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MAYA AND AVIDYA: THE SHANKARARAMANUJA DEBATE By Darren Hackler

Two of Indias greatest Vedantic philosophers have created considerable debate in the last millennium with their postulations. Shankara, and later Ramanuja, are credited with the virtual creation or synthesis of many of the concepts held to be true in the Advaita Vedanta and Viistadvaita philosophical systems. The Shankaran tradition is a non-

dualistic philosophy while Ramanujas system is that of qualified nondualism. Concerning the role of maya and avidya, both of these learned men have differing views. This in turn had led to untold volumes of speculation and interpretation. The translation of the word maya has confounded Western interpreters for centuries. Perhaps it is best not to try to give a direct translation, but rather to state the concept to which the word refers. Ramanuja and Shankara have each placed different emphases on what exactly maya is. Basically, maya is appearance. In conjunction with avidya (ignorance), maya is that which gives rise to perceptual reality and is understood to be the totality of reality. It is that, and our own ignorance, which leads humans to believe in a

dualistic world wherein physical reality is differentiated from that of the realm of the supernatural or spiritual. Shankara, perhaps the best known of Indias classical philosophers, is considered the founder of the Vedantic school known as Advaita. It is unclear as to when exactly he lived, but the latest scholarly opinion cites 788-820 C.E. as the probable span of his life. Most accounts say that by a young age he was already a formidable debater, philosopher and writer. On his travels throughout the whole of India he developed the philosophical system known as Advaita, set up great monasteries in the four corners of India, and even met with the wise Kumarila, founder of the Bhatta school of Mimamsa (another school accepting the validity of the Vedas). By the time of his death, which is believed to have happened in the Himalayas, he developed one of the worlds most intriguing and important philosophical systems, and raised points of contention about what is real and unreal that have been debated unto the present day.1 Ramanuja was a later theologian, philosopher and secular leader. He was a leading figure from southern India, more specifically the Tamil area, during the 11th and 12th centuries C.E. Ramanuja was born into a Vianava (worshippers of Vishnu) family perhaps as early as 1017 C.E., although this date is dubious. Over the course of his life, Ramanuja developed a system

of qualified non-dualism know as Viista Advaita.

He created a

philosophical system different from Shankaras in several ways, yet it was similar enough to still be classified within the bounds of Vedantic philosophy. During his life, Ramanuja on occasion debated followers of Shankara while on a trip or tour of northern India. Being a devotee of the god Vishnu, Ramanuja developed a philosophy that fit in with beliefs he held about the nature of God. This, then, and the nature of maya and avidya is where the systems of Shankara and Ramanuja differ and the philosophical argument begins.2 The Advaitin system of Shankara is a fairly complex body of material. But distilled to its essence, the system concentrates upon Brahman (that divine aspect which is being, bliss and knowledge, or saccidandanda) and the effects that avidya and maya have upon perceived reality. But first it is perhaps wise to define the terms that Shankara used in his treatises. L. Thomas ONeil states that : The conception of the doctrine of maya in the though and system developed by ankara is seen by some as the central issue of the Advaita Vedanta. Much of modern scholarship has utilized the word maya to mean only illusion. But we must remember that the word maya is etymologically a word which means to measure. Maya, in ankara, is the canopy under

which reside the phenomenal world of name and form, language and experience.3

Hence maya is seen as that untenable force or phenomenon that gives rise to the world of perception which has a reality of sorts, but is still a realm of appearance. Avidya (non-knowledge, ignorance) in Shankaran thought has been transformed into a kind of manifest cosmic and personal force of ignorance that deludes one into believing that the world of maya is tangible and of total realness. The last major concept that needs a contextual

definition is that of Brahman itself. There are two aspects or forms of Brahman that Shankara defines: 1. Brahman is nirguna, that is to say without aspects, transcendent, real and the underlying truth of all; and 2. Brahman is saguna, that is to be understood as Brahman in an empirical, although all powerful, sense that is contemplated by humans. In other words Saguna Brahman is God.

The problems of the relation of humans to the world and to Brahman can be explained in the following manner based upon Shankaran thought. Shankara postulates three aspects or levels of reality: 1. real existent (Brahman), 2. existent or real (empirical, perceptual reality), and

3. unreality (paradoxes, etc., things that have no context in experience, i.e., a married bachelor).

Brahman is in truth the ever-existing reality. What can be truly defined as real is that, which according to Shankara, cannot be sublated or made erroneous by experience. Brahman is only that which cannot be sublated, as this is the real existent factor. Maya is seen as that tenuous, unobservable and usually indefinable element that brings about diversity and seeming duality. By means of

Brahmans creative power the world of appearance arises through maya. Maya can be explained as a superimposition over or upon Brahman. This concept is known as adhyasa. The world of maya, the world of seeming diversity, which is the world of perceptual experience, is what humans have a tendency to hold as the true reality. But this world is tenuous. In this world of maya there are varying levels of apparent reality. Levels of less understanding are able to be sublated or made erroneous by greater levels of comprehension or understanding. In this reality, then, the highest level of understanding is seen to be that of realization of non-difference between the empirical self (jiva) and the divine God-concept (which is Saguna Brahman).

Avidya also plays a great role in our accepting this perceived realm as the ultimate truth. This unseen force of cosmic and personal ignorance binds us to the world of maya and is seen as without beginning by the Advaita school. Wherein does this force reside? The Advaitin followers of Shankara answer in the following manner: Nescience and bondage are not directly associated with Brahman. For, Brahman which is reflected in the nescience or the internal organ is the jiva and that jiva is the locus of avidya and bondage objection [to this philosophical point] is untenableThe interaction of nescience and jiva-hood is regarded to beginningless like the seed and the sprout Nevertheless if the above explanation is unintelligible, it is answered that it is absurd to expect intelligibility in the case of nescience since it is of the very essence of nescience to be unintelligible in the last resort.4

Thus, avidya is the force of ignorance that deludes humankind into believing in the power of maya. That is to say, people accept the appearance of reality as produced by the power of maya as the totality of all things. This interaction of the force of avidya and maya then separate our empirical selves from the reality of the Nirguna Brahman, which in truth is nondifferent from the true essence of the jivas. The empirical selves are of

Brahman, but have forgotten this fact or have been removed from said knowledge by their belief in the reality of the perceptual world. So, in brief summation, Brahman is the real existent and the cause of maya which in turn is that which brings about diversity and seeming nonunity in the world. Through ignorance, humans perceive that their empirical selves, or jivas, exist separate from the world, and, also separate and distinct from Brahman. Only through enlightenment, the attainment of moksha, does one realize that the jiva is non-different from Brahman and that the world is but a delusion caused by maya and avidya. Although the world has an essence, as do the jivas, the experiential knowledge of these things of the realm of maya are sublated when one undergoes moksha. Thus, for an enlightened individual Brahman is all that remains, as was before. In contradiction to the aforementioned passages, Ramanuja puts forth a philosophical system that legitimates the existence and power of a personal God. Coming from the Vianava tradition, Ramanuja did not choose to agree with Shankara that the Nirguna Brahman is the ultimate reality. There is a qualification to the non-dualistic approach as seen by this Viista Advaitin philosopher. Ramanuja approaches the necessity of a divine reality by stating that there is such a thing. And that divine reality is a personal God much like Shankaras Saguna Brahman, or Ivara (the Lord), but it is

not sublatable by the knowledge of a higher form as this divine principle is indeed the highest reality in and of itself. Also, Ramanuja points out with his qualification of non-dualism, that the identity of the empirical self is more tangible than in Advaita philosophy. More specifically, the jivas have a reality, and are not sublated by moksha (in the sense that they are in Shankaras system). There is a continuance and union with Ivara upon attainment of enlightenment. Ramanuja asserts seven main objections to the Advaitic premises and the works of Shankara. Ramanujas objections are as follow: 1. Svarupanupapttithe identity or nature of avidya itself, 2. Arayanupapattilocus of avidya in humans specifically, 3. Anirvancaniyanupapattiindifinibility of the nature or actuality of avidya itself, 4. Tirodhananupapattithe obscuration of Brahman as caused by maya, 5. Pramananupapattithat avidya is not able to be proved in the Pramanas (philosophical treatises of earlier origin held to be fully authoritative in such matters), 6. Nivrittyanupapattithere is no removal of avidya in the system, and that of 7. Nivartakanupapattithere postulated.5 is no remover of avidya

Generally, the majority of these points are valid.

As is evident,

Ramanuja has multifarious objections to Shankaras system of philosophy or theology, but there will only be a brief account of the main objections herein. As for the premise pertaining to the actual existence of the world created by the unreal (not in the sense of unreality defined by Shankara as paradoxical, but rather of not being Brahman) mayaand that the world is in essence sublatable itself or unreal. Ramanuja dictates that according to the utras of Vyasa ...this is taught in the Upanisads, we have to admit that a cause may produce an effect entirely different from itself.6 Later in the text, there is a passage that ankara specifically asserts in the Arambhanadhikarana of the utras (II-1-15) that an unreal object may produce a real object.7 Therefore, one can realize that the Viista Vedanta school, and more specifically Ramanuja, has a legitimate point of contention pertaining to the definition of the ultimate reality of the universe. If

Shankara himself asserts: that an unreal cause can give rise to a real effect, then why is it so incredible, or impossible, that maya could give rise to a world of permanence and reality based upon the interrelation of subjects and objects? Another point of contention between Ramanuja and Shankara is of the variant emphases placed upon Ivara, or God, by the respective

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philosophers. In Advaitic philosophy, God assists people in the attainment of moksha. Shankara does not disavow bhakti (salvation or liberation

through devotion to a deity), but neither does he promote it. In the final analysis, though, God is Saguna Brahman and sublatable. God is an

appearance and an aspect of the tangibly apparent world of maya. Only the Nirguna Brahman is real in totality. It is saccidananda, that state of perfect being, bliss and knowledge. Ramanuja, being more inclined to the acceptance of the reality of God and the usefulness of bhakti, places his emphasis upon the divine, real nature of God, and more particularly upon Vishnu. He states that ignorance plays a lesser role in Viista Vedanta than Advaita. Also, Ramanuja changes the conception of maya itself. For this theologian/philosopher, the concept is seen as the actual creative power of a personal deity. It brings about

diversity and empirical reality. Although maya itself can be an hindrance to the eventual attainment of moksha, it is not quite as evident that this maya is as nearly or potentially as malignant as the concept becomes in Shankaran philosophy. Shankara states that the world is brought into being by the causal force of maya; Ramanuja disagrees with this and postulates that God itself is the efficient and material cause of the world, and that there is not a

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secondary eternal principle to explain creation. The concept of God as the efficient, material cause of the universe is expressed thusly: Since God unfolds Himself into this world, He is its material cause. In the production of an effect there are generally three causes at work namely, operative or efficient cause (nimitta), material cause (upadana) and instrumental (sahakari) cause. The operative or efficient cause is the agent or doer who makes the material, turn or transform into the effectThe instrumental cause is the instrument for producing the effectGod is all the three causes for the world. He is the operative cause qualified by His or sankalpaHe is the material cause qualified by subtle jive andmatter lying dormant within HimHe is the instrumental cause qualified by his intelligence and power.8

Although maya may be seen as the creative component of God in Viista Vedanta it does not exist in and of itself. Its reality is only existent when seen as an aspect of the Supreme Deity. There is a subtle difference between Shankara and Ramanuja on this point, although important. Shankara states that maya is an eternal creative or deluding principle, but it must be remembered that it is true that it itself is able to be sublated by knowledge of Brahman. The world of Ramanuja is more tangible and less apparent than that of his predecessor and rival and this is directly attributable to the emphasis given to maya and to avidya in each of the teachings.

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Both of these great classical philosophers/theologians have developed fairly in depth and plausible visions of the reality of the universe and our place in it. Each philosopher is of the same tradition, namely Vedanta, and are more similar than dissimilar in the final analysis. Raghavendrachar states the following concerning Shankara: ankara was primarily what we could call today a philosophical theologian, whose urgent interest was to explain in the most cogent rational terms the central message of the Vedanta. This led him to the theory of non-dualism H. N.

(adviatavada), out of which by sheer force of logical implication arose the subsidiary theory of illusion (mayavada, avidhyavada). ankara realized that if duality (in allubiquitous forms) is to be avoided while explaining (not explaining away) the world of maya, the principle of avidya needs to be recognized as a concomitant condition9 And thus it was Shankaras desire to present a non-fraudulent account of his understanding of reality. By the development of, or rather the usage of previous terms such as maya and avidya, Shankara was able to explain that which gives rise to diversity and the seeming reality of the world as understood by perceptual experience alone. It is easy to understand why Ramanuja, in particular, raised the objections that he did. It is also important to understand the cultural referent

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of Ramanuja. Raised in southern India in a family believing in Vainavism, he was familiar with and attached to the concept of a supreme, personal deity. The abstraction of Brahman was more of an alien concept. Ramanuja undoubtedly was devoted to a god, namely Vishnu. He was also a devoted proponent of the bhakti movement. It thus becomes necessary to develop a system of thought and belief wherein God is the supreme reality and material cause of the universe. And this is what Ramanuja did. Coming from the Vedantic tradition (with the ubiquitous presence of Shankaras postulates), it became necessary for Ramanuja to devise logical, plausible counter-arguments to those developed by Shankara against the importance of the personal God Ivara, if he wished to maintain the preeminent importance of the God-figure. Whereas Shankara gives

considerable importance to Nirguna Brahman and relegates God to relative obscurity (because understanding of Ivara may be sublated by knowledge of Brahman), Ramanuja does the reverse. God keeps those attributes given by Advaitic perception of the Deity and takes many of those aspects of Nirguna Brahman that make up saccidananda. So, in essence two great philosophers of the Advaita tradition have put forth generally credible views of the world. Shankara developed a system of non-dualism wherein the supreme reality is Brahman. Brahman is the only

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reality that is unable to be defined as false or erroneous. Life for humans in the realm of perception and experience is bound by maya and avidya, that is to say that this world has a sublatable reality between subjects and objects. Ramanuja accepts some of Shankaras system, but rejects certain parts. Instead of relegating the God-concept to obscurity or superflousness, he states that Ivara is in reality the totality of truth. Knowledge of God is the highest form attainable through moksha. Also, the importance and even existence of maya is denied; maya is relegated to a term devised to define the creative power of Ivara.

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ENDNOTES 1. Keith Crim, gen. Ed., The Perennial Dictionary of World Religions, (San Fransico: Harper and Row, Pub., 1989), p. 648. 2. Ibid., pp. 598-99. 3. Thomas ONeil, Maya in ankara, (Delhi, India: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), p. 92. 4. S. M. S. Chari, Advaita and Viistadvaita, (Delhi, India: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), p. 92. 5. Thomas ONeil, Maya in ankara, (Delhi, India: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), p. 92. 6. V. R. Srisaila Chakravarti, The Philosophy of Sri Ramanuja (Viistadvaita), (Madras, India: Chakravarti, 1974), p. 148. 7. Ibid., p. 148. 8. Ibid., pp. 289-290. 9. Thomas ONeil, Maya in ankara, (Delhi, India: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), p. 93.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Chakravariti, V. R. Srisaila. The Philosophy of Sri Ramanuja (Viistadvaita). Madras, India: Chakravarti, 1974. Chari, S. M. S. Advaita and Viistadvaita. Delhi, India: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976. Crim, Keith, gen. ed. The Perennial Dictionary of World Religions. San Fransico: Harper and Row, Pub., 1989. De, Aditi. The Development of the Concept of Maya and Avidya with Special Reference to the Concept of Vivarta. Patna, India: Patna University, 1982. ONeil, Thomas. Maya in ankara. Delhi, India: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980. Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli and Moore, Charles A. A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973. Reyna, Ruth. The Concept of Maya. Bombay, India: Asia Publishing House, 1962. Sharma, Arvind. Viistadvaita Vedanta: A Study. New Delhi, India: Heritage Pub., 1978.

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SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

Deutsch, Eliot. Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Reconstruction. Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center Press/University of Hawaii Press, 1969. Hiriyanna, M. Essentials in Indian Philosophy. London, UK: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1978. Long, Jeffery D. A Vision for Hinduism: Beyond Hindu Nationalism. London & New York: I. B. Tauris & Company, Ltd., 2007 Prabhavananda, Swami and Isherwood, Christopher, trans. Shankaras Crest-Jewel of Discrimination (Vivek-Chudamani). Hollywood, CA: Vedanta Press, 1947, 1975. Vrajaprana, Pravrajika. Vedanta A Simple Introduction. Hollywood, CA: Vedanta Press, 1999.

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