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P 241108Z AUG 07 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2979 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 002835 SUBJECT: BAGHDAD: SEVEN TACTICS

MILITANTS USE TO SEIZE AND MAINTAIN CONTROL OF NEIGHBORHOODS REF: A. BAGHDAD 2834 B. BAGHDAD 2317 C. BAGHDAD 2318 Classified By: DEPUTY POLCOUNS ROBERT GILCHRIST FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D). 1. (C) SUMMARY: Extra-legal governance institutions created by Shia and Sunni militants repeatedly use the same tactics to seize and maintain control of Baghdad's neighborhoods. In almost all areas of the city, militants initially found a role and a purpose in forcibly displacing people from their neighborhoods. Armed and organized, they remained as neighborhood power brokers after expelling their putative foes. Very few militants put down their weapons; instead, they used their weapons to intimidate and control members of their own sect. They then maintained and extended this control by expelling government officials and non-governmental organizations (NGOs); delivering many of the services that

legitimate institutions used to provide; controlling religious institutions and practices, as well as political rhetoric; recruiting unemployed, unskilled young men; and fomenting conflict and chaos. Repeated all over the city, these actions continue to constitute the seven core tactics employed by Baghdad's militants and their affiliated governance institutions. This cable is the second in a series (Reftel A) on extra-legal government in Baghdad, drawing on analysis and information from Baghdad PRT and the six Baghdad EPRTs. END SUMMARY. ----------------------------TACTIC 1 - DISPLACE THE OTHER ----------------------------2. (C) Militants who control many neighborhoods in Baghdad came to power in an atmosphere of fear and insecurity, and continue to thrive on it. Locals report that many armed groups came together in response to legitimate security concerns. One contact explained that his neighborhood felt extremely vulnerable to criminals and terrorists before cohesive militant groups arrived. "I can survive without money, food, or clothes," he said, "but I need to protect my family." Many Shia and Sunni militant groups, however, targeted individuals for extortion, kidnapping, and expulsion both before and after Coalition Forces arrived in 2003, motivated by criminal gain and sectarian prejudice. As a local contact surmised, "Before February 2006, people moved for economic reasons or because of specific threats." After the February 2006 bombing of the Samarra mosque,

however, militants began expelling perceived enemies with ferocity and purpose. Contacts report that armed Shia groups began targeting Sunnis whom they perceived could facilitate further attacks against Shia civilians and shrines. They ejected Sunnis from neighborhoods across the city. Sunni insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) responded in kind, displacing Shia on a massive scale. Both groups have also targeted other minority groups, including Christians and Yezidis. 3. (C) In almost all areas of Baghdad, militants found a role and a purpose in forcibly displacing people from their neighborhoods. Militant groups often initially took the form of self-appointed vigilante squads, with the self-assigned job of rooting out the so-called internal enemy from a minority sect. Pursuit of the locally-defined "other" became a violent obsession among many local militant leaders. 4. (C) A Sunni Sheikh in the Huriya neighborhood of Khadhamiyah district described the progressive militia violence that displaced thousands of Sunnis from Kadhamiya. First, he said, local Shia militants put bullets in envelopes and sent them to Sunni homes and stores. Then they wrote threats on the walls of apartment buildings, houses and shops. Next the militants spread terrifying rumors. Eventually, they killed a single family member of remaining Sunni families, hoping to cause the others to flee. Then they lobbed mortars at or planted bombs in Sunni areas. As the violence became progressively more menacing, Shia militants surrounded markets, schools and medical centers and

killed Sunnis inside. They also monopolized jobs in the local police and used this monopoly to establish fake checkpoints, often in coordination with the Iraqi Army. Finally, they attacked, burned, or bombed Sunni mosques in the neighborhood, often converting them into Shia mosques, or Husseiniyas. They then set up local offices inside some of these newly acquired mosques. Shia fleeing from Sunni areas described similar experiences, though many have reported that the violence began more suddenly than it did in Shia-majority areas, and it often started without warning. 5. (C) Crucially, the act of displacement transformed local militants into neighborhood power brokers. According to a local Shia contact, "After they (JAM) kicked out the Sunnis, they controlled everything." The collective use and application of force provided militants a sense of power that many of their members had not previously experienced. Very few of them put down their weapons after expelling their putative foes. Instead, they consolidated their control by turning their weapons on members of their own sect. -----------------------------TACTIC 2 - INTIMIDATE YOUR OWN -----------------------------6. (C) To consolidate local control after expelling minorities, militants have not generally required a large presence. When describing the size of the militant groups that control their neighborhoods, local contacts report a wide range

of numbers. "Some neighborhoods," a Baghdad resident reported, "live in terror because of five sadistic bullies." Local estimates range as to how many members a militant group requires to control an entire neighborhood, from approximately five to 100 members. The militants must merely find a means to intimidate local residents sufficiently to earn their obedience. Contacts throughout Baghdad have described a variety of horrific practices aimed at achieving local domination, from one-off public murders, to the regular dumping of tortured bodies in visible locations. These practices have occurred throughout the city, with particular frequency in neighborhoods along sectarian fault lines in western Mansour, western Rashid, and southern Adhamiya. Militants thus initially establish their dominion not through popular demand but through brazen public cruelty. ---------------------------------------------TACTIC 3 - EXPEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND NGOs ---------------------------------------------7. (C) Militants, upon seizing control of their neighborhoods, generally attacked or ejected local representatives of the Government of Iraq. They deliberately prevented the government from functioning, before taking credit for filling the vacuum that they created. It proved impossible, however, for militants to replace government officials without commanding government resources. Militant leaders soon learned that they could not provide most essential services to their neighborhoods without drawing on state-controlled or stateproduced assets, such as refined oil, water

purification pumps, electricity sub-stations, and sewage systems. When they eventually re-engaged with the state to acquire these resources, militant groups did so on their own terms, by intimidating many government officials into representing, or at least deferring to, their interests. Co-opted officials include Amanat directors general, ministry technocrats, and District and Neighborhood Council members. (NOTE: Post will report on the relationship between militant groups and legitimate government Septel. END NOTE.) 8. (C) Militants not only ejected state actors from Baghdad neighborhoods, they also expelled groups that traditionally fill the void created when the state fails -- local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Militants suspected the motives and political affiliations of purportedly unaligned local service providers. They sought to scare away all neutral actors. By targeting NGO workers for assassination, militants created for them an untenable atmosphere of fear and insecurity. Local residents began to avoid NGOs because they knew that association with unaffiliated strangers might put them at risk of attack by militants. 9. (C) In addition to government officials and NGO workers, militants in Baghdad have also targeted many of Baghdad's professionals. Some local residents explained that militant groups fear the independent mindset of professionals. "They don't want professionals -- they want followers," said one local contact, explaining that militants sometimes kill doctors, lawyers and engineers in

order to replace them with unqualified loyalists. In part as a result of this practice, Baghdad has experienced an unprecedented flight of its professional class. -------------------------------------------------TACTIC 4 - PROVIDE SERVICES TO DEPENDENT RESIDENTS -------------------------------------------------10. (C) By creating an atmosphere of fear, militants have immobilized Baghdad's population. The vast majority of local residents continually report, in interviews and surveys, that they are scared to travel outside of their neighborhoods. Without freedom of movement, locals limit the extent to which they travel to health care providers, markets, schools, jobs, and social service offices. These essential services and public goods must, as far as possible, be brought to the neighborhood. 11. (C) Residents of Baghdad neighborhoods with a limited government and NGO presence, few professionals, and restricted mobility have grown reliant on the governance capacity of the militant groups that control their areas. Thus militants have artificially created local dependence upon the security and services that they can offer. The governance institutions of militant groups currently provide, with differing degrees of effectiveness in various parts of the city, at least the following services: -- local security against rival militant groups;

-- shelter, food rations, money, and clothing to vulnerable populations, including displaced persons, orphans, widows, unemployed and poor people, and families of detained or killed fighters; -- subsidized oil, propane, and kerosene for cars, generators, and stoves; -- increased access to electricity; -- access to facilities. health care practitioners and

Paradoxically, militants have created a situation in which people turn, for help in solving their daily problems, to the groups that contribute significantly to their creation. 12. (C) Two recent examples in Baghdad's Karada and Kadhamiya districts illustrate ways in which militant groups have assumed governance roles. Following a particularly deadly vehicle-born improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack in Karada on July 27, locals report that the Provincial Council (PC) and District Council (DAC) delivered blankets, water, and USD 800 to each of the 120 families whose homes the attack destroyed. The PC also reportedly offered 64 families USD 8,000 to pay for a new home and land to build it on, in another Baghdad district; apparently, they failed to locate a housing option in the same neighborhood or district. By the time PC officials made this offer, they learned that the local OMS office had already provided to all 64 families

apartments in a building in the same neighborhood where they used to live. Similarly, local contacts in the Shula neighborhood of Kadhamiya district reported in early August that OMS has outperformed the local Neighborhood Council (NAC) in the crucial task of re-settling internally displaced people (IDPs). NAC officials now reportedly send IDPs directly to the local OMS office, where Sadrists register the families with the PC, move them to new homes, and coordinate their relief assistance. 13. (C) It is not always possible to tell which comes first -- ineffective service delivery, or the appearance of alternative institutions -- since legitimate governance institutions in Baghdad perform markedly better in some areas than they do in others. It is clear, however, in all instances in Baghdad, that the government loses influence and effectiveness when faced with rival governance institutions buttressed by armed militants. In one area where the city has failed to deliver services, the Muthana-Zayuna neighborhood of 9 Nissan district, a group of local residents reportedly sent a letter directly to Muqtadr Al-Sadr asking him to provide them with electricity, according to a local contact who lives in the neighborhood. When the legitimate government retreats, then the extra-legal government benefits significantly from its absence. ----------------------------------------TACTIC 5 - CONTROL THE MOSQUES, RELIGIOUS PRACTICES, AND POLITICAL RHETORIC -----------------------------------------

14. (C) Mosques and their clerics (Shia Imams / Sunni Sheikhs) have become the site and object of sectarian struggle. Warring militants seek to destroy mosques belonging to rival sects, and to control the clerics operating mosques belonging to their own sect. Many of the clerics in Baghdad whose influence does not extend beyond their neighborhood still serve their local communities as credible religious leaders. Since clerics continue to serve as important arbiters of local power, militants covet their allegiance. Their mosques offer an important public venue for the sort of "strategic communications" that bolsters political agendas. Clerics also continue to serve as a trusted source of social welfare provision. 15. (C) Locals have accused all the major militant groups of abusing the sacred status of mosques by using them as hide-outs, weapons caches, detention centers, and torture chambers. OMS often opens its neighborhood governance office inside the local Shia mosque, or Husseiniya. Contacts have described Sadrist-dominated Husseiniyas as the equivalent of the "311/411" call centers available in some American cities because Sadrists send people -especially new arrivals to the neighborhood -- to their Husseiniyas to collect information about the array of social services on offer locally. In this regard, OMS offices situated in Husseiniyas serve a worldly function, but their sacred location also lends them a weighty air of religious authority, and serves as a clear symbol of sectarian affiliation. Husseiniyas thus provide a degree of legitimacy by enabling OMS members to conduct charitable giving from a

traditional venue for such activities. AQI and Sunni insurgents, especially those affiliated with the Wahabbist movement, also reportedly seek religious sanction and a public voice through control of the local mosque and its Sheikh. 16. (C) In addition to controlling activities within religious institutions, local militant groups seek to dictate religious practices outside of them. The self-proclaimed prerogative of policing religious behavior offers militant groups a justification for exercising social control. All of the militant groups in Baghdad seek to manipulate religious institutions and clerical authority to foist their particular interpretations of Islamic texts upon the private lives and public comportment of local residents. Contacts report that militants often demonstrate that they have dominion over the neighborhood by attacking or killing individuals -- very often women -- who fail to follow their religious edicts. In June, for instance, residents of the Adhamiya neighborhood of Adhamiya district described constant, violent harassment of unveiled local women by AQI. Many women from both sects say that they feel unsafe in militant-controlled areas of Baghdad if they do not wear a hijab or, at the least, cover their hair. They suggest that the pious pretensions of militant leaders barely conceals a simple desire to control their neighbors. 17. (C) Militants continually make clear the terrifying consequences of publicly challenging their political will. Local contacts report that many people, out of fear, have changed political

affiliation from secularist or moderate parties to the party preferred by local militants. All Embassy contacts in militant-dominated areas report that they no longer feel free to express their opinions about political parties or national issues -- let alone their views about the role of militant groups and extra-legal government. Residents generally do not gather to protest publicly unless instructed to do so by local militants. Many who live in areas controlled by the more extreme militants have commented that the political atmosphere reminds them of the constant paranoia fostered by Saddam Hussein's regime. "We used to have one Saddam, but now we have 1,000," one woman remarked, with reference to the stifling of political freedoms by militants. -------------------------------------------------TACTIC 6 - RECRUIT UNEMPLOYED, UNSKILLED CADRES BY OFFERING MONEY, MEMBERSHIP, AND CHANCE FOR REVENGE -------------------------------------------------18. (C) Militant groups employ simple but effective recruiting tactics. They require no experience or training, pay above-market rates, provide immediate material benefits, convey a sense of belonging and security, and offer a chance for violent revenge against perceived enemies. Local leaders most often target uneducated and unemployed young men, aged approximately 16 years and older, to fill the "front line infantry" ranks. According to local contacts, many groups offer approximately 200,000 Iraqi dinars per month (USD 200), plus an Ak-47, with an immediate bonus payment of 100,000 Iraqi dinars (USD 100) upon joining. While the

more capable recruits often join marauding special teams, most young members conduct security and patrol work in neighborhoods, markets, public transportation centers, parking garages, and checkpoints. Membership includes perks, such as privileged access to fuel, electricity, rations -and, crucially, immunity for their family from attack, robbery or extortion by the militants. Militants also recruit both male and female residents of different ages simply to form a local neighborhood watch. These people receive payment merely to sit at home and report on the behavior of their neighbors, and on the arrival of strangers to the area. 19. (C) Locals complain that it is much harder to acquire and maintain a legitimate job in Baghdad than it is to work for militants. Contacts report that it often requires a bribe (reportedly of up to USD 600) to become a government official -- a desirable position that offers job security and social status. Militant recruiting efforts benefit from the paucity of job opportunities for young men in Baghdad, especially in overcrowded, poor areas with high unemployment rates, like Sadr City. The widespread lack of mobility also helps recruiters; when people fear traveling to schools, universities or jobs outside their district, local opportunities assume greater appeal. 20. (C) Much like gangs in American urban centers, many militant groups offer young people the sense of belonging that comes from joining a cohesive group with a shared identity and belief system. Crucially, for the many individuals who

have lost family members as a result of sectarian violence, militant groups also provide their members a chance to avenge those that they blame for causing their loss. One contact told Poloff the story of a Sunni insurgent commander from Haifa Street who was 15 years old, which is young by the standards of Baghdad's militants. He reportedly spent little time protecting his neighborhood or attacking Coalition Forces; instead, he went on a homicidal rampage, clinically murdering every Shia he could find, because JAM members had killed his father. Eventually, JAM assassinated him. His apocryphal story serves as an appropriate symbol for Baghdad's unremitting cycle of violence. ------------------------------------------TACTIC 7 - PERPETUATE NEED FOR YOUR ROLE BY FOMENTING CONFLICT AND CHAOS ------------------------------------------21. (C) Militant groups perpetuate the need for their role as protectors and service-providers by continually fomenting conflict and chaos. They attack neighborhoods run by rival militants; kidnap and murder government officials and wealthy businessmen; bomb shrines, mosques, schools, and processions; destroy vital infrastructure; assassinate professionals and NGO workers; and even shoot garbage collectors. Rather than the conscious calculation of a centralized group of militant leaders, these actions may stem from the intuitive logic of groups that thrive in anarchic conditions. Much like warlords, militant leaders only seek order that they can locally impose and control, while maintaining enough insecurity in the

broader environment to keep the government at bay. While AQI currently conducts the most horrific attacks on mass gatherings, all of Baghdad's militants benefit from the perception of state failure that these attacks create. Without a state, their presence appears justified and sustainable. 22. (C) Since few of the more destructive acts committed by militants offer any hope of material profit, they do not appear to be criminally motivated. Some local contacts believe that they form part of a political and territorial agenda. Militant groups, such as JAM, aggressively attack rival areas and rival leaders, hoping to acquire control of more neighborhoods in Baghdad. They seek to control "lines of communication" -- key streets and areas that enable them to establish security and governance links across neighborhood lines, in order to strengthen their hold on entire districts of the city (Reftels B and C). CROCKER (Edited and reading.) reformatted by Andres for ease of

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