V.

LIABILITY
A. POSSESSOR OF ANIMALS Art. 2183, CC. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905)
VESTIL V IAC (UY) 179 SCRA 47 CRUZ; December 6, 1989 NATURE: Petition to reinstate the decision of the Appellate Court. FACTS - July 29, 1975: Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead. She was discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. - Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia bronchopneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies - Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. - Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants. IAC found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. - On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. Petitioners Claim The Vestils are liable for the death of Theness, since they own the dog that bit her. Respondents Comments The dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. ISSUE WON the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the dog. HELD Ratio The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. Reasoning ART. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. - While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no

doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. - There is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly. - Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia bronchopneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies. The Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. - It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal. - Obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. DISPOSITION: The Court approves the time.

B. THINGS THROWN OR FALLING FROM A BUILDING CIVIL CODE Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907) Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused: (1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place; (2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property; (3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure; (4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908) Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909) Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910) Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)

Page

DINGCONG vs. KANAAN 72 Phil.14; G.R. No.L-47033 AVANCEA;Apr.25, 1941 NATURE: Pet. for certiorari assailing the decn of the CA FACTS: -The brothers Loreto and Jose Dingcong rented the house of Emilia Saenz (in Jose Ma. Basa Street of the City of Iloilo) and established the Central Hotel. Among the hotel's guests is Francisco Echevarria, paying P30 a month, and occupying room no. 10 of said hotel. Kanaan, on the other hand, occupies the ground floor of the hotel and established his "American Bazaar" dedicated to the purchase and sale of articles and merchandise. -Around 11pm of 19 September 1933, Echevarria, when retiring to bed, carelessly left the faucet open that with only an ordinary basin without drainage. That time, the pipes of the hotel were under repair; the water run off the pipes and spilled to the ground, wetting the articles and merchandise of the "American Bazaar," causing a loss which the CFI sets at P1,089.61. -The Kanaans (Halim, Nasri and Michael), representing the establishment "American Bazaar," thereafter filed this complaint for damages against Loreto Dingcong, Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria. -CFI held Francisco Echevarria liable, and acquitted Jose Dingcong. CA reversed and declared Jose Dingcong responsible, sentencing him to pay the plaintiffs damages. ISSUE: WON Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable for damages HELD: YES. -Francisco Echevarria, the hotel guest, is liable for being the one who directly, by his negligence in leaving open the faucet, caused the water to spill to the ground and wet the articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs. -Jose Dingcong, being a co-renter and manager of the hotel, with complete possession of the house, must also be responsible for the damages caused. He failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent these damages, despite his power and authority to cause the repair of the pipes. Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed, with the costs against apellant.

act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced. Art. 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If afellow worker's intentional malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's fellow worker.

AFABLE V SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY 58 PHIL 14 VICKERS; March 6, 1933 NATURE: Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila FACTS: - Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City of Manila, and he was supposed to be residing in his district according to the records of the company. - One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured at the corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. - It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso St. in Manila without notifying the company, and that at the time of his death he was returning home after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte. - According to the practice of the company, if collectors made collections on Sunday they were required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next morning. - The widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought an action to recover from the defendant corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812, P100 for burial expenses and P1,745.12 for compensation. - Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended, and they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428 fifty per cent of P16.78 for 208 weeks of P1,745.12 plus P100 for burial expenses. - Defendant as special defenses alleged that Leopoldo Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries resulting in his death was violating an ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibits work on Sunday; and that Act No. 3428, as amended, is unconstitutional and void because it denies the defendant the equal protection of the law, and impairs the obligation of the contract between the defendant and Leopoldo Madlangbayan, and deprives the Courts of First Instance of their probate jurisdiction over the estate of deceased persons and nullifies Chapters XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII, and XXXIV of the Civil Code Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code. ISSUE: WON the employer is liable to pay the employees heirs.

C. DEATH/INJURIES EMPLOYMENT

IN

THE

COURSE

OF

Page

CIVIL CODE: Art. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary

Page

RULING : NO. - As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed on November 16, 1930 and Act No. 3812 was not approved until December 8, 1930, it is apparent that the law which is applicable is Act No. 3428, section 23 of which reads as follows: When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to in the pursuance of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. - The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance of his employment. - At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation, but was on his way home after he had finished his work for the day and had left the territory where he was authorized to take collections for the defendant. - The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment", and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because such an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his employment. - The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812 to "arising out of and in the course of". Discussing this phrase, the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Mueller Construction Co. vs. Industrial Board, said: The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. By the use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employment of incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded. - If the deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his employment, the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, to recover. - In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in his own conveyance. - Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never notified the defendant corporation of his removal from San Francisco del Monte of Manila, and that the company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of the accident; that the defendant company did

not require its employees to work on Sunday, or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles. - These are additional reasons for holding that the accident was not due to and pursuance of the employment of the deceased. If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one; and if he made collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him. DISPOSITION The decision appealed from affirmed, with the costs against the appellants. was

D. STRICT LIABILITY/PRODUCT LIABILITY Blacks Law Dictionary, 6 Edition, p. 142

th

Art. 2187,CC. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. Consumer Act: REGULATION OF SALES ACTS AND PRACTICES Art. 50. Prohibition Against Deceptive Sales Acts or Practices. - A deceptive act or practice by a seller or supplier in connection with a consumer transaction violates this Act whether it occurs before, during or after the transaction. An act or practice shall be deemed deceptive whenever the producer, manufacturer, supplier or seller, through concealment, false representation of fraudulent manipulation, induces a consumer to enter into a sales or lease transaction of any consumer product or service. Without limiting the scope of the above paragraph, the act or practice of a seller or supplier is deceptive when it represents that: (a) a consumer product or service has the sponsorship, approval, performance, characteristics, ingredients, accessories, uses, or benefits it does not have; (b) a consumer product or service is of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model when in fact it is not; (c) a consumer product is new, original or unused, when in fact, it is in a deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed or second-hand state; (d) a consumer product or service is available to the consumer for a reason that is different from the fact; (e) a consumer product or service has been supplied in accordance with the previous representation when in fact it is not; (f) a consumer product or service can be supplied in a

quantity greater than the supplier intends; (g) a service, or repair of a consumer product is needed when in fact it is not; (h) a specific price advantage of a consumer product exists when in fact it does not; (i) the sales act or practice involves or does not involve a warranty, a disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty terms or other rights, remedies or obligations if the indication is false; and (j) the seller or supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or affiliation he does not have. Art. 51. Deceptive Sales Act or Practices By Regulation. - The Department shall, after due notice and hearing, promulgate regulations declaring as deceptive any sales act, practice or technique which is a misrepresentation of facts other than these enumerated in Article 50. Art. 52. Unfair or Unconscionable Sales Act or Practice. - An unfair or unconscionable sales act or practice by a seller or supplier in connection with a consumer transaction violates this Chapter whether it occurs before, during or after the consumer transaction. An act or practice shall be deemed unfair or unconscionable whenever the producer, manufacturer, distributor, supplier or seller, by taking advantage of the consumer's physical or mental infirmity, ignorance, illiteracy, lack of time or the general conditions of the environment or surroundings, induces the consumer to enter into a sales or lease transaction grossly inimical to the interests of the consumer or grossly one-sided in favor of the producer, manufacturer, distributor, supplier or seller. In determining whether an act or practice is unfair and unconscionable, the following circumstances shall be considered: (a) that the producer, manufacturer, distributor, supplier or seller took advantage of the inability of the consumer to reasonably protect his interest because of his inability to understand the language of an agreement, or similar factors; (b) that when the consumer transaction was entered into, the price grossly exceeded the price at which similar products or services were readily obtainable in similar transaction by like consumers; (c) that when the consumer transaction was entered into, the consumer was unable to receive a substantial benefit from the subject of the transaction; (d) that when the consumer was entered into, the seller or supplier was aware that there was no reasonable probability or payment of the obligation in full by the consumer; and (e) that the transaction that the seller or supplier induced the consumer to enter into was excessively one-sided in favor of the seller or supplier.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 3720 AN ACT TO ENSURE THE SAFETY AND PURITY OF FOODS, DRUGS, AND COSMETICS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC BY CREATING THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION WHICH SHALL ADMINISTER AND ENFORCE THE LAWS PERTAINING THERETO. Section 11. The following acts and the causing thereof are hereby prohibited: (a) The manufacture, sale, offering for sale or transfer of any food, drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded. (b) The adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic. (c) The refusal to permit entry or inspection as authorized by Section twenty-seven hereof or to allow samples to be collected. (d) The giving of a guaranty or undertaking referred to in Section twelve (b) hereof which guaranty or undertaking is false, except by a person who relied upon a guaranty or undertaking to the same effect signed by, and containing the name and address of, the person residing in the Philippines from whom he received in good faith the food, drug, device, or cosmetic or the giving of a guaranty or undertaking referred to in Section twelve (b) which guaranty or undertaking is false. (e) Forging, counterfeiting, simulating, or falsely representing or without proper authority using any mark, stamp, tag label, or other identification device authorized or required by regulations promulgated under the provisions of this Act. (f) The using by any person to his own advantage, or revealing, other than to the Secretary or officers or employees of the Department or to the courts when relevant in any judicial proceeding under this Act, any information acquired under authority of Section nine, or concerning any method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection. (g) The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the whole or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with respect to, a food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for sale (whether or not the first sale) and results in such article being adulterated or misbranded. (h) The use, on the labeling of any drug or in any advertising relating to such drug, of any representation or suggestion that an application with respect to such drug is effective under Section twenty-one hereof, or that such drug complies with the provisions of such section. (i) The use, in labeling, advertising or other sales promotion of any reference to any report or analysis furnished in compliance with Section twenty-six hereof.

Page

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS V CA (GERONIMO) 227 SCRA 292 DAVIDE, JR.; October 18, 1993 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business of selling food and drinks to children in the Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen located in Dagupan. - August 12, 1989 - A group of parents complained that they found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke and Sprite that their children bought from Geronimos store. Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks and found that there were indeed fibrous materials in the unopened soda bottles. She brought the bottles to the Department of Health office in their region and was informed that the soda samples she sent were adulterated. - Because of this, Geronimos sales plummeted with her regular sales of 10 cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3 cases. Her losses amounted to P200 to P300 a day which later on forced her to close down her business on December 12, 1989. - She demanded payment of damages from plaintiff Coca-Cola but the latter did not accede to her demands. - The trial court ruled in favor of Coca-Cola, stating that the complaint was based on a contract and not a quasidelict because of pre-existing relation between the parties. Thus the complaint should have been filed within 6 months from the delivery of the thing sold. - The trial court however annulled the questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in the civil case. According to the CA: the allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is an action for damages arising from respondents act of recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sol for public consumption. It also noted that the availability of an action for breach of warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective goods. Petitioners Claim: - Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. - Since the complaint is for breach of warranty (under A1561, CC), it should have been brought within 6 months from the delivery of the goods. Respondents Comments: - Geronimo alleges that her complaint is one for damages which does not involve an administrative action. - Her cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiffs right which can be brought within 4 years (based on A1146, CC). ISSUE WON the complaint is founded on a quasi-delict and pursuant to A1146(12), CC, the action prescribes in 4 years HELD YES

Reasoning - The vendees remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in A1567. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. - Under American law, the liabilities of the manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort or other grounds. DISPOSITION The instant petition is denied for lack of merit.

II SANGCO, pp 714-734

Page

E. INTERFERENCE RELATIONS

WITH

CONTRACTUAL

Art. 1314, CC. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. (n) GILCHRIST v CUDDY 29 Phil 542 TRENT; February 18, 1915 NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the CFI FACTS: -Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. Gilchrist was the owner of a theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the Zigomar for exhibition in his theatre for a week for P125. - Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist days before the delivery date so that he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350 for the film for the same period. - Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy. ISSUE: WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga is liable for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the identity of the parties HELD: YES - Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the contract and causing its breach. This liability arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. - Article 1902 of the Civil Code provides that a person who, by act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to pay for the damage done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage. No such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damages suffered. DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed

SON PING BUN vs CA (Tek Hua) GR No. 120554 Quisumbing; September 21, 1999 NATURE: Appeal on certiorari for review of CA decision FACTS: - In 1963, Tek hua Trading, through its Managing Director So Pek Giok, entered into a lease agreement with D.C. Chuan covering four stalls in Binondo. The contracts were initially for one year but after expiry of the same, they continued on a month to month basis. In 1976, Tek Hua was dissolved with the original members forming a new corporation, Tek Hua Enterprises with Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators. - So Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, occupied the same stalls under the business name, Trendsetter Marketing.

Page

- In 1989, the lessor, DC Chuan sent a letter to Tek Hua advising it of a 25% increase in rent effective September 1, 1989. A further rent increase of 30% effective January 1, 1990 was implemented. Enclosed in both letters were new lease contracts for signing. While the letters contained a statement that the leases will be terminated if the contracts were not signed, the same were not rescinded. - In 1991, Tiong wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking him to vacate the four stalls as the same were going to be used by them. Instead of vacating the stalls, So was able to secure lease agreements from DC Chuan. - Tek Hua filed an injunction and an action for nullification of the contracts between Trendsetter and DC Chuan. The lower Court ruled in favor of Tek Hua. The CA, on appeal, upheld the trial court. Both the trial court and the CA awarded legal fees only. ISSUE - WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of contract HELD- Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other of his private property. In the case at bar, petitioner, Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent of the latters property right. Reasoning- Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damges are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; b) the invasion is substantial; c) the defendants conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under the general negligence rules. - On the other hand, the elemts of tort interference are a) existence of a valid contract b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence c) interference of the third party is without legal justification or excuse - Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights over the leased stalls. The action of Trendsetter in asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful interference. - The SC handled the question of whether the interference may be justified considering that So acted solely for the purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. It stated that it is sufficient that the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives to conclude that So was not a malicious interferer. Nothing on the record imputes

deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the part of So. Hence the lack of malice precludes the award of damages. - The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous interference is Article 1314 which states that any third party who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. The Court ratiocinated that the recovery of legal fees is in the concept of actual or compensatory damages as provided in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. In this casse, due to defendants action of interference, plaintiff was forced to seek relief through the Court snd thereby incur expenses to protect his interests. The Court, however, found the award exorbitant. It was reduced to Pesos 100,000.00 Disposition: Petition denied. CA decision affirmed subject to the modified award of attorneys fees.

F. LIABILITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS Art. 2189, CC. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n)

AQUINO, pp 795-801

Page

GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN 171 SCRA 382 SARMIENTO; Mar 21, 1989 Nature: Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of CA Facts: on July 25, 1978, Florentina Guilatco, a court interpreter, accidentally fell into a manhole while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk at Perez Blvd. Her right leg was fractured, due to which she was hospitalized, operated on, and confined. She averred that she suffered mental and physical pain, and that she has difficulty in locomotion. She has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter (at the time of filing of complaint) and thus lost income. She also lost weight, and she is no longer her former jovial self. Moreover, she has been unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities which she used to do prior to the incident. Police confirmed existence of the manhole, which was partially covered by a concrete flower pot by leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 feet wide or 42 cm wide by 75 cm long by 150 cm deep. City Engineer of Dagupan Alfredo Tangco admitted that the manhole is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National Government. He said that he supervises the maintenance of said manholes and sees to it that they are properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his subordinates. Trial court ordered the city to pay Guilatco actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees. CA reversed the lower courts ruling on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove that City of Dagupan had control or supervision over Perez Blvd. City contends that Perez Blvd is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city. Issue: WON control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 CC. Held: YES - The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows: Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of

roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. - It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. - In this case, control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. - The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of the city. On the other hand, article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from defective streets, public buildings and other public works. On Damages awarded - Actual damages of P10000 reduced to proven expenses of P8053.65. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount. The court can not rely on speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the amount. - Moral damages of P150000 is excessive and is reduced to P20000. Guilatcos handicap was not permanent and disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one year. - Exemplary damages of P50000 reduced to P10000. - Award of P7420 as lost income for one year, plus P450 bonus remain the same - P3000 as attorneys fees remain the same Disposition: Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside, decision of trial court reinstated with modification.

G. PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE CIVIL CODE: Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n) Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n) Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907) Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910)

Page