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The Fraternal Order of UTOPIA

ATENEO de MANILA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW SINCE 1964 For tomorrow shall cast a myriad of mighty storms where only those with firm determination and Utopian vision do survive


ADVOCATE : One who assists, defends or pleads for another. One who renders legal advice and aid, and pleads the cause of another before a court or a tribunal; a counselor. A person learned in the law and duly admitted to practice, who assists his client with advice, and pleads for him in open court. An assistant; adviser, a pleader of causes (Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., 1990, 55) ATTORNEY-AT-LAW : A person admitted to practice law in his respective state and authorized to perform both civil and criminal legal functions for clients, including drafting of legal documents, giving legal advice, and representing such before courts, administrative agencies, boards, etc. (Id., 128) That class or persons who are, by license, officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are developed by law as a consequence. (Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., (1988), 82, citing Cui v. Cui, 120 Phil 729) ATTORNEY-IN-FACT : A private attorney authorized by another to act in his place and stead, either for some particular purpose, as to do a particular action, or for the transaction of business in general, not necessarily of legal character. This authority is conferred by an instrument in writing, called a letter of attorney, or more commonly a power of attorney (Blacks Law Dictionary, supra., 129) CONCURRING OPINION : A separate opinion delivered by one or more judges which agrees with the decision of the majority of the court but offering own reasons for reaching that decision. (Id., 291) COUNSEL (OR COUNSELOR) : An attorney; lawyer. A member of the legal profession who gives legal advice and handles the legal affairs of a client, including if necessary, appearing on his or her behalf, in civil, criminal, or administrative actions and proceedings. (Id., 348) DISSENTING OPINION : A mere expression of the individual view of the dissenting justice from the conclusion held by the majority of the court. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., 279, citing Garcia v. Perez, 99 SCRA 635) EASEMENT : An encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable property belonging to a different owner (Civil Code, Art. 613)


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA A liberty, privilege, or advantage without profit which the owner of one parcel of land may have in the land of another. A service which one estate owes to another. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., 302) A right or privilege in the (estate of an individual) for the advantage or convenience of the owner of another estate. Essentially, a burden, a charge upon the servient estate. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Gurtiza v. Castro, 13 June 1985 and Ereneta v. Mascunana, 23 April, 1963) INTERLOCUTORY ORDER : An order is interlocutory when it does not terminate or finally dispose of the case, because it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing People v. Hewald, 105 SCRA 1297) An order made by to secure some end and purpose necessary and essential to the progress of the suit and generally collateral to the issues formed by the pleadings and not connected with the final judgment (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Rodriguez v. Vera, 2 October, 1974) One that is provisional and leaves substantial proceeding to be had in connection with its subject in court by whom it was issued. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Bairan v. Tan Siu Lay, 28 December, 1966) An order is considered interlocutory if it does not dispose of the case but leaves something else to be done by the trial court on the merits of the case. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra, citing De Guia v. Constantino, 10 February, 1981) One which does not, of itself, definitely settle or conclude any of the rights of the parties to the action (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Dais v. Garduno, 49 Phil 168) One which is a determination on some incident or collateral matter that does not dispose of the merits of a controversy (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Sison v. Ocba, 7 March, 1986) JUDICIAL POWER : Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Philippine Constitution, Art. 8, Sec. 1) The authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violation of such rights. (Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756) LANDMARK DECISION : A decision of the Supreme Court that significantly changes existing law. (Blacks Law Dictionary, supra., 879) LAW : A large body of rules and regulations, based mainly on general principles of justice, fair play and convenience, which have been worked out and promulgated by governmental bodies to regulate human activities and define what is and what is not permissible conduct in various situations. (Kinyon, How to Study Law) The term law is also used in a much broader sense to denote the whole process by which organized societythrough governmental bodies and personnel (legislative, courts, administrative tribunals, law-


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA enforcement agencies and officers, penal and corrective institutions, etc.)attempts to establish and maintain peaceful and orderly relations between the people in that society. (Id.) Law is classified into (a) Natural Law which derives its force and authority from God and (b) Positive Law rule of action freely established and promulgated by a competent authority for the benefit of the common good. (Id.) The sources of law are (a) legislation, (b) Supreme Court decisions or judicial precedents, and (c) customs (Id.) LAW OF THE CASE : A legal principle that when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case, such declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal. The rule made by an appellate court, while it may be reversed in other cases, cannot be departed from in subsequent proceedings in the same case. The general rule is that legal conclusions announced on a first appeal, whether on the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only prescribed the duty and limit the power of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but they become and remain the law of the case in all after steps below or above on subsequent appeal. The rule is grounded on convenience, experience and reason. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Zarate v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil 749) Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the courts. (21 CJS. 330) LAWYER : A person learned in the law; as an attorney, counsel, or solicitor; a person licensed to practice law. Any person who prosecutes or defends causes in courts of record or other judicial tribunal, or whose business it is to give legal advice or assistance in relation to any cause or matter whatever. (Blacks Law Dictionary, supra., 888) LEADING CASE : Among the various cases that are argued and determined in the courts, some, from their important character have demanded more than usual attention from the judges, and from this circumstance are frequently looked upon as having settled or determined the law upon all point involved in such cases, and as guides for subsequent decisions, and from the importance they thus acquire, are termed leading cases. (Id.) A case, the decision of which establishes a principle. (Oxford Law Dictionary) MUTATIS MUTANDIS : After making the necessary changes (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., 613, citing US v. Ponte, 20 Phil 384) OBITER DICTUM : A statement made in passing; a rule issued on a point not necessarily involved in the case (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., 643, citing Montano v. Insular Government, 12 Phil 588) A remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, by the way, that is, incidentally or collaterally and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Morales v. Paredes, 55 Phil 565) An opinion uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects. The opinion of the court upon any point or principle which it is not required to decide. An opinion of the court which does not embody its determination and is made without argument or full consideration of the point, and is not the professed deliberate determination of the judge himself. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., 643-644, citing People v. Macadaeg, 91 Phil 413) An opinion expressed by the court upon some question of law, which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., 44, citing Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, 59 SCRA 120) A [personal opinion of a judge] on a collateral question uttered by the way. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Gallegos v. Philippine Racing Club, 25 July, 1980) A mere incidental expression of the views of the court. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Jandug v. Cloribel, 54 OG 700) A dictum which generally is not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule may be followed if sufficiently persuasive (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Lee v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 204) RATIO DECIDENDI1 : The ground or reason of the decision. The point in a case which determines the judgment (Blacks Law Dictionary, supra., 1262, citing Morales v. Paredes, 55 Phil 565) The reasoning or principle upon which a case is based. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., 787, citing US v. Pico, 18 Phil 390) RES JUDICATA2 : A rule that as between the parties to the first judgment and their privies, it operates as a bar to a second litigation but also as to all matters which might have been litigated therein, whereas in an action between then upon a different cause it is a bar only as to matters actually litigated. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra, 821, citing Palanca Tanguinlay v. Quiros, 10 Phil. 262) A doctrine which precludes parties from re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by prior and final judgment. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra, 821-22)

A clarification should be made at this point. A distinction exists between ratio decidendi and judgment in that the latter pronounces the disposition of the case, while the former provides the basic reason for such determination. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Republic v. Cuevas, 11 November, 1975 2 At this juncture, it should be noted that Law of the Case does not have the finality of the doctrine of Res Judicata and applies only to the one case, whereas res judicata forecloses parties or privies in one case by what has been done in another case. A further distinction is that the doctrine of the law of the case is akin to that of former adjudication, but is more limited in its application. It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case. The doctrine of res judicata differs therefrom in that it is applicable to the conclusive determination of issues of fact, although it may include questions of law, and although it may apply to collateral proceedings in the same action or general proceeding, it is generally concerned with the effect of an adjudication in a wholly independent proceeding. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra., citing Comilang v. Court of Appeals, 65 SCRA 79)


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA In its broad concept, the rule means that when a court of competent jurisdiction has determined, on its merits, a litigated cause, the judgment entered, until reversed, is, forever and under all circumstances, final and conclusive as between the parties to the suit and their privies, in respect to every fact which might properly be considered in reaching a judicial determination of the controversy, and in respect to all points of law there adjudged as those points relate directly to the cause of action in litigation and affect the fund or other subject matter then before the court. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra, 822, citing Viray v. Marinas, 49 SCRA 50) The requisites for a judgment to be in res judicata are (1) The judgment must be final and executory and not merely interlocutory; (2) The judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties and nature of the suit; (3) The judgment must be on the merits, or at least have the effect of an adjudication on the merits; and (4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, or causes of action, or, in certain cases, reliefs prayed for. It is not necessary that there is be absolute identity, it being sufficient that there is substantial identity of parties. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra, 823, citing De Guia v. Espiritu, 28 January, 1980) STARE DECISIS : The doctrine that, when the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same, regardless of whether the parties and property are the same. (Blacks Law Dictionary, supra, 1406, citing Horne v. Moody, Tex. Civ. App., 146 S.W. 2d. 505; Philippine Law Dictionary, supra, 902, citing Government v. Jalandoni, 44 OG 1840) State decisis simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra, citing Prudential Bank and Trust Co. v. International Asian Co., 6 August, 1974) STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIETA MOVERE : Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra, citing Santiago v. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 410) Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. (Philippine Law Dictionary, supra, citing J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Mariano, 85 SCRA 647)

What is stare decisis? Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco Filipino Savings,

GR No. 137980

Banco Filipino sold eleven (11) real estate properties housing its branch sites to petitioner, including the Davao branch site subject of the instant suit. Immediately following the sale, petitioner leased the same branch sites to respondent. According to respondent, petitioner was merely holding out

FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA such properties for it for a three percent (3%) per annum add-on to their carrying cost. Respondent further claims that it was part of their agreement that the said properties would be returned to it at its pleasure at the same transfer price. Under the terms of the eleven-year amended contract presented by petitioner, the lease expired on August 31, 1992. Petitioner claims that thereafter, the lease was extended on a month-to-month basis on the condition that whatever terms and conditions are agreed upon would retroact to September 1, 1992. The parties negotiations failed to yield any results, whereupon petitioner informed respondent that the rental rates shall be those it submitted to the latter, which were based on a study by the Asian Appraisal Co., Inc., retroactive to September 1, 1992. More particularly, rates were as follows: Two Hundred Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Pesos (P200,840.00) monthly with a rental escalation of ten percent (10%) per year, with four months deposit, four months advance deposit, and a Five Hundred Thousand Peso (P500,000.00) goodwill. Respondent refused to comply with these terms. Instead, it continued to pay rent in the old monthly rate until March 31, 1994, when it totally ceased paying any rent. Petitioner instituted a Complaint for Ejectment against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Davao City. The court a quo rendered its Decision dismissing the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, after finding that the real issue, i.e., which of the two contracts of lease was controlling, was not capable of pecuniary estimation. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City affirmed the decision in toto. With the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered its now questioned Decision holding that both lower courts erred in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the case when the issue of validity of lease contract is intertwined with the issue of possession. However, it dismissed the Petition to maintain judicial stability and consistency, it appearing that in other similar ejectment suits brought before the Court of Appeals, the twenty-year lease contract presented by respondent had been upheld. Subsequently, however, on Motion for Reconsideration of respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and revoked its order for payment of back rentals. Issue: W/N THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OPERATES AS STARE DECISIS BETWEEN PARTY-LITIGANTS? Held: It is not the eleven (11)-year lease contract but the twenty (20)-year lease contract which is the real and genuine contract between petitioner Tala Realty and private respondent Banco Filipino. Considering that the twenty (20)-year lease contract is still subsisting and will expire in 2001 yet, Banco Filipino is entitled to the possession of the subject premises for as long as it pays the agreed rental and does not violate the other terms and conditions thereof (Art. 1673, New Civil Code)." In light of the foregoing recent Decision of this Court, we have no option but to uphold the twentyyear lease contract over the eleven-year contract presented by petitioner. It is the better practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. "Stare decisis et non quieta movere." Here, therefore, even if the property subject of the Decision of G.R. No. 129887 is located in Urdaneta, Pangasinan while that in the instant case is located in Davao, we can very well apply the conclusion in that it is the twenty-year lease contract which is controlling inasmuch as not only are the


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA parties the same, but more importantly, the issue regarding its validity is one and the same and, hence, should no longer be relitigated. Thus, while we are bound by the findings of this Courts Second Division in that case under the principle of stare decisis, the fact that respondents failure to pay any rentals beginning April 1994, which provided ground for its ejectment from the premises, justifies our departure from the outcome of G.R. No. 129887. In this case, we uphold petitioners right to eject respondent from the leased premises. J. M. TUASON v. MARIANO 23 OCTOBER 1978 FACTS: Manuela and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a certain parcel of land. They claimed that the land was acquired by their father by Spanish title. The Aquials alleged that J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon the land. They further alleged that the land in question had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735, and was registered in the names of the petitioners Tuason. The Aquials also claimed that the TCT were issued to defendants J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and the National Waterworks and Sewerage System (NAWASA). The Aquials prayed that OCT NO. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceedings. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The lower court denied the motion. ISSUE: W/N OCT NO.735 AND THE TITLES DERIVED THEREFROM CAN BE QUESTION AT THIS LATE HOUR BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. HELD: NO. The Court noted that the supposed irregularities in the land registration proceedings were the same issues raised in the civil cases decided by Judge Eulogio Mencias. In those case, Judge Mencias ruled that OCT NO.735 was invalid. On appeal to the Supreme Court, that decision was reveresed, and the validity of OCT NO.735 was once more upheld. The Court underscored the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere. The holding of the courts that OCT NO.735 is valid should no longer be open to attack. EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS v. PEDRO MARCAIDA FACTS: In Spanish HELD: The rule of stare decisis does not apply to the extent of perpetuating an error. It is the duty of every court to examine its own decisions without fear and to revise them without reluctance. As was well said in a case, 'I hold it to be the duty of this court freely to examine its own decisions, and, when satisfied that it has fallen into a mistake, to correct the error by overruling its own decision. An

GR NO. L-953

FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA acknowledged error must be more venerable and more inveterate than it can be made by any single decision before it can claim impunity upon the principle of stare decisis. Precedents are to be regarded as the great storehouse of experience; not always to be followed, but to be looked to as beacon lights in the progress of judicial investigation. Their 'authority must often yield to the force of reason, and to the paramount demands of justice as well as to the decencies of civilized society, and the law ought to speak with a voice responsive to these demands.



FACTS: This is the case of the Davide Impeachment. Eighteen petitions were filed all in all which culminated to this case. On June 2, 2003, a first impeachment complaint was filed against then Chief Justice Hilario Davide and 7 other associate justices of the SC for culpable violation of the Constitution, Betrayal of public trust and other high crimes by Joseph Estrada as endorsed by Reps Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen. Such complaint was later on referred to the House Committed on Justice, which dismissed the complaint ruling that it was sufficient in form but insufficient in substance. Later, a second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Davide, endorsed by Reps. Teodoro and Funtabella and signed by at least one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives. Meanwhile, Section 3(5) of Article 11 of the Constitution bars a second impeachment complaint against an impeachable officer (Justices of SC, Members of Constitutional Commissions, President, VP, Ombudsman), while Sections 16 and 17 of the internal rules of the House of Representatives bars a second impeachment complaint only when there is a proper initiation of the complaint, in this case, when the House Committee on Justice has declares that the complaint is sufficient in substance ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 16 AND 17 OF THE INTERNAL RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ARE VALID? WHETHER OR NOT THE SECOND IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT IS BARRED UNDER THE SECTION 3(5) OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONSTITUTION? HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House of Impeachment Rules are unconstitutional for being incoherent with Section 3 of Article 11 of the Constitution. According to the Commissioner Bernas (Fr. Bernas) of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. Hence, the SC held that it is very clear that the framers of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution intended initiation to start with the filing of the complaint and not when the House Committee on Justice

FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA declares the complaint to be sufficient in substance. Because of this, when the first impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide, Jr. was filed on June 2, 2003, that complaint is considered to be initiated, even though it was dismissed on Oct. 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Being so, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide, Jr. is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. RES JUDICATA

Plaintiff sued the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) and the spouses Cirilo B. Garcia, seeking the nullification of the sale of the disputed lot and the cancellation of the certificate of title in favor of defendants-spouses. She assailed the authority of the PHHC to make the award to said spouses, on the ground that they are disqualified to purchase the lot since they had previously acquired another lot from the PHHC and are the owners of several other lots. Defendants-spouses set up as special defense the pendency of an action to quiet titled and/or recovery of possession of the disputed lot previously filed against plaintiff. Judgment was subsequently rendered in favor of Garcia in the action to quiet title. Whereupon, he moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, which the court dismissed based on the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals which certified the case to the Supreme Court since the appeal involves pure questions of law. The Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal holding that the cause of action in the first case, which it to remove the cloud on the title of the land is different from the cause of action in the second case which not only seeks the nullification of the award and sale to the awardee and the cancellation of the certificate of title, but also places in issue the power and authority of the grantor to make the award to one disqualified to purchase the same. ISSUE: WHETHER THE FINAL JUDGMENT IN THE FIRST CASE FOR QUIETING OF TITLE AND/OR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION, CONSTITUTES RES JUDICATA AS WOULD BAR THE APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF AWARD AND DEED OF SALE AND CANCELLATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE TO THE LAND

HELD: In the application of the doctrine of res judicata, if it is doubtful whether a second action is for the same cause of action as the first, the test generally applied is to consider the identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest upon different states of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment is one is no bar to the maintenance of the other. An action which seeks not only the nullification of the award of a lot by the PHHC, the cancellation of the certificate of title, but also places in issue the power and authority of the grantor (PHHC) to make the award and sell the land to one disqualified to purchase the same is not barred by a prior action which seeks only to remove the cloud on the title of the land. Since the power of authority of


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA the PHHC was not in issue in the first case to quiet title and neither was the qualification of the awardee, plaintiff therein, directly determined, the judgment in said case (quieting of title) is not conclusive and binding in the second case for annulment of the award and sale, and for the cancellation of the title of the awardee or purchaser. A judgment in an action to quiet is not conclusive as to matters not in issue and determined, particularly where such matters could not have determined in such action.


GR. NO. 125607

FACTS: This case involves dispute among siblings. There were several transactions involving parcels of land. Herein plaintiffs filed civil case against Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos and ICP. They prayed for the annulment of the deeds of sale in favor of Rosafina Reginaldo, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, and Rafael Ramos and Rosemarie Cayabyab; cancellation of transfer certificate of titles and recovery of possession of the First and Second Parcels by virtue of an alleged deed of donation inter vivos purportedly executed by Eulalia Cayabyab in favor of the petitioners herein. On the other hand, the defendants claimed that all the transactions over the First Parcel were entered into free from all liens and encumbrances not inscribed in the title. Recognizing the final decision in Civil Case No. 15298 on the nullity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and the corresponding TCTs issued in favor of Pastor Cayabyab. The respondents herein as appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred in applying the principle of res judicata to the judgment in Civil Case No. 15298. ISSUE: WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA APPLIES HELD: For res judicata to apply, there must be (1) a former final judgment rendered on the merits; (2) the court must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and, (3) identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the first and second actions. According to the appellate court, the third requisite for the application of res judicata is not present in this case. In order to determine the identity of the causes of action in Civil Case Nos. 15298 and 15937, and consequently, the application of the doctrine of res judicata, it is essential to consider the identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both causes of action. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same and covered by the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA upon different states of fact, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other. The evidence required to prove the allegations in Civil Case No. 15937, which involves the annulment of the subsequent transactions and TCTs covering the subject parcels of land and the recovery of possession thereof on the basis of the alleged deed of donation inter vivos, is necessarily more than that required in Civil Case No. 15298, which involves only the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and the corresponding TCTs covering the First and Second Parcels.

Res judicata, therefore, does not apply.

AGILET TECHNOLOGIES V. INTEGRATED SILICON TECHNOLOGY FACTS: There is a 5-year Value Added Assembly Services Agreement entered into between Integrated Silicon and the Hewlett-Packard Singapore (Pte.) Ltd., Singapore Components Operation. Under the terms of the VAASA, Integrated Silicon was to locally manufacture and assemble fiber optics for export to HP-Singapore. HP-Singapore, for its part, was to consign raw materials to Integrated Silicon; transport machinery to the plant of Integrated Silicon; and pay Integrated Silicon the purchase price of the finished products. Integrated Silicon filed a complaint for "Specific Performance and Damages" against Agilent and its officers. On the other hand, Agilent filed a separate complaint against Integrated Silicon for "Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages. The Court granted the writ of replevin. ISSUES: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN APPRECIATING THE IDENTITY OF PARTIES; WHETHER THE CASE IS DISMISSIBLE ON THE GROUND OF LITIS PENDENTIA HELD: YES. The Court of Appeals correctly appreciated the identity of parties in Civil Cases No. 31232001-C and 3110-2001-C. Well-settled is the rule that lis pendens requires only substantial, and not absolute, identity of parties.29 There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case. Likewise, the fact that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case or vice versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia. NO. Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second GR NO. 154618



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other The identity of parties notwithstanding, litis pendentia does not obtain in this case because of the absence of the second and third requisites. The rights asserted in each of the cases involved are separate and distinct; there are two subjects of controversy presented for adjudication; and two causes of action are clearly involved. In this case, any judgment rendered in one of the actions will not amount to res judicata in the other action. There being different causes of action, the decision in one case will not constitute res judicata as to the other. Of course, a decision in one case may, to a certain extent, affect the other case. This, however, is not the test to determine the identity of the causes of action. III. LAW OF THE CASE BUAYA V. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE GR NO. 139020

FACTS: Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. filed a complaint against Paquito B. Buaya, its erstwhile branch manager for Cebu for the collection of the principal amount of owing to the Stronghold. For failure of the Buaya and his counsel to appear at the scheduled pre-trial, petitioner was declared in default. Court a quo ruled in favor of Stronghold ISSUES: CAN A DECISION OF A REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH IS ANNULLED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS BE REINSTATED BY THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RENDERED THE DECISION OR ANY TRIAL COURT FOR THAT MATTER AND THEREAFTER ORDER ITS EXECUTION? HELD: YES. The trial court's Decision was reversed and set aside, not annulled, by the appellate court. Since it was merely set aside to enable petitioner to present his evidence, then there was nothing wrong with the Order of the trial court reinstating its original decision after he had failed to take advantage of the ample opportunity given him to present evidence. The CA remanded the case to the court of origin for further hearing, not for retrial. A motion for new trial under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, is a remedy separate and distinct from an appeal. A Writ of Execution of the March 16, 1995 Order of the trial court reinstating the September 17, 1987 Decision


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA was issued by the trial court on May 11, 1995. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a Writ of Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. It is axiomatic that once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is erroneous. Having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment may no longer be altered even at the risk of occasional legal infirmities or errors it may contain.


A.M. NO. RTJ-94-1131

FACTS This is an administrative complaint for Gross Ignorance of the Law filed by Miguel Argel against Judge Herminia M. Pascua. Complainant contends that respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Respondent Judge alleged that she rendered the judgment of acquittal because she erroneously thought that there was no witness who positively identified the accused, herein complainant, as the perpetrator of the crime. Her mistake was brought about by the fact that the testimony of the eyewitness was not attached to the records at the time she wrote her decision. However, when she re-read her notes after her attention was called by the lawyer of the private complainant that there was such an eyewitness, respondent confirmed that there was indeed one in the person of Tito Retreta. Hence she "revised" her previous decision and rendered the Decision dated 19 August 1993 finding the accused guilty of murder. Fully aware of her prior decision of acquittal, respondent nevertheless ordered the police to bring complainant Argel to court not for the purpose of having him incarcerated but only to inform him of her new decision so that he could be made to answer for his civil liabilities arising from the crime. ISSUE: Whether a judge can "revise" her decision of acquittal withour violating the right of the accused against double jeopardy? HELD: NO. Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration except to correct errors which are clerical in nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion, or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moromoro or mock trial. A final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness. Complainant herein was already acquitted of murder by respondent. Applying the aforestated rule, the decision became final and immutable on the same day. As a member of the bench who is always admonished to be conversant with the latest legal and judicial developments, more so of elementary rules, respondent should have known that she could no longer "revise" her decision of acquittal without violating not only an elementary rule of procedure but also the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judge Herminia M. Pascua, RTC-Br. 25, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, is FINED P20,000.00, the same to be deducted from her retirement benefits. Since respondent has already compulsorily retired as of 18 September 1998, let her retirement benefits be immediately released to her minus the amount of P20,000.00 herein imposed on her as fine.



This is a per curiam decision of the SC of the Motion for Reconsideration of Leo Echegaray, represented by FLAG, affirming his conviction for the crime of raping his 10 year old daughter and meting him the penalty of death pursuant to R.A. 7659, the Death Penalty Law.

267 SCRA 682

ISSUE: Whether the decision attained finality notwithstanding new legal and factual matters raised on appeal. HELD: SC held that these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal but with regard to the issue on jurisdiction, they ruled that although the offended party signed an Affidavit of Desistance, she testified in court that she is not withdrawing the charge against the accused since he might do the same thing to other women, so the trial court had jurisdiction. ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FACTS: This is a per curiam decision of the SC of the Motion for Reconsideration of Leo Echegaray, represented by FLAG, affirming his conviction of the crime of raping his 10 year old daughter and imposing on him the penalty of death pursuant to RA 7659. On this Supplemental Motion for Recon, the SC summarized the issue as follows: 1. Failure to consider the pardon by mother and offended party, failure of prosecution to point exact date, due process, etc. 2. Incompetence of counsel 3. Constitutionality of RA 7659 HELD: Factual matters can no longer be raised. While the victim signed an affidavit of desistance, she still wanted to pursue the case since he might do the same to other women. Thus the trial court continued to have jurisdiction. Furthermore, the client is bound by the mistakes of counsel During the deliberation on the Constitution the framers originally wanted to abolish the death penalty. But it seems this proposal did not materialize. The dissenting party was unwilling to absolutely excise the death penalty from our laws and leave society helpless in the future upsurge of crimes or other similar emergencies. Thus, the move to add the phrase unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails: 1. For Congress to define heinous crimes 2. Congress to specify penalty of death only on crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with definition set in the Death Penalty Bill and designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to 301 SCRA 96



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA death. Death must only be imposed upon the presence of circumstances proven in court which characterize the crime as heinous in accord with DP. 3. Congress an be similarly motivated be compelling reason involving heinous crimes. The preamble of RA 7659 gives the definition or description of heinous crimes heinous for being grievous, odious, hateful, offenses which by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrages to common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. 4. RA 6659 is replete with procedural and substantive safeguards to ensure its correct application

The Death Penalty per se is not per se cruel, degrading, inhuman punishment as ruled by the USSC in Furman vs. Georgia. The issue in such case was not so much on the Death Penalty itself but on the arbitrariness pervading the procedure by which such was imposed by the jury. It was centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused. Thus, it did not outlaw Death Penalty because it was cruel or unusual. In fact, after Furman, when most states re-enacted the Death Penalty statutes but now bearing procedural checks, the court affirmed their constitutionality. The death penalty is not a cruel, degrading, inhuman punishment for the crime of rape even if it does not involve the taking of life (as is necessary in the case of Cooker vs. Georgia USSC). The SC rejected the contention of petitioners on the ground that: They fail to see how the case of Cooker could have any bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context on our own culture. The gauge of death penalty is not the attendance of death on the part of the victim. To do so is an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice. Death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivable execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person on criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts not because they have caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and survival of government. In People vs. Cristobal, Rape is a forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It injures justice and charity, deeply wounds respect, freedom and physical and moral integrity, causes grave damage and marks the victim for life an intrinsically evil act, an outrage against decency and dignity that hurts the victim of society. If we are to preserve the humane society we will have to retain sufficient strength of character and will to do the unpleasant in order that tranquillity and civility may rule comprehensively. It seems very likely that capital punishment is a . . . necessary, if limited factor in that maintenance of social tranquillity and ought to be retained on this ground. To do otherwise is to indulge in the luxury of permitting a sense of false delicacy to reign over the necessity of social survival. LAWYERS, COURTS AND JUDGES FERNANDEZ V. GRECIA A.C NO. 3694

FACTS: This disbarment complaint against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia was filed by Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and Achilles Bartolome and the St. Luke's Medical Center. The


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA respondent is charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft of some pages from a medical chart which was material evidence in a damage suit filed by his clients against the aforenamed doctors and St. Luke's. In this case, the late Fe Linda Aves was seven (7) months pregnant when she was admitted as a patient at St. Luke's Hospital. She complained of dizziness, hypertension, and abdominal pains with vaginal bleeding. Dr. Fernandez, head of the OB-GYNE Department of St. Luke's, Dr. Ongtengco, Jr., a cardiologist, and Dr. Bartolome, a urologist, examined Mrs. Aves and diagnosed her problem as mild preeclampsia. Five (5) days later, on Christmas Day, Mrs. Aves was discharged from the hospital, to celebrate Christmas with her family. However, she was rushed back to the hospital the next day, December 26, 1990. On December 27, 1990, she died together with her unborn child. Blaming the doctors of St. Luke's for his wife's demise, Attorney Damaso B. Aves, along with his three (3) minor children, brought an action for damages against the hospital and the attending physicians of his wife. Atty. Grecia was their counsel. The medical records of Fe Linda Aves were produced in court by St. Luke's, as requested by Attorney Grecia. The records were entrusted to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles. However, upon arriving in court for another hearing of the case, Attorney Grecia borrowed from Mrs. Robles the folder containing the medical records of Mrs. Aves. While leafing through the folder, Grecia surreptitiously tore off two (2) pages of the medical records. The respondent's act was noticed by Mrs. Robles and Maria Arnet Sandico, a clerk. They saw Grecia crumple the papers and place them inside the right pocket of his coat. He immediately returned the folder to Mrs. Robles (who was momentarily rendered speechless by his audacious act) and left the office. Mrs. Robles examined the medical chart and found pages "72" and "73" missing. She ordered Sandico to follow the respondent. Sandico saw Grecia near the canteen at the end of the building, calling a man (presumably his driver) who was leaning against a parked car (presumably Grecia's car). When the man approached, Grecia gave him the crumpled papers which he took from his coat pocket. The latter in turn reported it to Judge Capulong. The three of them Judge Capulong, Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico went downstairs. Ms. Sandico pointed to Judge Capulong the man to whom Grecia had given the papers which he had filched from the medical folder of Linda Aves. Judge Capulong told Sandico to bring the man to her chamber. In the presence of Attorneys Aves and Limson, Mrs. Robles, Ms. Sandico, and a visitor, Judge Capulong confronted the man and ordered him to give her the papers which Grecia had passed on to him. The man at first denied that he had the papers in his possession. However, when Sandico declared that she saw Grecia hand over the papers to him, the man sheepishly took them from his pants pocket and gave them to Judge Capulong. ISSUE: WHETHER ATTY. GRECIA VIOLATED RULE 1.01, CANON 1 OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AS WELL AS Canon 7 THEREOF HELD: By stealing two pages from Linda Aves' medical chart and passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility as well as Canon 7 thereof which provide that: "Canon 1. . . . "Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct." "Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the Bar. The Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer. Atty. Grecia is DISBARRED. REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN GR NO. 105938

FACTS: Petitioners in this case and private respondent Roco were all then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (commonly known as ACCRA). ACCRA performed services for clients which included acquiring and/or organizing business associations and/or organizations where it acted as incorporators or simply as stockholders. As members of the law firm, petitioners and Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of companies included in Civil Case No. 0033. In keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders. Civil Case No. 0033 RP v. Eduardo Cojuangco et. al., for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stock in certain corporations PCGG later on filed a motion to admit 3rd amended complaint, which excluded Roco in Civil Case 33 as party defendant. PCGG was removing Roco because Roco was going to make choochoo and reveal the identity of the principals. The ACCRA lawyers then filed a comment and/or opposition saying that they should also be removed the way that Roco was. PCGG then said that it will ask for their exclusion only if they will also disclose the identity of their clients During the proceedings, Roco did not actually reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder The ACCRA lawyers motion for exclusion was denied (they refused to comply with the PCGGs offer) by the PCGG and the court. Hence, this motion for certiorari. ISSUE: W/N THE ACCRA LAWYERS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE CASE Held: Yes. It is apparent that the ACCRA lawyers were only impleaded to force them to disclose the identity of their clients. PCGG has no valid cause of action ISSUE: W/N THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PROHIBITS THE ACCRA LAWYERS FROM REVEALING THE IDENTITY OF THEIR CLIENTS Held: General rule: a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery Exceptions: where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability Where revealing the identity would furnish the only link that would be necessary to convict an individual of a crime Suing the lawyer to force him to disclose the identity of his client in any of these instances is improper and the suit, upon motion, may be dismissed on such ground.



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA The prosecution should rely on the strength of their evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. Roco merely stated that he was acting as nominee-stockholder for the client and is part of legitimate lawyering. The ACCRA lawyers also made such statement and should also be dropped. The relation of attorney and client is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The lawyer is more than a mere agent or servant because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client.


FACTS: Elvira Vidal Tuason de Rickards is the owner of a private subdivision located at Sampaloc, Manila. In 1954, the lots therein were leased to various tenants among whom were Bernardo Manalang, Vicente de Leon and Salvador de Leon. As the City of Manila allegedly increased the assessment of said land effective January 1, 1954, the administrator thereof notified the tenants of the corresponding increase of the rentals of the lots therein. The said tenants, however, insisted on paying the former rate, and as the landowner refused to accept the same, the former consigned them in court. Elvira Vidal Tuason de Rickards, assisted by her husband, Jose A. Rickards, instituted with the Municipal Court of Manila civil case for ejectment. Therein defendants filed separate motions to dismiss invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1162, which was approved on June 18, 1954. The matter was duly heard and the Municipal Judge of Manila issued an order denying the motions to dismiss and suspending the proceedings for 2 years from the enactment of Republic Act No. 1162 or until further order from the Court. Upon motion of the plaintiffs, the Municipal Judge issued an order setting the cases for hearing on the merits. Defendants tried to secure a reconsideration of the aforesaid order but as their motion was denied, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Manila against the spouses Rickards and the Judges of the Municipal Court of Manila, alleging that the order of the same Court of July 14, 1954, already disposed of the action and determined the rights of the parties. The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petition on the ground that the order of the inferior court was merely interlocutory in nature, and that the statements contained in the body thereof were the basis of the court's ruling, as embodied in the dispositive part thereof denying the motion to dismiss and suspending the proceedings therein for 2 years or until further order from the court. ISSUE: WHETHER THE ORDER OF THE INFERIOR COURT OF JULY 14, 1954, IS INTERLOCUTORY OR NOT HELD:



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA The order of the Municipal Judge of July 14, 1954, is clear enough to call for any construction or interpretation, for while it opens with the paragraph stating that it was the opinion of the court "and so holds that from the approval of Republic Act No. 1162 no ejectment proceedings should be instituted", etc., the dispositive portion of the order decreed the denial of the motion to dismiss which was based on the same Republic Act No. 1162. And this ruling is understandable. It appears that the actions for ejectment were filed before the enactment of Republic Act No. 1162 and conceivably under the general principle that laws can only be enforced prospectively, the Municipal Judge for one reason or another saw it fit to suspend the proceedings for quite a long period, probably with the expectation that the question of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1162 might be in the meantime duly passed upon. The resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing. In the case at bar, considering that the dispositive part of the order merely suspended the proceedings without touching on the merits of the case or disposing of the issues involved therein, said order cannot be said to be final in character but clearly an interlocutory one which in this case cannot be the subject of an action for certiorari. It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declarations in the body of said order that may be confusing. In the case at bar, considering that the dispositive part of the order merely suspended the proceedings without touching on the merits of the case or disposing of the issues involved therein, said order cannot be said to be final in character but clearly an interlocutory one which in this case cannot be the subject of an action for certiorari.

PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, vs. HON. VICENTE ERICTA GR NO. L-40675 FACTS: The Court dismisses for lack of legal basis and merit this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition to set aside the questioned orders of respondent judge granting execution of its final and executory decision and judgment ordering petitioner corporation to execute the sale of the subject property in favor of private respondent and to annul the corresponding transfer certificate of title issued by respondent register of deeds in favor of said respondent pursuant to the deed of sale executed by respondent branch clerk of court on behalf of petitioner corporation as authorized by respondent judge. Private respondent Jaime O. Rivera had obtained as plaintiff the judgment of December 28, 1971 granting his action for specific performance and "ordering the defendant [petitioner PHHC] to execute a deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff [respondent Rivera] of the entire property. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to execute the corresponding deed of sale in favor of respondent despite two writs of execution issued by respondent judge at respondent's instance, with the claim not set forth in the aforesaid board resolution that respondent had not completed payment of the purchase price (at cost). ISSUE: WHETHER THE RESPONDENT JUDGE'S COURT "ABUSED ITS DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION" IN ISSUING THE AFORESAID QUESTIONED ORDERS LEADING TO THE EXECUTION OF THE DEED OF SALE BY THE CLERK OF COURT ON



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA BEHALF OF PETITIONER CORPORATION BY ADDING THEREIN MATTERS WHICH WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION DATED DECEMBER 28, 1971. HELD: Respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion nor did he act "capriciously or whimsically" as to amount to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Orders. As correctly stated by respondent judge in denying reconsideration, his court was merely ordering the execution of the dispositive portion or judgment of the decision for "execution of a deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff [herein respondent]," no more, no less. Said judgment ordered the execution of such deed of sale unqualifiedly and unconditionally and has long become final and executory. The entire record shows that no claim is made by petitioner that the amount of P13,427.01 paid by respondent by way of rentals for a pealed of ten years (1954 to 1964) does not cover the full cost to it of the property. The decision's clear implication is that these rentals did fully cover the cost to petitioner of the property and therefore constituted full payment of the purchase price as fixed by Republic Act No. 3802. Hence, the judgment ordering unqualifiedly the execution of the sale to respondent, subject to no further payment of any amount. BRO. MIKE VELARDE V. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY GR NO. 159357

FACTS: SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition") before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate. ISSUE: The issue in this case pertains only to the dispositive portion of the Decision of the RTC HELD: The assailed Decision in the present case leaves us in the dark as to its final resolution of the Petition. To recall, the original Petition was for declaratory relief. So, what relief did the trial court grant or deny? What rights of the parties did it conclusively declare? Its final statement says, "SO ORDERED." But what exactly did the court order? It had the temerity to label its issuance a "Decision," when nothing was in fact decided. The dispositive portion cannot be deemed to be the statement quoted by SJS and embedded in the last paragraph of page 10 of the assailed 14-page Decision, to wit: "Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause." If at all, that statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion. RATIO DECIDENDI SUNTAY V. COJUANGCO SUNTAY GR NO. 132524



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA FACTS: Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. The marriage soured so that Isabel CojuangcoSuntay filed a criminal case against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their children who were living with their mother. The trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between the parties. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is respondent Isabel's paternal grandmother. The decedent died without leaving a will. respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. ISSUES: WHETHER THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF RESPONDENT ISABEL'S PARENTS "NULL AND VOID" MUST BE UPHELD HELD: There is no merit in petitioner's argument that it is the dispositive portion of the decision which must control as to whether or not the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents was void or voidable. Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding statement in the body of the decision or order which may be somewhat confusing, the same is not without a qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a final decision or order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or construction which usually is "the case where the order or decision in question is that of a court not of record which is not constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on which the judgment is based." Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion and the body of the decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole body of the decision in order to give effect to the intention, purpose and judgment of the court. MARVIN MERCADO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 149375 FACTS: MARVIN MERCADO, together with several otherswas charged with and convicted of violation of The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, for which he and his co-accused were sentenced to a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accused Marvin Mercado assails his conviction, and arguing that the Court of Appeals having increased the penalty imposed by the court a quo to a prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, should have certified the case to this Court as the penalty of thirty (30) years was already reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124, 2 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA ISSUE: WHETHER CA ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING AUTOMATIC APPEAL OF THE CASE TO THE SC HELD: The Court of Appeals in its assailed resolution relied on People v. Omotoy 5 where the Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty of arson and sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua. The case reached this Court on automatic appeal. In Footnote 16 of the decision, it was observed
The appeal was taken directly to this Tribunal for the reason no doubt that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is involved, albeit joined to prision mayor in its maximum period in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Actually, the appeal should have gone to the Court of Appeals since strictly speaking, this Court entertains appeals in criminal cases only where "the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher" (Sec. 5[2](d), Article VIII, Constitution), i.e., the penalty is at least reclusion perpetua (or life imprisonment, in special offenses). The lapse will be overlooked so as not to delay the disposition of the case. It is of slight nature, the penalty of reclusion perpetua having in fact been imposed on the accused, and causes no prejudice whatsoever to any party.

SC see no error by the appellate court in relying on a Footnote in Omotoy to affirm the conviction of the accused. The substance of the Footnote may not be the ratio decidendi of the case, but it still constitutes an important part of the decision since it enunciates a fundamental procedural rule in the conduct of appeals. That this rule is stated in a Footnote to a decision is of no consequence as it is merely a matter of style. OBITER DICTUM PEOPLE V. HON. MACADAEG GR NO. L-4316

FACTS This is an action of prohibition against the Seventh Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, composed of Honorables Higinio Macadaeg, Potenciano Pecson, and Ramon R. San Jose, Judges of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to restrain and prevent it from taking jurisdiction and cognizance of a petition for amnesty filed by respondent Antonio Guillermo, alias Silver, who was convicted and sentenced by this Court for murder. The grounds upon which the petition are based are (1) that this Court has already expressly ruled in its judgment of conviction in said case that said Antonio Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of amnesty, because the murders of which he was convicted were committed "not in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of a fratricidal strife between two rival guerrilla units," and (2) that the Seventh Guerrilla Amnesty Commission can take cognizance only of cases pending appeal in the Supreme Court on October 2, 1946 and Guillermo's case was not pending appeal in this Court at that time. ISSUE: WHETHER THE HOLDING OF THIS COURT THAT THE RESPONDENT GUILLERMO IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF THE AMNESTY PROCLAMATION, IS MERELY AN OBITER DICTUM HELD: The first ground upon which the opposition to the petition is based, namely, that the holding of this Court that the respondent Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty proclamation, is


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA merely an obiter dictum, is without any legal foundation, and must be dismissed. An obiter dictum is an opinion "uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects or the opinion of the court upon any point or principle which it is not required to decide or an opinion of the court which does not embody its determination and is made without argument or full consideration of the point, and is not the professed deliberate determinations of the judge himself. The ruling of the Court that the said respondent is not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty is not an orbiter dictum, but is a ruling of the court on an issue expressly raised by the party on facts or evidence adduced in the course of the trial of this case. It is not an opinion uttered by the way; it is a direct ruling on an issue expressly raised by the party. It was not unnecessary to make that ruling; the ruling was absolutely essential to a determination of a question of fact and of law directly in issue.


GR. NO. 142947

FACTS: Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in "People of the Philippines v. Atty. Tomas Bernardo, Roque Villadores, Alberto Adriano and Rolando Advincula," for Falsification of Public Document. It appears that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties, among them, IBC 13. When the labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner Villanueva, Jr., IBC 13 appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. The appellate court found that the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amended informations and dismissed the petition of Villadores. The decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 became final and executory on July 18, 1998. 8 Subsequently, before Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, respondent Villadores moved for the disqualification of Rico and Associates as private prosecutor for petitioner Villanueva, Jr., in line with the following pronouncement of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103, to wit:
Incidentally, We are one with the petitioner when it argued that Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. is not the offended party in these cases. It must be underscored that it was IBC 13 who secured the falsified surety bond for the purpose of the appeal it had taken from an adverse judgment of the labor case filed by Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. himself and wherein the latter prevailed. We see no reason how Villanueva could have sustained damages as a result of the falsification of the surety appeal bond and its confirmation letter when it could have even redounded to his own benefit if the appeal would be dismissed as a result of the forgery. If there be anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it purchased a fake surety bond.

Rico and Associates opposed said motion on the ground that the above-quoted pronouncement of the appellate court is a mere obiter dictum. Motion denied. ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE APPELLATE COURT IN CAG.R. SP NO. 46103 TO THE EFFECT THAT PETITIONER VILLANUEVA, JR. IS NOT AN OFFENDED PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 94-138744-45 IS OBITER DICTUM. HELD: An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent.



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA Based on the foregoing, the pronouncement of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 is not an obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised by respondent Villadores in his petition assailing the admission of the Amended Informations. An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case, and led up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to matter on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some other ground, or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can an additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make statements of the court regarding other propositions dicta. DISSENTING OPINION RUIZ V. UCOL No. L-45404 G.R.

FACTS: The facts are not disputed, Agustina Tagaca, laundrywoman for Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an administrative charge against Encarnacion Ucol, a midwife in the health center of Sarratt, Ilocos Norte. In her answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Atty. Ruiz who wanted to get back at the Ucol's because of a case filed by Encarnacion Ucol's husband against Ruiz. The administrative case was dismissed. Ruiz decided to file his own criminal complaint for libel against Ucol based on the alleged libelous portion of Ucol's answer. Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed and that the cause of action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. On appeal, the Court of Appeals certified the case to us, the only issue being whether or not the civil action for damages was already barred by the criminal case of libel. ISSUE: WHETHER UCOL CORRECT WHEN IT FILED AN "APPEAL BY CERTIORARI" BEFORE THIS COURT QUESTIONING THE DISSENTING OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS HELD: No! Any ordinary student in law school should readily know that what comprises a decision which can be the subject of an appeal or a special civil action is the majority opinion of the members of the court, but never the dissenting opinion. Moreover, no decision on appeal has as yet been rendered in this case. The act of the defendant-appellee's counsel in filing such a petition defies logic or reason. It is totally inexplicable how a member of the bar could be so careless or, if the act was deliberate, could have the courage to come before this Court asking us to review a dissenting opinion. Counsel is warned that we do not find his mistake in the slightest bit amusing.



FACTS: The accused were charged for rebellion and subversion. Two of the accused, Nolasco and Aguilar-Roque were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously been issued against NOLASCO. Judge Pano issued search warrant. The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's witness. ISSUE: IS THE SEARCH VALID?

NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all-embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides: "Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested. A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, the SC are of the opinion that, in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order. In this case, the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee in the case of Galman v. Pamaran was taken into consideration. TOLENTINO V. ONGSIAKO

GR. L-17938


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA FACTS: Esperidion Tolentino is praying for the enforcement of the dissenting opinion on a preceding case entitled, Severo Domingo, et al. vs. Santos Ongsiako. Esperidion is the successor in interest of the losing party in the preceding case. He claims that his predecessor died without receiving the outcome of the case, and Esperidion filed this case before he received the copy of the results. Esperidion is requesting that the decision of the majority of the Court be declared erroneous and unjust; and that the dissenting opinion is the correct view of the case, and should be enforced. ISSUE: Whether or not Esperidion may ask that the dissenting opinion be enforced HELD: No, for the reason of the lack of cause for action. Appellant's position that the decision was erroneous and unjust is entirely untenable, because the issue sought to be reopened is res judicata, aside from its having stood unchallenged for 30 years. The ridiculous prayer to enforce a dissenting opinion requires no discussion, it being sufficient to state that there is nothing to enforce in a dissenting opinion, since it affirms or overrules no claim, right, or obligation, and neither disposes of, nor awards, anything; it merely expresses the views of the dissenter. PEOPLE VS MALMSTEDT 198 SCRA 401

FACTS Police officers set up a checkpoint after receiving reports that a foreigner from Sagada was transporting prohibited drugs. After a few hours, the bus carrying the accused was stopped. The police officers noticed a bulge on the waist of Malmstedt and asked for his passport. When the accused failed to comply, the police officer asked him to bring out what was bulging on his waist. The bulge turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. When the accused was asked to alight from the bus he got his two bags which contained a teddy bear each. It was only thereafter that the accused produced his passport. The accused was then brought to the police headquarters where the teddy bears were cut up and found to contain hashish. HELD Search valid. The search was incidental to a lawful arrest where a crime was actually being committed. Under the circumstances of the case, there was probable cause for the NARCOM officers to believe that the accused was then and there committing a crime. The receipt of information that a foreigner coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession and the failure of the accused to produce his passport gave rise to probable cause. Note: (Dissenting Opinion) The search is illegal because the law requires that there first be a legal arrest before a search of the body and the belongings of the accused may licitly be made. In this case, it was in fact illegal possession that retroactively established probable cause. The dissenting opinion in this case was made the basis of subsequent decisions which are in force up to this date




FACTS: The Kitty Kat Lounge desires to present totally nude dancing. Indiana statutes require that dancers wear pasties and a g-string. The dancers also wish to dance nude because they believe they would make more money. Glen Theater, Inc. supplies adult entertainment through written and printed materials, movie showings, and live entertainment at an enclosed bookstore. The dancers in the bookstore dance nude or semi-nude. The 2 companies sued to enjoin the enforcement of the Indiana public indecency statute. They claim that the statute violated the First Amendment because nude dancing was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. ISSUE: W/N NUDE DANCING IS A FORM OF EXPRESSION PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT RULING: The Indiana statutory requirement that the dancers in the establishments involved must wear pasties and a g-string does not violate the First Amendment. This Court has held that when speech and non-speech elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. The Court used the OBrien test: a government regulation is sufficiently justified if: It is within the constitutional power of the Government, It furthers an important or substantial government interest, Governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression and The incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. The Court found that Indianas public indecency statute is justified despite its incidental limitations on some expressive activity. Applying OBrien: The traditional police power of the State is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety and morals. The statute reflected moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in public places. The public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality What Indiana prohibited was not dancing as a communicative element but simply its being done in the nude. Indianas requirement that the dancers wear at least pasties and a g-string is modest and the bare minimum necessary to achieve the States purpose. CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYEH, INC. V. CITY OF HEILAEAH 508 US 520

FACTS: Petitioner church and its congregates practice the Santeria religion, which employed animal sacrifice as one of its principal forms of devotion. The animals were killed by cutting their carotid arteries, and were cooked and eaten following all the Santeria rituals except healing and death rites. After the church leased land in respondent city and announced plans to establish a house of worship and other facilities there, the city council held an emergency public session and passed among others Resolution 87-66, which noted residents concern over religious practices inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety, and declared the citys commitment to prohibiting such practices. Ordinance 87-40, which


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA incorporated the Florida animal cruelty laws, broadly punished whoever . . . unnecessarily or cruelly . . . killed animals. It has been interpreted to reach killings for religious reasons. More ordinances were passed defining sacrifice, prohibiting animal sacrifices and limiting slaughter of animals to slaughterhouses. ISSUE: W/N THE ORDINANCES VIOLATED THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT. HELD: YES. The Court reversed the lower courts decision, concluding that the laws in question were enacted contrary to the free exercise principles, thus void. The Court noted that under the Free Exercise Clause, laws that burden religious practice do not have to be justified by a compelling governmental interest if they are (1) neutral and (2) of general applicability. The text and operation of the laws in question demonstrate that they were not neutral, but had as their object the suppression of Santerias central element: animal sacrifice. Moreover, they were gerrymandered with care to disallow the Santerian practices, but to allow almost all other animal killings. They also suppress much more religious conduct than is necessary to achieve their stated ends. The laws pursue the city governments interests only against the conduct motivated by religious belief, and thereby violate the requirement that laws burdening religious practice must be of general applicability. Some ordinances were found by the Court to be underinclusive with regard to the citys interest in preventing cruelty to animals since they were drafted with care to forbid few animal killings, those occasioned by religious sacrifice, while other types of animal killings were not prohibited. They were also considered underinclusive with regard to the citys public health interests in preventing the disposal of animal carcasses in open public places and the consumption of uninspected meat since the laws do not address non-religious conduct. The Smith Standard, that is, that laws must be narrowly tailored to accomplish the asserted governmental interests, was not met by the laws in question. They were underinclusive in various respects because the objectives were not pursued with parallel non-religious conduct, which could have burdened religion to a far lesser degree. Thus, the interests given cannot be considered compelling. WHAT IS LAW, CUSTOM, PRACTICE, USAGE? LAW CUSTOM it is defined as a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation. This statement contains the two basic elements of custom: the material factor, that is, how states behave and the psychological or subjective factor, that is, why they behave the way they do. PRACTICE USAGE XII. LANDMARK CASE



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA Landmark Case a case where the Supreme Court rendered a decision that significantly changes existing law. VILLABER V. COMELEC Facts: On February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Villaber made a check to Efren D. Sawal in the amount of P100,000.00, he knew that there was insufficient funds, and was subsequently dishonored by the bank. He was found guilty for violating BP22, the anti-bouncing law. Villaber ran for congressman in the First District of the Province of Davao del Sur in the last May 14, 2001 elections, and was disqualified by Comelec and got his motion for reconsideration denied. He was disqualified on the grounds that his conviction is a crime of moral turpitude, hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office Issue: The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude Held: Yes, (take note of other definitions in the original case, Lozano v. Martinez is the landmark case) The effects of the issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano vs. Martinez,22 through Justice Pedro L. Yap, "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest."23 Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals. Recuerdo v. People FACTS: Recuerdo has been convicted for violating BP22. She bought a 3-karat loose diamond stone valued at P420,000.00 from Ms. Yolanda Floro, and gave a downpayment of P40,000.00. In settlement of the balance of the purchase price, petitioner issued 9 postdated checks, 8 of which in the amount of P40,000.00, and 1 in the amount of P20,000.00, all drawn against her account at the Prudential Bank. The checks bounced. She was found guilty for 5 counts for violating BP22. Recuerdo is questioning the validity of BP22. Petitioner contends that since banks are not damaged by the presentment of dishonored checks as they impose a penalty for each, only creditors/payees are unduly favored by the law; that the law "is in essence a resurrected form of 19th century imprisonment for debt" since the drawer is coerced to pay his debt on threat of imprisonment even if his failure to pay does not arise from malice or fraud or from any criminal intent to cause damage; 12 and that the law is a bill of attainder as it does not leave much room for judicial determination, the guilt of the accused having already been decided by the legislature. GR 133036 January 22, 2003 GR 148326 NOVEMBER 15, 2001



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional? HELD: These matters subject of petitioners contention have long been settled in the landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez15 where this Court upheld the constitutionality of B. P. 22: The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.16 (Emphasis supplied) The contention that B. P. 22 is a bill of attainder, one which inflicts punishment without trial and the essence of which is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt, 17 fails. For under B. P. 22, every element of the crime is still to be proven before the trial court to warrant a conviction for violation thereof. LEADING CASE Leading Case among the various cases that are argued and determined in the courts, some, from their important character, have demanded more than usual attention from the judges, and from this circumstance are frequently looked upon as having settled or determined the law upon all points involved in such cases, and as guides for subsequent decisions, and from the importance they thus acquire are familiarly termed leading cases. Asufrin, Jr v. San Miguel Corp. Facts: Asufrin is a regular employee of SMC promoted from being a forklift operator, to stock clerk and transferred to the Sum-ag Bacolod City Sales office as a warehouse checker. The Sum-ag office then reorganized and declared all warehouse and sales personnel positions as redundant and the office will be closed. SMC informed the employees that are to be retrenched that they may have the option of early retirement or be redeployed or be transferred into another office. Asufrin notified his manager that he opts to be transferred. SMC opted to retire Asufrin. Asufrin is now contending that he was illegally dismissed. NLRC ordered that Asufrin be reinstated. The CA reversed the decision of NLRC Issue: Whether or not Asufrin was illegally dismissed. HELD: Yes. In the case at bar, petitioner was dismissed on the ground of redundancy, one of the authorized causes for dismissal. In Dole Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, citing the leading case of Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. NLRC, we explained the nature of redundancy as an authorized cause for dismissal thus: . . . redundancy in an employers personnel force necessarily or even ordinarily refers to duplication of work. That no other person was holding the same position that private

GR156658 March 10, 2004


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA respondent held prior to the termination of his services, does not show that his position had not become redundant. Indeed, in any well-organized business enterprise, it would be surprising to find duplication of work and two (2) or more people doing the work of one person. We believe that redundancy, for purposes of the Labor Code, exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as overhiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. The determination that employees services are no longer necessary or sustainable and, therefore, properly terminable is an exercise of business judgment of the employer. The wisdom or soundness of this judgment is not subject to discretionary review of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, provided there is no violation of law and no showing that it was prompted by an arbitrary or malicious act. However, it was found out that (1) Asufrin sent letters notifying that he wishes to be retained, and that his coworkers who did not send any letters were retained. (2) Asufrin was really in the payroll of the Sta Fe Brewery during his stay in Sum-ag, and should have returned there upon shut down of the office. (3) The Sum-ag office did not really shut down and remained operational. And (4) that there was no criterion applpied on why Asufrin should be retired instead of the others. Petition granted. JURISDICTION HERRERA V. BARRETTO 25 PHIL. 245

FACTS: Constancio Joaquin, believing himself entitled to a license to open and exploit a cockpit in the municipality of Caloocan, and the authorities thereof refusing to issue it to him, began an action against Godofredo B. Herrera as municipal president of said municipality, the officer whose duty he claimed it was to issue cockpit licenses, to obtain a mandamus compelling said official to issue such license. On the presentation of the verified complaint and upon the facts stated therein and the exhibits annexed thereto, the plaintiff asked that the court issue a mandatory injunction directed to the defendant requiring him to issue a provisional license under which the plaintiff might conduct his cockpit during the pendency of the action. The action referred to in this paragraph is one begun by Antonio Bertol and Tranquilina T., widow of Angeles, against Godofredo B. Herrera and others relating to validity of a certain ordinance. "5. That there being pending civil cause No. 986 mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the Court of First Instance of Rizal lacked jurisdiction to issue the mandatory injunction which he issued on the 1st of March, 1913, for the reason that it tends to render inefficacious and null the decision which the Honorable Richard Campbell will render in civil No. 986." The objection is based upon an action previously begun by Antonio Bertol and Tranquilina T., widow of Angeles, against the municipality or the officials thereof for the purpose of having declared null and void municipal ordinance No. 8 of Caloocan, which is the same ordinance upon which was based the complaint of Constancio Joaquin and in which the mandatory injunction was issued. ISSUE:


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA WHETHER THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ISSUE WRIT OF CERTIORARI HELD: Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, as we have said before, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari, in so far as it was a method by which the mere errors of an inferior court could be corrected, no longer exists. Its place is now taken by the appeal and so long as the inferior court retains jurisdiction, its errors can be corrected only by that method. Where it is claimed that a Court of First Instance has in the judgment of one of the parties issued an injunction erroneously or performed any other act in the opinion of a party illegally or beyond or in excess of his jurisdiction, the party should, before invoking the jurisdiction of a higher court, call the attention of the inferior court to its supposed error and ask for its correction; and this court discourages all attempts to come here upon questions which a court below is entitled to decide without first invoking its judgment thereon.


GR L-40527

Hermogenes Mariano has been found guilty for malversation of public funds in a military court. He was found to have misappropriated items of cable wires to be valued $717 entrusted to him under receivership as the Liaison Officer of San Jose del monte, Bulacan. The Provinical Fiscal of Bulacan then filed a criminal case of estafa against Mariano. Mariano filed a motion to quash claiming that the respondent court does not have jurisdiction since the Military Court has already decided a case under malversation against him. The respondent judge dismissed the case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Issues: Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction to try Mariano for estafa? HELD: Yes. "Jurisdiction" is the basic foundation of judicial proceedings. The word "jurisdiction" is derived from two Latin words "juris" and "dico" "I speak by the law" which means fundamentally the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear, and determine certain controversies. Bouvier's own definition of the term "jurisdiction" has found judicial acceptance, to wit: "Jurisdiction is the right of a Judge to pronounce a sentence of the law in a case or issue before him, acquired through due process of law;" it is "the authority by which judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases." The conferment of jurisdiction upon courts or judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the constitution and statutes of the forum. Thus, the question of jurisdiction of respondent Court of First Instance over the case filed before it is to be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. That, We find in the Judiciary Act of 1948 where in its Section 44 (f) it is provided:


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction: xxx xxx xxx (f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos, (emphasis supplied) The offense of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is penalized with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. By reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6) months imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance. APPEAL Sitchon v. Provincial Sheriff of Occidental Negros (short case) Facts: Petitioner was declared in default for failure to answer the defendants counterclaim upon the deadline required by the judge. Issues: Whether or not petitioner may appeal a case dismissal which is not final. HELD: No. The proper remedy for the plaintiff would have been to file a motion to set aside the order of default under section 2, Rule 38, and if denied, to appeal from the final judgment of the court on the merits of the counterclaim. Unless he has filed said motion, the defaulting party can not appeal from a final judgment on the merits (Garcia Lim Toco vs. Go Fay, L-1423, January 31, 1948). And on appeal, appellant may not only have the judgment revised and corrected, but he may also raise the question as to whether or not the order of default was correct or in accordance with law and facts of the case, because the reversal of the order of default will necessarily carry with it the invalidity of the subsequent final judgment on the merits. The reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a final order or judgment, and not from interlocutory or incidental one, is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which must necessarily suspend the hearing and decision on the merits of the case during the pendency of the appeal. If such appeal were allowed the trial on the merits of the case should necessarily be delayed for a considerable length of time, and compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses; for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as incidental questions may be raised by him and interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. 80 Phil 397



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA Facts: Daniel Mauricio raped her daughter Jonalyn who is only 11 years of age. Two informations were filed against him, one that of rape and the other attempted rape. Attempted Rape was also charged due to an incidence after he spontaneously desisted during an overt act of raping her, however, this was not merited since it was not proven that rape would have materialized. Mauricio was only convicted of rape. Issue: Whether or not Mauricio should be punished by death HELD: No. It was not alleged in the case that the aggravating circumstances were present and thus the defendant could not be punished for it. As to the award of P30,000.00 exemplary damages, we note that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on 1 December 2000, requires that aggravating circumstances, in order to be appreciated, be stated in the information. The pertinent provision of the new Rule 110 states Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment (emphasis supplied). Texas v. Johnson 491 US 397 June 21, 1989 (Short Case) Facts: During the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas, respondent Johnson participated in a political demonstration to protest the policies of the Reagan administration and some Dallas-based corporations. After a march through the city streets, Johnson burned an American flag while protesters chanted. No one was physically injured or threatened with injury, although several witnesses were seriously offended by the flag burning. Johnson was convicted of desecration of a venerated object in violation of a Texas statute, and a State Court of Appeals affirmed. However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the State, consistent with the First Amendment, could not punish Johnson for burning the flag in these circumstances. The court first found that Johnson's burning of the flag was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. The court concluded that the State could not criminally sanction flag desecration in order to preserve the flag as a symbol of national unity. It also held that the statute did not meet the State's goal of preventing breaches of the peace, since it was not drawn narrowly enough to encompass only those flag burnings that would likely result in a serious disturbance, and since the flag burning in this case did not threaten such a reaction. Further, it stressed that another Texas statute prohibited breaches of the peace and could be used to prevent disturbances without punishing this flag desecration. Held: Johnson's conviction for flag desecration is inconsistent with the First Amendment. Pp. 402-420. (a) Under the circumstances, Johnson's burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke the First Amendment. The State conceded that the conduct was expressive. Occurring as it did at the end of a demonstration coinciding with the Republican National Convention, the expressive, overtly political nature of the conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent.


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA (b) Texas has not asserted an interest in support of Johnson's conviction that is unrelated to the suppression of expression and would therefore permit application of the test set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 , whereby an important governmental interest in regulating nonspeech can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms when speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of conduct. An interest in preventing breaches of the peace is not implicated on this record. Expression may not be prohibited [491 U.S. 397, 398] on the basis that an audience that takes serious offense to the expression may disturb the peace, since the government cannot assume that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot but must look to the actual circumstances surrounding the expression. Johnson's expression of dissatisfaction with the Federal Government's policies also does not fall within the class of "fighting words" likely to be seen as a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs. This Court's holding does not forbid a State to prevent "imminent lawless action" and, in fact, Texas has a law specifically prohibiting breaches of the peace. Texas' interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity is related to expression in this case and, thus, falls outside the O'Brien test. (c) The latter interest does not justify Johnson's conviction. The restriction on Johnson's political expression is content based, since the Texas statute is not aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but is designed to protect it from intentional and knowing abuse that causes serious offense to others. It is therefore subject to "the most exacting scrutiny." Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 . The government may not prohibit the verbal or nonverbal expression of an idea merely because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable, even where our flag is involved. Nor may a State foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it, since the government may not permit designated symbols to be used to communicate a limited set of messages. Moreover, this Court will not create an exception to these principles protected by the First Amendment for the American flag alone. PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZA 4 FEBRUARY 1992 FACTS: The Narcotics Regional Unit in Legaspi City, headed by CIC Taduran conducted a buy-bust operation to apprehend drug traffickers upon a tip from a confidential informer. Taduran met Segovia, one of the accused, who introduced him to the alleged seller of marijuana, accused Rodrigueza. Upon agreeing on the price to be paid, Rodrigueza boarded a tricycle operated by Luceras and left. He returned with a plastic package allegedly containing marijuana. Thereafter, Taduran returned to their headquarters to prepare his report. Although without warrants of arrest, the suspects were apprehended later that evening. Likewise, a raid was conducted on the residence of Rodruiguezas father, without a search warrant. The accused Rodrigueza tested positive for the presence of the ultraviolet powder, with which the bills (used in the operation) were treated. Rodrigueza and his co-accused gave alibis as their respective defenses. Moreover, they alleged that they were maltreated while in the custody of the authorities, and that they were made to hold the powder-treated bills so as to be implicated in the alleged sale of marijuana. The lower court ruled against Rodrigueza finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. His two co-accused were acquitted. ISSUE:


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA W/N THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED WERE VIOLATED, THUS WARRANTING THE REVERSAL OF THE LOWER COURTS DECISION. HELD: YES. The Court ruled that the supposed buy-bust operation failed to meet the requirement of legitimacy because it was unable to apprehend the malefactor in flagrante delicto3. In addition, the sworn statement of Rodrigueza was taken in violation of his constitutional right to competent and independent counsel. Although he waived his right to counsel, such waiver should be made in the presence of counsel. As such, the confession obtained was inadmissible as evidence in court. Furthermore, the evidence obtained from the raid in the residence of Rodriguezas father was done without an authorized search warrant, although the NARCOM agents claimed that surveillance had been done for quite some time. Hence, there was no excuse for the absence of the needed search warrant. The prosecution was unable to present the corpus delicti4 of the crime, which should be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Instead, they presented only the confiscated articles from the residence of Rodriguezas father. Moreover, the serious flaws and discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were deemed fatal to the prosecutions case. It was ruled that the prosecution should rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. XVIII. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT/JURISDICTION Minuncher v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 142396

FACTS: Petitioners Minuncher and Torabian were apprehended in a buy-bust operation for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Among the narcotics agents present was Arthur Scalzo, an American working for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. Minuncher filed a case before the RTC for damages on account of his claim that the charges against him were merely trumped-up by Scalzo. The RTC ruled in the petitioners favor, awarding him damages. However, the CA reversed and ruled that Scalzo is immune from suit. ISSUE: Whether or not Scalzo is immune from suit. HELD: Yes, he is. Scalzo claimed that he enjoyed diplomatic immunity because he was an Assistant Attach of the US Diplomatic delegation to the country. But since the nature of his actual responsibility is vague, there are still doubts on his claim to diplomatic immunity. Nevertheless, Scalzo cannot be sued because of state immunity since he was working under the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The doctrine of par in parem, non habet imperium applies that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.
3 4

IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO: Caught red-handed CORPUS DELICTI: Body of the crime



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA Jeffrey Liang v People FACTS: The petitioner is an economist working for the Asian Development Bank, which has its headquarters here in the Philippines. He was sued for grave oral defamation by a co-worker, Joyce Cabal, after he uttered defamatory words against her. The Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in favor of Cabal, but was instructed by the Department of Foreign Affairs that the petitioner enjoyed diplomatic immunity. Consequently, the MeTC dismissed the criminal case. On appeal, the RTC ruled in favor of Cabal and ordered the enforcement of the warrant of arrest earlier issued. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Liang enjoyed diplomatic immunity in this case? HELD: No, his action was not covered by diplomatic immunity. G.R. No. 125865

The agreement of the DFA and ADB clearly states that: a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity. (section 45). It is therefore not an absolute immunity. In addition, slandering a person is not included in the immunity agreement because Philippine laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. One must also adhere to the well-settled principle of law that a public officer may be held liable in his private capacity for acts done with malice or in bad faith, or beyond the scope of jurisdiction or authority.
SEAFDEC-AQD v. NLRC FACTS: Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) employed respondent Juvenal Lazaga. Petitioner Lacanilao, acting in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDECAQD, sent a notice of termination to Lazaga (who was then Head of External Affairs), informing him that his services shall be terminated due to financial constraints. He is to receive separation benefits equivalent to one month of his basic salary for every year of service plus benefits. Lazaga filed a complaint at the arbitration branch of the NLRC upon petitioners failure to pay the separation pay. In response, the counterclaim of the petitioners stated that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization. The labor arbiter decided in favor of Lazaga. The decision was affirmed by the NLRC. ISSUE: Whether or not the SEAFDEC-AQD falls under the jurisdiction of the NLRC. HELD: G.R. No. 86773



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA No, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the NLRC SEAFDEC-AQD is an international agency established by the Governments of Malaysia, Burma, Japan, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The RP became a signatory to the Agreement establishing the SEAFDEC-AQD on January 16, 1968. Being a signatory, the Philippines must recognize that the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the NLRC. Also, the respondents cannot claim of estoppel even if the petitioners only invoke the lack of jurisdiction upon appeal. It is a settled principle that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void and that the lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. Hence, estoppel may not be invoked EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE, SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION Inciong v. Hernandez FACTS: GR No. L-7995

Lao H. Ichong, for his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by RA 1180 (which is a Filipinization of retail trade) brought an action against the Act and sought that it be declared unconstitutional. The petitioner claims that it violates their rights protected by the equal protection clause. The equal protection clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It also guards against hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. The Government sought to address the growing infringement of the local retail industry by foreign players. Statistics prove that while there are still more Filipino retailers than aliens, the assets and gross sales of these alien retailers are six to seven times greater than that of the average Filipino retailer. In order to address the threat, the legislature passed RA 1180, which as Ichong claims, violates the due process clause of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the Act is constitutional. HELD: Yes, it is within the ambit of the Constitution. The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. If there is a valid classification (please refer to People v Cayat), then it is constitutional. Citizenship (aliens being the adverse party) is a valid and legal classification. Furthermore, it passes the reasonable test since the remedy is not only reasonable, but actually necessary in order to curb foreign domination of the retail industry. The approval of the act is therefore a valid use of the States police power. Tiu v. CA FACTS: Congress passed into law RA 7227 (An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses). It also established the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). Section 12 of

GR 127410


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA the Act also provides that the President shall delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ and that there will be a separate customs territort in the zone that will provide for incentives such as furnishing capital, equipment, and waiving tariffs from imports. President Ramos thus issued EO 97, stating that only the former military base area will enjoy the tax and duty-free privilege. In addition, he ordered PP 532 delineating the SSEZ as limited to the bounds of the former naval base. Petitioners (those outside of the base proper but within Olangapo) cried foul, stating that the protection clause was violated. ISSUE: Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated HELD: No, there was a valid classification. The Act gave the President the right to define the scope of the SSEZ, thus the act of President Ramos was merely to validly classify what areas are to be included in the special zone. There are valid and substantive distinctions between the circumstances inside and those outside the former base. In addition, the classification is germane to the purpose of the law. RA 7227 was aimed to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into productive uses. Hence, the SSEZ should only encompass the former Subic base. For there to be a valid classification, it must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class (People v Cayat). COURTS ARE ARBITERS AND GUARDIANS OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (PRIVACY) AYER PRODUCTIONS V. CAPULONG 29 AUGUST 1988

FACTS: McElroy and petitioner Ayer Productions envisioned to produce a docu-drama regarding the EDSA Revolution entitled The Four-Day Revolution. The script by David Williamson (of Gallipoli), included fictional characters who were used to trace the events of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. The proposed film was green-lighted by the MTRCB, as well as other governmental agencies, including Gen. Fidel Ramos. The petitioners also contacted Juan Ponce Enrile to acquire his permission for the use of his name in the film, he being a key player in the 1986 EDSA Revolution. He denied the petitioners the permission, stating that: He would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation x x The petitioners complied with the demands of private respondent and his name and character was deleted from the movie script, the petitioners then proceeded to film the motion picture. Private respondent then filed a Complaint requesting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of Makati, seeking to enjoin the petitioners from producing the movie. The private respondent allege that the filming, without his consent and over his objection, of the miniseries constitutes a violation of right to privacy. The trial court granted the TRO and set hearing.


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the film would not involve the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor that of his family and that the Preliminary Injunction is a prior restraint on their right of free expression. Trial Court issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioner then raised the issue to the Supreme Court on certiorari with an urgent prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order. Thus, the present complaint. ISSUE: W/N THE FILM IS COVERED BY PETITIONERS RIGHT OF FREE EXPRESSION. W/N THE FILM VIOLATED RESPONDENTS RIGHT TO PRIVACY.

RULING: YES. The Court, citing Gonzales v. Katigbak stated that Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. x x This freedom is available to both locally-owned and foreign-owned motion picture companies. The circumstance that this production is a commercial activity is not a disqualification for availing the said freedom, media, as the medium to disseminate information, being sustained by its commercial aspect. NO. Our law does not expressly provide for a right to privacy, only jurisprudence provides for such. However, like most rights, it is not an absolute one, and is liable to governmental intrusion for the right reasons. Specifically, the right of privacy can be intruded if that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from his or to be published from him constitute matters of public character. The right to privacy only protects from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern. In Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, the Court held that being a public figure does not ipso facto destroy a public figures right to privacy. The right to invade the right to privacy does not extend to fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In that case, it was admitted that the producer included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality. As differentiated from the cited case, the case was filed after the film was completed, therefore it was not a prior restraint on the right to free expression. As against in the case at bar, the respondent filed the complaint while the film is in production. Measure of prior restraint are invalid from the beginning as provided in the Constitution, this is without prejudice to subsequent punishment if such expression does not abide by our laws. The judge shouldve stayed, because the clear and present danger may not be invoked for the film has yet to be completed. The subject matter of the film is clearly of public concern, being the depiction of the bloodless 1986 EDSA Revolution, thus it must be regarded as having passed into the public domain as an appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of media. The synopsis of the film does not in anyway relate to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile unlike in Lagunzad. The extent of the intrusion of the present film therefore is limited to the role he played on the historical event, to make the filming an accurate account of the events. A public figure defined as a person who by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA character has become a public personage, or a celebrity. Also included in such list are fugitives or convicts. Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent, their right of privacy, this is because, they have consented to it for entering the public realm, their personalities and affairs had become public, and that the press has the duty to inform the public regarding matters of public concern. LAWRENCE AND GARNER V. TEXAS JUNE 26, 2003

FACTS: Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered petitioner Lawrences apartment and saw him and another adult man, petitioner Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Petitioners were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse or sodomy, in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment5 based on a previous case, Bowers v. Hardwick. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTS OF LAWRENCE AND GARNER VIOLATE THEIR RIGHT TO LIBERTY OR RIGHT TO ENJOY THEIR FULL POTENTIAL OR CAPACITY? RULING: The Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause6. The right to liberty means, the right to enjoy his or her full potential or capacity with limited government intervention. Intervention can only be possible when due process is satisfied. Due process is satisfied when the law is reasonable. In the present case, the Texas statute seeks to prevent the consensual sexual relations between homosexual persons. Since such relationship is within the purview of liberty protected by the Constitution, the government cannot intervene without a reasonable law. And since the Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the individuals personal and private life, such law has to be declared unconstitutional. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION vs. PBC, INC. Primacy of human rights over property rights 5 JUNE 1973

FACTS: The officers and members of the PBMEO, a legitimate union in PBM, informed the latter of their proposed mass demonstration at Malacaang, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift as well as those in the regular second and third shifts. PBM called a meeting the following day. It informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution emphasizing, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. So, PBM warned PBMEO that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who should fail to report for work the following morning would be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike.

Same as Section 1 of Bill of Rights: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. 6 Due process simply means reasonableness of the law UTOPIA FIGHT!


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA The workers proceeded with the demonstration despite the warnings. PBM filed with the CIR a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a violation of R.A. 875 (Industrial Peace Act) and of the CBA providing for No Strike and No Lockout. PBMEO claimed that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration, that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm. ISSUES: W/N BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS OF FREE SPEECH ARE GIVEN PRIORITY OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS. HELD: YES. Human rights are given priority over property rights. The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose - that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive - would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil, which the State has the right to prevent. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Property and property rights can be lost through prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed. PEOPLE v. CAYAT 6 MAY 1939

FACTS: Cayat, a native of Baguio was convicted of violation of Act No. 1639 (Sec. 2 and 3): "SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe. "SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereon, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court." ISSUE: W/N Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause. HELD: NO. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable: (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class. It applies to a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture. DOCTRINE: Equal protection of the laws does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not The Power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. Citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification. XXI. WHAT ARE THE PARTS OF THE CASE? The usual parts of the case are:
1) Case Title indicates the nature of the case (e.g. people v. echegaray crim case; republic

v. tan case v. govt; etc.)

2) Body the body usually contains the following:

a. b. c. d. e.

Facts the history of how the controversy came to be; Issues questions that the court needs to resolve; Arguments the discussion of differing views of the adverse parties; Ruling the answers to the issues or questions that needs to be resolved; Dispositive the instructions of the court in lieu of its ruling



3) Procedural Antecedents standards that needs to be followed for the higher court to

acquire jurisdiction of the case. ABANDONMENT VS. REVERSAL


Vitarich v NLRC FACTS:

G.R. No. 121905

Isagani Recodo was terminated by Vitarich for alleged insubordination. Recodos superiors sent a memo instructing him to ground all accounts receivable (A/R) drvers to avoid further anomalies. Recodo failed to immediately ground Cordovas A/R driver, but explained that only the first paragraph of the faxed memorandum was readable so he had it verified. He only learned its full context when he was negotiating for the security of Cordova's past accounts. Nevertheless, he was terminated by Vitarich for insubordination, despite the assessment of the Personnel Head that there was no defensible ground for terminating Recodo's services. Consequently. Recodo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of managerial incentive bonus and for moral and exemplary damages. Upon reaching arbitration, Vitarich included the charges of backloading, unauthorized credit extensions and cash disbursements. The Arbiter noticed that only insubordination was included in the dismissal letter. The Arbiter ruled that there was lack of due process in the termination of Recodo. The NLRC initially reversed, but corrected itself by reinstating the initial ruling of the Arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not there were enough grounds to dismiss Recodo for to loss of confidence due to insubordination. HELD: No, the doctrine of loss of confidence does no apply. In Midas Touch Food Corporation v NLRC, the Court gave the guidelines for the proper application of the doctrine: (a) loss of confidence which should not be simulated; (b) it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; (c) it should not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and, (d) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. The allegations of policy violations do not constitute just causes of dismissal on account of the lack of confidence since it would appear that what Recodo resorted to was a judgment call being the sales manager, which apparently turned out to be beneficial for the company. The presumption of good faith in the performance of the duties of the employees must be followed sans lack of concrete proof claiming otherwise. In this case, Vitarich did not



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA convincingly prove that Recodo was guilty of insubordination to justify dismissal due to loss of confidence. Relampagos v Cumba FACTS: Petitioner Relampagos and private respondent Rosita Cumba were candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two votes over the former. Relampagos challenged the result and brought it to the RTC of Agusan Del Norte. The Court ruled that the petitioner won by 6 votes. The private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC, which ordered Cumba restored to her position. The petitioner then questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, citing the consolidated cases of Garcia vs. De Jesus and Uy vs. Commission on Elections, which stated that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases. Respondent COMELEC maintains that there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction - Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. HELD: Yes, the COMELEC has jurisdiction. The Court must abandon the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases. It now holds that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows: The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases. remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The grant was intended as a remedial legislation to eliminate the seeming incongruity or irrationality resulting in a splitting of jurisdiction. Astraquillo v. Javier FACTS: In a dispute between the petitioners and respondents, the trial court ordered a writ of execution commanding the petitioners to pay a sum of money in the form of rentals immediately due to the petitioners insolvency. The petitioners highly question this writ, saying that it hasnt been conclusively

G.R. No. 118861

G.R. No. L-20034


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA proven that they are insolvent. Furthermore, they question the reversal of the CA ruling, which originally set aside the writ but backpedaled and affirmed the trial courts order. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a motion of execution pending appeal and (2) whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing its original decision. HELD: No to both, the trial court and CA are correct. Respondent trial judge, in granting the motion seem to have been satisfied that the evidence already submitted did warrant such execution pending appeal. This finding was confirmed by the Court of Appeals in its disputed resolution. Based on the factual findings of the trial court, the petitioners were clearly insolvent. The Supreme Court is a trier of laws, not of facts, so it is bound to the facts submitted by the trial court. As regards the reversal of the original CA decision, Sec. 5, Rule 135, of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the court has the inherent power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. This power includes the right to reverse itself.

Serrano v NLRC FACTS:

G.R. No. 117040

Petitioner Serrano was hired by private respondent Isetann Department Store as a security checker to apprehend shoplifters and prevent pilferage of merchandise. Initially hired on a contractual basis, Serrano eventually became a regular employee and was promoted to become head of the Security Checkers Section of Isetann Department Store. As a cost-cutting measure, private respondent decided to phase out its entire security section and engage the services of an independent security agency. Isetann then sent a memo to Serrano informing him that he employment is terminated immediately. Serrano then brought his complaint to the Labor Arbiter, and he was awarded with a favorable decision. Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision, claiming that the hiring of an independent security provider is a valid ground for retrenchment. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the hiring of an independent security agency is reason enough to terminate petitioners employment; (2) Whether or not petitioners termination is valid despite lack of due notice, and (3) whether or not petitioner is entitled to backwages. HELD:


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA (1) Yes, it is a valid reason Art. 283 of the Labor Code provides that The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operations of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. Jurisprudence also provides (Asian Alcohol Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, De Ocampo v. National Labor Relations Commission) that redundancy in labor is a valid cause for termination of employees. (2) Yes, it is valid Under the Labor Code, only the absence of a just cause for the termination of employment can make the dismissal of an employee illegal. Art. 279 states that: In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Therefore, the appropriate sanction for failure of notice is the payment of backwages for the period when the employee is considered not to have been effectively dismissed due to lack of or late notice. (3) Yes, petitioner is entitled to backwages. The NLRC decision is ordered modified, granting the petitioner backwages and separation pay.

People v. Mapa FACTS:

G. R. No. 91014

Elmer Mapa was arrested and convicted for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act (selling marijuana). The People contend that the police received a tip that a certain Elmer was engaged in drug pushing. Henceforth, the police conducted a buy-bust operation and caught him red-handed selling marijuana. On the other hand, Mapa contends that this was a set-up, a replacement job since the original detainee was released by the police. He claims that the police entered their house without permission while he, his uncle, and fellow chess club members were merely playing chess. He was dragged to prison and threatened that he will be convicted for alleged drug offenses. The Court noticed several inconsistencies with the witnesses of the prosecution. ISSUE:



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA Whether or not a reversal of the decision of the lower court is in order given the glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. HELD: Yes, the petitioner-accused is acquitted. The prosecution was not able to explain the inconsistencies, which brought serious doubts as to the culpability of the petitioner. Also, the accused was not found positive of drug use, a curious fact since most drug pushers are also drug users. The SC cited that it cannot condone actions of police officers, people who are supposed to be the protectors of the citizenry. XXIII. OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE, PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS PP 1017 CASE 20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS 1988 19 AUGUST

FACTS: The petitioner sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct searches and seizures in connection with the latters anti-film piracy campaign. In its letter-complaint, the petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films, in violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property). Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the private respondents. These applications were consolidated and heard by the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Eventually, the desired search warrants were issued. But acting on a Motion to Lift Search Warrants, the lower court issued an order lifting the warrants issued earlier. The petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari likewise filed by the petitioner. ISSUE: W/N THE SEARCH WARRANTS WERE PROPERLY LIFTER BY THE JUDGE FOR WANT OF PROBABLE CAUSE. HELD: YES. Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution provide that no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause. This constitutional guarantee is a time-honored precept, which circumscribes governmental action with regard to the procurement of a search warrant.



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA In the case of Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, the Court had occasion to define probable cause for a valid search as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. It was likewise held by the Court that this constitutional provision demands no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified in order to convince the judge, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. In the case at bar, the lower court lifted the questioned search warrants against the private respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. The lower court ruled that there was no probable cause that the private respondents violated PD No. 49. As found by the lower court, the NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the petitioners counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the search warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application. It was thus ruled that the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns. The essence of copyright infringement is the similarity or at least the substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the videotapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Moreover, the Court ruled that the questioned warrants were in the nature of general warrants, against citing the case of Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, wherein the search warrants in question were declared void by the Supreme Court. The articles described in the search warrantstelevision sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, and tape cleaners are articles which can be found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out of video tapes COLUMBIA PICTURES v. COURT OF APPEALS 28 AUGUST 1996 FACTS: The complainants lodged a formal complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for violation of Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended. Agents of the NBI and private researchers made discreet surveillance on various video establishments in Metro Manila, including the private respondent Sunshine Home Video, Inc. An application for search warrant was undertaken by NBI Senior Agent Lauro Reyes, whose affidavits and depositions were taken. These were corroborated by two other witnesses. The search warrant sought for was duly issued. A search was conducted by the NBI agents and, in the course of the search, they found and seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures/films owned or exclusively


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA distributed by the complainants, and machines, equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials and accessories. A Motion to Lift Search Warrant was filed, but was later denied. Thereafter, a motion for reconsideration of the Order of denial was filed. The court granted the said motion and justified it on the ground that the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, were never presented. This case eventually reached the Court of Appeals, which sustained the Order of the trial court. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners was likewise denied. ISSUES:


RULING: NO. It ruled that any foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may maintain an action in Philippine courts upon any cause of action, provided that the subject matter and the defendant are within the jurisdiction of the court. And even if the foreign corporation concerned is without a license to transact business in the Philippines, it does not follow that it has no capacity to bring an action in Philippine courts. Such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in business in the Philippines. It was noted by the Court that no general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what constitutes doing or engaging in or transacting business. Each case must be judged in the light of its own peculiar environmental circumstances. The true tests, however, seem to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body or substance of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another. There was no showing that, under existing statutory or case law, petitioners were doing, transacting, engaging in, or carrying on business in the Philippines as would require obtention of a license before they can seek redress from Philippine courts. No evidence has been offered to show that petitioners have performed any of the enumerated acts or any other specific act indicative of an intention to conduct or transact business in the Philippines. NO. The Court discussed the nature of judicial decisions by citing certain provisions of the Civil Code. Art. 4 provides that (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Art. 8 of the same Code declares that (j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. As regards Art. 8 of the Civil Code, the Court was quick to clarify that jurisprudence cannot be considered as an independent source of law; it cannot create law. While it is true that judicial decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of the legal system of the Philippines, still they are not law. Judicial decisions, though not law, are

LOCUS STANDI: Proper standing in front of the Court



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA nonetheless evidence of what the laws mean, and it is for this reason that they are not part of the legal system of the Philippines. Moreover, the Court said that, citing the case of People v. Jabinal, an interpretation upon a law by the Court constitutes a part of the law as of the date that the law was originally passed, since the Courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. But when a doctrine of the court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. The Court also explained what could be called the principle of prospective application. Citing the case of Spouses Benzoan v. Court of Appeals, the Court said that the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contracts and hence, unconstitutional. The same consideration underlies the Courts rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law but consists merely of construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one. The Court found merit in the petitioners contention that it was absurd to apply the formulation enunciated in the 20th Century Fox ruling as regards the finding of probable cause, when such formulation was yet nonexistent. The 20th Century Fox casewhich was promulgated on August 19, 1988could not have been considered by the lower court when it issued Search Warrant 87-053 in December of 1987, months before the promulgation of the 20th Century Fox ruling. The formulation enunciated in the 20th Century Fox case should, at most, be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies. The Court held that the said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases. Judicial dicta should always be construed within the factual matrix of their parturition. Otherwise, a careless interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the writer with the vice of overstatement and the reader with the fallacy of undue generalization. NBI Senior Agent Lauro Reyes, who filed an application for a search warrant, did testify on matters within his personal knowledge based on the complaint filed by the petitioners as well as his own investigation and surveillance of the private respondents video rental shop. Moreover, Reyes testimony was corroborated by other witnesses for the prosecution. The Court held that they displayed none of the ambivalence and uncertainty that the witnesses in the 20th Century Fox case exhibited. This categorical forthrightness in their statements, among others, was what initially and correctly convinced that trial court to make a finding of the existence of probable cause. It would be incorrect to suggest that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted films is always necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause and that, in the absence thereof, there can be no finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. Such auxiliary procedure does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence. It is an established principleas enshrined in the 1987 Constitutionthat a showing of probable cause is a condition sine qua non8 for the issuance of a search warrant. But it was observed by the Court that the term probable cause is exceedingly difficult to define with any degree of precision. There is, in other

SINE QUA NON: Indispensable requirement



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA words, no exact test in determining probable cause. In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. It was likewise noted by the Court that neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Court attempt to define probable cause, obviously for the purpose of leaving such matter to the courts discretion within the particular facts of each case. A restriction of the exercise of discretion by a judge adding a particular requirementthe presentation of master tapeswould serve no purpose but to stultify and constrict the judicious exercise of a courts prerogatives and to denigrate the judicial duty of determining probable cause to a mere ministerial or mechanical function. QUE V. PEOPLE 154 SCRA 160

FACTS: Petitioner seeks a review by certiorari of the appellate court's decision and the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the same, on the grounds that respondent appellate court not only decided a substantial question of jurisdiction not in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence but also sanctioned the departure by the lower court from the accepted judicial procedures on the issue of jurisdiction. ISSUE: WHETHER THE DECISION OF BOTH THE TRIAL COURT AND APPELLATE COURT AND THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND EVIDENCE HELD: It is of no moment whether the said checks were deposited by the complainant in a bank located outside of Quezon City. The determinative factor is the place of issuance which is in Quezon City and thus within the court's jurisdiction. The argument on petitioner's second issue has likewise no leg to stand on. On this argument that he issued the checks in question merely to guarantee the payment of the purchases by Powerhouse Supply, Inc. of which he is the Manager It is now settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. Indeed, it is the intention of the framers of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum and thus punishable under such law. PEOPLE V. LUISITO CO G.R. No. 116001

FACTS: Luisito Go, while having fun in a disco house with two women companions, was arrested for illegal possession of firearms after policemen saw the gun tucked in his waist and accused-appellant was unable to produce any gun license. On the way out of the disco, accused-appellant asked permission to bring his car, which was parked outside. The police officers accompanied accused-appellant to his car, a Honda Civic with license


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA plate number TCM-789. Through the windshield, SPO3 Liquido noticed a Philippine National Police identification card hanging from the rearview mirror. He asked accused-appellant if he was a member of the PNP, and he said no. The police officers asked accused-appellant for his driver's license and the registration papers of the vehicle, but he was unable to produce them. When accused-appellant opened the door, SPO3 Liquido took the ID card and found that the same belonged to SPO4 Zenaida Bagadiong. The police officers saw pieces of glass tooters and tin foils on the backseat and floor of the car. They asked accused-appellant why he had these items, but he did not say anything. Instead, accused-appellant suggested that they talk the matter over, and attempted to bribe the policeman. Accused-appellant assails the validity of his arrest and his subsequent convictions for the two crimes. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the arrest and subsequent seizure were legal. ISSUE: WAS THE ARREST AND SEARCH VALID? HELD: YES. The constitutional proscription, that no person shall be arrested without any warrant of arrest having been issued prior thereto, is not a hard-and-fast rule. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where an arrest may be effected without a warrant. Among these are when, in the presence of a peace officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. In the cases at bar, the police saw the gun tucked in appellant's waist when he stood up. The gun was plainly visible. No search was conducted as none was necessary. No warrant of arrest was necessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules. As a consequence of appellant's valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant, as provided in Rule 126, Section 12. This is a valid search incidental to the lawful arrest. The subsequent discovery in his car of drug paraphernalia and the crystalline substance, which was later identified as shabu, though in a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearm was committed, cannot be said to have been made during an illegal search. Under P.D. 1866, the essence of the crime is the accused's lack of license or permit to carry or possess firearm, ammunition, or explosive. Possession by itself is not prohibited by law. XXIV. WHAT IS AN APPEAL, CERTIORARI, WRIT? APPEAL - To ask a more senior court or person to review a decision of a subordinate court or person. In some countries such as Canada, the USA and Australia, appeals can continue all the way up to the Supreme Court, where the decision is final in that it can no longer be appealed. That is why it is called "supreme" (although, in Australia the supreme court is called the High Court ). CERTIORARI A writ of certiorari is a form of judicial review whereby a court is asked to consider a legal decision of an administrative tribunal, judicial office or organization (eg. government) and to decide if the decision has been regular and complete or if there has been an error of law. For example, a certiorari may be used to wipe out a decision of an administrative tribunal which was made in violation of the rules of natural justice, such as a failure to give the person affected by the decision an opportunity to be heard.



WRIT - An official court document, signed by a judge or bearing an official court seal, which commands the person to whom it is addressed, to do something specific. That "person" is typically either a sheriff (who may be instructed to seize property, for example) or a defendant (for whom the writ is the first notice of formal legal action. In these cases, the writ would command the person to answer the charges laid out in the suit, or else judgment may be made against them in their absence).
XXV. MUTATIS MUTANDIS The phrase mutatis mutandis is Latin and means that having been changed which had to be changed or more commonly, with necessary changes. In Latin, mutatis mutandis means upon changing that to be changed, where that to be changed is usually implied by a prior statement assumed to be understood by the reader. It carries the connotation that the reader should pay attention to the corresponding differences between the current statement and a previous one, although they are analogous. This term is used frequently in economics and in law, to parameterize a statement with a new term or note the application of an implied, mutually understood set of changes. EBRALINAG v. DIVISION OF SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU 1 MARCH 1993 FACTS: The petitioners are composed of elementary and high school student from various public and private schools in Cebu and are represented by their parents. These students, members of the Jehovahs witness religion, were expelled from their respective schools for their refusal to participate in the flag ceremony. The respondents actions were in compliance with Republic Act No. 1256 and Department Order No. 8 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, requiring participation in the flag ceremony. The members of the Jehovahs Witness religion believe that the flag is an image or idol, and that the flag ceremony was a form of worship. Therefore, to participate in the flag ceremony would be contrary to their religious beliefs. The same issue was raised in the precedent case, Gerona v. Secretary of Education, wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the expulsion of the Jehovahs Witnesses from their schools for noncompliance with the law is not a violation of religious freedom, explaining that the flag is only a symbol of national sovereignty. The petitioners stressed that although they do not take part in the flag ceremony, they do not engage in any disruptive behavior that may offend their countrymen who do participate.




FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA NO. The Court re-examined the Gerona case and ruled that compelling one to take part in the flag ceremony would undermine ones constitutional rights, specifically the Free Exercise Clause. The Court likewise explained the twofold aspect of religious freedom, namely (1) the absolute freedom to believe as long as such is limited within the realm of thought, and (2) the freedom to act on ones belief, which may be regulated. It underscored the rule that the only justification for restraint is the existence of clear and present danger, both grave and imminent, which is of serious evil to public interest. In the present case, the Court held that the Jehovahs Witnesses non-participation in the flag ceremony in no way poses a clear and present danger to society. Therefore, restraint on the part of the government would be unjustified. Moreover, the petitioners right to quality education, as granted by the 1987 Constitution, was likewise violated by effecting the expulsion of the students. A. UNDUE DELEGATION Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan FACTS: Executive Order No. 6199 (15 USCA 709 note), prohibited 'the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. This action was based on section 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933. That section provides: 'Sec. 9. ... '(c) The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any violation of any order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both. This was promulgated by Franklin Delano Roosevelt during the depression years of the US just before the onset of the Second World War. ISSUE: Whether or not this is a constitutional delegation of power by the Congress to the President. HELD: No, it is not. It was found to have lacked the defining criteria necessary for delegation in order to apply the proposed restriction. It was the omission of Congressional guidance on State petroleum production ceilings that led to the ruling. The Congress needs to provide for clear guidelines or criteria whenever it passes a law that delegates power or decision-making to the executive branch. This was a blow to Roosevelts New Deal legislated programs in the 30s. 293 US 388(1935)



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA HOW TO STUDY LAW AND WRITE LAW EXAMINATIONS KINYON, STANLEY How to Study Law A. Tools of the Profession The student needs certain tools in order to survive in law school. Books, both casebooks and textbooks, comprise him primary tools. The student will also need writing materials in going about his trade. The student is also advised to get his own law dictionary. The author notes that law students usually have difficulty in comprehending legal terms. This is because Law has virtually built a language on its own. It would also be helpful to the student if he acquaints himself with the other law books found in the library. This way, he will not have to go through all of them when the need arises. B. Object of Law Study Law is a large body of rules and regulations, based mainly on general principles of justice, fair play and convenience, which have been worked out and promulgated by governmental bodies to regulate human activities and define what is and what is not permissible conduct in various situations. The term law is also used in a much broader sense to denote the whole process by which organized society, through governmental bodies and personnel attempts to apply these rules and regulations and thereby establish and maintain peaceful and orderly relations between the people in that society. The study of law should be viewed within the context of the legal system as a whole. Studying law is not just about learningor memorizinglegal rules and court cases. The student must learn how to take a particular problem or controversy, accurately classify it as it would be classified by a legal tribunal, discover and apply to it the rules and principles generally applied to controversies in that class, and, so far as possible, draw the same conclusions and arrive at the same solution as the legal tribunal would. The studenttheoretically, at leastwill be able not only to handle his own affairs but also to advise others as regards the problems that they face everyday.

C. Studying under the Case Method or Case System The Case System is based on the idea that the best way to study law is to study the actual court decision in various types of cases and to derive from them, by inductive reasoning, an understanding of the main files of classification in the law and the general rules and principles applicable in those fields. Cases are published reports of controversies, which have come before the courts, including the courts decision and its reasons for its decision. These reports usually deal with the decisions and opinions of appellate courts. Trial courts decisions are not ordinarily recorded in printed volumes of public distribution.



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA Casebooks are made up principally are made up principally of selected cases taken from these reports and arranged according to the type of controversy or subject matter in the case. D. Reading Cases In reading cases, the student should first know what to look for. This is achieved by knowing the basic parts of a case, which are the following: (1) a brief statement of the kind of controversy involved. This is usually accompanied by an explanation of how the case got to this particular court; whether it started there, or, it is a matter on appealas it usually ishow and why it happened to get there whether plaintiff or defendant appealed, and just to what action of the lower court the appealing is objecting; (2) a statement of the facts of the controversywho the parties were, what they did, what happened to them, who brought the action and what he wanted; (3) a statement of the question or questions the court is called upon to decidethe various issues (either of law or fact) which must be settled before a decision on the controversy can be reached; (4) the arguments on the issuesa discussion of the pros and cons; and (5) the general conclusion and, ultimately, the courts decision. The student is expected to read the cases systematically so as to be able to have an intelligent grasp of the case. The following steps will be helpful in facilitating the reading process: (1) get a clear picture of the controversy involvedget all the facts and issues straight; (2) analyze them; (3) read the courts conclusions and the arguments behind them; (4) jot down or mark important points that might be encountered; and (5) study the notes the author or annotator has appended to the case (if there are any). E. Briefing Cases Briefing a case simply means making a brief summary or abstract of the case in the students own words. Briefing cases serves two purposes. First, and most important, it makes the student read the case more thoroughly and carefully. Second, it gives the student a permanent condensed written record of each case. There are three (3) cardinal rules in making good briefs. First, one should not try to brief the case as it is read through the first time. Second, the brief should be written in the students own words. Third, the brief should be organized and concise, without sacrificing substance. As far as this third rule is concerned, a good logical order for a brief is as follows: FACTSISSUES DECISIONREASONS. F. ClassworkTaking Notes Some points that the student should remember in taking notes: First, do not try to write down everything that is said in class. Second, if a case is being discussed, write down its name and then stop and listen to what is being said about it. Third, when the discussion has proceeded to a point where a conclusion has been reached or a rule developed, get it clearly in mind and then write a concise, accurate statement of it. Fourth, when going from one problem to the next, indicate the transition, if possible. G. Review 1. Day-to-day Review



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA The object and purpose of day-to-day review is quite apparent from its name. It is primarily a device for nailing down or clinching the material being studies as the student goes along. One good tip is that the student should review each course just before he reads the next days assignment in that course. 2. Periodic Review The object and purpose of periodic review is to get a broad mental picture of the main divisions in each course and, ultimately, of the whole course and the whole field of law. H. Outline An outline gives the student a tangible picture of the organization of the course. It also compels the student to do the reviewing more thoroughly, carefully and systematically. Case Method of Instruction Historical Background The introduction of the case method came with the publication in 1871 by Dean Christopher Langdell of his casebook on contracts. He asserted that law was a science, the materials of which were the cases. He wanted to make legal education more realistic and less abstract. Thus, the study of different particular cases which, more or less, depict the actual scenario to be tackled by the lawyers-to-be. Justification The case method of instruction serves as training for the student as regards the development of his critical faculties. This method puts emphasis on analysis and reasoning rather than on a correct conclusion. Conduct of Classes The student is asked to state the facts and holdings of the case or cases assigned by the professor. This serves two (2) purposes: (1) to provide a common basis for class discussionthe case itself and (2) to expose the student to a critique of his accuracy and understanding in reporting the case. In conduct of classes employing the case method, hypothetical cases are posed by the professor, calculated to test the scope of the rule that the student has derived from his study of the opinion. Reviewing Reviewing gives the student a much more comprehensive and systematized vision of the course. LANGUAGE MASTERY AND LEGAL TRAINING MEHLER, IRVING Quinovit neque id quod sentit exprimit perinde est ac sinesciret He who knows but cannot express what he knows is as if he were ignorant.



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA The perennial problem faced by legal educators is the inability of law students to use the English languageboth the spoken and written wordproperly and effectively. 1. The Law Schools Burden The law school has the burden of addressing this handicap by setting up courses dealing with the rudiments of the English language within the required law school curriculum. Language is a lawyers principle stock in trade, one can only learn from ideas and he can only deal with them through the medium of language. The burden exists because of a language deficiency barrier. 2. Areas in Need of More Effective Communication Training A lawyer is a professional in versatility. The importance of a lawyer is to express himself clearly and cogently, both orally and in writing. The penultimate and ultimate end of all law is the quest and attainment of justicehuman justices. Human justice oftentimes has a penumbral and elusive quality. There may be additional hidden elements working beneath the surface of a factual situation not entirely exposed to ordinary probing and humanly infinite powers of discernment. We may be able to sense these unknown elements intuitively, but we are unable to express them due to the lack of language mastery in its broadest sense. Due to this inability, the goal we seek is not attained. Greater emphasis on expanded language techniques and mastery in the following areas of legal communication: a. Interviewing This area is important because of the fact that a case begins when it is brought into a lawyers office and the lawyer has to make the initial decision of what to do about it and how to prod the inert wheels of justice into movement. When the case has found that way into the office there is less sterile pedantry, an act of making a tedious show of dull learning, about what is or is not the law and a more serious quest for whatever can aid the lawyer to cope with his problems. The inadequacies in the lawyers grasp of the language may invite failure in his duty to represent his client competently. The direct or subtle nuances of the interview can well make or break its final outcome. The failure of a lawyer to competently represent his client is often due to: (a) dulled linguistic habits, (b) inadequate command, and (c) unskilled use of language in relation to the problem at hand. Language habits have too much dulled our living potentials, have blocked our awareness too much of what we are and what we are about. Conducting a skillful interview involves both the psychological and neuropsychiatric aspects, or the conscious and unconscious respectively, of the psyche. b. Counseling The lawyer may be viewed as an omniscient, all-knowing and infinitely wise adviser of human beings concerning their multifarious every day social and economic problems. The problems that lawyers encounter as counselors-at-law are primarily problems not of law but of human relations.



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA Being an effective counselor involves (a) solid grounding in the law, (b) a psychological insight, and most importantly, (c) a mastery of language and techniques to assure the merging and proper application of law and insight to the problem at hand. Words are the indispensable tools of the lawyers craft. Judge Vanderbilt enumerates the elements of the basic ingredients always present in the work of the counselor and advocate: (a) assembling and marshaling or facts, (b) application thereto of the principles of law dealing with human nature in a wide variety, giving consideration to the economic, political, and social environment of each transaction coming up for consideration, (c) reasoning back and forth with respect to all four of these types of material, and (d) use of understandable and convincing English, both oral and written. c. Advocacy The primary task of the advocate is to persuade the court of tribunal to his view of the law and the facts of his clients cause. The adversary system of jurisprudence purports that (a) it is the duty of the lawyer as advocate to convince the court of the justice and fairness which preponderate in his clients favor, (b) he must induce the court to believe something so that it will act in accordance to with he believes, and (c) he must influence by argument, advice, entreaty and expostulation. The function of an advocate is not to ascertain the truth, but to present from one side of the case all that be usefully and properly said in order, that when compared with what is presented from the other side of the case, the tribunal may distinguish from what side the truth really lies. The facile and persuasive command of English is where the advocacy will likely be successful. d. Negotiation Like advocacy, negotiation requires persuasion, possibly in a gentle and more delicate form. A firm grasp of the language provides the arsenal needed. The process of adjustment of existing differences, with a view to the establishment of a mutually more desirable legal relation by means of barter and compromise of legal rights and duties of economic, psychological, social and other interests. This, therefore, involves personal skills and insights as well as, personal behavior in terms of poise, assurance and mobility, and that these must be conveyed by the proper voice and manner. e. Drafting Drafting is the most important and major part of a lawyers professional activity. One appellate court said that the greater, more responsible and delicate part of a lawyers work is in drafting of instruments, creating trusts, formulating contracts and drawing wills and negotiations. All require legal knowledge and power of adaptation of the highest order. Legal draftsmanship is basically concerned with words and/or language technique. In drafting documents, one needs to state the facts accurately and communicate ideas precisely.



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA In conclusion, language should be taught with equal parity with the other legal subjects in law school. EL PODER JUDICIAL EN FILIPINAS NARVASA, ANDRES

Judicial Power in the Philippines: Its Governance, Structure and Independence A. The Judiciary: 1. Courts during Spanish Regime Prior to the arrival of the Spanish in the Philippines, there existed a baranggay system, ruled by chieftains who exercised all powers of governance, including legislative, executive and judicial. With the arrival of the Spanish, a central government was established with Legazpi as the first Governor. Empowered by Royal Order of August 14, 1569, he administered civil and criminal justice, and heard and decided any suit, civil or criminal in the region. On 5 May, 1583, The REAL AUDENCIA was established as a dependency of Mexico. There was a President, 4 Oidores (justices), a fiscal, an Aguacil Mayor, and a Teniente de Gran Canciller, with the First President being Governor Santiago de Vera. The first session took place on 10 June, 1584. During these days, the executive and the judicial powers are one, with the Governor-General, also the ex-oficio President of the Court, the Alcalde Mayor and Gobernadorcillo as Court of First Instance Judge and Municipal Magistrate, respectively. During the 2nd half of the 19th century, the Real Audencia was placed under the Consejo de Indios in Spain, which held appellate jurisdiction over administrative matters and civil appeals more than 6,000 pesos but not criminal cases. It is also during this time that there occurred first a separation of executive and judicial powers, inspired by Montesquies De lesprit des loix (The Spirit of the Laws). The Consejo was abolished March 1834 and its jurisdiction assumed by Tribunal Supremo de Espana e Indias. In 1815, the Governor-General was replaced by a Chief Justice, and 7 Oidores. On 4 July, 1861the Real Audiencia was no longer advisory board of the Governor-General, and functioned solely for the administration of justice. Audiencia Territorial de Manila was divided into a Sala dela Civil and a Sala dela Criminal. Also, two other audiencias was established in Vigan and Cebu, respectively. These other audiencias had one Chief Justice and two associate justices, they held appellate jurisdiction over civil but not criminal cases. Aside from this, there existed special courts which includes, (1) ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS, which held jurisdiction over priests, canonical laws, marriage and divorce, (2) TRIBUNAL DE CONSULADO, which was directly under the Tribunal de Alzadas and held jurisdiction over mercantile and commercial obligations and contracts, (3) MILITARY COURTS, and (4) CHINESE COURTS. 2. Courts under American Sovereignty On 13 August, 1898, a military government was established under Maj. Gen. Wesley Merrit, by the powers of the President of the United States as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. They


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA maintained the civil powers of the Real Audencia, but the criminal cases were handled by the Military Courts. On 30 January, 1899, civil jurisdiction was suspended as well. On 29 May 1899, M/Gen. Otis issued Gen. Order 20, which established the Audencia Territorial insofar as compatible with the sovereignty of the United States, restoring both its criminal and civil functions. Cayetano Arellano was the first Chief Justice. On 11 June, 1901, by virtue of Act No. 136, the Audencia was finally abolished and in its place was established the Supreme Court, with one Chief Justice and 6 Associate Justices, holding practically the same jurisdiction as the Real Audencia. This Act was finally affirmed by the Act of 01 July, 1902, otherwise known as the Philippine Bill. In 1917, with the enactment of the Administrative Code, the judiciary was reorganized with the Supreme Court over the Courts of First Instance (Courts of Superior Jurisdiction) and over the Peace Courts. There was one Chief Justice and eight Associate Justices. On 29 August, 1916, the Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act, the US Supreme Court held appellate jurisdiction over the Philippine Supreme Court on matters involving constitutionality of any statutes, treaties, titles, and rights and privileges of US citizens, plus claims of over $25,000. The Tydings-Mcduffie Law of 24 March, 1934 espoused that the Philippine would have its own Constitution, a convention being called for that purpose. On 14 May, 1935, the Commonwealth Constitution was drafter with the Supreme Court established with one Chief Justice and 10 Associate Justices. On 31 December of that same year, the Court of Appeals was established as the 2nd highest court of the land, composed of 11 members, (15 in the late 30s, 17 in 1942, and 69 presently, though not filled up) 3. Courts during Japanese Occupation During the Pacific War, Japan dominated the Philippines, and there really wasnt much change with the Judiciary in this instance, only there were 5 members of the Supreme Court, one Chief Justice and four Associate Justices. This Supreme Court first held session on 17 February 1942. The members were later increased to seven. The Court of Appeals first held session 6 February 1942, and the Courts of First Instance, on 23 February 1942. 4. Courts under the Independent Republic In 1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 was enacted. With 11 members of the Supreme Court, sitting only en banc, the Court of Appeals had 15 members which may sit in 5 divisions, then the Peace Courts was designated as Municipal Courts. There was also established a Criminal Circuit Court by virtue of RA5179 enacted on 8 September 1967. 5. Courts under Martial Law



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA The Supreme Court membership was again increased to 15, and the proclamation of Martial Law vested the Supreme Court with administrative supervision over all inferior tribunals. On August 1980, BP129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 altered the name of the Court of Appeals into the Intermediate Appellate Court and Courts of First Instance to Regional Trial Courts. Metropolitan Trial Courts were established in metropolitan areas, as well as Metropolitan Trial Courts in Cities in cities not inside a metropolitan area. 6. Under the Freedom Constitution and Beyond On 28 February 1986, the Court of Appeals was reinstated. During this time, the present concept of judicial power was concocted. The concept of judicial review over governmental acts was unheard of before this time. Now, the second sentence of judicial power as provided in the Art. 8, Sec. 1 of the Constitution is one of the most important in the present Constitution. 7. Special Courts and Administrative Tribunals or Quasi-Judicial Agencies Quasi-judicial agencies are administrative agencies vested with limited adjudicatory power. Such includes Sharia Courtsexercising limited jurisdiction over cases involving the Muslim Code of Personal Laws. (The present Integrated Judicial System can be viewed on Page 13 of the Article.) B. Rules on Procedure. 1. Laws of Spain: Made Applicable to the Philippines Only those which came to have effect to the country, which were extended by royal decree. The chief codes and laws made effective here in the Philippines included the Ley Provisional, Codes of Criminal and Civil Procedure (1888), the Penal Code, Family Law, Marriage Law. Laws of limited application made effective here, included the mining law, and the notarial law, among others. 2. Effect of American Sovereignty.

The Spanish statute law was by the change of sovereignty, severed from Spanish jurisprudence and made effective in this jurisdiction to the same extent as if Congress had enacted new laws for the Philippines modeled upon those same Spanish statutes.



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA All political laws were abrogated immediately, because of the change of sovereignty. All other laws, customs, and rights of property incompatible with the American system were superseded. During the time of Spanish occupation, at least from 1888 onwards, the Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal and Ley de Enjuciamiento Civil were controlling as to the procedure of how the actions occurred in court. Prior to this, there was not a systematic legal compilation of procedural laws, but only judicial decrees of the Real Audiencia, among others, that were controlling. In April 1900, General Orders 85, the Criminal Code of Procedure, modified or repealed the Ley de Enjudiciamiento Criminal. In September 1901, Act No. 190 also known as the Code of Civil Procedure superseded the Ley de Enjudiciamiento Civil. This shift altogether changed the former inquisitorial mode of litigation, to the present adversarial mode of litigation. The Philippine Autonomy Act or Jones Law of 1916 otherwise respected the Judicial System already running in the Philippines. However, it is important to note that this law allowed the appeal on any decision of the Philippine Supreme Court to the Federal Supreme Court of the United States. In July 1940, the Rules of Court was made effective. It superseded both Codes of Criminal and Civil Procedure already existing. It culled much of its content from both Codes that it superseded plus that of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Decisions of the Supreme Court among others.

3. The Independent Republic

On January 1964, the new Rules of Court took effect. The revision included provisions from the New Civil Code of 1950, and took into consideration as well, proposals from various quarters as well as jurisprudence. From then on, the Rules of Court has been revised numerous times including the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

C. The Judicial System (will be discussed in Constitutional Law I)



For the world court to be able to apply any asserted rule of international law, it must be shown that it is the product of the of the three law-creating processes, otherwise known as the direct or formal sources of international law. These are (1) treaties and conventions, (2) customs, and (3) general principles of law. The secondary or indirect sources of international law are (1) decisions of courts, and (2) writings of publicists. These are discussed in detail below:


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA The power of the Court to decide a case ex aequeo et bono, that is to say, to ignore rules which are the product of any of the above three primary sources and to substitute itself as a law-creating agency depends on the agreement of the parties to a dispute. A formal source is that from which a rule of law derives its force and validity. The material sources, on the other hand, are those from which it derived the matter, not the validity of the law. The material source supplies the substance of the rule to which the formal source gives the force and nature of law. 1. Custom A custom is defined as a practice, which has grown up between States and has come to be accepted as binding by the mere fact of persistent usage over a long period of time. An example is the practice of granting immunities to foreign heads or States. One of the defects of customary international law is the difficulty of determining when a practice can be considered to have heartened into custom and thus acquired obligatory character. Another problem is its inability owing to its slow process of evolution to adjust swiftly to moving developments. COLOMBIA v. PERU ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 266

FACTS: Haya dela Torre, a Peruvian, staged among with others, an unsuccessful rebellion in Peru in 1948 and was ordered arrested. De la Torre was granted asylum by Colombia. Peru refuses to permit de la Torre out of the country. Colombia, therefore institutes present action. ISSUE: W/N COLOMBIA, AS A STATE GRANTING ASYLUM, MAY QUALIFY THE CONDITIONS OF THE ASYLUM UNILATERALLY. RULING: NO. The party, which relies on a custom, must prove that this custom is established in such a manner as it is binding upon the other party. In this case, Colombia fails to prove that qualification for asylum can be had unilaterally and even if such was proven, Colombia may not invoke the custom between Latin-American States as binding since Peru has refused to sign the Montevideo Conventions of 1933 and 1939 which defined the qualification of the offense in diplomatic asylum. FEDERAL REPUBLIC of GERMANY v. DENMARK and NETHERLANDS p. 3 ICJ Reports, 1969,

FACTS: Denmark and the Netherlands both propose the Equidistance-Special Circumstances Principle, while Germany proposes the Doctrine of the Just and Equitable Share. Germany argues that using the principle proposed by both Denmark and the Netherlands would result to a smaller share for the State in between the two States, in this case, Germany. ISSUE: WHAT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ARE APPLICABLE TO THE DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELVES IN THE NORTH SEA. RULING: Before a conventional rule can be considered to have become a general of international law, it might be that, even without the passage of any considerable period of time, a very widespread and representative participation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose interests were specially affected. The Geneva Convention to which both believe to have settled the issue was deemed not to have settled the issue because the Convention on the Continental Shelf of


FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA the Geneva Convention was never ratified, although practiced by the affected States. Therefore, the World Court, in this instance, decided to rule not on which principle should be used, but instead came up with its own principle to guide the issue at hand. It was held that: (1) Delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances, in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each Party all those parts of the continental shelf x x (2) If in the application of the preceding sub-paragraph, the delimitation leaves to the Parties areas that overlap, these are to be divided between them in agreed proportions x x Dissent of Judge Lachs: The equidistance rule, have been accepted not only by those States which are parties to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, but also by those which subsequently followed it in agreements, or in their legislation, or have acquiesced in it when faced with legislative acts of other States affecting them. This can be viewed as evidence of a practice widespread enough to satisfy the criteria for a general rule of law. Dissent of Judge Sorensen: The court does not seem to have laid down strict requirements as to the duration of the usage or practice which may be accepted as law. In particular, it does not seem to have drawn any conclusion in this respect from the ordinary meaning of the word custom when used in other contexts. [I believe] as a result of a continuous process over a quarter of a century, the rules embodied in the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf have now attained the status of generally accepted rules of international law. 2. Treaties Not all treaties can be considered a direct source of international law. A treaty, to be considered a direct source of international law, must be concluded by a sizable number of States. Even if originally agreed upon only by a few States, the treaty may become binding upon the whole world if it is intended to lay down rules for observance by all and it is subsequently signed or acceded to by other States. Treaties are more of contractual obligations rather than a source of law. The Constitution provides that Congress should ratify treaties before it can actually become law. This just means that a treaty is already a contractual obligation, but not a law, until it has been ratified. In essence, the treaty may lead to a law, but is actually not yet a law. 3. General Principles of Law The general principles of law are mostly derived from the law of nature and are observed by the majority of States because they are believed to be good and just. Although no international convention was necessary to bring them into existence, the general principles of law have nevertheless become universal in application because of the unilateral decision of a considerable number of States to adopt and observe them in recognition of their intrinsic merit. NETHERLANDS v. BELGIUM 77 PCIJ Reports, Series A/B, No. 70, pp. 76-

The Netherlands claimed that Belgium had infringed a treaty obligation by building canals that altered the flow of water in the River Meuse.



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA RULING: Hudson. He who seeks equity must do equity. The Netherlands lost the right to bring its claim because of similar earlier conduct on its part. 4. Decisions of Courts The doctrine of stare decisis is not applicable in international law, and so the decision of a court in one case will have only persuasive value in the decision of a subsequent case. The decision of the Court has no binding force between the parties and in respect to that particular case. 5. Writings of Publicists It must be a fair and unbiased representation of international law, and by an acknowledged authority in the field. 6. Discussion on Soft Law Soft Law consists of written instruments that spell out rules of conduct that are not intended to be legally binding, so that they are not subject to the law of treaties and do not generate them to become a custom.

Notes by Paolo Abarquez: Introduction to law Course and Discussion Guide Dean Jose M. Roy I. The courts and jurisprudence What are courts? An organ of the government, belonging to the judicial department, whose function is the application of the laws to controversies brought before it and the public administration of justice. Simply a body organized for the administration of justice. (Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th edition) What is Judicial Power? Judicial power, according to Section of Article 8 of the Philippine Constitution, includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Is the power of the court inherent or traditional? How did the notion of judicial power come to this country? Are decisions law? Yes. According to Article 8 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. However, only the decisions of the Supreme Court are treated as such, the decisions of the



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA lower courts have not in practice been considered as law because these cases are not largely reported or published. Parts of a case? The usual parts of the case are: 4) Case Title indicates the nature of the case (e.g. people v. echegaray crim case; republic v. tan case v. govt; etc.) 5) Body the body usually contains the following: a. Facts the history of how the controversy came to be; b. Issues questions that the court needs to resolve; c. Arguments the discussion of differing views of the adverse parties; d. Ruling the answers to the issues or questions that needs to be resolved; e. Dispositive the instructions of the court in lieu of its ruling 6) Procedural Antecedents standards that needs to be followed for the higher court to acquire jurisdiction of the case Dispositive Portion that portion of the case where the order of the court is stated or the conclusion of the case. In Philippine cases, it usually begins with the word Wherefore. Separate Opinions the portion of the case where a member of the court would state his reasons and legal basis for not agreeing with the main opinion. Usually, stated after the main opinion. Stare Decisis is also known as the doctrine of precedent, simply, that past judicial decisions are generally binding for the disposition of factually similar present controversies. Obiter Dictum is language in a decision that is not necessary to the decision. In common parlance, it is what you call a by the way. Since it is not the Ratio Decidendi or the principle of law which the case has been decided on (opposite of Obiter Dictum), the Obiter Dictum cannot be binding on future cases, but it might be persuasive. Leading Case among the various cases that are argued and determined in the courts, some, from their important character, have demanded more than usual attention from the judges, and from this circumstance are frequently looked upon as having settled or determined the law upon all points involved in such cases, and as guides for subsequent decisions, and from the importance they thus acquire are familiarly termed leading cases. Landmark Case a case where the Supreme Court rendered a decision that significantly changes existing law. History of Courts

II. What is Law? What are the sources of law? a. custom b.



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA What is custom? Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. However, the courts take no judicial notice of custom, and must be proved as fact according to the rules of evidence to be considered by the courts. What is Jus Cogens? Treaties - A compact made between two or more independent nations with a view to the public welfare. A treaty is not only a law but also a contract between two nations and must, if possible, be so construed as to give full force and effect to all its parts. General Principles of Law Municipal Law That which pertains solely to the citizens and inhabitants of a state, and is thus distinguished from international law. In its more common and narrower connotation however it means those laws which pertain to towns, cities and villages and their local government. International Law Those laws governing the legal relations between nations. Rules and principles of general application dealing with the conduct of nations and of international organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical. Art II Section 2 of the Philippine constitution The Philippines renounces war as a instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. III. Judges and Lawyers What are judges? An officer so named in his commission, who presides in some court; a public officer, appointed to preside and to administer the law in a court of justice; the chief member of a court, and charged with the control of proceedings and the decision of questions of law or discretion; a public officer who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. Lawyers a person learned in the law; as an attorney, counsel, or solicitor; a person licensed to practice law. Counsel an attorney or counselor. Advice and assistance given by one person to another in regard to a legal matter, proposed line of conduct, claim or contention. attorneys

IV. Modern Judicial Function and Policy Prospectivity as a general rule, laws are prospective in nature and are not retroactive. The New Civil Code of the Philippines provides under Article 4: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.



FRATERNAL ORDER OF UTOPIA Ex post facto laws laws which are retroactive in nature. Ex Post Facto laws are explicitly prohibited by the constitution under Section 22 of the Bill of Rights which states that, No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. The following are ex post facto laws: 1) Law which makes a crime punishable, when it was not punishable at the time it was committed; 2) Law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater or graver than when it was committed; 3) Law which provides for greater punishment to a crime than that annexed to it at the time of commission; 4) Law which alters the legal rules on evidence, and receives less or different testimony than the law required at time of the commission of the offense in order to convict defendant; 5) Assumes to regulate civil rights only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; 6) Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, like double jeopardy, or amnesty Res Judicata This is the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action. Simply, a thing or matter settled by judgment or that has already been decided. Law of the case designates the principle that if an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the case to the court below for further proceedings, the legal question thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain the same. Courts of Equity A court which has jurisdiction in equity, which administers justice and decides controversies in accordance with the rules, principles, and precedents of equity, and which follows the forms and procedure of chancery; as distinguished from a court having the jurisdiction, rules, principles, and practice of the law. In the Philippines, our courts are both courts of equity and courts of law.

Tips for Intro to Law by Anthony S. Tan:

1. Buy a law dictionary. Read it. Bring it. Take note of the words you come across when reading the cases. 2. Read the originals. Digests serve only as a guide and works best when the original case is read, either before or after. 3. Read digests when you cant understand the originals, or you dont have time to finish it. 4. Try retelling the case after reading it. (Facts, Issues, Held) 5. Take down notes. 6. Going to study groups to study is not advisable. It would just be a case of a blind person leading another blind person. You have the embodiments of excellence as your brods. Go ask them. 7. Going to study groups to study is advisable when you have really studied in your own time. Go find a friend. The more, the many-er. Having a good group of friends is really advisable. 8. Recite with confidence. Never slouch. Never put your hands in you pockets. 9. Be in class ahead of time (at least 30 minutes, I think) 10. Asking questions to Dean Roy is not advisable. Getting into a disagreement with him is suicide. 11. Never let a bad recitation discourage you. There are lots more to come, be sure to redeem yourself. Chances are, you would be called once, or not at all, some even 3 times. 12. Get some decent sleep. 13. EXCELLENCE




For tomorrow shall cast a myriad of mighty storms where only those with firm determination and Utopian vision do survive