The Revolt in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1881-2 Author(s): Charles Jelavich Reviewed work(s): Source: The Slavonic and East European

Review, Vol. 31, No. 77 (Jun., 1953), pp. 420-436 Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4204461 . Accessed: 28/11/2011 14:00
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The

Revolt

in

Bosnia-Hercegovina, CHARLES JELAVICH

1881?2

of the first world war the the outbreak In the fifty years preceding back? their relative of Bosnia and Hercegovina, despite provinces as centres of agitation and remoteness, wardness figured prominently The crises of 1875-8, conflict. areas of great-power and potential because of their wide and 1914 are familiar to the historian 1908-9 in European many of the history. However, diplomatic significance in a also made their appearance involved in these episodes issues 1881 and 1882, only a few which occurred during uprising had received the right government years after the Austro-Hungarian at the Congress of Berlin. The the provinces to occupy and administer as well as its effect on the of this incident, international repercussions serious the difficulties which demonstrated of the Empire, politics in their attempt to administer encountered authorities the Habsburg Balkan lands. and control the South Slavonic that The ostensible reason for the revolt was the announcement in Southern that is in Dalmatia, military service would be introduced and in the newly acquired and Dubrovnik, the area of Boka Kotorska internal of Bosnia and Hercegovina. in 1869, Austria Previously, provinces in Southern Dalmatia had attempted to enforce conscription only to had to be be met with such widespread resistance that the measure In this as in the later instance the opposition to the abandoned. authorities was based on the legal grounds that when the Monarchy Dalmatia after the Napoleonic wars, the Emperor Francis I acquired from military service had agreed to respect the privilege of exemption area under Venetian rule.1 by the people of the Dubrovnik the failure of the initial attempt the Austrian government service. again in 1881 to impose military in the disturbances announcement immediately produced area of Southern which then spread into Herce? Dalmatia, Krivosije and parts of Bosnia when similar military were govina regulations In November 1881 it was decreed issued for these provinces. that enjoyed Despite decided The every able-bodied man in Bosnia-Hercegovina should on reaching his 1 For a brief summary of the question of military service in 1869 and 1881 see: Great Britain, Public Record Office, Political Despatches, St John to Granville, F.O. 7/1023, No. 3, Ragusa, 16 March 1881; No. 6, Ragusa, 28 September 1881 (hereafter cited as F.O.); Grga Novak, ProUostDalmacije,Zagreb, 1944, II, 403-4; Edward A. Freeman, 'The Revolt in Dalmatia', Nation, XXXIV, 16 February 1882, pp. 140-2; The Times, London, 2 July 1881, p. 7; Neue Freie Presse, 14 January 1882, pp. 1, 2; 22 January 1882, p. 2. Hereafter, all newspaper dates, unless otherwise indicated, will refer to the year 1882.

REVOLT

IN

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

42 I

be required twentieth to serve three years in the army and birthday nine years in the reserve.2 To appease the Moslems were provisions made to respect their religious The observances and traditions.3 Austrian also tried to persuade the local inhabitants government that it was their duty to join in the defence and maintenance of order in their lands, but such arguments were received with little sympathy. the introduction of military service was the immediate Although cause of the uprising, this was merely the culmination of a series of events which the inhabitants of Bosnia-Hercegovina deeply resented or misunderstood. In the first place, the occupation had from the been received with the greatest disfavour. The Orthodox beginning Serbs had no desire to exchange Turkish for Austrian rule, but wished to join either Serbia or Montenegro. The Orthodox were as distrust? ful of the predominantly Catholic Dual Monarchy as they had been of the Moslem Ottoman The Moslems, who had hitherto Empire. been masters in the provinces, from bitterly opposed their transference Turkish to Austro-Hungarian even though the Convention authority, of 1879 provided that they remained the technically sultan. Moreover, both religious groups had been led the occupation would be terminated after a period of years. With the passing of time however they began probable subjects of the to believe that a few perhaps to realise the

of the situation. Thus the two once antagonistic permanence on the basis of their common groups were able to cooperate enmity to rule.4 Habsburg In addition, the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina soon had much to of in the character of the administration to which they were complain now subjected, the corruption of the officials. In discussing particularly causes of the revolt, the British consul at Dubrovnik his government on 23 January 1882 that Austria'was either unwilling or unable to send out a well-paid and Hungary efficient recruited her officials from among staff, and consequently those whose promotion in the public service at home was, to say the doubtful'.5 This opinion was confirmed least, by the British consul at who wrote on 8 May that impartial and unprejudiced Sarajevo, officials were urgently because have been needed, 'good employees to come to Bosnia and the administration has hitherto been unwilling carried on either by incapable and corrupt persons who were chiefly unable to obtain employment in their own country' or by inexper2 Neue Freie Presse, 4 November 1881, p. 1; 5 November 1881, pp. 1-2; Vladimir Oorovic, Politickeprilike u Bosni i Hercegovini, Belgrade, 1939, p. 31. 3 The Times, November 5 1881, p. 5. 4 Vladislav Skaric et al., Bosna i Hercegovina pod Austro-UgarskomUpravom,Belgrade, 1938, p. 9. 5 St John to Granville, F.O. 7/1041, No. 5, Ragusa, 23 January 1882; No. 36, 8 April 1882. reported to the various

422 ienced

THE

SLAVONIC

REVIEW

to the Orthodox, particularly young men.6 Thus it appeared, for better administration which Andrassy that despite the promises and corruption of had made at the Congress of Berlin the decadence the Turkish period of control continued. centred in the system of taxation. cause of irritation Another rule taxes had been heavy and often collected Turkish Under by all they could. interested in extorting officials who were primarily had been developed methods for circumventing some Nevertheless, the new administrators Consequently, although obligations. in other respects, their meticulous inefficient exaction of proved a heavier burden on the inhabitants tax actually than placed every been the case.7 had previously of the often

had also hoped for a change in the land-tenure had been for the most the Turkish occupation they system. During of the Moslem who begs, or landowners, part the kmets, or tenants, Under the new rule they had expected were chiefly of Slavonic origin. would end and the kmets would become that the beg-kmet relationship of the houses in which they lived and of the land sole proprietors the The Orthodox they cultivated. in neighbouring in 1878, between did not follow. Meanwhile, however, which had also acquired Turkish lands Montenegro, carried out. The contrast agrarian reform was immediately the two administrations increased thebitterunderstandably subjects.8 the most serious source Such a result,

ness of the Austrian

of dissatisfaction with the Habsburg Perhaps was the fact that they ignored or failed to under? officials themselves and traditions. stand local customs the people of BosniaAlthough the were largely of Slavonic and language, Hercegovina nationality in the life of the individual Each element was his religion. principal of the three religious and Catholic, Moslem Orthodox, groups, its unique and each held on with great cherished characteristics to the legacy of the past. The new administrators tenacity paid little and in some cases used the mosques respect to the Moslem religion who wished to make a pilgrimage for ammunition Moslems dumps. or to migrate there were hindered to the Ottoman from doing Empire so. The Orthodox of interference and the military complained by civil officials in their religious and many of their teachers affairs, 6 Freeman to Granville, F.O. 7/1041, No. 15, Sarajevo, 8 May 1882. See also Theodor von Sosnosky, Die BalkanpolitikOsterreich-Ungarns 1866, Stuttgart, 1914, II, pp. 31-2; seit Skaric, op. cit., p. 9. See also the comments of Dr Rus, a member of the Austrian delega? tion, Neue Freie Presse, 1 February, p. 3. 7 Skaric, op. cit., p. 9; Freeman to Granville, F.O. 7/1041, No. 4, Sarajevo, 27 January 1882; Green to Granville, F.O. 103/18, No. 44, Scutari, 25 April 1882; Neue Freie Presse, 6 January, pp. 2-3; 19 January, p. 3; The Times, io February, p. 7. 8 Skarid, op. cit., pp. 9-11; Freeman to Granville, F.O. 7/1041, No. 4, Sarajevo, 27 January 1882; No. 5, Sarajevo, 2 February 1882; Neue FreiePresse,6 January, pp. 2-3. For a description of the agrarian arrangements, see Paulina Irby, 'Bosnia and Its Land Tenure', The Contemporary Review,July 1889, pp. 28-40.

REVOLT preferred to seek refuge under such conditions.9

IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA in Serbia or Montenegro rather than

423 remain

The widespread discontent with the Austro-Hungarian occupation meant that the revolt, once it had begun, the sup? policies enjoyed of many factions in the country. the active partici? However, port those who were immediately affected pants were primarily by the introduction of military service?the men. Because eligible young of the nature of the movement it is impossible to estimate the numbers offensives were launched and, for the most in groups often, thirty, fifty or even a hun? operated part, dred men. They concentrated their attacks on scattered outposts and on roads, bridges and other means of communication. The primary was Southern Dalmatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, sphere of operation i nthe area bounded by Mostar-Konjic-Sarajevo-Gorazde-Cajnice and the rebels the Montenegrin and Turkish The most potent ally of the frontiers. was perhaps the mountainous and rugged terrain of South? insurgents ern Dalmatia and Hercegovina, which gave virtually impenetrable cover. The Austrian nor troops were not familiar with the territory, could they count on aid from the local inhabitants, who, on the con? the rebels with food and shelter, as well as with trary, freely supplied information on the movements of the opposing forces.10 When the revolt first broke out, the Habsburg officials considered it of minor importance. when However, been unable to restore order, the possible of the revolt caused concern. Through by January consequences of Bosniathe occupation of its added to the numbers 1882 they had of the spread involved. No large-scale

the Dual Monarchy had Hercegovina discontented South Slavonic already subjects a group who were not stirred to action but who were experienced in resisting only easily control. the occupation came after a period of foreign Moreover, intense in which of the the population revolutionary upheaval, had failed to attain its national of union with provinces aspiration either Serbia or Montenegro. The danger thus existed that should the revolt, which arose at first on the relatively minor issue of con? show signs of succeeding, the territory as a whole might rise scription, and fight for the larger objective. On io February Times the London in an editorial on the subject concluded that 'the total correctly result is that the Austrian rule has become in three years as unpopular as Turkish rule ever was, and that the Empire has on its hands an insurrection which is daily a most difficult spreading through and which, from the circumstances of the case, is full of country, elements.'11 dangerous 9 Skarid, op. cit., p. io. 10 Detailed accounts of the military phase of the revolt are to be found in Sosnosky, op. cit^., pp. 34-42, and Skaric, op. cit., pp. 15-32. A good account of the day to day developments n The Times, io is to be found in The Timesand the NeueFreiePresse. February, p. 7.

424

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REVIEW

the Habsburg to deal with this situation Therefore, government a Commission of Reform with instructions the to examine instituted At the same time it was decided that the first task entire problem. areas by persuading the should be to restore order in the disturbed insurgents to destroy initiated their resistance to abandon or, if this did not succeed, them. With the failure of the first alternative, steps were to make the second effective. Because of the extent of the

rebellion and the wide area of its manifestation, it was recognised of soldiers allotted to the region would that the normal complement not be adequate and that not only would additional troops be needed but also an extra expenditure of 8,000,000 florins. These requests were placed before the Delegations of the Empire when they met at the end of January were granted but during the 1882.12 The demands course of the debate of view on the causes of the divergent points revolt were expressed and government officials in by the delegates attendance. finance revolt of the government was explained of position by the minister of the Empire, J. de Szlavy, who was the titular head of the of Bosnia-Hercegovina. administration He naturally denied that the The

was caused or overtaxation and pre? by maladministration to argue that the Bosnians and Hercegovinians, having fought the Turks for centuries, had a certain love of combat which they could not be expected to lose quickly. He also contended that the law was partially at fault.13 Despite the these explanations military in February recommended a reform of the administration Delegations ferred tenure system. The Habsburg officials promised to take to raise the material standards of the population, to improve the steps taxation of system, to organise schools, to reform the administration in particular, to treat the three religious with and, justice groups equality.14 Next the question of the suppression of the revolt was met. After additional men and money a Habs? General receiving Jovanovic, officer of South Slavonic who had previously been burg origin, a lack of supplies, now prepared an end to the to put handicapped by disturbances. He was able to make only slow progress in the difficult Bosnian terrain and at a high cost. Moreover, another obstacle to com? success soon became Even when the government plete apparent. troops were able to rout groups of rebels, it was found that the survivors of these bands, instead of surrendering, into the frontiers crossed or the Ottoman Montenegro a sympathetic population. Empire, They where used they found the foreign refuge among to territory and the land

12 Neue Freie The Presse, 28 13 Neue Freie Presse, 1 January, pp. 1-3; The Times, 30 January, p. 5. Times, 1 February, p. 5. 3-4; 14 Neue Freie Presse, February, pp.1. 7 February, p.

REVOLT

IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

425

their forces and then struck again at the Habsburg troops. reorganise the frontiers to con? If they met with further defeat, they recrossed to General Jovanovic tinue the same tactics. The objective assigned forces thus proved to be and wiping out the insurgent of defeating of accomplishment, unless Austrian troops were to be impossible of neighbouring the rebels across the borders to pursue allowed would expand the area of conflict states. Such an action, however, Balkan the whole and would explosive question. certainly reopen became Since this was not the aim of Austrian policy, the problem one of diplomacy. of When the revolt had taken a turn for the worse in the autumn Prince Nikola of Montenegro had offered to serve as arbitrator 1881, and the rebels.15 This suggestion the Austrian between government and the Monarchy that Mon? demanded was declined, subsequently remain neutral and desist from aiding the insurgent should tenegro that he forces. Nikola agreed to this, and, on the surface, it appeared to stand by his assurances.16 In February 1882 he visited the intended areas and instructed his subjects not to have any dealings frontier even if he had across the border.17 However, with their compatriots sincere in his actions and declarations, the enforce? been completely of strict non-intervention would have been almost impossible. in sympathy with was wholeheartedly population Montenegrin of the the tales of the sufferings the revolt. They believed implicitly and Hercegovinians Bosnians and were eager to aid those who were for an apparently cause. of refugees righteous Sheltering fighting ment The from seemed what was only and army to turn back the refugees, the order would probably have and he would also have antagonised his subjects.18 been ignored, there is no evidence of his having issued directives Although contrary to Vienna, of the to his declarations it is known that his minister Maso Vrbica, officials the frontier to instructed interior, actually and their belongings.19 give refuge to the rebels, with their families The Dual Monarchy was thus unable to block this source of assistance to the uprising. Relations with the Ottoman Empire in this matter assumed much the same form. The Moslems were outside the Dual Monarchy 15 Green to Granville, F.O. 103/15, No. 122, Cetinje, 15 October 1881; F.O. 103/18, No. 26, Cetinje, 9 March 1882. 16 Skaric, op. cit., pp. 10-11; St John to Granville, F.O. 7/1041, No. 12, Ragusa, February 1882. 1317 Green to Granville, F.O. 103/18, No. 17, Scutari, io February 1882. 18 Despite the fact that the Austrian foreign minister, Kalnoky, defended before the Delegations of the Empire the correctness of the attitude of Nikola's government, the Austrian press, well aware of the aid and comfort given to the rebels by the population, strongly condemned the Montenegrins. Neue FreiePresse,28 January, pp. 1-2; 1 February, 19 Loc. cit. pp. 2-3; 9 February, p. 1; Skaric, op. cit., p. 11. as regarded If Nikola natural. and persecution injustice Habsburg had commanded his frontier officials

426 sympathetic and support to those

THE

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REVIEW

and they willingly extended what aid within, could to their coreligionists, as has been who, they with their old antagonists, noted, were now cooperating previously the inhabitants of the Ottoman the Orthodox. Certainly, Empire, who as still part of their possessions, were Bosnia-Hercegovina regarded embarrassed. In Constantinople to see the Austrians not unhappy nature of the a leading Yakut, stressed the temporary newspaper, the argument that the inhabitants and supported of the occupation being technically subjects of the sultan, could not be com? provinces, armed forces.20 In general, pelled to serve in the Austro-Hungarian a similar view and sought other Turkish adopted newspapers arouse public opinion against the Habsburgs. press and the open sympathies Despite the tone of the Ottoman II apparently Hamid Sultan Abdul maintained his people, to of an

Like Nikola he was willing to promise a correct attitude. entirely deal. In January 1882 it was reported that he was disturbed by great were the revolt. He had been led to believe that Moslem insurgents their insurrection.521 A but he 'blamed and abhorred few in number, ordered to take measures to counteract all mufti was subsequently There was also a rumour that enmity towards the Dual Monarchy. to assist in the suppression of the sultan had even offered troops did take place movements in Unexplained troop uprising. the frontier, but their purpose could not be deter? February along mined.22 as in the case of Montenegro, no matter what the true However, to control of the Porte were, it proved the intentions impossible and officials in the areas bordering actions of the Moslem population the A typical expression of the resentment felt by on the Dual Monarchy. was uttered their northern the Turks against by Rizah neighbours to Montenegro, when he spoke to the the Turkish envoy Bey, warmth and indignation' 'with considerable British representative that are being committed on 'the atrocities by the Austro-Hungarian both Christians and he . . . and Mohammedans against troops declared . . . that the insurrection can only be terminated by the 20 The Times, 21 November 1881, p. 5; 28 November 1881, p. 5; Green to Granville, F.O. 103/18, No. 51, Scutari, 22 May 1882; Skaric, op. cit., pp. 9?11; Slobodan Jo vano vic, VladaMilana Obrenovica, Belgrade, 1934, III, 52. 21 Austria-Hungary. Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv, Unruhen in Bosnien und der Herzegovina, XXXX 209, Interna VIII, Calice to Kalnoky, XXXX 209, Tel. No. 26, Constantinople, 29 January 1882; No. 9 A-E, Constantinople, 7 February 1882. Hereafter cited as H.H.S. Kalnoky also publicly affirmed the correctness of the sultan's policy. The Habsburg press, in contrast to its treatment of Montenegro, tended to exonerate the Porte from any suspicion of rendering aid to the rebels, although it was known that the Turkish public was sympathetic to the Moslems who had participated in the revolt. Neue Freie Presse, 1 February, pp. 3-4. 22 Calice to Kalnoky, H.H.S. XXXX 209, No. 7C, Constantinople, 31 January 1882.

REVOLT annihilation ' 23 of the

IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA Moslem population in the occupied

427 pro?

vinces

to receive complete the failure of the Monarchy support Despite or the Ottoman to from either Montenegro Empire in the attempt from a third state bordering was obtained end the revolt, satisfaction of 1881 Prince Milan of In the summer on the afflicted provinces. which made him a Serbia had signed a treaty with Austria-Hungary virtual vassal of that state. This policy brought him into conflict with made his tenure in power of his subjects and henceforth of subservience The chief support for this programme to precarious. which was opposed came from the Progressive Vienna the Party, by Liberal and Radical parties. When the revolt broke out in Dalmatia the majority these latter groups the immediately supported Hercegovina, an issue in internal became and the whole question Serbian rebels, the insurrection to the Serbian The opposition presented politics.24 with those used in 1875-6. in terms identical The alleged public were described of the South Slavs in the two provinces in sufferings and and the pro-Austrian of horror and resentment, policy of the bitter criticism. It was thus Party received prince and the Progressive to see that the revolt should end as quickly interest in Milan's as since its prolongation of might well result in the overthrow possible, words his government. Therefore, he worked closely porters, in order with the to protect himself Austrian minister and his sup? in Belgrade,

All information which might aid in the suppres? Count Khevenhuller. sion of the revolt was passed on, and an attempt was made to seal the in order to prevent frontier of Serbia with Bosnia-Hercegovina aid The crossing into the provinces.25 the cooperation which it was appreciated Khevenhuller to express its thanks to Milan receiving als korrekten for his 'ebenso loyalen Haltung'.26 of the treaty with Serbia was a closely guarded Since the existence in the Dual Monarchy was not aware of the secret, public opinion extent of the support received from the Serbian government. Indeed, and Budapest a section of the press in Vienna to regard preferred of the conspiracy as the headquarters allegedly Belgrade directing and volunteer detachments Austrian office foreign and instructed The influential Hungarian paper Pester Lloyd did not uprising. but felt that he was powerless doubt Milan's to attitude, personal elements in his capital. It believed, the subversive eradicate in fact, the 23 Green to Granville, F.O. 103/18, No. 27, Cetinje, 9 March 1882; The Times, 16 February, p. 5. 24Jovanovic, op. cit., p. 52; Locock to Granville, F.O. 105/32, No. io, Belgrade, 21 January 1882; No. 13, Belgrade, 22 January 1882. 25 Khevenhuller to Kalnoky, H.H.S. XXXX 209, No. 5A-B, geheim, Belgrade, 20 January 1882. 26 To Khevenhuller, ibid., Abschrift einer geheimen Depesche, Vienna, 20 January 1882. from

428 that the

THE only way to end was to use force.27

SLAVONIC the

REVIEW which existed along the

'anarchy'

frontier

the majority of the newspapers of the Dual Monarchy However, the South Slavs as tools used by the real enemy? really regarded launched a strong Hence the Habsburg Russia. antijournalists of their suspicions confirmation was Russian campaign. Apparent delivered M. D. Skobelev, found in a series of speeches by General the hero of the recent war with Turkey^ and in reports of the activities of various Russian agents in the Balkans in favour of the insurgents. on 24 January In St Petersburg of the fall 1882, the first anniversary General Skobelev, of Geok Tepe, its conqueror, delivered the first of addresses. After attacking the Russian his two most notable intelli? for what he termed their 'cosmopolitan which gentsia Europeanism', a betrayal of Russia, he spoke warm words of sym? to him signified in Hercegovina.28 Several weeks later, when pathy for the insurgents a group of Serbian students in Paris on a private visit, he addressed into a vigorous attack on the German powers. Although and launched his exact words on this occasion are a matter of dispute, he is reported to have said: It is the German. I repeat it, and entreat you never to forget it?the Ger? between the Teuton and the man is the enemy. A struggle is inevitable Slav. It cannot be long deferred. It will be long, sanguinary, and terrible, but I entertain the faith that it will culminate in the victory of the Slav. It is quite natural that you should be anxious to know how matters stand, since your kith and kin are even now shedding their blood. I will not say much, but I can assure you that if anyone ventures to touch the States by European treaties, such as Servia and Montenegro, recognised you shall not be left to fight alone . . . if fate wills it, may we meet again on the shoulder to shoulder against the common enemy!29 battle-field, statements these caused understandably great anxiety. Quite 27 Locock to Granville, F.O. 105/32, No. 14, Belgrade, 27 January 1882; Khevenhuller to Kalnoky, H.H.S. XXXX 209, No. 7A-B, Belgrade, 24 January 1882. 28 O. (Olga) K. (Novikova-Kireyeva), Skobeleff theSlavonicCause,London, 1883, pp. and 253-62. An interesting account of Skobelev's career is given in V. F. NemirovitchLondon, 1884. Dantchenko, PersonalReminiscences General of Skobelejf, 29 O. K., op. cit., pp. 282-3, fn. 1; E. Tarle, 'Rech' Gen. Skobeleva v Parizhe v 1882 g.', KrasnyyArkhiv,XXVII, 1928, pp. 219-20. There is a marked difference of opinion regarding Skobelev's comments in Paris. Olga Novikova-Kireyeva, op. cit., pp. 263-84, denies emphatically that the general ever made the remarks attributed to him. However, even if her opinion is correct, the European newspapers, the public and the governments themselves assumed that such statements had been made. Skobelev's anti-German theme caused alarm in the European capitals, especially in Berlin. The international repercus? sions resulting from this are discussed in Hans Herzfeld, 'Bismarck und die Skobelewepisode', HistorischeZeitschrift, 142, 1930, pp. 279-302, and in William L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1800, New York, 1950, pp. 238-42. Skobelev's speeches also disturbed the tsar, his chief adviser, K. P. Pobedonostsev, and the acting Russian foreign minister, N. K. Giers. They regarded the general's behaviour with extreme disfavour and distrusted his growing popularity. He was compared to Garibaldi, and the Grand Duke Constantine was reported to have said, 'that one could be at the same time a hero on the des battlefield and a fool in politics'. Denkwurdigkeiten Botschafters Generalvon SchweinitZj Berlin, 1927, II, pp. 182, 185; Neue FreiePresse,23 February, p. 1.

REVOLT General Skobelev

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of the Russian the imagination had captured Asia as well as his well-known in Central exploits public through war. To the the daring he had shown in the Russo-Turkish through Pasha' who had demonstrated his Turks he had been the 'White into battle in a white uniform. To his compatriots bravery by riding His speeches, he was one of the most romantic figures of the century. of Russian as they did typical Panslav hos? phrases containing the Germans as well as expressions of sympathy towards for tility received the rebels in Bosnia and Hercegovina, attention particular the tsar expressed in the press of Austria-Hungary. his Although of the Paris speech and summoned the general home, it disapproval for the Vienna and Budapest to believe that was difficult journals have made these statements would on his own Skobelev entirely The outstanding Viennese Neue Freie Presse, led initiative. newspaper, the attack. The best expressed was questioned and ing a correct were being taken editorials of February of them, 'Russlands Doppelgesicht'. whether the Russian government was actually in one loyal policy, to check the and, if so, what practical revolt? Was Russia going theme of its numerous 1882 is Here measures it follow?

to aid in or use it as an excuse to bring its suppression about a larger war?30 of the Russian The attitude contributed to press also definitely the distrust of the Habsburg arouse was newspapers. Sympathy on the larger issue of the However, freely expressed for the insurgents. and his anti-German Skobelev sentiments was speeches opinion that the statements had caused a and her foreign policy. In deep its point, it took the significant order to illustrate of the Paris portions if they had been speech and showed how they would have sounded made by a German general to a group of Austrian students. Then his * "It is the Russian. I repeat it and entreat words would have been: ' Russian is the enemy." What impression you never to forget it?the would this have made on the Russians, asked the journal?31 Another of the general's Russian paper, Golos, also disapproved anti-German of Bosnia and Herce? views, but it did not believe that the inhabitants as legal subjects of the sultan, should be expected to serve in govina, the Habsburg armed forces.32 divided. mistrust Vestnik Tevropy maintained in Europe towards Russia actions. organs were more critical of the Austrian for instance, claimed that the true aim of Austrian Novoye Vremya, in the provinces was the acquisition of Macedonia military activity Other Russian 30 Neue Freie Presse, February, p. 2; 21 5 February, p. 1. 31 'Inostrannaya politika', VestnikTevropy,17 -.3, March 1882, p. 426. 32 Trauttenberg to Kalnoky, H.H.S. XXXX 209, No. 3G, St Petersburg, 13/25 January 1882. The Russian press is discussed in Irene Griming, Die russische bffentliche Meinungund ihre Stellungzu den Grossmachten, 1878-1804, Berlin, 1929.

430 and whose Salonika.33 The

THE

SLAVONIC

REVIEW taken by Rus', of the Panslav

editor Ivan writers, wrote:

was stand, however, strongest one of the most influential Aksakov,

the Krivosijani The Austro-Magyar campaign against [Southern Bosnians and in an indirect manner against Dalmatians], Hercegovinians, this is a campaign against us. . . . Every shot of the AustroMontenegro, which . . . strikes an Orthodox Slav, delivers a blow at us; the Magyars, shedding of every drop of Slavonic blood falls on our souls, stains us and calls for vengeance.34 attitude of parts of the Russian press, the more proof of Russian intrigues in reports Habsburg journalists of the activities of individual citizens to aid the insurgents. Russian The Slavonic Benevolent of Odessa, a Panslav organisation, Society found was collected to be particularly active. Money to aid soappeared and plans were made to called refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina, send a detachment of volunteers, of nationals of the chiefly composed two provinces, to aid the rebels.35 To show its sympathy further the St Petersburg branch of the society elected one of the rebel leaders, as an honorary member.36 were also Kovacevic, Reports in the Austrian of the landing of Russian officers and published press arms at Bulgarian Black Sea ports and of the active recruiting of under Russian auspices in Bulgaria. volunteers Stojan the best apparent indication of Russia's being involved in However, the revolt came from the events centring around the village of Cacak in Central Serbia. If men and material were in fact being sent to the have to pass through Serbia, they would in all probability provinces, had become unstable. where conditions highly Parliamentary bywere scheduled for 27 May, elections and in both Belgrade and Vienna fear was expressed that the Serbian Radical Party might use force to win the election or to overthrow Milan and his government. was fraught with great danger for Austrian policy. It Such a possibility was feared that if either the Radicals or the Liberals came to power, Milan's of the acceptance would abandon of Habsburg they policy also his policy of strict neutrality towards perhaps the Dual Monarchy as well as the Progressive Party found themselves in the results of the election, and vitally interested concern was felt over the possibility of internal disorders particular during the campaign.37 33 Trauttenberg to Kalnoky, H.H.S. XXXX 209, No. 3G, St Petersburg, 13/25 34 I. S. Aksakov, January 1882. Slavyanskiy vopros,1860-1886, Moscow, 1886, p. 390. 36 Thornton to Granville, F.O. 65/1135, No. 124, St Petersburg, 5 April 1882; Neue 36 Ibid., Freie Presse, 1 February, p. 4. 5 February, p. 2. 37 Jovanovic, op. cit., pp. 53-4. The Habsburg government's concern over the possible results of the election is best indicated by the report of the Austrian minister in Belgrade, who wrote that: 'If Ristic [the Liberal Party leader] again comes to power, Austria will constantly have to hold a gun at her side.' Furthermore, both Milan and the Austrians the revolt. Thus domination and In addition to the hostile

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As a result of the extraordinary taken, Serbian govern? precautions of guns, ment officials on 17 May seized near Cacak two wagon-loads which were being conveyed for Hercegovina, destined apparently the Serbian Immediately opposition by sixty armed Montenegrins. Milan and his supporters for this action and accused attacked parties who were depriving fellow them of being mere Austrian puppets Slavs answer, of the means declared The government, in necessary for their defence. that the arms were not destined for the exclusively

rebels, but were to be used to create disturbances during the impend? The vital point in this episode was the fact that the elections. ing had used Russian to enter Serbia.38 This passports Montenegrins in the revolt. of Russian to be definite intrigue proof appeared Russian intervention in the However, appearances, despite the basic principles of Russian have been against would uprising at that time. Under the leadership policy as it was being conducted of N. K. Giers, the Russian foreign office was pursuing a policy which and tranquillity in Europe. In June 1881 Russia at peace with Germany and Austriathe Dreikaiserbund agreement signed of this alliance The maintenance with the two Germanic Hungary. aimed powers, who were the object diplomacy.39 goal of Russian some guarantee and provided of the Panslavs, was the understanding gave Russia allies that the status quo would be kept in the The recent war with Turkey, and the Dardanelles. the Bosphorus all groups in Russia, had results of which had bitterly disappointed her military drained power and made her fear risking her southern flank to a possible British attack, if war should break out in the Bal? East. If Russia wished to have her point of view kans or the Middle prevail at the Straits and in the Eastern Balkans without resorting to hatred This force, finally strated ment rather it could only be with German in the formation culminated which support. The negotiations of the Dreikaiserbund had demon? lack of enthusiasm for an agree? that if Bismarck he would From the abandon were forced his eastern of the

with

the Habsburg government's Russia. It was also apparent between Austria and Russia, his southern

to choose

of 1856 neighbour. experiences had learned that she could not risk diplomatic and 1878 Russia Thus the Russian office could not at this time isolation. foreign which would endanger in any activities the Dreikaiserbund. engage believed that the Radicals had received financial assistance from Russia for the election campaign. Loc. cit. 38 Ibid., pp. 52-3; Locock to Granville, F.O. 105/32, No. 89, Belgrade, 19 May 1882; No. 90, Belgrade, 20 May 1882. 39 Russian foreign policy in general and Giers' role in its formation is discussed in S. Skazkin, Konetsavstro-russko-germanskogo soyuza, Moscow, 1928, I; Baron Boris Nolde, Valliancefranco-russe:les originesdu systerne Paris, 1936; Ada von diplomatique d*avant-guerre, Karlovic Giers, russischer Aussenminister, 1882-1885: Eine politische Erdmann, 'Nikolaj Geschichte,IX, 4, 1935, pp. 481-540; J. Y. Biographic', Ze^cnr^fl fur Osteuropaische Memoirs,Cambridge, Mass., 1920, I, pp. 36-49; and Langer, op. cit. Simpson, The Saburov

than

432

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and AustriaIn addition, with Germany during the negotiations she received in regard to Russia, in return for the provisions Hungary, to her allies. the Straits, was forced to grant reciprocal concessions with the Austrian One of these dealt specifically rights in Bosniareserves the right to and stated that: 'Austria-Hungary Hercegovina she shall deem oppor? at whatever annex these provinces moment had actively sided with the rebels, whether openly a repudiation of the action would have implied of Austrian in this part of the Balkans predominance recognition The of one of the bases of the Dreikaiserbund. and, consequently, had to a large to conclude hesitation the original agreement Austrian for the Austrian from the fact that it was difficult derived extent tune'.40 or secretly, such in the Wes? to believe that Russia would not interfere government in cases involving Orthodox Slavs. How? tern Balkans, particularly and the Straits were of far greater ever, for official Russia, Bulgaria of the sympathy than Bosnia-Hercegovina, regardless importance which these check individual territories. Russians Thus inhabitants of might feel for the Slavonic the Russian foreign office took definite steps to in aid of the insurgents. If Russia

press was not aware of the exact nature of the Dreikaiserbund, Count Kalnoky, the Habsburg foreign minister, to Russia and believed its importance that the Russian realised to the agreement. was adhering Thus, when the Delega? government defended in January-February tions met 1882, Kalnoky publicly a correct policy.41 Never? she was following Russia and insisted that he instructed the Austrian March Count Wolkenstein, in St Petersburg, to make representations concerning certain events involving Wolkenstein Russian subjects. questioned Giers on reports that Russian officers were on their way to Herce? the recruitment of promoting Giers denied that officially provinces. were involved, but admitted that officers representatives from service might be engaged in such activities. released Later, on he was with new Austrian when confronted accusations, 24 May, forced to admit that some of the charges had been confirmed.42 govina and Bulgarians accredited that they for service actively in the Count Wolkenstein reported to Vienna that Despite this admission he was convinced that Giers and the Russian government had taken no initiative in the affair and that, on the contrary, were deeply they disturbed by the turn of events in the Balkans.43 Wolkenstein's report 40 The terms of the Dreikaiserbund are found in Alfred Franzis Pribram, The Secret Treatiesof Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914, Cambridge, Mass., 1920, I, pp. 36-49. 41 Neue Freie Presse, 1 February, pp. 2, 3, 4. 42 Trauttenberg to Kalnoky, H.H.S. XXXX 209, No. 16E, vertraulich, St Petersburg, 17 February/1 March 1882; to Wolkenstein, ibid., Vienna, 1 May 1882; Wolkenstein to 43 Loc. cit. Kalnoky, ibid., No. 32D, vertraulich, St Petersburg, 12/24 May 1882. were in theless, ambassador

any activities the Austrian Although

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with earlier dispatches and British represen? by the Austrian in Sofia to their respective that Both reported governments. had learned had ordered its that the Russian government

in Bulgaria to refrain from any action which could be as being in favour of the insurgents.44 Since the represen? interpreted of Russia's two principal thus tatives adversaries in the Balkans representatives to exonerate arises who the Russian government, the question for the apparent was responsible in the revolt. Russian interference book has been given in the admirable The answer to this problem on the Dreikaiserbund by S. Skazkin, who had access to the Russian archives. to Giers did live up to his declarations Imperial Evidently, the Habsburg and from the beginning did exert all his government efforts to prevent the revolt from developing into a new European crisis. At the end of 1881 he instructed in the Russian representative to caution Nikola to be wise and prudent in his attitude Montenegro seemed the uprising.45 of towards to Skazkin, the real instigator According the interference in the revolt was the Russian consul-general in Sofia, M. A. Khitrovo, an ardent Panslav who acted and Austrophobe, from St Petersburg. without instructions From his advantageously aid for the rebels, diplomatic post in Sofia he organised the collection of funds from the sympathetic supervised Bulgarian and distributed He also furnished public money to the volunteers. situated Russian passports which he hoped would enable the new recruits to cross Serbia into Hercegovina.46 of his the best example Perhaps lack of discretion and the extremes to which he was willing to go is the fact that he even felt it proper to solicit funds from the Bulgarian Alexander of Battenberg.47 The prince was already under prince, attack from Austria-Hungary for allegedly permitting Bulgaria to be an assembly area for aid to the rebels, and he, needless to say, refused 44 Biegeleben to Kalnoky, H.H.S. XV 19, No. io, Sofia, 4 March 1882; Lascelles to Granville, F.O. 78/3413, No. 34, Sofia, 24 March 1882. 45 Skazkin, op. cit., p. 209. Later in March 1882 Giers informed the Austrians that he had proposed to the tsar that 30,000 roubles should be granted to Nikola to relieve the Mon? tenegrin government of part of the burden of supporting the refugees who had fled into Montenegro and who were without any means of support. Giers argued that Russia could not now desert these people whom she had aided many times before. He also hoped that such a payment would prevent Nikola from accepting financial assistance from the Slavonic Benevolent Society. From the information available it appears that the Habsburg government did not object. In fact, in February 1882, the Austrians too had presented Nikola with a gift of 100,000 florins in the hope that this would serve as a further induce? ment to the prince to take steps to seal his frontiers. The sum was taken from the fund of 8,000,000 florins voted by the Delegations for the suppression of the revolt. Vladan Djordjevic, Crna Gorai Austrija, 1814-1804, Belgrade, 1924, pp. 462-4. 46 Skazkin, op. cit., pp. 209-10. The highly incriminating evidence presented in R. secretsde la politiquerusseen Orient,1881-1800, Berlin, 1893, has not Leonoff, ed., Documents been used in this article, because Skazkin, who has examined the Russian archives, declares the collection to be 'a crude and ignorant forgery'. Skazkin, op. cit., p. 295. 47 Simeon Radev, Stroitelite sdvremenna na Bdlgariya,Sofia, 1911,1, pp. 339-42; A. Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg,London, 1887, pp. 102-4; and E. C. Corti, Alexandervon sein Kampf mit den ZarenundBismarck,Vienna, 1920, p. 119. Battenberg:

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charac? to do with actions of such a compromising anything ter. In May 1882 Khitrovo not because was recalled from Bulgaria, of the role he played in the rebellion, the extent of which was not realised aid from in until after interference events in the internal Russian Bosnia to Russia, but because of his constant With his departure, of Bulgaria.48 the officials in Bulgaria ceased. Thus, although in many instances and Hercegovina in 1881-2 his return affairs

the Russian those of the period govern? 1875-6, closely paralleled ment did not allow itself to be pushed into a policy which did not conform with Russian national interests. in the uprising the original source of the trouble, Meanwhile, had almost completely died out. During March Bosnia-Hercegovina, and April 1882 the Austro-Hungarian troops were able to recapture most diminution held by the insurgents. With the progressive territory of their area of operation, the latter found it more difficult and the to re-enter Hercegovina from their sanctuaries in Montenegro to Turkish provinces. In time the imperial were able virtually troops of the

seal the frontiers. Since it now seemed certain that the Monarchy the would be able to reassert its authority over the area completely, rebels found less support for their cause in the provinces. However, a problem. the Montenegrin continued to present population the satisfied with Nikola's Although apparently public declarations, was displeased that he had not fully controlled Habsburg government bands the actions of his subjects. Until almost the end some insurgent to In an attempt to operate from Montenegrin continued territory. close this last avenue of serious resistance to their rule, the Austrians on 6 May sent a strong note to Cetinje, informing Nikola that this state of things should be remedied or they would be forced to take 'all measures' Since the revolt had really spent itself and since necessary. Nikola his own subjects had lost much of their earlier enthusiasm, was now able to put into effect measures to comply with the Austrian of all outside assistance, demand. the rebels thus met with Deprived of con? defeat by the end of May, although reports were received tinued The causing skirmishes revolt within of 1881-2, the provinces the despite as late fact that as August.49 it subsided without

a major crisis, the Balkans throughout follow. flict which

the disastrous Austro-Russian rivalry in the region after the turn of the century. These issues did not lead to active conflict in the 1880's, because Russia was neither prepared of Giers, Russian for nor willing to risk war. Under the leadership 48 For a discussion of Khitrovo's role in and the reasons for his recall, Bulgarian affairs see C. E. Black, The Establishment Constitutional Government Bulgaria, Princeton, 1943, in of pp. 195-219. 49 Skarid, op. cit., pp. 29-32; The Times, 29 April, p. 7.

In particular, were to foment

the uneasy exposed peace that prevailed and foreshadowed the events that were to it provided a warning signal of the areas of con?

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forsaken both the dreams of the Panforeign policy had temporarily slavs and the imperialist the drive of the Russian empire towards with the other two great conserva? Straits, in favour of an agreement tive empires. the the policy of the government, However, despite Russian public could still be aroused by tales of the sufferings of the Balkan Orthodox Slavs. when someone like General Therefore, a popular Skobelev, hero, was ready to challenge already military rule over Slavonic German and when such a prominent subjects figure as Ivan Aksakov made passionate pleas on behalf of the Balkan foreign office found itself under strong pressure. Baron in St Petersburg, Councillor of Embassy to his government in January 1882 that one Trauttenberg, reported could not exclude the possibility that Russia 'gegen ihren Willen' would once again be forced to come to the aid of the Balkan Slavs.50 The Russian had thus both to contend with Austrogovernment moves in the Balkans and at the same time to exercise a Hungarian influence over the more adventurous of its own citizens. restraining The Dual Monarchy also found itself in an unfortunate predica? ment. Ostensibly a policy of status quo in the Balkans was being sup? but this was proving Austriato maintain. ported, impossible contained within her frontiers half of the Hungary approximately South Slavonic im? and these were becoming increasingly peoples, bued with nationalistic under these circum? fervour. It appeared stances that the choice would some time have to be made either of these South Slavonic or of bringing under abandoning possessions control those which were as yet outside the empire. The Habsburg first alternative would be a step towards the disintegration of the the second would in all probability lead to war with Monarchy, Russia. Just as in Russia Panslav ideas and the pressure of public opinion influenced officials responsible and Budapest menace', the government, had to contend the so in the Dual Monarchy of the Vienna with the activities who wanted to put an end to the 'Slavonic Slavs, the Russian Even the Austrian

extremists, for the recent disturbances. they believed responsible the revolt showed that not only were Russia and AustriaMoreover, but that confronted with the pressure of public opinion, Hungary Serbia and the Ottoman also faced a situation Montenegro, Empire that was difficult to manage. In all three states the authorities in the last resort could not control of their subjects. The the actions real or alleged inhabi? of the Orthodox and Moslem persecutions tants of the Dual Monarchy found ready sympathy in the three states, whose citizens considered it almost their sacred duty to render what? ever assistance or coreligionists. they could to their compatriots which 50 Trauttenberg to Kalnoky, H.H.S. XXXX 31 January 1882. 209, No. 6C, geheim, St Petersburg

436 These issues were

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of bitter internal questions that of Milan in Serbia, as, for example, struggle if any government, to go against the popular current. should attempt the problem the revolt of 1881--2 was suppressed, Thus, although relations with the newly acquired lands was not of Austro-Hungarian the Habsburg that had been made, the promises solved. Despite reforms in Bosnia-Herce? failed to introduce effective government govina. Some changes were made, but these failed to meet the require? ments of the time and in no way checked the steady growth of antithe situation sentiment. 1882, when injune Consequently, Habsburg the revolt had ended, was in reality basically the same as it had been in January, is so much blaze'.51 when a contemporary combustible material, 51 The Times, observer a feeble wrote spark that might 'where there set all in a

7 January, p. 5.