (8) At 270700 January, C/2-320tb displaet to 3W702598. closed at 1715 hours. Direct support of 2-502e Infa;try.

(9) At 28100D January, C/2-320th displaced to EN667688. closed at 1815 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Tufamtry,

closed at 310200 hours.

(10)

At 30.830 January, C/2-320th dia7:.aced 1,o IPbU874.

Oaeral support let Brigjie.

(11) At 271320 January, B-30th dis laced to B3667688. Unit closed at 1757 hours. General support reinforcin the fires of C/2-320th. (12) At 300900 January, B/1-30th dis laced to BN7la87. Unit at closed 2100 hours. General support rsimforcin# the fires of 1st Brigade.

Ib.

Phase Ils (1) At 170645 February, A/2-320th d~splaced to HN 16252. closed at IM5 bows. Direct support of 1-327th lafantry. closed at 3-100 hours. closed at 1800 hours. Unit

(2) At 230700 February, A/2-32Ot

irect support of 1-327th rafntry.

di.splaoed to 94125384.

Unit Unit

(3) At 281400 February, A/2-320th d4splaced to 31266456. Direct support of 2-327th Tfantry.
Direct support of 2-327th Tfantry.

closed at 0830 hours. J

() At 170500 Febzuary, /2-320th dUlplaced to 3ft253i8. Unit

Unit

I(5)

At 230600 February, B/2-320th d4Bplszsd to EM2350jh. closed at 1100 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry. closed at 0900 hours.

(6) At 250600 February, B/2-32th d1splaced to A812817.

Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

Unit
Unit

6 (7) At 280630 February, B/2-320th displaced to W2 &i56 . closed at 1320 hours. Direct support of 2-32M Infantry.

closed at 1730 hourv.

(8) At 170730 February, C/2-320th displaced to A962316.

Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

Unit
Unit

(9) At 180600 February, C/2-320th displaced to W2121j06. closed at 1800 hours. Direct sipport of 2-502d W .amtry. closed at 1630 hours.

(10)

2 At 190700 February, C/2-320th displaced to M 12 5o4.

Direct support of 2-502 Infantry.

Unit
unit

(2-) At 281330 February, 0/2-320th displaced to ON2661s%6. closed at 2000 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry.

lr -,,E T ALi
8-2

COTSN 11) LNT IAL

In lowure 8 FAmJWUT (Artillery) to Oombat Operations After Action Report, Operation

(12)

At 170715 Febrarys BA1-3t

displaced to W762316.

Unit
Unit

closed at 1730 hours.

General support reinforcing the fires of C/2-320th.

(13) At 2814lO February, BA-3Oth displaced to W?66L56. closed at 2020 hours. General support of the let Brigade.

S.

Fase Ilt Unit Uit

I.

'(2)

(1) At 030700 March, A/2-320th displaced to E"187666. closed at 1000 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry. At 060615 March, A/2-320th displaced to EH266456. closed at 1035 hours. Direct support of 1/327th Infantry. (3) At 010630 March, W2-32th displaced to 1,23339. closed at WO 20hours'. irect support of 2-327th Infantry. (4) At 020730 March, B/2-320th displaced to 3518420. closed at 1500 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry.

Unit Unit

(5) At 030700 March, B/2-320th displaced to 359h521. closed at 1615 hours. Tkirect support of 2-327th Infantry. (6) At 030500 March, C/2-320th displaced to I205528. closed at 0930 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry. (7) At 060630 March, C/2-320th displaced to EN266456. closed at 1600 hours. Direct support of 2-502d I"fantry.

Unit

Unit Unit

(8)

At 030600 March, B/1-3Otb displaced to EN594521.

Unit

closed at 1615 hours. d. phase IV:

0eaeral support reinforcing the fires of B/2-320th.

(1) At 090600 M, A/2-320th displaced to 3786667. closed at 1500 hours. Direct support of 1-32?th Infantry. (2) At 220700 March, A/2-32Oth displaced to W1744869. closed at 1715 hours. General support let Brigade. k3) At 090500 March, 2-320th displaced to E1703597. c3omed at 1745 hours. Direct support of 2-327th Infantry. (4) At 150700 March, B/2-320th displaced to B686682. closed at n52 hours. Direct support of 2/502d Infantry. (5) At 230900 March, B/2-320th displaced to q1h77869. closed at 1250 hours. General suqport of let vrigade. (6) At 080800 March, C/2-320th displaced to W15419. closed at 1250 hours. Direct support of 2-502d Infantry. (7) At 121300 Mard, c/2-320th displaced to 207441,869. closed at 2130 hours. Direct support 2-327th Infantry.

Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit

(8) At 220700 March, B/1-30th displaced to E634526. Unit closed at 1000 hours. General support reinforcineg the fires of B/2-320th. (9) At 230900 March, 9/1-30th displaced to 31714869. cloeed at ]2h5 houre. General support of let Brigade. 4. Reslts: a. 12 VC (nB Arty). 8-3 Unit

CONFIDENTIAL

I _

... . ...

CON-! "1NTI/.- L
ITclosuro 8 (Artillery) to Oombat Operations After Action Report, Operation FAI UCOT b.

4OVO

(KB Arty) (EST). H/A The radar was extenslvely emloyed

5.
6.

Administrative matteros

Special equipment and techniquest a.

during phases brst.

1II11 ad IV of VARRAGUT in the following mawras

Registrations were conducted, both center of impact and high racking

b. Survey coordinates were computed for C batterx bV the of a low charge high angle round tired by C battery, by radar.

c. Further tes in computing survey coordinates for a given location Vere oonducted by the rajar section as follows!

(1) Tracking a banlon floating above the point at which surveyed ooordinates were desired, (2) TrackUig an H-13 hovering above the point at which surveyul
coordinates are desired. (3) Tracking a beer can dropped from an H-13 onto the point at which surveyed coordina.s are desired. 7. Coomander's AnaL ys: That the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery, Battery 272 lst Battulion 30th Artillery, and tactical air oontinue to provide adequate fire support. Temts conducted with the portable HF radio in broadcasting air warning messages hav' been more satisfactory than methods emloyed In past operations. A more powerful portable UHF radio, once obtained, should eliminate the problm of adequate aircraft warning Juring the conduct of fire missions. Tests conducted with the radio hiv indicated may areas of possible employment in a counterinsurgency enwLronmnt. 8. Recovmendations: That four (4) C1-47's be provided this brigade at all times and that Vi aviation compm assigned to Soport continue to provide a Unison officor.

&44

CWHDLNIAL
Inclosure 9 (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation 1. The most si%;ificant Engineer activity in Operation FARRAOT was the opening and use of land lines of communication. During the initial phase of the operation, the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry moved into the Secret 6 Base 7 area using Rt I and Rt 40 . The later stages of the operations were characterizod by daily usage of Rt 1 in the area in which the Brigade was MAO THIET to SONG operating. The displacement of the Brigade base from PRAM ar~d from SONG MAOto FRAN RANG was accomlished by road. 2. The let Brigade, 101st Airborne Division received general Engineer L support from elements of the 35th Engineer oroup. Company 9, lhth Engineer Battalion provided support in the PHAN RANG area, specifically repairing 8 6 kilometers of Rt 40 in late January, assisting in the opening of Rt 1 from PMR ANG to SONG MAOon 15 and 16 February, and in opening Rt 407 to SONG from FN THIET to SONG 1AO on 17 and 18 February. Co pany B, 87th EngIneer Battalion constructed the airfield at SONG MAO, prepared the Brigade base area At SONO MAO,provided bulldozers for construction of access roads into the LE HONG PHONG Forest, and installed a bypass on Rt 1 on 4 March. The support rendered by each of these units was responsive and timely in every incident.

HAl in mid March. 2d Platoon, Company A, lth Engineer Battalion provided support in preparing the Brigade base area at PHAN THIET and in opening Rt 1

3. Throughout the operation Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion provided LZ clearing and demolition teams to the committed Infantry Battalions. Mine sweeping teams working with A Troop, 2d Squadron (Airborne), 17th Cavalry and with the MYPlatoon conducted daily sweeps on 't 1 from 18 February through the nd of the operation, The company provided a provisional platoon, reorganized as Infantry, to secure Battery 3, 1-30 Artillery, from 3 through* 11 February. With equipment support from the 35th Engineer Group, Oompany A, 326th Engineer Battalion opened Rt 1 from PHAN THIET to SONG MAO, repairing 27 cuts and installing 3 bypasses. Eesant of the compaw constructed approx-

imately 25 kilometers of access roads ".hto LE HONG PHONG the Forest and destroyed two bunker complexes totalling more than 1O bunkers.
L.
bon.a emplaced on trails

The types of mes encountered in Operation FARRAODT were the CO

and along Rt I between FRAN TMET and SONG MAO,

& comand detonated Claymore type mine used on Rt I north of TUT PRONG, and electr ically detonated road minos emplaced on Rt I north of PHAN INIET# Those
electrically detonated ines used a firing mechanism made of two flattened sections of tin caT h aponrlmatly 1/8 inch apart by split wooden pag. eld
7heee metal sections were wired into the firing "aetom and pressing the

sctions together completed the circuit and fired the mine.

affective

This siMle but

mechaim was used as a pressure device or for command detonation.

5. Drinking water was a distinct problem in the coastal rgions arou.nd and north of PHA TRIET. The only water soure found near PRAN THIST that

would support the Brigade water point was the city reservoir.

During the

dry months of February and March this water has a strong, musty taste that is extremely unpleasant and even effects foods prepared with water. Salt Forest.

was used to contaminate wells used by ti'a VCon the edge of the LE HONG PRONG 6. There were no unusual Engineer problems encountered in Operation FARRAM. The requirement for careful road sweeping and the efficiency of roads as a means for moving supplies were again demonstrated.

CONFIDENrIAL