Sie sind auf Seite 1von 90

UNCLASSIFIED AD NUMBER

AD507319

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO:

FROM:

unclassified

confidential

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

FROM:

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 17 NOV 1969. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

AGO

dtd 23 Jan 1976

D/A

ltr dtd 23

Jan

1976;

AGO

D/A

ltr

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED

AND CLEARED FOR Pe.LIC RELIME UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200,20 AND NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON

ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEENT A

APPROVED~ FO,% PUSLt.C RELKASEJ DISTRIB)UTION UNLIMITED,

SECURITY

MARKING

The classified

or limited status of this report applies

to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a defi- nitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specificafions, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

),

44

./€

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OUPI

OF 11W ADJUTrANT

W4REAL

WASHIN

TON. D.C.

20310

Mi RLY

TO

AGDA (M) (6 Feb 70) FOR OT UT

694259

10 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

BEES

Of

W'4ATIOMSL,T

71,f

Of

iri

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance

with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

I

as

DI

Incl

STRIBUTIONO

Comanding Generals

NETH G.

WICIKM

Major General, USA The Adjutant General

'

~t

US Continental

Army Comand

-

US Army

Combat

Developments

Comand

US Army Material Command Commandants

n

US Army

US

US Army Air Defense School

US Army Armor School

US

US Army Civil Affairs School US Army Combat Surveillance School US Army Electronic Warfare School

War

College

Army Command

Army Aviation

and General Staff College

School

Regrae unclassife whm spraled

from dassifle

Indosre.

US Amy

US

Army

Engineer School

Field Artillery

School

US Army Infantry School

US Army Institute for Military Assistance

CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

CONFIDENTIAL

US Army Intelligence School US Army Ordnance School US Army Signal School US Army Southeastern Signal School US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:

Office, Chief of Staff, US Army Deputy Chiefs of Staff Chief of Research and Development Assistant Chiefs of Staff Chief of Engineers The Surgeon General The Provost Marshal General

OSD(SA) Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces Director, Defense Research & Engineering Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff Commanding Generals

US

Army Electronics Command

US

Army Weapons Command

III Corps

II Field Force Vietnam

Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force, Plans & Operations Commandant of the Marine Corps

USAF Air Ground Operations School The Air University Library Defense Documentation Center USAF Project RAND

Comanding

Officers

US

Army Limited War Laboratory

US

Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency

US

Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center

2

CONFIDENTIAL

I

CONFIDENTIAL

OPRATIONAL REPRT -

LESSONS LANED

HEADQUARTERS II PiRIOD OF 1 AUGUST 169

-

FFORCIV

31

OCTOBER 1969

TABLE OF CONTENTS

P.&RAGfAPH

 

PAGE

1.

(U) Section It Operations: Significant Activities*

 

a.

Comnnde,

*0eS.ooo•.

o.o

****•

oooo0000 01

b.

Personnel# Health, Morale, Safety, and Disiplne

 

2

a.

Intelligence and Counterintelligenoe

 

00005

d.

Operations# Plans, and Training

 

26

o. Logistics and Transportationoo

••000

0.0.•oo42

f. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs

 

.

.00.00.47

g. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Sup,,ort.o 49

h. Communcations

 

55

jo inspector General

 

ko

Staff Judge Avocate

 

0.

.

.

o

2.

(U)

Section II,

Lessons Learnede

Commander's

Observations,

 

EvaluatLonsp

and Recommendations.

 

a. Personnel.,

••••••

•.• ••••••

 

•.56

b. Intelligence

eo Tprain

a.

000000o

do Organizations.

ho

Tatri

INCLOSURES

el.oo

o.oo.O

 

.

.

.58

o

0000

o.0.00 00000000.5

 

9

964

oooo.ooo

o*e

00000.69

II

FFCRCEV

Order of Eattle

ol

II

FFCRCEV

Area of Operationso o.2

INcL

Close C1

A0/Cir

Air Spot.o

B-.52 Sre

o

oe

o

oo

Disposition of Sneua Foroe II FFORCI Troop stes

Inemy Organisation in the III CTZ

S.ot

CONFIDENTIAL

••

7

0.0

0.5

oo.

0.

6

8

Rgradsd unclassifid whn seprated

from cIassifid In osur

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMET OF THE ARMY

HEADqUARTERS,

II

FIELD FORCE IIETNAM

APO San Francisco

96266

AVFBC-RE-H

SUBJECT:

Operational Report-Lessons

17 NOV 1969

Learned of Headquarter, II Fieid

Force Vietnam,

Pericl Ending 31 October 1969,

RCS

CSFOR-65(R2)

SEE DISTRIBUIION

(U)

1.

(C)

Section I, Operations: Significant Activities.

a.

Command Group.

(1)

During the reporting period there were two major changes in the

command group:

(a) On 29 September, Major General Walter B. Richardson became

Acting Commanding General of II Field Force Vietnam, while Lieutenant

General Julian J. Ewell was on

leave in CONUS.

(b) On 3 October, Colonel Berkeley S. Gillespie replaced Brigadier

General Burnside E. Huffman, Jr., as Chief of Staff.

(2) During the reporting period., there were seven major changes in

the staff of II FFORCEV:

(a) On 13 August, Lieutenant Colonel John E. Mann became Deputy Assistant

Chief of Staff, G5, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Daniel H. Wardrop.

(b) On 25 Auguit, Colonel Charles W. Hayward became Assistant

Chief of Staff, G3, replacing Colonel Frederick C. Krause.

(c) On 10 September, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas K. Lightcap became

Deputy Staff Chaplain, replacing Lieutenant Colonel John D. Logan.

(d) On 20 September, Lieutenant Colonel Steven T. Clark became

Provost Marshal, replacing Colonel Saige Okazaki.

(e) On 4 October, Colonel Joseph N. Hearin, Jr. became Commanding

Officer of the 23d Artillery Group, replacing Colonel Walter Beinke. On the

saw day, Colonel John E. Baker replaced Colonel Hearin as Deputy Commander

of Il Field Force

(f) On 17 October, Lieutenant Colonel Richard

Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Raley A Secretary of the

Vietnam Artillery.

T. Lambert replaced General Staff.

(g) On 25 October, Lieutenant Colonel Joe E. McConnell became

CoinMding Officer Alvin Ungerleider.

of Bien Hoa Tactical Area Command, replacing

Colsnel

(3) The overall assigned and attached strength of II FFORCEV increased substantially during the quarter as a result of reorganization in II FFORCEV

4

/

.5~-

Inclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

WNWOMA

AT 311*M

1U3AJ4

tWum Am112 vim

WIw

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-RE-H

SUBJECTs

Operational Report-Lessons

Learned

of

Headquarters,

II

Field

Force

Vietnam,

Period Lnding 31 October 1969,

RCS CsFOi-65(ii2)

(U)

Artillery. followst

A comparison

at

the end of

the

last four reporting perious

DATE

OFICERS

WARRAIT

GFFICARS

i-,

1"bI~I

31

Jan 1969

376

36

3105

30 Apr

1969

412

37

2925

31 Jul

1969

418

36

3010

31

Oct 1969

572

57

4859

b.

Personnel,

Morale,

Safety,

and

Discipline.

(1) USARV General Order 3920, dated 21 October 1969, assigned thc following units to II FFORCEV Artillery:

2d Battalion,

32d Field

Artillery

6th Battalion,

27th Field'Artillery

7th Battalion, 8th Field Artillery

Battery F9 16th Field Artillery

6th Battalion,

15th Field Artillery*

(*scheduled

for deployment)

The personnel sections of the battalions are consolidated under the super-

vision of the Sl,

administration for all artillery units with the exception of the 5th

Battalion (AW) (SP),

section until a later date. The personnel records and related functions

for Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, II FFORC Artillery, Head-

quarters and Headquarters

11 FFORCEV Artiflery,

2d Artillery

and will

accomplish personnel

its organic

and

which will retain

personnel

13

FA

Battery, 8th TAB,

25th Artillery,

AG Section

detachments wre transferred Artillery on 31 October 1969.

from the II FFORCU

to II FFORh6V

(2)

The morale of the command remainnd

at a satisfactory level.

 

(3)

The awards

and decorations

processed, approved an('

issuu

ni

listed below.

INCL

2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-RE-H

SUBJECTs Operational bport-Lessons learned of Headquarters, II Field

Force Vietam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65(R2) (U)

y69 - Jul.69

Aug 62 - Oct 69

SILVER STAR

64

141

DISTINGUISHLD FLYING CROSS

36

50

SULDI S

fWAL

17

34

BR(NU

STAR

EIML

471

1282

AIR MEDAL

500

1202

ARMY CO*WDATIOJ

MEDAL

667

1962

PURPLE~ HUIRT

28

4

 

TOTAL

1783

4717

(4) Effective 17 October 1969, the following units were assigned to Field Foroe Artillery and came under the decorations and awards

II

authority of CG, II Field Force:

6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery

6th Battalion, 15th Field Artillery

2d Battalion, 32d Field Artillery

Battery F, 16th Field Artillery

7th Pattalion, 8th Field Artillery

234th FA Detachment (Radar)

260th FA Detachment

(Radar)

258th FA Detaomnt (Radar)

(5)

(a)

Postal Activities,

During

the quarter,

44th .Army Postal Units

the 44th APU sold $9030200.00 in mney

orders, processed 91 tons of inoomhW mail and 41 tons of outgoing mil. Wfective 15 September, all active duty military personnel in Vietnam were

INCL

3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC-RS-H 3UBJXT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, II Field

Force Vietnam, Period .Ending31 October 1969, RCS CSFOE-65(R.

authorized to purchase

October,

so

postal money orders without paying

the procedure for purchasing money orders was further modified

a fee.

reiuirea

On 10

tn

that

personnel

desiring to

purchase

money orders

were

furnish the postal clerk a

(Currency

pre-addressed envelope,

the

to

ID Card.

The

31

December

and

with I',CV Form 5

clprk

Control

-late)

and

postal

now

Mtils

by

isCVs

k.TIA,

.L,

t1*

envelope.

The

(b)

iperitd of

period

increaad

1 October

postal activity

was

designatt,:

"Ci

has been termed

-

b,;LL". In preparation for "ui&ATIUV iLGIWLLL", the 44t, Al-U has been

• Jmented with four personnel and 2' ton mail van.

(6) The military personnel iijury

the

FY 69

rate as

rate for 1st ,.uarte:, PTY70 1:

Tne

--ru

motor

35.4,. below

vehicle accident rate remained the sime.

shown on the chart below.

II F7ORCSV AiSIG.D, ATTACKED, AND OiCUN4 U1I'

FY 69

GIL;GRY

*ilitary personnel

(Injuries

injury

rate

per one million man-days)

.%r1y motor vehicle acciaent rate (Accidents per one million miles)

LU1st

Jtr,

'Y

I

46.1

29.8

6.5

6.

(7) Weapons accidents involving s:, ll

irms anl/or

'rnridpf ,r'

1~c

1

q1 injuries and 12 fatalities, accountinC for ,'w. motor vehicle accidents accounted for 29

a&id

sevn

I" killed in

fatalities.

Additionally,

41.5,

of

t)-e tot)

military

;,erc'nne

r

t, ,

'

there were 26 Viet.,>e

r iv.

k

accidents involving Army motor vehicles.

for conditions

was the primary cause of Army motor vehicle accidents, in"

upon entering

a secure

area was the

major

factor

failure

to clear

weapons in weapons accidents.

(8)

The status

of discipline,

stable.

law Hn

order

within

thp

CoQM,.A

mained reiativelV

,k-

Nuarterly

sttistics for the lit

?kXtkW, V

assigned,

art,',

70 indicate that offense rates for II

,ttacnea ;,_

nits remain relatively stable when compared witn tne previos tart

quarters. Miscellaneous and

w

downturn

conand interest and selective

military

offenses ',ontinued to declin,"

persons and pro erty.

offenses

Unit

reflected

increaz-d

standdown and larger

inerease was experienced in crimes against

in previously

increasing

traffic

enforcement.

4

C0-iINi

'BAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVMBC-IM-H

StUJ&Vol

Operational Report-Lessons learned of iheadquarters, II Field Fbroe Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65() (U)

troop densities In base camps associated

-ith the

tactical lull can be

viewed as primary causes cf increased incidents. The last three quarters of IT 69 and the first quarter of FY 70 compative rates Zcmputt on the basis of 1000 troops are listed below.

0

Crime Againet Persons

SE

A

ORY

2d

3r6 tr 69

4th Qtz9

lot

tr 70

and Property

3.17

1.91

1.,2

2.13

Miscellaneous

Offenses

50.08

4.44

6.29

6.00

Military Offenses

22.18

20.09

19.16

17.53

Traffic Offenses 13.31

16.89

21.*5

17.53

O Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

(1) Intelligence aspects .of tactical operations conducted inthe II

Field Poroe Vietnam (II

discussed in the Operational bport-Lessons Learned submitted by units under the operational control of this headquarters.

MIRCE!) Tactical Area of Interest

(TA0)

are

(2) Intelligence Collection.

(a) The daily briefing of selected agent reports was continued by

Colleotion Division. The purpose of this briefing was to inform thl 02

of enear momemnt, supplyg, subordination, strangth, and intentions s

veil as to better evaluate

nine the reliability of the sources.

which smpleys

which should be released.

intelligence produced by agents and to deter-

This,

in turn, enables

the agency

which saents warrant retention and

the sources to decide

(b) Colleotion Division was also responsible for

pecific

Intelligene bquiremtu (SICR)

olleotion ageniese

appgrwiate

insuring that ell were published ad

olletie

muessawy

levied on the

In addition,

vision ecordinated the collection of intelligence on specific

subjects

Wi infaored subordinate uits as to which SICR'S were ourrent by publishing

a qutery I11 0MO0 bgsta/. The hlgitt

specific

Intelligence

Indeed all SICR's by

Collection

Requiremnts

amber and by collection

CONFII)ENT IAL

CONFIIENTIAL

SWJs

Operational Haport-lessone

learned of

Hbadquarters,

Force Vietnamt

Period Ending 31 October 1969,

RCS

II

Field

C.3FR-65(R2)

(U)

asncy. During the past quartert 7 MACV 5ICR's and 2 II FFORCEV SICR'a

Were canoelledt while 18 new MACV and no new II FFORCLV SICR's were levied. Two MACV colleotion plans, Black Beard and Rapid Shave, were revised and one MACV collection plan, Empty Flask, was cancelled, its requirements

being incorporated into Black Beard.

mented,

One

new collection

plan was imple-

local

the

I

FFORCET Intelligence III CTZ.

Collection

Plan III CTZ against

force units in

(c) During

the period 1 August to

31

October 1969,

Collection

Division

continued to analyse agent reports for more complete exploitation of all reported information* Specific area of interest examined were: enerw

sanctuaries

divisional force.;

and base areas;

caches;

movement

- particularly

which

of regimental

and

intelligence

would contribute

to tha

identification and selection of targets by the G2 Target Division; and informtion regarding enen activities on interior waterways patrolled

by the

W3 Navy,

which

is passed

to the Navy 150,

(3) Counterinte llisence/PHOENIX,

(a)

Operations

of the Province

and

District

II

FlORCEV.

Intelligence

and Operations

Ooordinating

enters (DlOCC)

improved

considerably as compared

to the

pre-

vious quarter.

This improvement

was

borne out by the

increased

rate

of

VCI

neutralisations,

(aonthly

average

of 221

VCI

neutralizations

for first

six months of 1969,

as

compared

to

380 for this reporting

period).

This

increase was attributable to (1) increased emphasis by the GVN on the

I'hung HOW Program; (2) upgrading the US advisory effort

to

tho

Phung

Hong Program; (3) increased use of speoifio targeting; (4) increased rate of Doi Chah; and (5) extension of GVN control over additional hamlets. The GVN Phung Wang Program was extended down to the village level in thrn

provinces

In III

CTZ.

These

village

organizations

were designed

to serve

as

intelligence

collection

agencies

and,

hopefully

would

involve

village

offioials to a greater extent in the attack on the infrastructure. The Big ack Intelligenoe Collection Program continued to improve. During

th quartet 40 per"oaul from II FIORCOT OPCO units attended the PRODIX School Mesented by MACOORDS/PBONIX.

(b) Emphasis

the results continued

to the program a attributed

to fall

contimued on the

Volunteer

Informant Program (VIP)

decline

The

in

but

short of expectations.

overall

to the

limited response

activity.

military

Additionaly, Vietnamese civillans were still

forested areas of III

restricted from entering

MZ. The VIP was not seriously affected by the

the

austere

funding

conditions

existing

throughout

South Vietnam.

6

CON

'l

AlIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECTs

Operational BRport-Leusons

Force Vietnam,

Learned of

badquarters,

II Field

Period Ending 31 October 1969,

SCS cSFOR-65() which began lost

(o) The analysis

of serrorist incident locations,

(U)

May, continued through the past quarter. In general, the analysis indi- cated that terrorism ocourred along lines of o.mmunication in contested

areas.

Mediated at the tim the analysis was initiated.

Over the

This result was past six months,

it

was shown that terrorism followed no definite

pattern. One thing which we learned from the anlysis, however, was that a need existed for a more precise definition of terrorism. The definition used by MACV iss Terrorism includes those acts by the ene directed

primarily against the civilian population.

The key word in this definition

is

"direoted".

This required a decision as to the intent of

the persons

responsible for the incident. For example, a mine is planted on a road.

If

a military vehicle detonates

the mine,

it

wae

not listed as a terrorist

incident.

However,

if

a tri-lambretta

hit the mine,

it

was

terrorism.

Another common example was a rocket landing in

installations. WIea the rocket aimed at the hamlet, or was it unsuccessfully aimed at the installation and missed? Monitoring terrorism did Mrovide an indication of the progress of pacification efforts, During the past quarter, terrorism steadily declined, from 211 incidents in July, to 180

in August, to 123 in September. At the tim of preparation of this report, it was too early v.o forecast any trend for tim month of October.

a hamlet near a military

(4)

Ground Reconnaissance.

Company D (Ranger),

151st infantry GOn-

tinued its operations In U1 Province, Eastern SR-5. and southern War Zone D. Initially, the unit screened the northern approaches to the long Dinh - Binh oa complex, while in September and October, Company D was targeted against elements of the 74th Artillery Pegiment. As the quarter progressed, more frequent use of the ready reaction force was noted along with afre

aggressive employment of the team. Utilising

niques, there were 241 teams inserted which resulted in 30 contacts,

sightings, 17 eneW killed and I prisoner. In mid-October, Company D entered into an extensive training program as the National Guard personnel were replaced by active Army personnel.

saturation patrolling

tech-

53

(5) Q,2 Air.

(a)

While

Air Pore

photography continued

to be the photographic

larger areas

mainstay because of its ability

OV-1 Mohawk, increasing use was made of Mohawk photography using the KA-30 oamra. The most suitable lens was found to be the six-inch lens, which produced greater clarity at large scales (1:1f500 - 13000). This was excellent photography for exploiting small areas of interest originally

detected on smaller soale Air Force photography. Experience shoved that

to cover relatively

than the

7

CONFIDENTIAL

I

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFBC419-

SUBEiCTt

the

two systoe,

Opational 11port-Lessono Learned of Headquarter,

11 Field

Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1969,

Air

RCS CSFOR-65(2)

(U)

Foe and ArW, complement each other muost ef(~otively

environment

in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

enlargemnt has made a substantial contri-

aetivitir.

aircraft covered the entire

In the O0ltr.in8Ur98ncW

The Mohawik photogwapl' at a 2X

bution in the area,of targeting and monitoring ensM

Side Looking Airborne Rladar (SLUR)

III CTZ five times

detect

Surveillance patterns placed a heavy emphasis along the Cambodian border,

Angel's Wines&Toy Viah Province,

(b)

a night pine once during the day in an attempt to

and on the periphery

of the corps area.

the Fishhook,

and the northern and

ay movement within

southern TAWI'se

into the

above,

period*

Movement remained

fairly constant on all approaches

Saigon area. with the ezoeption of the Adamsa Road Corridor where

normal movement was detected throughout the majority of tho report irg

(c) Infrared (Red Raz)

surveillance was asseubly areas

provided,

flown~ to detect

within ni

enemy activity,

base camps, staging areas, and

emphasis was

ci1z. During this

period,

the Cambodian border, Tay JWinhv Binh

Wiar Zones C and D).

Song B. Corridor, Michelin Plantation,

flantation, the Phno Vlnh

south of Trang Scm.

Bien floa area and season drastically

placed on the surveillance

Long,

Coverage was also

Also,

of the areas adjacent

to

and

over the

Filhol

are a

and Phuoc Long Provinces,

and the

almost

go Bo and Dci Loi Woods,

nightly,

Funnel Area,

the Catcher's Mittv

possible rocket launch sites around Long Binh/

pricrities,

The monsoon

around Saigon were given high

reduced the

at:mospheric

quantity of recorded Rled Haae emissions

attenuation,

and the

because of weather aborts,

high content

of moisture in the jungle aoov and soil.

(d)

On 16 September

1969,

the recommendations

of the 07-1 Fohawk

Direct Support Concept

General Orders attaching the

Evaluation were realized with the

Aerial Surveillance

and

lot UM Infantry Division and

publication of

Acquisition

Target

(ASTA)

Platoons

of the

let US Cavalry

Division

(AX)

Airplane).

for all purposes to the 73d Aviation CompszV (Surveillance

(e) The height of the southwest monsoon during the montbs of Auguat

the Air Force target

attempts,

and

of all RIB to approximately 35

completions

fell

Per Cente

The

resulting in the coverage

and September reduced

from the usual 50 per cent

southwest monsoon subsided early in October,

of many backlogged targets

to constitute

(exact figures not yet available).

71

per cent

in

Daring this

period the organization of preplanned targets

90 per cent

in!corps increased by

targets

in RYN.

of all preplanned

8

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJCTS

Operational Report-Lessons Leazned of Headquarters, Il Field Force Vietnaua Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFO-65(2) (U)

(f)

Closer coordi ation was established with Detacibment 1, 460th

Tactical Reconnaissance

Red Haze sensor to increase flexibility and resionsiveness. Availability

of this sensor increased by 100 per cent in Octcber: however, full effectivness will not be realized until December because of the influx of itrexperienced crew mebe-s.

Wing (TRW)

which utilized

the ES-10-A

real time

(g) The efficiency of film processing ed inte:iretation of the

460tb TRW at ?an Son Bhut va.;

increased by the 45th 2actical Reconnaissance

Squadron-(TS) anquiring

Facility (PPIF). In the near future, the 12th Reconnaissance Technical

its own Portabka Photographic Interpretation

Squadron (S)

will also acquire a FPF3 to further increase the Air Force

support.

(6) M Targets Division.

(a) The G2 Targets Divieion's rima7r function continued to be the

development and evaluation oi targets for B-52 strikes. Tn conjunction with this function, an extensive data base of hard ir'stallations 'rawn on acetate maps, to encompass niI Corps Tactical Zone, continued to evolve. The data base portayed eney hunkers, base camps, fightin6 positions, tunnels, and other hard installation data. Since friendly units were

often not in an AO for a sufficient period of time to have a complete "feel" for the previously constructed hard installations, C2 Targets

alleviated this problem in

Gang Toi and traditional areas of the 274th Regint by providing

friendly units involved in the above stated areas with a comprehensive and current acetate overlay of enemy hard installation data in their

the areas

of Long Thanh,

Catcher' s Mitt.

respective

AC'so

(b) siring this quarter, 504 B-52 strikes were targeted apinst lucrative base and staging areas within III Corps Tactical Zone. Fifty- sve per cent of the B-52 air assets available within Southeast Asia wre allocated for strike to this headquarters by YACV. The most inten- sive targeting of the quarter was in August against the lot EVA Division# 7th NVA Division, ad 9th VVA Division located in northeastern Tay 3bb

Province and western Binh Long Pzovine. Tb 5th VC Division was also

heavily bomba ded in its base areas southeast of Bu Gia Naps

In Septeabero

3-52 strikes weo evenly dispersed in II CTZ with the exception of

consentrations in

Division and northeast of Bearcat against the 274th Regimt. In October,

targeting emphasis

also on infiltrating WVA/VC troop concerretions based along logistical

9

nortbwesteorn Due Phong

targeted against

the 5th VC

continued against the 274th Regiment with emphasis

CONFIDENTIAL

I

COWFITIENTIAL

IVFBC-PRE.-] SJCTs

Operational Report-lessons

learned

of

Headquartersq

II

Field

Force

Vietnam,

Period Ending

31

October 1969,

RCS CSFOR-65(02)

(U)

resupply points along the Serges Junle Highway. One strike was targeted against the D445 Battalion in the Long Hai area located in southern Phuoc Tuy Province and resulted in 46 secondary explosions, suggesting tbat the area was probably being used for the storage of vast quantities of munitions.

(c)

The

29th Chemical

Detachment,

under the

operational

control of

G2

Targets

Division,

remained

one

of the

princiral

sE4eiilance

means

available

borne personnel

to

tlx

division.

This quarter,

212 hours

-ere

flown on air- to 184 hours for

detector (Sniffer) missionst compared

tie previous quarter. Units supported on "Sniffer" missions during the

quarter were as follows:

of 82d t rborne, and BMTAC. Due to tle rainy season, there were no

defoliation missions conducted or reqc 'd of this unit.

199th LiFbt Infantry Brigade,

RTAVF,

1d Brigade

(7)

Description

and Recepitution

of Enemy Qrde;. cf Battle.

(a) Descriptions The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVK) rericined the supreme political military headquarters controllin all Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (YVA) activities in the southerv half of the Republic of Vietnam. Military units in III CTZ are subordin- ated either directly to COSVN.or to one of eight secondary level headquarters

in III CTZ.

(See Inclosure 8). There were no significant changes in

the

enemy's

II CTZ continued

appeared to be a shift in eneo tactics toward decentralization and small scale actions aimed at sustaining a steady attrition of US and allied forces and protecting the VC political infrastructure, while keeping main

military-political bcundaries

during the quarter and

the avea

There

of

to be divided into 13 major sub-divisions.

force strength intact for the long run. Yost large VC and ?VVA maneuver units were back in base areas preparing fror the Winter-Spring Campaign, but reCional and sub regional commands appeared to have been given the go ahead to plan and execute highpointr indepenilently.

(b) Significant

Order

of Battle

Developments.

.t

Few significant

in

the

units were noted

changes

E

in

the

number and effectiveness

The table

of enei

the

FFORCEV TAOI.

below portrays

combat effectiveness beginning and end of

of regiumnts and separate battalions at the

the quarter.

Units which were