*c

Major Petibon. THB 9 th DIVISION IB

1918.

... TACTICAL 3TUDY.

CHAPTERS I ana XII,

--- With annotationa by General Oemolin.

CHAPTER I: THE DIVISION IK A WITHDRAWAL.

Page8 1 to 68 inoluslro.
CHAPTER III: THE DIVISION IH THE ATTACK IN A COMBINED OFFENSIVE ACTION.
Pages 69 to 108 inclusive
. *********
Translated from tho Frenoh
by
Captain John B* Sherman.
---- The Command and General Staff School
Fort Lcavenworth,
Kansas,

THR 9 th DIVISION IN 1918,

First Chapter,
THE DIVISION I!< A WITHDRAWAL,
(NOYON. MARCH)

In March 1918? the 9th Division Is resting in the vioinity of

Kstre'es--Saint-Denis,
It is composed oft
The divisional infantry (1), oonsisting of the 4th, 82nd,
and 389th Infantry, eaoh made up of three battalions oonsisting of
three companies of infantry and a maohlne-gun company*
The divisional artillery (8), oonsisting of a field artillery
regiment made up of three groups of 76 mm.guns; the 30th Field Art illery, and a group of heavy 166 mm.howitzers f Schneider ); the
fifth group of the 105th Field Artillery, ( Translator's note: 8,
3 or 4 batteries in a group)*
A divisional squadron ( the 3rd of the 8th light oavalry )
Two companies of engineers: 6/4 and 6/62,
2nd Battalion, 122nd Territorials.
Auxiliary servloes*
The division onoe more has been brought up to full strength
in personnel and materiel; its instruction has been perfeoted during
its laut six weeks of rest, especially in regard to tho war of move ,ment. Therefore It is in exoellent oondition to go into battle*
(1), Colonel, afterwards General Sohier,
(S), Colonel, afterwards General Fain*

8.
On Uaroh Blst, the Germans open their offensive on all sides
of St-Quentin, They break through the British front nnd progress
rupidly In a southwesterly direction*
The 9th Division, reserve of General Headquarters, plaoed at
the left of the Frenoh Army, will be one of the first divisions
sent to stop the wave whioh is rolling In,
On Uaroh 28nd, at 1:00 A*U, the following telegram is reoolved
at divisional headquarters.
"The 9th Division, whioh will be immediately alerted, will hold
itself in readiness to be transported by trucks, today Uaroh 22nd,
to start in 8 hours* The movement will be arranged by the llotor
Transport Regulating Commission, Tho mounted elements will move
towards the north as soon as the truoks shall have passed*
A divisional staff offioer will prooeed to Oeneral Headquartorg
of the Army to reoelve the orders, at 8;00 A* U."
The ohief of staff has the warning order telephoned to oil
bivouao oo&nanders.
The division 0*3 goes to Army Headquarters at Olermonfc, and re ports to the offioer who is to aoquaint him with the situation and
to give him his orders* The statement given to him may be summed
up as follows:
"General situations British front broken over an extent of
raoro than 60 kilometere* Aooording to the latest information, the
enemy is advancing rapidly*

8.
"Probable intentions of the enemyi To advance rapidly into the broaoh oade, and to separate the two British and Frenoh armies, while turning partly on Amiens, partly on Paris* "Oar intentions! To rapidly form a grouping of Frenoh foroes, to thxleft of the Frenoh (main) Army, to proteot the TOfa British Army in retreat, to stop the enemy, and try to establish l i a i s o n with the British armies w^'oh are s t i l l holding before Amiens and further north* "Consequentlyi "There s h a l l be formed a grouping of those d i v i s i o n s that are nearest to eaoh other* This grouping, undor oommand of General Pell", commander of the Vtfa Army Oorpa ( 1 ) , w i l l Immediately go into aotlon on bhe l e f t of the main Frenoh Army, i t s mission being to blook the road Hoyon-Complegne-Paris to the enemy, while new groups w i l l be formed to aot further to the l e f t * "The 9th Division w i l l be one of the f i r s t to be transported in truoks. I t w i l l be detrucked, beginning today, i n the vioinlty of Noyon* An officer of the Motor Transport Regulating Commission w i l l report this morning at your headquarters to arrange the movement* Your equipment w i l l follow by road* "Command Post of General Pelle't Hoy on ( Town Hall )* today after 8:00 P.M."

Upon return to division headquarters, the offioer makes a report of hie nil salon. The general and his ohlef of s t a f f are staying at Estrees8t Denis to arrange for the entrucking of the foot-troops of the division

(1)*

To whioh the 9th Division belongs organioally*

4.

and the departure of the truok column. They will leave BO t\a to bo In Roy on ot 7i.OO PU, that let before the arrival of Oonoral Pellet The commander of the divisional infantry and the division Q-3 start immediately in the direation of HoyonGuiaoird-Ham, in order to gather Information of the situation in this region, where the
V

division will have to go into aotion, and to prepare, in accordance with this reoonnaiseanoe, the order for the tf'.aposition of the troops in blvouao8t Contact i s mad* by then with the staff of the Hire) British Army Corps, at Buohoiro (near Guisoardh The onemy i s adrana* Ing rapidly; i t is possible that tomorrow he may be on the Somme Oenal. They return immediately to Hoyon. There, the staff offioer of the Army Corps, in cooperation with the offioer regulating the de truoking of the troops, gives to the 9th Division, for tho night of lfaroh 22nd to 23rd, the area in whioh i t will be stationed} Bethanoourt finolusive)-Tirlan3ourt{inclusive)GuiaoardfexoluBive)Mauoourt (inolus ive) Noyon(inoluaive)Vauohelles(inolusive)Porquorloourt finoluslve)fcus3y(inclusive) Division ooramand posts Hoyon* As a function of this aone and the enemy, who i s in a northeasterly direction, more than a day's maroh away, the plan for the pladlng of the troops la immediately drawn up according to the direotions given by the general, with the idea of having a distinot arrangement in readiness for the next day, with two regiments ready to maroh in front, to the north, northeast, or east, and one regiment in reserve. The other elements! divisional oenter of instruction, headquarters 2nd eohelon, group of divisional atretoher-bearera, are plaoed more to the rear, ready to follow. The mounted elements are not oonaidered. These, moving by road,

6.
oannot arrive before tomorrow*
The assignment to bivouac areas is as follows ( Map No. 1 ):
Divisional Headquarters, first eohelon* '
Staffs: Divisional Infantry.divis- 17 Plaoe Oordouan, Hoyon*
ional artillery, engineers, medical
oorps.
battalions and staff: Queamy*
88nd Infantry*
329th Infantry* 11 battalion}* jllauooort*
1 battalion and staff: Rimberoourt.
1 battaliont......... :Muironoourt*
(Bethauoourt*
(Tirlanoourt*
l battalion aid staff: Busay.
1 battalion:* .< Orioolles,
1 Battalion:****...i Genvry*
) Vauohellee,
..)
1 battalion :*

Headquarters. 2nd eohelon: Oroup of divisional stretoner-bearers:*

Companies of Engineers: ...<.*..) porq.uorloou.rt

Divia ional Gen ter of Ins truo tions :*... * * )
After completing this table, the officer of the 0-3 seotion goes
to await the truofc oolumn at the point where the column is to be broken
up, whioh point is 300 meters to the east of the eastern exit of
Larbroye*
There, as they successively pass, he gives to the commanders of
the units information on the general situation, and the order relating
to the bivouacking of the troops for the night* After this he returns
to Hoyon, and makes a report to his general, who has just arrived, on
what he has done during the day*

6.
At 8j00 P.M. a mooting la hold, at Headquarters of tho Army Corps, of the division commanders of tho groupings General Pella" outlines tho situation as follows: This evening the enemy had reached the oanal botweon tho Somme and the Oise, on the front Tergnier--Saint-Simonj The troops of the H i s t British Army Corps( headquarters: Buohoire), who were occupying the line beyond the oanal, are s t i l l holding out on the south bank* The 14th Division, in particular, i s ca the line llenneais (exolusive), Flavy-le-Martel (inclusive). Head quarters: Deaumont-on-Beine, The 17th British Division is farther to the p.3t# According to latest intelligence received, the enemy has cooupied Torgnier, Juasy; The 125th Prenoh Division Is marohing out of ViryHoureil this evening ( Uaroh ESnd ), in the direotion of Tergnler, The 1st Frenoh Bismountad Cavalry Division must take position on the .eft of the 185th Division. Then, successively further to the l e f t , the 9th and 10th Frenoh Divisions will follow each other into aotion, Afterwards the general gives, to eaoh of his division oomoan ders, the ordera whioh oonoern him* He orders the general oommanding the 9th Division to hold himself in readiness to relieve, during the night of the 23rd-24th, the infantry of the 14th British Division on the front: Hennesis (exclusive;) Chateau do Savriennols (north of Flavy-le-llartel, inclusive).

7,
The British artillery is to stay in plaoe until it oan bo relieved
by the Frenoh artillery.
For the purpose of the exeoution of this movement, the 9th Divis ion, as soon as possible, will push its most advanced elamenta for*
ward in the region Beaumont-Genlis Woods*
Should the situation of tomorrow, tne 23rd, not allow it to
accomplish its mission of reliof it must be disposed on the line;
Beaumont(inolusive)Qenlis-Ouyenoourt woods (exolusive), whioh must
be held at all oopts.
Contact on the right with the let Dismounted Cavalry Division,
whioh will hold Gfuyenoourt. Information regarding the troops operating
on the left will be given later*
For its mission, the 9th Division will have available, over and
above its organic elemental
The 308th Field Artillery, consisting of:
& groups of 155 mm,howltsera,( Sohneider );
1 group "of 166 nan,heavy guns,( 1877 );
1 group of 166 mm.howitzers, ( 1912 )
This regiment is scheduled to arrive at Hoyon in the afternoon
of Uaroh 23rd,
These order? are given verbally to the division oommandor* His G~3, who is present, takes notes*
Confirmation of what has been aaid will be published in writing
by an Army Corps general order, whioh is being printed at this very time*
But the general does not wait until receiving this confirmation
before issuing his own orders. He must save time, for it is imperative
that his orders reaoh hie units during the night, so fiat the troop
movements may be executed the next morning at daylight.
N

e.

What ia to be aooompllshod?
To bring the division into the region; Oenlis woodsla-Heuville,
so that It may either relievo the British division on the following
night, or, if this relief cannot be aooomplished on aooount of the
enemy's advanoe, to give battle in this position,
What can the enemy do to prevent the carrying oat of this
mission?
Push book the English, oross the oanal, and reaoh the indicated
position beforo the division can do ao#
In the present situation, a hostile attaok cannot take place
before daylight the next morning* As it may be anticipated that this
attaok will undoubtedly be delayed by the defensive action of the
British, it is almost oertaln that It oannot reaoh the Oenlis woods
ahead of the troops of the 9th Division, if they oarry out their move*
ment in the early hours of the day. Further, the roads leading from
the bivouaos to the Genlis woods oannot, at present, be effectively
taken under observed fire of the enemy artillery*
Thoroforo the troops can move to it (Genii8 woods) in column, on
the road* But, for added safety, and in order to Insure the poaaibil lty of manoeuvre in case of necessity, the troops will be protected
by advanoe guards
What disposition of the troops is to be oarried out after com pletion of the movement?
The information on the situation of the 14th British Division
is vague and ur^eliable* How is this division placed? Oan it hold

9.
out until tomorrow night? 11 the enemy advances, will the 9th Dlvis lon have to fight faoing towards tho east or towards the northeast ?
Therefore the formation to be adopted is one \vhioh should permit the faoing of any eventuality, that 1st a disposition in depth*
Because of the Importanoe of the front, and the divergence of
possible dlreotlons in whioh tho enemy may attaok, a front of two
regiments is necessary* Therefore we must have two regimonts in tho
line, eaoh having one battalion advanoed, the other battalions to
the rear, ready to support the first ones in the direotion of attaok,
or ready to accomplish the intended relief by tho existing roads* The
third regiment, in reserve, will be plaoed at a road intersection,
ready to advanoe in one of the two directions,
Examination of the map shows which are the routes to be taken
by the units for their movements*
The division oommander's order (1) will therefore be the following:
9 th INFANTRY DIVISION. STAFF. 3rd Section*
GENERAL ORDER OP OPERATIONS HO X For the day of Haroh 23rd*
I* General situation. Here is given a repetition of the infor mation given by the oorps oommander. ()
II* Mission of the division*-- Here Is stated the mission assigned
by the oorps commander, (3).
Ill, Supplementary means, pu.t at the disposition of the division
The orders givon in the prosent study are, of oourae, those
that were actually issued in aotion*
(8) and {3). Not reproduced, to shorten the text*
(1)* DIVISION 0, P.
82 March* 12:30 A,W.
(Twenty-third Maroh, twelve-thirty A.M)
|

10,
to aooomplieh its mission : 308th Field Artillery ( heavy) consisting
of ....(1)
IV, Execution,- The infantry, breaking camp at 7:00 A,M. (2),
will start its aaroh in oolumns, but with advance guards, and randy
to deploy for battle*
82nd Infantry. Routes QuivryTJgny-le-0ay* This regiment must
push its leading battalion into the Genlis Woods, th battalion
following towardB Ugny-le-Qayt lto rear battalion towards los Reset tee.
It will hold itself in readiness to defend the GeniiB Woods, from the
Chateau Oalllard (exolusire) to Guyenoourt (exclusive)* Liaison on
the right with the 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division, on the left with
the 329th Infantry,
Command post of the colonels Ugny-le-Qay.
The 39th Infantry, moving through Berlanoourt, will bring its
leading battalion to Beaumont-en-Belne, and the main body of the reg iment on the plateau of the Ohdteau and the farm of Beino* It will
hold itself In readiness to defend* the fronts Chateau. Galllard (inclus ive)Beculleu (inclusive)*
Command post of the colonels Chateau and farm of Beine,
4th Infantry: will move via Saint-Martin to a position at Quesmy-
Uauoourt, in division reserve, prepared to move towards either Ouivry
or Berlanoourt*
Command post of the oolonel: Quesmy,
Initial location of the division command post and headquarters
of the first eohelon: Quesmy, after 9:00 A,M, (Divisional infantry,
divisional artillery, engineers, medioal troops, with the division
commander,)'
(1) Hot reproduced, to shorten the text*
(2) It is the end of tfaroh. Order is muoh more Important than haste.

lit The engineers and the group of divisional stretohor-boarers will prooeed through Beaurains, Oonvr-y, OrlsoHes, Saint-liar tin-sur Ques/ny, following the 4th Infantry, Tho Divisional Center of Instruction and headquarters of second eohelon will be maintained at Porquerloourt and Vauohellea* YA subsequent order will presorlbe tho movemont of the wagon* trains and the cavalry squadron (1). VI,--Trucks will be placed at the disposition of tho battalions, at 6s00 A#M., in their bivouacs, for the transportation of the machine* gunsr One day's reatfrve rations will also be distributed, by luotcr trucks, to the troops in theAbi7Ouao8, before their departure* Tno Commanding General, 9th Division*
Signed* GAMELIN. Chief of Staff. BLIH. (OF?IOIAL)

This order la dospatoned to the urdte whioh alroady hare been alerted and aoquainted with the situation by the l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s . The order leaves the division command post at ls80 AUt on the 23rd, and w i l l rocoh the units at about 3:00 A*U*

DAY 0? M R H 23rd. AC

(UAP HO. 1 ) .

i f t e r two or three hours sleep, the general leaves with his ptaff at about 6:00 A,U,, to go to Quearay, v/here he has decided to establish his oomirand post at the Chateau. He arrives Vnere a t about fit00 A.M.

(1)

I t must be remembered that these units have not yet arrived in the zone of the d i v i s i o n .

12.
.At the some timo, the divisional ouvalry equadron arrirea tilso,
whioh, moving aorois country, has passod she wagon-train, whioh Is
often delayed to allow the motor truoks to pasn
Soon after his arrival at Quesmy, the division oomnander goes
to Buohoire to ceet the oom-*auding general of the III* British Army
Corps. There ho also moots the commanding genorul of the XVIIIMl
British Army Corps and learns that the British troops are retiring
everywhere, having lost the oroueings over the canal* Hcllon,
The general returns immediately to his headquarters, and studies
the situation, to give his orders accordingly.
He must not lose sight of his primary missior, for, if he ehould
abandon the Genlis Woods, the enemy might be able to wedge himself
into the breaoh thus formed* But neither oan he negleot this threat
on his left flank, whioh is the more 'serious b8 the 10th Division,
whioh is to operate on his left, rill not arrive until the afternoon*
Therefore, while maintaining a disposition of troopo fGOing eeat
and northeast, he also must plaoo troops i'aolng to r.he uortti, sad
this as qu!:>cly as possible, as the situation may beoome critical at
any moment*
What troops has he available to ward off this threat ?
His divisional oavalry oiuadron, one of the battalions of the
Chateau and farm of Beine, the 39th Infantry, and tha 4th Infantry,
in reserve at Quesmy-Uauoourta
Whero shall he strike his oountor-atteok ?
The enemy
has penetrated Into Ram, and is marching on Oolanoourt and Esmery-

13
An examination of the map ahown that the plateaux to the north of Flavy-le-Meldeux and le Plessis-Patte-d'Oie aoom to lend thorusolvoa well to this, ond are situated at a oonvenlent distanoe* Therefore he vrill immediately move his squadron there, whioh will hold the knolls until the arrival of the regiment from Quosmy-llauoourt. Afterwards, the relieved oquadron will proteot the left flunk of the division, maintaining itself on i t s exterior flank, while one of the battalions of the 389th Infantry, from the Chateau and farm of Beino, will insure liaison between the 4th and the 389th Infantry by prooeoding to Villeselve* Here then i s the division, extended over a front of 16 kilometers What does i t matter 1 This situation i s thrust upon us by the oir oumstanoest But in this situation the division oannot pretend any more defin itely to stop the enemy; a l l i t can do, no doubt, will be to hold out for a limited time under powerful attaoks, unless i t be reinforoed. This, at locet, is what the ge.ral thinks, but he keeps this thought for his ohlef, the oommander of the Vfati Army Corps, and does not im part i t to his subordinate commandera. After having thus deployed his division, and engaged a l l hia reserves, the first oonoern of the genoral is to reorganise now onoe. To nooompllsh this, ho takes the two battalions of the 8End Infantry at Ugny-lo-Gay and les HoBettos, and plaoes them in division reserves OonooquohMy, the order issued is the following!

14. 9th INFATTRY DIYI8I0H. STAFF. <)*. Cfciesmy. 83 ttaroh. 10:30 A.M. (Twenty-third Uaroh. Ten-thirty A.U.).

3rd Seotion. H. O D R HO. 8. RE

I.

Situation.

On the l e f t of toe division, the XTCXXtfe B r i t i s h

Army Oorpe advines that the enemy, debouohin3 from Ham, hae pushed i t s Oulumno towards Bsmery-Halioa --Qolanoourt. I I . i n oonsequenoes a) The divisional oavalry squadron, proceeding immediately from Quesmy, and oorered by three reoonnaissanoe parties of non-Qommiaalorid offloors prooeeding towards Bsmery-Hallon, Oolanoourt and Brouohy, w i l l more into the region of Flary-le-lfeldeux, l e Pleasis-fatte-d'Ole. Uisaloo, (1).

To oorr this front during the adranoe and the deployment

of the 4th Infantry. As soon as the 4th Infantry has oooupled this front, to move .nto the regiont iialnt-Bioolaa farm ( 8 kilometers wast of Flavy-le-Uldux)--l'Hopital Woods, and to oover the l e f t flank of the division; b) The 4th Infantry w i l l aove immediately into the area Plavy-leUeldeuz and l e PleasiB-Patte-d'Ol'), ftatride the road from Ban, and holding the knolls immediately to the north of these looall t i e s . o) The 389th Infantry w i l l more one of i t s two battalions from the farm and Chateau of Beine to Y i l l c s e l r a . Oontaot to the l t f t with the 4th Infantry towards Oolleiy; to (1) The squadron oommand7, haring been instruotod personally in regard to his mission, has already started.

15.
yr the right with the battalion at Beaumont. d) The two battalions of the 62nd Infantry from Ugny-le-Gay and

l e s Hexettas w i l l constitute the division reserve, disposed i n the area Guivry-los Heeettes, III* Command Vostt Division, divisional a r t i l l o r y , divisional

infantr?> engineers, medical troopat Maintained at Quea.-ny. Oomoand Post of 8Bnfl Infantry: Quivry* Oommand Poot of 3B9th InfantryI OhSteaa and Farm of Beine. Oommand ?oat of >^th Infantry I Berlanoourt. I7 Engineers; i l e r t e d at Saint-Uartin* Divisional Center of Instruotiont Alerted at PorQuorioourt. Oroup of divisional atretoher-bearera ( detailed orders issued by tho division siu'goon )

The Commanding General, 9th Division. Signed: QAlffiLIN. Tho OVdLef of Staff. BUB. (OPPIOIiL).

After having Issued these orders, the general gives the Army Corps
Commander an aooount of the delioate situation whioh oonfronts him,
and asks him to expedite the entry of the 10th Division into the line
on his left, and also to order the 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division,
whose misBion of relief has beoome useless, to replaoe it in the
Qonlis Woods*
The divisional oavalry squadron and the infantry battalions oarry
out the order they have reoeived*

16. Tho squadron, after having moved rapidly

--preoeded by ita

reoonnaiaeanoe partlea and ita patrols-- to the aouthorn slopes of the plateau of h i l l 87 ( east of Flavy-le-Meldeux ), dismounts, moves up the h i l l , and takes i t s position, ready to stop by i t s fire any enemy debouohing from Golanoourt, After the arrival of the 4th Infantry, i t mounts onoe more, and proceeds to the farm Vieux-SaintNicolas, with some elements posted at the northeast oorner of the l'Hopital WooJs, whioh enables i t to watoh and to hinder any move ment of the enemy debouohing from Eemery-Halion, Tho 4th Infantry i s disposed with one battalion at le Plesais Patte-d'Oie and h i l l 87, one battalion at Flavy-le-UeldeuxRouvrel, the 3rd battalion, regimental reserve, at the oroaaroadB 200 meters west of tho Berlanoourt ohuroh. The 389th Infantry, as i t was ordered, moves one battalion to Villeselve, thus insuring liaison with the right battalion oi the 4th Infantry through a mixed detaohment of the two regiments, at Golleiy. Starting at noon, the enemy, in oontaot with our lines, attempts o ooriea of looal attaoks, whioh are a l l repulsed. At about
8JOO

P.M. the Army Corps oomaander announces by teleph

one that the 10th Division will be responsible, at nightfall, for the ground west of the main road from Hoyon to Ram, and that tho 1st Dismounted Oavalry Division will relieve the right of the 9th Divis ion at the Oenlis Woods dur'.ng tho >dght In oonseiuenoe, the division ovamonler issues special orders to tho divisional squadron * <d the 4th and 8End Infantry, apoolfyingt >i

the divisional squadron: To withdraw, after the infantry of

the 10th Diriaion has moved into plaoe, to Quesmy, where it wj..\l
await further orders of the diriaion commander*
For the 4th Infantry: Temporarily to oontinue on the same miss ion, then, when the battalion from Plavy~le-)feldeux shall hare been
relieved, to more it to a position between Berlanoourt and Gulsoard,
in division reserve
For the 88nd Infantryi To move its battalion from the Oenlis Woods,
after it has been relieved, to la-Heuville-en-Beine, ready to protect,
eventually, the right of the 389th Infantry*
The afternoon is comparatively oalm. The enemy evidently is
trying to determine the line we oooupy* Cn the other hand, thore are
still olemonta of British detaohmenta Isolated in front of our line*
The general takes advantage of this to perfeot the disposition of
his artillery for the next day.
The batteries are announoed as due to arrive by nightfall. The
regimental, group and battery oommandors, with their reoonnaissanoe
detaohmonts, are moving ahead of the oolumn so as to reoeiv* their
orders and to reoonnoiter their emplacements before nightfall* The
artillery will move into position during the night, and will oarry
out its fire for adjustment at daybreak, thus being roady to intervene*
On the morning of the 84th the general will have two infantry
regiments in lines 389th on the right, 4th on the left* He deoides
to plaoo a group of field artillory in direot support of eaoh of
his regiments* He holds the 3rd group of the artillery regiment under
hia own oontrol, either to engage targets of opportunity, or else
to reinforoe the fires of one of the first two groups, aooording to

16,
the prinoipal direotion of the enemy's attack.
Both the group of 156 mm. howitsers ( Schneider ), whioh is an
organio part of the division, and one of the two groups of howitzers
( Sohneider ) of the 308th Field Artillery (hoary), are assigned
normal tones ooinolding with the sones of aotion of the infantry
regiments they are supporting*
By order of the Army Corps, one of the heavy groups must be placed
at the disposal of the 10th Division*
The two other groups, heavy guns (1877), and howitzers (1918),
are kept eubjeot to the orders of the division oommr.nder* The first

for long range interdiotion on those legalities whioh the enemy is

obliged to oross, the seoond to be employed aooording to oiroumstanoes*
The emplaoements of the groups are determined by agreement with
the divisional artillery commander, who works in a room near the
general's*
These positions are ohoaon by taking into aooount the paramount
neoesslty for the artillery to aooomplish its mission with effioienoy,
that is; to be suffioiently olose, and also to be able to move easi ly to the rear in oase the infantry should be pushed baok* As ft
matter of foot, seeing that his division is deployed over a width
Of 9 kilometors, the general oonsiders the possibility that his line
may not be able to maintain itself intaot in oose of a strong enemy
attcjk, and above all, he has always to fear should the enemy's
movement become intensified to the west of Ram that the entire
left of our line may be outflanked and forood to give way*
Re deoides to plaoe the artillery group in direot support of the

19,
regiment on the right in rear of the knoll to the east of Belnet a
good distance, and having good approaohos towards the raar*
The support-group of the regiment on the left may be plaoed,
either in the valley to the eaat of Borlanoourt, or else in the valley
of GuiaoardBuohoire. The first position is somewhat advanced, and
does not faoilitate an easy withdrawal of the group* The aooond is
somewhat distant* Consequently, the group will be plaood in depth,
with one battery to the east of Borlanoourt and two batteries to the
eaat of Guisoard*
The third group will be plaoed towards hill 104*
The two groupa of howitiers (Sohneider) will be plaoed, one towards
Buohoire, the other in the valley 600 me tors to the north of Saint-
Martin,
This disposition, therefore, allows the artillery to oarry oat
its initial mission, and its establishment in depth will insure its
continuity of fire in oase of the progressive retreat of the troops*
All these decisions are confirmed in the following general orders
9th DIVISION. STAFP. 3rd Seotlon, O.P. 83 Uaroh*(Twenty-third Uaroh) at 2:00(two) ?u*

- GENERAL ORDER NO. 3 (Employment of the ArtUlery), The artillery plaoed at the disposal of the 9th Division will
oarry out its fire for adjustment tomorrow, Uaroh 84th, in the morning,
as scon as the weather permits*

0.
It will support the defense aa follows*
I.......75 mm. Guns,
1st Group of the 30th Field Artillery: Will be in direol
support of the 329th Infantry, from a position on the knoll 1 kilometer
eaat of Beine.
8nd Group of the 30th Field Artilleryj Will be in direct
support of the 4th Infantry, having one battery to the east of Berlan oourt, and two batteries to the east of GuiBoard.
3rd Group of the 30th Field Artilleryi Will be at the
disposal of the oolonel in oommand of the grouping of the divisional
field artillery on the plateau of hill 104 (to the northeast of Buohoire),
The 4th and 39th Infantry may oall direotly on this group
in oase of urgonoy.
The majors commanding tho 1st and nd Groups will be with
the oolonels of the 4th and 389th Infantry respectively*
The 3rd Group will detail a liaison non-oommissioned offioer
to be with eaoh of the oolonels of the 4th and the 389th Infantry.
II*166 mm.(Sohneider).
The 6th Group of the 106th Field Artillery (heavy), in
the Buohoire area, must be prepared to fire prinoipally in the sone
of the 329th Infantry, with whioh it will have a liaison cffloer.
The 3rd Group of the 308th Field Artillery (heavy), to
the north of Saint-Martin, will fire prinoipally in the gone of aotion
of the 4th Infantry, with whioh it will have a liaison offioor*
The 8nd Group of the 308th Field Artillery (heavy) near
Rosavoine, is scheduled to be plaoed under the orders of the 10th Division,

81.
It will bo prepared to fire, eventually, in the sone of aotion of the 4th Infantry* III 166 mm.heavy guna(1877), and 166 mm,howitzers (1918), The position of the group of 166 mm.heavy guns (1877), and the group of 166 mm.howiteeru (1918), will be determined in the morn ing of the 84th. Signed: GAUEUH. As the organio territorial battalion of the division will detruck late in the afternoon at Buboeuf, a apeoial order direota i t to bivouao at Mauoourt* Orders are also issued for the birouaoking of the auxiliary servloes, aooording to their arrival* Finally, a general order antioipateB and presoribes the defensive organisation of a seoond position* This will inoludet A key .position, whioh the general seleota on the slopes south of the brook running from Beaugies towards Oulsoord, and dlsoonneoted taotioal looalities looated forward on the mo&t im portnnt points of the terrain, and being able to defend simultaneously against a hostile attaok ooaing from tho north, northeast, or east* The seoond position has been ohosen on the line 8eaugi68-Ouisoard, for the following reasons: It i s far enough away from the aotual front lines, so that i t oannot be taken under effective fire by the enemy artillery preparation and supporting fires during the attaok on them. Therefore this will neoessitate the displacement of this artillery, whioh aeans a delay for the onomy.

8.
It offers, to tho infantry, A auooeaaion of easily defended taot icfil localities, with an obstaolo in front of them: the brook.
Finally, it lends itself perfectly to tho aotion of the supporting
artillery, union will plaoe its fire on the slopes and on the knolls
north of the brook.
To put his troops in plaoe for the attack, the enemy will be un able to find any dead apaoe or any oovor, ezoept perhaps the narrow
defile to the south of hill 104 k whioh may be easily enfiladed*
This seoond position will be organised by the End Battalion, 12End
Territorials, under the direotion of the division engineer*
The taotloal looalities organised ahead of the position are in tended to permit the breaking up of the enemy's attaok with oomparatlv ely small dotaohmenta* The enemy must maneuver in order to take these
taotioal looalities, whioh will lead to a disorganisation of the init ial arrangement of the enemy's attaok. It will be neoessary for him
to reorganise it in ordor to oontinue the advanoe for the purpose of
finally attaoking the seoond position*
Further, their disposition in the shape of a triangle allots them
to faoe in all direotiona, muoh more effectively than if they oooupied
a oontinuous line*
Three taotloal looalities have been prescribed: At the farm of
Beine, on the ridge of Minimea, and on the knoll botwoen hill 104 and
hill 94*
The first will be established by the 389th Infantry, in whose
aeotor it is looated, The other two will be organised by the ooramander
of the divisional engineers, who has two oompanles of the 88nd Infantry
under his orders*

83,

The division order relative to the defensive organisations of the seoond position i s sen? out on Uoroh 83rd t at 11100 P.M. At nightfall, a battalion of the 10th Division relieves the Flavy-le-Ueldeux battalion. This hattalion i s pieced 1 kilometer southwest of Berlanoourt, in division reserve* Tho squadron returns to Quesmyc At about 9iOO P.II. the enemy attempts a night attaok on a front: Geniij Wooda--Boauaont-en-Beine, but i s repulsed with serious losses by tho two battalions of the 8End and 389th Infantry. These battalions maintain their front intaot. The enemy does not attaok any more* Toward midnight, a battalion of the Dismounted Cavalry Division This

relieves the battalion of the 82nd Infantry at Geniia Woods, battalion moves, as ordered, to Heurille-en-Boine.

During the remainder of the night, whloh remains oalm, the a r t i l l ery moves into position* Finally, infantry detaohments are pushed forward on the front Oolanoourt--hill 81 (more to the east) to support and to aot as oov erlng dotadhments for the retreat of small British elements, whioh have been seen s t i l l fighting in this direotion*

D Y OF 1IAR0H 84th. ( A NO.8) A MP No onemy attaok at daybreak* The Geraans simply have made use of the last hours of night, to gain oontaot everywhere with our lines* They hove oooupied Oolanoourt in foroe* At about 9i00 A*ll* the enemy launohea vigorous attaoks, ooming partly from Ougny-Kauoourt, partly from the vloinlty of Oolanoourt*

24*
It 1B shown, from the ao^gunt of the operations around Hoyon
by the High German Command (1), that in the single eeotor of the 9th
Pronoh Division six front line German divisions (Z) were employed
during the attack, and that three hare followed in reserve* These are:
In the front llnet 46th Reserve Division:* 6th Guard Division: 36th Division: ... 10th Division: Is t Bavarian Division: 34th Division:..,...... In reserve the: 9th Division!# 33rd Division: 37th Divioion:...,.,.. .Golanoourt eBrouohy, Uontalimont* Beaulieu* Genlis Woods Genlls Woods. 011esy . *Flavy-le-Uartel East of Genlis Woods*

All the attaoks are repulsed with heavy losses for the enemy, and
our front is maintained intaot.
Nevertheless, a heavy fog, whloh oontinues during the entire
arming, renders our artillery fire very inefficient. Thus, our front
line battalions euooeed, by their own fire, in repulsing the attaoka
launohed against them*
Towards noon, the division oommandor is told over the telephone,
by the Army Corps Commander, that the division oommander on the right
has been foroed to issue orders to evaouate Genlis Woods* He adds
that the 9th Infantry Division is authorised to begin a retrograde

(1). Dooumont oommuniontod later by the Frenoh O*HQ*

(8)* In faot, 4 oomploto divisions, the front of the two other div isions overlapping the seotors of the 10th Infantry Division
and of the 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division*

80.

movement i f the circumstances require i t . Soon afterwards, information cooing froa the 82nd Infantry and from the mounted reconnaissance parties sent this morning to the command posts of the front line majors, enow that the eituatUn i s eren more norlOILS. The battalion of the 82nd Infantry at Beino is attaoked, and it is reported that the enemy is already ad veoing out of Ugny-le-Gay; finally, more to the south, the Germans
have taken Oaumont*
The regiment of dl amounted cavalry, operating on our right, falls
baok, partly on the 82nd Infantry, partly on the orest southwest of
Ugny-le-Qay, unable to oontinue the fight, as it has run out of ammun ition.
The situation therefore is serious* The front of the division has
held firmly against all assaults, but it has been turned, and the
slightest adfanoe of the enemy nay out the entire line of retreat*
What must be done ? Especially sinoe we have no more means to
maintain a support ohIon.
Are the troops to be withdrawn immediately oh the entire front?
This movement could not possibly escape being noticed by the enemy,
and would be tho signal for him to launoh a general attaok, with the
oertointy of sucoess* All that would not beoome casualties would hate
to fall baok in disorder, and the division, thus disorganiied, would
be unable to oontinue its delaying mission*
To hold out until night, that lei until the enemy will be unable
to observe the withdrawal? Mils solution evidently is the only wise
one, though it is bold and apparently quito difficult of execution*

26.
However, tho general adheres to this decision* H believes i t possible a on aooount of the stubborn resistance which his troops have offered until now; he submits i t to the Army Corps Compandor, who approves i t . ( l ) Horthward thero i s no reason for serioua aneaeiness* troops merely are ordered to stand their ground, but oostly oountor-attaoka. Facing toward the east, however, thfl situation i s particularly difficult. The right battalion of the 329th Infantry, at Rles-do-Ougny, being in dancer of being surrounded, reooives orders to move, facing east, to the heights of Beaumont-en-Beine* This movement i s possible* Beoauae of tho wooded nature of the terrain, the battalion can escape tho enemy* The battalion of the O2nd Infantry at Neuvilie-en-Belno is well placed, faolng east* The two battalions of the 88nd Infantry, in division reserve at Oulvryloo Hezettea, axe available* The battalion from les-Heiettes io deployed lAaediataly, astride the roadi T7gny-3.e-QayOuivry, with elements at the h i l l at lee Ulnlmec* This battalion, which i s disposed on a rery wide front, will do wonders to stop an enemy who, constantly repulsed with heavy losses in his frontal attacks, tries to envelop the flanks of tho battalion* Xhe other battalion of the regiment i s held in looal reserve at Oulvry, ready to move to the knoll between OuivryOommenohon, in (1). It must be added that there are British troops% artillery, a r t i l l ery trains, convoys even, in re treat on all the roads, somo of whloh will be encumbered until night* -All of those troops are, however, very oala and in good order*
n0

There is to launch

no necessity for making cny change in the disposition of units* The

87,

oase tho outflanking movement of tho eneruy should oontinue* The squadron i s moved to Beaugies, with a detachment at h i l l 180* Having onoe more used up his reserves, the general immediately considers the forming of new ones* He ordora the 3rd Battalion, 329th Infantry, to be sent to Guieoard, The oolonel in oommand of the divisional artillery, who is oon atantly kept posted on the situation, makes arrangements for the with drawal of his group to the east of Beine* Two batteries are taken to the l'Etang-de-Boeuf farm, another battery stays in position with the mission of supporting the infantry u'lvil the last moment, and then to f e l l baok on i t s grottp, T>ie batter? to the west of Beine reoeives & similar order* The group of h i l l 104 i s plnoed in support of the 82nd Infantry* The heavy artillery groups fire concentrations on the Genlis Woods and on Ugny-le-Gay* A light mist s t i l l hampers the efficient action of the artillery* These arrangements are sufficient to stop the enemy on the front Beaumont-en-Beine'Guivry. Re Buoceeds in getting a foothold on the lee Minimes ridge, but a concentration of fire by all the available batteries makes i t impossible for him to stay there* To offset this, there exists a gap on the right of the division, and the enemy is making progress there At the end of the day, he has obtained a foothold in Guivry, whioh ia energetically defended by the battalion of the 82nd Infantry, whioh is looated there* ilore to the south, the enemy has reaohed Beaugies* The squadron established on h i l l 107 prevents him from debouching. S t i l l more to the south, the enemy has taken Cailloel-Orepigny* He has alsc made progress to the north of the division's seotor*

8.
Thus the enemy i s at Freniches and at Beangles, and elements of the division are s t i l l fighting at Beaumont*en-Belne* This shows what one oan attempt with troops who fight well* It is now absolutely neoessary to stop the advance of the enemy in an easterly direction, in order to gain the neoessary time for the withdrawal of the division; whioh will be possible, as night i s app~ roaohing. In the existing situation, the best means to stop the enemy seems to be a oounter-attaok*
1

W must wlthdrawt. The troops, who are now fighting on a front of e

16 kilometers more or less, are pressed on all sides* Inevitably gaps have been created into whioh the enemy enters, advancing by infiltrations* The oounter-attaok will accomplish the desired purpose* Even i f i t should seem to f a i l , that i s : not to make any real progress, i t will save the situation* Its mission i s not in the least to retake ground: we know very well that we would have to abandon i t afterward?. Its purpose Xfi to stop the advance of the enemy, and to do this in the direction where he is most threatening* Thus, simultaneously, there will be carried out a oounter-attaok on the right, and a withdrawal in the oenter and on the left, this withdrawal being effected by eohelons* But with what troops shall the oounter-attaok be launched? The general has none available in that.direction. Fortunately, in war, things are never as good or as bad at they seem at first sight* Just at the moment when the information received

9,
indicates that the situation i i orltloal, there arrlvos, at Qmesmy, the head of the 89th Infantry of the 10th Division, This regiment has arrived by forced marohos, for i t knows the orltioal situation of the 9th Division* iaimediately. The oolonel and the majors, who have oom in ahead of the column, receive their orders* The leading battalion of the regiment will execute the oounter attaok on Beaugies* The battalion takes i t s position for the attack, under the proteot ion of the squadron, and goes into aotion, The squadron, l e f t behind, remounts it*; horsesa The oounter-attaok proceeds. Beaugies is retaken, then abandoned* But the result has been obtained, as the enemy is temporarily stopped in this looality. The artillery begins i t s withdrawal* nevertheless, we must establish the new position, behind which those troopa whioh have beoome the most disorganized during the with drawal may reform safe from hostile threats* Nightfall, and the temporary halting of the enemy as a result of our ootfnter-attaok, pormlt the carrying out of the neoessary movements The position i s ohosen by the division oommander on the line Beau gies-- Guisoard, prepared to subsequently extend i t to the line RimberoourtSaint-MartinQroix-des-Six-Voies, should the enemy oontinue to advance over the v/ooded ridges of h i l l 106, la Gave Woods, and Autreoourt Woods* This front will be held by the two regiments whioh have suffered It i s tired. It does not matter* It goes into aotion

30.

least;the 80th on the right, the 4th on the left* Seotor of.the 69th Infantry: between Beaugles (inclusive) and Buohoire (inolusive)* This regiment o.'ders ito End Battalion to Buohuire, and holds i t s 3rd Battalion in reserve at Mouoourt* Seotor of the 4th Infantryi between buohoU'e(exoluaive) and Guisoard (inolusive), with units on the knoll to the southeast of this locality, the units of the 10th Division having fallen baok on Rim beroourt. The 389th and the 82nd Infantry will reorganize: the first at Saint-Martin, the second at Quasmy. After these orders have bean issued, all that oan be done is to await their execution* The division staff i s s t i l l at the Chateau de Quesmy, where the shells begin to f a l l with raoro intensity* The general deoides to move his oommand post to los Usages* The staff will leave in two eohelons. The general, the chief of staff, the 0-3, and the orderly officer will be tho last to leave, so ca to maintain the confidence of a l l by their example, and to provide against any unforeseen eventualities* They will find the new oommand post ready upon their arrival* At first, the withdrawal is oarrled out under considerable diffio ultiea. Many of the units of the front line, in the n*at of combat, have not hesitated to engage the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting, and are forced to out their way baok with the bayonet* Somewhat later, however, the movements con be carried out without separating the units too muoh, whioh are grouped on the positlond indicated.

31.
Staff of floors, plaoed on the road GuiuourdSaint-Liar tin, giro to groups whloh \ave lost tholr units the directions nooessnry for rejoining them* The territorial battalion i s established as a oo7ering foroe astride the Guisoard--l?oyon toad, at the north exit of loa Usages* The artillery oarries out its withdrawal, and, during the night, oooupios a position to the east of Porquerioourt mountain* However, at about 10:00 ?!!, Information reoeived indioates that the enemy, as anticipated, oontinues to cdvanoe along the ridges to the right of the division* Re has taken Beaugies and Mauoourt from the 89th Infantry, outflanking these localities on the south* Thereforo i t becomes neoessary to carry the defense more to the south* The following dispositions are ordered: 4th 589 th 89th 82nd Infantry: Infantry i Infantry: Infantry: south slopes of Rimberoourt. Saint-liar tin* Quesmy* in division reserve at lea Usages, with some units at la Croix-des-Six-Voies*

Towards the end of the night, the division commander leaves, at les Usages, the oolonel commanding the infantry of the 9th Division, who up to now has been either with him, or else with the colonels of the regiments, to explain to them the delicate situations and the intentions of the general* He oomes personally to Noyon to rejoin the Army Corps commander, in order to receive his instructions relative to the employment of the infantry of the 1st Division, the arrival of which has been announoed to him*

32,

By order of the Army Corps, he establishes his oomraand post at Royon

D Y OF M R H 2Dth.(UAP No.3). A AC

The disposition of the units of the 9th Division, on the morning

of Maroh 26th, is exactly as was ordered during the night. It is
indioated on map No.3
As the 1st Division has gone into action in the sone where the
9th Division aoted before, this last division is placed under the
orders of the general in oommand of the 1st Division, who ie the
senior of the two division oommanders. Therefore, for today the artill ery is plaoed under his control.
The intention of the oommanding general of the Army Corps is to
have the 1st Division make a oounter-attaok in the direction of
Guisoard.
After a meeting at General Headquarters of the Army Corps, whioh
is attended by the two division commanders, he orders the 9th Division:
1 2. To hold in its present position at all costs, to permit the
To protect the right flank of this oounter-attaok by. reserv infantry of the 1st Division to be put in position.
ing, for its use, the Quesmy (lnolusive)--La Cave Woods (inoluaive)
860tor, ooordinating its movement, should it be necessary, with that
of the lat Division.
The infantry of the 9th Division, whioh is deployed faoing north,
must therefore, for the present, hold its present position, then

prepare to support the oounter-attaok by i t s fire the moment i t i s launohed. Finally, after i t has been passed by, i t will beoome the reserve, remaining in i t s present position, and will of this to onoe more restore order in i t s units. Suoh will be the mission of the 4th, 029th and 62nd Infantry. The 89th Infantry will not be passed. It will hold to i t s posit ion, resisting during the entire aotion tho probable counter-attacks of the enemy on the right flank of the 1st Division. In oase the right wing of this division should advance beyond Quesmy, i t must coordinate i t s movement with this division, that i s : extend i t s l e f t . After having been passed, the principal mission of the division therefore i s the proteotion of the right flank of the oounter-attaok. The occasion will arise to reinforoelthis proteotion; the 82nd, now at les Usage8, already has a unit at la Oroix-des-Six-Voiea. It will move in i t s whole foroe to this locality, ready to proteot the right flank of the 89th Infantry, the reserves of which, initially arranged on i t s .right, must, in view of i t s new mission, be moved mostly to its left. The oounter-attaok of the 1st Division must be launohed a.t 9:00 o'olook in the morning. take advantage

The General Order of the 9th Division i s as follows: (see next page).

34.

9th Division. STAFF, 3rd Seotion.

0,P, Hoyon, 86 llaroh. 4.* 30 A.II, (Twenty Fifth Maroh Pour-Thirty A,U, )

GENERAL ORDER No, 7, In compliance with the Army Corps Order, attached hereto ( 1 ) : 1, The d i v i s i o n must hold, at any o o s t , i t s precant position,

in order to cover the forming and launching of tho oounter-attaok, 2, The mlsalon of the 69th Infantry i s : To hold the line in

tho zone assigned to the d i v i s i o n , between Quesmy(inolusive) and the height of the la Cave Woods(inclusive), establishing l i a i s o n , on the r i g h t , with the elements of the 1 s t Dismount;'I Cavalry Division, On the l e f t , i t s movement must be coordinated viith that of the right elements of the 1st Division, 3, The 82nd Infantry, when i t s h a l l have been passed by the

attack of the 1st Division, w i l l move on l a Croix-deVsix-Volos, and take up a position in reserve bohind the 89th Infantry, I t w i l l send a detachment on the knoll at l e s Oarrieres, 1 kilometer, 600 meters north of Salenoy, to oover the right of the d i v i s i o n , 4, The 4th and the 389th Infantry, when they s h a l l have oeen

passed by the oounter-attaok of the 1st Division, and when this div i s i o n shall have taken i t s o b j e c t i v e s , w i l l reorganize in place, and w i l l revert to d i v i s i o n reserve 6, The engineers and the t e r r i t o r i a l battalion w i l l temporarily

remain where they are.

(1)

This order oonfirms what has been verbally said to the division commanders at the meeting at GHQ. of the Army Corpa.

86,
6. The 4th, 589th and 89th Infantry moot make the ne< essary

arrangements to support by their fire the launching of the attack of

the 1st Division*
7, Division command post; Hoyon (suburb of Amiens)*
Command post of the dirislon infantry: Tarlefease*

The Commanding General,9th Diviaion.

(OFFICIAL). The Ohief of Staff.
BLIH.
Signed: OAMELIN.

Our decision, then, is to oounter-attaok. But, in war, our plans

are constantly in opposition with those of the onemy.
This is most particularly true of this morning of Maroh 26th.
We have decided to counter-attack in the direction of Gulsoard,
at 9*00 A.U., with all our available foroes: one division*
The enemy has deoided to attack in the direction of Hoyon, at
7:30 A.M., with all his available strength: three divisions*
Therefore the troops of the 9th Division will be put to a terrible
test* They will have to hold out, by themselves alone, against three
divisions, for an hour and a half, and that at the mooent when these
three divisions will exert their maximum effort* They have received
the order to resist at all costs, and they will do so*
During an hour and a half the battle is lnoessant* The division
infantry weakens, wavers, stiffens up, and holds on*
Certainly! the entire front line cannot be maintained intaot, but
in order to accomplish the mission, it is vital that the eastern
position be held*

86.

The 1st Division, whioh has only two regiments available, the third regiment having been held at Hoyon, leaves at 9:00 A.M. from Cri8olles--lea Usages, and launohes the oounter-attaok: one regiment west of the Hoyon--Guisoard road, one regiment to the east, The German lines yield for a moment, but the Frenoh infantry i s not numorloally strong enough to definitely thrust them baok Confused oombats will take plaoe during the entire morning, then quiet will be reestablished. The Frenoh troops will be established on the line: Orisollee crossroads 200 motors north of lea Usages 0roix-de^*SixVoie8t The 1st Division hag not auooeeded in driving the enemy back, but i t has stopped his advanoe for the rs4_jQf_the day The units of the 9th Division have been unable to pass into reserve, and are struggling in the front l i i e , mixed with the units of the 1st Division* The 4th Infantry only, whioh really has suffered too aiuoh, receives orders to reorganize at Happlinoourt* The 82nd Iufuntry, furiously attacked at la Croix-des-Slx-Yoies, ha8 suooeeded in keeping this important position. In the oourse of the afternoon, the commander of the 9th Division prooeeds to the heights north of Hoyon, to study, in collaboration with the ohiefs of infantry of the 9th and 1st Divisions, the oondltions . under whioh i t will be possible, in the evening, to move the elements of the 9th Division into the reserve, in order to reorganize them, under the protection of the 1st Division* They agree to reassemble the 9th Division on the knoll immediately to the north of Hoyon. This operation is to be carried out without confusion, and the units are not to f a l l back until the regimental

37.

i nd battalion commander3 of the 1st Division shall judt?o i t possible. The staff of the 9th Division has no need to intervene during the battle, as oil orders, in the course of the day, ore issued by the oonra.nding general of the 1st Division, end transmitted by his staff* However, the ohief of staff and the ohief of the 1st seotion suet oon aidor the steps neoessary to again furnish supplies of all kinds to the units* The other officers, and particularly the officers of the 3rd seotion, ake advantage of theue few hours of liberty to v i s i t the front line units, to aoquaint the latter with the general situation, and to gather information for themselves on the details of the battle under which the infantry units have to bear up* Thoy ask the needs of everyone, i.nd will try to satisfy them when thoy shall have returned to the oo.nmand post* While not personally intervening in the battle, the ooamandiag general of the 9th Division keeps himself constantly posted on the situation* He is furnished information of all the orders concerning the operations of the troops of the 1st and 9th Divisions* Ho supple ments this information by reports received directly from his units* The first part of the afternoon i s calm* also attacks further to the left* Toward8 6:00 P*M. the first information oomes in: The left of the division has held, but the division operating on the left, ha,*d pressed and outflanked, has fallen baok on Sercanlze. The enemy penetratos into Beaorains, Towards 4:00 P.M. the

enemy makes a strong attaok against the left of the 1st Division, and

36,
At about 6;60 T/,k,, the Jlrmy Corps Commander arrives at the command
post of the 1st Division where he sends for the commander of the 9th
Division, and states his plans to him. whloh are as follows:
1 To leave the 1st Division, as long as possible, on the heights
north of noyon, but to assign to it --as limit of its tone of action
the Oise, below Pont-1'Sveque, should it be forced to fall back*
& To form, further to the west, a grouping under the command of
the 9th Division commander. This grouping to be made up of the remain der of the 9th Division, still reinforced by the 89th Infantry(l); the
35th Division, composed of two regiments (57th and 123rd) (2); which
will arrive, and all the artillery whloh he already had at his dispos al in the engagement of the 24th, inoreased by the 13th Field Artill ery (organio regiment of the 10th Division).
At this moment, information is received confirming ttie enemy's
oooupation of Beauralns, and that he alsc has launohed a strong attack
on the OrioollesBeauralna front, ia a southeasterly direction*
This attack, on the left flank of the troops who are fighting
faolng to the north, is progressing rapidly* The troopo engaged in the
vicinity of les Usages are felling baok on the heights immediately
to the north of Hoyon, so as not to be out off from that locality* This
withdrawal is possible only because it can be oarrJ.od out under the
protection of all the units in reserve, which are engaged in the
direction of Genvry*
Towards Beaurains, the situation is even more difficult* ill the
(1). Of the 10th Infantry Division, as previously stated.
(2). The 35th Infantry Division is commanded by Genoral llareohal,
who is junior in rank to General Gamelin.

39,
field artillery of the group, end a part of the heavy artillery, are
in position to the east of the mountain at Porquerioourt, end Iho road
net doea not allow them to be dliaplaoed to the rear exoept by the north
and the south of the hill mass, that is: through Soeauoourt and Larbroye*
How, at Beauralns, two groups of the 30th Field Artillery already
hare had to bring up their limbers to within a few hundred meters of
our front lines* It is to be expected that vory soon the Soeauoourt
road will be out* Only the Vauohelles road remains open, but it is
quite oertain that there will be a bad traffio-anarl at the crossroads
200 meters east of Larbroye, and it will take many hours before all
the wagontrains ooming from Yauohelles and Hoyon will be able to get
through.
But, if the situation is already difficult, it may be expeoted that
from tomorrow on it is liable to become ever more so* A great part of
the hostile forces, operating to the south, is going to strike at the
Olse on the entire front to the east of Hoyon. These troops undoubted ly will not try to oross the river, but will outflank the obstaole,
that is; they will attack to the west of Hoyon. Moreover,it seems that
their general directions must be towards Amiens and Paris*
On the other hand, it is true that the stubborn defense of thebe
last days has delayed the maroh of the enemy for the time necessary to
reoosemble new troops*
The 35th Division is one of tile advanoe elements of these forces*
However, it will still require several iays before the combined
strength of these troops will be in condition to aot
Therefore it is still necessary to hold on during that time, losing
the minimum of ground, until the grouping will have been completely
accomplished*

What is the problem for the oomman<Unfl general of the group? Three things* 1. 3, To extrioace his artillery, and to regroup it* To reorganise and restore order in all units* 2* Tc form a n<m line, opposing the roaroh of the enemy.

Considering the problem in i t s prinoipal aspeots, i t seems possible for him to reform, for tomorrow, at least a temporary front in the zone: Pont-l'Eytquemountain at Porguerioourt (1) with the 10th Infantry Division.) Re w?'kl regroup the 9th Division in the zone: OaiineotanoourtYille PaaselChiry-Ouraoampa, eventually Intrusting i t with the mission of forming a barrier behind the Dlvette* As to hi8 artillery, he will initially have to provide i t with assembly points, from which i t will be possible to move i t again during tho night, and to put i t into action onoe more the next day for the f.urpose of defending the front whioh he may have been able to form* As a measure of preoaution, the general prescribes these assembly points fairly well to the rear, but not too far, ao as not to risk needlessly tiring the horses. Zone: Le Hamal-Honolithe for the field artillery, zone of Cambronne for the heavy artillery* Els deoision has been made, but i t i s imperative to execute i t as quickly as possible. The latest Information reoeived shows the urgent need of this* (1) The commanding general of the Army Corps by authority of the High Command, has drawn the attention of the commanding general of th6 grouping to the importance of holding the mountain at porquerioourt, or, at least, not to allow the enemy to dominate i t completely* ( in cooperation

41.
To gain tine, ho will subdivide the work.
His ohJ.ef of tho divisional artillery, his ohiof of divisional
infantry, and his ohief Ox staff know his deoision. He will order
Mie 1'irat to issue the detailed orders relating to the movements of
tho artillery, the seoond with restoring order in the infantry units,
and the third is to arrange the movement of and tho plaoir-,; of the
units of the division in position.
He himself .asjumes responsibility for tho most difficult problem:
thct of rebuilding a front*
For thnt purpose, he will employ the regiments of tho 3Dth Division*
Therefore ho oalls immediately on the ooramanding genoral oi this div ision, who has just arrived at the town-hall of Noyon^
The 35th Division has only two regiments available, the third
hcving boon pluood at tho disposal of the division operating more to
tho loft. The two rojiments available at this timo are the 183rd whioh
13 boing detruoked at Ribeoourt, and the 57th whioh has been sent
during the day towards Baboeuf from whero it has boon reonllod but
whioh hua not yet reaohed Noyon.
Thereforo, one oannot oount on these two rogimonts until later ir.
.10 night, end it is not knoin whioh ono will arrivo first*
Tho general orderst that tho .first available regiment be pushed
in tho direction of Vauohellea, with its right rosting on tho last
houion of Noyon and lta left extending towards Porquerioourt, ostab liniiing liaison with tho adjunont divioionj nd to plaoo the sooond
roc;imQnt on Iho hoights to tho north ox tho Bivotte, as evonbual
rrajport of the firot*

42.
A O M R H 26th . ( M P No. D Y P AC A After having issued a l l his orders, General Gamolin, in oomraand of the grouping, leaves Noyon --already in flames-- during tho night ond reJoinB his new oomraand poat at Ghiry-Oursoamps. His ohief of artillory and ohief of staff report to him how the exeoution of his orders i s progressing* The general informs the artillery oommander that, if he suoooeds in forming his new line aooording to his plans, ho will have to plaoe; His fiold artillory between the Divotto and the knoll: Uonolithe- Tour (west of Ohiry-Oursoompa); His heavy artillery in the rioinity of Dronlinoourtle Homel* Consequently, he orders that the groups be hold in readiness to movo into position immediately upon reoeipt of ordora, during the latter part of the night prepared to go into aotion immediately after daylight. This order i s sent at about throe o'olook in the morning, upon rooeipt of the latest information*

The ohiof of 8toff submits to the general tho plan, whioh he has prepared, for the disposition of tho units of tho division, The oolonol in oommand of tho infantry of tho 9th Division oomos to roport, at about 6tOO A.M, that the infantry of tho division has now oooupied i t s seleoted positions* No aoourate information is rooelve . \uring tho night,,for tho olo montn of the front line* All we know is that evonts hnvo reached a orisis on tho hoifthtn

43.
to the north of Hoyon, no doubt due to the strong danger that the
units ongegod there may be surrounded*
It is only at daybreak that information ooming from the oolonel
in oommand of the infantry of the 35th Division and from oavalry re oonnaiasanoe parties detailed from the divisional oquadron and sent,
over the entire front, to the oommand posts of the units of the front
line-* outlines the situation with aoouraoy*
The 67th Infantry Is established on the front: Mount Renaud--
Sempigny, with a battalion at Mount Renaua, a battalion at Sempigny,
behind the Oise, the bridge of whioh has been blown up; one battalion
at Passela
The 123rd Infantry has a battalion at Dive-le-Franc, and one
battalion 600 meters further north on the height of the old mill bet ween Dive-le-Frano and Suzoy. The third battalion has not yet arrived*
It will bo halted at Ohiry-Oureoampa, in division reserve*
This is not the disposition the general hca orderod, and whioh
ho had hoped oould be accomplished*
Hore ia a general description of what has happened:
Hearing that the 67th Infantry will soon arrive at Rovon. and
realizing that the 123rd will arrive late, the commanding general of
the 36th Division wished to push the 57th Infantry on Vauoholles*
But on aooount of tho unoxpeotod rapidity with whioh evonts hnvo
dovoiocod north of Noyon, the oolonel in oommand of tho infantry of
tho 36v ,**iaion (1) haa been forced to put the let Battalion of the
57th Infom / into notion, facing north, in ordor to covor the move*
mont of his othor two battalions. Tho let Battalion, having aooom pliphed i to mission, haa fnllon book with the roor element* of tho

(1) Oolonol, afterwardo Ooncrnl Itorolgno*

44.
1st Division, and, after crossing the Oiso, has established itself
at Serapigny. The two other battalions have been plaoedt one on
Mount Renaud --An important peak giving a viovr of the entire region
It was impossible to diapatoh them
the other at Paaael, in reserve*

further to the north beoause of the strong proa8ore of the enemy and
the impossibility to put them into aotion during the night on terrain
they did not know*
Under those oonditions oontaot with the division on our left has
boon oompletely lost, and the enemy has been able, without diffioulty,
to oooupy the mountain at Porquorioourt.
A report oovering the above is immediately sent to the commanding
general of the Army Corps who in reply lets it be known that the
oommanding general of the Army attaohos great importanoe to the oooup ation of this height*
The general immediately prepares to organize an oporation for
rotaking lt
What troops does he have available?
The entire 183rd Infantry, and the find British Cavalry Divlsion(l),
which has Just boon put under his orders, and tho leading olemonts of
v/hioh are arriving at tho oh&toau 1 kllomotor south of Ohiry-Oursoamps*
With this limited numbor of available troops, he oannot plan to
ottaok the ontire front of tho mountain at Porquoricourt, Ho will try
to take it by enveloping both flanka, tho 183rd Infantry on the south,
tho British cavalry division on the north.
Tho groups of the 13th Fiold Artillery are put in direot support
(1). Ao a matter of foot, we r.ro denllng hero with a mixed division,
made up prinoipally from tho End Dritioh Cavalry Division*

45.
of tho 183rd Infantry; the 3rd group of this regiment in direct support
of the 2nd British Cavalry Division*
The 30th Field Artillery is put in direot support of the 67th
Infantry, insuring the protection of the right flank of the attack*
Two groups of 156 mm.howitzers (Schneider) will fire on the moun tain at orquerioourt The balance of the heavy artillery will oon tinuo its fire, on opportunity, on the exits of Hoyon and on tho town
itself*
Shortly before this operation oommenoes, the enemy* in turn attaok ing, oooupies Larbroye and SuBoy, without being able to dobouoh from
thorn. Further to the south, he takes Mount Ronaud. He is immediately
driven from this last point by a looal oounter-attaok launohed by the
57th Infantry whioh has reoeived orders to hold its position at any
008t in order to oover the right of the 123rd Infantry A number of
prisoners remain in our hands*
The operation about to develop will be one whioh will take a
great part of the day* It really oannot be arranged in tho form of
& time-table, fixed in advanoe, beoause of the indeterminate nature
of our information and the impossibility of knowing,at any partioular
moment,what will be our possible line of departure and the onemy
situation.
The regimental ocmmanders and the majors will therefore aot
aooording to eiroumatanoes, being oonstantly in oontaot with and
assisted by their own support units whioh thoy oan oall upon direotly.
The ooordination of effort of the British onvnlry division and
tho Fronoh infantry regiment is not obtained by the synchronisation
of tho rato of advanoe, but by assigning identioal missions to them,
whioh insures a ooordinatod attnofc, any advanoe of the one aiding tho
progress of the other*

46,
While the cotion ia developing, the oommanuor of the grouping
at Chiry-Oursoompa la gradually Informed that the following troopa
have been put at his disposals
It A dotaohment of five aqundrons (ooming from the Sixth Army)
( two from the 14th Light Cavalry, three from the 2nd Light Cavalry),
ia 8ohoduled to arrive via Ouraoamps.
2 The 205th Infantry (from tho 53rd Infantry Division), a?.so
ooming from the Sixth Army, a battalion of whioh la duo to arrive
via Our so amps and the two others b"' way of Bailly and Pimproz.
At the oamo time the general ia adviaed of on ordor iaauod to
the 1st Division to return the battalion of tho 57th Infantry whioh
is now at Sempigny. This battalion ia to rojoln via Oursoampa*
Upon arrival of the five mounted aqua.irons, three of them are
put at the disposal of the oommanding general of the 35th Division,
in ordor to reinforoe the line at Mount Renaud, whioh is threatened
to be outflanked along tho Oiso, end the two othora are kept in roaorve
or the grouping at Paasol.
The intention of the commander of the grouping is to put the 205th
Infantry, upon ita arrival, into ronorvo of the 123rd, whioh is to
oontinuo tho operation ogainat tho mountain at Porquorioourt.
AQ a mat tor of faot tho firat itoma of information roooivod in lloate that this oporation is devoloplng favorably. It la roportod
th; t tho 123rd haa taken tho aouthorn part of Susoy, whilo tho 2nd
British Onvalry Division hao roaohod tho northern oxi t oi' thia plaoo,
nJ, having oloanod out the wo.itorn part of loa Kaoarts V/oods, ia drawn
up ulontj tlio roi d from 3usoy to Sooauoourt. V W a 2nd British Cavalry
''iviaion is in oontaot with a deteohmont of the 3rd British Cavalry
Ivinlon operatint? to tho ri^ht oC tho noii_'hborlnt: divinion.

47.
At thia moment the oommander of the grouping learns, from the
oommanding general of tho Vth Army Oorpa, that the division on his
left is oompoHed to fall b&ok in the direction of Guy end ?lessis-
Oaoheleux, and that probably it will not be able to stop its retreat
there.
To offset this, the 77th Infantry Division is plaoed in support
on the heights between le ilonolithe and Lassignya
, Soon afterwards, the general definitely iearna that the elements
of the 2nd British Cavalry Division, enveloped on their outside flank,
have fal Ion baofc, The 2nd Division has even evacuated la Reserve
Woods, and has withdrawn on the line EvrioourtOld Mill. The division
on the left has fallen baok on Thiesoourt.
Under these conditions, we oan no longer hopo actually to reorgan ise an offonaive operation, but we oan meroly try to maintain our pos itions to the north of the Divette.
The gonoral adheres to this opinion, for, realising that his pcslt ion south of tho Slvette is his main line of reilst&nce, he wishes
to be able to maintain elements in front of it, in order to prevent
the enemy from establishing himself within assaulting dinUnoe of this
position.
The part of the front that is being threetenod in that part situat ed east of the old Moulin (mill), north of Dive-le-Frano. All the
ro8orvos will be dispatohed towards this vioinlty, c.n follows:
The 805th Infantry (whioh begins to arrive at a'aout. G:00 Pil )
into the vioinlty of Evrioourt;
A/di f.ho two avuilablo a quad rone to tho left of this regiment, trying
to'establish oontoot with the division oporotinu still moro to tho left*

48,
Tho orbsslngs of the Divette will be oooupied by two regimonts
of the 9th Division, to guard against any eventualities*
Consequently, the order issued is the following:
OAUBLIN GROUPIHG.
STAFF* 3rd S o o t i o n . H.

Command Tost* 6 Maroh, 6:00 P.H.

(Twe nty-six Itaroh* Five P.H. )

GENERAL ORDER HO, 9. I* II* Aooording to latest information reoeived, the right of the
Consequently, to oover the left flank of the grouping, the

10th Division has fallen book on Thiesoourt and Dives*

805th Infantry will move two battalions towards Evrioourt, holding
the line: Rill 98 (inclusive) north of Epinoy, hill 74 (inolu<9ive)
north of Evrioourt, establishing oontaot on the right with the elemente
of the British oavalry division and the 183rd Infantry, on the left
with the right elements of the 10th Division*
The two squadrons of light oavalry at Paaaol will remount and move
as qolokly as posaiblo into the BrrioourtThiosoourt area, insuring
oon toot between tho grouping and the 10 th Division*
Reoonnaissanoe parties toward Ouy and D I V O B *
The 329th Infantry will move immediately to Oanneotanoourt, and
will guard tho oroRSings of the Divot to bo twoon the olemonta of the
10th Division and tho bridge 800 motors oaat of Epinoy (inoluoivo).
The 89th Infantry will movo to Villo r.nd will hold tho crossings
to tho north, 1 kilomotor to tho east and 1 kilomotor to tho west of
this locality,

49.
The 4th and 82nd Infantry, and the engineers,will oooupy, organize and defend a position on the knoll: Uonolithe--Ohiry-Oursoamps, III* The position w i l l bo maintained along the entire l i n e :

Southern slopes of tho la Reserve Woodsold lloulln-rfount-Renaud Boutwest e x i t from Pont-l f Eveque
n

General GAHSLIN.
On the other hand, the commanding general of the grouping Asks
tho oommanding general of the British ORvalry division to hold his
present position during the night, while awaiting the arrival of the
205th Infantry and the regrouping of the 123rd. Infantry, whloh will
be studied in oooperation with the oommanding general of the 35th
Division*
The enemy oontlnuos to at took but is repulsed everywhere on the
front of the grouping*
At about 9100 p*lXt, Army OorpB sends information that the left of
iho division whioh is operating to the left of tho grouping is oom polled to continue its withdrawal, but that tho 77th Division Is ready
to oover it.
A break in the front having ooourred more to the west, the command ing goneral of the Army Oorps asks if it would Le possible for thd
grouping to detaoh any available troops to be pushed on this point* The
57th Infantry is lmmediatoly orderod to relievo the three squadrons
whloh are fighting dismounted near Mount Renavid, and for the latter
to move on Lasslgny*
Towards midnight the situation quiets down, the enemy boing evory where in oontnot with our lines, but having boen unable to bro&k

60.
through anywhere.

DAY OF M R H 87th. AC

( M P Ho. 1 ) A 5

During the night General Qamelin reoeives on order from the oommanding general of the Army Corps vrhioh definitely establishes under his command a oombat aeotor between Le Loennont (exolusive) end the Oise.

The troops plaoed at his disposal are made up of (1): The 35th Division (67th and 183rd Infantry); The 806th Infantry and the remaining elements of the 9th Division, (inoluding the 89th Infantry); The field a r t i l l e r y regiment of the 36th Division; 84th yield Artillery (this regiment replaoea the 13th Field Artillery, returned to the 10th Division), and the 30th Field Artillery, Tvro groups of 166 mm.howitfers (Sohneider). A similar group i s formed more to tho l o f t . The Army Corps Artillery i s regrouped by drawing on the groups of heavy a r t i l l e r y whioh temporarily had been plaoed entirely at tho disposal of the divisions*

Tho Amy Corps order i s to hold on the genoral l i n o : Divette V i 03 o our tPlemon t, h Thus wo now have suffioient strength ovorywhoro to stop tho enemy, Tho delaying mission ohangos to a defensive mission.

(1) Tho division mndo up of rogimenta from difforent British oavalry divisions hrd to bo made nv&llablo without delny for movonont to another pert of tho front.

61.
The oommanding general of the grouping imiMdlately oonoeires his defense as requiring three positions: Main line of resistance: The line: OanneotanoourtYllle--?aasel* Outpost position: Tho line: Errioourt--01d Kill--Mount Renaud* Barrage position: (1) The aerlea of heights whloh slope away from the Uonolithe, partly towards Ghiry-Oursoamps, partly towards Dresllnoourt* His intention 1st 1* To use at a l l oosts the maximum of means for the defense of the line of the Dlvette* 8. For the time being, to firmly hold the outpost position, but not to reinforoe it* 3* To establish, on tho barrage position, those troops of the 9th Division whloh hare been most sorely tried* The general decides that the hour has oome to stop manoeurerlng, and to fight to a decision. The oombat seotors of the grouping will be divided into three regimental sub-sectors* The flank eub-seotora will each hare one regiment, arranged in depth by suooesslve battalions, with a battalion on the outpost posit ion and two battalions on the main line of resietanoe (1 battalion to occupy the position, 1 battalion ready for the oounter-attaok)* The aub-seotor of the center, which is ulder, will hare two battal ions on the uutpoat position; the third battalion of the regiment

(1). Term in use at that moment*

58.
;nd the rem'Aining elements of a regiment that has boon in battle and which may be figured At two battalions, will be plaoed on the main line of realstanoe ( one to oooupy the position Itself, the others to be ready for the oounter-attaok). The sub-seotors will hare as boundaries: 1. West boundary of the right aub-aeotor: Tour (west of Ohlry-Oursoomps) inolusire eastern exits of Yille Dive-le-FranoLarbroye; East boundary of the left sub-sec tori Knoll 1 kilometer southeast of Orval and 1 kilome tor north east of Rill 141 (inclusive)-- Hill 76, west of La Bernardie (exoluslro)--bridge 1 kilometer northeast of the ohuroh of Qanneotanoourt finolusive) the road Junotion 300 metera oast of the knoll la the La Re'borve floods. The aotual assignment of the troops on the ground Is:
The 67th Infantry on the right,
The 183rd and 89th Infantry in the oenter,
The 806th Infantry on the left.
The 57th Infantry wltht 1 Battalion at Uount Renaud, 1 Battalion at
PGBBOI,

1 Battalion at Chlry-Ouraoanpa, Coamund post of tho oolonel ooaamnding tho aub-aootor: at Pacaol ( ;i out horn port )

58.
The 123rd and 89th Infantry with: 1 Battalion o^ the 123rd at the Old UU1. 1 Battalion of the 123rd on the southwestern slopes of la Reserve Woods, 1 Battalion of the 123rd on the northern knolls of la Bernardie Woods, The 89th Infantry at V i l l a . Coamand post of the oolonel of the 123rd, oomaandlng the sub seotor: la Bernardie* Ihe 205th infantry withi 1 Battalion at Bvrioourt, 1 Battalion at Canneotanoourt. 1 Battalion at Orral. Coomand post of the oolonel: Orral* The oofflbined sub-seotors of the 57th and 123rd Infantry w i l l be plaoed under the orders of the oolonel commanding the Infantry of the 35th Division* Command post: Chiry-Ouraonapa. Ihe sub-sea tor of the 205th Infantry w i l l be plaood under the orders of the oolonel in oooa&nd of the infantry of the 53rd Division, of whioh this regiment ie an organlo part* Coaaumd post: Uonolltha* The oombined infantry of the throe sub-seotors w i l l be plaoed undor tho orders of the commanding general of the 35th Division* Co.-amrnd post: Dreallnoourt* :he oolonol ooaaanding the right and oenter aub-aootora w i l l hare

64.

at his disposal one battalion of the 89th Infantry as a reserve. The oolonel in oommand of the l e f t sub-aeotor w i l l have at his disposal one battalion of the 805th Infantry (battalion from Orval) as a reserve. The commanding general of the combined three sectors w i l l hare at his disposal one battalion of the 57th Infantry (battalion from Chiry-Oursoamps) All the reserves, moreover, are plaoed in readiness in the immed iate proximity of the main line of resistanoe. They are ready to oounter-attaok in the seotor where they have been plaoed. But i t re gains thoroughly understood that they may be movod to another location i f the oommand to whioh they are attaohed should judge i t necessary. The troops of the 9th Division w i l l be disposed in the following manner: 329th Infantry at le lionolithe, 4th Infantry 8 kilometers more to the east. 6nd Infantry at Ohiry-Oursoaapa and k>.oll more to the west* Those three regiments oombined w i l l be plaoed under the orders of the oolonel ooaimanding the infantry of the 9th Division* Command post: Dreslinoourt* Tt ( the oombination) forma a reserve of infantry at the disposal oi' the general in command of the grouping*

The general in oommand of the grouping onoo more w i l l move hifl oo.-vaand post to Ribeoourt, from where i t will be easier for him to rut his a r t i l l e r y into aotion, tho commander of whioh w i l l also oouo

60.
to the village, to be in a house near his own. He also will be better placed there to diroot the eventual employment of his infantry reservos. The field a r t i l l e r y will remain in position to the north of the knoll UonolitheOhiry-Oursoamps, so as to have I t s maso of fire avail able in front of the prinoipal position, but to be able to fire also in front of the outpost position* I t will be disposed as follows: 24th Field Artillery in diroot support of the sub-seotors of the 57th and 123rd Infantry, with a group able to fire a bar rage in front of eaoh of the three battalions of the front l i n e . The oolonel commanding this field a r t i l l e r y will have hia command post olose to the oolonel commanding the combined right and center sub-seotore at Ohlry-Ouraoamps, One group of the 30th Field Artillery in direot support of the 206th Infantry, so as to fire a barrage in front of i t s battalion of the front l i n e . The commander of this group will have his command post near the colonel commanding the left sub-seotor at le Mono11 the. Tho tv.c other groups of the regimen*; will stay together, at the disposal of the general commanding the grouping, to f i r e , nooording to circumstances, on the front of the eu ire sector* The two heavy groups, in the region of Dreslinoourt, will be in readiness to firo on the front of tho entire seotor They tnus_t take port in the oounter-preparationa arranged on the prinoipal possible assembly points for the enemy's attaoka, as follows:

56.
La Reserve Wooda--Suaoy-Larbroye--south exit of Hoyon--?ont-lIKveaue* The engineer companies will be disposed as follows: Divisional oompcnieo of the 35th Division: At the disposal of the regiments of the front line* Divisional companies of the 9th Division and territorial labor battalion: On the knoll Honolith--Chiry-Ouraoamps, under oommand of the ohief of engineers of the 9th Division*

This is, in general,how the general in oommand of the grouping plans to organize his seotor and i t s oommand* To summarize, he will have under his direot orders: * As oommander of the infantry to go into aotion: The general commanding the 36th Division* As oommander of the infantry in reserve: The oolonel oommanding the infantry of the 9th Division. As oommander of the oomblned artillery of the aeotor: The oolonel oommanding the divisional artillery of the 9th Division* As oommandera of the engineers and of the oavalry: The oommanders of the engineers and of the divisional squadron of the 9th Division* The organization of the defensive seotor of the grouping is the 3ubJ9ot of a general order whioh reaohes the units in the morning, but warning orders, and, later, speoial orders, have already provided for execution of the movements during the night* The next morning, when the enemy attacks, he i s repulsed everywhere* H begins again during the day, but without result* His losses ere o

B7.
enormous, and nowhere does ho suooeed in breaking through our outpost
position* Then he roalizen that the situation has boon ohonged, and
that now he ia faolng infantry in suffioiont strength to hold its
lines, and whioh oan oount on the efi'ioient support of its artillery*
PERIOD FROM HARCH 88th TO 1LAROH 30th.
On Maroh 26th and 89th there ore no attaoks by the enemy. The
Gorman divisions are preparing for a oombined offensive whioh they
will launch on Muroh 30th.
On our side, time is not being wasted* Everywhere we improve the
existing organizations in the area by adjusting them to our present
front. And, most important of all, we reoeive the ammunition whioh
will enable us to withstand the shook of the ooming attaok.

The enemy attuoks Uaroh 30th, repulse.

It will result in his complete

The second sections of the staffs have functioned* Their infor mation, received from various aouroes, is in oomplote aooord with that
of the observation posts of the oommanA, the artillery and the ln fentry. Everywhere there are indications of a ooming attaok* It is
expootod on the 30th,
In the early hours of the morning of thpt day, an enemy pipne
is shot down. Its observer does not have time to destroy an order he
is oarrying, whioh gives the hour for the beginning of the operation^
8.30 A. II.
Half an hour before this zero hour for the hostile attack the

68.
{jonoral In ooamumd of the grouping orders & gonorfcl counter-prepar ation by a l l tho guns at his disposal,(1), This oounter-proparation is rclnforoed by firo on the hostile rear areas, by a l l the Army Corps a r t i l l e r y , .All possible assembly points are searched by the guns. As the enomy has no, or few, defensive positions to more into, entire bettal* ions are put to flight, pursued by tho shells* The infantry aots with a l l i t s means of f i r e . The enemy's attack i s able to s t a r t only on a few points; every where else i t hns been Btopped in i t s truoka. The oountor-proparation of the a r t i l l e r y now beoomes a barrago. Some of our units, inspired by their suooess, s t a r t forward and bring bi;ok prisoners. These prisoners enable us to .identify the 33rd, 37th and 103rd German Divisions whloh h&vo nttaoked : The 33rd in tho vicinity of Hount Renaud--Larbroye; the 37th in tho Suzoyla Reservo Yfoods area, tho 103rd to the east of Cuyr, Two othe'r divisions, tho 34th an<l tho 36th, aro in reserve in the i roa. The heavy a r t i l l e r y also doen good work. At a given momont i t tiikos under fire an Important oonvoy of motor truoks whloh aro trans porting reinforcements. Boforo noon, the general commanding the grouping was able to tolephono tho Army Oorps commander that tho battle had ended on hiB front, that thoro was no moro need to bo oonoernod about him, and that ho wes yoinc to reconstitute his reserves. This immediately (1). Tho gonoral felt that this half-hour vms nooossiry, considering thfit, in spite of everything, ho had but l i t t l e a r t i l l e r y undor his command for the extent of hia front.

59.
ullov/ed the Army Oorpa e r t J l l o r y to not e n t i r e l y for the bonofit of thn o Uior

, the operations around Uoyon ond for tho 9th D l v i n l o n . i\f tor h i s bloody repvlno of tho 3 0 t h t und aa tho enemy 1Q d e f i n i t o l y a topped, only the 35th P i v i o i o n i s l o f t in the l i n o ; tho troops of the 9th D i v i s i o n are onoe more moved to the ronr, i n t o tho v i c i n i t y of V i l l o r a - C o t t o r e t a , und then entrained and transported by r a i l r o a d to H-uto-.Algaoe, where aoon uftorwarde they w i l l entor i n t o a BOO t o r .

REFLECTIONS ON THE KNOAQKUHHT3 GROUND NOYOH.

For tho 9th D i v i s i o n , the b u t t l e of Noyon presents two d i s t i n c t phases, acparntod by the iny of Huron 26th: In tho f i r o t phcaa, i t beoomes ony^god, with roduoed meuio, on iront3 of 10 to 10 l c i l o a e t o r s , v/ithout dofonslvo o r g a n i z a t i o n s prop hrodi in advanoe, und fnoing a numorioaJly f r r auporior eneay, Vhoro ioro %11 i t oon hope to do l a to delay tho eneoy'a t\dv*vnoo. In tho sooond phueo, on tho othur hand, tho A i v i o i o n , roinforoou, in ongugod on a normal front i n proportion to i t n ntrone.i>. ( 6 k i l o .Tiotora for 3 froah rocioontn, tnil tho rooalnin{j olomontn of 4 ret'io ontr> whioh htvo olroiidy btf^n i n b a t t l e ) ; thor>foro i t i o able to ,'lvo b u t t l o and ^ooa not r e t i r e any moro.

In tho f i m t phDne, tho .iianoouver i o ourriod out --oxoopt for tho oventual ^nd ayntoaritio >vitlvlrhwol of tho o u t j o n t o - - i n tho form o f

60.
reslutanoe In plaoe daring the day; afterwards, duving the night,
the infantry of tho defense falls baok to a position whloh the enemy
do8 not know.
This manoeuver Is noooaeltated by tho faot that tho greater part
of tho tono to bo defended is without oovor, and doos not permit small
infantry units to fire in close support of one another as they with*
draw in eohelon. it oloao range, fire it able to immobilise a body
of troops, and deny it any movement. Moreover, even if in wooded ieot lons withdrawal Is possible for an isolated body of sen of relative*
ly anail importance, It Is a rather difficult matter to ooordlnate, in
the midst of battle, the withdrawal of a large number of small elem ents who are in oontaot with the enemy on a very wldt front*
Evidently, a body of troops whloh is not very large, attacked by
a rery muoh stronger enemy, runs the risk of being overwhelmed* But
one should take into account how alow the enemy always is in making
oontaot, and the low efflolenoy of the artillery at the start of an
engagement, beoause of the diffloulty the infantry has in indloating
to tho artillery the exaot location of the automatic arms whloh stop
it. At Hoyon, the attaoka of the morning undoubtedly were atrong, but
as a rule the prinolpal attaok never took plaoe before 4 or 6 P.M.,
that is: just a few hours before the end of day. By leaving to the
units a certain amount of elastlolty for their defensive dispositions,
they were able to hold out until night.
In the seoond phase, the quostlon Is definitely to stop tho enemy.
One point should be emphasiied from the point of view of the
deolslon of our oomsander. It Is to give a holding mission to the

61*
outposts without providing for their reinforcement* This decision
results from the situation as oreate&by the preooding engagements*
The battle continues eaoh day, and it appears to be espeolally dlfflo ult to organise the systematic withdrawal of the outpoete. On the
othar hand, the enemy is not disposed on terrain farorable to his
offonaiTft over a long distanoe* Re oannot gain earprise; we know that
he is there in strength, but we hate means available that are equal
to hla own* Therefore we aooept ooobat systematically organised to
defend in depth* which tends to disorganise his units*
In Haute-Alsaoe, where the division will hold a seotor for about
three months, the situation will be entirely different: the front
develops itself over more than 0 kilometers* The enemy, having avail*
able terrain whioh favors the offensive, oan gain surprise* Tho
general provides for the withdrawal of the outposts* There is ample
time to prepare for this, and the defensive organisation makes its
eseoution easy*
This withdrawal, moreover, will be planned in a different manner,
according to the way in whioh the situation will develop; in the
beginning we will be satisfied with preparing the evaouatlon of the
sone where the enemy is able to combine the action of his mlnenwerfers
and the adjusted fire of his field artillery and gain surprise* We
wish to gain the necessary time for the arrival of the army reserves*
The defensive position is chosen 6 or 6 kilometers from the enemy's
lines*
In the beginning of June there are no more large reserves in the
area* They are all employed on other parts of the front* Therefore,

68*
in oaae of attaok by the enemy, the dlvision(l) will hare to hold
its twonty kilometers with lta own foroea alone* In that oase, we
will oonslder the withdrawal of the outposts on a larger soele*
The general wishes to profit to the faliast extent from the advant ageo whioh.the terrain may give him, and, by turning the situation
around, to gira him possibility of obtaining surprise. He wishes to
engage the enemy on ground whioh ha will hare prepared in advance* He
ohooses the best position of the area on whioh to dispose the bulk of
his troops, though this is looated some 10 kilometers from the front
line. The battalions in outpost positions are no more than covering
battalions, anO normally rery weak in artillery, the bulk of whioh
Is deployed behind the main line of resistance (2). It goes without
saying that the manoeurer would be exaouted only if the events demanded
it, and aooordlng to the manner in whioh the different threats developed.
Finally, as will be seen in the next chapter, the division will be
engaged in the oounter-attaok in the month of July. It will aot on the
offensive for more than ten days in front of Epernay. naturally, It
oannot attaok every day on its entire front; it has to atay on the de fensive on part of it. In this situation, not only oan there be no
question of withdrawing the outposts, but their reinforoement will be
provided for in oase they should be attacked. We shall fight for the
preservation of the fronc line, whioh is to be the line of departure
for the eventual attaok of the next day*
(1). Reinforoed, moreover, by the bulk of an American Division.
(8) nevertheless, our artillery Is oocatantly on the move] Batteries,
even groups, are frequently pushed fur a day in support of the
outposts*

60,
OTms, then* war illoatratlone show as how much everything, on the field of battle, presents a special case, how situations will assume different forma, varying from any set rules, whioh i t is impossible to apply to their solution*
******

Conoernlng the taotioa of the different arms, applied during the

engagements around Hoyon:
From the standpoint of the infantry:
The striking faot has been the value of infantry fire, not only as
an aid during, but as a means of preparation for the attacks, or as a
defensive means of breaking up the attacks of the enemy. On the other
hand, it should be pointed out that on the German side the aotlon of
the infantry during the preparation of the attacks oonsisted of an
infiltration of small elements espeolally through the covered or
dofiladed tones on the flanks of the line to be attaoked, in order
to envelop it, either on both flanks, or else on the most aooessible
flank.
From the point of view of the artillery:
During these operations, the Germans have employed, almost exclus ively, their light field artillery: 77 mm, 105 mm, comparatively few
160 mm,guns. The employment of larger oalibors, or of heavy pieoes, has
not been observed before the E6th. On that day the heavy artillery
rejoins tho divisions that are engaged. It was not able to follow them,
on aooount of the rapid progress of the first days of the battle*

64.
Proa the point of view of its employment, wo hay noon the German
artillery take as its objective oar front lines of infantry, whioh was
the immediate objective, and fire concentrations on the seleoted points
of attack, on whioh they would lay down veritable rolling barrages at
the moment of assault*
Little or no ooantor-battery; little or no firing on oar rear*
Several times, and notably in preparation for their night attacks,
the Germans hare employed, over and above the auxiliary means of firs
of the infantry regiments, medium and heavy minenwerfers They hare
used theae in preparation for the assault on the Tillages (especially
Gulsoard)* From the 6th on, they have generalised the as of them for
their preparations (attaok of Mount Renaud, for instanoe)*
On the Frenoh side, all the artillery is most often kept under the
oommand of the division oommander* Because of the small amount of ar tillery in the beginning, the speoialiiation of the groups having to
go into action In support of any given unit would have led to soon a
dispersion of artillery fire that it would have beoome ineffective. It
waa considered preferable to oonoentrate the mass of artillery fire in
front of that part of the line deemed to be the most threatened, ready
to awitoh it afterwards to another tone which in its tarn was partic ularly exposed*
This concentration of the artillery, in spite of the very great
extent of the front, was most often made possible thanks only to its
arrangement in an aro of a circle, whioh made the changing of objectives
and the liaison easier*
However, at times it was nevertheless deemed preferable to special ise certain groups, and to put them temporarily in exclusive support
of a particular unit.

66.
Fron the point of view of tho oaval?yt
The German oavalry appears on the battlefield only to make one
attempt at a oharge against ono battalion of the 4th Infantry* The
oharge is made tnloe, by wares, and with one result only, that of
unquestionably making thie oavalry unavailable for the root of the
battle, for we hare not seen it any more aftor this attempt.
How muoh more effective would it have been had it been used, on
the evening of the 84th or the 26 th, by small units boldly pushed
forward through all the gaps, and sweeping our routes of withdrawal
^ith their fire.
On our side, the divisional squadron, and the fire aguadrons sub sequently put at the disposal of the 9th Division, are properly em ployed to insure the arrival of the infantry and to oover the flanks,
*******

00H0LD3I0H O QEHERAL OiUEUK* F

The lessons remaining of value for operations of this nature, whloh seem to e to result from this f i r s t study, are in my opinion the f o l l owing: The power of resistance of a good body of troops, even in entirely open oountry and on wide fronts, without organised intrenohments and without natural obstacles, when one has available the time neoeasary for the establishment of a good system of f i r e , and when one has a plentiful supply of ammunition. As a natter of faot, the 9th Infantry Division has held out, from the end of the morning of Uaroh 25rd u n t i l the evening of lfaroh 24th,,

66.
on a front whloh extended up to 18 kilometers, against IUI enemy who at one time was numerically five times stronger. Its front was not broken, and, although both i t s flanks were enveloped, i t was able without great difficulty to extricate i t s e l f at nightfall, of tho 26th. from the 26th to tho 30th, the grouping whioh I commanded (consisting of two infantry divisions, ono of whioh had already been in battle, and, for a short time, a division of oavalry) has held itn entire pos ition intaot, though, to be sure, i t was only partly organised, on a front of approximately 6 kilometers, This power of resistance, moreover, results to a certain extent from the faot that, in a war of movement, the enemy, not knowing exaot ly where we are looated, encounters groat difficulty in adjusting a ay8tern of fire to his attacks, whioh system i s indispensable i f he does not have tanks. This oapaoity for oombat would undoubtedly have actual* ly increased under analogous conditions. The role of the Infantry fire, not only from the standpoint of the barrages, but from the action in depth during all the phases of oombat, and more especially from the point of view of counter-preparation. As a rule, the necessity of waiting, when one finds himself serious* ly involved except in rery oovered or mountainous terrain until night in order to esoape without difficulty, and to withdraw some dlstanoe. The great variety of situations whioh may oonfront one in the war of movement, the possibility of meeting them with we 11-trained troops by means of manoeuver. But the requirement for success Is a good system of liaison and oommunioation. The role luok plays in war. Here: our good fortune in being able to have the division move with entire freedom before i t was thrown into

67.
battit; our good fortune in being able to bring up the artillery and trains by road and in tine, while so Many nearby oomrhdas did not aee the* arrive until too late; the look to bring down an enemy plane oarrylng extracts of orders vhioh gave the essential information neoes* aary to fire the oounter-preparation at the right moment* But, even ao, one moat grasp the fleeting opportunity, and one oast have plaoed him aelf in position to be able to exploit it* Action, in the fora of an offensive sore, i f i t is not absurd, will bear i t s fruits taotioally, besides raising the morale of our troops* By aounter-attaoklng on the evening of the 84th with the 89th Infantry, we have halted the envelopment of our right* In trying to retake ground on the 7th, with part of the 85th In fantry Division and the British oavalry, we Ha*# stopped the enemy for the time being by surprising him daring his advance, and we gained time to plaoe ourselves in position; the same as when retaking Mount Benaud* Thus, in strategy. It should not be forgotten that i t is the stunning blows of t\e Third Army at Woevre, of the Fourth Army on the House, of the Fifth Army at Guise, whioh in 1914 turned the German manoeuver from its oourse, and whioh allowed the resumption of the offensive on the Karoo* To sum up: At the time when the question of oovering forces i s being dl80U8sed, perhaps without having all the elements of the situat ion, the operations whioh have just been discussed are suoh as to give us oonfldenoe* Seeing what one i s able to do under improvised condit ions, we may Infer what one may hope to undertake in the execution of

68.

a aission whioh has boon oarefully studied and prepared, eren with troops whioh laok the experience of four yearn of war.
*******

Ho to.

I would be ungrateful i f I failed to cention the valuable oooperation which I hare reoeired in the u Alain ration of m ooarade. General Mare'ohal, oo moan ding the 35 th Dlrision, y who supplied ae with two of his excellent regiments, and of General Pittaann, ooaoandlug the mixed British oaralry diT ision whioh fought with us on Ifaroh 26th, 1918.

CHAPTER X I I .

6 9 .
OHAPTBR I I I . THE DIVISION III THE ATTACK IN A OOMBIHED OFFENSIVE AOTIOH.
THE VE3LB,
- Soale of map:l/0,000

Following tho engagements around Epernay, the 9 th Division it> rested in the areas DameryOumieresBouraault. It remains there until the end of August, then i t iB brought up olose to the front, whioh hae boon utablliied onoe more on the Teslo* O Anguflt fidth, i t entera into a aeotor in the lone between: n iho linej Oourlandon --knoll to tho southwest of TJnohair(inolusire) on the woet, and the linei Voiain farm --Hourgesfinoluaire) on the east* Our front units are erorywhere in oontaot with the enemy, whoso outpoat position is along the line: Ormont farmroad from Rheime to Fismes (as fcr as the orossroads 400 meters west of Vassleuz Farm) Hill 96Bin 76 (300 netere southwest of Voiein farm)* His main line of reelstanoe seems to be established immediately to the north of the Vesle. O our tiide, we have our main line of resistance on tho knolls to n the west of Unohuir, between Unohair and Rourges, and to the east of Hourgoe. There f.re only outposts in the ralley, in oontaot with the enemy. The division command post is established at Imagery, and will after words bo mored to Orugny (southern part)*

70,
The command post of the divisional infantry is at Orugnyfnorthem
part),
The 0eotor 1B held by two infantry regiments; the third one is a
reserve.
The artillery ia deployed in rear of the main line of resistance
defined above*that is: in rear of the ridge line*
The division has a dual mission assigned)
1 To organise the seotor defensively*
8* To hold itself in readiness to take the offensive*
At this period, the general situation is favorable to the Allies*
After the viotorioua offensive of the Somme, on August 8th, new attaoks
ar* lAunohed on the 80th, between the Oiee and the Aisne, then, on the
SGth, on the road ArraaOambrai. They allow us to advanoe in these
areas, but it is atill premfcture to antioipate their offoot on the
front of the Fifth Army (Oennral Berthelot), halted on the Veale sinoe
August- 6th, whenoe the twofold mission given to his divisions*
In order to aooomplieh their defonsive mission, the troops set to
work vigorously, so as to oonplete the organisation of the main line
of resistunoe. To oarry out tho offensive mission, the outpost battal ions are ordered to oarry out a series of small operations with the
objeot of gradually throwing the enemy baok from his advanced positions
routh of the Vesls, to oooupy the river-line everywhere, and to pre pare for its orossing* On the other hand, all theee minor operations
hfivo the advantage of allowing prisoners to hi taken, whioh is indie pone able in order to know what the enemy is doing, and if one does not

71.
wish to run the risk of being surprised by a possible hostile withdrawal* The first of this kind of operations, whloh are all oarrled out in the form of surprise atfcaoks while holding the ground oooupied, takes plaoe on September 1st, and allows elements of the 4th Infantry to take possession of the Ornont fara and the surrounding woods* On September find the progress of the Allies foroes the Germans to f a l l baok on the Siegfried line. The advanoe of ltangin's army, dominating the plateau region north of the Alone, causes the linth Qermat Army and the right wing of tho Seranth to f a l l baok, partly to the northeast of Hoyon, partly to the plateaux north of the Teslt as far as the rioinity of ttsmes* More to the east, the enemy holds his old pooltions. To the left of the 9th Infantry Division, the Aaerloan dirieion operating in the violnlty of Flames is exerting strong pressure on tha enemy, while we, aoting on his right, are trying to break the turning point of the new German line, and are attaoking the village of Qourlandon* W auooeed in taking i t , and elements of the 4th Infantry oooupy the wood o to the northeast of the Tillage, thus insuring an outlet for the divis ion to the north of the Vesle From now on, the troops of the division will oontinue their minor operationsi some for the purpose of oompletely driving b&ok the enemy from the south bank of the Yesle, wherever he may s t i l l bt , others to try to Improve our positions to the northwest of Breuil* On September 6th the 889th Infantry takes Breuil. On tho 10th there are no more Germane south of the Vesle* From the 10th to the 10th we make some slight progress northeast of Oourlandont

Tft.

U the general situation i s beooalng ore and more favorable to the Allies, their offensive extends orer a front Hiloh i s steadily beooaing wider* On September 20th, the Fifth Ara\y orders a l l the divisions to hold themselves in readiness to partlolpate in a ooabined offensive aotlon whioh will be launohed very shortly with the objeot of driving the eneny from the heights between the Vetle and the iiene. From that day on, a suooesslon of orders arrive at the division oommand post, giving, by degrees, a l l the neoesstry data for p re par ing and organiilng the attaok* DRiWIHO UP O T R 0RDKR8 KEUTIXO T THE ATTJ01'. F H O The 9th Division will be protested ou 1U right by the 10th infantry Division, already in seotor, and on i t s l e f t by the IMrd Dlv is ion entering into the lint between the 9th and the 45th Division, the latter having relieved the Anerloana Its tone of aotion l i e s betwtent West boundary! Breull-eur-Yeile(exoluelve) the Vesle B O O asters to the northeast of Breull-surVole Mont ftm Inf. Dlv)*the Orands 8avarts(to the 9th Inf Hit.)* (to the 9th The west bound

ary oute the road Vlontigny--Ventelay 1800 Meters to the south of Vnntelayt i t leaves the Long Volsln fara to tht 9th Infantry Division, nnd Bourgogne to the 168rd Infantry Division* Bast boundaryi Point on the Vesle, 600 MUrs east of Volsln fan; passes to the west of h i l l 176 (southeast of Hontlgny, this

70.

hill assigned to the 10th Infantry Division hill 804 flEOO mote re south of Bouranoourt, this h i l l assigned to tho 9th Infantry Division,), The objeotires prescribed by the Aroy arti first objeotiret Knolls to the north of the HaurouAls farm, knoll north of Montifny-sur-resla(9th Ini, Dir,)Mont terra'(9 th Inf. DirJ Romainloewln trat, a to* Saoond objeotirti
Knolls dominating Ftry on tha wast l'Ome farm (9th Inf tha Orands Sararts (9th Inf. Dir4 knolls doninating Vsntalay to tha wtst, o t o . . ,
flntl objaotlrti

P^Ty hill 04 (1800 a\atars south of Bourannourt) (9th Inf. --Long Voisin fam (9th Inf. Dlr.)-Bourgogna, oto., Tha sapplasantary aaans pat at tho disposal of tha 9th Division oonaist of tha following artillary onlyi 8 Raglmentn of field artillery, 75 aatguna. Oroupa of haavy artillery. 1 Oroup of 365 SB,howl tier? (Schneider 1917). 1 Oroup of two 880 na.mortars, with tractors, .'Juoh are tha assantial data of tha oonmand, allowing tha division uoowander to plan his operation* This operation differs from tha attack carried out by his troops nt Kpornay on July 18th in that It oan ba planned with the greatest oiuntlon to detail, on aooount of tho time available for i t s praparatio

74.
and of the relative stability of our line of departure and of the front
line of the enemy; in any oaae, of the possibility to know both of them
with aoouraoy*
This detailed oare in the preparation ie, moreover, neoossary, for
we are no longer faolng an enemy who has oooupled his position only
the day before,after an advanoe whioh to some extent has disorganised
his units; we are in the presenoe of an enemy who has oooupied his
positions for almost two months, who has been able to oonstruot fairly
substantial defensive organisations, and who has a liaison between the
infantry and artillery whloh is perfeotly established* The attaok to
bo exeouted is therefore quite different* We hare, besides, a great
dlffioulty to solve at the very beginning of the attaok, whioh is that
of orossing the Yesle, whioh is bordered on both its banks ovor almost
its entire oourse by marshos whloh often aro oxtonaivo*
The general prepares his denielon*
Over and above the mission and the means whloh we will have at our
disposal, whioh have already been defined, the elements of the situat ion aro, as always, the terrain and the enemy* Everyone works on them,
bo that their study may be o&rried out with the greatest oare*
The 8nd seotlona are espeolally fortunate, for information is ftban dan t and fairly aoourate*
It allows us to looate, on the front between thu dirt road leading
from the Roma In tree to Baslieux and the road JonoheryPe'vy, three
Gorman divisions, as follows)
1, On the west, the 19th Division, as far as the road BrouilRomain*
8, in the oenter, the find Bavarian Division, as far as Uontigny,
(inoluaive).

3. On the eaet, a division, number unknown, whioh has relieved the 6th Reserve Division, The 19th Division i s a good one, and the 2nd Bavarian Division i s a very good division. The sector, taken as a whole, seems to be organised in the follow ing manner: In the advanoe oombat nonet A line of outposts, held by weak elements, along the north bank of the Yesle as far as Breull, and fron that point on in olose oontaot with our line. A main lino, whioh la marked out approximately by la ?onta* nolleles Sableslea PotJ^ Venteauzthe organisation of the Qoulot Woods. In the principal oombat tone (\)t A main line defined by le Croons ton--tho orgonitaticnc on the revorse slope of Mont Ferre'--Uontlgnyand tho heights to the east of this village. The dlsfosition of the troops seems to oe the following:
Eaoh division has two regiments in thft line*
Each regiment hast
One battalion in the advanoe oombat tone, with two oompanlet in the front line and two in support* One battalion in the prlnoipal oombat sone as defined above* One battalion at rest, along the Alsne* The deployment of the artillery has been oarried out in rear of tho line i Roma in--Mont FerreMonti gny. The inetmotions given to the troops seem to be to hold in plaoe*

( I ) Moordlnp to tlio Gorman oxpranolon,

76,
The defensive organisation has already progressed fairly wall:
numerous trenohes, but generally discontinuous. Few large wire entang le wonts, exoept on the reverse slope of Mont For re'. Additional minor
defenses in the thickets*

All the information obtained is oommunloated to the subordinate

commanders on the S4th of September* It forma a document of nine
pages, on aooount of the numerous details obtained regarding the loo atlon of automatlo arms, small outposts, oomaand posts, observation
posts, depots of all kinds; the life in the seotor, the probable in struotionst It is to be noted, moreover, that the information obtained
is far more abundant and aoourate in the lone to the north of the Yesle,
where we are in olose oontaot with the enemy, than where the rirer
separates us*

The Army order for the attaok prescribes that the 153"d Division
must Insert itself between the 9th Division and the 46th Division whioh
operates on its left. The 9th Division most abandon the bridgehead of
Courlandon to it; its front for the attaok, moved ovor towards the
oast, is thus everywhere outlined by the Vesle*

In the lone of aotlon assigned to it, there are, after the orosslng
of the river, two immediate principal objectives, of practically the
same lmportanooi Mont Perre and Montigny-sur-Yesle, which determine
oloarly distinot missions, each one to be confided to a regiment,

The aotual arrangement of the BOO tor is as followst Two regiments

in llnei

77.
The 4th, on the right* From the Volaln farm (inoluslve) to Breull sur-Veale (exolualve). The 8Bnd, on the left. From Brouil-sur-Vesle (inolueive) to la Croix-Bortrand (inolusive). The third regiment, the 329th, la in reserve* The 88nd Infantry i s the most tired. In order to prevent the enemy from identifying, through prisoners, the presenoe of the 163rd Division, i t has been deoided that this div ision n i l l not be inserted until during the night proceding the attaok* The left battalion of the 88nd Infantry will not be relieved until that date. Therefore, i t is a good plan to hold this regiment in reserve, and to order the 4th and 329th Infantry to attaok, the first Montigny, the seoond Mont Forre# At this time the 4th Infantry is made up of three battalions, eaoh consisting of two Prenoh rifle oompanles, a oompany of Senegalese rifle mon, and a Frenoh mfiohine-gun oompany. One Senegalese maonine-gun oom pany is a reserve fire power held at the disposal of the regimental commander* This regiment must try to take Montlgny-aux-Vaale, manoeuvring on the north by passing over h i l l 63, and on the south by trying to get a foothold, as soon as possible, on the knoll dominating the village, iouaedlately to the east, A battalion will be oharged with taoh of those two missions, while the third battalion of the regiment will follow In reserve, at the disposal of the oommander of the divisional infantry* The 889th Infantry i s oomposed of four battalions: three Frenoh

78.

battalions consisting of two rifle oompanies and one maohine-gun com pany, and tho BSrd Battalion of Senegalese riflemon, oomposed of three rifle oompanioB and one maohine-gun oompany. The objective of this regiment is Uont For re'. How, between the Yeale and this h i l l , in the division BOO tor, there are two tones of terrain whloh are quite dissimilar. The one to the west is wooded and dlffloult to oross, the other, on the east, is with out oover and eaay to cross* Therefore, the troops engaged in the western part would risk having their formation for the attaok completely disorganised when, after an advance of 700 aeters under trees, they would tt last find themselves within aavjulting diatanoe of their principal objective! Uont Perre. Consequently, i t so ems to be adrantageoua to Unit tho terrain of attack to the e-ast tone, while taking into aooount the possible rlek "f 8oeing the tttaoklng troops taken under oblique fire by tho defen* dors of the eastern edges of the woods, as it i not oertain that theBe will be entirely noutrallied. The frontal attaok on Uont FerrV, from the aouth, thus risks being insufficient; therefore the general oommanding the 9th Divlcion has the plan to profit from the attaok by the 163rd Division, on our l e f t , by making some of his elements aot in i t j tone* The right of this div ision, being unable, upon leaving Breuil-eur-Yesle, to attaok over the marshy tone immediately to the north of this looallty, takes as i t s Mno of departure the Vlgneux woods, and attaoka in the dlreotlon Kult-VoieinaBourlemont woods. Our units will be able to advanoe In Its traoks, tlen, when they shall have arrived abreast of Uont Ferro' thoy will ohango direotion into the tone of the division and will ntuok this point of support by outflanking i t from tho north*

79.
Thus, as at Uontigny, wo obtain a simultaneous aanoeuver from
the north and from the south, seeking to take the point of support
by onoiro lemon t.
Moreover, this attaok, whioh does not have to oroBS the Vesle,
offers the advantage of enabling the battalions making it to open,
to eome extent, the door to the oomrades who might not have suooeeded
in 6ffooting the always diffioult operation of orossing a stream.
Consequently, this regiment will fora two groupings.
One of the groups will attaok from the south.
Two of its battalions will aot ovor the exposed tone. One battalion
will be oharged with oovsring the left flank of the one whioh is to
oftaok Uont For re', by taking las Venteaux and the eastern edges of the
woods, without, however, entering into the wooded region.
The two battalions aoting in the lone of the 163rd Division must
advance as near as poBsiblo to tho leading olements of this division,
Due without running tho risk of having to go Into aotion; then they
will change direction into the tone of the division: one, the 63rd
not tali on of Senegalese riflemen, will oontlmie In tho general direot lon of the Orand Savarts, while the other will ohange dlreotion towards
Uont Perre" from the west and tho northwest.
After the taking of Uontigny and of Uont For re', the attaok will be
oontinued by making the principal effort on the left, on the orest of
tho Grands Savarts. It will be oarrltd out:
In the atotor of the 4th Infantry: By the two battalions whioh have
tnkon the village, or eventually, if neoossary, by the third battalion,
Uvlsional infantry reserve;

80.
la the BOO tor of the 389th Infantry: By the 53rd Battalion of
Senegalese riflemen, and by the battalion of the 329th whioh has
attacked Mont Forre from the south*
The battalion engaged on the edge of the lea Venteaux Woods will
insure the mopping up of all the wooded parts; the battalion which has
aoted with the 53rd Battalion of Senegalese riflemen will stay on
Wont Forre', as garrison of thlB point of support, and will organ lie
Itself there*
Engineers (Uap Ho*l) The prlnoipal problem to be solved is that

of the orosslng of the Yesle, a stream having an average width of six

meters, but whose banks, over a width of about a hundred meters, are
marshy and orossed by many small brooks* It will be neoessary to pat
down a fairly large numbar of footbrldgos, in order not to have too
groat a oonoentration of troops under the probable fire of the enemy's
nrtillery, and to allow an easy and rapid orossing and oubsequent
employment*
It la deoided to establish about one footbridge for eaoh oompany
of ihe front line, that is: a total of 12 footbridges 6 in the tone
of the 4th Infantry, 6 in the tone of tho 889th Infantry*
Saoh of tho two companies of division engineers is ordered to oon*
. truot the footbrldgos in the none of a rogiment of infantry* Thy
will establish them at points ohonen by mutual agreement with the reg imental oommanders*
Tho diffpulty le that the enemy oooupies the north bank of the
Yoale, and that in spite of this tho operation must be oarried out
without his being aware of it* as tho attaok is soheduled to take plaoe
by eurprlse, without artillery preparation*

81.
To obtain this result i t is deolded, f i r s t , not to put down the footbridges until during the night preoeding the attack, the material havlug been assembled beforehand nearby, and camouflaged; seoond, to aooustom the enemy to great aotivlty on the banks of the Veele by pro ceeding with numerous night patrols, and lastly by preventing his approaoh to the north bank by frequent maohine-gun fire, and even, at oertain prearranged tines, artillery fire (156 tarn.howl tiers). As soon as the attook has been Xaunohed, i t will beoooe neoessary to oonstruot tootbridgos for maohlne-gun oarriagos, then, after the attaok has moved towards the seoond objeotive, two bridges will ba construoted for the field artillery at les Venteaux and Yoiein faro* Finally the engineers will have to reestablish oomounloatlons on the axial road of the division. It will be aided in i t s different missions by laborers taken from the territorial battalion. Artillery* The oounter-balUry and the interdiction arc In charge

of tho Army Oorps, whioh has formed, with the heavy gums wliioh i t hes available (two groups of heavy guns of 106 mm, two groups of two batte rioo of heavy guns, 165 ton.old nodels, one group of heavy guns of 166 cm, 1917, one group of high power heavy guns, 155 u ) , two suitable grouping*, eaoh one operating on the front of one of the divisions of tho Amy Oorpa (9th and 10th) The firing (1) on moving objeotivos will likewise be carried out by

tho Army Corps, over i t s entire front, by two batteries of 105 mo.guna. The interdiction at Ions range will bo insured bj the heavy artlll* or? of the Army (166 ma.high power Filloux guns), formed into one single

(1). The 153rd and 46th Infantry Division are under tho orders of tho general oommandlng the XXttl Army Corps.

88.
group, with the prinoipal mission of denying the bridgoa over the Alone
to the enemy, in front of the divisions on the left flank of the Army.
The artillery, under the orders of the division ooicmander, will be
charged wi K h the direct support and the o ore ring of the attao*c.
It seems necessary to have, for this direct support, two regiments
of field artillery, cooperating with the two assault infantry regiments*
It is decided to put:
The 30th Field Artillery in support of the 39th Infantry.
The 83rd Field Artillery in support of the 88nd Infantry,
The oommandera of the artillery regiments will have a ooomand post
in oommon with the oommandora of the infantry regiments they are sup porting.
Tho third regiment of field artillery (886th Field Artillery,portee),
ia consolidated with the groups of heavy artillery into one grouping in
gonoral support*
Tho fiie of dlroot support will bo laid down in the form of rolling
barrages*
The fire of the artillory in goneral support will require:
Protootivo fires, oarried out in the form of suooensive oon onntrations, lifted and carried further when they are ovortaicon by the
rolling barrages*
Blinding fire by smoke shells, plaoed on the bottom of the
valley and in front of tho observation posts of tho onomy, in ordor to
mask ne dlffloult operation of the Placing of the fuotbridgoa.
Firing with lnoondlary oholla numerous-* of l'Orme farm*
A roinforoomont, at a givon raonont, of tho fire of direct
support (by one group)*
on the sheds --whloh are quite

68.
The problem of the deployment of the artillery was particularly
dlffioult: the ridge line to the south of the Veale Is, taken as a
whole, four or five kilometers from this river, and is without coverj
finally, the northern slopes are slightly wooded.
From which follows the dilemmat
To plaoe the artillery in position in rear of the ridge line,
therefore distant, not allowing continuity of fire in oase of a marked
advanoe by the infantry, and making liaiaon between these two arms
rather diffioult.
Or to place the artillery in position in front of the ridge
liue, that 1st in front of our position of resistanoe, on the forward
nlopes at about 1500 to 8000 meters from the enemy, in a specially
haiardous looation, exposed to the direot artillery fire of the enemy,
or to a hostile attaok of Borne importance, whioh is, however, rather
i probable.
In entire agreeraont with Colonel Langloie, commanding the division
artillery, the general deoldes to plaoo the groator part of the field
artillery north of the ridge lino, in spite of the risk entailed* This
risk, howevor, seemed reduoed by tho faot that it was eoidod to plaoe
the guns in position during the laot night preceding tho attaok(l), the
formation of ammunition depots having been started during tho preoed ing night, and being thoroughly camouflaged,(2) and that it was arranged
not to oarry out any firing, not oven a single ranging shot, beforo
tero hour*
(1) Wo will B O O later on how, tho dato of tho attaok having been delated,
tho artillory will remain for throe days in this prooarious situation*
(g) Tho munitions supplios wore to bo established on the following baoosi
Fiold Artillory, 75 mm* 3fc days of fire.Day of flret 800 rounds per pleoo.
165 mm,howitBors.3 days of flr*Day of flret 150 rounds per plooe*
Houvy nrtlllory ond mortarsiB to 4 days of fire, according to oalibor.
This was lnoroased to 4 days for tho 75 mm.guns*

84.

It fflll be observed that suoh a plan and a fire as oarefully adjusted as that whioh waa oarried out, Imply f i r s t olaes a r t i l l e r y . The order issued by the diviaion waa the following:

9th INPAHTRY DIVISION. STAPP. Section. K., 6034 3/D. I. GEHERAL O D R HO. 41 RE 3E0RET.

Oo^aand poet of Orugny. 87 September, 1910. 10(Ten) A.M.

A combined offensive operation of tho Fifth Army, for the

purpose of driving the enemy from his positions on the plateaux boi.ween the Yeale and tho Alane, and to throw him book beyond the Aisno, i s to take plaoe on a day to be determined later* II* This operation w i l l be participated in, from right to l e f t , b y : Tho Yfch Army Oorpil: 10 th and 9 th Ifen try Divisions; The XXfch Army Corpsi 163rd and 46th Infantry Divisions; Tho XVI Mt Army Corps: 68nd Infantry Division and the 77th Amorioan Division* To the right,- the Xlllfeh Army Oorpa w i l l support by i t s fire the aotion of the Yth Army Corps, and the XVI th Infantry Dlvisionfloft d i v i s i o n of the XIIIWi Army Corpo) w i l l hold I t s e l f In readinesR to follow and to support the offensive of the 10th Infantry Division* Tho 63rd Infantry Division and the Oseoho-Slovaklan brigade in rooervo of the Army w i l l follow tho Vlfc Army Corps in traoe* The 163rd Infantry Division, whioh w i l l go into aotion betwoon tho 9th and tho 46th Infantry Diviaion, w i l l not be put in plnoe until the l a s t moment, and undor oovor of tho outposts of tho 9th Infantry

86.
Division north of the Vesle. III. Zone of aotion of the 9th Infantry Division:

West boundary: Brouil-sur-Vesle (exolusive) The Veele 00 meters northeast of Breuil-sur-Vesle Mont Ferre'fto the 9th Ifantry Division) --the Orands Savarts (to the 9th Infantry Division), The west boundary

crosses the MontlgnyVentelay road 1200 met&re to the south of Yentolay. I t leaven the Long Volsin farm to the 9th Infantry Division, and Bour gogno to the 163rd Infantry Division. Bast boundary: Point, on the Voele, 600 meters east of the Voiain farm. I t passes to the west of h i l l 176 (southeast of Uontigny; this h i l l to the 10th Infantry Division) h i l l 04 (1800 motors south of Bouvanoourt; this h i l l to the 9th Infantry Division).

IV.

Objeotlvess

First objeotlve:

Knolls to tho north of Haurouais form, knoll north of Uontlgny-surVesle (9th Inf. Div.)Mont Ferre' (9th Inf. Dlv. )RomainRomaln tree, eto.... Seoond objectives Knolls dominating Pevy on tho v*st l'Orme farm (9th Inf. Dlv.) the Orands Savarta (9th Inf. Dlv.) f knolls dominating Yentolty on the west, e t o . . . Final objootivei Pevyhill 04 (1800 motors south of Bouvanoourt) (9th Inf. Dlv.) Bourgogne, o t o . . . . Tho attaok w i l l be ourried out aooording to a tlmo oohoaule until the seoond objootive has been reoohod ( 1 ) , afterwords i t w i l l bo oonduoted (1) Avorago spoed for tho whole Ar.uyi IOC voters in 4 minutes, with a
halt of 1/8 hour on tho f i r s t objootive.Howovor, tho gonorals of
tho infantry divisions nro free to arrange their barrugos and to
adjust thorn by mutual agroemont.

86.

upon the i n i t i a t i v e of the division oommandera end the subordinates commanders, who w i l l oarry i t forward as rapidly and as fur as possiblo. V. Plan of attuok of th 9th Infantry Division, with two reglm

onts in tho front line and one in reserve* Assault troopsi On tho righti 4th Infantryt two battalions (throo r i f l o companies eaoh, of whloh on i s a company of Senegalese riflemen^, and ono machinegun oompany); On the l e f t : 389th Infantry* four battalions (throo battalions, eaoh of two r l f l o oomp&nlas and one eMohina-gun oompany --and ons

battalion of Sanegalese rifleman, tho 63rd, oonslstlng of throo r i f l e oompanies and one oaohlno-gun oompany)* divisional Infantry reservei Ono battalion of tho 4th Infantry (threo r l f l o oompanlos, one

boing a oompany of Senegalese riflemen, and one m&ohlno-gun oompnny). Division reservei
The 08nd Infantry, of three battalions (enoh of throo rlflo oom panios, one being a oompany of ^enogaleeo riflemen, and one maohine gun oompany).
Sohome of nanoeuverst
Tho 4th Infantry will manoeuvor so as to envelop and capture
the village of Uontlgny from the north and from tho south> It will
oloaoly ooordlnato its notion, on tho right, with that of tho 10th
Infantry Division; it will try to roaoh, as soon as posnible, the knoll
vhioh dominates Uontigny on tho enat,
Tho first and Important objootlve to bo taken by the 8B9th is
Mont Ferret

87.
Tho 39th will form two groups of attaok:
fc). Tho flret group, two battalions strong, andor the orders of
the oolonel, will orose the Veele east of les Ventoaux, and will make
a frontal atUok on Mont Ferret it will pro toot itself on tho left by
taking loo Ventoaux and the eastern edges of the wood moro to the north*
but without penetrating into the wooded tone*
b). The seoond group, consisting of the 63rd Battalion of Sene galese riflemen and the third battalion of the 329th, will initially
be plaoed undor the orders of Major Devaux, of tho 63rd Battalion of
Senegalese riflemen* This group will start behind the right of the
153rd Dlrialon, the adranoe of whioh it will follow as olosely as poss ible, the 63rd Battalion of Senegalese riflemen in the lead, third
battalion of tho 389th eoheloned to tho right rear; taking tho general
dirootion of the Oranda Sararts* As noon as the Uoulin-des-Bois brook
shall hare been crossed, the 63rd Battalion of Senegalese rlflomen,
advanoing as rapidly as possible, will advanoe on the right of tho right
olements of the 163i'd Infantry Dirision; the third battalion of the
389th will ohange dirootion towards Mont Forre' from the lost and the
northwest.
Tho groupt 63rd Battalion of Senegalese riflemon, third battalion
of Ihe 389th, will, as soon is it has entered onoe more into the tone
of tho 9th Infantry Division, rovort to tho oontrol of tho oolonel
of tho 389th.
After tho oapturo of Mont Ferro, tho attuok will be oorriod forword,

(1) Initially it will be undor tho ordoro of the oolonol commanding the
-lirluional Infantry, 163rd The regiment on the right of tho 163rd
is the reglmont of Uoroooan riflemen; one battalion of the 6th Zouaves
hna tho mission of mopping up, on tho west, thu woodn north of los
Yen tooux.

88.
by the 389th, on the left by the 63rd Battalion of Senegalese riflemen,
on the right by the battalion vthioh haa attacked Mont Ferre'from the
south* In prinoiple, the two other battalions t h e one which shall
have taken lea Yenteaux and the eastern edge of tho woods, and the
one wliioh shall have attaokod Mont Porre' from the northwest-- will pass
onoe more into regimental roserve: one of these battalions will be loft
to oooupy Mont Per re'.
Interdiction fire by artillery and maohine-guns will be executed
on the wooded sone to the north of les Yenteaux during tho entire time
neoeasary for its envelopment (see below)*
The battalion of the 4th, divisional infantry reserve, will oross
tho YeBle as soon as the progress of the assault regiments will allow
it, prepared to support one of them*
The 8End, division reeorve, will form two groups:
To tho left, tho battalion now in outpost will assemble as soon as
it shall have boon passed through by tho 153rd Infantry Division and
the grouping under tha orders o* Major Dovaux; it will follow this
last grouping, but will not pass beyond the violnlty of Mont Forro*
To the right, the two other battalions will be initially assembled
In the ravines two kilometors north of Orugny, ready to movo forward*
VI. Oontaoti
Insurod, on the right with the 10th Infantry Division by a
joint dotaohment, Including a sootion of the 4th Infantry ( andor
ordors of the oolonol oomaandlng tho Infantry of the 10th Division);
on the loft, with tho 163rd Infantry Division, by the 63rd Battalion
of Scnogalooo rlflomon when it shall take Its position on tho lino (undor
ordors of the oolonol oomraandlng tho Infantry of tho 163rd Division)*

89.
VII. Arrangements preliminary to the oroBsing of the Veale.
The oolonel commanding the divisional Infantry of tho 9th Division
will give all detailed orders neooasary to oarry out, from now on, a
aeries of night patrols, to be particularly aggressive along the Veale,
for the purpose of aooustouting the onomy to great nativity on this part
of the front; and, by maohine-gun fire, will prevent enemy patrols from
npproaohlng the north bank from now on*
The opnpanies of engineers, 6/4 and 6/68, are ordered to throw
the neoessary footbridges (to a total of. 12) , in the tones of the
4th and 329th Infantry respectively, and at points to be determined
by agreement between the oolonela oormaandlng the regiments and the
commandor of the division engineers* The neoessary materiel will be
brought up olose by during the nights preoeding the attaok, and oare fully camouflaged* The laying of the footbridgos will take plaoe at
the vory last moment during the night preoeding the attaok, in aooord anoo with detailed orders given by the oommander of the division engineers*
f The available engineer unite will be employed in tho repairing of
the bridges and of a road), VIII. Artillery:
The 30th Field Artillery (3 groupu of 76 mm.).
The 883rd Field Artillory (3 groups of 76 mm*)
The 886th Field Artillery,porteo (3 groups of 76 mm,),
The Vth group of tho 106th Field Artillory, heavy, (three batte ries of 166 mm* howitcors, Sohnoider 1916)*
Tho Vth group of the 134th Field Artillery, heavy, (throe batte rleo of 166 mm, howl tiers, Sohnolder 1917)*
The Vth group of tho 84th Field Artillory, heavy, trcvotor drawn,
(8 battnrlea of two 880 mm. mortars, true tor drawn)*
(See below)*

Tho 9th Infantry Division has available:

90.
One regiment of field artillery will be put in direct support of
oaoh regiment of assault infantry (30th in support of the 329th, 883rd
in support of the 4th,
The remainder of the artillery will stay under the direct ojfors of
the goneral commanding the division and the oommander of the artillery
of the division, to insure the protection of the attack*
The oounter-battery, harassing and interdiction will bo taken oare
of by the Army Corps artillery*
The artillery will be put in plaoe, with the neoossary ammunition
on hand, during the nights preoading the attack, in the greatest
secrecy*
The field artillery will be placed as far forward as possible, in
order to be able to support from its initial positions, as long as poss ible, the progress of the attack*
Tho artillery, plaoed on the slopes facing the Voslo, will be oare fully camouflaged, and all neoossary orders will bo given by the divis ional artillory oommader so that all movement near tho batteries will
be avoided*
Until H hour, and exoept on orders to tho oontrary from the divis ion oommandor, only the artillery now in sector (30th Fiold Artillery
ana the Yth group of the 105th Fiold Artillory,heavy) will be allowed
to firet without, howovor, modifying tho present dally sohedule of fire*
Tho fire preparation for all the other elomontti will bo made
entirely from tho map and from tho firing data of tho batteries in
sector*

9 1 .

IX.

Preparation:

There shall be no preparation of any kind before the launching

of the attaok
All the artillery will open fire at R hour.
However, during the night preoeding the attaok, the Vth group of
the 106th Field Artillery, heavy, will exooute & alow harassing fire
on the line of amull German outposts* to allow the engineers to put tho
footbridges in plaoe. The sohedule of night firing will, from now on,
be arranged in suoh a manner that the before-mentioned fire will not
appear abnormal to the enemy.
X. the Army*
This R hour, whioh will be given later, will probably be fixed
at shortly bofore daybreak.
The rolling barrages will bo laid down, at R hour, on the railroad
traoka north of the Yosle; they will be maintained thore until R hour
plus 16 (fifteen), to allow the leading oombat groups, rapidly Grossing
the river, to move up oloso to tho barrage. The relnforoemente and the
reaorre oompanios will follow as closely as possible, so as to olear
the sone of tho left bank, whoro tho enemy probably will lay down his
artlllory barrages.
The barrages will start moving at R hour plus 16 (fifteen),
and will bo liftod, starting from the lino of departuro ( railroad
traoks north of tho Yesle), at tho rnto of 100 motors in 6 (elx) min utes during tho first kilometer of progression, thon at the rato of 100
Sxeoutlon of the attaoki
The attaok will be launohod at H hour on tho entire front of

92.
meters in 4 (four) minutes until reaching the first objootive.
The barrage will again a tart at the first objeotivo at E hour
plus 1 h60 (one hour, fifty minutes), and will be lifted at n rate
of 100 meters in 5 (fire) minutes, until reaohing the second objeotive.
When the attnok shall hare reaohed the second objootire, it will
organise the ground taken, and with its fire will rapidly eearoh the
woods of lea Sararts and the rarines to the north and to the south* It
will push forward offensive patrols, who will more up olose to the
standing barrages established in front of the second objective.
At H hour plus 3 h30 (three hours, thirty minutes), the standing
barrages will be lifted, and oarried forward, by a searching fire, in
front of the third objeotlve* The infantry operation will be resumed
in the form of offensive rooonna.lssknoes, supported by the progression
of the yj.aaindor of tho battalions of tho front line and the reserves,
uooordlng to the principles of war of movemont,
Tho neooasary artillery supports (lifting of tho barrages on the
3rd objeotiro, oonoontrations of fire on the looal enemy points of
rosiatanoe, eto.j, will bo oailed for by the oolonels of the 4th and
tho 389th direotly from their artillery in diroot support of them*
XI General employment of tho artillerys
As stated above*

BarragoB*

Fro too tire oonoentratiomii 76 mm* guns and 166 mm, howl tierst Shoda
of tho formor oraouation hospital south of Montlgny, Mont Torre, Grands
Savarts, hoight to tho east of Uontigny, To bo lifted Aooording to the
progress of the attack.
76 mm Smoko Shells i On tho observation poets and liont For re'Woods
and on Montigny*

93.
76 mm. Inoendiary Shell?: On the shade of l'Ormo farm* 880 mm. Mortars I On the obaorvation poets of Uont Ferre'and Uontigny. The iuterdiotion on the wooded ione, not attaokod, to the north of lea Yenteaux w i l l bo Insured, from H hour to R hour plue 40 ( f o r t y ) , by the heavy a r t i l l e r y of the Vth Oorps*

XII*

Divisional maohine gunat

The two t e r r i t o r i a l oompanles whioh the division has available, and whioh are undor the orders of the divisional tanohine-gun oaptain, w i l l be employed to atrengthen the a r t i l l e r y i n t e r d i c t i o n , from R hour to R hour plus 30 ( t h i r t y ) , on the wooded lone, not aHooked, to the north of lea Venteaux,

XIII*

The divisional squadron, in the v i o l n i t y of Sony and Prln,

w i l l send out reoonn&iBnante parties of non-oommiaaioned offloers to tho 4th and tho 389th, and w i l l furnish l i a i s o n patrols (offloors) to the oommand posts of tho 10th and the 163rd Infantry Divisions. The oommander of the divisional squadron w i l l personally bo near tho d i v i s ion oommandor.

XIV,

Command Postst

V k Oorpst --Ihery. M 9th Infantry Division and divisional a r t l l l o r y of tho 9th Divis ion: --Mont-Orenet Divisional infantry of t^o 9th Divislonj--Hoursos, 4th Infantry: Villn-aux-Bois (Chatoou), 389th Infantry: - - ".outhwost oornor of tho Villo-nux-Boin Park, 68nd Infontryt Quorries, north exit of Orugny*

94.
XV. Communioatload . ( See speolal order)*

Axis of oomounioatlon: Uont-Gronet ( d i v i s i o n command postJ-'Kourges (oommand post of d i v i s i o n a l Infantry)--Chateau of Ville-aux-Bois foomaund posts of the 4th and 3 8 9 t h ) - - Voialn fern. Will subsequently be extended,

during tho oourae of the advanoe, on MontignyVadevi)leVaux Varennest

XVI. Repairing of an axial road by tho engineera: Road Crugny--Hourge8Yenteauz (dirt road or detour via the Chateau of Ville-aux-BoisYenteaux) Montlgnyroad h i l l 176 h i l l 818Bou vanoourt.

The Chief of Staff. BLIIf.

Tho Commanding General, 9th Dlr. Inf. Signed: 0 A B LI It* M

A supplement to the order preaorlbed the missions for the air nerrioet For tho balloont General obnerratlon; partioulnrly to Indicate tho looatlon of batteries In aotion, and to observe any movements In tho rear, to dleoovor either the oounter-attaoks or a well d e f hoatile withdrawal. Kor the airplanes: Oenoral observation from daybreb^ il t*

10*30 A.M., do tomining the enemy positions at 8.JO and 10,30 A.U; othor missions w i l l be prescribed,aooording to noeds, for tho airplanes alerted at Anthonay.

Almost at the same hour, thore vroro Issued: By the d i v i s i o n ! The order relating to oom&unlontiono and In* trnnstnlsslon of ordors, and tho ono relating to tho functioning of the auxiliary sorvloea.

95.
By the divisional infantry and the divisional artillery: The operations ordereu This simultaneous publication of ordoru was a result of tr,t oontinUBI ooopo/ation between tho different staffs. It is worth noting the diffloalty that lh& divisional artillery had in the preparation of their fire in support of tho infantry, because of: 1st, The aature of tho terrain, whJoh wna ^ut.te dlaelrallar eooording to the lonea, some being level and without oover, others being defiladed *nd wooded* find* The genial form of tho atlaofc, chloh oonaiated in a great enveloping ttoveaent of the left flank, tho 10th Division f craving pivot on the right* 3rd* The nanoeuver oarrled out inside of tK* ronr of the 9th irision, the two groupings of the 39th Infantry attacking: one in a M" .th-north dlrootIon, the other in a west-east direction, after having A tvanoeJ Into the tone of the lf>3rd Division* W p Ho* wna one of those att&ohed to tho order a ? division ..rtillery, and shows the difficulty in establishing the rolling barregoa. It should be pointed out that, until reaching tho first objeotlvo, thn effort to bo made on the right and that to be oorried out on the loft have the same itajortonooi Kovfevor, on aooovjit of the relnforoamont of tho 30th Field Artillery by a group of tho 26th, tho barrage seems to bn of groater density In front of the 3S9th Infantry, but It must be Uken into aooount that two groups of tho ET3rd are firing with roduood ohnrgoe, with a rato of 160 shota por hovir por rleoo, while tho othor groups, firing with a normal oharge, start off with only 100 shoto. Aftor

96,
the f l r o t objeotire, t .* principal effort la made on tha lef'*j the density of the a r t i l l f v y la greater there, whloh la normal*

PRBWJUTIOH OF THS ATTACK,

What <Sominato8 thia phaae la the aeoreoy with which a l l preparations must be aade In ora r to taoape the enemy1a notioe. The aotlTlty, In

tense faring the night -resulting from the reoonnaleaanoe of o f f i c e r s , the preparing of the a r t i l l e r y and ifca munitions, the eatabli8hment o depots of a l l kinds, particularly thoae of che materiel required for the oonatr-aotlon of the footbridges-a top 8 Rufcdealy aa aoon ae day

l i g h t oom^a* Partioular o w e ia paid to the oamouflage of ererything* Sot a single important movement l a oarried out by day i n roar of tha (Uriaiou. numerous patrola, during the night, aoouatom the enemy to "hearing noises" along the r i v e r , while our f i r e taakea the aotion of their own patrols very diffiou?.t

The attaok huring been scheduled for tin 28th, the a r t i l l e r y l a put in plaoe during the night of the S7th**S8th* At the l a s t moment the

date for the opening of i t s fire i s deferred for one day* Then, from the 89th, i t la again delayed to the 30th. Thus the a r t i l l e r y s t a y s , muoh longer than waa anticipated, in i t a haiardoua situation* Ite principal proteotion la aought in keeping the enemy ignorant of i t a existence; perfect oamouflage of the b a t t e r i e s , maintenance of the normal aspect of the daily f i r i n g .

97,
Some batteries, having stayed in their old positions, are aotive*
The others are silent, and do not execute any fire, not eren fire for
adjustment, except some pieoeB of heavy artillery, whioh will have
very aoourate fire to oarry out* They alone are authorised to fire
a few shots* At whioh time their fire is camouflaged by the fire of a
battery of the sector*
The infantry, of course, receives new instructions. In case of a
hostile attaok, it must hold on in front of the batteries; therefore
the outpost reoelves a holding mission* They must hold out at any oost
in their present positions, between the Yesle and the JonoheryPiemos
road* However, in order not to make the enemy auspicious, no modific ation is made .In the arrangement of the defense, no reinforoement of
any kind takes place* It is only ordered that, immediately upon notic ing the first indications of the threat of an attaok, the companies of
the outmost battalions maintained on the ridge will move forward through
the system of approach trenohes constructed in a few days*
One battalion is held ir readinesB to oounter-attaok via the alopes
west of Mount Ooohelet*
Two battalions proceed to Mount Qrenet, ready to oounter-attaok;
OUG via Mount Ooohelot, the other via the slopes of Vendeull*
The other battalions are brought uy oloae to the front, and oooupy
positions of readiness whioh have been determined in advanod*
The artillery carries out firing with all the batteries in posit ion in rear of the crest; those situated in f r . U of the crest do not
intervene exoept upon orders of the division oommander*
In order to prevent the enemy from withdrawing without our knowledge.

98,
lthr through baring gotten wind of our attack, or for any other
reason, we attempt a surprise attaok northwest of Breuil, in the mor ning of September 29 th* Pi re prisoners remain in our hands, and con firm that the ououpation of. the enemy's positions continues unohanged.
The date for the attack having been definitely fixed for September
80th, during the oourBe of the night of the 9th-30thi
The Infantry takes its attaok positions;
The engineers place the footbrldgos which they already had
brought up near by,
Thia last operation, carried out under the protection of patrols
whioh hare orossed to the right bank, suooeeds perfeotly. It lasts the
entire later part of the night,the pioneers, aided by foot-troops, often
standing in water up to the waist* The work is carried out in the
greatest silence, and is not noticed by the enemy*
EXECUTION OF THE ATTACK.
At H hour, fixed at 5:30 A,U,, all the artillery apens fire. The
first companies hasten towards the footbridges, orost* the river, and
deploy in front of the railroad traoka. At 6t45 A.M., the artillery
inoreaaes iha range, and the infantry is off to the attack. The support
companies begin to arrive on the north bank of the Yerle,
During the first ten minutes following H hour the German artillery
has remained absolutely silent, and, in his observation post of Mont
Grenet, the division commander asks himself if his attaok is not going
to be useless, the enemy apparently having withdrawn during the night*

99,
Only aone maohlne-guns are revealed, but this oan only bo a matter of r*ar-guarda covering the retreat of the main bodies* This anxiety It rery soon dispelled, however, as the German artillery gradually opens fire, the density of whloh brings proof that the enemy Is present In full strengths It was Impossible to establish with oertalaty the causes of this tardy opening of their fire, one of the prtnolpal reasons evl dently being the suddenness of the attack and the power of our neutral* lilng fire* i t H hour plus 15, the enemy's artillery fire beoones especially dense, but Its shots are those of an artillery wfcloh Is blinded as a result of the heavy soreftn formed by our amok shells* Thu enemy's shots f a l l principally on the two banks of the Ysle, but are soattared o?er the entire lone of the division, on aooount of the Impossibility to looate our footbridges* Their effeots are unimportant, und our losses trifling, both among the foot-soldiers orosolng the rlrer as well as among the pioneers remaining to carry out the necessary repairs to the footbrldgea* To the north of the river* the German infantry resists, find slows up the advanoe of our units making a frontal attack on Montigay and on Uont Ferre'* They even suooeed In stopping our attack for a short time, but yield at last upon seeing that thoy are being outflanked, aooordlng to the manoouver whloh we had planned, and whloh Is oarrled out to tht letter* Then begins the headlong retreat; the enemy's losses are heavy, and more than 400 prisoners f a l l Into our hands* Itoiit Perre'and Uontlgny are oooupled*likewise the oeoond objective*

100,
Our rapid advanoe has foroed tho enemy to leave eome guns behind, among whioh i s one atti-tank piece* W are then foroed to halt for a considerable time, due to the un e oertaln situation on oar l e f t , the enemy talcing 00 in the flan* on the lopes falling away to the north of the line Uont Ferre" Grands Savatts* The ftttajfc of oar neighbors has succeeded perfectly in the beginning, but on that side the enemy has brought up the groatar part of his re serves, whioh has enabled him to retake the oroat of the Romaln tree, and to launoh oounter-attaoks against the 163rd Division* The 389th Infantry refuses i t s flank sllghtly,faoing northwest, to aid their oonrades by ita fire, and to enable them to maintain them* selves on the oaptured poaitiono under any circumstances. The first battalion of the 8nd Infantry,towards noon, moves into
the vioinity of Kent Perre', tc> guard againrt any unforeseen contingency*
The other battalions prooeed to Hoorgoa and Unohair respeotivelyi
The mopping up of the woods north of the Petita Venteaux and of the village of Montigry takes rather long; i t yields *s some more prisoners Sinoe 7:00 o'clock in the morning, units from tne engineer companies have briskly begun work on the oonetmotion of two bridges for the field artillery, utiliiafrton of whioh has been anticipated as probable towards the end o the night of September 3Oth~Ootober lst
r

As soon afc possible, the advance i s resumed, but the s t i l l oonfusfrd situation on our .left restricts our possibilities of exploitation* Towards 6*00 PU#, aur front line passes through the Long Toisln farm

101.
and hill 804 (1 Rond Ghoiie), a distanoe of about 6 kilometers from
our line of departure. Four 810 nn guns, and also additional prieoners,
fall into our hands.
Towards the end of tho afternoon, the general gires thought to the
continuation of the operation the next Morning. Though he hae no oxaot
details about his left, and though the Army Corps order has not reaohed
him, he wishes to aoquaint his regimental commanders with wL*t they will
hare to do* Confirmation of what will be ordered will be sent them after*
wards, with the neoessary modifications or detailed instructions.
The first order issued Is the following!
9th IHFAHTRY DIVI8I0H. STAFF. 3rd Saotion, H GETORAL ORDER OF 0PKRATI0H3 .Ho.. I Before nightfall, effort will be made to determine exactly
our line, and to adjust, as closely as possible to this line, the
barrages of the groups in direct support.
II. The assault battalions, established in combat outposts, will
maintain olose contact with the enemy, and will hold themselves in
readiness to resume the operation tomorrow morning, either at an hour
fixed by the oommanderv or upon the initlfctire of the regimental oom mander8, and even to resume the advance during the night if the oppor tunity should arise
30 Peptemter. 6t80 P.M. {Six-thirty P.M.)

102, First objective of the divisions Knoll of the tree 191 (Road from poyenoourt to Vaux-Yarennea), by outflanking Bouvanoourt from the north (389th Reg, Inf.), and from the south (4th Reg* Inf.). General direotlon of the division: Connloy. III. During the nightt

The groupings in direot support must insure the proteotlon of the Infantry, and, if i t mores forward, the support of i t s movement. The group ir general support will exeoute harassing fire on Guybnoourt and on the crossroads tiro kilometers uesfc of Vaux-Varennes. Ae soon as the oondition of the bridges will allow, and if the situation has not been changed, the 30th Field Artillery will more a group into the ar*a: Mont Ferrer-defile of Romain--the Gilbert Woods ridge. The 283rd Field Artillery will nove, under the some conditions, a group into the ttodtlgny aroa, The other two groups of each of these regiments will stay in the valley of the Yesle, oh the Bouth bank. The 286th Field Artillery will send the Unohair group down into the Valley of the Tesle, and as far to the east as possible. The greater part of the batteries of heavy howitsera will be moved into the area north of Hourges-Unohair. X7 The 82nd Infantry will move , in the later part of the

night, to the north of the TeBle, int o the area south of Uont Ferre, it It will have orossed the river before daybreak.

103.
Y. Oommand Posts) Division and d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y : moved back again to Orugny, for tho night* Divisional Infantryt La Yille-aux-Bois (Ohetteau).

The Commend Ing General, 9 th Inf. D I Y . Signed: GAUELIN.

Daring the night, the division oommand post receives: 1 Information on the rogimente engagedt Situation unohanged,

enemy on the alert* 2. Information of the 153rd Division: Definitely and firmly

established on our l e f t . 3. The order of the Yth Army Corpsi Ordering the oontlnuanoe

of the atttok, and s l i g h t l y modifying the division sone of action. The general reorganises for an attack at 6:00 !!, and aooordingly draws up, at about 4|30 A.M., the following orders

9th INFANTRY DIVISION. STAFF. 3rd Section,

N. .. 1.

1 October, 1916 (4:40 A.M.). ( four-forty A.U. ) .

GENERAL OPERATIONS O D R No,

RE

Attaok to be resumed at 6:00 AU., following the detailed orders

of the commandera of the infantry regiments* Division front shifted s l i g h t l y to the south. The right bounded byt H i l l 04 ( l e Rond OhSne)Yadeville--tho Bouvanoourt--Hermonvllle road at the point where i t outs the 880th

104.
meridian*
The left bounded bys Bouranoourt (Inclusive)Ohalons-le-Yergeur
(exolusire).
II. Suooesslre objeotires:
a) Grands SarartsI Rond Ohdne;
b) BouranoourtYaderlllo;
o) Tree 191Yaux-Yarennes}
d) Saint-Auboeuf heights*
The groups in direct support will aot upon request of
the commanders of the infantry regiments*
The Field Artillery group In general supports At 6t00 A.M. will fire a preparation, and oonoentrations to oover the attack on the south slope of the YentelayBouranoourt ralley; left bounded by the Ventelay-Montigny Road , right bounded by the BouranoourtPeVy Road* At 6:15 A.Mi Lifting that part of the fire west of the 816th meridian. At 6|0O A.Ki Ufting that part of the fire west of the 816th meridian, as well us south of the e69th parallel* Grouping of heary howl tierst Objeotires: Yentelay wood south* east of Yentelaysmall ralley of h i l l 103,3 to the southwest of Long Yolsln farm--small ralley to the south of Bouranoourtwooded small ralley south of the line BouranoourtYaux-Yarenn0 All this fire will be lifted under the same oonditibs" as the fire of the group of the field artillery in general support* IV. The dlrlsion commander and the oolonel oommanding the dlrls lonal artillery will be at the Uont-Oronot obserration post from 7:00 ' A*U on.
The Oommanding General. 9th Dlriaion,
Signed: OAMBLIN.

105,
The attaoic is launohod at the hour set for It, and progreaflee
favorably* The enemy yields} he is soon thrown into disorder and
foroed to fall baok over his entire front. Hie pursuit is about
to begin*
*****

RBFLEOTIOHS OH THE EKQAGEHBHTS OP THE VESIE.

The attaoic of the 9th DlTlsion seems to have emphasised the follow ing two points 1
1. The iaportanoe of the aanoeuver;
The diffloulty to anticipate, with any degree of oertalnty,
the results to be expeoted from an operation; from whloh follows the
necessity elwaya to be ready to take advantage of those that do ooour
Oertai.. battles of war of position have oaused us to lose the habit
of aanoeuver Howerer, manoeurer is indispensable for any unit, eren
if It Is an Interior organisation and aotlng in a comparatively res tricted araa*
The infantry manoeurer laid down for the 9 M \ Division for Septem ber 30th has largely contributed to the final success of the operation.
The frontal attaoic on Mont Ferre'and on Uontlgny, despite the artillery
concentration (1), might perhaps not have suooeeded if it had not been
combined with a manoeurer to outflank these two taotloal localities.
The manoeurer with a strong foroe oan often be planned in advance,
because of the terrain and the position oooupied by the enemy's troops*
(1) And it nay be *xpeotedt at the start of a war, that for an operation
of this nature there would be less artillery arailablejthan that
whloh we had at our disposal in 1918*

106.
Thus oonoelved, It can be carried oat quiokly, from beginning to end, with an appropriate scheme of artillery flre On the other hand, for small infantry units the manoeuver i s often carried out aooordlng to the way in whioh the battle develops, with the support given by their own means of fire, aooording to the drowns tanoes. But nothing i s certain. Some times, email units also carry out a prearranged manoeuver and with strong echelons, the great flexibility of the artillery fire allowing them to manoeuver aooording to the sequence of the trenfce ooourring during the course of the aotlon; but
f

hen one must allow time, which always will be long, to adjust the

artillery fire to the infantry nanoeurer. It i s always diffioult to anticipate the results of an operation. i t !pernay, we hare seen that the decision was obtained only after ten daya of struggle, while at the Vesle i t was obtained after one day of battle, and in spite of the difficulty introduced by the always delicate operation of a river crossing and the strength and depth of the defensive position. It i s true that the front had been pounded pre viously by the Incessant battles in the vioinity of Roaaln. In the operation of the Vesle Itself, our High Command made i t s main attack on the tree of Romaln ridgei i t was there that i t wanted success, for i t knew that any progress in this area would enormously facilitate the action of the nearby di via ions. But the e tie my, also realising the full value of this position, dlspatohed a l l his reserves to i t , and held us in check there for a moment. On the other hand, the 9th Division, whioh was not so strongly oounter-attaoked, was able to make more progress, and i t s advance, whioh threatened to take the enemy's oountor-attaoka in flank, largely contributed to the final result of the operation.

107.
Thus, the oomaand evidently moat select its sones for the main
and secondary efforts, and distribute Its means accordingly, bat It
mast hold re8erres sufficiently mobile to enable it to move them where
the enemy giroa way, even if it should be in a direction different
from the one initially selected, on oondition, however, that such move ment will contribute to the suooess of the general mission.
Whatever the situation may be, the subordinate commanders, as we
have already seen in the last article, must make the aflxinrnm effort
and endeavor to gain a deolslon in oaoh case* i body of troops that
is advancing evidently must insure its oontaot with the nearby units,
but it must not entirely subordinate its movement to theirs* Having
its flank exposed by their halt, It often must continue to Advance,so
as not to play Into the hands of the enemy, who, as he is unable to
be everywhere in great numbers, has tried to establish strong points*
The continuation of the advance will lead to the withdrawal of the
enemy, threatened in his turn on his flanks and in his rear; it will
permit the fidvanoe of the nearby units, who again will Insure the
protection of the flanks. On the other hand one must not rush forward
heedlessly, everywhere and always, and play a lone hand; here, as in
everything, it is all a matter of prudence and moderation*
********

108.
COH0ED3IONS BY 0EHBRAL QAMELIN.
Z oonaider that the offensive operation outlined in the present
ohapter speaks for itself, and does not need to be* oomoented upon.
As Major Petibon points oat, the art of war and the manoeuver
should never lose their righto The faot that at the beginning of
an eventual var we might not have the same resources in artillery
(number of batteries and quantity of ammunition) available, should
add weight to this observation*
Finally, as Major Petibon also observes, suooes3 in battle Is not
always obtained where it has been anticipated, and results from events
whioh are constantly ohanglng. The day before the attaok, our Army
oommander, General Berthelot, had oome to see me. He had not in any
way hidden from me, without doubt in order not to hurt my feelings,
whioh he knew to be touchy, that he was veil aware of the difficulties
of the task assigned to the 9th and the 10th Infantry Divisions, whioh
had to oross the Tesle by a surprise movement, in the faoe of the enemy,
He had added: If you experienoe diffioulty in advanoing, do not worry,
there are powerful resouroes on your left (an excellent Afrloan div ision, tanks), and the advance of your neighbors will give you freedom
of action. But, on the contrary, it so happened that our neighbors
were the ones to encounter the greatest difficulties: very heavy artil lery barrages, strong oounter-attacks business, had reasoned like us*
I sincerely believe that the aooount one has just read still remains
full of valuable teachings.
The Germans, who know their