Court File No.

: 33800 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL) BETWEEN: SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND MUSIC PUBLISHERS OF CANADA APPELLANT

- andBELL CANADA, THE CANADIAN RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, APPLE CANADA INC., ROGERS COMMUNICATIONS INC., ROGERS WIRELESS PARTNERSHIP, SHAW CABLESYSTEMS G.P., TELUS COMMUNICATIONS INC., ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE ASSOCIATION, ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE ASSOCIATION OF CANADA and CMRRNSODRAC INC. RESPONDENTS

SAMUELSON-GLUSHKO CANADIAN INTERNET POLICY AND PUBLIC INTEREST CLINIC, CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY TEACHERS, FEDERATION OF LAW SOCIETIES OF CANADA AND CANADIAN LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE AND COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION INTERVENERS

FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER, CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY TEACHERS

Torys LLP 79 Wellington Street West, Suite 3000 Box 270, TD Centre Toronto, ON M5K 1N2 Wendy Matheson Andrew Bernstein Tel: (416) 865.0040 Fax: (416) 865-7380 E-mail: abernstein@torys.com Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian Association of University Teachers

Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP Suite 1900, 340 Albert Street Ottawa, ON K1R 7Y6 Patricia J. Wilson Tel: (613) 235-7234 Fax: (613) 235-2867 E-mail: pwilson@osler.com Ottawa Agent for the Intervener, Canadian Association of University Teachers

TO: AND TO:

REGISTRAR Matthew S. Estabrooks Gilles M. Daigle D. Lynne Watt Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP 2600-160 Elgin Street Box 466 StnA Ottawa, ON KIP lC3 Tel: (613) 786-0159 Fax: (613) 788-3451 Counsel for the Appellant

COPY TO:

Gerald L. (JAY) Kerr-Wilson AnneKo Fasken Martineau Dumoulin LLP 55 Metcalfe Street Suite 1300 Ottawa, ON KIP 6L5 Tel: (613) 236-3882 Fax: (613) 230-6423 Counsel for the Respondents, Bell Canada, Rogers Communications Inc., Rogers Wireless Partership, Shaw Cablesystems G.P., Telus Communications Inc.

AND TO:

Glen A. Bloom Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP 340 Albert Street Suite 1900 Ottawa, ON KIR 7Y6 Tel: (613) 787-1073 Fax: (613) 235-2867 Counsel for the Respondent, Canadian Recording Industry Association

Patricia J. Wilson Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP 340 Albert Street Suite 1900 Ottawa, ON KIR 7Y6 Tel: (613) 787-1009 Fax: (613) 235-2867 Counsel for the Respondent, Canadian Recording Industry Association

AND TO:

Casey M. Chi sick Tim Pinos Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP Scotia Plaza 2100 - 40 King Street West Toronto, ON M5H 3C2 Tel: (416) 869-5403 Fax: (416) 644-9326 Counsel for the Respondent, CMRRAlSODRAC Inc.

Eugene Meehan, Q.C.

McMillian LLP 50 O'Connor Street Suite 300 Ottawa, ON KIP 6L2 Tel: (613) 232-7171 Fax: (613) 231-3191 Agent for the Respondent, CMRRAlSODRAC Inc. Colin S. Baxter

AND TO:

Barry B. Sookman Steven G. Mason Daniel Glover McCarthy Tetrault LLP P.O. Box 48, Suite 4700 T-D Bank Tower Toronto-Dominion Centre Toronto, ON M5K 1E6 Tel: (416) 601-7949 Fax: (416) 868-0673 Counsel for the Respondent, Entertainment Software Association, Entertainment Software Association of Canada

Cavanagh Williams Conway Baxter LLP 1111 Prince of Wales Drive Suite 401 Ottawa, ON K2C 3T2 Tel: (613) 569-8558 Fax: (613) 569-8668 Agent for the Respondent, Entertainment Software Association, Entertainment Software Association of Canada Douglas Brown Nelligan O'Brien Payne LLP 50 O'Connor, Suite 1500 Ottawa, ON KIP 6L2 Tel: (613) 231-8210 Fax: (613) 788-3661 Agent for the Respondent, Apple Canada Inc.

AND TO:

Michael Koch Goodmans LLP Barristers and Solicitors 333 Bay Street, Suite 3400 Toronto, ON M5H 2S7 Tel: (416) 979-2211 Fax: (416) 979-1234 Counsel for the Respondent, Apple Canada Inc.

AND TO:

David Fewer Universite d'Ottawa Centre for Law, Technology and innovation (CIPPIC) 57 Louis Pasteur St. Ottawa, ON KIN 6N5 Tele: (613) 562-5800 Ext. 2558 Fax: (613) 562-5417 Counsel for the Intervener, Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic

AND TO:

Ronald E. Dimock Bruce W. Stratton Sangeetha Punniyamoorthy Dimock Stratton 3202 - 20 Queen Street West Box 102 Toronto, ON M5H 3R3 Tel: (416) 971-7202 Fax: (416) 971-6638 Counsel for the Intervener, Federation of Law Societies of Canada and Canadian Legal Information Institute

John S. Macera

Macera & Jaryna 1200 - 427 Laurier Avenue West Ottawa, Ontario KIR 7Y2 Tel: (613) 238-8173 Fax: (613) 235-2508 Agent for the Intervener, Federation of Law Societies of Canada and Canadian Legal Information Institute Sylvian Rouleau

AND TO:

Andrea Rush Brad Elberg Charlene Lipchen Heenan Blaikie LLP Suite 2600, P.O. Box 185 Royal Bank Plaza, South Tower Toronto, Ontario M5J 2J4 Tel: (416) 360-3541 Fax: (416) 360-8425 Counsel for the Intervener, Computer & Communications Industry Association

Heenan Blaikie LLP 55 Metcalfe Street Suite 300 Ottawa, Ontario KIP 6L5 Tel: (613) 236-1668 Fax: (613) 236-9632 Agent for the Intervener, Computer & Communications Industry Association

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

PART I - OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................... 1 PART II - QUESTION IN ISSUE ............................................................................................ 1 PART III - STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT ........................................................................... 2 Interpretation of Research ................................................................................................... 2 Fairness Factors ................................................................................................................... 6 Fair dealing not constrained by international obligations ................................................... 7 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 10 PART IV - SUBMISSION ON COSTS ................................................................................... 10 PART V - RELIEF REQUESTED .......................................................................................... 10 PART VI - TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ 11 PART VII - STATUTES RELIED ON ....................... ~ ............................................................ 12

- 1-

PART I - OVERVIEW

1.

The Canadian Association of University Teachers is the national voice for college and

university academics - people extensively involved with research. CAUT has intervened in this case to assist the Court with the interpretation of research in the fair dealing exception under the
Copyright Act, as well as some related aspects of the fairness test. CAUT seeks to assist the

Court in considering the potential ramifications of its decision about fair dealing beyond the specific facts of this case. 2. Research is not just an activity engaged in by experts through a systematic inquiry for the

purpose of proving or disproving a hypothesis or creating a new work. Research can be done by people without any special expertise, such as students just beginning to explore a new subject. It can involve gathering random, disjunctive facts, unsystematically. It can lead to conclusions, or creations of new works, or it can be a long road to nowhere. Whatever its outcome in a particular case, a large and liberal interpretation of research for the purposes of fair dealing fosters the creation, use and dissemination of knowledge, in the public interest. 3. A broad interpretation of "research" in s. 29 not only serves the purposes of the

Copyright Act, it is necessary to give the breathing space needed to advance the goals of the fair

dealing exception for research. It is necessary to ensure balance between rights of users and rights of owners under the Act. To narrow fair dealing, as proposed by the appellant, would disturb that balance. It would turn a broad public user right into a narrow, specialized privilege. There is no reason to do so.
PART II - QUESTION IN ISSUE

4.

CAUT will address these three aspects of the arguments advanced on this appeal: (a) (b) why research should be given a large and liberal interpretation; how the amount of the dealing and the commercial nature of the activity should be considered when evaluating certain of the fairness factors; and (c) why the Court should reject the invitations to roll back CCHbased on the "threestep test" under international instruments.

-2-

PART III - STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT

Interpretation of Research

5.

The interpretation of "research" must accord with the purpose of the fair dealing

exception within the statutory scheme, which is to balance the rights of users and owners under the Act. As a result, fair dealing, including the meaning of research, must be given a large and liberal interpretation and not the narrow restrictive meaning that SOCAN suggests. 6. The purposes of the Copyright Act The central goals of the Copyright Act are to

encourage the creation and the dissemination of literary, artistic and other works, as well as providing ajust reward to their creators. The Act's principal tool to accomplish these goals is to grant several exclusive rights to creators, including a limited statutory monopoly over the reproduction and performance of their works. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association ofInternet Providers [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, 2004 SCC 45 at para. 50 [SOCAN v. CAIP} 7. Fair dealing is an exception to this statutory monopoly. Under fair dealing, which is

properly considered a user right, users may copy works without infringing copyright so long as they are engaging in research or private study and they deal with the works in a manner that is fair. Fair dealing serves the purposes of the Act by encouraging dissemination of information, knowledge and ideas, and can (although need not) lead to the creation of new works. CCH Canadian v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339; 2004 SCC 13 at para. 48 8. As the respondents Apple and Bell explain in more detail, the dual purposes of the Act

and the role of fair dealing in encouraging the dissemination of works provide ample justification for a large and liberal definition of research in the context of fair dealing. However, there are further important reasons arising from fair dealings' role in the statutory regime. 9. Fair dealing is an essential counterbalance to the exclusive copyright regime. The right is

intended to blunt the sharp edges of the monopoly the Act provides to copyright owners, by providing breathing space for the use of works for particular purposes.

-3-

10.

Fair dealing recognizes that the social value of works will be limited if they simply

accumulate in a library or archive. The value of works arises when people read, listen to, look at and watch them. These people are the "users" and it is user rights - fair dealing being the most crucial - that need to be balanced against the rights of creators and owners of copyrighted works. This is not necessarily because every user will become a creator, but because the very purpose of works - their ultimate value - is that they are used. It is for this reason that fair dealing and other user's rights are "not just loopholes." It is only through ensuring robust rights for users that the

Act can be given a "fair and balanced reading," ensuring the Act serves its statutory purposes,
while preserving the breathing space that fair dealing permits. Balance requires that research be given a large and liberal interpretation.

CCH Canadian at para. 48

11.

Permitting many different types of uses to constitute research encourages new solutions

to problems through the use of new ideas, methods, tools and technology. It also ensures that unorthodox or untested methods are not inhibited by the Copyright Act. What constitutes research necessarily evolves as both technology and modes of analysis are developed over time. Indeed, challenging the boundaries of what is conventionally considered to be research is an essential activity of academics and historically has been at the root of innovation and progress. 12. The Internet era has made a broad definition of research even more crucial to preserving

balance between users and owners. This Court has recognized that "[t]he capacity of the Internet to disseminate "works of the arts and intellect" is one of the great innovations of the information age." However, while a user might use more traditional forms of works (e.g., books) without implicating the rights in the Copyright Act, the Internet and related technology rely on the dissemination of digital copies of works, even for uses that do not seriously impact the economic interests of copyright holders. This is apparent from the facts of this case, where the previews at issue replace listening to music at the store before buying it.

SOCAN v. CAlP at para. 40

13. Finally, even a broad definition of research cannot seriously detract from owners' rights.

Whether or not a use is research does not finally determine whether or not it constitutes fair

-4-

dealing. It must also be fair. Conversely, defining research too narrowly will have a serious impact on user's rights because it forecloses the activity, even if it has no impact on owners' rights. It precludes the application of the fairness factors to all the uses that fall outside the narrow definition of research. 14. In sum, as the Court indicated in CCH, research under s. 29 must be given a large and

liberal interpretation. Fair dealing encourages the creation and dissemination of works, the central purposes of the statutory monopoly under the Copyright Act. It also ensures that users' rights under the Act are in balance with owners' rights. Whether or not a particular use constitutes research is a threshold question for fair dealing. As a result, an overly narrow definition will preclude the use of the balancing factors to determine fairness, and skew the balance away from users, and toward owners, upsetting the balance under the Act. CCH Canadian at para. 51

15.

Broad definition of research precludes SOCAN's definition. The importance of fair

dealing to the creation, use and dissemination of works means that SOCAN's definition of research must be rejected. SOCAN suggests that research be defined as "the systematic investigation into and study of materials and sources in order to establish facts and reach new conclusions, " and requires that research always be directed towards the creation of a new work. This definition adds requirements outside the common-sense understanding of the word. It ignores legitimate uses of works, in favour of formalistic requirements. 16. There are four obvious problems with SOCAN's definition of research: a) The requirement of systematic investigation ignores the reality that research can be conducted in other ways. It could involve a systematic inquiry, but may also be done informally or unsystematically, or through innovation, in new ways not yet contemplated. Unorthodox or innovative methods may lead to breakthroughs in our understanding of the world, and should fall within "research" in the fair dealing exception. b) The requirement that research reach new conclusions suggests that early exploratory research (for example, to formulate hypotheses, or gain inspiration),

- 5-

or late-stage confirmatory research (where the conclusion has already been reached, but is being tested or confirmed) are excluded from the scope of fair dealing, which cannot be justified. c) The requirement that the activity be focused on establishing/acts, excluding other research goals such as reaching or testing beliefs, opinions or theories. This restriction excludes many modes of academic and other types of research. d) The proposed requirement that research must lead to the creation of a new work, which ignores realistic and fair ways in which users can and should be able to use works, even if they never lead to the creation of a new copyrightable work. 17. The definition of "research" under s. 29 needs to be robust, to include the process of

searching, investigating, inquiring, studying, observing or experimenting. It needs to be forward-looking, and therefore should not exclude novel or unorthodox methods. It should accommodate many different objectives, such as reaching conclusions, making decisions, developing theories, formulating hypotheses, confirming others' conclusions, or simply learning for its own sake. Finally, there is no reason why it has to be directed towards the creation of a new work, for reasons discussed below. 18. No new work required SOCAN proposes to limit research to uses directed to the

creation of new works. This is misguided. Not only does it run counter to the purposes offair dealing - including, most crucially providing breathing space for users of works and balancing owners' rights with users' rights - it would also lead to absurd results. 19. Some examples of uses of works that should meet the definition of research, but would be

excluded by SOCAN because they are not necessarily directed to creation of new works include the following activities: a) a doctor who is faced with a difficult clinical case and photocopies part of a reference textbook to take home and read for the purpose of investigating the case and providing a diagnosis;

-6-

b)

a science professor who copies a series of journal articles to evaluate whether the experiments they describe are reproducible; and,

c)

a lawyer who copies a couple of case comments and headnotes of cases from a law library for the purpose of rendering a verbal opinion to a client.

20.

These examples, which are all normally considered research, do not necessarily involve

creating a new work. There is no reason to impose an arbitrary "new work" requirement. 21.

u.s. fair use does not require transformative uses.

Finally, SOCAN is wrong to

suggest that, under American law, only "transformative" uses can benefit from the fair use exception. One of the U.S. Supreme Court's seminal opinions on fair use, Sony v. Universal City Studios, involved a decidedly non-transformative use, VCR time-shifting (i.e., recording television shows to be watched at a different time than they are broadcast), which was found to be fair use. While the transformative nature of a use is a factor that the U.S. courts consider, it is not a requirement for fair use. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) at 455-6; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) at 579
Fairness Factors

22.

While CAUT does not propose to deal with all of the fairness factors, which are

comprehensively addressed by Apple and Bell, it does seek to respond to two issues: (1) aggregation in the amount of the dealing; and, (2) the commercial nature of the research at issue.
23.

Aggregation is not appropriate. SOCAN argues that, because the amount of previewed

music on iTunes apparently exceeds the amount of downloaded music, there can be no fair dealing. There are two obvious problems with this argument. First, it makes fair dealing essentially unworkable in practice. Second, the concern that aggregation attempts to raise (that the fair dealing will "swamp" the paid uses) is already dealt with by the fairness factors. 24. Consider a professor who photocopies journal articles to take home and read for a paper

she is writing. Whether or not this constitutes fair dealing should not depend on an analysis of the total amount of photocopying from those journals by everyone who makes copies, compared to their paid circulation in a given year. The professor cannot know these facts in advance, or

-7-

perhaps at all, and therefore is left in a permanent state of uncertainty regarding whether she can make the copies to further her research. Indeed, the very same activity might be fair dealing one year and rendered unfair in a different year, as these aggregate figures change. The amount of the photocopying, to the extent it may be relevant, should be considered on the basis of individual use only. 25. An aggregate analysis may show an adverse impact on the market for the work. Even

then, this is but one factor and not determinative. The textured nature of fair dealing is very different than pointing to comparative numbers and suggesting that their sheer quantities should determine the outcome of the analysis.

26.

Commercial nature of research just one consideration. SOCAN also argues that the

Court should consider the commercial purpose of the previews at issue in this case. However, it does not go so far as suggesting that this will be determinative, nor should it be. Research is often done for a commercial purpose, or with an ultimate motive of commercial gain. It can be conducted with financial support. It can be conducted by industry. It can be conducted using commercially-available tools offered by a for-profit enterprise. None of these activities should be foreclosed from fair dealing simply because of their commercial aspect - the answer should and will lie in the balance of all the factors under the fairness analysis. Fair dealing not constrained by international obligations 27. Canada's international obligations neither require the Court to narrow the scope offair

dealing, nor determine the outcome in this case. CSI's and CRIA's arguments rely heavily on the "three-step test" under various international instruments, as interpreted by a single WTO panel considering a very different exception. Even on the panel's analysis, a large and liberal definition of fair dealing under s. 29 of the Act is consistent with the three-step test. However, CSI and CRIA overstate the effect of the WTO panel's decision, and fail to recognize the more liberal, but equally authoritative, interpretations of these international instruments. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 1869 UNTS 299, 33 ILM 1197 (1994) [TRIPs], art. 3 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1971, 111 UNTS 30, s. 9(2)

-8-

United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act (2000), WTO Doc WT/DS160/R (Panel Report)
28.

Consistent with the Three-Step Test. Even if the Court accepted the submission that the

three-step test must be employed strictly, the fair dealing exception articulated in CCH fits comfortably within it. Fair dealing as interpreted in CCH already encompasses only (1) "certain

special cases" that (2) "do not conflict with a normal exploitation o/the worlC'; and (3) "do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holder."
29. CRlA and CSI wrongly suggest that "research" must be defined narrowly to ensure that it

constitutes a "certain special case." Research is not an exception to copyright, and therefore need not comply with the three step test. The exception is fair dealing as a whole. The right question is, therefore, whether fair dealing is a "certain special case." It is. 30. Uses that both constitute research and are fair are "certain special cases," even using the

WTO panel's definition, which provides that the nature of the exception be clearly defined, have a distinct objective and not overwhelm the non-exceptional uses. Fair dealing for the purpose of research, as defined by this Court in CCH, meets all of these criteria.

WTO Decision at paras. 6.108-6.113; CCH Canadian at paras. 48-60

31. Fair dealing also complies with the second and third stages of the test: not interfering

with normal exploitation of the work and not unreasonably prejudicing the legitimate interests of rights holders. In fact, the six fairness factors from CCH internalize these very questions, by requiring the court to consider the nature of the dealing, the alternatives to the dealing and the effect of the dealing on the work. 32. This is well-demonstrated by the facts of this case. While CSI argues that "there is no

doubt that previews have value," the record establishes exactly the opposite. The Copyright Board found that even if the previews at issue did not constitute fair dealing, they would award zero royalties for previews. This finding suggests that previews neither interfere with the normal exploitation of the work nor unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of rights holders.

Copyright Board Decision, para. 159, Appellant's Record, pp. 55-56

-9-

33.

These international instruments provide no reason to retract users' rights in the way

SOCAN, CRIA and CSI have suggested. Further, and as described below, there is good reason to conclude that the three-step test is not nearly as strict as these parties suggest.

34.

WTO Panel's decision not afinal authority on meaning o/TRIPS. The Court is not

bound by the single WTO panel's interpretation of the scope of permitted exceptions to copyright. It is not even binding on subsequent WTO panels, let along this Court. Indeed, the panel's decision has been criticized, and different national courts have provided different interpretations to the test, leading one writer to conclude "[w]hat these cases suggest is that the "three-step test" is (at least as currently understood) much too crude a tool to function as a useful method of determining the appropriate answer to questions about the application of copyright exceptions in novel situations." Griffiths, J., "The "Three-Step Test" in European Copyright LawProblems and Solutions", Queen Mary University of London, School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 31/2009, p. 18 35. The WTO treaty - TRIPS - expressly recognizes that the three-step test is not intended to

upset the balance between users and owners in copyright law. The objective of TRIPS, set out in Article 7, state that "[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations." TRIPs, art. 7 36. A group of high-profile copyright scholars, having carefully considered the three-step

test, stated that "[l]imitations and exceptions [to copyright] are the most important legal instrument for reconciling copyright with the individual and collective interests of the general public [i.e., users]." As a result, they have advocated that "[i]n determining the scope of application of limitations and exceptions, the Three-Step Test should not take into account only the interests of right holders." As one of them stated, it was always intended to "be uncontroversial" and to "accommodate the whole range of exceptions in existing national laws ... serving only to preclude the most obviously wholesale destruction of the reproduction right at

- 10 -

national level." Indeed, the Three-Step Test itself contains qualifiers - "normal exploitation",

"legitimate interest" and "unreasonable prejudice" - intended to provide flexibility for countries
and their courts to determine the scope of limitations and exceptions. Griffiths, p. 21; Geiger, "Declaration: A balanced interpretation of the "three-step" test in Copyright Law," (2008) IIC 707 at 709
Conclusion

37.

CAUT urges the Court to confirm fair dealing as a user's right that must be interpreted in

a large and liberal manner. It should reject the notion that fair dealing, or research, must somehow be confined to professionals using traditional, formal methods to create new works. "Research" should include the engineering professor who might copy journal articles to research a new type of engine, and a member of the public who might copy newspaper articles, or print out websites, to research which car to buy. Whatever the outcome of any particular case, a large and liberal interpretation of research fosters the creation, use and dissemination of knowledge, in the public interest. A narrow definition of fair dealing would turn a broad public user right into a narrow, specialized privilege.
PART IV - SUBMISSION ON COSTS

38.

CAUT does not seek costs and asks that no costs be awarded against it.
PART V - RELIEF REQUESTED,

39.

CAUT respectfully requests that it be permitted to make oral submissions at the hearing.

July 28,2011

WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

Of counsel for the Intervener, Canadian Association of University Teachers

- 11 -

PART VI - TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Authority

Cases 1.

Citing Paragraphs

Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association of Internet Providers [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, 2004 SCC 45 CCH Canadian v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339; 2004 SCC 13 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994)

6, 12

2.

7, 10, 14

3.

21

4. Legislation 5.

21

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 1869 UNTS 299, 33 ILM 1197 (1994) Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1971, 111 UNTS 30, s. 9(2) United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act (2000), WTO Doc WT/DS160/R (Panel Report)

27,35

6.

27

7.

27

Secondary Sources
8.

Griffiths, J., "The "Three-Step Test" in European Copyright Law - Problems and Solutions", Queen Mary University of London, School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No.

34, 36

3112009
9.

.
36

Geiger, "Declaration: A balanced interpretation of the "three-step" test in Copyright Law," (2008) lIC 707

- 12 -

PART VII - STATUTES RELIED ON Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, s. 29

29. Fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study does not infringe copyright. 29. L'utilisation equitable d'une oeuvre ou de tout autre objet du droit d'auteaur aux fins d'etude privee ou de recherche ne constitue pas une violation du droit d'auteur.