Islam and National Identity: The Case of Pakistan and Bangladesh Author(s): Nasir Islam Reviewed work(s): Source:

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 13 (I981), 55-72 Printed in the United States of America

Nasir Islam

ISLAM AND NATIONAL PAKISTAN AND BANGLA

IDENTITY: DESH

THE CASE OF

Indian Muslims have always been keenly aware of the differences between their own communal group and the Hindus on the one hand, and between themselves and the Christianforeigners on the other. This awareness of a separateMuslim identity was much strongerat the level of the elite, however, than at the level of the masses. At times, these feelings eruptedinto calls for jihad against the British, for example, the Wahabi and Fraizia movements. They also manifested themselves in the creation of religious schools, like Deoband, to preserve the Muslim way of life. Finally they emerged as the reformistAligarh Movementto promotemoderneducation, reinterpret the teachings of Islam, and secure the rights of Muslims as a minority community. In the early twentiethcentury, various attemptswere made to forge a unitedfront with the Hindusfor an Indiaindependentof GreatBritain.These attemptsmet with repeated failure.
ANTECEDENTS OF THE PAKISTAN MOVEMENT

During the I930S the idea of a separate, independentMuslim state began to take shape in the country. Allama Iqbal (I875-1938), the poet-philosopherof Muslim India, is creditedwith conceiving, articulating,and finally selling the idea of a separate Muslim polity to the Muslim League leadership, thus giving a more potent objective to the Muslim community than constitutional rights and representationin the civil services. Iqbal, like most other Muslim scholars, believed in the unity of an Islamic society and state, maintaining that an Islamic society could only be preserved by creating an Islamic state. This Islamic polity would unite the Muslims of India and preserve the Islamic way of life. Iqbal viewed Islam as a binding force which would integratethe Muslim community consisting of people of various ethnic and linguistic origins. Thus Iqbal's view of nationalism was both ideological (creating a Muslim (bringingthis communitywithin communityon the basis of Islam) as well as territorial frameworkof a polity). Accordingto him a communitybased on Islamic the territorial ideology was not possible without a polity. The following quotation from Jinnah's speech at the All India Muslim League Conferencein 1940 is a crystallizationof representative Muslimthinkingof thatperiod: "The Hindus and Muslims belong to two differentreligious philosophies, social customs, literatures.They neither intermarry,nor dine together, and they belong to two differentcivilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions."'
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At the same conference, the Muslim League adopted the famous Objectives Resolution for the creationof a separatepolitical entity within a loose Indianconfederacy. Two key changes occurred in the Muslim Nationalist Movement in the post-1940 period. First, the objectives of the Muslim League were reorientedaway from securing minority rights and toward achieving a separateand independentpolitical entity for a mass organization,using the techniquesof mass mobilizationfor achieving its main objectives. Grass-rootsorganizationswere created at the district and village levels, and middle-class leadershipwas co-opted to build these organizationswithin the Muslim League. Economic questions of bread and butter were included in the Muslim Leagueprograms.In a surprisinglyshorttime, the Muslim League was able to mobilize the Muslim masses behind the slogan of Pakistan- a homeland for Muslims where they would be able to organizetheirlives accordingto Islamicideology. The emergence of Pakistanwas a logical consequence of these events. Pakistanemerged as a nation-statein 1947. But, as Keith Callardpoints out, it had hardlyany historyof nationalunity. The membersof the Pakistaninationdid not speak a common language;they did not have a homogeneousculture;they did not even have a geographicalor economic unit.2 CertainlyPakistanand its people were not a nation in the traditionalWestern sense - a people living in a continguous territorywith the same ethnic origins, similar culture, and, above all, one language. Not many countries in the world fulfill all of these conditions except that of territorialcontinguity. Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, France,Spain, and Yugoslavia are examples of ethnic diversityand linguisticplurality. In my opinion, however, the existence of Pakistanas a nation was influenced more by the lack of a well-articulatedideology during the preindependenceera and the policies pursued by Pakistani political elites after the independence than by ethnic differences among various provinces. Muslim nationalism in India was differentiative. The two-nation theory owed its origin to the Hindu-Muslimdichotomy. Throughoutthe history of their struggle for independence, Indian Muslims emphasized that they were a group distinct from Hindus.3The unity of the Muslim nationwas largely based on fear of a Hindumajority which was a factor externalto the Muslim community. The leadershipof the Muslim League never tried to look for the roots of nationalisminside the Muslim community. The second nationin Indiawas simply definedas "Muslims living in the subcontinent," a definitionthatdid not take into considerationthe ethnic, linguistic, cultural,regional, and economic differences among the Muslims living in various parts of India. It was assumedthatthe largerumbrellaof Muslim identityhadtakencareof these differences. This definition ran contraryto the Western concept of nationality, which is the very basis of a nation-state.4 Religion has always been described as the single most importantbasis of Muslim nationhood, but it may be noted that Islam was employed as a means of fostering period. The use of Islamic groupidentityto mobilize the masses in the preindependence slogans by the bourgeois, Westernizedleaders was largely a faqade. Islam as a belief system5 did not play an importantpart in the political strategy of preindependence days, except in the revival movements of the nineteenthcentury. This is evident from the fact that the program of the Muslim League did not appeal to the ulama, the religious leaders and scholars. "Islamic state," "Islamic government," "Islamic constitution," and "Islamic ideology" were the slogans of the preindependenceera

Islam and National Identitv 57 and these slogans were successfully utilized to mobilize mass support for Pakistan, but no one was quite sure what they meant. The ideology of Pakistan, apart from distinguishing a Muslim nation separate from the Hindus, at best remained vague. Muslim intelligentiadid not make any serious effort to translatethis "ideology" into any concrete shape and spell out the future economic, political, sociocultural, and religious organizationof the state of Pakistan. During the last days of the campaign for Pakistan, the Muslim League leadership tried to co-opt some ulama and pirs (spiritualleaders) to the leadershipranks. When they could not co-opt a large numberof such people, they conferredthe religious titles on the ordinarylandlords,thus giving them the pretenseof being spiritualand religious leaders.6 Quiad-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah always appeard in public meetings dressedin a sherwani, the nationaldress of IndianMuslims, and the otherleaderswere expected to do the same. The Muslim Leaguemade greatefforts to promotethe Urdulanguagein the congress, but failed because of stiff resistance from the Bengali delegates. And so Muslim nationalismof the preindependenceperiod remainedlargely symbolic and differentiative in the sense that it distnguishedMuslims from Hindus. Nationalisticsymbols with religious connotations were successfully employed to mobilize masses behind the demand for Pakistan, thus creating a temporarynational identity.
POSTINDEPENDENCE ERA: QUEST FOR NATIONAL INTEGRATION

In hindsight, one can say that Pakistanwas born with a temporarysense of national identity, developed as a reactionto militantHindunationalism.VariousMuslim groups in the subcontinentwere able to suspendtheirregional, ethnic, and linguistic identities. Religion - as a way of life - had become the predominantforce as a basis for nationalism, other ethnic factors being temporarilypushed aside. But this certainly did not mean that regional and other ethnic identities had been assimilated by this newfoundsense of Muslim nationhood.This sense of Muslim nationalidentitybecame less important,once the objective of Pakistanwas achievedandthe external"enemies" of the Muslim nation - the Hindus and the Colonial regime - were removed from the the domestic political scene. Territorially Muslims had achieved the statusof a nation. But the question remained:How could a sense of nationalidentity be sustainedin the absence of visible externalthreatsto the Muslim nation?Duringthe postindependence era, the sustenanceof Pakistaninationalidentityand the process of nationalintegration would be greatly influenced by two sets of factors: regional-ethnicdiversity and the policies of Pakistanipower elites.
ISLAMIC UNITY AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY

Pakistanas created in 1947 was a state sui generis. Here was a nation unitedby the common belief of its people in the religion of Islam but at the same time a fragmented conglomerationof people speaking different languages; following different customs and traditions;belonging to different ethnic groups and even living in geographically noncontiguousterritories.Its "absurdities," "anachronisms," and "contradictions" time andtime again. The physical separation between the eastern have been enumerated and the western wings of the country, with a thousand miles of hostile territoryin

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between, gave Pakistan a unique character. Economic, demographic, cultural, and climatic differences between East and West Pakistanhave been mentioned too often to deserve repetitionhere. As opposed to the culturallyand linguisticallyhomogeneous East, West Pakistan is very heterogeneous, with its five major languages, various dialects, complex castes, and tribal differentiation. Various component groups of Pakistanination have strong linguistic and culturalaffiliationswith groups outside the national frontiersof the country. In view of these differences, it is only naturalfor the variousgroupsto have regionalethnic identities in addition to their national identity. Individuals are members of various social groups: family, tribe, caste, regional, and linguistic, as well as being membersof a Muslim nation. "Which of these identitiesaffects a person's action will depend on the situation in which the person finds himself."7 This element of multiple identity in a multiethnicstate is often ignored. In Pakistan it seems that it was taken for granted that the religious national identity of being a Muslim would always prevail in all situations. The elections in East Pakistan in 1954 and the elections in both wings in I970 proved to the contrary. During the I970 election, the right-wing political parties which emphasizedIslam as the bond of unity and which went to the polls with programsbased on "Islamic ideology" performed miserably. In the East wing, the Awami League won with an amazingly overwhelming majority, on the basis of a programof regional autonomy, and in the West, the People's Partyof Pakistanwon an absolutemajorityon a socialist program.8 It may be noted, however, thatboth the Awami League and the PPP were also Muslims and had equal claims to Islamic ideology. An East Pakistani journal, which represented the views of the intellectual elite and Awami League leadership, commenting on the election results, wrote: "Until 7 Decemberreligion was meantto be the cement which held Pakistantogether. With the political annihilationof those forces who campaigned on this assumptionin both wings, the quest for identity continues."9 Manyotherfactorsmay explain why Islamicappealsgraduallylost theireffectiveness for the purposes of national integration.First, until recently, Pakistanipolitical elites had never been committedto the actualcreationof an Islamic state. As MyronWeiner has pointed out, "The Westernized, largely non-relgious leadership which led the preindependencemovement was primarily concerned with creating a state with a Muslim majority, free from what they said would be the domination of the Hindu majority in India. They had no desire for an Islamic state."'? Except that symbolic use of Islam was no longer adequatefor mobilizing the masses. The Muslim political elites employed Islam to mobilize masses behind the Pakistan movement. But their purpose was simply to create a group identity against Hindus, ignoring the socioculturaldifferences among the Muslims. The Muslim League leadership was largely innocent of Shari'a - the Islamic code. Neither did they lead their everyday lives in accordancewith the principlesof Islam, nor did they accept Shari'a to serve as the basis for organizing the Pakistanistate. As anotherastute observer of Muslim history in Indiahas pointed out, "the Westernizedleadershipwas modernand therefore capable of creating a viable state, but it was not religous and therefore ' incapableof creating an Islamic state."1 Because of this attitudetoward Islam, Muslim political elites made no significant effort to spell out the details of Islamic ideology which at best remainedrathervague.

Islam and National Identity 59 of Consequently, after the creation of Pakistan, there was no modern interpretation Shari'a to provide a basis for a Pakistaniconstitutionthat could be largely accepted by all political groups. Instead, Islam became a hurdle in developing a constitution. During the early period of Pakistan'sexistence (I948-I958), the ulama found it particularlydifficult to agree on what an Islamic state was.12 At various stages of writing the constitution, the documentsrevealed a consensus on declaringPakistanan Islamic republicand included a few very general and ambiguous"principles" in the preamble which were supposed to be Islamic. During the Ayub era (1958-I967), the militarybureaucratic elite shifted the focus fromideological-religiousissues to economic issues. The Ayub regime preferredto use bureaucraticmechanisms ratherthan ideologicalpolitical means for nationalintegration.Thus the creationof an Islamic state was again postponed. Duringthe Bhuttoregime, the People's Partytriedto develop a melange of socialist economics andIslamicreligion underthe vague title of IslamicSocialism. The emphasis was on a pragmaticand popularconception of Islam as opposed to ritualistic, theological, andjuridicalconcerns of orthodoxgroups. Bhutto's ideologues and his regime had some initial successes in using this populist egalitarianconcept of Islam. The political frameworkcreated under Bhutto, however, was not an Islamic state in any real sense of the term. Thus as has alreadybeen pointed out, althoughIslam served as an effective instrument to differentiatethe Muslims from the Hindus, it did not mean that the entire Muslim nation sharedan identicaloutlook on how to organize the futuresociety - the differences within Pakistanon the social and State of Pakistan.There are fundamental of Islam. The elites and masses differ in their concepts of the political implications Islamic state or ideology. The ulama, belonging to differentMuslim sects and schools of thought, present widely divergent interpretations "Shari'a".'3 Consequently, a of Islamic ideology has not been translatedinto a concrete framework largely vague acceptable to the people for solving the common differences and the allocation of power and resources. The ulama never really supportedthe cause of Muslim nationalism. They did not believe in the "symbolic" use of Islam as did the nonreligiouselites. A majorityof them had even opposed the Pakistanmovement on the grounds that nationalismand Islam were incompatible. 4 The Qurandoes not permit political boundariesbetween the variousgroupsof believers. It speaks of a united "nation" of believers - the millat or the umma. An individual who believes in the divine law of Allah - the Quranand owes allegiance to Allah and his prophetis a member of the millat, irrespective of his color, race, nationality, or citizenship.'5 The Islamic nation does not, strictly speaking, have territoriallimits; it is rather a Diaspora. Thus the ulama were not sympathetic to the Western concept of nationalism which leads to division in the Islamic millat. They would not preachto the common man that he develop his identity with a Pakistanination.
POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF DISPARITY

I strongly believe that ethnic differences or similarities per se do not necessarily lead to balkanizationof a multiethnicstate. They are a necessary but not a sufficient

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condition of dismembermentor disintegrationof a country. The set of intervening variablesthat does play a very significantrole is the policies of the governing elites, both at the national and regional levels. Thus, if one looks at the political system as an independent variable and sees how the strategies and policies of the leaders of dominant and dominated groups influence the process of national integration and development, one may arrive at a better explanation of changing national identities and disintegration.There is, however, a generaltendencyto view the leader's strategy as a dependentvariable and ethnic differences as an independentvariable. 6. It is now a well-documentedfact that economic policies of various central governments in Pakistan led to a sharp increase in regional and social disparity. Business interests,civil servants,landlords,and middleclasses benefitedfromnationaleconomic workers, landless peasants,and industrialworkerswere excluded policies. Agricultural from sharing the benefits of the development plans. Most of these people were concentratedin relatively backwardregions of the country - particularlyin the Eastern Wing. RaunaqJahangives a well-documentedaccountof economic disparitybetween the East and the West giving statisticsof allocationof expendituresin the public sector, private investments, and growth in GDP in both parts of the country.'7 Within the Western Wing, as a result of the economic policies of various governments, wealth was concentratedin a few hands. These policies createdserious problemsnot only for regional integrationbut also for elite-mass integration. There seemed to have been a direct relationshipbetween the economic disparity between the two wings and the demandfor regionalautonomy.As the disparitybecame greater,the demandfor autonomygrew stronger.The students,politicians, economists, the press, and the intellectualseffectively utilized the economic argumentto mobilize mass supportfor regional autonomy in the East Wing. The elitist political system of Pakistan was hardly responsive to the growing unrest and the demands for sharing economic and political power. It may be noted thatthe dominantelites largelybelonged to West Pakistan. They always reacted with selective coercion or bureaucraticpersuasion but never by political accommodation.Thus conflicts and distrust, ratherthan compromise and confidence, markedthe political process. The effort of the CentralGovernmentto impose Urdu as the nationallanguage and the denial of representationon the basis of populationby the West led the Bengalis toward a complete distrust of the central government. Thus the Bengalis began to makedemandsfor a weakercenterandfor strongerprovincesin the futureconstitutional set-up of the country. This was the beginning of the demand for regional autonomy. The Muslim League gradually lost support in East Pakistan. In the 1954 provincial election it was completely wiped out by the UnitedFrontPartywhich won the election on a programof regional autonomy. The central governmentdid not approve of this programand the popularlyelected Ministryof the United Frontwas dismissed by the '8 governor-general. The first decade of Pakistanipolitics was markedby regional conflicts. The major conflict was between the West and the East - chiefly between Panjab and Bengal. WithinWest Pakistanthere was an acute rivalrybetween Panjaband the otherregions. The central governmentcounteredthe regionalismwith political centralizationwhich led to furtherresentmentin the provinces, particularlyEast Pakistan.

Islam and National Identity 6I Because of the regional conflicts, it took Pakistannine years to frame a constitution. The agreementbetween the East and the West was finally achieved by the formulaof which meantequal representation boththe Wings in the nationallegislature. of "'parity" East Pakistan's majority in the national legislature was transformedinto an Hence equality. It may be recalledthatwhen Pakistancame into existence, the firstconstituent Assembly (and National Assembly) had 44 seats for East Pakistanout of 79.19 The Muslim League disintegratedinto many regionalgroups. All the political groups operated on regional bases. After the death of Jinnah and Liaqat Ali, no Pakistani leader could claim support of a national majority. The politics became fragmented, particularlyin West Pakistan, where the landlords had extended their funds to the provincial and national political arenas.20 Ayub believed that the sole cause of Pakistan'sproblems was corruptpolitics. His During the Ayub regime, attemptsat eliminating politics ended in bureaucratization. elite became entrenched in the Pakistani political system. the military-bureaucratic functions,they also took over the political They not only monopolizedthe governmental functions of interestaggregation, interestarticulation,and political socialization. But they were far from being qualified to promote national integration. They formed a socially isolated class which did not have any roots in the mass culture of Pakistan. Their education, training, status, and even language set them apartfrom the people they were supposed to mobilize behind the national objectives, determined largely without any reference to political participationby the people. The only supportthey got was from the industrialelites. which was By eliminatingpolitics, Ayub also eliminatedthe political representation availableto East Pakistanin the pre-I958 period. The military-bureaucratic-industrial of complex that became all powerful in the Ayub era was largely unrepresentative East Pakistanis.Naturally,the people of East Pakistannever trustedthese groups.21 Instead, bureaucracyand army became the symbols of Western domination over the East. During the Ayub era, the demand for regional autonomy grew strongerand stronger and finally culminated in the 6-point programof Mujibur-Rahman. The six points included two separate currencies, provincial control of foreign exchange, no taxing power for the center leaving only defense and foreign affairs for the central government.22This was, of course, unacceptableto the military-bureaucratic-industrial complex of West Pakistan.Half-heartedefforts of the elite groups to moblize mass support behind their programfailed miserably. Widespreadunrestand violence in both Wings of the country broughtAyub's downfall and finally led to the Bangla Desh independence.
THE MAKE-UP OF BANGLA DESH NATIONALISM

Neville Maxwell pointed out that Pakistanwas pregnantwith Bangla Desh from the moment of its own birth. Labor was brought about unexpectedly by the decline of Ayub and birth was achieved by Caesariansection, India acting as the scalpel.23The analogy is well taken but it seems to assume the inevitabilityof the birth of Bangla Desh. This view is based on the strengthof ethnic differences between the people of East and West Pakistanand a separatefeeling of Bengali identity.

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Ethnic differences between the people of Bangla Desh and West Pakistan are too well known to be given in detail here. We contend, however, that these differences account for only a necessary condition of eventual separationof Bangla Desh and not a sufficient one. Ethnic identity is not a function of racial, linguistic, religious, or other differences per se, but of whether or not this difference is considered socially significant by the ethnic groups concerned. There is enough evidence to prove that the Bengali Muslims considered the religious differences as socially significant ratherthan racial characteristics or linguistic differences, particularlyduringthe PakistanMovement. In spite of their ethnic affinity, the Bengali Muslims were alienatedfrom Bengali Hindus, as shown earlier. This alienationresulted from a naturalsentimentof resentmentagainst the Hindu landlords who had exploited the Muslim peasants all through the British occupation of Bengal.24 Consequently, they did not supportthe militantBengali Nationalist(Hindu) Movementto annulthe partitionof Bengal. Bengali Muslims supported Islamic Revivalist the Movement in the nineteenthcentury, participatingin the struggle against the colonial governmentas well as the formationof the Muslim League. They supportedthe idea of a separateMuslim state and finally the Muslims of Bengal voted for Pakistanin a large majority. Religion as a principal source of Bengali Muslim identity retained its importance duringthe pre-Pakistanas well as post-Pakistanera at least for the masses. A survey done in I963-I964, using a sample of I,OOI factory workers and peasants in East Pakistan,showed that48 percentof the respondentsidentifiedthemselves as Pakistanis whereasonly I I percentconsideredthemselves Bengalis. The rest identifiedwith their village or district. Another survey done in a technical college in Dacca revealed that 74 percent of the respondentsregardedthemselves as Pakistanis, only 24 percent as Bengalis. It may be concluded that, even as late as the middle sixties, there was no awareness by the ordinaryman in East Pakistanof a basic conflict between Bengali and Pakistani identity.25Schuman in his analysis of the rise of nationalism in East in Pakistancontendsthattherewas no awarenessby the man-in-the-street East Pakistan of any conflict between his identity as "Bengali" and his identity as Pakistani.26 Bengali nationalismgrew in response to the changing natureof ethnic-groupinterrelationsin Pakistan.It originatedas ethnic conflict aimed at changingthe "dominantsubordinate"relationshipbetween East and West and the distributionof power within the society. It began as demandsfor languagerightsandeconomic equalityas a reaction to the central government's policies to impose Urdu on Bengalis, to reduce Bengali representation(both political and administrative)in the central government, and to increase economic disparity. Pakistanigovernmentwanted to have Urdu as the only state language of Pakistan. Jinnah, the father of the nation, and the first two prime ministers, one of whom was a Bengali, openly declared their support for this policy. It sparkeda controversy in the National Assembly and led to a strong language movement in East Pakistan in favor of Bengali as one of the state languages of Pakistan. The early fifties witnessed and seriousdisturbances riots on this issue. The provincialgovernmenttriedto suppress the movement and a number of students were killed during the language protests in Dacca. It may be noted that Bengali was the language of an overwhelming majority

Islam and National Identity 63 in East Pakistan. Only a small remnantof aristocraticelites, some urbangroups, and refugee settlers from Bihar spoke Urdu. Even in West Pakistan, only 7-8 percent of the populationspoke it. In spite of the fact that Bengali was recognized later (1956) as one of the official languages, the central government from time to time kept proposing to Islamize the language by changing its script or eliminatingcertain letters, with a view to bringing it closer to Urdu. A large numberof non-Bengalicivil servantswho came to administer the province tended to use either English or Urdu. This was perceived by the Bengali populationas some sort of conspiracy to impose Urdu upon them. The language movement sparkeda renaissanceof Bengali culture and an emphasis on secular ideas as opposed to Islamic ideology.27 Bengali intellectuals began to produce literatureemphasizing the distinctionbetween culture, religion, and politics. They took to preachingrational, liberal, and secular ideas. They began to reinterpret the history of the nationalist movement emphasizing its class nature ratherthan its religious foundations.The Muslim League was looked upon as a political organization of landlords, the two-nation theory was refuted, and lack of participationon the part of Muslims of Bengal in the Bengali NationalistMovement in the first decade of the twentieth century was attributedto their lack of education and backwardness.28 Unistudents, professors, journalists, writers, and artists played an importantrole versity in reviving the Bengali cultureas a reactionto the government'spolicy to impose Urdu or Islamizationof the Bengali language. The nationalistslogan of "Jai Bangla" was coined during this renaissanceperiod. Whenthe petit-bourgeoisieand intellectualswere tryingto revive the Bengali culture, literature,and secular outlook, their representativesin the ConstituentAssembly of Pakistanwere trying to develop a viable constitutionfor Pakistan.The chief obstacle in the way of constitution-making was the quantumof representation the National in Assembly of Pakistan.Between 1950 and 1958, five differentconstitutionalproposals emerged.29All but one of these gave equal representationto East Pakistan in the NationalLegislaturein spite of the fact thatthe provincehada majorityof the population of Pakistan.Bengalis were infuriatedwhen they saw theirnumericalelectoralmajority being reducedto paritywith West Pakistanin the futureNationalAssembly of Pakistan. The I962 Constitutionof Ayub Khan maintainedthe principle of parity between the two wings and gave East Pakistan only 50 percent of the total seats in the National Legislature. Bengali representationin the national bureaucracyremainedextremely weak. According to one estimate, nine years after the creation of Pakistan, only 51 top level policy-makingpositions were occupied by the Bengalis in the CentralSecretariatout of a total of 74I such positions. Bengali representationin the army was minimal 98 percentof the officer corps of the army, navy, and air force was composed of West Pakistanis.30 were concentratedin Panjab Big business, industrial,and commercialentrepreneurs and Karachi.Those who migratedfrom India in 1947 chose to settle down in Karachi. East Pakistani representationin industrialand commercial elites was virtually non existent. A large majority of head offices of big business concerns were located in Karachiand Lahore.31 During the early 1950s, the Muslim League - the party that had created Pakistan

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- stood in complete disarray. It was discredited and eventually defeated during the 1954 provincialelections by a United Frontconsisting of fourpoliticalpartiesincluding the Awami League. The United Fronthad won its victory on a programof land reform, nationalizationof jute trade, making Bengali the second official language, free education, and provincial autonomy. The United Frontgovernmentwas dismissed by the central governmentand this really infuriatedthe Bengali elites. The 1950S saw the birth of Nascent nationalistideology. Emphasis on Bengali as a symbol of unity and as an instrument mobilization, a renaissanceof Bangla culture of and literature,demand for provincialautonomyto modify the structureof power, and an awareness of internal colonialism and regional economic disparity were some of the ingredientsof this secular nationalism.It was still, however, a nationalistideology without a mass movement. It did not have the supportof the peasantryor the urban workers. It was largely a movement of petit-bourgeoisieand intellectuals led by factional political groups. The Bengali Nationalism of petit-bourgeoisiebecame a mass nationalistmovement during the period of Ayub Khan, and during the late sixties, it assumed a radical character.Duringthe Ayub era, therewas no safety valve of parliamentary democracy. Bureaucratization politics concentratedthe decision-makingpowers in the hands of of the bureaucracyand the army which had very little roots in East Pakistan. The economic policies of the Pakistanigovernmentconcentrated wealth in the hands of small industrialelite based in West Pakistanand transformedEast Pakistaninto a captive market for West Pakistani manufacturedproducts. This virtually created a situation of internal colonialism, leading to a vertical ethnic stratification,by which a class characterwas imposed on ethnic differentiation.It thus became easy for the intellectuals, student leaders, and petit-bourgeoisieto mobilize mass supportbehind the Bengali autonomy movement. Demand for independenceand radicalizationwas just a step down the road, in reaction to the militaryrepressionby the West Pakistani government. Duringthe post-independenceperiod, Bangla Desh's problemhas been an ideological differentiation opposed to ethnic differentiation.A homogeneous Bengali idenas tity did not prove to be a potent tool for coping with post-independenceproblems. As has Rashiduzzaman pointed out, "Bengalis demonstrateda separatistnationalismfed
by the economic grievances against the Federal government. . . . But Bengali leaders

failed to develop any sound political organization."32Even seven years after independence, Bangla Desh remains a country without established political institutions. Bengali Nationalist ideology was articulatedin the so-called "Four Pillars of Mujibism" - secularism, democracy, nationalism, and socialism. Mujibism temporarily raised popular expectations for improvementin the daily life of the toiling masses. "However instead of reform the population saw political tyranny and economic chaos." 33 The guiding principlesof Mujibismhave undergonea substantialchange over time. Anti-Indianfeelings had led to a change in the emphasis on secularism even during Mujib's regime. Since the coup and particularlyunder the Zia regime, the Islamic ideology and identity have been reinstated.Awami League's socialism remainedrhetoric ratherthan substantive policies. The Awami League was basically a reformist ratherthan a socialist party. Some industrieswere nationalizedby the Majib govern-

Islam and National Identity 65 ment. However, their managementhas caused enormous problems. Since the death of Majib-Ur-Rehman, private investmenthas received substantialincentives.34 It has been pointed out that although the separatistBengali Nationalism had successfully helped sustain Bangla Desh in its efforts to differentiate itself from West Pakistan, it has also raised new questions about this sense of national identity. Does Bangla Desh have a separatenational identity of its own which differentiatesit from West Bengal?35It may be pointed out that the only significant difference is Islamic ideology which was rejected by Bangla Desh intellectualsas a basis of Bangla Desh nationalism.

FURTHER TENDENCIES TOWARD SEGMENTATION

Far from leaving the West a homogeneous, ethnically integratednation, the separationof Bangla Desh, in fact, accentuated subduedethnic differencesand reopened the the question of nationality in Pakistan. The four remaining provinces each have a distinctcultureand a predominant language.The languageis, in fact, a culture-medium. In spite of distinct linguistic differences amongst them, the substantiveculture- the fundamentalvalues and belief system - does not seem to be so distinct as to justify the label of four different nations. The people of each province certainly do have a regional identity parallel to other identities that they possess. In certain situationsthis regionalidentitymay dominatethe others. Any federalgovernmentor dominatingelite has to consider this fact while making policies. The province of Baluchistanhas producedthe most violent separatistmovement so far. The vanguardof this movement has been the National Awami Party, the Baluchistan Federationof Students, and various Sardarsand their tribes - primarilyMarri and Mangal. The NAP supportof Baluchistanwas only partial, having won only 8 of the 21 seats in the ProvincialLegislative Assembly in the 1970 elections. The rest were won by IndependentSardarsor membersof Jamiat-e-Ulmai-Islam, right-wing a conservativeparty. This only goes to show the tribalnatureof politics in Baluchistan. Baluchistanpolitics are still very much dominatedby tribal politics controlled by tribal Sardarswho maintaineda traditionalmedieval system of justice and authority over their followers. Baluchistanreceived provincialstatusonly in 1972, and thus the advent of real civil government is only a few years old.36 The extension of civil governmentand the recent abolitionof the SardariSystem threatensthe traditionalway of life and has posed a serious threatto the power of Sardars.Their opposition is very natural.The Bhutto regime might have had a point when it arguedthat the so-called Baluchi Nationalist wanted to maintaintribal autonomy in the guise of regional autonomy. The demand for regional autonomy in Baluchistan is based on the argumentsof economic disparity, Panjabidomination, and general regional distributivejustice. It has been pointed out by some Baluchi leaders that the Baluchi Sui Gas is being used at a cheap cost by the people of Karachiand Panjab. Since the treaty with India, the Indus water is largely used by the farmersof Panjaband Sindh. Baluchi nationalists argue for strong provinces and strong nationalities. They look at Pakistan as being composed of four nationalities based on ethnic differences rather than as a nation

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composed of four provinces. They would like to reorganizethe boundariesof the four provinces according to linguistic demarcation.37 The Bhutto government used both army and economic development strategies to pacify the "revolt" in Baluchistan. The government made a gigantic effort toward economic development, beginning with the building of an infrastructure. The central governmentconsideredthe demandsfor regional autonomyand nationalityarguments as equal to succession. The government maintainedthat the abolition of the Sardari system, which gave the tribalchiefs the power to tax and administerprivatejails and to inhibit socioeconomic reform while cutting the roots from under the traditional political system of Baluchistan, was the root cause of violence in Baluchistan. It is noteworthythat all the leading figures among the insurgents- Mengal, Marri,Bizenjo - were Sardars. On the government side, the leading Baluchi figures - Raisani, Las Bela, and Dodha Khan- were also Sardars.38 The legal abolitionof the Sardarisystem will not automaticallyabolish the traditionalpractices and attitudes. But certainly it is a positive step in the direction of political integrationof the Baluchi people within the mainstreamof Pakistanipolitics. Unlike the Bangla Desh NationalistMovement, the Baluchimovementfor autonomy is a mere groupingof Baluchi and Barouhitribal leaders. "On the linguistic basis the Baluchis have as much in common with Barouhisas Tamils have with Pushtoons."39 The support of the National Awami Party was largely built on tribal loyalties. The conflict in Baluchistanoften seems to be tribal warfare ratherthan something to do with the aspirationsof Baluchi people. In fact. the Baluchipeople constitutea minority of the total populationof Baluchistan,as more Baluchipeople live outside the province than within it. The economic system that was dominatedby the Sardaritraditiondid not lead to the integrationof the people into a feudal system, let alone a modern, bourgeois, nationality.This fact is even admittedby the Soviet historianof Pakistan.40 The second significantregional movement is the demand for regional autonomy in North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) which is inhabited mostly by Pathans. Pathans are proud of their ethnic identity, they speak their own language and have their own distinct culture and traditions. The demand for Pushtoonistan- an independent or autonomous region governed by Pathans like the Bengalis chose to join Pakistanwith an overwhelming vote in a referendumin 1947. Although the Pathans- the NWFP - as a province is much more "modem" than Baluchistan, it is very much dominatedby a traditionaltribal system. Some parts of the present province have long been administeredas tribal areas or princely states accordingto the local laws and customs. Only recently have they integratedwith the provincial civil administration.The Pathans existed long before Pakistan came into existence. The Pathans as an ethnic group live on all sides of the frontiersof their province - in Afghanistan, Panjan, and Baluchistan. Although the Pathans have a strong regional identity, it is still difficult to regardthem as a nationalityliving in a circumscribedterritory.41 There are at least three distinct types of Pushtoonnationalism. The first originated from Kabuland was propagatedby the Afghan government.It is based on the Afghan government's desire to annex the territories (Pushto-speaking) in the NWFP and Baluchistanceded by Amir Abdur Rahmanto the British Colonial Governmentas a result of the Durand Agreement of I893.42 This brand of Pushtoon nationalismhas

Islam and National Identity 67 very little supportamong the Pushtoonsliving in Pakistan.It has been arguedthat the Pushtoons are an oppressed people even within Afghanistan. They form only about half of the populationof Afghanistan. The official language, until recently, has been Persianrather thanPushto. The majorityof the elite positionsin the Afghangovernment were occupied by people of Persian descent.43 The second brand of Pushtoon nationalism manifests itself as a demand for an independentPushtoon state carved out of Pakistan'sPushto-speakingterritories.This raises the question of independencefor the Pushtoonsliving in Afghanistan. The idea of a landlockedPushtoonstate with a very meagereconomic base is dismissed by most Pushtoon intellectuals and political leaders.44 The third and relatively more popularbrandof Pushtoon nationalismhas emerged in the form of a demand for an autonomousPushtoon province on a linguistic basis, within a federationof Pakistan.The Pushtoonleadersregardthis as being more in the spiritof the LahoreResolutionof 1940, which formedthe very basis of an independent Pakistan. This form of Pushtoon nationalismhas been supportedand propagatedby the Khudae Khidmatgar(Red Shirts) Movement, as well as by its "successor", the NationalAwami Party,underthe leadershipof Wali Khan.The NAP does not command an overwhelming mass supportin the NWFP. Its performancein the I970 elections was ratherpoor, when it won only 13 seats out of the 40 in the provincial elections. This hypothesis is supportedby the results of the 1977 elections. Its performanceas a senior partnerin a coalition governmentat the provincial level was full of contradictions. The NAP leaders complained of Panjabiand Kathiawaridomination in the business sector of the NWFP but, when in power, they invited these very groups to invest money in their province. The NAP governmentdeclared Urdu as the official language of the province, arguingthat Pushto is not a well-developed language. This government'srecordof oppressionof workersand peasantswas the worst in the history of the province. The province of Sindh has had a relatively weak regional autonomy movement. the During recent years, the controversyhas surrounded problemof language. About 56 percent of the people in the province are Sindhi-speaking, 20 percent have Urdu as their mother tongue. A number of other languages - Panjabi, Gujrati, and others - are also spoken. The Urdu-speakingpeople are concentratedin Karachi and other major urban areas of Hydrabad. The language used in universities and colleges is primarilyUrdu or English. When Sindhi was recently declared as the provincial language of Sindh, it sparked riots inspired by right-wing political parties representing Urdu-speakinggroups. Apart from sporadic language conflicts, there is no well-organized nationalist movement in Sindh at present. Some observers believe that the recent execution of Mr. Bhutto may spark a nationalistmovement again. However, Mr. Bhutto's execution has so far sparkedmore riots and protests in Panjabthan in Sindh. Post-Bangla Desh Pakistan still remains a classic example of a multi-ethnic, segmented, political system. Individualsand groups operatingwithin this political system tend to possess a layered set of identities as illustratedby Figure i. The top layer is the Muslim umbrellaidentity, which may have submergedthe other identities from time to time but has not replaced them. Muslim religion as practiced in Pakistanis not a monolith. There are two majorsects (Shi'a and Sunni) and several

Level of Politics

Type of Identity

Universal Muslim Identity

Nationaland international-

Other sects Shi'a Pakistani

Panjabi Provincialand regionalArain Jat

Sindhi

Pushtoon

Brohi

Hur

Yousafzai

Afri

clans Subregional and local -

clans

clans

clans

clans

cla

family

family

family
FIGURE I.

family

family

fam

Multiple identities in Pakistan

Islam and National Identity 69 subsects within the two. The second layer is composed of what may be an ethnic identity and there are four major ethnic groups (having their own language) which provide the basis for four provinces, althoughthe linguistic and provincialboundaries are not identical. The thirdlayer is formedby subethnicor tribalidentities. In Panjab, this usually takes the form "Zat" which is often based on lineage and/or occupation of the ancestorsand usually such a group, for example, Arain or Jat, does not possess a political structure,such as a tribe. Below this third layer are other regional or local identities - the most importantbeing the clan and family identities. These differentidentitiesbecame the basis of political mobilizationat differentlevels of politics, dependingon the issues at hand. In my opinion, ethnic/tribalidentities are still dominant and the Pakistani identity remains weak (in terms of an individual's psychological sense of belongingness). The internalpolitics of Pakistan seem to be dictatedmore by these segmentedand primordial loyalties thanby a loyalty to Pakistani nationality. Until recently, Islam has been a successful integratingor mobilizing factor only when it has been shown to be in dangeror when foreign policy issues or relationswith the Muslim Arab states or India are concerned. However, there have been no attempts on the partof political elites to createand build institutionsaroundIslamfor performing importantpolitical functions and for resolving conflicts, leading to integration. Alto though Muslim identity is very important the people, and Islam is probablythe only meaningful ideology, it has not been put into operationnor given its legitimate role in the political system. of The governmentof GeneralZia-ul-Haqhas embarkedupona program Islamization of the Pakistanistate. It is too early to say anythingabout the impact of these efforts on national identity and integration. It may be pointed out that the emphasis of the currentgovernmentseems to be on the ritualisticaspects and legal preceptsof Islam. The introduction an Islamic penal code, for example, will not provide a strongbasis of for national integration.In fact, there are signs that applicationof the Islamic penal and civil codes may lead to serious conflicts between the Sunni majorityand the Shi'a minority. What is needed is to modify and createdynamic institutionswithin the basic frameworkof Islam which relate to the political, social, and economic activities of the people. Post-Bangla Desh Pakistan still remains a classic example of a multi-ethnic state wherepeople have layersof variousidentities. Dependingon the sociopoliticalsituation with which the individualis confronted,differentlevels of identitymay become salient or dominant. Usually, the international questions such as those involving Kashmiror Palestine will evoke the domination of a more universal, inclusive identity, that is, Pakistani Muslim. When it comes to the allocation of resources, the subnational identities- Panjabi,Sindhi, Baluchi, or Pushtoon- become dominant.At the regional level, for example, during an election, a Yousafzai may vote for a Yousafzai or an Arain may vote for an Arain. Local governmentelections have often shown results on these lines. The rural voters seem to prefer representativesfrom their own castes or tribalgroups. Basic Democracies(BD) councils were often elected fromthe majority, caste or tribe in the ruralareas. According to one study, 73.5 percentof predominant the BD members and 71.5 percent of the elected chairmen of BDs came from the

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majority castes in their villages.45 Thus, in local politics, the cleavage and conflict often takes place on ethnic lines. The "caste" or tribe hence becomes a dominantidentity. Each of these identities is usually markedby a clustering of attributesthat an individualconsiders "ethnic" anddistinctfrom the next and more inclusive level of identity. Which of these identities affects a person's actions would depend on the situation. Consequently, without reference to "situation", it is difficult to say which kind of "ethnic" identity will determineindividualbehaviorand attitudes,but ethnicityremainsan important variable in multi-ethnicstatelike Pakistan.The tendenciestowardbalkanization ethnic nations - are alreadythere. Ethnicitystructures conflict situationsin the politics of Pakistan the - particularlyat the interprovinciallevel. It involves emotions, sentiment; leads to stereotypingand scapegoating. It forms the basis of the perceptions of relative deprivationand reverse-prejudice.It determinesthe natureof leadershipand the mobilization of leadershiproles. It will be justified, in my opinion, to make a case for the integrationof Pakistan. An integratedPakistanprovides sustenance to the oppressed workers, peasants, and the poor in all the provinces. Integrationmay only be achieved through more selfgovernmentand democracy at the provincial levels ratherthan throughcentralization and unitarystrategies. To conclude this essay, it may also be pointed out that the ethnic differentiationin West Pakistan has taken a different development than that of the situation between East and West Pakistan. In the latter case, the ethnic differentiationtook the vertical route where the class was superimposedon the ethnic differences. Thus, the Bengalis were not only ethnically different but also a different class. No significant Bengali elite participatedin the politico-economic system with the West Pakistanielites. The situation in West Pakistan itself is different. The ethnic differentiationoccurred on horizontallines. Each of the four provinces has its own elites which participatein the political system. Within themselves the provinceshave elite-mass differentiations,and some of the provincial elites have common interests with the dominant elites from Panjab. West Pakistanhas witnessed a high degree of labormobility. A substantialBaluchi and Makranipopulationhas emigratedto Karachiin searchof employment. Similarly, a large numberof working populationin Karachicomes from Northwest Panjaband the Frontierprovince. Trade unions have emerged, horizontally integratingworkers of variousethnic origins. Conflicton ethnic lines will occur, but whetherit will escalate toward disintegrationof Pakistanor not will largely depend on the policies pursued by ruling elites, the interventionof the foreign powers and the capacity of the state apparatus(military bureaucraticelites) to control the mass movements. It will also depend on how the emerging Islamic state will deal with realities of ethnic differentiation.

NOTES 'Jamil-Ud-DinAhmad, Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom (Lahore, 1970), pp. 380. 2KeithCallard, Pakistan: A Political Study (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957), p. I. 3Jamil-Ud-DinAhmad, Speeches and Writingof Mr. Jinnah (Lahore:Ashraf, 1952) I, 469.

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71

4LeonardBinder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, I963), p. 4. 5Fora distinction between Islam as a belief system and as a group identity, see Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little Brown, I970), p. I6I. 6Reportof the Court of Inquiryconstituted under the PanjabAct II of I954 to inquire into the Panjab disturbancesof 1953. 7See Wendell Bill and W. E. Freeman,Ethnicityand Nation Building (Los Angeles: Sage, 1974). 8See Results of the PakistanElection in Pakistan Forum, I, 3, (February-March, 1971), 10. "'Different Roads to Socialism" (editorial) in Forum, 2, II (January30, 1971), 3. Weiner, "The Politics of South Asia" in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The 'OMyron Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1960), p. I6I. IWilfred C. Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), P. 54. '2EdgarSchuler and KathrynR. Schuler, Public Opinionand ConstitutionMakingin Pakistan (Michigan State University Press, 1967), p. I99. of '3An excellent account of various interpretations the Islamic state is found in Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan. '4See, for example, Maulana Maududi, Nationalism and India (translationfrom Urdu) (Pathankot, 1947). 15S. Ghaleb Kahn Abbasi and A. Zaya Abbasi, The Structureof Islamic Polity, Part 1 (Lahore, 1952), pp. 5-6. "6See Eric A. Nordlinger,ConflictRegulationin Divided Societies (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972). '7RaunaqJahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, I972). B. "8Khalid Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, I967), pp. 72-73. 9G. W. Chaudhri,Democracy in Pakistan (Dacca: Green Book House, 1963), p. 66. 20Sayeed,Political System of Pakistan, p. 87. 2"SeeRaunaqJahan, Pakistan. 22Fordetails see "6 Points", Pakistan Forum, April-May, I971, pp. 8-9. 23NevilleMaxwell, "A Passage throughPakistan", The New YorkReview of Books, March 23, 1972. 24Ramakrishna Mukherjee, "The Social Backgroundof Bangla Desh," in KathleenGaugh and Hari P. Sharma,eds., Imperialismand Revolution in South Asia (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973). 25Howard Schuman, "Note on the RapidRise of Mass Nationalismin East Pakistan"(unpublishedpaper). 26Howard Schuman, "Note on the Rise of Mass Bengali Nationalismin East Pakistan,"AmericanJournal of Sociology, 78, 2, (September 1972), 290-298. 27See G. P. Bhattachargee,Renaissance and Freedom Movement in Bangla Desh (Calcutta:Miverva Associates, 1973), pp. 82-110. 28Badruddin Umar, Kamruddin Ahmad, and HasanMurshidproducedmajorworks on the reinterpretation of the Freedom Movement in India. Muffazal Haider Chaudhri, Abul Fazl, Abul Mansoor Ahmad, M. Shahidullah,Abdul Mannan, Hasimuddin,Sufia Kamal, and HamidaRehmanwere some of the prominent writers, artists, and journalists who were the vanguardof the culturalrenaissancein East Pakistan in the early fifties. 29For details see Callard, Pakistan. 30TheDawn (Karachi), January9 and I8, 1956. 3"Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State (Folkstone: Dawson and Sons, 1979), pp. and 94-95. See also HannahPapanek, "Pakistan's Big Businessmen:Muslim Separatism,Entrepreneurship PartialModernization," Economic Developmentand Culture Change, 21, I (October 1972), 1-32. 32M. Rashiduzzaman, "The Political Evolution of Bangla Desh," Current History, April 1979, p. i64. E. 33Joseph Stepanek, Bangla Desh: Equitable Growth? (New York: PergamonPress, 1979), p. 9. Political Evolution of Bangla Desh, pp. I66-167. 34Rashiduzzaman, 35See Trevor Ling, "Creating a New State: The Bengalis of Bangla Desh," South Asian Review, 5, 3 (April 1972), 222-224. 36Government Pakistan, WhitePaper on Baluchistan, Rawalpindi, October, 1974. of

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37AquilKhan, "What Is Up in Baluchistan?"Outlook, I, 36 (December 9, 1972), 5, and "Akbar Bugti Bides his Time", ibid., p. 7. 38See Lawrence Lifschultz, "Festering Dilemma for Bhutto,;;Far Eastern Economic Review, May 28, 1976. in 39"Contradictions Baluchistan," Pakistan Forum, 3, 8-9 (May-June, 1973). 40Y.Y. Gankovsky,The Peoples of Pakistan (Lahore:Peoples Publishing House, 1975), pp. 203-208. 4'See K. B. Sayeed, Pathan Regionalism, Reprint, No. 13, CommonwealthStudies Center, Duke University. 42Mohammad Said Khan, The Voice of Pushtoons (Lahore:Ferozsons, n. d.). 43See "Pushtoonistanand the PushtoonNationalQuestion," in Feroz Ahmed, ed., Focus on Baluchistan and Pushtoon National Question (Lahore:Peoples Publishing House, I975). "See M. Said Khan, "The PushtoonistanBogey I," KhvberMail, January12, I969. "Norman K. Nicholson and Dilawar Ali Khan, Basic Democracies and Rural Developmentin Pakistan Studies, Cornell University, I974). (Ithaca, N. Y.: Center for International