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Russia and the FrancoPrussian War of 1870-71

Mike Wells argues that Russian decisions in July 1870 were of major significance for the history of Europe.
There are some turning points in history which never quite get their due consideration. A good example is the decision by Hitler to declare war on the USA in 1941. Obviously this is mentioned in alt the standard books, but the explanations seem rather patchy for an event v^hich changed the whole war and then had huge effects on the postwar period. Another of these neglected turning points may be the Russian diplomacy importance of Russian diplomacy in 1870, simply telling us that 'Russia was preoccupied with the neutrality of Austria and Denmark'. Bismarck's Diplomacy and Wars Professor Tim Blanning has rightly pointed out the importance of Russian non-intervention in key periods of German history. Had Russia intervened during the wars that Bismarck fought against Denmark and Europe, however, had been radically altered, and Napoleon III was anxious to gain compensation and maintain France's role as a great power, able to influence European affairs. Yet Bismarck gave him little, and the growing economic and military power of Prussia presented France with a potential rival. Soon the issue of the Hohenzoltern candidature, in which a Prussian Prince was considered as a possible King of Spain, threatened France with encirclement and was viewed as provocation by Napoleon III and the French public. The independent South German states seemed increasingly hostile to Prussia, despite the military alliance which they had entered into with Prussia after the war with Austria in 1866. A war to resolve the hostility between France and Prussia and to force South Germany into joining the North German Confederation seemed highly likely by 1869. Prussia and the War of 1870 What would be the likely dangers for Prussia in case of such a war? Modern historians tend to stress the risks. Prussia's needle gun was not the warwinning weapon that it was made out to be; the French chassepot was aiso effective. Prussian artillery had deveioped a lot since 1866, but France had effective field artillery and the mitrailleuse, a sort of early machine gun. In addition, France's railways were better than the Austrian railways of 1866 and were plentiful on the border area. An invasion by Prussia therefore would meet resistance from an army fighting on interior lines of communication and, moreover, likely to arouse the sort of patriotic nationalism seen in France in 1792 and 1793, when there were French victories over superior foreign forces.

A reception given to the victorious Prussian army on 2V^ September 1866 in Berlin, after victory in war against Austria. Would Bismarck's forces have triumphed against France in 1870-71 if the Russians had not deterred Austria from intervening? at the time of the Franco-Prussian War. For example, in Pftanze's magisterial survey of Bismarck and unification (see Further Reading), Russian diplomatic actions in July 1870 get a few lines out of 600 pages. W.E. Mosse, while dealing in a penetrating and original way with relations between Russia and Germany in the period after Unification, has little directly on the
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Austria in 1864 and 1866, then the results might have been very different. As it was, Prussia defeated Austria and established the North German Confederation in 1867 without foreign interference. Neither of Prussia's powerful neighbours, France or Russia, stepped in to prevent the emergence of a new central European power. The balance of power in central

The North German Confederation was a recent creation and might well collapse should Prussian armies meet with decisive defeat.

Prussian military planning only envisaged a short war; but Europe expected a long one, and saw France as the major military power. A prolonged struggle might bring in Austria, in search for revenge for the defeat of 1866. A Prussian defeat might even bring Denmark to act, taking back the lands lost in 1864. There was undoubtedly hostility to Prussia within Germany, for example in Hanover. The North German Confederation was a recent creation and might well collapse should Prussian armies meet with decisive defeat. With its vulnerable geographical and military position, a war was only possible for Prussia because of the possibility that the major powers would not intervene on France's side. Thus Russia's role was cruciai, especially if the conflict with France was not over quickly. In the event of a longer struggle, Russia would become a key player. Bismarck, then, had to consider very carefully the possible reactions of the major European powers to a war between the North German Confederation and France. Bismarck's Strategy Bismarck relied on long-standing tensions between Britain and France to ensure that Britain would not intervene. As for Italy, she owed her acquisition of Venetia to Prussia's victory over Austria in 1866, and was ready to take advantage of French distraction to occupy Rome. Russia had been cultivated by Prussia ever since 1863 when Bismarck had agreed to cooperate against Polish rebels. Its hostility to Austria in the Balkans made cooperation unlikely against Prussia. However, Russian ruling circles were divided in their attitude to Prussia and France. There was no certainty about Russian reactions to war. A Possible Franco-Austrian Agreement The most worrying possibility was an alliance between France and Austria.

Not all the Austrian leaders had accepted the defeat of 1866. The view that Bismarck's lenient Peace of Prague had somehow ended the danger of an Austrian intervention is questionable. A possible FrancoAustrian alliance was talked of in 1869 and 1870. The Emperor Franz Josef of Austria stated in 1869: 'We consider France's cause our own and shall contribute to the success of French arms'. The Austrian minister-president Beusst pressed hard to join with France. The Archduke Albrecht had visited Paris to discuss joint military pianning and in 1870 General Le Brun visited Vienna. Had the war gone in France's favour, then it is by no means unlikely that Austria would have intervened. Austrian participation was made considerably less likely by Russian diplomatic decisions. Bismarck, like all German leaders after him, was concerned with the possibilities of war on two fronts. Russian support for Prussia in July 1871 made this less likely. There were, of course, other factors working against a FrancoAustrian alliance. First, Austrian military capability had been severely hit by the defeats of 1859 and 1866. Secondly, the influence of Hungary in the Dual Monarchy, as represented by Andrassy, joint minister-president, was against further action in Germany. Thirdly, nationalism among Germanspeakers in the Austrian Empire had risen to considerable heights and military intervention on behalf of France would have been met with political opposition. However, all this may have been more apparent after the event than it was in July 1870. In 1868 there had been discussions between the Russian government and Bismarck via the Prussian ambassador to Russia, Reust, about mutual action to prevent what was seen as a likely alliance between Austria and France. The Russian government had promised to move 100,000 troops into Austria if Austria joined France in a war against Prussia. In return, the Russians would have

liked a formal agreement for German military action in support of Russia in the event of a war against Austria. Realistically, this seemed to Bismarck more likely and he resisted a formal commitment. Instead there was simply an understanding about recognising mutual interests. Bismarck was well aware of the possibility of using this understanding in July 1870. The Meeting at Ems, June 1870 Bismarck had gone out of his way to cultivate the Tsar when he had come to Ems to take the waters in June 1870. Wilhelm 1 had met the Tsar at Ems, too. Though not naturally proGerman, the Tsar had told his mistress. Princess Catherine Dologuruky, that he had come to see Napoleon HI as 'an adventurer'. Bismarck was encouraged by this meeting and by his conversations at Ems with the Russian foreign minister, Gorchakov, which went on at the same time, in those important four days in June 1870. When Prussia and France mobilised on 15 July 1871, following the furore at the famous Ems telegram, it was natural for Bismarck to make approaches to the Russians and ask if the understanding of 1868 was still current. The Crucial Decision, July 1870 It is at this point that there came about what might be considered one of the most significant developments of 19'**century diplomacy. The Russians assured Bismarck on 14 July that the agreement held and that, in the event of an Austrian mobilisation, 300,000 Russian troops would be sent to Galicia, preventing an Austrian invasion of Germany and allowing Bismarck to fight a one-front war. As a bonus, Russian pressure was appiied to Denmark, whose king had married a Russian princess, to remain neutral. Contemporaries saw this as being of the utmost importance. In a French history published in 1879 (Alfred Rambaud's History of Russia. 1879) the following interesting passage occurs:

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The French certainly expected Austrian help and telegrammed to enquire when it was coming during the early stages of the war.

Bismarck orchestrating the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Despite Russian support in 1870, he failed to repay his debt, preferring instead to secure compromises favourable to Austria-Hungary and Britain. The menacing attitude of Russia forced Austria to maintain her neutrality. This carried with it Italy. Russian diplomacy weighed in the same manner on Denmark, linked to the Romanovs by marriage between a Danish Princess and the Tzarevitch. Russia prevented the formation of a possible League of Neutrals and discouraged the collective intervention of Europe. The American ambassador thought that the officers of the Russian army were unanimous in their desire for a war against Prussia; but the general public thought otherwise and there were subscriptions everywhere for the benefit of wounded French. This forgotten contemporary history, written just a few years after the events, gives much greater prominence to Russian decisions than have many more recent works The Austrian government knew
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about the Russian military threat and discussed it in an important meeting of the Austrian Crown Council held on 18 July. The Russian reply to Bismarck had been reported by Austrian agents in Berlin. It may not have been a deciding factor, but it certainly strengthened Andrassy's arguments for neutrality, especially as the meeting heard reports from the war ministers about Austrian's military unpreparedness; Austrian forces could not have dealt with a large-scale Russian invasion. C.A. McCartney, in hisstudy of the Habsburg Empire, described this meeting in Vienna as a major turning point. Indeed it was. By declaring neutrality, Austria-Hungary had made a Prussian victory more likely. She had indicated that she would not be a major player in German affairs, and signalled that her future interests would be in the Balkans. The possibility of revenge for 1866 had receded; the way was open for alliance with Germany, which would

come about in 1879. Though Beusst, the Austrian minister-president, told the French in confidence that in the event of a French victory, the neutrality might well end and Austria would probably join with France, the very fact of Austrian neutrality made that French victory less likely. As Russian diplomacy had contributed to these major changes, it must be seen as highly significant. In fact, Alexander H's position changed quite quickly. The Prussian victory at Sedan and the capture of Napoleon III led the Russian government to seek to avoid a complete French defeat in order to maintain a balance of power. The way was thus set for a future Franco-Russian alliance. But as such rapid Prussian conquests were not foreseen, it is the diplomacy of 14 July that must be seen as most influential. It seemed that Bismarck's wooing of Russia of 1863 had come to a magnificent fruition - it ensured French isolation and gave Moltke the best possible chance to concentrate

In the event of an Austrian mobilisation, 300,000 Russian troops would be sent to Galicia, preventing an Austrian invasion of Germany and allowing Bismarck to fight a one-front war.
his forces in the west, using his railways to take advantage of huge French strategic and tactical errors. There was more than just Russian inaction at the key juncture - the threat of intervention, even if not made directly to Austria, was the clearest possible indication of Russian support at a key time in the development of a new Germany. The Consequences of Russian Policy The effects of Russia's policy were huge, and not necessanly foreseen by Alexander II and Gorchakov, his foreign minister. These two focused on the immediate advantage that Russia could extract from Prussian support and European preoccupation with more changes in central Europe. They sought to end the restrictions imposed on Russian warships entering the Black Sea and issued a unilateral rejection of those clauses from the 1856 Treaty of Paris. Bismarck had let it be known that he would not object. France was preoccupied; Austria was indifferent. That left only Britain. The Gladstone government, intent on European concert diplomacy and on domestic changes, would not be likely to restage the Crimean War Thus, from a mixture of friendship and support to Prussia and by raising the possibility of armed intervention in Austna, Russia had gained considerabie advantage from the events in the Franco-Prussian War by October 1870 and had rejected the hated restrictions which she had had to accept in 1856, after defeat in the Crimea. The Long-term Effects Yet the promise of 14 July must have had wider ramifications. Even in 1870 Bismarck was not offering unconditional reciprocation of good will. Though he accepted the end of the Biack Sea Clauses of the Treaty of Paris, he made it clear that he would have preferred an internationai conference. This is a pre-echo of the situation in 1878. If the Russians expected huge gratitude for their really quite remarkable offer of military assistance at a crucial time. they were to be sadly disappointed at the Congress of Berlin. In 1878, after a war with Turkey on behalf of the Christians in the Balkans who had been slaughtered in massacres in Bulgaria, Russia hoped to create an enlarged client state in Bulgaria and dominate the region.

Tsar Alexander II (1818-81). How far was he led astray by Bismarck's diplomacy? Under his successor, Russia signed an alliance with France.

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If the Russians expected huge gratitude for their really quite remarkable offer of military assistance at a crucial time, they were to be sadly disappointed at the Congress of Berlin.
However, before a general European conference in Berlin, she had to reduce her aims and accept a much smaller Bulgaria. German support was not forthcoming. Bismarck preferred to mediate and support a compromise acceptable to Britain and Austria. Though standard histories correctly link this disappointment with the subsequent ili-feeling between Russia and Germany, to the closer links between Germany and Austria and the build-up to the war, they fail to give due emphasis to Russia's guarantee of 1870. This unusual commitment by Russia must have made the failure of Bismarck to offer support at the Congress of Berlin all the more galling to the Russians. Without this Russian support, the German Reich might not have come into being, and yet Bismarck, the socalled 'Honest Broker' of 1878, seemed to forget that his state owed a huge amount to Russian diplomacy at a crucial time in 1870. It would be hard to overstate the importance of the subsequent rift between Germany and Russia. It was a major contributory factor to the First World War; it amounted to a huge part of World War II; and itwas still of significance in the Cold war era. Similarly, the closer links between Austria and Germany that developed after 1879 were of huge significance. These developments were deeply affected by decisions taken between 14 and 18 July 1870. Had Austria offered greater support to France, her subsequent alliance with Germany would not have developed. Had Russia not offered such important support in 1870, then her subsequent disappointment at the
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lack of German support might not have led her into alliance with France. A Neglected Turning Point The 'Blank Cheque' offer of military support from Germany to Austria in 1914 was a key step to world conflict and has received due attention by historians. A rather similar, if less wideranging, commitment by Russia to Germany in 1870 is more of a footnote to history, but its consequences are considerable enough to make it a candidate for a fuller study and more consideration by students of German Unification and Russo-German relations after 1870. For students of Bismarck, the issue is a fascinating one. On one hand, it was a tribute to his concern for Russian relations that, despite divisions of opinion among the Russian people, government and court, an undertaking of this sort could be obtained. His analysis of the need to avoid a war on two fronts has been seen as the vital element in his diplomacy; the neglect of the principle after 1890 has been seen as the key to the tragedies of the 20**^ century when Germany was 'encircled' by Russia and France and felt the need to resolve the dangers this posed by war. However, the undertaking of 14 July 1870 set up obligations as well. There really is 'no such thing as a free lunch' in diplomacy: Bismarck's success engendered huge problems of how to repay the debt to Russia while avoiding alienating Austria and Britain. From the decision of July came disappointment for the Russians and distrust of Germany, emotions that were becoming unmanageable by the later part of Bismarck's period of

office. This festering resentment would probably have led to a FrancoRussian alliance even had Bismarck not been dismissed by the new Kaiser, Wilhelm II, in 1890. Further Reading Erich Eyck, Bismarci< and the German Empire (Norton, 1954) George Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order (Princeton,

1979)
Edgar Feuchtwanger, Bismarcl< (Routledge, 2002) Lothar Gall, Bismarck, White fiei/o/uf/onary (HarperCollins, 1986) Immanuel Geiss, German Foreign Policy 1871-1914 {Routledge. 1976) C.A. McCartney, The Habsburg Fmpire, ?790-/9;S(Longman, 1968) W.E. Mosse, The Rise and Faii of the Crimean System 1855-7] (Macmillan, 1963) O. Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany (Princeton, 1963) LM. Schneerson, The Franco-Prussian War and Russia {\^oscow, 1976) A.J.R Taylor, Bismarck, Man and Statesman (1958, reprinted by Sutton, 2003) Mike Wells, Bismarck {Collins History Makers, 2003) D.G. Williamson, Bismarck and Germany 1862-1890 {Longman, 1998 edition) Mike Wells is an experienced A level examiner and author of a study of Bismarck in the HarperCollins History Makers series. A former Deputy Head at St. Mary's Hall Brighton, he currently teaches at Roedean School.