Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh Author(s): Vijay Sen Budhraj Reviewed work(s): Source: Asian Survey, Vol.

13, No. 5 (May, 1973), pp. 482-495 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642797 . Accessed: 26/11/2011 06:08
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MOSCOW AND THE OF BIRTH BANGLADESH

/ VijaySen Budhraj
Pekingand Islamabad may say,' it is wrongto assertthat whatever of SovietRussia had a hand in thedismemberment Pakistan.Indeed,the to the thatMoscowsought prevent thirdIndiaof suggests weight evidence PakistanWar whichled to Pakistan'sbreakup.From the verystartthe had hometo themilitary junta in IslamaSovietgovernment triedto bring in situation a to bad theneedforseeking politicalsolution thecomplicated East Pakistan, thatthiswas theonlywayto keepPakistanunited, believing of peace and to checktheinterference Pekingand Washington to maintain in a region closeto theUSSR.
SOVIET REACTION TO THE OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR

The generalelection, held in was complicated. lNo doubtthe situation Ali December1970, clearlyrevealedthe existenceof, to quote Zulfikar wingwhere "twomajority parties"in Pakistan,one in the eastern Bhutto, 167 of 169 East Pakistanseatsin the theAwamiLeague (AL) had secured and NationalAssembly the otherin WestPakistanwherethe 313-member 88 Pakistan People'sParty(PPP) had secured of 144 WestPakistanseats. Sheikh the When toward end of March 1971 the military junta arrested the in operation MujiburRahman,outlawed AL, and launcheda military for to the and East Pakistan crushthemovement democracy autonomy, AL of RepublicofBangindependent the announced establishment a sovereign, ladesh. to Sovietleaderscouldsay that they had known In response this situation, for wouldultimately proveto be illusory, even in the unity thatreligious had denounced partition the plan. They had late 1940s SovietIndologists and that British religious massacres usedthem provoked imperialism argued and the as an excusefordividing country thatthedivisionof India was no described Pakisto In solution thecommunal problem. theearly1950s they tan as an "artificial" absurdity withits two wings state,a geographical
'On December 10, 1971, PekingReview argued that "with the backing of Soviet revisionistsocial-imperialism, Indian reactionariesinvaded Pakistan . . . to impose the the puppet regimeof the so-called 'Bangla Desh' so as to . . .annex East Pakistan." (Vol. XIV, No. 50), p. 12. Z. A. Bhutto stated in the SecurityCouncil that Moscow was a "party to Pakistan's dismemberment" and that India was "arrogant enough to defy the will of the General Assembly" because it stood on "the shoulders of a big power,"the USSR. S/PV. 1611,December12, 1971. 482

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separated a thousand milesof Indian territory. by Stalindubbedthe very and conceptof Pakistan"primitive" N. S. Khrushchev held thatWestern had imperialism made the"two Hindustan States"bitter enemies. During his visitto India in 1955, the Sovietleader said in Srinagarthathe was convinced that"whenpassions... calmeddown,"thepeoplewouldregret the "artificial division India." But in the 1960s,whenPekinghumbled of New Delhi in theHimalayas, Sovietsbegan to improve theirrelations the withPakistan.2 in Moreover, 1971 theSovietshad to consider strategic the implications civilwar "in the immediate of of vicinity the USSR" against thebackground their of the disdeepinvolvement theregion, Sino-Soviet in puteand rivalry, China'sefforts promote to in subversion WestBengaland Nagaland, and Washington's to its withPeking. attempts improve relations It is important notethatsincethe1965 war between to India and Pakistan, theSoviets had been devising meansto bringthe"twoblood brothers" -on thesubcontinent closertogether a meansof ensuring as stability, peace and and security reducing influence outside the of in powers theregionin order to safeguard Moscow'ssoutheastern flank. WhenthePakistanitroops went intoactionin East Pakistan, tensof thousands terrified Pakistanis of East pouredintoIndia. Since mostrefugees wereHindus,it was fearedthatthe subcontinent might witness renewal theHindu-Muslim the of riotsof 1947, whichcould have undermined India's stability, obstructed rapid and its orderly and all progress, destroyed Soviethopesofinvolving bothIndia and Pakistanin Moscow'ssecurity plans forthe region. Thatwasnotall.Sinceall Sovietattempts weanPakistan to from Washingtonand Pekinghad beenunsuccessful since General and Yahya Khan had refused 1969 to accepttheSovietplan forregional in economic cooperation between India,Pakistan, Iran andAfghanistan a (although few weeksearlier he had committed himself support theSovietleaderslookedforward to it), to theestablishment a democratic of government Pakistan, in believingthat sucha government wouldpursue different a policy. thearmy But crack-down in East Pakistan dashedall Soviethopesofan earlyreturn civilian to rulein Pakistan. Something to be doneto restore had normalcy East Pakistan. in The peopleofIndia,especially politically of sensitive WestBengal,condemned army atrocities East Pakistanand demanded in thattheirgovernment shoulddo to something stopthereignof terror. on Accordingly, March31 theIndian Parliament called upon all countries persuadePakistanto stop"thesysto tematic decimation peoplewhichamounts genocide."Moreover, asof to it sured"the75 million peopleofEast Bengal... thewhole-hearted sympathy andsupport thepeopleof India."13 of
2For details, see this author's "The Evolution of Russia's Pakistan Policy," The AustralianJournal of Politics and History,December 1971 (Vol. XVI, No. 3), pp. 343-360. 'For the resolution'sfull text,see Bangla Desh Documents (New Delhi, Ministryof External Affairs, 1971), p. 672.

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The Sovietgovernment responded theIndian appeal immediately. to On of behalf thePresidium theSupreme of SovietoftheUSSR, President PodwarnedPresident gorny Yahya Khan on April2 that"continuation reof pressive measuresand bloodshedin East Pakistanwill,undoubtedly, only makethesolution theproblem of moredifficult" could"do greatharm and to thevitalinterests theentire of it people of Pakistan."He considered his "duty"to appeal to the President Pakistan"to stopthe bloodshedand of repression" to turn methods a peaceful and "to of settlement" theinterest in of "preserving peace in the area." He showedhis sympathy the AL for leaders whenhe spokeofthem having"received as suchconvincing support from overwhelming the majority." lestthisfriendly But advicebe regarded as interference Pakistan'sinternal in affairs, SovietPresident the stated: In appealing youwe areguided thegenerally to humaniby recognized tarian in principles recorded theUniversal Declaration Human of Rights andbyconcern thewelfare thefriendly for of peopleofPakistan.4 Threethings shouldbe noted here.The emphasis and concern "the on for entire people of Pakistan" (mentioned twice) in theSoviet messageindicatedthatMoscowwas on theside of thestatusquo-it did notwantPakistan'sbreakup.Second,the reference "peace in the area" revealedthat to Moscow thought thatpoliticalchaos and fighting withinPakistancould overflow escalateinto a war between and India and Pakistan-a situation Moscowwas determined prevent. to SovietRusThird,theappeal reflected sia's deepconcern theregion. for It appearsthat Moscowwas oftheviewthat Pakistan the Government was dividedon the "toughpolicy"issue. A Sovietwriter blamed"a groupof that army hawks" theuse offorce seemed imply for to whenthe"hawks" and "a threatened coup if thegovernment withthe eastern compromised province," President Yahya Khan was led to crushthe popularmovement by of force arms.Commenting somereports theWestern on in presswhich preof the dicted breakup Pakistan, Sovietspokesman the observed thiswas that what"certain circles"hoped and that"the imperialists imperialist would notbe averse taking to of in advantage thesituation Pakistan further their to he neo-colonialist aims."5Finally, asserted thatwhileEast Pakistani selfish, leadershad certain oncethesewereredressed two economic grievances, the wings,despite their cultural differences, could worktogether the prosfor of perity thewholeofPakistan. This approach servedMoscow'sinterests severalways.First,any enin to movement wouldhavejeopardized couragement thesecessionist Moscow's
'For full text of PresidentPodgorny'smessage, see "Message fromN. V. Podgorny to the President of Pakistan," CurrentDigest of the Soviet Press (hereafterCDSP), May 4, 1971 (Vol. XXIII, No. 14), pp. 35-36 (fromPravda, April 4, 1971), "Soviet Union & the Struggleof the Bangla Desh People," Soviet Review (supplement), January18, 72 (Vol. IX, No. 3), pp. 8-9. 'A. Ulansky,"The Eventsin Pakistan,"New Times,No. 15,April 1971,p. 9.

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in presence Islamabad.Second,other in greatpowerswithinterests therein gion stoodsolidlybehindtheWestPakistanigenerals orderto counterin believed be Sovietinfluence New Delhi. As a relato balancewhatthey nor was in a position tively satisfied power, Moscowwas neither prepared the of could a to taketheriskofcreating newstate. Third, breakup Pakistan into have thrown entiresubcontinent chaos and spread the germsof the to secession therestof Pakistanand possibly India. The Chinesewould to sucha situation. havebenefited mostfrom the of It is not impliedherethatMoscowwantedthe continuation military the to from It muchwished generals retire to rulein Pakistan. very politics, of for transfer to power therepresentativesthepeople.Its sympathy theAL After thisparty all had won a majority seats in the of was understandable. was its National Assembly, socioeconomic program in Moscow'seyes"proin gressive," leaderswere againstPakistan'smembership SEATO and its economic cultural, and withIndia. As the CENTO and stoodforcloselinks, Pakistan-thewholeof it-ruled by theAL couldbetter Soviets calculated, in their serve policyobjectives theregion. to President To return President Podgorny's message, though YahyaKhan assured Moscowthathe wouldstart talks"withnationalrepresentative elements 'EastPakistanat theearliest in opportunity,"" had no intention he of of withtheAL leaders.As thebrutality thearmyinopening negotiations creased,manyintellectuals joined the ranks of secessionists. Disaffection in even to missions abroad.MostBengalis spread Bengalidiplomats Pakistan wereconvinced thattheirsurvivaldependedon fullindependence. Many themselves the 'Mukti tookto armsand organized into Bahini (liberation fled force)andseveralmillion acrosstheborder India to escapethearmy to terror. The influx so manyrefugees India and thestories genocide of into of they and with brought them, theestablishment Bangladesh of diplomatic missions in Calcutta New Delhi in April1971 all worsened relations and the between IndiaandPakistan. Moscowfeared theIndiraGandhigovernment that would notbe able to postpone longwhatthepeopledemanded:recognition for of and large-scale Bangladesh military assistance theMuktiBahini. It was to certain thatrecognition wouldlead to war between India and Pakistan.A that Sovietanalyst, therefore, cautioned thecontinuing bloodshed East Pakistan doingserious in is harm not to interests thePakistani of only thevital people, alsoto thecause but ofpeacein Asia andthroughout world.7 the
Not 6"PakistanIs Determined to AllowAnyCountry Interfere Pakistan's to in In. ternal Affairs," Peking Review, April 1971(Vol.XIV,No. 16), pp.8-9. 16, "International Notes: Crisisand Its Consequences," CDSP, June1, .I. Ratnikov, 1971(Vol.XXIII,No.18), p. 28 (from Pravda, May1,1971).

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THE ATTITUDE OF PEKING AND WASHINGTON

werenotin a mood to open negotiaThe "hawks"in Pakistan, however, of as tionswiththe electedrepresentatives thepeople,regarded "traitors" Muslims. The standof Pekingand Washington thecivil on and "inferior" the whowereagainsta political warstrengthened handsofthose settlement. In a message President to Yahya Khan,PrimeMinister Chou En-laistated thatwhatwas happening Pakistanwas "purelythe internal in affair of Pakistan"and thatonly"a handfulof persons"wanted"to sabotagethe of to unification Pakistan."He did notmiss theopportunity denounce his rivalsin theregion, he allegedthatbothMoscowand Washington had for been"carrying grossinterference theinternal out in of affairs Pakistanby the of exploiting internal problems yourcountry." Finally, assured he Islamabad that should Indian the ... expansionists launch aggression against Pakistan, Government will, always, as theChinese ... the firmly support Pakistan and to Government peoplein their statesovjust struggle safeguard and ereignty national independence.8 Thoughthemilitary junta lost all moralauthority rule East Pakistan to whenit failedto abide by the resultsof a freeelectionand launchedits suppression the campaignin the region, Nixon administration refused to takea publicstandagainstthemassacreof civilianpopulation and did not take the necessary halt stepsto effectively all its arms sales to Pakistan. to India that case Peking Washington also reported havewarned is in helped Islamabadin a warwithIndia,NewDelhi shouldnotcounton U.S. support. did on Moscow, itspartand underthesecircumstances, notwantwar at all. war General in thesubcontinent wouldhavebeendisastrous from Soviet the bothIndia and Pakistan, pointofview.It wouldhaveweakened prolonged rule military in Pakistan, strengthened rightist the forces India and furin therincreasedIslamabad'sdependence Pekingand Washington. on What Moscowcouldnotcounton Washington's was worse, to the support prevent war. involvement Chinain a newIndia-Pakistan Thiswas a newsituation, of forin the1965 war theU.S. and USSR had warned Pekingnotto intervene in theconflict. Izvestiacommentator Vasin understandably V. advisedboth terms make efforts prevent "further to India and Pakistanin identical to a in of aggravation thesituation" theIndiansubcontinent.9
THE INDO-SOVIET SECURITY PACT

Pakistanto threaten India withwar. IslamabadveAll thisemboldened accused India of undermining Pakistan'sintegrity hemently through sub8Radio Pakistan broadcast Prime MinisterChou En-lai's message on April 11, 1971. in The messagehas been printed J. A. Naik, India, Russia, China and Bangla Desh (New Delhi, S. Chand,1972) as appendix5, pp. 133-34. '"Russia Also Takes to Delhi-Pindi ParityFormula,"Sunday Standard (New Delhi), July11,1971.

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versionand supporting liberation President the struggle. Yahya Khan's bellicose. publicly He statedthatPakistanwas utterances grewincreasingly nearto warwithIndia and thatit wouldnotbe alone.As thesituation very forces.Therewas no doubt the worsened, two sides alertedtheirfrontier thatIndia trained and supplied MuktiBahiniforces the witharmsand ammunition thehopethatthey on wouldbe able to drivethePakistaniforces out of East Pakistan. in Moreover, India it was beingarguedthatlooking seven after million and refugees hampered development was moreexpensive thanwar,whichappearedto be the onlysolution settle Bangladesh to the problem onceand forall. Finally, severalIndianpolitical and many parties leadersdemanded immediate Congress the of It recognition Bangladesh. was that evident recognition wouldgreatly increase tension couldlead to war. and A way out appearedto be to makeit clearto 'Pakistan and its allies that, if-attacked, wouldnotbe aloneeither. Soviets, India The hastened therefore, to offer India a treaty to to designed assureNew Delhi'ofSoviethelpin case any country threatened security. its The 'SovietForeignMinister arrived 8 in India on August and thenextdaythetwocountries their put signatures to a twenty-year whosedetailshad apparently treaty been worked much out servedas a warning Pakistanthatif it earlier.ArticleIX of thetreaty to attacked to India,Moscowshouldnotbe expected remain neutral. To say thisis notto suggest thatas of August9 theKremlin abandoned thepost-Tashkent policyof treating India and Pakistanalike. The Soviets had invited Islamabadin 1969tojoin itscollective security arrangement and the invitation had not been withdrawn. Pakistancould still join. It was reported aboutthistime"a non-aggression between USSR and that pact the Pakistan" was "mooted informed in in quarters Islamabad,"10 probably but thehawksin themilitary juntacould notbe won over. Again,theSovietambassador Pakistan to couldhavereferred thejoint to issuedon theconclusion thevisitoftheSovietForeign statement of Minister to India wherein was emphasized thetreaty notdirected it that was against anyone. he Additionally, couldhavepointed that jointstatement out the did notrefer East Pakistanas East Bengal,though to thisis whatIndia desired and was theterm IndianParliament used in itsresolution March the had of
31.

Thoughthetreaty helpedin defusing explosive the situation thetime for to continued pour into India. Moscowwas convinced that being,refugees thesituation both on sidesoftheIndia-Pakistan border couldbecome normal onlyiftherefugees returned homeand thattherefugees wouldnotgo back tillthegenerals transferred powerto thosein whom peopleof East Pakithe stanhad faith. The Sovietgovernment, therefore, continued advisePresito dent Yahya Khan to seeka political solution."
--

'0Zubeida Mustafa,"USSR and Indian Actionin Pakistan," Pakistan Horizon,fourth quarter1971 (Vol. XXIV, No. 4), p. 65. "D. Volskyand A. Usvatov,"War on the Indian Subcontinent," New Times, No. 50, December1971,p. 8.

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since completely Sovietadvice; particularly Pakistancouldnotdisregard not opentheWestern powers also had beenadvising-though as forcefully, of the rights thepeopleof ly nor clearly-Islamabadto respect fundamental were generally press and politicalobservers East Pakistan.The Western the towardthe people of East Pakistan,denounced atrocities sympathetic urgedIslamabad to create committed the Pakistanarmyand strongly by the to which wouldpermit refugees return. conditions of The resultwas that President Yahya Khan assuredthe community to nationsand thepeople of Pakistanthathe was committed establishing his In with pledgeto restore civilianrule, in democracy hiscountry. keeping of on 31 he announced August theappointment Dr. A. M. Malikas governor Dr. as someEast Pakistanis members of ofEast Pakistan. Malik appointed appealedto The President also proclaimed generalamnesty, a his cabinet. to the homeand announced holdingof freshelections therefugees return in and 193 (by-elections) East Pakistanto fillthe 78 NationalAssembly of seatsmade vacantby thedisqualification those East PakistanAssembly who wereallegedto have "takenpartin the anti-national acAL members tivity." that could not inspire knowledge the Malik government It was common a was confidence though BengaliMuslim, amongthepeople.The governor, In a the considered Quisling mostEast Pakistanis. fact, newgovernment by of of had thesupport a smallminority collaborators-Muslims non-Benof in gali originwho had settled East Pakistansince 1947 and some Bengali who in 1970 election. The conservatives had beendiscredited theDecember all to suchpeopleand almost ofthem refused return refugees couldnottrust home.
EFFORTS TO 'PERSUADE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO PRESSURE YAHYA

and by imposed sucha largenumber For India,thefinancial socialburden It in was the of refugees unbearable. wanted Sovietsto use theirinfluence Indira Gandhiherself PrimeMinister Islamabadfor-apoliticalsettlement. 1971 to seek Soviethelp for Moscowtowardtheend of September visited -the solution therefugee of problem. Thoughthe Indianpressclaimedthat "in closerto India the shewas successful bringing SovietUniontoa position a the still on Bangladesh,"'12 Kremlin maintained neutral One must posture. that "East remember sinceMarch1971 India had beencallingEast Pakistan of issuedat theend oftheIndian Bengal."Butin thetext thejointstatement PrimeMinister's visitto theUSSR, theterm"East Pakistan"was used,13 in Whatwas moreimportant, to sensitivities. evidently deference Pakistan's told the Prime Minister Mrs.Gandhithat conflict East Pakistan in 'theSoviet it -of was "an internal that was forthepeopleofPakistan problem Pakistan,"
""Major Shiftin Soviet Policy on Bangla Desh," Times of India, September30, 1971. 1""Joint Soviet-IndianStatetment," New Times,No. 41, October 1971, p. 7. Also see "Joint Soviet-IndianStatement,"CDSP, October 26, 1971 (Vol. XXIII, No. 39), pp. 10-11 (fromPravda, Izvestia,September 1971). 30,

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to decide "whatsortof politicalsecurity theyshouldhave" and that"the of struggle thepeoplehad to go on in Pakistanterritory."14 solutionof the MoscowthuscautionedIndia againstseekinga military did Bangladesh issue,and madeitclearthattheIndo-Soviet treaty notmean of The movement. Sovietsdid notwishto say Sovietbacking theliberation whichwas likelyto damage Sovietrelations withIslamabadbeanything yondrepair. This explains factthat, the unlikesomeoftheWestern powers, did the Kremlin not suspendeconomicaid to Pakistan.If therewas any doubtonthis point, was removed theSoviet-Algerian communique it by joint of October 1971, whichproclaimed 8, Moscow's"respectforthenational unity and territorial integrity bothIndia and Pakistan."'15 of Moreover, a Sovietcommentator called fora settlement based bothon the"will and interests" theEast Pakistanis of inand on "respect Pakistan'sterritorial for tegrity."'6 other One reasonforthisSovietposture maywellhavebeenthat who backed the Kremlin was not preparedto displease its Arab friends Islamabadand who were opposedto the dismemberment Pakistan, the of largest Muslimstatein theworld.Incidentally, evenmostIndian Muslims did notfavor breakup Pakistan. the of in had notyet Stillanother factor the couldbe that situation East Pakistan crystallized. liberation The the forces couldnotmatch resources thePakiof stangovernment their and hit-and-run tactics notdislodged Pakistan had the army from strategic any position. July-August oftheMukti The gains Bahini seemed havebeenwipedoutbythemilitary to operations thearmy of following the rainyseason. The Bangladeshleadersin India and elsewhere had still demonstrate strength thebattlefield warrant to their on to attention from theinternational community to justify and theirdemandthattheybe consideredthereal representatives thepeopleof East Pakistan. of Mostimportantly,was held in Moscowthatif WestPakistanagreedto it let East Pakistanhave substantial autonomy, Pakistancould stillremaina and nothing singlepolitical unit, wouldhave pleasedtheSovietsmorethan a united Pakistan withSheikhMujiburRahmanas PrimeMinister. the For Sheikhappearedto MoscowtheNehruof Pakistan-a votary non-alignof ment, secularism, socialismand democracy. is apparent It thatfor Soviet military strategists, Pakistanwas moreimportant West thanEast Pakistan. They could not ignorethe strategic locationof WestPakistanwherethe United States had onceoperated intelligence notfarfrom USSR, an base the and whichwas nowlinked withChinaby tworoads-the old Silk Routereopenedin August1970 and theKarakoram Highway completed January in 1971. Moscowvisualizeda definite decreasein Chineseand American influence Pakistan in when power passedintothehandsoftheAL, themajority party Pakistan. therefore of It renewed efforts secure releaseofthe its to the Sheikh and in thebeginning October largenumber Sovietpublicorof a of
14"Major Shiftin Soviet Policy on Bangla Desh," Times of India, September30, 1971. 15"Soviet-Algerian Statement," New Times,No. 42, October1971,p. 37.

16A.Ulansky, "The Tragedyof East Pakistan,"ibid.,pp. 13-15.

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his demanded releaseand also thatof "'other ganizations popularleadersof condemned East Pakistan."The resolutions passed by theseorganizations and and "thepersecution progressive of "theactsofterror violence" political leaders."'7 the It is notwithout significance the Sovietleadersdiscussed situathat whentheyvisitedCanada and France in October tionon thesubcontinent a in 1971.In hisspeech Paris,Brezhnev urged necessity finding politithe of the And in Ottawa, SovietPrimeMinister told to cal solution theproblem. thatduring visitto Iran theSovietPresihis CanadianM.P.s and Senators of dent had demanded President Yahya Khan (on October15) therestorain the of tionof democracy East Pakistan, freeing theSheikhand arrangements thereturn therefugees for of fromIndia. Radio Pakistan, however, his claimedthatduring talkswithPresident Yahya Khan,theSovietPresiin the denthad "expressed SovietUnion'skeen interest the unityand inTo of couldbe maintained of tegrity Pakistan."'8 be sure,theunity Pakistan ifthemilitary juntastepped aside in favorof theelectedrepresentatives of a TheKremlin evensentNikolaiFirybbin, SovietDeputy thepeople. Foreign to to the Minister, Delhireportedly persuade AL leaders"to acceptautonomy forBangladesh within singlePakistan."'19 a At aboutthistime,on October PrimeMinister Indira Gandhibegan 24, hertourof six Western capitalswhichpresumably Moscow'sblessings. had Since 'theNixon administration appearedto be almostwhollyout of step withtheAmerican pressand public opinionon thisissue,Moscowhoped thatthe Indian PrimeMinister would succeedin persuading United the Statesto prevailupon Pakistanto releasethe Sheikhand switch fromrepression negotiation reconciliation. to and the had again become on border Meanwhile, situation theIndo-Pakistani tense. The twosidesaccusedeach otherof border violations. SovietcomA mentator reminded bothIndia and Pakistanof thetragicand harmful conof sequences the1965 war.He arguedthatin Pakistanit had "led to inflationand a rise in prices"whichaggravated "the people'sdiscontent with capitalist exploitation feudaltyranny." and Even thedemand autonomy for in East Pakistanand thevictory theAL in theDecember1970 election of wereconsidered be "a consequence the 1965 war. 'He playeddown to of" President Yahya Khan's threats war and blamed"irresponsible adof and venturistic elements" Pakistan whipping warhysteria. in for up Significantly, he also stated in India "theleadersofreactionary communal that and parties and organizations" weretrying capitalizeon the developments East "to in Pakistanand therefugee problems," employed "ultra-patriotic slogans. .. to fanreligious strife" impart dangerous and "a emotional character the to
"For full texts of "Statementsof Soviet Public Organisations,"see supplementto Soviet Review,January 1972 (Vol. IX, No. 3), pp. 19-24. 18, 18"Mr.KosyginWorriedby Pakistan," The Times (London), October 21, 1971 and "Yahya Meets Podgorny," The Statesman (New Delhi), October17, 1971. ""'KremlinEnvoy Meets Leaders of Bangla Desh," The Times (London), October 25, 1971.

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countries." Both India and Pakistanwere, tensionbetween neighbouring and and advisedto "displayrestraint statesmanship, bridlethe therefore, 'hawks'and ithe chauvinists. indicatesthatMoscow was deeplycommitted This analysisstrongly to India and Pakistanalike. Appreserving Pakistan'sunityand to treating would cooperatewith parently, Soviets still hoped that Washington the Islamabadto abanthe Moscow,as it did during 1965 war,in persuading donthepolicy confrontation. thetwosuperpowersactedin concert, of Had withthe immight have been pressured into comingto terms Islamrabad a prisoned leadersand Pakistanwouldhave thusremained singlepolitical unit.
POLICY CHANGE IN MOSCOW

In the earlypart of November, eventsconvinced Moscow thatthe two "hawks"had cometo control military the junta in Islamabad.First,after in moving troops his and armor toward forward position September-October President the on thepretext an exercise, of Yahya Khan despatched three of 5. was chiefs staff Peking November The mission led byZ. A. Bhutto, to on had denounced Tashkent the agreement a great as who,it maybe recalled, betrayal. Moreover, was partyto President he Yahya Khan's decisionto crushthemovement autonomy restoration civilianrulein March. and for of Uponhisreturnfrom Z. claimed that Chinawouldsupport Peking, A. Bhutto Pakistanif an armedconflict occurred. PrimeMinister Kosyginconcluded that"theforces an anti-popular of military dictatorship" "joined ranks had It withexternal aggressive circleshostileto the peoples of Hindustan."21 was heldin Moscowthat"there couldbe no peace on thesubcontinent while theIslamabadforces wererunning amuckin East Pakistanitowns."22 Second, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi'svisit to the UnitedStatesremained unproductive. Reporting the Gandhi-Nixon on meeting, Pravda quotedan American commentator say that"thetwoleadersfailedto agree to on measures mitigate present to the difficultiestheIndiansubcontinent." in It also stated thatthe"USA gave no indication itsreadiness influence of to GeneralYahya Khan in favorof a politicalsettlement" East Pakistan.23 in In other words according the Soviets,theAmerican to President was not prepared use his influence authority securethereleaseof Sheikh to and to MujiburRahman. Sinceboth MoscowandNewDelhiconsidered Sheikh's the releasethefirst toward political step a settlement thereturn therefuand of forcesearly gees,theonlyoptionopen to themwas to wishtheliberation and speedysuccess.And by this timethe guerillaand liberation forces
21"Pakistan's Bhutto Asks forUnderstanding," CDSP, April12, 1972 (Vol. XXIV, No.11),p. 2 (from Pravda, March 1972). 18, 22D.Volsky, "NowThattheGunsAre Silent," New Times, 52, December No. 1971,
1971,pp. 10-12.

20I.Borisov, "DarkSkiesover IndianSubcontinent," Times, 44,October the New No.

p.9. 28"U.S.Attitude Unhelpful, Pravda," Says Sunday Standard (NewDelhi), November 7,1971.

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to theirstrength about 100,000 and the news agenciesrehad increased bitter between themand regularPakistaniarmyunitsin fighting ported East Pakistan was verybad The newsfrom different ofEast Pakistan. parts forthemilitary junta. Theremayhave beentwomorereasonsforthechangein Sovietpolicy. the First,as the Sovietssurveyed scene,theycalculatedthatthe Chinese, 'to could perhapsdo little save East Pakistanfortheir wished, evenifthey wouldsoonbe closed now the passesin theHimalayas protege that mountain and the by snow.Second,the flowof Sovietarmsto India had continued New Delhi who and officials, visited Sovietdiplomatic military top-ranking thatIndia was in a position to the wereconvinced toward end of October, in the of dictatorship" East military destroy warmachine the"anti-popular the support. Pakistanwith Kremlin's diplomatic in in The shift Sovietpolicywas reflected theSovietpresswhichbecame and criticalof 'Islamabad's policyin East Pakistanand expressive overtly It for forces. began to highlight demonstrative its support theliberation in the and Bahiniknowing wellthat liberafull theactivities gainsoftheMukti India. In thesecweaponsfrom had their bases in and received tionforces ondweekofNovember article New TimesblamedIslamabadfortenan in The sion on thesubcontinent. authoralso statedthatthe "Dacca Cabinet" a "whichsuffered crushing was composed of of chiefly members theparties in nor authority supdefeat" the1970 election thatit enjoyed"neither and of the portamongthepopulation East Pakistan."He described stepstaken normalcy East Pakistanas "half-measures in bythemilitary juntato restore to or rather smoke-screen the authorities' a unwillingness workfor a for realpolitical settlement." is important notethattheIndianpresshad to (It madesomewhat whenthesestepsweretakenin thebesimilar observations to All ginning September.) thisled theSovietanalyst concludethatthe of affair" Pakistan.Moreover, was no longeran "internal of refugee problem 28) to assert that he approvingly quotedThe New YorkTimes (of October flowof destitute "in a refugees" constituted, effect, "the unprecedented bloodless againstIndia."24 aggression Whilepreviously Sovietobservers beenplaying the had downthescale of and invariably press while giving quotedthe Indian or Western disaster had seen with in thatthey observed November two figures, Sovietanalysts their people that ten misery has swept million owneyesthe"floodofhuman overintoIndia." Moreimportantly, emphasized factthatthere the was they no truth thePakistaniclaimthatall theconditions thereturn the in iof for returning home weresafely had and thatthousands refugees beenprovided everyday.25
24A. Ulanksy,"Indian Subcontinent:Roots of the Crisis," New Times, No. 46, November 1971, pp. 7-8. Also see "Hindustan Needs Peace," CDSP, December 14, 1971 (Vol. XXIII, No. 46), pp. 20-21 (fromIzvestia,November 1971). 16, 25V. Simonov and A. Shalnev, "The Tragedy of the Refugees," New Times, No. 49, December 1971,p. 11.

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493

couldnotmaintain the of nature things, WestPakistan In thevery troops for in environment long.Theycoulddestroy Mukti their authority a hostile in not in Bahinipockets big cities, in villages, especially thevillagesalong forcescould alwaysseek shelter across the Indianborderas theguerrilla in thefrontier India. To destroy guerrilla bases, Pakistanbegan shelling In wereauthorIndiantroops Indianborder villagesand towns. retaliation, 21 ized on November to crossintoEast Pakistan.Two days laterPakistan and a declared nationalemergency President Yahy.aKhan said thathe exten pectedto be "offon a war within days." Pravda strongly condemned blamed"reactionary in forces" Pakistanand Pakistan's aggressive posture, and relations forgiving them abroad"foraggravating PakistaniiIndian the it of character an international conflict."X26 Significantly, did not mention Indian military growing pressure along the borderof East Pakistan; the beenabandoned. had neutral posture evidently 3 air launched and ground attacks alongIndia's all iOn'December Pakistan as the and border portrayed conflict a warbetween Muslim Western Pakistan It and Hindu India. Moscowdid not agreewiththisassessment. held that not had their thepeopleofEast Pakistan risen against Muslim co-religionists but in WestPakistan, againstthemilitary bothpartsof clique oppressing "theWestPakistani and against military oligarchy," thatPakistan Pakistan, the Called uponto live up to provifor was responsible escalating conflict. the movedalong severallines. It sions of the Indo-Soviet treaty, Kremlin of the was of theviewthat interests thepeopleof East Pakistanand of the of in stability thearea wouldbe bestservedby an Indianvictory thewar. in ButIndiacouldrepelaggression theWestandhelpMukti 'Bahini achieve to or itsaim, provided Washington Pekingor both and the Security Council in Soviet diplomacy did not intervene the conflict. was diAccordingly, localized. December 'a Tass statement On to rected keeptheconflict 5, warned to that It all powers keepoutoftheconflict. observed theSovietUnionstood of for"thespeediest ending thebloodshedand fora politicalsettlement in the East Pakistan."27 The Kremlinthuslinked'theending-of war witha in politicalsettlement East Pakistan.Second,the Sovietspresumably calin culatedthattheU.S. wouldnot intervene militarily theconflict the 'and to was Soviet government determined oppose Chinese intervention. The in to Sovietambassador New Delhi,N. M. Pegov,is reported have assured attack in acrosstheHimalayas, SovietUnion Indiathat case ofa Chinese the actionin Sinkiang.28 was a riskyventure, wouldstartdiversionary It but to Moscowcould notafford let downits ally in theregion.Dr. HenryKis26"Internationalising Issue: USSR Opposed," The Hindu (Madras), November29, 1971. Also see "Pravda CriticisesPak Repressionin East Bengal," The Hindu, November22, 1971. see fulltextof the Tass statement, Soviet Review,supplement, 17, pp. 12-13. n. 27For 28VinodGupta, Anderson Papers: A Study of Nixon's Blackmail of India (Delhi, Indian School SupplyDepot, 1972), p. 126.

494

MOSCOW

AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESH

visits Peking July October President in to and Nixon'sproposed singer's and visitto Pekingcreated fearof Sino-American the collusion and made it all themorenecessary Moscowto demonstrate its non-Communist for to allies thattheKremlin wouldnotallowitself be browbeaten Pekingor Washto by ington.Anywavering duringIndia's moment peril might of have caused seriousdoubts Moscow'sother in non-Communist aboutthedependaallies bilityof Sovietsupport them. to CouncilMoscowlentunqualified supportto the Third,in the Security liberation movement proposed and that representativesthismovement the -of be given hearing. a The Sovietdelegate pointed thatthedeterioration out in thesituation not occuronlyon 3 December, did thattheSecurity Council shouldnot close its eyes to whathad been takingplace in East Pakistan He proposed resolution a which suggested political a settlement East Pakiin stanand which calleduponPakistan orderitstroops East Pakistan"to to in cease all acts ofviolence."The resolution showedbothrealismand an understanding thebasic issuesinvolved, as expected of but whentheresolution was put to thevote (on December5) China votedagainst, USSR and the Poland in favorand therestabstained. Between December and 21, whentheSecurity 4 Councildebatedtheconthe remained consistent. Moscowcasta negative votethree flict, Sovietstand timesto block "one-sided"U.S. or U.S.-sponsored resolutions and championedtheright self-determination peopleofEast Pakistan. of ofthe Meanwhile, Indiantroops the with activesupport Mukti the Bahiniand thepeoiof ple reachedthe outskirts Dacca. But the Soviet'delegation of assuredthe Security CouncilthatIndia wouldwithdraw troopsfromEast Pakistan its if Pakistandid the same. He arguedthatin orderto achievean effective political settlement powermust transferred thosewho"wona majority be to at theDecember 1970elections." that he Finally, emphasized onlytheelected representatives thepeople could "createconditions the return all of for of EastPakistan refugees from India" andnotthePakistan military authorities. Evidently, Moscowwanted India to undertake Bangladesh in whatIslamabad shouldhave done: transfer powerto theelectedrepresentatives of of thepeople. it hostilities Moreover, did notwantIndia to broadenor prolong in theWestto teachPakistana lesson.Such a movewouldhave provoked bothPekingand Washington-a situation Kremlin was determined the to prevent. The First Soviet DeputyForeignMinister, who arrivedin New Delhi on December twicepostponed departure Moscow,perhaps 12, his for in order impress to in the uponIndia thedesirability keeping conflict the of West limited. leftNew Delhi only afterthe Pakistaniarmyhad surHe rendered Dacca (on December16) and the day Pakistanagreedto a in cease-fire theWestin response an Indianproposal. in to To sum up, theoutcome theThird India-Pakistan of War and thebirth
2S/PV. 1615, December 1971. 15, since the beginning of 1971 or "to realityand .
.

. actual state of affairs."

VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ

495

for as of Bangladesh could be described greatvictories Sovietdiplomacy. The Kremlin reckoned thetiming thewar was unfavorable China that of to its how no wouldnotintervene and that Peking militarily matter vehemently It denounced India and Moscow'srole in theconflict. also representatives calculated Pakistan's that "blackdeeds"in theeastern winghad beenso well and widely publicized and condemned theAmerican by press, leadingU.S. the and Senators(SenatorEdwardKennedy SenatorFrankChurch charged withcommitting U.S. ambassadors to Pakistanis genocide),threeformer India, a largebody of intellectuals, academicians, religious leaders,social and workers, Commonwealth parliamentarians East Pakistani students, dipwouldnotbe lomats and intellectuals abroadthattheNixon administration in a position lendanything to morethanits diplomatic support Pakistan to at theUnited Nations, particularly sincethemajorNATO allies of theU.S. had expressed their sympathies thepeopleof East Pakistan.Finally, for the Kremlin realizedthat peopleofEast Pakistan the wanted complete indepen. denceand thatIndia was strong to enough pushback Pakistanin theWest and destroy Islamabad'swar machine theEast. in These calculations to was proved be correct. Sovietgovernment well The satisfied with outcome thewar: themilitary the of regime Islamabadwas in sweptout of power,foron December20 GeneralYahya Khan transferred powerto theleaderofthemajority party whatwas leftof Pakistan, in Zul. fikar Bhutto;Pakistan's Ali military machinehad been humbled, crippled and demoralized; legally the elected representatives East Pakistan of moved theBangladesh government Dacca on December to 22; and Sovietprestige in India and Bangladesh risenskyhigh. had Of course,Moscowhad to pay a priceforthesegains,forthetruncated Pakistan heldtheKremlin for responsible itsdismemberment theresult with thatfollowing war Soviet-Pakistani the relations stoodat a low ebb. When passionscalm downand Pakistanianalysts make an objective studyof the of breakup their however, they maynotblameMoscowas muchas country, themilitary dictatorship 'the for fatePakistan metin December 1971. PresidentBhutto admitted whenhe said on June27, 1972,thatthe"powerthis drunk" military junta"plungedour peopleintothewar and involved in us an intolerable surrender lost us halfour country." and Moreover, fact the thatWestPakistan's political leadersand bureaucracy tacitly supported the of reign terror theeastern in winghad convinced peopleofEast Pakistan the thattheirhonorand survivaldemanded complete independence. Had the United States oinedhandswith SovietUnion, itdidin 1965,inkeeping j the as out and Peking oftheIndia-.Pakistan conflict had it cooperated with Moscow during earlystagesofthecivilwar in effectively the persuading Yahya the to regime step aside in favorof the legallyelectedrepresentatives the of the people, ThirdIndia-Pakistan might War havebeenprevented thetwo and of wings Pakistancouldagain have a common government.
VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ is Reader in Political Science, Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra, Haryana,India.