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Money, Religion, and Politics: The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903 Author(s): Meir Litvak Reviewed

work(s): Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Feb., 2001), pp. 1-21 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/259477 . Accessed: 03/12/2011 08:47
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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 33 (2001), 1-21. Printed in the United States of America

Meir Litvak

MONEY, RELIGION, AND POLITICS: THE OUDH BEQUEST IN NAJAF AND KARBALA', 1850-1903

"Money was the life blood of Najaf." Thus observed the Shi'i author,'Ali Khaqani.1 The story of the Oudh Bequest, which channeledmore than 6 million rupees from the Shi'i kingdom of Awadh2in India to the two Shi'i shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala' in Iraq during the second half of the 19th century is a fine example of Khaqani's
assessment. These Atabat-i 'aliyat ("sublime thresholds") were the most important

centers of learning in Shicismduring the 19th century.For this reason, a study of the bequest provides importantinsights into the internalworkings of a leading community of ulama during a period of change, as well as into the role of Europeanplayers in the life of such communities. It should be stressed that unlike Ottomanand Iraniancenters of learning, the 'Atabat's main source of income was not landed awqaf (endowments) but contributions from lay believers. Althoughnetworksof patronageextendingto Iranduringthe 1830s and 1840s channeledgrowing amountsto the 'Atabat,these sums proved insufficient, and many of the ulama and studentslived in poverty.3 The interactionbetween money and social power raises the question of the role of the Oudh Bequest in the formationof socio-communalbonds, particularlythe system of patronageand social networks, which served as the backbone of the social system in the 'Atabat.We will also address the role of financial resources in the acquisition of leadership status, while making a distinction between its religious and social aspects. The impact of the bequest on the finances of the entire community of learning in the 'Atabatalso merits consideration. Integratingsociety and culture, the Oudh Bequest demonstratesthe role ethnicity played in the formation of social alliances and rivalries during a pre-nationalistera and the mannerin which it was articulated.Finally, as the bequest was established as a trust of cash funds carrying perpetual interest and was operatedby non-Muslims, this study sheds light on the ways in which financial necessities forced traditional legal conventions to adaptto changing circumstances.

Meir Litvak is Senior Lecturer,Departmentof Middle Eastern and African History, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel; e-mail: litvak@post.tau.ac.il. ? 2001 CambridgeUniversityPress 0020-7438/01 $9.50

2 Meir Litvak
THE ESTABLISHMENT OUDH BEQUEST AND EARLY OPERATION

OF THE

Financial donations from the rulers, ministers, and notables of the Shi'i kingdom of Awadh amounting to more than 1 million rupees flowed to the 'Atabatduring the years 1786-1844. The larger share of these funds was spent on public projects, such as the constructionof the Hindiyya canal in the Middle Euphratesto bring water to Najaf and Karbala'i. The Oudh Bequest originatedin the Third Oudh Loan, which the East India Company (EIC) extractedin 1825 from Ghazi al-Din Haydar,king of Awadh, in order to finance its war in Nepal.5The principalof 10 million rupees (about ?1,000,000) was never to be repaid;the interest, fixed at 5 percent a year (i.e., Rs500,000), was to be applied by the governmentof India in perpetuity to specific purposes. Among other things, the agreement stipulated monthly allowances for life of Rs10,000, Rs2,500, Rs1,100, and Rs1,000 to four women: Nawwab MubarakMahal Sahiba and Sultan Miriam Begum Sahiba (both wives of Ghazi al-Din), Mumtaz Mahal, and Sarfaraz Mahal. Each was empowered to bequeathone-thirdof her allowance to any purpose she desired. The remainingtwo-thirds,together with any portion of the one-thirdnot bequeathedby will, were to be divided equally and transferredto the mujtahidsresident in Najaf and Karbala'for distribution"to deserving persons ... for the acquirement of religious merit."If any of the women's designatedbeneficiaries died without heirs, their allowance was to go to the 'Atabat,as well.6 The bequest became operative when the two widows of Ghazi al-Din Haydar died in April and June 1849 and monthly installmentsof Rs8,664 began to accumulatein the EIC's treasury.7 In October 1850, the British resident in Baghdad, Henry Rawlinson, informed Shaykh Murtaza Ansari, the leader of the ulama community in Najaf, of the funds due to the 'Atabatadvising him to appointan agent in Bombay to withdrawthe money. After repeated appeals by the resident, Ansari informed him that Hajji Muhammad Mahdi al-Kuba, of the wealthiest Shi'i merchantfamily in Baghdad, would serve as his agent-a manifestation of the long-established links between merchants and funds for the ulama.8Rawlinson ulama, in which merchantsmanaged and transferred concurred;funds were transferredto Ansari and to Sayyid 'Ali Naqi Tabataba'iof Karbala',who had established contacts with Awadh as early as 1843.9 Apparently, Ansari accepted the funds in view of the dire economic conditions in the 'Atabat, where, in his words, many distinguishedulama families "hadbeen reducedto destitution," and of the need to enhance the traditionalShi'i schooling in view of the Babi challenge, which had emerged during the 1840s.10 However, in view of Ottomanuneasiness over the flow of such large amounts to the Shi'is via the British, Rawlinson recommendedto his superiorsthat disbursements be placed at the hands of the resident, who would see that the funds were spent accordingto the donor's intentions.Distributionof the money in Bombay, he argued, precludedBritish efforts to preventmisuse of the funds for political subversion.Moreover, he claimed that "considerablesums" had alreadybeen "divertedfrom charitable purposes to objects of personal ambition."At the behest of the Foreign Office, which wanted to allay Ottomanfears, Rawlinson'sproposals were adoptedand implemented
in October 1852.1

The OudhBequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903


TABLE 1

Monthlydistributionof the Oudh Bequest in Najaf


Rs. a. 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 P. 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8

Chief distributor Juniormujtahids Indigent mujtahids Persian students Arab students Custodianand attendantsof the Imam 'Ali Shrine PauperIndian and Kashmiriresidents in Najaf 0.5% deductedby the WathiqaOffice at Lucknow Total

545 674 848 595 674 278 590 21 4,225

After negotiations, the two mujtahidsaccepted Rawlinson's "suggestions,"which sought to "secularize the distributionrather than tie it up for exclusively religious purposes."'2 Overall, British fears of misuse of the funds to foment anti-Ottoman rebellion did not materialize. In view of their historical experience, the ulama were more interestedin building up the 'Atabatas centers of learning and in consolidating personal power bases than in fomenting rebellions whose outcome would be either defeat or semi-anarchyunder the rule of urbangangs."
DISTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN THE CATABAT

The allocation of funds was based on Rawlinson's agreementswith the two distributors. Shown in Tables 1 and 2, it illuminates the structureof the communityof ulama in both towns.'4 The distributionscheme reflects Najaf's superiorityover Karbala'as a center of learning indicated by the allocation of greater amounts to scholars and students and smaller sums to paupersand lay residents. In addition,funds were divided according to broad social categories ratherthan to specified individuals and families, befitting the smallercommunityof Karbala'. Ansari'sproposalfor distributionin Najaf, submitted to Rawlinson in 1854, mentioned 600 students from each group, Iranians and Arabs, while the distributionscheme for Karbala'spoke of 600 studentsall together.15 The division of the mujtahids in Najaf into two ranks also indicates the swelling among the elite, which led to internalgradations.The term "juniormujtahids"probably referredto the growing numberof mujtahidswho had received the diploma (ijazat ijtihad) but had yet to acquirea sufficient following among lay believers, who would send donationsto them.16 The division of the students into Arabs and Iraniansreflected the growing importance of ethnic divisions within the community of ulama, which had existed in the 'Atabatsince the late 18th century.Whereas Karbala'was predominantly Iranian,NaThe ethnic factor became more significant as the numjaf retaineda mixed character. bers of ulama grew, particularlydue to the immigrationof new students from Iran. studentswere lumped togetherwith the Persians,althoughthey The Turkish-speaking

4 Meir Litvak
TABLE

2 Monthlydistributionof the OudhBequest in Karbala' in early 1867


Rs. a. 8 0 0 0 0 8 p 7 0 0 0 0 7

Mirza 'Ali Naqi Tabataba'i Ditto, for repairsof mosques and schools Ditto, for privatecharity to paupersand sayyids Ditto, for scribes, accountants,etc. Ditto, for repairsto the HusayniyyaCanal Total OtherBeneficiaries: Mirza Zayn al-'AbidinTabataba'i(for Aqa Sayyid Muhammad,Aqa Sayyid Mahdi, and Sayyid Hasan Damad) Mulla Hashim (for four, later six, mujtahids:Zayn al-'AbidinTabataba'i,Hasan Ardakani,Zayn al-'AbidinMazandarani, MuhammadRiza Najafi, Muhammad Husayn Shahristani,and Mirza Aqa Qazvini) Marriedstudents Unmarriedstudents Custodianand attendantsof the Imam Husayn Shrine Custodianand attendantsof the 'Abbas Shrine Descendants of Sayyid IbrahimQazvini Descendants of Mir Sayyid 'Ali Buzurg and Mir Sayyid 'Ali Kuchuk Descendants of the Shahristanifamily Descendants of Shaykh Khalaf ibn 'Askaral-Ha'iri Descendants of MuhammadHusayn Isfahani Descendants of Sayyid Kazim Rashti and Hasan Gauhar Descendants of Shaykh Husayn Sultan Shaykh Muhammad(for distributionamong the imams)' Municipal elders (wujah, shuyfikhmahalla, ikhtiydrf-yebalad) Resident devotees (mutadabidan) Paupersand sayyids of six mahallas PauperIndian and Kashmiriresidents in Karbala' 0.5% deductedby the WathiqaOffice at Lucknow Total
aPresumably prayerleaders.

365 161 160 63 190 939

129

192 319 319 159 159 80 64 69 64 48 40 32 160 32 48 477 810 21 4,225

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8

would later emerge as a distinct faction in the course of the struggle for religious leadershipthatfollowed Ansari'sdeathin 1864. The importanceof ethnicitywas often manifested in increased competition over funds, as Iranian donors, who were the major contributorsto the 'Atabat,often restrictedthe beneficiaries to members from their own region or ethnic group.7 Although Arab students numbered fewer than the Persians did, they received a largeramount.This reflected Ansari'smode of leadership:he sought a balance among all groups and bore in mind that the Arab ulama had less access to the donationsthat As flowed into the 'Atabat,mostly from Iran."8 the ethnic issue was less significant in the predominantlyIranianKarbala,distributionthere kept to the traditionalpayments for students in Shi'i centers of learning, according to which married students were eligible for higher allowances. The distributionscheme for Karbala'divided the ulamainto threecategories,mainly

The OudhBequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903

along family lines reflecting a smaller community and a lower numberof newcomer ulama. Seven (later nine) mujtahids,who were regardedas luminariesof equal standing, were divided into two groups. The first consisted of Hasan Ardakaniand Zayn who were considered greaterscholars than Sayyid 'Ali Tabaal-'AbidinMazandarani, taba'iand had a largerfollowing in Iranand India. Both, and particularlyMazandarani (see later) were rivals of the Tabataba'ifamily, and the British resident probably imposed their inclusion on the distributors'9 The second category consisted of descendantsof deceased mujtahids,who rivaled family. Their initial allocations were neithertheir fathers' greatnessnor the Tabataba'i reckonedaccordingto the numberof recipients.' Noteworthy in this context were the grants allocated to the descendantsof the former leaders of the Shaykhi community in Karbala',Sayyid Kazim Rashti and Hasan Gauhar,in view of the enmity of the Usuli majority toward the Shaykhi minority from the late 1820s to the early 1840s. These grants point to a certain rapprochementbetween Usuli and Shaykhi ulama following the emergence of the Babi-Baha'i challenge to both communities. Yet the relatively small amounts awarded to them suggest that the differences between the two sects had not totally disappeared. The third and largest group of ulama comprised prayer leaders as well as Qur'an and ta'ziya (mourningon Imam Husayn) readersand muta'abidan(worshippers),who probablyserved the large pilgrim populationin the shrines and numerousmosques in both shrine cities. The British resident and the two distributorstook care to rewardlay notables, the custodians of the shrines, who had been the wealthiest and often the most powerful figures in both towns. The other lay recipients were neighborhoodshaykhs and notables, who were supposed to distributesome of the money among the poor in their neighborhoods.The allocation of specific amounts to Indian and Kashmiri paupers reflected the Iranianmujtahids'long-standingdiscriminationagainst them. The British, who were aware of such problems and who did not want to spend their own money to sustain Indian paupers,made sure that they would get their share from the bequest. The higher amount allocated to Karbala'reflected its greaterpopularityas a pilgrimage site than Najaf.22 of Only scanty informationexists on Ansari's tenureas a chief distributor the Oudh Shi'i sources and various petitions submitted to the British after his death Bequest. universally acclaim him as a just distributor,whereas his successors were constantly Some dissatisfactionwas inevitable, but Anaccused of favoritism and corruption.23 sari's reputationas an ascetic and his generally undisputed leadership kept it from coming out in public. Nor do the British files contain any complaints against him. As they signed receipts with their first names only, it is impossible to verify the Shici sources report that Ansari made Shaykh Mahdi identity of the sub-distributors. al-Kashif al-Ghita'responsiblefor the distribution,probablymeaning as sub-distribu24 tor among the Arab students. Shaykh Mahdi, whose family had been somewhat overshadowed by Iranianmujtahids,never abandonedhis claim for leadership. His probablycame in recognitionof his senior status among the Arabulama appointments and in order to court his acceptanceof Ansari's leadership.25 In March 1860, Ansari "declined any longer to receive his portion of the Oudh Several modernIranian benefaction alleging as a reason the bad state of his health."26

6 Meir Litvak writers, projecting later developments to the past, assert that when Ansari realized that the bequest was a British ploy to buy influence among the ulama, he withdrew from the distribution, resisting British exhortationsto remainin his post.27 Such a fear was unjustifiedat the time, but a withdrawalfor such a reason conforms with Ansari's aversion to politics and contacts with temporalpowers.28 Ansari's withdrawalhad no impact on other mujtahids,for despite his recognition as the supreme marja taqlrd (source of emulation), his decisions were not binding upon other mujtahidsand, at best, could serve as an example to follow at will. After Ansari's withdrawal,the British chose Sayyid 'Ali ibn Riza Bahr al-'Ulum as the distributor Najaf, a post he held until his demise in 1881. As a reputedmujtahid for of a prominentIranianfamily, he was a suitable candidate.His family's contacts with the mujtahidsof Awadh may have helped his appointment,as there is no evidence that Ansari recommended him for the post. Because he was not Ansari's disciple, Sayyid 'Ali probablydid not feel bound to follow Ansari's example and assumed the
distributorship.29

NAWWAB

IQBAL

AL-DAWLA

AND

THE

OUDH

BEQUEST

The Oudh Bequest underwenta significant change in 1867 with the establishmentof the Indian sub-bequestunder the control of Nawwab Iqbal al-Dawla, a grandson of Nawwab Sa'adat 'Ali Khan, ruler of Awadh and a resident of Kazimayn. Iqbal had rendered important services to the British during the 1856 British annexation of Awadh and in the course of the 1857 Indian Revolt. Though he received Rs1,250 a monthfrom the interestof the Awadhloans, Iqbalfelt financially constrained.30 Hence, duringhis visit to London in 1865-66, he submitteda memorandumto the British in which he criticized the control of the bequest by Arab and Iranianmujtahids,charging that the funds were spent "in debaucheryand unlawful things" while the Indian residents of the 'Atabatlive in "starvingpoverty" and "are shut out from participatingin this money."Moreover,he wrote, althoughthe Arabs and Iraniansbenefit from Indian money, they "return to ingratitude" the Indians. Iqbal proposed, therefore, to restrict the distributionto Indians in the 'Atabator, to alternatively, India,preferablyamong the poor membersof the formerruling family of Awadh. If that was not possible, the resident should appoint a distributor,having himself in mind, who "would have absolute discretion" over the distribution and would not favor membersof any ethnic group or pay "respectto the length or breadth of their beards or their turbans."Appealing to British self-interest,Iqbal stressed that "the Arabs and Persians are neither friends nor subjects of the English Government, whereas the natives of India are." Therefore, by complying with his proposals, the British government"would be blessed" in the eyes of its subjects.31 After some hesitation,the governmentof India accepted some of Iqbal's proposals, in contradictionto the original deed. The two distributorswere prevailed upon to divert the funds originally allotted to the Indian and Kashmiripaupers to an Indian sub-bequest,which was distributedin three equal shares among the Indians residing in Karbala',Najaf, and Kazimayn. Iqbal himself exercised overall supervision over the sub-bequest. The reputationof the Indian fund attracteda growing number of Indianpaupersto the shrine cities throughoutthe century.

The OudhBequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903

Taking advantageof the residents' ignorance of the inner dynamics of the ulama world, Iqbal graduallyacquiredconsiderableinfluence over the British and the ulama until his deathin 1887. Thus, when Sayyid 'Ali Naqi died in 1872-73, a bitter struggle for the post broke out between his brother,Abu al-Qasim, and his son Muhammad Ja'far. Iqbal's recommendationtilted the scale in the former's favor. According to Colonel Tweedie, the resident in 1890, "no mujtahidor other person for whom the door of acquisitionhad been opened by him durst displease him."33
OPPOSITION WITHIN THE ULAMA COMMUNITY

Control of large funds was essential in the struggle for leadership in the 'Atabat, because the individual mujtahids,rather than the endowments of the madrasa,provided the students with stipends. The more stipends a teacher could pay, the more students he could attract.In return,once the students returnedto their hometown or settled in other communities,they would play a crucial role in consolidatingthe teacher's leadershipstatus among the lay believers. Consequently,the Oudh Bequest became a focus of competitionand recriminations in the 'Atabatas soon as Sayyid 'Ali assumed the distributorship. Unlike Ansari, he did not enjoy universal acclaim in Najaf, and his opponents did not fear coming out against him. In addition,Sayyid 'Ali sought to distributethe funds two or three times a year instead of once a month, as hithertopracticed.The change, which would have made it easier for him to evade British scrutiny of the details of the distribution, aroused many complaints among recipients of losses incurred in the course of the exchange.34 In a series of letters, Sayyid 'Ali urged the resident not to heed the complaints against him by "restless" and "bad people ... who are about to create mischief." Those who used to get two Krans a year are now getting ten, he complained, "and are still dissatisfied,"while he himself was concerned only with the fate of the poor and with complying with British wishes. In reply, the Residency's official advised Sayyid 'Ali to lodge a complaint with the local OttomanQd'imaqam,and to be concerned only with the poor.35 Sayyid 'Ali did turn to the Ottomans,but, as will be discussed later, the "badpeople" to whom he referred were probably members of the urban gangs who used to extort money from the ulama. It is very unlikely that he would have turned ulama As over to the Ottomans,but he did have his opponents arrested.36 he explained to the British, however, if they were brought to Baghdad, he would intercede on their behalf and have them released later, and "it will be greatly beneficial to the distribution work." In other words, he sought to deter his opponents, but also to earn a reputationfor benevolence within the Shi'i populationand deflect possible charges of serving the Ottomansagainst fellow Shi'is. Complaints against the two distributorspoured into the British Residency as the two tended to regard their posts as their personal domain and as an instrumentto solidify their social position. Unfortunately,no details on the actual distributionare available, and the only sources on the bequest are the recurringcomplaints. Protests against Abu al-Qasim Tabataba'i,the distributorat Karbala',came primarily from individualmembers of families, who had originally been assigned a share in

8 Meir Litvak the bequest, and some students.Sayyid Abu al-Qasim responds to appeals, one writer stated, with the claim that funds coming to Karbala'are "exclusively his own property (mulk)to do with it as he wishes."37 By contrast, the opposition in late 1875 against Sayyid 'Ali in the larger ulama community of Najaf was wide in scope. It followed upon disappointmentwith the The opponew Britishresidentwho, like his predecessors,backed the two distributors. sition cut across ethnic lines but was organized in two major groups, one predominantly but not exclusively Arab, and the second predominantlyPersian. It is unclear whether they acted in concert. The Arab group,led by ShaykhMuhsin ibn Muhammad,turnedfirst to the Ottoman government in August 1875. Its members presented themselves as "weak poor subjects of the Ottoman government [who] have no place of resort but God and the compassionateaid of that government,"in view of the misuse of the bequest's funds. The petitioners sought to appeal to Ottomansensitivities by stressing the role of foreigners that is, Indian-Britishsubjects-who meddled in the bequest's affairs. Finally, while flattering the sultan for always seeking justice, they gave the Ottomans an opportunity to enhance their influence in the 'Atabatby calling upon the Vdlf (governor) to select a group of ulama to examine Sayyid 'Ali's conduct and ensure 38 properdistribution. The appealto the Ottomanswas quite significantin view of Ottoman-Shi'i tensions following the suppression of the 1843 Karbala'rebellion and subsequent anti-Shi'i measures. It could point to the high stakes involved, as previous appeals took place only in extreme circumstances,such as the struggle against perceived heretics. These appeals and the language they used, as well as the conduct of Sayyid 'Ali himself as a mediatorbetween the Ottomansand local gangs in Najaf, may suggest that some of the ulama operatedas urbannotables in the Ottomansystem.39 Two other groups of ulama, led by Sayyid Mirza Ja'far and one 'Abd al-Khaliq, petitioned the governmentof India throughthe intercessionof the Isma'ili leader Aqa Khan Mahallati,again an exceptional move in view of the ulama's great hostility to heterodox Shi'is. The large sums and social influence involved with the bequest probably promptedthe move. They complained that the resident dismissed all their grievances against Sayyid 'Ali owing to the interventionby Iqbal al-Dawla and his followers. This group tried to woo the British by accusing the Indians of willfully underminingBritish prestige in Iraq in revenge for the loss of the kingdom of Awadh by presentingBritainas supportinginjustice. The petitioners,for their part, expressed their confidence that the British were the only governmentthat "cannotbear any one suffering hardshipand oppression,"and therefore urged it to remove Sayyid 'Ali as
distributor.40

All the petitions reiteratedthe same accusations against Sayyid 'Ali namely, of about two-thirdsof the bequest to himself and his dependents,of using appropriating the funds to purchaseland, and of assuming excessive power over the inhabitantsof Najaf and treatingthem high-handedly.The overall similarityof the accusations suggests a factual basis for the complaints, coordinationamong the various groups, conventional modes of expression regardingsocial norms and conduct, or some combination of these.41

The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903

The leading figure in the petition sent to the Ottomans,ShaykhMuhsin ibn Muhammad, was described by the British resident as a wealthy landowner who was not "a sojournerat the Shrine."He was probablyShaykh Muhsin ibn MuhammadKashif alGhita',a communal-religiousleader in Najaf during that period who owned land, but whom the Shi'i sources did not mention as a great scholar.The Residency's surgeon, Bowman, who visited Najaf in 1890, mentionedthe rivalrybetween the Bahr al-'Ulum family and the family of ShaykhJa'farand ShaykhMahdi ibn ShaykhJa'far.He added that conflicts between the parties had often resulted in bloodshed. In subsequentletters, he sometimes added the title al-Ja'farto the name, further enhancing the likelihood that they had belonged to the important Kashif al-Ghita' clan.42Biographical dictionariescannot identify positively the other leaders, 'Abd al-Khaliq,Sayyid Mirza and 'Abd al-Husayn.43 Jacfar, Even though the mid-1870s were characterizedby fierce competition for religious leadership in Najaf and the Shi'i world, none of the leading Iraniancontenders for marja'iyyatal-taqlfd (being a source of emulation) at the time can be openly associated with the opposition movement, and there are no data on their stand. Sayyid 'Ali's opponents,however, cannot be dismissed, because their movement comprised several hundred people. The Aqa Khan's intercession on their behalf also attests to their popularityand strength.44 British control over the bequest preventedthe Ottomansfrom using the petitions to deepen their influence in Najaf. The acting Valf merely sent them to Resident Nixon, expressing hope that he would set things right. In his reply, Nixon explained that the bequest was a Muslim trust "in which it is not becoming for Christiangentlemen to interferetoo minutely."45 Nevertheless, Nixon confrontedthe two distributors their and opponents in an effort to resolve the issue. Although he agreed that the distributors had complete discretionin the distribution,Nixon admonishedthem to make all payments in public so as "to prevent any cavil or complaints."46 The Indian government,for its part, refused "to sanction any interferencewith the distributionof the funds" once they had been transferredto the mujtahids.47 Undeterredby failure, ShaykhMuhsin dispatcheda series of petitions to the British ambassador in Istanbul, the Nizam Minister of Haidarabad,the British Foreign Office in London, and Queen Victoria in which he reiteratedhis complaints and demands. He asked the British to appoint anotherdistributor,"elected by the people of Najaf," or some other reliable agent who would distributethe money justly. Should that happen, of he promised, all the ulama would be "contentand propagators" Britain.48 The two distributors,fearing for their posts, moved to solidify their alliance with Iqbal al-Dawla and, throughhim, with the British. Both simultaneously"discovered" the numerous Indian "holy sojourners"living in a "state of utter poverty" in the 'Atabatand decided, therefore,to allocate a third of their monthly allotment-that is, Their act finally formalized the the amount already deducted-to those Indians.40 Indian sub-bequest, which operated until 1902. The major beneficiary of the entire episode was Iqbal al-Dawla, who enhanced his position as the one person on whom the distributorsand the British grew more dependent. When Sayyid 'Ali died in the 1881 plague, the struggle over the distributionresumed with full vigor. The contenders were Sayyid 'Ali's nephew and son-in-law,

10 Meir Litvak Sayyid Muhammad;Sayyid 'Ali's brother,Sayyid Husayn; and Shaykh Muhsin ibn Muhammad.The resident received scores of petitions supportingeach candidateand denigratingthe others.50 The submissions of petitions in Arabic and Persian shows a preferenceto organize along ethnic lines, even in joint public activities. In addition,the hundredsof signatories supportingSayyid Muhammad-particularly among well-established local families-attest to the scope of the network of patronage and support that the Bahr al-'Ulums had forged, thanks to their financial resources. Interestingly,both the Bahr who supportedthe rival candial-'Ulum and Kashif al-Ghita'families had "renegades" date. Plowden, then the British resident, appointedSayyid MuhammadBahr al-'Ulum as the new distributorin September 1881, either because he was impressed by the breadthof support that Sayyid Muhammadenjoyed or because the British preferred to work with a familiar family. They probably realized that any distributorwould face opposition from other mujtahids.Like his uncle before him, Sayyid Muhammad only after the resident prodded him, choosing the same appointed sub-distributors people who had served his predecessor.He also announcedhis plan to carry out the distribution only once every three months,probablyto hamperBritish efforts to supervise his activities.51 In March 1889, Major Talbot of the British Residency visited Karbala'and Najaf for to inquireabout the upsurgeof complaints against Abu al-Qasim Tabataba'i using the bequest to pay his personal debts. As for Najaf, Talbot reportedthat Sayyid Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulum, ratherthan accumulatingdebts, "had gone to the other extreme of making himself a rich man out of the bequest," and complaints against him were pouring into the Residency.52 Talbot demanded that both distributorspreparenew lists of recipients, as the old ones had not been updatedfor years, and submit to the Residency monthly receipts for the variousgrants,certified by the HonoraryBritish-Indian Agents of their respective towns. Each agent was to serve thereafteras a supervisor over the distributors. Although the distributorof Karbala'produced lists of payees to the Residency, their reliability and effectiveness in preventingabuses were negligible.53 The Indian supervisorfailed to carry out his supervisory role, and then Resident Tweedie complained that the distributorsprocrastinatedin submitting receipts then pressed for additionalallotments on the groundsthat "the poor are suffering"and the Consequently, money was urgently needed to make them "happy and contented."54 Tweedie set up a three-mancommittee comprising the distributor,HonoraryAgent Nawwab MuhammadTaqi Khan, and a third "disinterestedparty" in each town to The experimentended preparethe lists of payees and distributethe funds in public.55 notable serving as the independentmember and the Indian in failure, as the Baghdad agent did not dare challenge Sayyid Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulum. The latter, complained Tweedie, "remainedas unruffled, as his ways of distributionremained unIn straightened." Karbala',on the other hand, the independentmember,Sayyid Hasan Hakimzade,tried to introducesome order,thereby "exciting in the highest degree the animosity"of Abu al-Qasim and his party. Tweedie, for his part, admitted later that it had been unrealistic to expect a layman to defy a prominent mujtahid and risk 56 excommunication.

The Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903


THE OUDH BEQUEST AND RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP IN THE CATABAT

11

The Oudh Bequest, like all other financial resources, was instrumentalin acquiring the status of religious leadershipin the 'Atabatbut only in additionto scholarship.As mentioned earlier, the Bahr al-'Ulum family obtained social leadership thanks to its control of the Oudh funds. Sayyid cAli Bahr al-'Ulum, who had become a wealthy landowner,mediated the capitulationof the Zukurtgang to the Ottomanarmy troops following its revolt in July-August 1877. His wealth must have played an important over gang rule. Yet he role in determininghis preferencefor Ottomanadministration did not enjoy the same status of a marja' taqlfd as of many Ansari's disciples.57 Sayyid MuhammadBahr al-'Ulum, the distributorwho followed, was recognized by the Ottomans as the "head teacher" of Najaf for administrativepurposes, and whoever carried his signed approval that he was a student was exempted from Yet conscription.58 he owed his position as a mujtahidprimarilyto his importantbook, Moreover,he had a fairly small Bulghat al-faqih, as much as to his role of distributor. following in Iranas a marja' taqlrd.Excessive financial dealings relatedto the bequest implied a worldly nature,which the ulama never regardedas commendable-hence, the constant stresses in Shici sources on the asceticism of various mujtahids.During a visit to the 'Atabatin 1883, Acting Resident Tweedie acquired the impression that "the acceptanceby them of this mundanecare and duty, formed in the eyes of many, a lamentabledefection from the type of characterproper to them," leading to a loss of donationsfrom followers.59 A similar situation existed in Karbala'.Sayyid Abu al-Qasim Tabataba'iattained the title of Hujjatal-Islam, the highest title at the time. But both Hasan Ardakaniand outrankedhim as scholars and maraji' taqlfd. Abu alZayn al-'AbidinMazandarani Qasim's involvement in the distributionearned him the title dunyadar ("this-worldly person")and allegedly contributedto the decline of his status late in his life. When Abu al-Qasim Tabataba'idied in January 1892, his son MuhammadBaqir used his role as de facto distributorduring his father's last years to mobilize wideMazandarani Concurrently, spreadsupportfor his appointmentas the new distributor. sent the viceroy in Delhi a telegram warning that MuhammadBaqir's appointment As because he was not a mujtahidat all.60 a rival would be "thecause of disturbances," of the Tabataba'i family, he seized the opportunityto lay his hands on so importanta source of money and patronageas was the Oudh Bequest. telegram, British Resident Mockler sent Major Jennings Following Mazandarani's to Karbala'to review the matterwith him and to inquire about the general attitudein the He Karbala'towardthe distributors. instructedJenningsto convey to Mazandarani of the time, had "exmessage that Mirza Hasan Shirazi, the leading marja' taqlzd pressed his approvalof MuhammadBaqir's appointment."61 Previous cases contained nothing to suggest that the successful appointmentof a distributor requiredthe supportof a particularmujtahid.Now, however, when Shirazi authorityamong the ulama and when MuhammadBaqir's had attainedunprecedented scholarly credentials were in question, the former's support was deemed essential. Presumably,Shirazi sought to draw MuhammadBaqir closer to himself against Mazandarani,who regardedhimself as his equal and did not accept his authority. insisted that he alone was fit to be During the meeting with Jennings, Mazandarani

12 Meir Litvak as a distributor, he was the only universallyaccepted mujtahidin Karbala'.He angrily rejectedJennings'scomment that Shirazi supportedMuhammadBaqir's appointment, therebydenying Shirstatingthat Shirazihad "nothingwhateverto do with Karbala'," azi's supremeauthorityover his own turf.2 Priorto the meeting, Jenningsdiscussed the relative status of mujtahidsin Karbala' and the distributionissue with local mujtahids,notables, and ordinarypeople. All of as lower than Mazandarani a mujtahid,but them rankedMuhammadBaqir Tabataba'i The most of them supportedhim as a distributor.63 British, therefore,decided to nominate MuhammadBaqir as distributorbecause of the popular support he had for that sons, who were likely to succeed post and because of the notoriety of Mazandarani's him. In other words, the British acknowledged and solidified MuhammadBaqir's status as a social leader, but as in Najaf, social leadership was not tantamountto
marjaciyya status.
REFORMS AND POLITICS

The most importantchange in execution of the Oudh Bequest took place in 1903, when the British bypassed the two distributorsand delegated in their stead several mujtahidsin Najaf and Karbala'.Though corruptionwas cited as the immediatecause of the change, it was an insufficient incentive in itself. Growing British awareness of the importanceof the ulama of the 'Atabatin Iranianpolitics, and the need to exert some influence on them, had been equally importantfactors. By 1902, the quarterlyyields of the bequest had reachedRs29,706-4 (i.e., Rs4,951 Of per month) for each distributor. this sum, RslO,000 per quarterwas deducted for the Indian sub-bequest.The mujtahidsdid not receive the remaining funds directly; these went throughthe Jewish sarraf (banker)of the Residency,EliahuEzekiel Danus. Apparently,the two had mortgagedthe bequest, or a large portion of it, to the sarraf as interest on their debts to him.64 Scrutiny of the accounts submitted by the two distributorsrevealed that large amounts were allotted to members of their respective households, including children and servants.Many fictitious persons or names of deceased persons appearedon the lists, and their grants were "deposited"with the distributor'ssecretary.Several witnesses asserted that many of the poor had received smaller amounts than those recorded but were threatenedwith forfeiture of their entire grant should they disclose the fact. The supervision system, set up by previous residents, failed completely as the Indian supervisorscollaboratedwith the mujtahids.65 In view of such abuses, Newmarch concluded that the funds should be distributed among several mujtahids in order to avoid excessive accumulationin the hands of two persons. Anticipating approval for his recommendations,Newmarch set about compiling lists of eligible mujtahids.In April 1902, he sent letters to them offering them a share of the bequest, but the letters were not well received. He sent the Residency dragoman,Marine, to the 'Atabatto gather informationon prospective mujtaOf hids and convey offers of participationin the new distributionscheme.66 the thirteen mujtahidsasked (twelve Iraniansand one Arab), only three (two of them bitter immediatelyfavored the change and expressed their personalrivals of the distributors) willingness to take part in the distribution.

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Six other mujtahidsrefused to have anythingto do with the bequest. Significantly, these were leading, first-rankmujtahidsat the time: Fazil Sharabiyani,Mirza Husayn Khalili, MuhammadTah Najaf, Hasan Mamaqani, and Kazim Yazdi Tabataba'iin Najaf, as well as Isma'il Sadr al-Din in Karbala'."Because some of them were also active in Iran against Muzaffaral-Din Shah's growing acquiescence to foreign influence, they were probably reluctantto be associated with the British at such a time. Thanks to their elevated status, these mujtahidsreceived substantialdonations from their followers and could, therefore,dispense with the British Oudh funds.68 The thirdgroup consisted of those mujtahidswho opposed the proposedchange but eventually received the money. Most of them argued that the two distributorswere the best men for the post, as they belonged to respectable families-an interesting point in that it omits any reference to their personal qualities or scholarly status. for Akhund Khorasaniand 'AbdallahMazandarani, instance, acknowledgedthe problems of distribution,but added that any change would only multiply the quarrels over the grants. One unnamedmujtahid,who subsequentlyrenouncedhis allowance, explained that "a lion and a fly cannot be placed on the same level together,and [it] is still more unjust to give the respective food of the one to the other."69 The opposition of the mujtahidsfrom this group to changing the mode of distribustemmedfrom several tion in view of the numerouscomplaintsagainstthe distributors possible causes. At least some of the mujtahidsmight have benefited from the bequest and saw no need for change. The degree of nepotism, which appearedexcessive to the British,probablyseemed reasonableto many mujtahids,in view of the importance of the family and the requirementsof the patronagesystem. Genuine fears of intensified scrambling for the money and resistance to increased British leverage on the ulama at a time of political turmoil were also likely motives. Once the change was implemented,such reasons no longer obtained, and the mujtahidssaw no reason not to avail themselves. The wide range of responses to the proposed change illustrates once again the diffuse natureof leadershipin the 'Atabat.No mujtahidwas sufficiently prominentto impose his view, or even to serve as a model for others. Based on Marine'sreportand on his own investigations,Newmarchcompiled a list of fifteen mujtahids,ten of them Iranians,who had agreed to accept the funds. Most of them, except for Khorasaniand Mazandarani, belonged to the second tier of leadership in Najaf and therefore welcomed the opportunityto bolster their financial resources. Newmarch explained that initially it had been difficult to get mujtahidsto accept the money, "owing to the intimidationof the old recipients."It was necessary, therefore, to give the funds to any mujtahidwho was willing to take them, and so This explains the large presence of Indians, who "breakthe ring of the old hands."70 the Iraniansand had not been mentioned as mujtadid not enjoy high prestige among hids in the "poll"conductedby Marine.A conscious measureby Newmarch to favor Arab mujtahidswere not included, indicatIndiansmight have been anotherreason.71 ing that they did not enjoy widespread recognition among their Iraniancolleagues. Ironically, some of the recipients had previously declared their adamantrefusal to In participate in the bequest "even if the money was put inside [their] pocket."72 addition, Newmarch eliminated the Indian sub-bequest,except for a reduced sum allotted to the Nawwabs in Karbala'and Kazimaynto carry out their duties as consular agents. The funds thus saved were diverted for the ulama.73

14 Meir Litvak The two displaced distributorsand their supportersdid not procrastinatewhen it came to protectingtheir privileges and wealth. Upon implementationof the new measures, they sent a series of letters, some with crudely forged signatures of senior mujtahids,criticizing Newmarch'sreformfor violating the original deed and for causing "disorderand waste of money."74 MuhammadBaqir Tabataba'i'ssupportersraised substantive arguments, as well, againstthe change in the mode of distribution.ChallengingNewmarch'sinterpretation of the 1825 deed, they argued that if the term "mujtahid"applied to full-fledged mujtahids(mujtahidmutlaq), then only the two former distributorsfit that definition. However, if the term applied to any holder of ijazat ijtihad, then more than 2,000 The denial of the people in Najaf and 200 in Karbala'were eligible for the funds.75 ijtihad of so many leading mujtahidsreveals the intensity of the pursuitof money and leadership. The distributors' supporters also resorted to open intimidation against those who were willing to take funds. The petitions, however, failed to convince the British. of Overall, the change deprivedthe two distributors access to considerablefinancial resources, thereby weakening their social position in the 'Atabat. Others who lost under the new system were the custodians of the shrines and several lay notable kept Althoughnearly all the new distributors families who no longer received shares.76 the money for themselves and their families, investing it mainly in real estate, the change probablybrought about a more equitable distributionof funds in the 'Atabat. Writing in 1904, Newmarch concluded with satisfaction, "I seldom now receive any complaint."77
THE BEQUEST'S ECONOMIC IMPACT

During the first fifty years of its operation, the Oudh Bequest channeled more than 6 million rupees (?400,000-?600,000). True, Murtaza Ansari, the first recipient of the bequest in Najaf, reputedly received about 150,000 to 200,000 toman a year (f60,000-?80,000) from lay believers, but he was the exception. Nor is it clear whether these amounts excluded the Oudh funds.78Most other mujtahidsfared less well at the time. The best example is the Bahr al-'Ulum family, which was impoverished until the 1840s but grew wealthy thanks to its control of the distribution.79 It is impossible to determinehow many ulama benefited from the bequest during each period of its operation,because the money was not distributedevenly. The 1854 distributionagreement for Karbala'mentioned some 1,000 members of established ulama families and 600 students,in addition to several hundredshrine attendantsand prayerimams and a thousandsayyids. In Najaf, it spoke of 1,200 students,in addition to hundreds of other ulama. If the distributionactually encompassed these people, then the bequest sustained the vast majority of ulama in both shrine cities. Another indication of the importanceof the bequest, even if exaggerated,was the petition to in the Nizam Ministerof Haidarabad 1876, which contended that formerlythe money had reached"all the ulama in Najaf, and everyone was content since they had all been poor and thesefunds had been their major source of living" (emphasis added). In the early 1890s, the British mentioned 600 persons in Najaf and 500 in Karbala'as direct beneficiaries.Undoubtedly,some of those recipients sustainedothers, as well, thereby

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As multiplying the number of beneficiaries.80 the flow of donations to the 'Atabat increasedtowardthe end of the century,the share of the Oudh Bequest in the overall finances of the community of ulama declined. Sharabiyani,the leading mujtahid at the beginning of the 20th century,reportedlydistributed4,000 Turkishpounds (about ?3,240) a year among his students,slightly less than the annualamount(about?3,300) received. Still, the poverty sufferedby many studentsand each of the two distributors low-level ulama indicates that the flow of funds was insufficient to cover the needs even though the yearly of the ever-growingpopulationof the 'Atabat.8 Concurrently, amountseach mujtahidreceived after the 1903 change declined to Rs6,000 (or ?400), it still constituteda considerableincome.82 Moreover,in that it provided a steady source of income free from the whims of the donors and immune to economic and political fluctuations, the bequest compared favorably with other financial resources. Thus, in 1908, when donations from Iran declined, the Oudh Bequest remained the chief source of income for both teachers The flow of such large amounts to the 'Atabatwas very helpful in and students.83 consolidating their status as the leading centers of learning for the Shi'i during the 19th century.
THE OUDH BEQUEST IN PERSPECTIVE

The operationof the OudhBequest influenced, and was influenced by, several broader historicalcurrentsthat markedthe region. Chief among them was Europe'sincreasing political and financial interventionin the internal functioning of the community of ulama and the ulama's adaptationto new economic and political circumstances.The bequest createda certain dependenceof the ulama on the British. This was evident in the language they used in appealingto the British, such as the recurrentemphasis on the unrivaled British commitment to justice. Deepening British involvement in the internalpolitics of the community of ulama correlateddirectly to the broaderprocess of their increasinginterest in Iraq and involvement in Iranianpolitics. GrowingBritish interventiondid not necessarily lead to greaterculturalunderstanding. Consideringthat most mujtahidsvoiced disapprovalwith a change in the distribution system, it is conceivable that British complaints of corruptionwere exaggerated. What the British may have construedas gross nepotism in sustainingmembers of the distributor's entouragewas part and parcel of the patronagesystem among the ulama. As outsiders, the British could not help but receive a distorted view. However, the flow of complaints and petitions to the British during the 19th century somewhat rectified that problem. The attitudesof the ulama toward the Oudh Bequest reflect the adaptationof Shi'i legal norms to changing economic and political circumstances.The establishmentof the bequest as a trustof cash funds carryingperpetualinterestcontrastedsharplywith the classical waqf, which pertains to a permanentendowment of property, taxable under Islamic law, the usufruct to which is dedicated to charitableend. Yet Hanafi jurists in the Ottoman Empire legitimized the use of cash waqf (waqf al-nuqad), commerprovided the endowmentwas invested througha mudaraba(a profit-sharing cial association between an investor and an agent) and the proceeds used for the benefit of the community.84 Although the Oudh Bequest did not employ a mudaraba,

16 Meir Litvak Ghazi al-Din's designation of funds was that of a mixed waqf (waqf mushtarak),in which part of the proceeds went to family members, while the other part was earmarked for communal purposes specifically, for "the acquirement of religious merit."However, unlike regularawqaf, non-Muslimsadministeredthe Oudh Bequest. Apparentlythis is what legitimized it in the eyes of the Shi'i ulama, based on the notion, formulated earlier by Indian mujtahids in Awadh, that taking interest from infidels was permissible.85 The Shi'i ulama referredto the bequest in terms that suggested its ambiguouslegal status:al-wathfqa al-hindiyya ("the Indian deed"), al-khayriyyaal-hindiyya ("the Indian charity"), al-wathiqa al-khayriyya al-hindiyya ("the Indian charity deed"), or khayrat 'Uwda ("the Awadh charity"). A waqf is administeredby an administrator who is bound by the provisions laid down by the donor,unless these were (mutawallr) of a general nature.In the Oudh Bequest, the British sharedthe role of administrator both in stipulatingthe initial beneficiariesof the funds and subsewith the distributors, quently in the actual distributionthereof. Indeed, the mujtahids responsible for the distributionwere called muqassims (distributors),not mutawallfs, indicating that the bequest was not regardedas a genuine waqf. However, toward the latter part of the 19th century,various Shi'i ulama came to the see the bequest practically as a waqf, referringto it as endowed (mawqafa) or as a waqf, reflecting in this way the adaptation of Shi'i legal norms to practicalneeds. The unifying Shi'i ethos did not eliminate ethnic divisions among the ulama of the 'Atabat.Not only were the funds allotted according to ethnic criteria, corresponding to the ethnic separationof classes and living quarters,but opposition to the distributor was largely organized along ethnic lines. Iraniandominationof the shrine cities and a certain sense of superiorityvis-a-vis the other groups was all too evident. In 1867, Iqbal al-Dawla complained of discriminationagainst the Indians by the Arab and Iranianmujtahids.Likewise, British ResidentNewmarch,reflectinghis own ethnocencould not be left tric biases, arguedthat selection of eligible mujtahidsfor distributors Iranians. The latter had dominated both to them because they would choose only towns, "and were prone to think themselves superiorto all other Orientals."Indeed, when the Residency's dragomansasked about the mujtahidsin the shrine cities, the Iraniansdid not mention Arabs or Indians.6 The petitions to the British reveal the level of self-awareness of such divisions. Thus, in a petition thatjoined togethermembersof both groups, the authorsstress the fact that they are both "Arabs and Persians"(al-ddciyyinmin 'arab wa-'ajam). That they stressed their coming from both ethnic groups demonstratesthe unusual nature of this joint action. The recruitmentof hundredsof Arab ulama behind the attemptof the Kashif al-Ghita' family to replace the distributorwas a product of these ethnic tensions and divisions. Yet these were never articulatedas such. The petitionerscomnot plained about the personal conduct of the distributor, about discriminationon an ethnic basis. Further,the use of the traditionalArab term `cajam"to mean Persians, reflects the persistence of the traditionalIsratherthan the modem term "Iranians," lamic discourse prior to the advent of nationalism.7 Traditional perceptionsare also evident in the praise and criticism of various mujtahids. Sayyid MuhammadBahr al-'Ulum's opponentsmaintainedthat his relativeyouth disqualifiedhim for the post. Likewise, when Marineasked the mujtahidsabout their

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colleagues, they acknowledged only those older than themselves. On the other hand, supportersof variousmujtahids,or sometimes the claimantsthemselves, used the term recognized mujtahid' (mujtahidmusallam)as proof of their eligibility for "universally the post, probablybased on the prerequisiteof justice (addla) for the attainmentof ijtihad. The emphasis of this attributeof mujtahidmusallam and the accusations that some persons were not mujtahidsat all attest to the problematicnatureof the attainment of this rank. It depended partly on peer recognition and was, therefore, highly subjective and the root of endless struggles among the ulama throughoutthe century. Although the acquisition of financial resources was essential for the consolidation of leadershipstatus, it did not guaranteeprimacy.Despite their prolonged control of the Oudh Bequest, both the Bahr al-cUlum and Tabataba'ifamilies remained in the second tier of leadershipfor most of the period, their authoritybarely extending beyond the shrine cities. The hereditarynatureof the bequest led to the situationin which not all distributors were first-rank scholars.In addition,excessive financialdealings underminedthe repuas tation of the distributors scholarsand spiritualleaders. Association with the increasingly unpopularBritish furtherenhancedone's worldly image, entailing a certain loss of prestige for the distributors.This explains why some mujtahids refrained from takingpart in the bequest, althoughthe scramblefor funds somewhatbelies this point. Although it was insufficient to ensure spiritualleadership,the bequest was instrufamilies into communal-religiousleaders (rads; the mental in transforming distributor pI., ru'asa'), as evidenced by conduct of the two distributorsof the Bahr al-'Ulum family and the title of ra:'s al-tacifa ("headof the community")they earnedfrom their supporters. The lack of consensus over the bequest reflects the diffuse natureof the leadership in the cAtabat. During all fifty years of bickering, no attemptswere made to form a unified stand among the mujtahidson the bequest or to resolve the issue by establishing a collective body to supervise the distribution.This was due to the traditional individualisticadministrationof awqaf and the lack of a unified organizationof the and madrasa,and to the prevalenceof interpersonal patronagerelationsthatpermeated most aspects of life in the community of ulama. That opponents of the distributors turnedoutwardto the Ottomansand the British is anothermanifestationof the lack of unity or organizedhierarchy,and of the bitter rivalries arousedby the struggle for funds, in view of the tense backgroundof Shici-Ottomanrelations. Variousulama opposed the bequest as a matterof principle.Aversion to the British role and to the corruptionassociated with the bequest were the main reasons. Such opposition was not confined to any particularethnic group, family, or faction; it was It an individualratherthan a collective stand.88 is possible, though by no means certhat this opposition increased through the years along with the rising hostility tain, toward the British. Overall, however, it seems to have been a minority position. For the majorityof ulama, the lure of money was irresistible.
NOTES Authors note: I thank the anonymousreferees for their helpful comments. Needless to say, all mistakes are mine alone.

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"Ali Khaqani,Shu'ara' al-Ghari, 12 vols. (Qom, 1988), 12:478. 2Oudhis the British name for the kingdomof Awadh.It is used here because British documentsconstitute the major source for this study. 3For an analysis of the economics of the communities of ulama in the 'Atabat,see Meir Litvak, "The Finances of the 'Ulama' Communitiesof Najaf and Karbala',1796-1904," Die Weltdes Islams 40 (2000): 41-66; Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'is of Iraq (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1994), 205 ff. 4Fora detailed discussion of the remittancesfrom Awadh, see Juan R. I. Cole, "'IndianMoney' and the Shi'i Shrine Cities of Iraq, 1786-1850," Middle Eastern Studies 22 (1986): 461-80. 5The first and second loans of 10 million rupees each were extractedby the EIC in 1816 to finance the cost of the war: see Juan R. I. Cole, Roots of North Indian Shi'ism in Iran and Iraq: Religion and State in Awadh, 1722-1859 (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1988), 260. 6Deed of arrangementbetween H. M. the King of Oudh and the Rt. Hon. Company, 17 August 1825, Government of India Foreign Department (hereafter,GIFD) Political Consultations (hereafter,PC), no. 35-36, 16 September 1825, IOL P/124/25; John G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and CentralArabia, 2 vols. (Calcutta, 1908-15, repr.London, 1970), 1, 1B:1409-11. Mahal died in 1878, and Rs335-5-4 were added to each town: Resident to Abu al-Qasim, 6 7Sarfaraz March 1882, National Archives of India (hereafter,NAI) Baghdad Residency (hereafter,BR) 176 (Payments). The three volumes dealing with the Oudh Bequest at the NAI are all numbered176, but each has a different addition. 8Colonel Rawlinson to Shaykh Mortaza, mujtehid of Nejjef (sic), 10 October, 1850, BR 176 (18501900); Shaykh Mortaza at Nejef (sic) to the Political Agent, 1852 (precise date is not given) BR 176 (1850-1990). 9Rawlinsonto Palmerston, 2 February 1852, Baghdad, no. 2, FO 195/367, enclosed in Rawlinson to Canning, 11 February1852, Baghdad, no. 5, FO 195/367. "Ansari's proposal for distributionof the Oudh Bequest, 1854 (no exact date given), BR 176 (18501900). For Ansari's educationalactivities, see Meir Litvak, Shi'i Scholars of Nineteenth CenturyIraq: The 'Ulama' of Najaf and Karbala' (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1998), 74. "Extractsfrom letter no. 8 from the Political Agent in TurkishArabia to the Secretaryof State to the Governmentof India in the Financial Department,dated 2 February1852, enclosed in Rawlinson to Canning, 11 February1852, Baghdad, no. 5, FO 195/367; Allen to Rawlinson, 8 October 1852, Fort William, no. 260, GIFD, PC no. 5, 22 December 1852. For a detailed discussion of British policy regardingthe Oudh Bequest, see Meir Litvak, "A Failed Manipulation:The British, the Oudh Bequest and the Shi'i British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 27 (2000): 69-89. 'Ulama' of Najaf and Karbala'," 12Lorimer, Gazetteer,1, 1B:1414-1415; file BR 176 (1850-1900) contains an undatedproposalby Ansari for distribution. 3Forthe political conduct of the ulama in the 'Atabatduringthe 19th century,see Litvak, Shi'i Scholars, pt. 2. '4Thetables are enumeratedin many receipts found in the BR 176 files. 15Ansari's proposalfor distribution,1854, BR 176 (1850-1900); QuarterlyDistributionat Karbala',1854 (no exact date is given), BR 176 (1850-1900). For an analysis of the ulama populationin both towns, see Meir Litvak, "Continuityand Change in the 'Ulama' Population of Najaf and Karbala',1791-1904: A Socio-DemographicStudy,"Iranian Studies 23 (1990): 31-60. 16Ansari's proposal for distribution,1854, BR 176 (1850-1900). 7Fora more detailed discussion of ethnic relations in the 'Atabat,see Litvak, Shi'i Scholars, 30-35; and Nakash, The Shi'is, 84-88, 100-108, 257-58. 8ForAnsari's mode of leadership,see Litvak, Shi'i Scholars, 70-79. 21 '9"Mazbata," June 1872, BR 176 (1850-1900). 20Thedistributionproposal for 1854 in BR 176 (1850-1900) and the distributionsummaryfor 1872 in BR 176A (1868-77) both show the correlationbetween the numberof recipients and the amount given. 2'Forthe origins and development of the Shaykhi-Usuli rivalry in Karbala',see Denis MacEoin, From Shaykhismto Babism (Ph.D diss., CambridgeUniversity, 1979). For Ahmad Rashti, see 'Abd al-RazzaqalKammuna,Mawarid al-Athaf fi Nuqaba' al-Ashraf, 2 vols. (Najaf, 1968), 2:61-2. 22Onthe discriminationagainst Indians, see Litvak, "Finances." 23GIFDgeneral proceedings for September 1876, no. 47-48, P/1026. MuhammadHirz al-Din, Ma'arif al-rijal fi tarajim al-'ulama' wal-'udaba', 3 vols. (Najaf, 1964-65), 2:108-109.

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Al 24Ja'far Mahbuba,Madi al-Najaf wa-hadiruha, 3 vols. (Najaf, 1955-58), 3:206; Muhsin al-Amin, A'yan al-Shi'a, 60 vols. (Sidon, 1957), 48:152. 25For Shaykh Mahdi's bid for leadership,see Litvak, Shi'i Scholars, 76-77. 26Kemball to GIFD, 3 March 1860, Baghdad, no. 11, BR 176B. 27Mahmud Mahmud, Ta'rikh-i ravabit-i siyasi-yi iran va inglis dar qarn-i nuzdahummiladi, 7 vols. (Tehran,1949-50), 7:1343-44; Isma'il Ra'in, Huquq-i bigiran-i inglis dar iran (Tehran,1347/1968), 104; Khan Malik Sasani, Dast-i pinhan-i siyasat-i inglis dar iran (Tehran,n.d.), 104; Amin, A'yan, 44:47. 28On British policy toward the political use of the Oudh Bequest, see Litvak, "A Failed Manipulation." On Ansari's attitudetoward politics, see Abbas Amanat, "In Between the Madrasaand the Marketplace: The Designation of Clerical Leadershipin Modern Shi'ism," in Authorityand Political Culturein Shi'ism, ed. Sa'id Amir Arjomand(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 112. 29Kemball Sayyid 'Ali Bahr al-'Ulum 1 Sha'ban,23 February1860, BR 176 (1850-1900). For Sayyid to 'Ali's status, see MuhammadHasan Khan I'timad al-Saltana.Kitab al-ma'athir wal-athar (Tehran,1306/ Iranianorigin: 1888), 152; Hirz al-Din, Ma'arif,2:107-9. Kemballstressedthe importanceof the distributors' of see Kemball to Under-Secretary State, India Office, 7 April 1867, GIFD political proceedings,Baghdad, no. 122, June 1867, P1437/71.Kemball never mentions whetherAnsari recommendedSayyid 'Ali. 30Lorimer, Gazetteer, 1, 1B:1475-76. 3'Merivaleto Kemball, 7 January1867, GIFD political proceedings for June 1867, no. 122, P/437/71. of 32Government India to Northcote, no. 131, 3 August 1867; Simla, L/P85/6/93; Tweedie to Thornton, Secretaryof State to the Governmentof IndiaForeign Department,12 March 1890, GIFD externalproceedings, Baghdad,no. 123, P/3742; Kemball to Iqbal al-Dawla, 3 November 1867, GIFD, P/3743, 355 (Appendix A in Tweedie to Secretary of the Governmentof India Foreign Department,no. 376, 3 July 1890). Until 1877, Rs590 a month were deducted from Najaf to the sub-bequestand Rsl,437 from Karbala',due to the greaternumberof Indians residing in this town: see receipts in BR 176A (1868-77). to 33Tweedie Thornton,GIFD, P/3742; Tweedie to Thornton,3 July 1890, GIFD external proceedings, no. 177, P/3743. 34Sayyid'Ali to Resident, 16 Ramadan 1276/23 March 1860, BR 176 (1850-1900); idem to Resident, April 1860 (no exact date is given), BR 176 (1850-1900). 35Sayyid'Ali to Resident, 1860 (no exact date is given), BR 176 (1850-1900); Heystop to Sayyid 'Ali, March 15, 1860. 16Forthe relationsbetween the ulama and urbangangs, see Litvak, Shi'i Scholars, 122-23, 136-42; Juan R. I. Cole and Moojan Momen, "Mafia, Mob and Shi'ism in Iraq: The Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala', 1824-1843," Past and Present 112 (1986): 112-43. to 37Telegrams the Residency dated 27 March 1875, April 1875, 14 and 26 March 1876, 15 April 1876, 4 May 1876, BR 176 (1850-1900); Petition in Arabic, no. 36, 1879; Petition, no. 41 (no dates); Petition, November 1880, from former students of Sayyid 'Ali Naqi. of 38Translations petitions from people of Najaf to the Ottomangovernment, 21 Rajab 1292/22 August 1875, GIFD general proceedings for September 1876, no. 49-50, P/1026. 390n the ulama's relationshipswith the Ottomanssee Litvak, Shi'i Scholars, pt. 2. 40"Apetition signed by the learned men, students, and fakirs residing at Najaf to the Chief Secretaryto received 1 December 1875, GIFD general proceedings,no. 40. P/1026; GovernmentPolitical Department," Petition, enclosed in Nixon to Thornton, 14 February 1876, Baghdad, no. 9, GIFD general proceedings, no. 36, P/1026. 4"Petitions, enclosed in GIFD general proceedings, no. 41, 47-48, P/1026. 42 Nixon to Thornton, 14 February 1876; "Reportby Brigade Surgeon Bowman on a visit to Najaf, 23 January1890," GIFD internalproceedings,P/3742 (Appendix E to Tweedie to Thornton, 12 March 1890). 43'Abd al-Khaliq does not appear in Aga Buzurg Tehrani's TabaqatA'lam al-Shi'a (Najaf, 1954-68): Amin, A'yan; Hirz al-Din, Ma'arif, and Mahbuba,Madi al-Najaf. The other names are too common to reach any definite conclusion. 440ne petition alone claimed more than 700 signatures,and another,318. Several others containedseveral dozen signatories each. On the other hand, hundredsof signatures were manufacturedor written several times in similar petitions submittedin 1893: see later. 45Hasan Fawzi, Acting GovernorGeneralBaghdadto Nixon, 25 Sha'ban 1292/26 September1875, GIFD general proceedings, no. 46, P/1026; Nixon to the Acting Governor General, 2 October 1875, Baghdad, no. 71, GIFD general proceedings,no. 49, P/1026.

20

Meir Litvak

46Nixon to Thornton, 14 February1876. 47Viceroy's Council to Salisbury,Secretaryof State for India, 4 September 1876, Simla, L/P&sn7/10.

4'GIFDgeneral proceedings,no. 54-56, 62-67, 71-73, P/1026; Petition in Arabic, 12 September 1876, BR 176B. 49Themujtahidsof Karbala'and Najaf to Colonel Nixon, 1 May 1877, GIFD external proceedings, no. 119, P/3743 (Appendix B of the Political Agent letter to Thornton3 July 1890, no. 376). 50Register of letters, BR 176 (Payments),mentions seven petitions in favor of Sayyid Muhammad.Most of the petitions carry only the year, or sometimes the month of April or June. Petition dated 1881; Zayn al-'Abidinto Resident, n.d., trans. 17 April 1881; Petition dated 18 Jumada1 1298/17 April 1881; Shaykh Muhsin to Residency, 18 JumadaI 1298/17 April 1881; Petition dated May 1881. All in BR 176 (Payments). 5'Resident to Sayyid MuhammadBahr al-'Ulum, 29 September 1881; Sayyid Muhammadto Resident, 2 and 3 Dhi Qa'da 1298/26 and 27 September 1881. Both in BR 176 (Payments). 52Memorandum by Major Talbot, 2 May 1889, letter no. 6 (Appendix D to Tweedie to Thornton, 12 March 1890, Baghdad, no. 123, GIFD external proceedings, P/3966). to 53Tweedie Thornton, 12 February 1891, GIFD internal proceedings for May 1891, no. 185, P/3966. On the dubious reliability and effectiveness of these lists, see Mockler to Secretaryto the Governmentof India at the Foreign Department, 18 August 1893, Baghdad, no. 579, GIFD internalproceedings, no. 292, and below 40 ff. 54Tweedie Thornton, 11 March 1891, GIFD general proceedings for May 1891, no. 187, P/3966. to 55Major Talbot memorandum,2 May 1889. to 56Tweedie Thornton, 12 March 1890; Tweedie to Thornton, 12 February 1891. 57'Alial-Wardi,Lamahat ijtima'iyya min ta'rikh al-'iraq al-hadith, 6 vols. (Baghdad, 1969), 2:258-59; Litvak, Shi'i Scholars, 162, 229 n. 58Litvak, Shi'i Scholars, 161-62. to 59Tweedie Thornton, 12 March 1890; Tweedie to Barnes, 12 February1891, Baghdad, no. 82, GIFD internalproceedings for May 1891, no. 185, P/3996. 60Mockler Secretaryto the GovernmentIndia at the Foreign Department, 12 March 1892, Appendix to C, GIFD internalproceedings, no. 210, P/3996.
6,Ibid.

62The entire report is recordedin Jennings to Mockler, 16 March 1892, GIFD internalproceedings, no. 208, P/4187 (Appendix A of Mockler to Secretaryto the GovernmentIndia at the Foreign Department,23 March 1892, Baghdad, GIFD internalproceedings, no. 207).
63Ibid.

following account, unless stated otherwise, is based on Newmarch to Barnes, 20 September 1902, Baghdad, no. 390, GIFD internalproceedings, no. 70, P/6652.
64The
65Ibid.

66Ibid. (Appendix C, Instructionsto Marine, 6 May 1902). 67Ibid., Marine Report; Hirz al-Din, Ma'arif, 2:108 n. Newmarchto Dane, 15 June 1903, Baghdad,no. 313, GIFD proceedings,no. 80. For a discussion 68Ibid., on the status of these mujtahids,see Litvak, Shi'i Scholars 91-92, and the references detailed therein. Lorimerto McMahon, 11 August 1911, Baghdad, no. 689, FO 195/2368. 69Ibid., Newmarch to Dane, 15 June 1903, Baghdad, no. 313, GIFD proceedings, no. 80. 70Ibid., "In enclosure no. 8 to his letter (no. 390), Newmarch praised the two Indian mujtahidsfor voluntarily distributingamong the poor all the funds they had received. Apparently,in contrast to their Iraniancolleagues, the Indian mujtahidsfelt no need to spend money on building patronagenetworks, as they were never serious contendersfor supreme marja'iyya.They could, therefore,be more generous to the poor. 72Marine Report, enclosure to no. 390, 20 September 1902. 73Newmarch Secretary to the Governmentof India in the Foreign Department,24 September 1903, to Baghdad, no. 590, GIFD external proceedings for February1904, no. 27, P/6887. O'Conor to Newmarch, 20 September 1902, FO 195/2120; Hamilton to the Viceroy 74Constantinople London, no. 35, GIFD political proceedings, P/6652; Newmarch to O'Conor, 21 January 1903, Baghdad, no. 37/5, FO 195/2138. 75GIFD internalproceedings,no. 81 (enclosure to Newmarch to Dane, 17 June 1903, Baghdad,no. 315), P/6652.

The OudhBequest in Najaf and Karbala', 1850-1903

21

76Newmarch Secretaryof State to the Governmentof India Foreign Department,15 June 1905, Baghto dad, no. 432, L/PS/10/77. 77Wilson Secretaryto GOI, 29-30 August 1919 FO 371/4198/167721; Newmarch to Dane, 30 May to 1904, Baghdad, no. 422, L/PS/10. 7I 'timadal-Saltana,Ma'athir, 136. 79Amin, A'yan, 42:46; MuhammadTunkabuni,Qisas al-'ulama', 36. 80Petition Arabic, 12 September 1876, BR 176B; Quarterlydistributionfor Karbala',1854, BR 176 in (1850-1900); Ansari's proposal for distribution,1854. 8"For descriptionsof the poverty of the students,see Hasan QuchaniNajafi, Siyahat-i Sharqya Zindiganinamah-yiAqa Najafi Quchani (Mashhad, 1351/1972), 297, 315; and Amin, A'yan, 40:54, 64. 82Hirz al-Din, Ma'arif, 2:374. A measure of the value of Rs400 may be given by the monthly pension of Rs40 given to the English widow of the Residency's surgeon: see BR 278C, IV, 2 November 1907. 83Nakash, Shi'is, 217-18. The 84Jon Mandaville,"UsuriousPiety: The Cash Waqf Controversyin the OttomanEmpire,"International E. Journal of Middle East Studies 10 (1979): 289-308.
85Cole, Roots of North Indian Shi'ism, 263.

16Newmarch to Barnes, 20 September 1902, Baghdad, no. 390, GIFD internal proceedings, no. 70, P/6652. See also Yahya Dawlatabadi'scondescending remarkson Arab mujtahidsin his Hayat-e Yahya,4 vols. (Tehran,1341s/1963), 1:25. 87Petition Arabic, 12 September 1876, BR 176 B. in "See the cases of Sayyid Husayn Bahr al-'Ulum in Amin, A'yan, 26:58; ShaykhJa'faribn 'Ali Kashif alGhita',in 'Ali Khaqani,Shu'ara'al-Ghari, 10 vols. (Najaf, 1954), 2:47; and Amin himself in A'yan, 40:55.

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