The Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh: Integrational Crisis between Center and Periphery Author(s): Syed Nazmul Islam

Reviewed work(s): Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 12 (Dec., 1981), pp. 1211-1222 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643880 . Accessed: 26/11/2011 06:48
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TRACTSIN HILL THE CHITTAGONG CRISIS INTEGRATIONAL BANGLADESH: CENTERAND PERIPHERY BETWEEN Syed Nazmul Islam*

SINCE JANUARY 1976, the law enforcement agencies in different parts of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh have come under repeated attacks by the so-called Shanti Bahini (Peace Corps).' In these attacks with sophisticated modern weapons, a dozen law enforcement personnel have either been killed or seriously wounded. Naturally, this causes the government of Bangladesh serious concern and arouses the interest of researchers who specialize in the study of political development. The immediate steps taken by the government have been two-fold: the law enforcement authority has been strengthened, and the government convened a convention2 to which most of the influential tribal leaders were invited with the aim of inducing them to persuade the dissident militant groups to reach a peaceful solution to the problem. Regardless of the success or failure of the government's venture in this connection, the important point for researchers in political development to consider is that the cause of militant action by anomic groups in this district is still unknown. This article will examine the primary sources of this violence and the factors that have led to the emergence of the militant "Shanti Bahini" as a dissident force demanding full autonomy for the Chittagong Hill Tracts.3 This type of crisis is not unknown in new nations burdened by ethnic or racial conflicts and primordial sentiments. In the political * In the period of 1976-1978, I worked as a research fellow for the Project "Tribal Leadership and Political Integration" under the auspices of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Chittagong, Chittagong, Bangladesh. During that period I toured the CHT extensively and interviewed more than one hundred tribal people, leaders, administrative officers, employees of the government, and semi-government organizations for the purpose of collecting data for the project. I used some of these data and information in this article. Therefore, I am very thankful to R. I. Chowdhury, Chief Director of the project and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Chittagong, for his permission to use these data and information for further scholarly research. 1211

1981 by The Regents of the University of California 0004-4687/81/121211+ 12$00.50

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development literature the malintegration of ethnically diverse societies is usually recognized as the major problem for their leadership. National integration has become a favorite theme of writers on the politics of new states. Bangladesh emerged as a nation state on December 16, 1971 by seceding from the uncontiguous union of Pakistan. Unlike many emergent nations of Asia and Africa, Bangladesh has most of the factors needed to become an integrated nation state. The only exception is the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), one of the 19 districts of Bangladesh. With less than 1% of the population of Bangladesh, this district contains a traditional society with divergent religions, languages, and primordial sentiment that stand in the way of national integration.4 The two imperatives facing the leadership of every emerging nation are, first, the creation of national identity and, second, the demand for raising the standard of living through economic development.5 Soon after independence, the new leadership of Bangladesh realized the intensity of the first problem-i.e., national integration. This is evident from the adoption of nationalism as one of the four basic principles of state policy,6 which was bitterly criticized by the lone member of parliament from the tribal area, Manabendra Narayan Larma.7 In January 1975, Bangladesh switched to a one party presidential form of government from a multiparty parliamentary government, and Larma went underground soon after this constitutional change. After 1975 pro-autonomy dissidents in CHT demonstrated increasing militancy by storming police stations, looting market places, and attacking ferry boats on Lake Kaptai. This militant activism symbolized the reaction of aspiring tribal leaders to attempts by the national leadership to integrate a culturally divergent CHT with an otherwise culturally homogeneous society. The impediments to this integration process can be categorized into two types: first, the givens18 or preexisting cultural factors, namely, differences in social structure, ethnicity, language, religion and customs; and second, induced factors, which include both developmental programs and the consequences of these programs.

The Givens
Social Structure: Like many other countries of Asia, Bangladesh has faced the crises of national identity in the CHT, whose social structure differs markedly from that of the other 18 districts of the nation. Geographically, the district of CHT belongs to the hilly region that branches off from the Himalayan ranges to the south through Assam and Tripura to Arakan in Burma. The historical development of this hill region has been different from that of the low lying alluvial plains of Bangladesh. For some time it was under the Sultans of Bengal. The Mughals conquered it from the Arakanese in 1666 and it remained in Mughal possession until 1760 when it was ceded to the East India

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Company. It became a territorial part of East Pakistan with the independence of Pakistan. The district ceased to be a tribal area with a gazette notification of the Pakistan government issued on January 10, 1964.9 Despite the fact that over the centuries this border region has experienced a succession of invasions and ruling dynasties,10 the people of the district have enjoyed a high degree of autonomy with respect to their internal administration in every phase of the different dynasties. This, in turn, has contributed very much to the development of tribal solidarity. Consequently, the present administrative structure of CHT is a dyarchy-tribal administration and a civil administration that reflects the persistence of the tribal structure. In terms of civil administration of the central government of Bangladesh, the district is under the jurisdiction of a Deputy Commissioner (district administrator) and is subdivided into three subdivisions (corresponding to the tribal circles) administered by three Subdivisional Officers. The Deputy Commissioner is the administrator, executive, and judge (sometimes) of the district. The Subdivisional Officers assist the Deputy Commissioner in administering the district. Each of the three subdivisions again is subdivided into several Thana or Police Stations. The Police Officer in Charge is the administrator of each Thana, being responsible for preventing violation of laws and crime. However, in terms of tribal administration, the CHT is divided into three circles with a chief or raja as the head of each circle. This position is a hereditary institution. The raja is the ultimate authority in tribal and social affairs, and is the symbol of the unity and integrity of the people of his circle. Functionally, he is the administrator, judge, and lawmaker in tribal affairs. Disobedience of his orders or failure to show him due deference is tantamount to a grave social offense. He also does much for his people. He must keep himself aware of "weal and woe" of the people of his circle. He listens patiently and is accessible to all who have complaints. Occasionally, he presides over religious performances. Apart from maintaining law and order in his circle, he maintains effective liaison and good neighborliness with tribes of his adjoining circles. With respect to relations with the central government, he represents his tribes at the national level. He is the link between tribal people and the district administration. The chief is the principal member of the Advisory Council to the Deputy Commissioner, providing all help, information, and advice to the Deputy Commissioner for the proper administration and development of his circle. He collects revenue for the government through the headmen. The administrative set-up of tribal affairs is based on a three-tiered structure, the circle, the mouza, and para, in descending order. The chief is on the top and below him is a headman for each mouza, which is composed of several villages or para. The headman is the link between a mouza and the chief. The headman is selected by the chief and endorsed by the Deputy Commissioner, who never vetoes the chiefs selection. The post of headman is hereditary. He collects land revenue and tax for jhum farming (a type of slash and burn agriculture used in the hills) from the people of his area. Whereas he shares a portion of

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jhum tax with the chief, he deposits the entire amount of land revenue to the chief who, in turn, deposits it to the district administration. The headman is the lieutenant of the chief and executes the chief's orders and maintains peace and discipline in his mouza. He performs some judicial functions in minor cases. The lowest position in the hierarchy of tribal administration is that of karbari, also a hereditary post. He is the formal leader of the village or para. He maintains peace and order in the locality and represents his
para to his superiors.

For the preservation of long-standing traditions of tribal structure, the government of Pakistan adopted the following basic principles for the administration of the district onJune 30, 1967. These principles are applied by the Bangladesh district administration as well." (1) No middlemanwould be allowedbetween the representativesof the government and the tribal people. All lawyersand attorneys were directed to refrain from playing foul with mattersbetween two hillmen in the court. of (2) The maximumsimplification legal procedureshould be observed. In other words, the hillmen should not be overburdened with expenses in the process of adjudication. (3) Administrationof justice should be quick and expeditious. (4) Noninterference in tribal laws, customs, and norms that regulate tribal life. Thus, with these principles, the government restrained the district administration from interfering in tribal social affairs other than legal matters, which require the interference of administrative authority. While the codified laws of the land are applicable to the rest of the country, they are considered to be unsuitable for the primitive hill man. The persistence and working of this dyarchy in the CHT reinforces the tribal people's allegiance to the tribal chiefs rather than to the central government. Ethnicity: The present population of the Chittagong Hill Tracts is 508,199,12 of whom 90% belong to twelve distinct tribes. The four major tribes are the Chakma, the Marma, the Tipras (which are dominant in the Rangamati, Ramgarh, and Banderban circles, respectively), and the Mros, which are allied to the Marma. Though there is a difference of opinion regarding the origin of some major tribes (Chakmna, Tipra), taking every argument into account, it appears that they are of the same origin."3 They have close links with hill peoples of the vast region that extends from Tibet to Indochina, but these tribesmen are ethnically different from the settled population in Bangladesh.14 Differences of ethnicity contribute to an integrational crisis in many countries in Asia. Language: Each tribe living in CHT speaks its own dialect and language. The mother tongue of the Chakmas is a perverted form of

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the Bengali language written in Burmese characters; the Marmas speak Arakanese, a dialect of Burmese; the Tipras, a language of their own akin to Kachari. The rest of the tribes speak different Assami Burmese tongues of their own.'5 Among the dialects of different tribes, the Chakma dialect comes nearest to Bengali, yet it is quite different from the Bengali language, the mother tongue of almost all the Bangladeshi. It has been argued that language has sometimes been held to be the essential basis of national conflicts.
The reasons why a unilingual state is stable and multilingual state unstable are quite obvious. A state is built on fellow feeling. To state briefly it is a feeling of a corporate sentiment of oneness which makes those who are charged with it feel that they are kith and kin. This feeling is a double edged feeling. It is at once a feeling of "consciousness of kind" which on the other hand, binds together those who have it so strongly that it overrides all difference arising out of economic conflicts or social gradations and, on the other, severs them from those who are not of their kind. It is a longing not to belong to any other group.16

Since all the tribes of the CHT speak different languages from the rest of the unilingual Bangladeshi, a sense of tribal solidarity is created that impedes the course of national identity in this area. Religion: Another hallmark of crisis of national identity in this region is the difference between the religion of the tribal people and the dominant Muslim religion of the people of the rest of Bangladesh. The religion of the major tribes of CHT is Buddhism. Most of the minor tribes are animistic in religion. The partition of India into two states, India and Pakistan, is the most outstanding example of the impact of religion on national integrity. Although the factor of different religions is not in itself sufficiently formidable to induce the tribal people to demand a separate homeland for themselves, the differences can contribute to undermining the forces for national integration in this region, as in the cases of the Muslim Arakanese in Buddhist Burma, the Ambonese in Islamic Indonesia, the Islamic Moros in the Christian Philippines, and the Sikhs in Indian Punjab.17 Custom: Nothing could be farther from the truth than to picture the inhabitants of the Chittagong Hill Tracts as primitives, if one means by that term survivors of some prehistoric age in their pristine purity. Nonetheless, the hillmen are quite different from the people of the plains. Tribal affiliation plays a great role in their lives. Their social organization, marriage customs, death and birth rites, food, techniques of agriculture, and other social customs differ markedly from those of
the rest of Bangladesh.18 Differences in custom form a basis for a certain amount of national disunity almost everywhere.

Induced Factors
The KarnafuliProject and Its Impact: It is held by some writers that

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in traditional areas any new investment policies must be evaluated and implemented with caution, keeping in view the prospective purpose they would serve for both the region and the nation. As Myron Weiner writes, "Once the state takes on new investment responsibilitieswhether for roads and post offices or for steel mills and power damsquestions of equity are posed by the regions' tribes [and] linguistic groups which make up plural societies.'" The Karnafuli multipurpose project, begun in 1957 and completed in 1962, has contributed considerably to the enhancement of tribal solidarity. The project, which was constructed to accelerate economic development in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), had serious effects on the economy and life patterns of the people in this region. The dam submerged an area of approximately 400 square miles, including 125 mouzas and the major portion of the district headquarters at Rangamati. The submerged area includes 54,000 acres of settled, cultivable land-i.e., about 40% and 90% of the total acreage of the district and Rangamati subdivision, respectively. About 10,000 plowing families and 8,000 jhumiya families totaling more than 100,000 persons have been affected by the flooding.20 After a fairly vigorous search, it was possible to settle the displaced persons in about 20,000 acres of flat cultivable land of somewhat inferior quality. Compared to the original 54,000 acres, this meant a net loss of 34,000 acres of land. Of 18,000 families, 11,761 have been rehabilitated so far. The average land holding of the 10,000 families having permanent rights to land in the reservoir bed was estimated at six acres per family, but the new settlements in the non-submerged and de-reserved areas provided them with scarcely two acres of land per family on average.2' The dam not only submerged a large amount of cultivable land, but also caused irreparable damage to the jhum pattern of cultivation22 and created serious unemployment problems for the tribal people. Job Opportunities and the Influx of Non-tribals into the Area: Although the government is trying to solve the unemployment problem by encouraging the tribal people to take up other occupations such as fishing, horticulture, etc., the response has not been encouraging. The reason is twofold: (1) the circumstantial disadvantages, and (2) the hillmen's lack of professional skills. However, the creation of job avenues has caused a massive influx of non-tribals into the area, which is one of the main reasons for the revolt that has occurred. The massive influx of non-locals can be gauged from Table 1. While in 1951 the tribal population in the CHT totaled 261,538 and the number of nonlocals was 26,150 (approximately 91% and 9%, respectively), by 1974 the population figures were 449,315 and 58,884, respectively. The growth rate of non-tribal people was significantly greater than that of tribal people-125.1% vs. 71.7%. Now, let us turn to the main point and examine how the tribal people are being exploited by the nonlocals in different job avenues.

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TABLE 1: Tribal and Non-Tribal Population of Chittagong Hill Tracts in the 1951-1974 period Population 1951 Tribal People Nontribal People 261,538 26,150 1974 449,315 58,884 Percentage Increase 71.7 125.1

SOURCE: 1951 Census of Pakistan and author's interview with Subdivisional Public Relation Officer, Rangamati, CHT.

Currently, there are about 3000 registered fishermen23 on the lake created by the dam. The local people comprised only 20-25% of the total number,24 and those who are engaged in fishing come from that group who were uprooted by the submergence of their land. They are extremely poor and live at a subsistence level. Their economic difficulties become more acute when the fish catch is very low because many unscrupulous non-local businessmen lend money to the local fishermen on the condition that they supply fish to the former when harvests are good at very much lower rates than the existing market rate. Moreover, the commercial supply of fish is completely regulated and controlled by the non-locals, which has caused considerable indignation among the tribal people. Another supplementary occupation encouraged by the government is horticulture, with pineapple as the main product. Recently many displaced tribal people undertook the production of this fruit because it can be produced in the hills with minimum labor. But in this also the tribal people are exploited by the non-local money lenders and businessmen who buy fruit at very nominal prices when the pineapple plants are in bloom and no other cash crops are ready for harvesting-i.e., a period of economic hardship for the tribal people. The fruit would bring a much higher price at harvest time, but even then the wholesale buyers control the price. Thus, the locals have to sell their fruit at the low prices fixed by the non-local businessman. This problem has been created because government-sponsored buying centers are lacking.25 To minimize the dependency of the tribal people on the money lenders, the government adopted a policy of giving agricultural loans to the pineapple growers at a nominal rate of interest. Nevertheless, some officials of the loan-granting agencies indulge in corrupt practices, which further discourage the tribal people from taking such loans and builds hatred towards such officials.26 The explosive rate of population growth has led to a growing landlessness among Bangladesh agriculturalists. Because of the relatively lower price of hill lands, many fortune seekers settle down in this district. Although the 1900 Manual of the CHT restricts the purchase of land by non-locals, some people have bought land in this area by promising to give the seller high prices. In most cases, the tribal people

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have been deceived with regard to the prices promised during the negotiation of the purchase.27 The CHT is basically agrarian, and almost all the people of the area are agriculturalists. Previously, the hillmen produced all their daily necessities by themselves and commercial transactions played a very insignificant role in their economic life. The tribal people are therefore unaccustomed to business as a profession. The submergence of vast areas by the lake water deprived the majority of the tribal people of production of many daily commodities and made them dependent upon external supplies to fulfill their needs. This has resulted in a heavy influx of non-local fortune seekers and unscrupulous traders into the area. Several categories of people came to the CHT-tourists, businessmen, traders, or settlers-none of which is welcomed by the tribals. The lake created by the dam is large and picturesque, so the towns of Kaptai and Rangamati have become tourist attractions. The tourists, people with a wider and more liberal outlook towards life, come to visit and have fun, but are alleged to have corrupted the tribal culture and way of life.28 And the outsiders who come to make their fortune exploit the tribal people. Therefore, outsiders in general are never welcomed no matter what the purpose of their visit.

GovernmentPolicies and the TribalPeople's Increased Awareness of Differences

Taking the general backwardness of the tribal area into account and the sacrifices its inhabitants have made for the good of the rest of the country, the central government has undertaken many development projects designed to compensate the area. The projects included the improvement of the transport and communication systems, the spread of education, and the provision of such modern amenities of life as hospitals and markets. Since the undertaking of these programs, the number of primary schools increased from 222 in 1962 to 842 in 1976. There was only one college in the district in 1965; now there are four, including one technical college. With the introduction of a modern education system and expansion of education facilities to the tribal people, the number of literate persons has risen from 49,280 in 1961 to
77,851 in 1974.29

To enhance the tribal people's economic development and also to increase local participation in development activities, the government created the Chittagong Hill Tract Development Board at Rangamati in 1976. The consultative body of the Board is comprised of three tribal chiefs, representatives of most of the headmen, and other elite of the area. Since its inception, the Board has undertaken 25 projects of different types, the work on which is progressing rapidly with the participation of the local people. With the intention of showing the people the developmental activities that are taking place all over the country as well as in the tribal area, radio and television sets have been provided by the Board to the different Community Centers.30 Modernization plans

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undertaken by the government (after the construction of the project), such as the increase of literacy, improvement of communication, local participation in developmental projects, and the provision of modern audiovisual mass media, helped the tribal people to gain a clear understanding of the differences between their area and the rest of the country. This growing awareness enhanced tribal solidarity. As Welch has pointed out, the dilemma of modernization is that social change and participation may lead to an expansion of communal solidarity, rather than an integration of diverse groups.31 Current Crisis-The Emergence of Shanti Bahini: The immediate cause of the emergence of a militant dissident group was the rebellious outburst of aspiring non-traditional tribal leaders to the efforts by the national leadership to integrate culturally the divergent CHT with the rest of Bangladesh. The majority of these leaders came from the Chakma tribe, who had been severely affected by the construction of the Karnafuli Hydro Electric Project.32 The Chakmas, however, were also the principal recipients of the government's rehabilitation benefits, particularly the educational facilities extended to the affected tribal people. Consequently, at the end of the 1960s, a group of modern educated youths, capable of providing leadership to the tribal people, emerged in the area. This educated class was, in fact, the instrument for the articulation of "anti-non-locals sentiment" among the Chakma people. Nevertheless, a pro-autonomist dissident group did not emerge in the 1960s because during that period there was no influx of plainsmen into the area to concern the tribal people. Moreover, Raja Tridib Roy, Chief of the Chakma tribe, was pro-Pakistani in his political outlook, and was also the symbol of integrity and cohesion of the Chakma tribe. Both these factors prevented the growth of a proautonomist dissident group among the Chakmas. However, when Bangladesh came into being in 1971, Tridib Roy remained in and subsequently opted for Pakistan, leaving the Chakma tribe without a chief until 1978.33 The tribal people became perplexed; their solidarity was threatened, and under these circumstances the new educated class was able to obtain a significant hold on tribal leadership. Thus, in 1973 when a parliamentary election was called in Bangladesh, the new leadership was successful in mobilizing tribal public opinion and got their leader, Manabendra Narayan Larma, elected to the Bangladesh Parliament. In parliament, the central leadership by a great majority of votes had a resolution passed declaring Bangladesh a unilingual and unicultural nation state. Larma was infuriated, and demanded that the tribal status of his area be restored, but his demand went unheeded. In 1975, Bangladesh switched over to one-party presidential rule and disbanded parliamentary government as well as existing political parties (except the ruling Awami League), and Larma went underground soon after. Since then, the pro-autonomist group, the Shanti Bahini, has emerged and demonstrated increasing insurgency. The Shanti Bahini is a militant group armed with sophisticated

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modern weapons. It has been reported that Larma is providing the leadership of the Shanti Bahini, which is composed of roughly two to three thousand guerrilla members.34 Although the membership came overwhelmingly from the dissatisfied educated Chakma youths, it has been assumed that some armed collaborators of Pakistan's defeated army in Bangladeshjoined the group. Moreover, collaboration with the Mizo dissident group from the adjoining Indian state of Mizoram and the Karen secessionist group from Burma is a strong possibility. With the active cooperation of these two groups, the Shanti Bahini seem to have obtained an arms supply.35 The main tactics of the Shanti Bahini are ambush and sabotage of the movements of Bangladesh police, law enforcement personnel, and the armed forces. At times they demonstrate their militancy by storming police stations, looting market places, and attacking ferry boats on the lake. Although Shanti Bahini is a pro-autonomist dissident group, they sometimes demand the complete secession of the CHT from the union of Bangladesh and the formation of an independent state with the cooperation of other secessionist groups from neighboring countries who are engaged in similar struggles. It is on this point that the Shanti Bahini does not seem to obtain support from the other dominant tribes, particularly the Marina. In fact, the Marma tribe feels that if the CHT secedes from Bangladesh and forms a separate independent state under the leadership of the Chakma elite, the Marma would be exploited and dominated by the Chakmas.36 Whatever may be the radical points of the Shanti Bahini's objectives, the main reasons for tribal resentment are the heavy influx of outsiders into the area, which is generally believed to jeopardize their economic and cultural entity. Therefore, the popular slogan of the Shanti Bahini personnel has become: "Bangalira Hill Tracts Charo paharee jatir upar julam bandha kara" (The Banglees quit Hill Tracts and stop exploitation of the hill people).

Conclusion
To sum up, it may be held that the recent disturbances sparked by militant dissidents in the name of Shanti Bahini are the results of accumulated grievances as well as the reaction of aspiring tribal leaders to attempts by the national leadership to integrate the culturally divergent CHT with the otherwise culturally homogeneous society of Bangladesh. At the same time, one may point to the insignificance of this secessionist tendency of the tribal people in view of their low percentage of the total population.This argument is partially true. Although it is unfeasible for the tribal people to secede from Bangladesh and form a separate homeland for themselves, still in recent times the insurgencies of tribal peoples in many countries of Asia (e.g., the Mizo tribesmen in India, the Karen in Burma, the Moros in the Philippines) have caused the central government serious concern. The recent upsurge in Assam in India has alarmed the government in Dacca because

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it may push them into a complicated situation. First, some Indian politicians have remarked that "Bangladesh was somehow involved in the Assamese troubles,"37 and this sort of feeling may induce Indian leaders to an act of retribution by instigating the CHT tribal people to a massive insurgency against the Dacca government. Second, the tribal people of the CHT may derive inspiration from the Assamese. Although the Assamese are not tribal people, their insurgency bears similarities to that of the CHT people in the sense that the rebellious upheaval of both peoples was sparked by the heavy influx of non-locals into their areas. However, Bangladesh, having been overburdened by many socioeconomic problems, cannot afford the luxury of keeping the CHT economically unintegrated with the rest of Bangladesh. The CHT's vast natural resources, electricity, paper, fish, timber, and horticultural produce contribute enormously to the nation's economic development. This economic integration must be accompanied by social and political integration in order to avoid charges of internal colonialism by the tribal people. This venture of social and political integration, however, should in no way be allowed to clash with traditional values, which can be utilized conscientiously to hasten modernization and political socialization. Transforming a sentiment of group loyalty into a fact of national integration is extremely difficult but not impossible.38
SYED NAZMUL ISLAM is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Chittagong, Chittagong, Bangladesh, and is currently on study leave and enrolled in the Ph.D. program in Political Science, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York.

NOTES 1. Although Bangladesh experienced the problem of integration in a somewhat mild form in this hilly region intermittently after independence, the activism of dissident militant forces has recently been intensified. See Michael T. Kaufman, "Migration Sparks Bangladesh Tribal Revolt," in theNew YorkTimes,Tuesday,July 29, 1980, p. A3. See also, The Khabar (The News) Dacca (Bangladesh), July 27, 1980, p. 1. 2. On July 23, 1976, the deputy commissioner of CHT called a convention of the headmen (karbari),and other influential leaders in the local cinema hall to induce the local leaders to persuade the dissident militant groups. See The Daily Ittefaq (Dacca, Bangladesh), July 26, 1976. 3. The inhabitants of the area reported that the Shanti Bahini, after their militant exercise, chanted slogans in favor of full autonomy for the CHR and also demanded that all non-locals quit CHT immediately. 4. S. N. Islam, "The Karnafuli Project: Its Impacton theTribal Population,"Public Administration(Dacca University, Bangladesh) 3:2 (Summer 1978), p. 28. 5. C. Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Geertz, Old Societiesin New States (London: The Free Press, 1963), p. 108. 6. The Constitution of Bangladesh embodies four "basicprinciples of state policy": Democracy, Nationalism, Socialism, and Trust in Almighty Allah. 7. Manabendra Narayan Larma, member of the then Parliament of Bangladesh from the CHT, challenged the idea of Bangladesh nationalism when the new leadership included it on the basis of one language, one culture, and one ethnicity, arguing that the

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Chittagong Hill Tracts, his constituency, had ethnicity, culture, traditions, and language Assemdifferent from those of Bangladesh. See Bangladesh, Proceedingsof the Constituent bly, Dacca, 1974. 8. Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," p. 109. 9. M. Ishaque (ed.), Bangladesh District Gazetteers:Chittagong Hill Tracts (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, 1971), Preface. 10. Ibid., p. 25. 11. Author's interview with a Bangladesh district administrator who was a member of the Bangladesh government's team that negotiated with the Shanti Bahini. He expressed his desire to remain anonymous. 12. Islam, "The Karnafuli Project," p. 29. 13. A. Sattar, In the Sylvan Shadows (Dacca: Saquib Brothers, 1971), p. 271. 14. Bessaignet, The.Tribesmen CHT, (Dacca: Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1958), p. 5. of 15. Ishaque, Bangladesh Gazeteers:CHT, pp. 201-203. 16. Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," p. 110. 17. Ibid., p. 113. 18. Ishaque, Bangladesh Gazeteers:CHT, p. 46. 19. Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," in Claude E. Welch, Jr. (ed.), Political Modernization:A Reader (Belmont, California, 1967), p. 154. 20. Islam, "The Karnafuli Project," p. 31. 21. Ibid., p. 32. 22. Jhum cultivation is usually done on the ridge and creep of the hills and the interval period between two farmings is 7 to 10 years. Hence, there is no record of how much jhum land lies under water. The only figure available in this respect is that 8000 jhumiya families have been affected. 23. Many of these fishermen were from the Ganges delta and settled in the CHT after being displaced from their original area by the devastating cyclone of East Pakistan's coastal area on November 12, 1970. 24. The local hillmen were never accustomed to fishing until the creation of the lake (which has become a vast habitat for different kinds of fish), so many lack the proper skills. The 20-25% include many fake local fishermen who take advantage of the government's policy of providing fishing materials free to the tribal people. With the intention of procuring these costly materials free of charge and subsequently selling them to the non-local fishermen, many fake local fishermen registered themselves with the Fisheries Development Corporation. Information provided by F. D. C., Rangamati, Bangladesh. 25. S. A. Imam, ChittagongHill Tracts at a Glance (Rangamati, Bangladesh: CHT Development Board, 1976), p. 35. 26. Author's interview with tribal people. 27. Ibid. 28. Author's interview with tribal people. 29. Imam, CHT at a Glance, Appendix 1. 30. Ibid., p. 12, appendix X, and p. 14. 31. C. E. Welch, "The Comparative Study of Political Modernization," in Welch (ed.), Political Modernization:A Reader, p. 10. 32. About 90% of the Chakma people were affected by the dam, and a similar percentage of Chakma people were displaced from the original settlement. 33. In 1978 Debashis Roy, the son of Raja Tridib Roy, became 18 years old and was crowned as the Chief of the Chakma tribe. However, since Raja Debashis Roy is very young, many tribal people think that he cannot properly maintain tribal solidarity and cohesion as his predecessors did. 34. Michael T. Kaufman, "Migration Sparked Bangladesh Tribal Revolt"; also, author's interview with a Bangladesh district administrator. 35. Ibid. 36. Author's interview with Marma chief. 37. Michael T. Kaufman, "Migration Sparked Bangladesh Tribal Revolt." 38. C. E. Welch, "The Comparative Study of Political Modernization," p. 11.