olnLs Lo be covered

1 CurrenL compeLlLors
a 8lack berry
b Samsung
c Mlcromax
d Accordlng Lo Lhe laLesL 2010 (!anuarySepLember) reporL by luC a provlder of
markeL lnLelllgence noklas markeL share was 362 ln 2008 and 329 ln 2010
2 ulfference ln Lhe feaLure offered by nCklA oLher brands
3 8eason for downgrade ln markeL
4 CurrenL requlremenL ln MarkeL
Androld
1ouch screen
Cheap cosL
3 Measures Laken by nokla ln lasL few years
6 Measures Lo be Laken ln order Lo make comeback ln markeL



1 Moblle Mlcroflnance ln 2009 nokla plloLed a scheme ln Lwo lndlan sLaLes where lL
sold handseLs on a weekly lnsLallmenL of 100 rupees ($2) over 23 weeks nokla planned
Lo rollouL Lhe mlcroflnance offer ln 12 lndlan sLaLes
2 lndla noL a lowend markeL segmenL 81 percenL of Lhe lndla's moblle users are ln
urban areas nokla anLlclpaLes such cusLomers would drlve demand for hlghend
phones
3 lncreaslng CompeLlLlon from new moblle handseL manufacLurers' enLry lnLo lndla ln
one quarLer of 2009 alone LwenLyseven new moblle handseL manufacLurers enLered
Lhe lndlan markeL Lo lnLroduce enLrylevel models (and oLher models wlLh feaLures such
as dual SlM cards and full CWL81? keyboard) for Lhe prlce senslLlve lndlan consumer
4 nokla's compeLlLors ln lndla MoLorola Sony Lrlcsson Splce MacroMaxx karbonn
Lava Lemon Cscar
3 Maxx Moblle ln less Lhan Lwo years afLer enLerlng Lhe lndlan moblle phone markeL
Maxx Moblle capLured around four percenL markeL share by offerlng around 43 models
and havlng a presence across lndla wlLh lLs 300 servlce cenLres WlLh such a sLrong
dlsLrlbuLlon neLwork Lhe company wanLs Lo lncrease lL markeL share Lo abouL 10 percenL
ln Lhe nexL Lwo years (by 2012) ln 2010 'Mlcromax Moblles' was second on Lhe llsL of
fasLesL rlslng search Lerms and Lhe fourLh mosL searched brand name on Coogle lndla
webslLe (ZelLgelsL 2010)
6 nokla's 'Made for lndla' phones ln 2000 nokla lnLroduced Lhe nokla 3210 wlLh a Plndl
menu ln 2003 nokla launched Lhe nokla 1100 a flrsL Made for lndla phone lndla's
MosL 1rusLed 8rand nokla ranked as lndla's LopmosL LrusLed brand ln Lhe 1he Lconomlc
1lmes8rand LqulLy's annual 'MosL 1rusLed 8rands' survey for 2010 ln 2004 nokla
ranked 71 and moved Lo 44 ln 2006 as lndla's mosL LrusLed brand ln 2007 lL ranked ln
Lhe Lop Len aL number 4 nokla has slnce held Lhe number one sloL for Lhree years
consecuLlvely










Those statistics in more detaiI:
PART A: MobiIe subscribers; gIobaI mobiIe handset and smartphone market
share; worId's top five operators
1) There wiII be 5.3 biIIion mobiIe subscriptions by the end of 2010, estimates The
InternationaI TeIecommunication Union (October 2010). That is equivalent to 77
percent of the world population. And is a huge increase from 4.6 billion mobile
subscriptions at the end of 2009.
90 percent of the world now lives in a place with access to a mobile network. For
people living in rural communities this is lower at 80 percent.
At the end of 2010 there will be 3.8 billion mobile subscriptions in the developing world
that's 73 percent of global subscriptions.
For more on the latest TU stats read this: interview with ITU statistics chief Susan
TeItscher
Key GIobaI TeIecom Indicators for the WorId TeIecommunication Service Sector
in 2010
aII figures are estimates)

GIob
aI
DeveIop
ed
nations
DeveIopi
ng
nations
Afric
a
Arab
State
s
Asia
&
Pacif
ic
CIS
Euro
pe
The
Americ
as
MobiIe
ceIIuIar
subscriptio
ns
miIIions)
5,282 1,436 3,846 333 282 2,649 364 741 880
Per 100
peopIe
76.2
%
116.1% 67.6%
41.4
%
79.4
%
67.8
%
131.5
%
120.0
%
94.1%
Fixed
teIephone
Iines
miIIions) (
1,197 506 691 13 33 549 74 249 262
Per 100
peopIe
17.3
%
40.9% 12.1% 1.6% 9.4%
14.0
%
26.6
%
40.3% 28.1%
MobiIe
broadband
subscriptio
ns
miIIions)
940 631 309 29 34 278 72 286 226
Per 100
peopIe
13.6
%
51.1% 5.4% 3.6% 9.7% 7.1%
25.9
%
46.3% 24.2%
Fixed
broadband
subscriptio
ns
miIIions)
555 304 251 1 8 223 24 148 145
per 100
peopIe
8.0% 24.6% 4.4% 0.2% 2.3% 5.7% 8.7% 23.9% 15.5%
Source: InternationaI TeIecommunication Union ctober
2010)

via:
mobiThinking
2) MobiIe growth is being driven by demand deveIoping worId, says The ITU
(October 2010) and is being fuelled by ndia and China in particular. These two
countries collectively added 300 million new mobile subscriptions in 2010 that's more
than the total mobile subscribers in the US.
Mobile penetration is fast reaching saturation point at over 100 percent mobile
penetration
Mobile penetration in the developing world now is 68 percent.
Mobile penetration in Africa is the lowest worldwide at 41 percent.
The worId's most popuIous nations have the most mobiIe subscriptions
unsurprisingIy), China and India Iead growth.
China: 859 million mobile subscribers (64 percent of population) in Dec 2010, up 112
million from 2009. Of these 47 million were 3G mobile phone users (NationaI Bureau
of Statistics of China February 2011).
ndia: 840.28 million subscribers (70 percent of population) in May 2011, up 223
million from May 2010 (TRAI, June 2010).
USA: 302.9 million subscribers (96 percent of population) in Dec 2010 (CTIA).
3) There were 18.5 percent more mobiIe devices soId in 2010 compared to 2009.
IDC: 1388.2 million handsets were sold in 2010, up 18.5 percent compared with 2009.
Strategy AnaIytics: 1388.2 million handsets were sold in 2010, up 18.5 percent
compared with 2009.
Top five mobiIe phone manufacturers,
by 2010 gIobaI saIes
according to IDC

Top five mobiIe phone manufacturers,
by 2010 gIobaI saIes
according to Strategy AnaIytics
Ran
k
Vendor
Unit
shipmen
ts
Marke
t
share
Annu
aI
saIes
growt
h

Ran
k
Vendor
Unit
shipmen
ts
Market
share
1 Nokia
453.0
million
32.6% 4.9% 1 Nokia
453.0
million
33.3%

2
Samsun
g
280.2
million
20.2% 23.3% 2
Samsun
g
280.2
million
20.6%

3 LG
116.7
million
8.4% -1.0% 3 LG
116.7
million
8.6%

4 ZTE
51.8
million
3.7% 94.0% 4 RM
48.8
million
3.6%

5 RM
48.8
million
3.5% 41.4% 5 Apple
47.5
million
3.5%

Others
437.7
million
31.5% 31.2% Others
413.8
million
30.4%

Total
1388.2
million
100.0
%
18.5% Total
1360
million
100%

Source:
IDC February 2011)

Source:
Strategy AnaIytics
via:
mobiThinki
February 2011) ng
3b) The top device manufacturer by market penetration rather than saIes of new
handsets - above and beIow) is Nokia in W.Europe, Samsung in the US and Sharp
in Japan. Smartphone penetration in is higher in developed nations than in the rest of
the world, but even here the vast majority of devices are still feature phones. These
estimates are based surveys conducted by ComScore in October, November,
December 2010 (Japan is December only).
Top mobiIe manufacturers, by market penetration, Q4 2010, according to
ComScore
USA Japan Germany UK France Spain ItaIy
1
Samsung
24.8%
Sharp
25.3%
Nokia
33.1%
Nokia
30.4%
Samsung
34.1%
Nokia
47%
Nokia
47.4%
2 LG 20.9%
Panasonic
15.0%
Sony
Ericsson
18.2%
Samsung
19.4%
Nokia
20.6%
Samsung
15.3%
Samsung
21.4%
3
Motorola
16.7%
Fujitsu
11.7%
Samsung
17.8%
Sony
Ericsson
13.7%
Sony
Ericsson
10.7%
LG 10% LG 7.2%

Proportion of popuIation with a smartphone, Q4 2010, according to ComScore
27% 33.6% 38.0%
Source: ComScore (February 2011) Survey group: 27,000 via: mobiThinking
4) Smartphone saIes showed strong growth worIdwide in 2010.
IDC February 2011): Total shipments in 2010 were 302.6 million units up 74.4 percent
from 2009. This makes smartphones 21.8 percent of all handsets shipped.
Strategy AnaIytics February 2011): Total shipments in 2010 were 292.9 million units
up 67.6 percent from 2009. This makes smartphones 21.5 percent of all handsets
shipped.
Top five mobiIe smartphone
manufacturers, by 2010 gIobaI saIes
according to IDC

Top three smartphone manufacturers, by
2010 gIobaI saIes
according to Strategy AnaIytics
Ran
k
Vendor
Unit
shipmen
ts
Mark
et
share
Annu
aI
saIes
growt

Ran
k
Vend
or
Unit
shipmen
ts
Mark
et
share
AnnuaI
saIes
growth
h
1 Nokia
100.3
million
33.1
%
48.2
%
1 Nokia
100.1
million
34.2
%
47.6%
2 RM
48.8
million
16.1
%
41.4
%
2 RM
48.8
million
16.7
%
41.4%
3 Apple
47.5
million
15.7
%
89.2
%
3 Apple
47.5
million
16.2
%
89.3%
4
Samsu
ng
23
million
7.6%
318.2
%
Other
96.5
million
32.9
%
103.9%
5 HTC
21.5
million
7.1%
165.4
%

Other 61.5
20.3
%
88.7
%

Total
302.6
million
100.0
%
74.4
%
Total
292.9
million
100.0
%
67.6%
Source:
IDC February 2011)

Source:
Strategy AnaIytics February
2011)
via:
mobiThinki
ng
mobiThinking reaIity check on AppIe: Apple receives far more publicity than any
other mobile-phone manufacturer, but on the world stage it is still a pretty small player
(though fast-growing). Before media hype lulls you into focusing your
marketing/development budget on the Apple platform exclusively, consider this: 96.5
percent of mobile users don't have one mostly they use Nokia or Samsung; and even
among smartphone users 84 percent don't have an Apple.
4b) Android is forecasted to become the number one smartphone operating
system in 2011.
Gartner ApriI 2011) estimates that 468 million will be sold in 2011, that's a 57.7
percent increase from 2010. Of those phones, 38.5 percent will be powered by the
Android operating system. By 2015, 631 million smartphones will be sold, approaching
half of those will be Android.
IDC March 2011) estimates that 450 million will be sold in 2011, that's a 49.2 percent
increase from 2010. Of those phones, 39.5 percent will be powered by the Android
operating system.
Both Gartner and DC expect to see Symbian nose dive following Nokia's decision to
dump its smartphone operating system in favor of Microsoft's Windows Phone.
Windows phone shows strong growth, but considerably less market share than Symbian
enjoyed to 2010.
More anaIysis and impIications of these stats.
WorIdwide smartphone operating system S)
market share in 2009-2015, according to
Gartner

Smartphone S market share
and compound annuaI growth
rate 2011-2015, according to
IDC
S
Iisted
aIphabeticaIIy)
2009
market
share
2010
market
share
2011
market
share
2015
market
Share

2011
market
share
2015
market
Share
2011-2015
CAGR
Android 3.9% 22.7% 38.5% 48.8% 39.5% 45.4% 23.8%
BlackBerry 19.9% 16.0% 13.4% 11.1% 14.9% 13.7% 17.1%
iOS 14.4% 15.7% 19.4% 17.2% 15.7% 15.3% 18.8%
Symbian 46.9% 37.6% 19.2% 0.1% 20.9% 0.2% -65.0%
Windows
Phone/Mobile
8.7% 4.2% 5.6% 19.5% 5.5% 20.9% 67.1%
Others 6.1% 3.8% 3.9% 3.3% 3.5% 4.6% 28.0%
Total
smartphones
sold
172
million
297
million
468
million
631
million

450
million
N/A 19.6%
Source: Gartner ApriI 2011)
Source: IDC
March 2011)
via:
mobiThinking

5) nIy a fraction of smartphones and tabIets are protected by security software.
Juniper Research: (June 2011) Only 4 percent of smartphones and tablets are
protected with security software, despite a steady increase in threats from device
loss/theft, malwares and viruses.
By 2016, 277 million mobile devices will have some kind of protection installed, costing
mobile users a collective US$3.6 billion. 69 percent of this investment will be made by
corporations concerned about corporate data is stored on mobile devices.
6) The top five mobiIe network operators worIdwide: by number of subscribers,
revenues, monthly average revenue per user (ARPU), monthly churn (i.e. loyalist
customer base) and data as a percentage of total revenues, according to Portio
Research:
Top five operators by different KPIs - worIdwide
Rank Subscribers
TotaI
revenues
MonthIy
ARPU
MonthIy
churn
Proportion of
revenues
derived from
data
1 China Mobile China Mobile 3 UK
NTT
DOCOMO
Japan
Smart Philippines
2 China Unicom AT&T US
Bouygues
France
KDD Japan Globe Philippines
3
Bharti Airtel
ndia
Verizon US
Vodafone
reland
SingTel
Singapore
SoftBank Japan
4 AT&T US
NTT
DOCOMO
Japan
O2 reland
Chunghwa
Taiwan
NTT DOCOMO
Japan
5 Verizon US Sprint US
Orange
Switzerland
T-Mobile
Germany
KDD Japan
Source: Portio Research June 2009)
via:
mobiThinking
mobiThinking note on the Top fives: the most interesting thing is the predominance
of Asian mobile operators coming top in both the customer loyalty and data revenues
sections. Perhaps this represents different and longer-term priorities than the European
networks that come top in average revenue per user. (Note: the analysis in this report is
based on 2008 revenues).
7) MobiIe operators in deveIoped countries couId run out of profit in the next two to
four years if they do not change their business models, according to research by
TeIIabs/AnaIysys Mason (February 2011). This assumes current trends in demand for
data, revenues and costs associated with investing in high speed data networks.
When mobiIe operators in deveIoped economies are expected to run out of profit
if expenditure, demand and revenue trends remain the same)
Region
Worst case
scenario
median Best case scenario
North America Q1, 2013 Q4, 2013 Q2, 2014
Developed Asia Pacific Q3, 2013 Q3, 2014 Q1, 2015
Western Europe Q1, 2014 Q1, 2015 Q2, 2015
Source: TeIIabs/ AnaIysys Mason February 2011) via: mobiThinking























To Save Nokia Would Take These Steps - Urgently As In Right Now!
Ok. Lets try to save Nokia. What should Nokia do?

There are two gigantic problems. II Nokia was a person, it would be in the hospital in the
emergency room, where a little while ago it had stopped breathing, and now also the heart had
stopped. Nokia's doctors would need instant emergency assistance to get the heartbeat back, and
to get the patient breathing. Then aIter that, Ior the patient to stabilize at least that much, that it
need not be in the emergency room anymore.

TWO DISASTERS SIMULTANEOUSLY

I explained the two problems. The problem over the past two months or so, has been that the
reseller chain (mostly the mobile operator/carrier customers oI Nokia) had stopped selling Nokia
smartphones. In eIIect the retail channel has started a Nokia smartphone boycott. What Iew
Nokia smartphones are now selling, are sold with enormous discounts so Nokia's corporate proIit
engine has stopped perIorming. As Nokia warned us a Iew weeks ago, where it was supposed to
have something like about 600 million dollars that Nokia projected Ior proIits in Q2 only two
months ago, to about zero dollars Nokia now says in its proIit warning two weeks ago.

And there is a severe knock-oII eIIect, that Nokia's non-smartphones (ie 'dumbphones') are also
selling Iar less than expected this Q2, partly due to the reseller boycott, and partly due to overall
Nokia brand collapse.

The second problem (ie the heart suddenly stopping) is the news in the past Iew days, that
Nokia's share p rice has Iallen well below the critical level, where now Nokia shares are so
cheap, that Nokia would be worth more iI it was split up and sold in pieces, than iI kept together
as one entity.

WHAT CAUSED IT

So, Nokia resellers are boycotting Nokia. Why? It all started on February 11, when CEO Stephen
Elop stupidly announced that Nokia would replace its current Symbian operating system with
the MicrosoIt Phone 7 (now called Windows Mobile 7 ie WP7) operating system, while Nokia
had no such phones to sell or even to demo to prospective buyers. This announcement
also included the end oI Nokia's evolution path Irom Symbian to Nokia's brand-new operating
system, MeeGo, an open-source, Linux based, touch-screen optimized 'next generation'
smartphone OS, that Nokia had been developing with Intel. Nokia's related Qt development tools
and the Ovi store lost their value as assets in the Symbian and MeeGo strategic vision. This
vision had gained strong Nokia Symbian developer support, and Nokia shareholders had
rewarded Elop over the Iirst about halI year oI his CEO tenure, during which Nokia share price
had grown by about 10 up to February 10.

Stephen Elop witnessed the smartphone sales collapse and the severe dive in Nokia share price
(which has today lost over halI oI its value Irom February 11), and Elop responded with several
CEO errors that have Iurther angered his distributor channel, the carriers/mobile operators. Elop
has launched dual SIM card phone, said he will not use the traditional Nokia smartphone
development teams who have made smartphones that the operators/carriers on all other 5
inhabited continents have loved to sell (except in North America where only about 1 oI Nokia's
smartphones were sold). Instead he said the Iirst MicrosoIt WP7 based smartphones Irom Nokia
would be designed 'in CaliIornia' and would be designed to appeal to US consumers - which
obviously is not the preIerred way Ior the 99 oI Nokia branded smartphones that used to be
sold in the other markets outside oI North America. And now, the latest CEO blunder was to talk
about Skype Ior Nokia WP7 phones. The carriers/operators hate Skype. We now hear that since
MicrosoIt announced the Skype deal, apparently several oI the carrier stores are now also
actively steering buyers oI (non Nokia branded) WP7 phone buyers to select rival phones using
Google's Android OS.

Meanwhile today we learned that Nokia's CTO has been sent on indeIinite leave because he had
disagreed with Stephen Elop's WP7 strategy. And already 3 ratings agencies downgraded Nokia
stock. The major analysts are mostly projecting Iar more decline in Nokia share price value.
Some major analysts are now targeting Nokia's share price to Iall to less than halI where it is
now.

NOKIA OBJECTIVE

Nokia needs to achieve two diIIicult objectives under these very hard times. First, Nokia share
price value decline has to stop. Nokia share price has to recover at least about 10-20 Irom the
current levels (still 30 below the recent peak oI early February), Ior the danger to dimish that
Nokia might be sold Ior its parts and split up.

Secondly, Nokia has to get its reseller channel to stop the Nokia smartphones boycott and
recover at least partially the sales oI Nokia smartphones and at least partially the lost
dumbphones sales, so that Nokia's handset unit can deliver modest proIits in the 2 - 5 range
Ior Q3.

So, we have to somehow convince the carriers/operators to stop their Nokia boycott, and also to
get the share price to recover at least somewhat Ior now. That would bring Nokia back Irom the
brink oI extinction. This is how I would do it.

FIRE ELOP, CANCEL MICROSOFT

So, obviously, the carriers are boycotting Nokia primarily due to Stephen Elop's idiotic
statements Irom February 11 and since. And what little aIIection they may have had oI the
MicrosoIt WP7 smartphones, clearly vanished when MicrosoIt bought Skype. Nokia cannot
recover smartphones sales (and thus cannot recover proIits) until the resellers stop the boycott.
And there it is not enough Ior Elop to apologize or to try to backpedal any oI his statements.
Now the situation is truly that bad, that Elop has to be Iired and Nokia has to cancel the
MicrosoIt phones.

But also, remember, its not enough to get smartphone sales back, Nokia also needs to get the
share price to stabilize and turn to a modest recovery. So how to handle Elop Iiring?

I would have Nokia Chairman Jorma Ollila call an emergency press conIerence. In it he would
make the Iollowing announcements: CEO Stephen Elop has been Iired (or perhaps it might be
worded that Elop has 'leIt the company') due to disagreements about the smartphone operating
system strategy. And that Elop is no longer in Nokia's employ. The job oI interim CEO would be
taken over by Jorma Ollila in the interim period while Nokia seeks a new CEO on a Iast
schedule.

Jorma Ollila is the nearest thing to the gold standard, in the eyes oI Nokia investors. II he made a
'return' (a little bit like Steve Jobs returning to Apple) - even iI only Ior the interim period - this
announcement, to me, combined with the Iiring oI Elop, would help stop the decline in the Nokia
share price. But that is not enough obviously. We need the smartphone sales to recover.

Then clearly, Ollila would announce Nokia has cancelled all plans to launch any MicrosoIt WP7
based smartphones. And that the current smartphone development projects around WP7 would
have been terminated eIIective immediately. These are absolutely vital steps and unless Elop is
Iired and MicrosoIt WP7 smartphones cancelled, Nokia cannot recover.

HOW TO RESUME SYMBIAN SALES

Currently, even iI Nokia said 'read my lips, no WP7 phones' - that would not restore Symbian
smartphone sales. Nokia would have to make a very powerIul statement about returning to
Symbian (and made by Ollila obviously).

So, Iirst, say Nokia returns to Symbian platIorm. That is not enough. The only way Nokia
carriers/operators and the sales staII at retail stores to return to selling Nokia Symbian
smartphones, is iI the sales people and carriers/operators truly believe, that Symbian is going to
be long-term viable.

How could that be? The Symbian OS had been losing market share. Even aIter the well-selling
latest edition oI Symbian, the S`3 version; the overall sales oI Symbian had been losing market
share. That was all beIore Elop destroyed the credibility oI Symbian.

Here is my 'gimmick'. What iI Jorma Ollila announced that Nokia returns to Symbian, but not
just to power current smartphones, that to show how totally committed Nokia was to Symbian,
Ollila would commit Nokia to migrate all oI its dumbphones running Nokia's S40 OS, to
Symbian! This would bring over 100 million new handset sales to Symbian - per quarter (aIter
the migration was completed) per quarter. Bear in mind, the nearest rival to Nokia smartphones,
Apple's iPhone, only sold 18.7 million smartphones in Q1, Apple's best quarter ever. So this
announcement oI Nokia's shiIt oI all dumbphones to smartphones, would at least in theory,
propel Nokia/Symbian to an almost unassailable lead in smartphones. But understand, that
cannot be done in a year or even two. II Ollila committed to migrating its total dumbphone unit
to Symbian by a very aggressive year, and I'd say by end oI year 2014 - this would be a bold,
dramatic and Ieisty move. Suddenly Nokia would have regained its mojo!

Note, that whether Nokia actually migrates all dumbphones to Symbian by December oI 2014, or
iI Nokia would end up missing that target by some months, it nonetheless would be a massive
goal, and iI Ollila said it now, that - and perhaps only that - could jump-start the stalled Symbian
sales.

Would it be costly? You betcha! But no matter what costs, that was Nokia's long-term goal
anyway, Ior perhaps a 2016-2018 target, so this was not that crazy as it may initially seem.
Obviously Nokia would then have to pursue this target very vigorously, and iI in 2014 it seemed
that some oI the cheapest handsets could not be met to this target, Nokia could simply abandon
those cheapest phones, to very modest revenue and proIit 'damage' while this announcement now
in 2011, would help save Nokia.

And the typical 'blah-blah-blah' about this Symbian transition commitment, that this was the
unanimous commitment oI Nokia's Board oI Directors; and that the next CEO would be
committing to this target also in public, etc. Note, this bold target - where the scale oI how huge
Nokia's smartphone production would then become - would change the Nokia smartphone
market share picture totally - and would help recover some Nokia share price.

But it is clear, that Symbian is not viable at the high price end oI Nokia smartphones into 2012-
2013. Nokia needs a new migration strategy now, and MicrosoIt WP7 cannot be it.

ANDROID NOT AN OPTION

I know that many oI my readers would say this is the time Ior Nokia to go with Google Android
OS. Many investors would also welcome Android. But Android now would mean Nokia would
have to delay Nokia's next generation smartphones by another year to 18 months Irom
now! Nokia knows Symbian was on borrowed time back beIore February 11, and is Iar more
wounded now, aIter the Stephen Elop debacle. No, Android is not it. The only viable migration
Ior Nokia, Irom Symbian, is obviously to MeeGo. For that Nokia still owns the Qt developer
tools which support both Symbian and MeeGo. And Qt will also enable developers to make apps
Ior Android, so in a way, Nokia's MeeGo (and Symbian) would be 'compatible' with Android.
Not completely compatible, but MeeGo and Android would be now pitched to Nokia sales
channel, developers, investors and employees, as kind oI cousins.

Ollila would also reverse the other silly decisions Elop had made, such as the ending oI Ovi
brand, which Ollila would restore. He would announce Nokia's maps, carrier billing etc would
not be made available to MicrosoIt, nor any WP7 partners/rivals like Samsung, SonyEricsson
and HTC.

ANSSI FOR NEXT CEO?

Ok. Then the 'next CEO' consideration. Ollila should announce that Nokia would seek to hire a
new CEO very rapidly. It could have been (and perhaps should have been Anssi Vanjoki. I think
Anssi would be a great Nokia CEO, in particular in how he handled the N97 problems, the N8
and Symbian S`3 launches, making sure the two were ready beIore they were sold to the public.
Anssi is Iar more dynamic and entertaining as a public speaker than most Finnish execs. He's the
nearest thing we Finns have oI a 'charismatic' executive (but not in a Steve Jobs level haha).

However, this is not the right time Ior Anssi. Nokia now needs someone who is not seen as a
Nokia insider. Nokia now needs to restore its retail channel trust, so the new CEO would need to
be particularly Iavorably received by the mobile operators/carriers.

But I don't think Anssi would even do it. He's plenty wealthy. He has a new job. But Nokia
would really need him now. So lets assume Jorma Ollila manages to get Anssi Vanjoki to return
to Nokia, temporarily, as co-CEO in the interim period to help run the Nokia in deep trouble,
together with Ollila, until the new CEO has been hired. Nice idea? Anssi could Ior example
instantly take over the recall and redesign oI the Iailed E7 Ilagship phone, and even more
importantly, to oversee the rapid launch oI Nokia's Iirst MeeGo phone (the N9) which was ready
Ior launch in January but killed by Elop only days Irom launch.

HOW DO YOU GET ANSSI?

I honestly think that no number oI astronomical shares, stock-options, cash, bonuses, would get
Anssi Vanjoki to agree to come back to such a lousy job. To Iix Elop's mistakes, and then to
have step aside when the new CEO is hired. But I have an idea.

Imagine iI Ollila would oIIer Anssi Vanjoki with the ultimate reward. Yes, obviously pay him
royally well and give massive stock options and give bonus-incentives. But the gimmick. What
iI Ollila privately promises Anssi that Nokia will name its next Ilagship phone aIter him!
The Vanjoki. So Nokia would have two Ilagships, the Nokia Communicator and the Nokia
Vanjoki, released with updated editions on alternate years. And that Ollila would give
Anssi carte blanche to design the Iirst edition oI the 'Vanjoki' which would be priced in the
above-iPhone scale, and Anssi could then use whatever Iorm Iactor he wanted and put in
whatever Ieatures he wanted. Imagine, the Iirst phone oI the industry, named aIter the man who
came in to help save Nokia... (Nokia really needs Anssi now, this is how to get him)..

SO WHO AS ACTUAL NEW CEO

And what oI the new CEO? Not someone Irom CaliIornia Irom the IT industry. We have now
seen what a MicrosoIt guy attempts to do (whether Elop or Steve Ballmer) or someone like Steve
Jobs at Apple (I am not suggesting Jobs would ever Ior one second consider the job, I just mean
this is the thinking oI West Coast US execs) - they all want to bypass the carriers/mobile
operators! So while the investors would like an American, any US IT guy would be seen as
another threat.

No, what iI Nokia said, halI oI all mobile phone users are in Asia. And Nokia's distributor chain
is the mobile operators/carriers. So wouldn't it be the best way to soothe the hurt Ieelings oI the
carrier community now, iI Ollila said that the next Nokia CEO will be hired Irom the top
management oI a mobile operator/carrier - Irom Asia. Someone like say Neil MonteIiore oI
Starhub (Iormerly CEO oI M1) oI Singapore. A Nokia-Iriendly CEO who is super-hyper-
competent, in ultra-competitive customer-oriented Singapore. A country where already today
75 oI all phones are smartphones! Isn't this like the obvious way to restore Nokia's
management to the right path, and rapidly heal the riIt between carriers and Nokia?

WILL NOT RECOVER NOKIA TO 2010 LEVELS

Note, this is an emergency procedure. Nokia currently is about to die. Nokia needs to get the
share price back up, and must get the carriers to stop the Nokia boycott.

Even beIore Elop messed up Symbian, there was trouble in selling Symbian based Nokia phones.
AIter the above, there is no way Nokia's smartphone market share could recover to the 29
levels it was beIore the February 11 silly Elop announcement. But I think Symbian sales would
be partially recovered. To what level now? Maybe 10 or 15 or at best 20. That is still
massively worse than what it was in Q1 at 24. And then in the near term, Nokia would suIIer
enormous costs oI Iorcing the expedited shiIt Irom S40 based dumbphones to Symbian.

Symbian is an old system. Its app development is very hard. The Qt development tools are still
under development themselves, so not all things work there yet. But this is now the best strategic
option leIt Ior Nokia.

Nokia has to Iire Elop. Nokia has to end the MicrosoIt partnership. No iIs, ands or buts. That
will only stop the downward spiral oI Symbian sales, market share, revenues and proIits (ie
losses). But iI Nokia did all the above moves, I do think Nokia would have some reasonable
chances to recover. And Nokia would start to sell MeeGo phones beIore the end oI the year
(likely already in Q3) and Iorcing dumbphones to Symbian, Nokia would actually still
potentially challenge Android Ior biggest smartphone maker. A costly and resource-hungry
move, but at this point, there is no other option.

Jorma Ollila has to step in, and in an ideal world, Anssi Vanjoki would join him Ior the short
term. And the next Nokia CEO would come Irom an Asian mobile operator/carrier. Then in the
mid-term, Nokia could actually become quite competitive once again.

But remember, Nokia's problems oI the past were mostly execution and marketing, not phone
design or soItware or ecosystem. And even here, an CEO coming Irom the carrier/operator
community (especially Irom Asia) would bring Iar more urgency and marketing-customer Iocus
to Nokia compared to what it has had in the recent past.

This is not the way to get Nokia back to a leader position. This is the way to stop the two
disasters today, and get Nokia distributors to stop their boycott oI Nokia, and to get the stock
market and shareholders, to restore some Iaith and trust in Nokia..