Creation of The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes From 1914 To 1918

VLADISLAV B.
SOTIROVI
C R E AT ION OF T HE K IN G D OM OF SE R B S, C R OA T S AN D SL OVE N E S, 19141918
CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918
ASSOC. PROF. VLADISLAV B. SOTIROVI, PH.D.
Vilnius University Press Vilnius 2007
Assoc. Prof. Vladislav B. Sotirovi, Ph.D.

Reviewers Prof. Dr. habil. Gert-Rdiger Wegmarshaus (Director of Euro-College, University of Tartu & ExtraOrdinary Prof. of Political Science at European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder)) Prof. of History Dawid M. Crowe (Prof. of Legal History at Elon University School of Law (North Carolina)) Jens Stilhoff Srensen, Ph.D. in History and Civilisation (Research Fellow at Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Stockholm)) Cover and design Vladislav B. Sotirovi Publisher and editor Vladislav B. Sotirovi http://www.freewebs.com/ovsiste vsotirovic@delijeonline.com vsotirovic@serbiancafe.com Copyright 2007 by Vladislav B. Sotirovi All rights reserved 50 exemplars First edition Printed by Vilnius University Press 2007 Universiteto g. 1, Vilnius LT-01122, Lithuania ISBN 978-9955-33-068-4
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION...................................................... page 5 FIRST CHAPTER: THE IDEA OF THE YUGOSLAV UNIFICATION, 17941914 page 9 SECOND CHAPTER: THE FIRST WAR YEAR AND GERMAN, AUSTROHUNGARIAN, BULGARIAN AND SERBIAN WAR PLANS ..... page 22 THIRD CHAPTER: THE TREATY OF LONDON, CREATION OF THE YUGOSLAV COMMITTEE AND ITS PROPAGANDA WORK .... page 33 FOURTH CHAPTER: DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE YUGOSLAV COMMITTEE AND THE ROYAL SERBIAN GOVERNMENT UPON THE INTERNAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION OF THE NEW STATE AND CORFU DECLARATION ... page 53 FIFTH CHAPTER: CREATION OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF SLOVENES, CROATS AND SERBS IN ZAGREB AND A PROCLAMATION OF THE STATE OF SLOVENES, CROATS AND SERBS ...... page 72 SIXTH CHAPTER: GENEVA CONFERENCE AND A PROCLAMATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES........................................................ page 82 CONCLUSION....................................................... page 105 APPENDIXES..................................................... page 117 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................. page 131
INTRODUCTION
During the First World War majority of South Slavic peoples were fighting for creation of their own national state, which was officially proclaimed in Belgrade on December 1st, 1918 by the regent of the Kingdom of Serbia, later Yugoslav king, Aleksandar I Karaorevi. Creation and existence of almost united South Slavic state (a state which encompassed all South Slavs except Bulgarians) is the fundamental outcome of the results of the First World War in the Balkans. Practical work upon the establishment of a single Yugoslav (all South Slavs except Bulgarians) national state can be traced back from the first war year when on December 7th, 1914 Serbian parliament ( ) issued a Declaration in which it was clearly announced that the main war aim of the Kingdom of Serbia is to create a united South Slavic (in fact, Yugoslav state), i.e. a single national state of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. However, at that moment Bulgarians were not taken into consideration as members of South Slavic united state for the sake of Serbian-Bulgarian animosity over the territory of Macedonia that provoked Serbian-Bulgarian war in 1913. The Royal Serbian Government, as the executive institution of the Kingdom of Serbia, was the pivotal player in the process of creation of the new state, which was firstly named as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (from 1918 to 1929), and later as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (from 1929 to 1941). More precisely, during the period of making Yugoslav state (19141918), the Royal Serbian Government was a superior member among the three dominant factors of the South Slavic peoples who participated in the process of their political unification. Another factor was the Yugoslav Committee that was founded in London on April 30th, 1915 as the South Slavic (basically Croatian) response to the Treaty of London, which was signed several days before between Italy and the Entente. The main task of the Yugoslav Committee was to protect the interests of the South Slavs (in fact, Croats) in Austria-Hungary primarily in relation to the question of Dalmatia a littoral East Adriatic region which significant portions were designed to be incorporated into the Kingdom of Italy according to the Treaty of London. Finally, the third
factor in the unification process of the majority of South Slavs was the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, which was created in Zagreb on October 6th , 1918 with the task to abolish the realm of the Dual Monarchy over South Slavic population and to proclaim political independence of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs who lived until that time within the borders of AustriaHungary. Political relations between the Yugoslav Committee in London, the National Council in Zagreb and the Royal Serbian Government are the cornerstone of any research which pretends to discover and properly explain the process of Yugoslav political unification in 1918. In the other words, a political triangle between the Royal Serbian Government, particularly its Prime Minister Nikola Pai, the Yugoslav Committee, with its leader, Croatian politician from Dalmatia, Dr. Ante Trumbi, and the National Council with its President, a leading Slovenian politician, Dr. Anton Koroec, are crucial for understanding of the process of making the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. This book covers the most important period of Yugoslav political unification time from the foundation of the Yugoslav Committee in London on April 30th, 1915 to the proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in Belgrade on December 1st, 1918. Particularily, it is dealing with 1) the idea of Yugoslav unification, 2) the war plans of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Serbia, 3) a creation of the Yugoslav Committee, 4) political disagreements between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government upon the internal political-administrative organisation of the new state, and with 5) the political relations between the Yugoslav Committee, the Royal Serbian Government and the National Council in Zagreb during the last stage of the foundation of the united Yugoslav state. Researching the problem of the creation of the Yugoslav Committee, the question upon the genuine motives of the Yugoslav Committee's foundation and the Serbian government's role and political interests in negotiation with the Commeettee needs a satisfactory answer. The next question is of our particular interest to be answered: was the Yugoslav Committee formed only as a propagation agency of the Serbian government or it was established as an independent organisation in order to fight for the union of the South Slavs into a state that would be separate one from Serbia?
Therefore, this book will review the text of the Treaty of London, signed in April 1915, as one of the most significant historical sources which can reveal the original reasons for creation and politicaldiplomatic functioning of the Yugoslav Committee in London. The question of disagreements between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government on internal politicaladministrative organisation of the new state is of our specific research interest and importance. This question was particularly debated during the negotiations between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government on Corfu island in Greece in June and July 1917 when the Corfu Declaration was signed by Nikola Pai, Serbian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Dr. Ante Trumbi, political leader and the President of the Yugoslav Committee. At that moment, it was agreed that the new state would be a Constitutional Monarchy ruled by the Karaorevi dynasty a ruling dynasty of the Kingdom of Serbia. However, during the negotiations in Geneva in November 1918 with Serbian government, when the National Council in Zagreb participated as a formal representative of the AustroHungarian South Slavs, the same problem was resolved in a different way. According to the Geneva Declaration, the Constituent Assembly has to be formed in order to vote for the new Constitution. Therefore, the debates between the Serbian government, the Yugoslav Committee and the National Council during the period between the Corfu Declaration and the Geneva Declaration created the basis for more detailed investigation by historians. The final theme of this book is to put more light on relations between the Yugoslav Committee, the Royal Serbian Government and the National Council in Zagreb during the last stage of the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the autumn of 1918. We will cover, more precisely, the period between the foundation of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, in Zagreb (October 6th, 1918) until the official proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in Belgrade (December 1st, 1918). This theme of our research is dealing with the proclamation of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, recognition of the National Council in Zagreb by the Serbian government, Geneva Declaration, the National Councils proclamation of the unification of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with Serbia and Montenegro, and finally with the proclamation
of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes by the regent Aleksandar I Karaorevi. The main task of this book is to investigate and explain political relations within a triangle that was composed of the Yugoslav Committee in London, the Royal Serbian Government in exile and the National Council in Zagreb during the last, and crucial, two months of the process of creation of the common Yugoslav state, when the new political factor the National Council emerged on the scene of the South Slavic politics. In order to accurately investigate this issue, three main questions should be answered. Firstly, did the National Council in Zagreb replaced the political role of the Yugoslav Committee before the Serbian government and the Entente, as the political representative of the South Slavs in the Dual Monarchy? Secondly, did the Yugoslav Committee and the National Council pursued a common policy in their relations with the Serbian government and the Entente? Finally, what was the real political role of each of these three political subjects in regard to the final proclamation of the new state on December 1st, 1918 in Belgrade?
The modern coat of arms of the first 19th c. Serbias capital as a Principality Kragujevac
FIRST CHAPTER: THE IDEA OF THE YUGOSLAV UNIFICATION, 17941914

Development of the Idea of Union, i.e. of bringing the South Slavs into one state, or the idea of South Slavic common ethnical, historical and linguistic origins, can be historically traced from the end of the 18th c. when the most significant Serbian historian of that time, Jovan Raji, published in Vienna his the most important work in 1794 with the title , , . He pointed out that the Croats are Slavic peoples who established their own national state in Dalmatia (i.e., that Dalmatia was an original Balkan region of Croatian statehood). Croatian neighbours, the Serbs, came from the north and settled themselves on the area of Macedonia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Moesia, Rascia and Bosnia.1 Finally, according to his opinion, the medieval writers mixed up the Bulgarians with the Balkan Vlachs. It was the German historian A. L. Schltzer who in his Allgemeine nordische Geschichte (1771) made the first general systematisation of the dispersion of the Slavic tribes after their great migrations in the 6th c., and a scholar who created the term South Slavs (Sd-Slaven). Further, the Slovenian historian Anton Linhart was a person who for the first time introduced this term into the South Slavic culture (in 1802). The terms Yugoslavia and the Yugoslavs were firstly used in 1834, and further spread up during and after the Revolution of 18481849.2 The Serbian writer Dositej Obradovi at the beginning of the c. was anticipated the idea of mutual community of the South Slavs on the linguistic base.3 He implied in the Balkan case an 19th
1 Jovan Raji, , , , vol. II,

Wien, 1794, pp. 168169; Milorad Ekmei, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 17901918, vol. I, Beograd, 1989, p. 47. 2 Franjo Ile O postanku izraza Jugoslovenski, Prilozi za knjievnost, jezik, istoriju i folklor, IX, i, 12, Beograd, 1929, p. 153. 3 Milorad Ekmei, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 17901918, vol. I, Beograd, 1989, p. 53.
European romanticist idea, advanced by the rationalistic philosophers, that one language means and one national community, but at the same time with clear differentiation of the Serbian speech from the Slavic neighbours. For him, the borders of the common South Slavic language are at the same time and the borders of the same South Slavic ethnonation, regardless on the current (and historical) situation that the South Slavs have been living in different political entities (states) and confessing different faiths (by belonging to different, and even antagonistic, churches and theological believes the Roman Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Islam). By the creation of the French (by Napoleon) Illyrian Provinces (Provinces Illyriennes), composed by Dalmatia, Dubrovnik, littoral portion of Montenegro, Istria, southern Slovenia, southern Croatia and Carinthia, which as political reality existed between 1809 and 1814, began the period when the South Slavs from these territories started to live under the rule of a single state. These new political circumstances (from 1809 to 1918) had an impact on creation among them a consciousness of their national unity (a les unir en corps de nation): these various peoples had to be educated with regard to the idea of one nation in order for all of them to demonstrate similar spirits and ideas.4 Actually, the French government carried out a policy of the South Slavic administrative unification under the name of the Illyrian language and the Illyrian nation.5 It was, in fact, the policy of national unification of the French South Slavs under the Illyrian ethnic name. At the time of political absolutism in the Habsburg Monarchy after the Congress of Vienna (18141815), the Austrian Emperor retained some institutions and practice, which were established under the Napoleonic rule on the South Slavic territories of the former French Illyrian provinces. For instance, southern part of present day Croatia (from the Kupa River to Dalmatia) remained in the administrative connection with the Slovenian provinces. In fact, an organisation of the Illyrian Kingdom, as an Austrian crown land,
4 Monika Seknowska-Gluck, Illyrie sous la domination Napoleonienne 18091813, Acta Poloniae Historica, 41, Warszawa, 1980, p. 100; John B. Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, Columbia University Press, New York, 2000, p. 221. 5 At that time it was belief that all South Slavs originated from the ancient inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula the Illyrians.
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marked the beginning of the Habsburg anti-Hungarian policy. However, Vienna, at the same time, carried out the policy, according to which, the Illyrian Kingdom should be the nucleus of a single South Slavic administrative province within the Habsburg Monarchy, in order to avert the South Slavic unification under Serbias leadership, what means beyond the borders of the Habsburg Monarchy. This plan was originally designed by the Austrian chancellor Metternich, who wanted that the Austrian Illyrian Kingdom would embrace all Dalmatia in order to create the South Slavic federal unit (province) in the Habsburg Monarchy (Mitt gliches Slavisches Reich).6 After the fall of Napoleonic Illyrian Provinces and the end of the Serbian Revolution (18041833) against the Ottoman lordship the spirit of Yugoslav union shifted its centre of gravity from the Adriatic coast toward Belgrade. The Serbs claimed a political leadership of the union, not only because of the organisation of the two national uprisings against the Turks (18041813 and 1815), but also for the reason that exactly they started to create as the first Balkan nation a society without feudal elements. This social point became soon the crucial impetus for all liberal movements among the South Slavs.7 After the Serbian Revolution Serbia became the locomotive of Yugoslav union for the next one hundred years. In the mid-19th century there were very important Serbian political designs with regard to the future of the South Slavs on the Balkan Peninsula. The most important of them was the secret plan of Serbias foreign policy Naertanije (1844), or the Draft, written by the Serbian Minister of Interior, Ilija Gara anin, who, in essence, did not projected a common Yugoslav state but only a Greater/United Serbia (i.e., unification of all Serbian people and historical lands). Nevertheless, this project practically became a pivotal political program of the Yugoslav unification, alongside with a proposal for a future Serbian foreign policy designed by the Polish agent in Serbia, Francisco Zach, under the instructions given by the Polish count Adam Czartoryski in Conseils sur la conduite a suivre par la Serbie (1843). The basic Czartoryski's idea was that Serbia had to lead a policy of pan-South Slavic unification. In the other words, the final
6 Arthur G. Haas, Metternich. Reorganisation and Nationality, 18131818. A Study in Foresight and Frustration in the Rebuilding of the Austrian Empire, Wiesbaden, 1963, p. 100. 7 Milorad Ekmei, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 17901918, vol. I, Beograd, 1989, p. 165.
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goal of the Serbian foreign policy had to be a creation of the common South Slavic state.8 For the creation of the mutual state of the South Slavs was fighting also and Matija Ban, a liberal Serbian Catholic writer from Dubrovnik, who came to live in Belgrade in 1844. His main task was to turn the Serbian foreign policy from the idea of the creation of the Greater Serbia towards the formation of Yugoslavia.9 The official propagandistic ideology of the Croatian Illyrian Movement, lead by the Croatized German Ljudevit Gaj, from the first half of the 19th c., understood all South Slavs as a single ethnolinguistic group, who has to live in united national state of Greater Illyriafrom the Alps to the Black Sea. It is clear from Gajs article Nanarod (1835) in which he thought that in the Magnum Illyricum (as united South Slavic state, established by the western, central and eastern portions of the Balkans) should be included the Slovenes, Croats, Slavonians, Dalmatians, Bosnians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and finally Bulgarians.10 Ljudevit Gaj (Ludwig Gay) formally favoured a total unification of all South Slavs including and Bulgarians, but for the Serbs and Slovenes his projected Greater Illyria was nothing else but only Greater Croatia. However, the later pan-Yugoslav propaganda (mis)used Gajs writings to promote an idea of united Yugoslavia as, for instance, he was the first who proposed that the common name for the South Slavs in the Triune Kingdom (Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia) has to be the Serbo-Croats who spoke the common SerboCroatian (or Croato-Serbian) language.11 Undoubtedly, Ljudevit Gaj called the mutual South Slavic state as the Magnum Illyricum, that was territorially divided into the higher (Slovenia), the middle (the main part of Croatia) and the lower (from Bosnia to the Black Sea) unites.12 In the other words, Lj. Gaj incorporated the whole
8 Dragoslav Stranjakovi, Kako je postalo Gara aninovo Naertanije, Spomenik, 91, Beograd, 1939, p. 13; Vasa ubrilovi, Istorija politike misli u Srbiji XIX v., Beograd, 1958, pp. 166169. 9 Milorad Ekmei, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 17901918, vol. I, Beograd, 1989, pp. 369370. 10 Ljudevit Gaj, Nanarod, Danica, 34, Zagreb, August 29th, 1835. 11 Franjo Fancev, Ilirstvo u Hrvatskom preporodu, Ljetopis JAZU, 49, Zagreb 1937. 12 Ljudevit Gaj, Nanarod, Danica, 34, Zagreb, August 29th, 1835. During the first visiting of Budapest by Ljudevit Gaj in 1846 one of the British intelligence diplomats noticed that he was surely convinced in the fact that the secret aim of the Croats was and probably is, to create one Illyrian Kingdom which would be consisted by Carniola, Carinthia, Istria, Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia
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Slavic south from the Adriatic Sea to the Black Sea, from Villach (Beljak) and Gorizzia to the lower Hungary, and from Skadar to Varna into the Magnum Illyricum.13 However, political centre of Gajs Magnum Illyricum had to be Croatias capital Zagreb. At the same time, Vuk Stefanovi-Karadi, a famous Serbian language reformer, standardized the literal language for the Serbs. This model of Serb standardised language was borrowed by Ljudevit Gaj for the litteral language of the Croats and on such a way Vuk and Gaj completed a historical mission of standardising the common literal language for both the Serbs and the Croats. Among the Slovenes the language-standardisation work was completed by France Pre and the other Slovenian poets at the first half of the ern 19th c.14 As a common standpoint of a majority of the 19th c. South Slavic philologists was an opinion that after the process of a final standardisation of the South Slavic national languages they, anyway, have been understood as only different written expressions of a common South Slavic vernacular. The First Slavic Congress, held in Prague from May 5th to June 3rd, 1848, was an important pan-Slavic historical event which fostered the idea of Slavic union and the South Slavic solidarity and reciprocity in the Balkans. The Congress deputies decided that the territorial integrity of the Habsburg Monarchy has to be saved, but at the same time that the national-territorial-administrative autonomies of the Slavic peoples within the Monarchy should be formed and respected. A participation in the Congress' sessions were taken and by one Yugoslav section composed by the delegates from Slovenia, Croatia, Dalmatia and from the Serbian populated areas in the southern Hungary (Vojvodina). The Congress received a proposal by
[Blackwell to Palmerston, Memoire on the Agitation in the Austrian Empire. Viewed as a Question of Diplomacy, London, August 21st, 1846, Public Record Office, Foreign Office, London, 7/333, No 109]. 13 Franjo Tuman, Hrvatska u monarhistikoj Jugoslaviji, vol. I (19181928), Zagreb, 1993, p. 16. 14 According to Tuman, Karadis idea that all tokavian dialect speaking population of Serbo-Croatian language is of the Serb origin, written in his article Srbi svi i svuda in 1836 and published in Kovei za istoriju, jezik i obiaje Srba sva tri zakona (Wien 1849), was the crucial reason for Croats to turn back from the idea of Illyrism towards the idea of Croatism. Tuman, also, pointed out that Karadis theory was a foundation of the Great Serbism for the next generations of the Serbian ideologists and politicians in order to create a Greater Serbia [Franjo Tuman, Hrvatska u monarhistikoj Jugoslaviji, vol. I, Zagreb, 1993, pp. 2223]. However, Tuman was wrong in this point for the reason that the Karadis idea of tokavian Serbdom was in fact taken by him from the leading Slavic philologists at that time and it was publically presented as a Serbian answer to the Croatization of the Roman Catholic tokavian speakers by the leaders of the Croatian Illyrian Movement.
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the Yugoslav delegation that the Illyrian name for the South Slavs would be replaced by the Yugoslav one.15 After the fall of absolutism in the Habsburg Monarchy the Yugoslav political unification was championed by Serbias Prince Mihailo Obrenovi III (18601868), who worked on a creation of the political-military alliance of the Balkan nations for a war against either the Ottomans or the Habsburgs. In fact, this war would take the form of a general Balkan revolution for the national liberation. On the ruins of the Ottoman and the Habsburg multinational empires Prince Mihailo intended to (re)establish independent Balkan and Sub-Danubian national states. As the most significant South Slavic national aim, Prince Mihailo designed, in cooperation with the Croatian and Bulgarian national representatives, a creation of one (con)federal Yugoslav state with Serbia as its political centre.16 His leading reason, of the geo-political nature, in this matter was a strong conviction that only a territorially great and nationally united state could be really independent one at the Balkans. The most chances to create such state had primarily the South Slavs.17 The first Yugoslav Congress (of the South Slavs from AustriaHungary) was held in Leibach (Ljubljana) from December 1st to 3rd, 1870. The main Congress decesion was that the AustroHungarian South Slavs should negotiate with the Hungarians upon the modification of the existing AustroHungarian dual system (established in 1867). According to the Yugoslav proposal, this dual (AustroHungarian) federal system had to be transformed into the triple federal system (AustroHungarianSlavic) by recognition of the separate Slavic part as an autonomous federal unit within the Habsburg domains.18 The leading Croatian National Party issued at
15 Milorad Ekmei, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 17901918, vol. I, Beograd, 1989, pp. 535536. 16 Vasa ubrilovi, Istorija politike misli u Srbiji XIX v., Beograd, 1958, pp. 222223. 17 An agreement between the Serbian government and the Bulgarian Revolutionary Committee, signed in Romania in 1867, anticipated a creation of the Yugoslav Empire. In fact, the Serbo-Bulgarian federation had to be created under the government of the Serbian Obrenovi dynasty. By agreement between Serbia and Montenegro the Montenegrin Prince Nikola I Petrovi granted to abdicate from the throne in the Prince Mihailos favour in the case of political unification of Serbia and Montenegro [Vasa ubrilovi, Istorija politike misli u Srbiji XIX v., Beograd, 1958, pp. 225227; Grgur Jak Vojislav Vukovi, Spoljna i, politika Srbije za vreme vlade kneza Mihaila (Prvi balkanski savez), Beograd, 1963, pp. 281287, 362369, 452455]. 18 Dr. Jaroslav idak, Dr. Mirjana Gross, Dr. Igor Karaman, Dragovan epi, Povjest hrvatskog naroda 18601914, Zagreb, 1968, p. 45.
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the same year a Declaration, announcing that the final aim of common desires and work of the Serbs, Bulgarians, Slovenes and Croats should be their union into the independent, free, popular and Yugoslav state community.19 In the 1860s both Croatian bishop and national leader, J. J. Strossmayer, and Serbias Prince Mihailo Obrenovi III believed that the South Slavic peoples could achieve their freedom only in the case of military defeat of the Ottoman Empire in a war against the Balkan Christians, what also would be a precondition for the final Ottoman expulsion from the Balkan Peninsula.20 However, on the other hand, J. J. Strossmayer, in contrast to both Prince Mihailo and the Serbian Prime Minister Ilija Gara anin, did not think that the Habsburg Monarchy was the main opponent for achievement of the liberal political and national aims by the Balkan nations.21 In July 1868 Strossmayer told to the agent of the Serbian government that his Croatian National Party believed that the duty of Serbia was to liberate Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Ottoman Empire and at such a way to create a foundation for the future Yugoslav state unification.22 A project of the Yugoslav unification designed by the Croatian National Party was in essence based on the idea that in the struggle for creation of a common Yugoslav state Serbia should assume a political, but Croatia a cultural mission.23 According to J. J. Strossmayer, Serbia would be the Yugoslav Piedmont, while Croatia would play a role of the Yugoslav Tuscany.24 J. J. Strossmayer, F. Raki, M. Mrazovi and the other leaders of the Croatian National Party firstly supported a cultural union of the
19 Milorad Ekmei, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 17901918, vol. II, Beograd, 1989, p. 235. 20 Vasilije . Kresti, Srpsko-hrvatski odnosi i jugoslovenska ideja u drugoj polovini XIX veka, Beograd, 1988, p. 136. 21 ibid. 22 Milorad Ekmei, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 17901918, vol. II, Beograd, 1989, pp. 238239. 23 Dr. Hans Schrekeis, Introduction in the collection by Anton Zollitsch, Josef Georg Strossmayer. Beitrge zur konfessionellen Situation sterreich-Ungarns im ausgehendem 19. Jahrhundert und zur Union sbemhung der Slawen bis in die Gegenwart, Salzburg, 1962, p. 5. 24 This division of roles on Serbian Piedmont and Croatian Tuscany made Strossmayer in his letters to the British Prime Minister [R. W. Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav question and the Habsburg Monarchy, London, 1911, p. 420, The letter sent to Gladstone on October 1st, 1876; James Bukowski, Jugoslavism and the Croatian National Party in 1867, Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, 3, 1, 1975, p. 74].
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South Slavs, which would be a basis for their later national and political unification.25 However, both Serbs and Croats believed that a creation of a common Yugoslav state was only possible way to unite all Serbs and Croats into a single national state. For example, the Croatian National Partys ideologue, historian Franjo Raki, was convinced that the divided Croats (who lived in several Austro Hungarian provinces and Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina) could be united and provide for themselves a cultural, national and political independence only in the alliance with other South Slavs.26 Crucial difference between Serbian and Croatian political leaders in regard to the creation of a common South Slavic state was their opposite opinions upon the question who has to play a principal role during this process. Serbian politicians claimed that this role should play the Principality of Serbia, while their Croatians counterparts saw Croats as the principal leaders of the unification. Consequently, according to the prior, Belgrade would be the capital of united South Slavic state while the later favoured Zagreb as a South Slavic capital. During the Serbian-Ottoman crises in 1862 Serbian politician from Vojvodina (Vajdasg), Mihailo Polit-Desani proposed a political plan for resolving both the Eastern Question and the SubDanubian Question. According to the plan, one great Balkan state has to be created gradually in three stages: 1) the Greater Serbia, composed by Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, the Ancient Serbia (Kosovo, Metohija and Sandak) and the Principality of Serbia; 2) the Yugoslav Federation of Croatia and Serbia (the demarcation line between Serbia and Croatia would follow the Vrbas River in Bosnia), and 3) the Balkan Federation, made by the Yugoslav Federation (Serbia and Croatia) and Bulgaria.27 The way of thinking of Mihailo Polit-Desani was tracked by the first Serbian socialist Svetozar Markovi who proposed a similar plan. He also designed three stages of creation of one common South Slavic Balkan state: firstly, the creation of federal Serbia; secondly, the Serbo-Bulgarian Federation (or the Yugoslav Federation), and thirdly, the Balkan Federation.28 The Serbian writer Jovan Skerli and scholar Jovan Cviji also
25 Vasilije . Kresti, Srpsko-hrvatski odnosi i jugoslovenska ideja u drugoj polovini XIX veka, Beograd, 1988, p. 134. 26 ibid. 27 Vasa ubrilovi, Istorija politike misli u Srbiji XIX v., Beograd, 1958, pp. 258262. 28 ibid, pp. 300313.
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favoured a Yugoslav Federation. One of the supporters of the concept of the Yugoslav federation with Belgrade as a capital was and the Serbian historian and philologist Stojan Novakovi. He expressed his federalist ideas in the article Nakon sto godina (After one hundred years, 1911).29 Actually, all of these mentioned Serbian politicians and scholars saw Serbia as the Piedmont of either Yugoslavs or all South Slavs.30 At such a way, Belgrade had to play a role of Serbian Bismarckism. Their arguments were based on the next three facts: 1) only Serbs created up to that time free South Slavic states Serbia and Montenegro; 2) Serbs had been in majority among all South Slavs and particularly among the Yugoslavs; and 3) Serbian people and its lands had the biggest economic potentials and natural resources. Towards the end of the 19th c. there were many variations of the project of united South Slavic, or Yugoslav, lands. For example, the Serbian writer Milan Milojevi in 1881 published a map of de facto Greater Serbia, but under the name of a Greater Yugoslavia. According to him, the Greater Yugoslavia should embrace the following territories: historical Macedonia (up to Thessaly), the whole portions of Banat (eastward to Arad), Baka (northward to Szeged), and all Croatian and Slovenian lands including Carinthia, Trieste and some territories beyond the Isonzo River. Such borders of the future Yugoslavia were also accepted by the Serbs P. Niketi in 1890 and D. Putnikovi in 1896, but without Slovenian lands.31 The idea of Yugoslav unification became a leading ideological force of the Youth Movement among all Yugoslavs either that in independent Serbia and Montenegro or those who lived within Austria-Hungary. The movement flourished between 1903 and 1914 having different names in various Yugoslav lands: the Omladina, Mlada Bosna, Mlada Dalmacija, etc.32 The Austrian General of Slovenian origin, Oscar Potjorek, introduced the term Jungslawen for this Yugoslav Youth Movement. His notification was that the most significant characteristic of this movement was its wish to create a
29 ibid, p. 393. 30 John B. Allcock claims that Nikola Pai was the first among them [John B. Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, Columbia University Press, New York, 2000, p. 221]. 31 P. M. Niketi, Srpski svet u rei i slici, Beograd, 1890, p. 3; D. J. Putnikovi, akovanje i carevanje, knjiga za mlade, Beograd, 1896, p. 102. 32 Milorad Ekmei, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 17901914, vol. II, Beograd, 1989, p. 523.
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Yugoslav state.33 An appearance of the Slovenski Jug (Slavic South) magazine in 1903 in Belgrade marked a turning point in the process of ripening of the Yugoslav Youth Movement. This magazine became, in fact, more and more a meeting point of supporters of the Yugoslav idea. Together with a separate cultural organisation with the same name, it propagated an idea of cultural integration of all Yugoslav peoples, but with respect of ethno-confessional-historic differences between them. Actually, the movement desired Yugoslav spiritual unification within the Yugoslav political federation as the final goal and greatest ideal.34 The most important slogans of this organisation and its own magazine were: the Union of the South Slavs and the Revolution at occupied lands. The first Yugoslav Youth Congress was organised in Belgrade in 1904. Three years later, also in Belgrade, the Yugoslav Revolutionary Organisation was founded, which fought, according to its Statute, for the Yugoslav federal state community with autonomous provinces. It was organised in Prague in 1910 the Association of the Yugoslav Clubs with the aim to create the Yugoslav cultural union.35 Serbian and Croatian students from Vienna and Prague founded a new organisation in December 1911 under the name the Serbo-Croatian National Youth. Their national idea was Croato-Serbian; their nationality was the SerboCroatian.36 The final union of the Yugoslav Youth Movement into a single organisation was done in the house of the Croatian writer Oscar Tartalja in Split (Dalmatia) on March 16th, 1913. In May of the same year the propagation magazine of the idea of the Yugoslav unification Ujedinjenje (the Union) started to be published by the same (united) Pan-Yugoslav organisation. The goal of it was to prepare national Yugoslav revolution that was scheduled for the year of 1917 for the reason to spoil 50th anniversary celebration of the AustroHungarian political-national settlement Aussgleich (1867).37 In general, the idea of the Yugoslav unification was
33 General Potjorek to Bilinsky, Sarajevo, July 1st, 1914, Archives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, Fond ZMF, 778; uro urmin, Jugoslovenska omladina posle aneksije BiH 1908, Kalendar Sv. Sava, Zagreb, 1934, p. 4; Tin Ujevi, Borba nacionalistike omladine, Beograd, 1930, p. 88. 34 Milorad Ekmei, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 17901918, vol. II, Beograd, 1989, pp. 537538. 35 Ivan Janez Kolar, Preporodovci 19121914, 19141918, Kamnik, 1930, p. 167. 36 Dr. Jaroslav idak, Dr. Mirjana Gross, Dr. Igor Karaman, Dragovan epi, Povjest hrvatskog naroda 18601914, Zagreb, 1968, Hrvatski narod u razdoblju od g. 1903 do 1914, p. 106. 37 Pero Slijepevi, Mlada Bosna, Napor Bosne i Hercegovine za osloboenje i ujedinjenje, Sarajevo, 1929, p. 192.
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accepted by much wider South Slavic audience, especially by those from Austria-Hungary, after the liberation of the South Slavic lands in the Ottoman Empire by Serbia and Montenegro in 1913. Finally, it is necessary to review the attitudes towards the question of the Yugoslav unification by the most influential Croatian opposition political parties represented in the Croatian-Slavonian Parliament (Sabor) in Zagreb. The most nationalistic Croatian party was the Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska Stranka Prava), led by a Serbophobic Croatophile Ante Starevi. The main original political aim of this party was to create an independent, free and united greater Croat national state based on ethnolinguistic and historical rights of the Croats (but outside Austria-Hungary). This political task was radicalised when Josip Frank took the partys leadership (actually it was created a new party under the name Pure Croatian Party of Rights). Franks political demands were to create a separate united Croatian nationaladministrative province within Austria-Hungary. However, in both cases Croatia should embrace and incorporate into united Croat part of the Monarchy primarily all Croatian historical lands (Croatia, Dalmatia, Rijeka, Istria, Dubrovnik, Slavonia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Srem and Baka). The initial slogan of this party was neither under Vienna or under Pest, but for the free and independent Croat state. Any compromise with the Habsburg Monarchy was impossible for Starevi. With regard to the problem of national identity of the Croats, in the early period of his activity Starevi wrote in 1867 the booklet Bi-li k Slavstvu ili ka Hrvatstvu (To the Slavdom or the Croatdom) in which he presented the opinion that the Slavic name was an artificial fabrication. According to him, the Croats could be only Croats but not either the Slavs or the Yugoslavs.38 For him, the Yugoslav idea was only a mask for (Orthodox) Russian Pan-Slavic policy, which was dangerous for the Croatian national interest. In 1895 Starevi resigned from his own party, because the internal disagreements between the partys leaders, and formed the Pure Party of Rights. After his death in the next year (1896) Josip Frank took the leadership of the (new) party. However, in contrast to Starevi, Frank wanted to create a Great Croatia within Great
38 Franjo Tuman, Hrvatska u monarhistikoj Jugoslaviji, vol. I, Zagreb, 1993, p. 31.
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Austria39 (but not as a real independent state outside the borders of AustriaHungary, as originally Ante Starevi wanted). It is the fact that while Starevi worked on the dissolution of AustriaHungary, as the main external enemy of the Croatian national interest (the Serbs have been, according to him, the crucial internal enemy of Croatia), Josip Frank worked on preservation and strengthening of Austria-Hungary as the best protector of Croatian interest. The leadership of both Croatian parties of rights never adopted a positive attitude towards the South Slavic unification. Moreover, Josip Frank (who was not of the Slavic origin) had strong anti-Slavic (especially anti-Serb) attitude, and openly worked in the favour of the Rauch regime in Croatia-Slavonia (19081910) against the Serbs within Austria-Hungary, having his own armed paramilitary legions (the so-called Franks Legions).40 The Franks party at the time of the Sarajevo assassination (June 28th, 1914) was the strongest Croatias Serbofob, calling for the war against Serbia, with the expectation that a Greater Croatia would be formed with the Austrian support after the war.41 On the other hand, the new Starevis Party of Rights, which separated itself from the Franks party just before the war, adopted during the time of the Great War of 19141918 an attitude in favour of a dissolution of the Dual Monarchy and preferred a creation of the common South Slavic state. During the anti-Serbian campaign in Zagreb in 1914 the Hrvat, a journal of the Starevis Croatian Party of Rights, was openly on the Serbian side and interceded in favour of the Yugoslav unification. For example, the Hrvat published several articles in which the Socialists, Anarchists, Hungarians and Freemasonry were accused as the organisers of the assassination in Sarajevo in 1914, but not Serbia. What concerns the Yugoslav unification, the most important article of this journal was published on July 4th, 1914 under the title National Principle in which the idea of the South Slavic ethno-political unification was supported. It can be concluded that the Idea of Union of the South Slavic, or only the Yugoslav (the South Slavs without the Bulgarians)
39 Rijeki Novi List, V/1911, No. 301, December 19 th, 1911. 40 Frano Supilo, Politika u Hrvatskoj, Zagreb, 1953, pp. 206208; Antun Radi, Sabrana djela, vol. XVIII, Zagreb, 1938, pp. 187, 335336. 41 More informations about it in: Veeslav Wilder, Dva smjera u hrvatskoj politici, Zagreb, 1918.
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peoples in one common national state had relatively deep roots in historical development of political ideas among the South Slavs (from the end of the 18th c.). This idea had several stages of development and the features of expression, but basically the supporters of the Idea of Union primarily understood the Serbo-Croatian cultural, national and political cooperation, reciprocity, solidarity and finally (political) unification as a backbone of any kind of the South Slavic state (with the Bulgarians or not). Finally, the idea was imagined to be realised in the two phases: 1) only the Yugoslav unification (the Serbs, Slovenes and Croats): and 2) the Pan-South Slavic unification (the Yugoslavs and Bulgarians).
The Balkan territories offered to Serbia by the Entente in 1915
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SECOND CHAPTER: THE FIRST WAR YEAR AND THE GERMAN, AUSTROHUNGARIAN, BULGARIAN AND SERBIAN WAR PLANS
The war, which began in August 1914 to contemporaries the Great War, to posterity the First World War marked the end of one period of history and the beginning of another. Starting as a European war, it turned in 1917, with the entrance of the U.S.A. into a world war. The spark that triggered it off was the assassination of the Austrian heir-presumptive, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, by Serbian nationalist in Bosnia Gavrilo Princip, a member of the Young Bosnia (Mlada Bosna) movement, in Sarajevo on June 28th, 1914. According to the German historian Fritz Fischer, one of the crucial far-long designs of Germanys policy at the end of the 19th c. and the beginning of the 20th c. was a creation of the Central Europe (Mitteleuropa), as a new economic unit controlled by Germany. The conception of the Middle European tariff union in BethmannHollwegs program from September 1914 were territorially divided into two parts: 1) the territories considered as direct members: (France, Luxembourg, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, and Russian part of Poland), plus the Habsburg Monarchy; and 2) the countries considered as associates: (Norway, Sweden, and Italy). However, in 1916 the new territories were designated for annexation by Germany: Lithuania with Vilnius and Courland with Mitau. At the same time Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, the Ottoman Empire and Greece were saw as an incorporated lands into the New Order in Europe under the German lordship. Finally, Livonia, Estonia and Finland were designed for closer political and economic alliance with Germany after the peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Berlin.42 At such a way, the Yugoslav territories of the Habsburg Monarchy were intended for direct membership, while Serbia and Montenegro were considered for incorporation into the German New (European) Order as the separate parts from the other Yugoslav territories. In any case, all Yugoslav territories were
42 Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War, New York, 1967, see the map on p. 107.
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designed as parts of the German Central Europe, as a new economic unite under German control and exploitation. The authorities of the Habsburg Monarchy (both Austrian and Hungarian) accepted participation in Germanys schemes for creation o the German controlled the Central Europe (Mitteleuropa) the Central European Customs Union.43 What both Germanys and AustroHungarian governments understood, what concerns the question of the Balkan incorporation into the Central European Customs Union, was that in this part of Europe their crucial enemy was the Kingdom of Serbia, which sought to be united with its ethnolinguistic compatriots from the Austro Hungarian Empire, what practically ment a dissolution of the Austria-Hungary. Serbia was, at the same time, seen as the main obstacle against the Austrian and German political-economic advance towards the Aegean Sea, and even further towards the Middle East (the so-called project of Drang nacht Osten or Berlin-Baghdad connection). Among all European crises and conflicts at the end of the 19th c. and the beginning of the 20th c. the clash between the Kingdom of Serbia and the AustroHungarian Monarchy was a unique one. According to Joachim Remak, the concept of a Greater South Slav State was fully as defensible as was Austria-Hungary's right to survival.44 Further, according to the same author, the Austro Serbian struggle originally (as it was imagined in Vienna and Berlin) had to be finished in the form of the third Balkan war, as the war between the two nations directly affected... From Germanys perspective, the AustroSerbian military clash had to be isolated from the influences from the rest of the European powers.45 From the Habsburg perspective, the Austro Hungarian declaration of the war against Serbia (July 28th, 1914) was intended to reassert the position of Austria-Hungary as an
43 Alan Sked, The Decline & Fall of the Habsburg Empire 18151918, London and New York, 1990, p. 259. 44 Joachim Remak, 1914The Third Balkan War. Origins Reconsidered, The Journal of Modern History, vol. 43, No. 3, September 1971. 45 ibid. Also, according to Joachim Remark, ...the most basic decisions affecting peace or war were made by Berthold rather than Bethmann, and Pa rather than Sazonov. i
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independent European Great Power.46 According to Joachim Remak, Berchtold and Conrad had very much of a premeditated desire for a simple Balkan war to recover some of the monarchys lost prestige.47 Bulgarias policy of a hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula from 1885 dovetailed with the political and military aims designed by the Central Powers, particularly with an intention to eliminate Serbia as a political factor in the Balkans. After the failure of Bulgarian aims in the Second Balkan War (1913), Sofia found a support from the Central Powers for its aim to incorporate the Vardar Macedonia48 (and the Aegean Macedonia, too). Following the out break of the WWI, on August 2nd, 1914 Bulgarias Radoslavovs government offered to the Central Powers a political-military alliance in return for Bulgarian participation in the war against Serbia with the intention to gain territorial concessions (similarly what Italy offered to the Entente in 1915 to fight on the side of the Entente for territorial concessions in the Balkans and South Tyrol). The government insisted that Bulgaria had to annex those territories on which Bulgaria claims the ethnic and historical rights.49 The Bulgarian western territorial pretensions were not in opposition to the AustroHungarian plans with regard to the territorial concessions at the expense of the Kingdom of Serbia. Rather, the plans about creation of a Greater (San Stefano) Bulgaria were fully in accord with the policies of the Danube Monarchy. The AustroHungarian ruling circles agreed that the Kingdom of Serbia has to be territorially reduced to the extent which would no longer be dangerous for the Danube Monarchy, but at the same time opposed the annexation of the larger territories populated by the Serbs in order not to have so huge number of the South Slavs (and the Slavs in general) within the Monarchy. That was a crucial reason for the Central Powers to accept the Bulgarian territorial aspirations at the expense of Serbia.
46 A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918, London, 1990, p. 250. 47 Joachm Remark, 1914The Balkan War. Origins Reconsiderd, The Journal of Modern History, vol. 43, No. 3, September 1971. 48 ivko Avramovski, Ratni ciljevi Bugarske i Centralne sile 19141918, Beograd, 1985, p. 315. 49 Haus-Hoff und Staatsarchiv, Viena, telegram No. 213.
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By signing the Secret Convention on September 6th, 1915 with Bulgaria, the Central Powers guaranteed to Bulgaria an annexation of the whole territory of the Eastern Serbia as far as the Morava River and the whole portion of Serbias Vardar Macedonia.50 According to this Convention, Bulgaria gained the territories of the Kingdom of Serbia as far as the demarcation line between Bulgaria and AustriaHungary, which was stretching from Smederevo, between Kru evac and Stala, before Vuitrn and Prizren, including the Mountain, ara Lakes of Ohrid and Prespa and the town of Gevgelia on the south.51 According to the first article of the Secret Convention, Bulgaria should be enlarged with the new 51.425 square km., and 2.648.168 inhabitants.52 Finally, according to the Secret Convention, Bulgaria should achieve from the Ottoman Empire the territory of the lower Maritza River in front of the city of Edirne. A main quarrel between Serbia and Bulgaria during the second half of the 19th c. and the beginning of the 20th c. was the question of Macedonia. The problem was so complex that even the Russian ambassador in Belgrade during the WWI (19141917), Count G. N. Trubecki, admitted that he never could reach a right conclusion on Macedonia, although he studied this question for the long period of time.53 The Russian diplomacy was, in general, indulgent towards the Bulgarian territorial requirements. For instance, during a meeting with the Bulgarian ambassador in Serbia, Tchaprashnikov, in November 1914 in the city of Ni Count Trubecki informed him that Bulgaria may achieve Macedonia, but regarding the Balkan territories annexed by Romania and Greece after the First Balkan War we can only promise that You will be supported by us. Trubecki, as well as, indicated that Bulgaria might annex the territory of Thrace as far as the line Enos-Midia. However, the Russian ambassador in Serbia at the same time noticed that Bulgaria would gain these promised territories only in the case if Sophia will enter
50 ivko Avramovski, Ratni ciljevi Bugarske i Centralne sile 19141918, Beograd, 1985, pp. 150173. 51 ibid., see the map on p. 225. 52 ibid., p. 170. 53 Knez Grigorije Nikolajevi Trubecki, Rat na Balkanu 19141917 i ruska diplomatija, Beograd, 1994, p. 30.
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the war on the Entente side.54 The Russian diplomacy, likewise the diplomacies of the other members of the Entente, from the very beginning of the war pressed Serbia to revive the Balkan politicalmilitary bloc of 1912, and to make final bilateral settlement with Bulgaria upon a territorial division of the Vardar Macedonia.55 As a territorial compensation for Serbias lands handed over to Bulgaria, Russia offered to Serbia doubtful territorial concessions: ...except pure Serbian lands and concessions on the other side.56 However, the Serbian answer always had been that the bloc could be recreated again, but with a remark the required territorial concessions had to be given to Bulgaria by Greece and Romania, but not by Serbia. At the same time, Serbia claimed that the question of the South Slavs had to be resolved by their union into one common national state and that the Vardar Valley (i.e., the Vardar Macedonia) had to be included into Yugoslavia.57 It is obvious that from the very beginning of the war, the crucial war aim of Serbia was a creation of a large South Slavic state in the Balkans. The question of inclusion of Bulgaria into Yugoslavia primarily depended on the Bulgarian diplomatic decision which military bloc (the Central Powers or the Entente) Sofia will join. The Serbian war aims during the WWI were designed within the two options. The first one, and more realistic, was an option of unification of all Serbian historical and ethnic territories into the united national state of the Serbs. In the other words, after the war it should be created the so-called Greater or United Serbia. That was a minimal Serbias war aim. The first step in the realisation of this option or a project was a territorial enlargement of the Kingdom of Serbia after two Balkans Wars (19121913), when Serbia gained Kosovo, Metohija, Northern Sandak and the Vardar Macedonia. However, the second option, only accepted in the case that the first one could not be realised primarily because of the opposition by
54 ibid., pp. 7172; Archives of Serbia (Arhiv Srbije), Beograd, Ministarstvo Inostranih Dela, Politiko Odeljenje, 1918, X-323, Pai to Vesni, January 18th, 1918; Dragoslav Jankovi, Bogdan Krizman, Graa o stvaranju jugoslovenske drave, vol. I, Beograd, 1964, p. 45. 55 Milorad Ekmei, Ratni ciljevi Srbije 19141918, Beograd, 1992, pp. 89. 56 Spalajkovi-Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministarstvo Inostranih Dela MID), St. Petersburg, November 1/14th, 1914, Diplomatic Archives of Yugoslavia (Diplomatski Arhiv Jugoslavije DAJ), Beograd, secret, No. 10166. 57 Milorad Ekmei, Ratni ciljevi Srbije 19141918, Beograd, 1992, p. 11.
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the Great Powers (what practically happened at the end of the war) was more important for the subsequent history of the Balkans and its inhabitants in the 20th c. Namely, Belgrade accepted the mid-19th c. idea of creation of Yugoslavia, or in the other words a common state of the South Slavs, but with a final and forever exclusion of Bulgaria (as the causer of the Second Balkan War). That was a maximal war aim of Serbia during the whole period of the WWI and it would be realised only if both Balkan military and international diplomaticpolitical situation at the end of the Great War would be lesser suitable for the realisation of the first option. For the Serbian authorities, the essential task of the realisation of the idea of Yugoslav unification it was in fact an unification of the Serbdom as a fundamental historical-national task of all Serbian history and the Serbs. Thus, for example, at the beginning of 1912 a Memorandum, written by the order of the Serbian Regent Aleksandar Karaorevi to the Russian Emperor Nikolai II Romanov, asked for the Russian support for the realisation of the Serbian national program in the coming Balkan wars. The importance of the Serbs for Russia and the whole Slavic world was put on the first place in this memorandum. The Orthodoxy was, according to the Memorandum, the crucial link between the Serbs and the Russians and the main national marker of the both nations. The Serbs, historically, after the Russians and Russia are the strongest deffenders of the Orthodoxy in the Slavic community in which they have a significant role in the Slavic struggle against the Pan-Germanic imperialism. Finally, the Memorandum stresses that a creation of united Serbian state, consisted of Serbia, Montenegro, part of Macedonia (the Vardar Macedonia), the Ancient Serbia (Kosovo, Metochia, Raka/Sandak), Bosnia, Herzegovina and Croatia (including Dalmatia and Slavonia) with 10 million Slavic inhabitants would be an important politicalmilitary factor in Europe, and what is the most important, it would be a significant pilar and supporter of the Russian Pan-Slavic policy.58 A united Serbian state would finally stop further Germanic penetration to the Near and the Middle East. At the same time, the Balkan
58 About the Serbian-Russian connections on the basis of the Russian Pan-Slavic policy there are indisputable indications in: , 18781917 (), , 1935, V/55, Letter by Aleksandar Karaorevi to Nikolai II. After the Sarajevo assassination on June 28th, 1914 AustroHunarian Emperor/King Franz Joseph I clearly indicated in his letter to the German Emperor that Serbia is the principal pilar of the Russian Pan-Slavic policy in the Balkans.
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Peninsula would be ultimatly put under the Slavic domination.59 On the other side, Serbia was for Russia of an extreme importance as the only Balkan state, according to the Memorandum, on which Russia could rely upon. Namely, Bulgaria was more and more under the AustroGerman influence through the personality of the Bulgarian King Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, who was of the German origin; Greece was put as weel as under the strong Germanic control through Greeces dynastic connections with the German nobility and the Germanophile policy of the King Constantine I, while Turkey was already under a total German political-financial control. For those reasons, the Serbian national and war aims had to by supported by Russia for the sake of its own political interest in the Balkans. Finally, the Memorandum concludes that the Greater Serbia would be for Russia the last bulwark against the West.60 During the first days of the Balkan Wars 19121913 the Serbian Regent Aleksandar I adressed his army with the words that it came a moment to finish the process of liberation and unification of all Serbs, a process which started with the First Serbian Uprising against the Turks (18041813).61 He precisely marked, at the very beginning of the WWI, the Serbian lands which have to be liberated and united with Serbia and Montenegro in his Proclamation to the Serbian soldiers: Bosnia, Herzegovina, Banat, Baka, Croatia, Slavonia, Srem and Dalmatia.62 Obviously, for him all Austro Hungarian Orthodox South Slavs belonged to the ethnic community of the Serbdom. Following this idea of the Pan-Serbian unification, the Serbian Prime Minister and the Minister of the Foreign Relations, Nikola Pai, presented his own vision of the new (Yugoslav or united
59 Archives of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije), Beograd, Fond Vojislava Jovanovia, f. 119, Projekat memoranduma za ruskog cara, Salonika, February 3rd, 1912. 60 The Serbian consul in Odessa, Marko Cemovi, proposed to Serbias Prime Minister Nikola Pai to ask the Russian authorities to send three divisions to the Balkans in order to help the Serbian army to finally realize the Serbian national program [Archives of Serbia, Beograd, Ministarstvo Inostranih Dela, Politiko Odeljenje, 1916, IX/415, Cemovis Memorandum to Pai]. In general, the Tsarist Russia had been the principal champion of Serbia among the Great Powers and, without the support of St. Petersburg, the Serbs were in urgent need of friends [John B. Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, Columbia University Press, New York, 2000, p. 224]. 61 Archives of Military-Historical Institute (Arhiv Vojnoistorijskog Instituta), Beograd, p. 2, k. 35, Operacijski dnevnik, Naredba Komandanta I armije za 18. X 1912. 62 Branislav Gligorijevi, Kralj Aleksandar Karaorevi, Beograd, 1996, p. 364.
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Serbian) state to his the most closed political associates on July 29th, 1914 an idea that should be realised during the war. Namely, on the question asked by Jovan Cviji with regard to the new boundaries with Austria-Hungary after the war, Pa answered that our i borders are going to be set up on the line Klagenfurt-MarburgSzeged.63 The first official act issued by the Serbian government in which the Yugoslav program is presented, as Serbias maximal war aim, was Pa is Circular Note, sent on September 4th, 1914. In this document it was emphasised that in the Balkans a strong national (Yugoslav) state has to be created, composed by all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes64 (but not Bulgarians). According to Pai, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are the single same-tribe nation, which, on the basis of history, language, literature and the rights to selfdetermination, had all conditions to create their own independent political state.65 This Circular Note also emphasised that such state would present one ethnic and economic region with a united people of the same-tribe nation.66 At the end of September 1914 Pa i sent to all Serbian ambassadors in the capitals of the Entente states a map with very clearly marked territorial boundaries of the future Yugoslav state, after the defeat of the Habsburg Monarchy. Pa i anticipated that this state would have approximately 12 mil. Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and about 230.000 sq. km. It has to be noticed that in the case of annexation of Trieste and Klagenfurt the First Yugoslavia would be territorialy bigger than the Second Yugoslavia, which was created after the WWII.67 The Yugoslav program, as the maximal war aim of the Serbian government, was recognised as a legal and official one on the session
63 Archives of SANU (Arhiv Srpske Akademije Nauka i Umetnosti), Beograd, The Memoires by General Panta Dra ki, 14 211; Milorad Ekmei, Ratni ciljevi Srbije 1914, Beograd, 1992, p. 84. 64 ore . Stankovi, Nikola Pa i jugoslovensko pitanje, vol. I, Beograd, 1985, p. 148; Milorad i Ekmei, Ratni ciljevi Srbije 1914, Beograd, 1992, pp. 8789; Dragoslav Jankovi, Srbija i jugoslovensko pitanje 19141915, Beograd, 1965, p. 101; Dragoslav Jankovi, Ni deklaracija, ka Istorija XX veka: zbornik radova, vol. 10, Beograd, 1969, p. 97. 65 ore . Stankovi, Nikola Pa i jugoslovensko pitanje, vol. I, Beograd, 1985, p. 150. i 66 Milorad Ekmei, Ratni ciljevi Srbije 19141918, Beograd, 1992, p. 177. 67 Aleks N. Dragni, Srbija, Nikola Pa i Jugoslavija, Beograd, 1994, p. 124. According to the author, i these territorial intentions were all but only not the intentions for a creation of the Great Serbia, p. 124. It is interesting to present opinion by Seton-Watson that the future capital of Yugoslavia should be Sarajevo or to be shifted from one place to other [Milorad Ekmei, Ratni ciljevi Srbije 19141918, Beograd, 1992, p. 182].
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of the Serbias Peoples Assembly (Parliament) in the city of Ni on December 7th, 1914. The principal result of the assemblys session was an adoption of the Declaration of Ni that publicly presented the Serbian war aims to the Entente.68 The fact is that the Serbian Prime Minister saw creation of the Yugoslav state as the best second option to finally resolve the Serbian Question (i.e., to politically unite all Serbian population and lands) in the case if the first solution (creation of the pure Pan-Serbian national state Greater Serbia) cannot come true.69 This Declaration especially stressed that Serbias war efforts for independence are at the same time and the efforts for liberation and unification of all our not free brothers, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (i.e., the South Slavs who lived in Austria-Hungary).70 In any case, the Declaration of Ni presented the integral Yugoslav program as an official war program of the Kingdom of Serbia. On the other hand, the principal shortcoming of the Declaration was the fact that only one side the Royal Serbian Government announced it. The Declaration of Niwas delivered to the diplomatic representatives of the Entente states France, England and Russia who have been at that time together with the Royal Serbian Government in the southern Serbias city of Ni 71 . The Declaration opened a path towards a long process of internationalisation of the Yugoslav Question. Subsequently, Serbia by this Declaration tried to beat back a diplomatic pressure on herself by the Entente in regard to the requirement to make territorial concessions to Bulgaria, Romania and Italy for their participation in the war on the side of France, Great Britain and Russia.72
68 Deklaracija vlade Kraljevine Srbije o ratnim ciljevima Srbije, Srpske novine, 282, December 7th, 1914, Ni. 69 ore . Stankovi, Nikola Pa i jugoslovensko pitanje, Beograd, 1985, p. 154. According to i Miodrag Zeevi, Nikola Pai and Aleksandar I Karaorevi favoured creation of Yugoslavia, while Serbian military establishment was against the union with the (Catholic) Croats and the Slovenes supporting creation of the Greater Serbia [Miodrag Zeevi, Jugoslavija 19181992. Junoslovenski dravni san i java, Beograd, 1994, pp. 3132]. 70 ibid., p. 157; Ferdo i, Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (1914 i 1918), Zagreb, 1920, p. 10; A. Arnaoutovitch, De la Serbie la Yougoslavie. Notes et Documents, Paris, 1919, pp. 23; Aleksandar Beli, Srbija i junoslovensko pitanje, Ni 1915, p. 83; Stanoje Stanojevi, , ta hoe Srbija?, Ni 1915, pp. 2127. , 71 After the Austrian-Hungarian armies attacked Serbia in the summer 1914 Serbias government with the General-Staff of Serbias Army left Belgrade and moved to the southern Serbias city of Ni. 72 With regard to the problem of the Italian territorial aspirations on the territory of the eastern Adriatic littoral during the Great War see: Dragoljub R. ivojinovi, Amerika, Italija i postanak Jugoslavije
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A proclamation of similar war aims was announced by the Montenegrin King Nikola I Petrovi in which he called all Montenegrins to fight for the liberty of all Serbs and the Yugoslavs against AustriaHungary, whose authorities proclaimed a war against both the entire Serbdom and the entire Slavdom. The Montenegrin Proclamation ends with a note that Serbia and Montenegro, in their justifiable struggle, would be supported by the almighty Russia.
The map of AustriaHungary in 1914
19171919, Beograd, 1970 (America, Italy and the Birth of Yugoslavia (19171919), Columbia University Press, New York 1972), pp. 3567. It is important to present a project created by the Croatian politician Dr. Ivan Lorkovi very soon after the break out of the war, who was at that time the leader of the Croatian part of the Croatian-Serbian Coalition. Namely, he sent to the Czech deputy in Prague Prof. Masaryk Memorandum in which proposed destruction of the Dual Monarchy and formation of a common state of all South Slavs. However, this state was imagined as a federal union of states, like the Holy German Empire, in which every state would have its own assembly and a ruler. The crucial point of this proposal was to create with Serbia one common state but in which it would be fully saved and preserved the continuity of the Croatian statehood [Franjo Tuman, Hrvatska u monarhistikoj Jugoslaviji, volume I, Zagreb, 1993, pp. 154155].
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The map of proposed united autonomous states of Austria Hungary during the WWI
Hungarian royal coat of armes representing Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Rijeka, Transylvania, Slovakia and Hungarian tribes settled Panonia in 896
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THIRD CHAPTER: THE TREATY OF LONDON, CREATION OF THE YUGOSLAV COMMITTEE AND ITS PROPAGANDA WORK
In the spring of the second war year (1915) two significant political events occurred in connection to the process of creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The first one was the secret Treaty of London, signed between Italy and the Entente. According to the Italian general Miln, who was a representative of the Italian government in the negotiations with the Yugoslav Committee in 1917, the Treaty of London had an aim to protect Italy from the Russian expansion in the area of the Mediterranean Sea by annexation of Constantinople, Dardanelles and the Straits of Bosporus.73 The second one was the creation of the Yugoslav Committee, which was, on the other hand, a good example how small nations were fighting against a selfish diplomacy of powerful and influential European countries for their own national and historical rights. An official ultimate political aim of both the Royal Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee was to create a single South Slavic state after the war. For both sides dissolution of AustriaHungary was obviously the most significant precondition to create a unified South Slavic state.74 However, in order to properly understand the scope of complex relations between the Serbian Royal Government, the Yugoslav Committee in London and later on, the National Council in Zagreb, it is necessary to notice that Serbia (as the main political-military partner) had as the principal war aim to include all Serbs into a single national state and, at such a way, to finally resolve the Serbian Question. Any kind of common Yugoslav state with the Croats and Slovenes was possible for Belgrade only after the Pan-Serbian state unification.
73 H. W. Sted, Mes Memoires, 19141922, Paris, 1927, p. 160; Dragovan epi, Jugoslovenski odbor i Rimski pakt, Zagreb, 1966, p. 484. 74 Archives of Military-Historical Institute (Arhiv Vojnoistorijskog Instituta), Beograd, 3, box 18, vol. 21, Vrhovna komanda Ministarstva vojnog, May 23rd, 1917.
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Many Serbian politicians, intellectuals, public workers and scholars thought that independent Serbian unification would be much stronger and longer in comparison with the situation in which united Serbs will live together with the Slovenes and Croats in one state. However, many of them have been aware that the Croats within the Serbo-Croat-Slovenian state will fight for their own autonomous status and even for internationally recognised independent Croatia. In the other words, Croatia would be always a corpus separatum within the Yugoslav state.75 On the other hand, a unification of only the Serbs would mean that the Croats will establish their own independent state. However, regardless on the question how small Croat national state would be, it will anyway with a support of some European states, primarily the Catholic ones, all the time jeopardise the Serbian interests.76 A real disaster for any kind of Greater/United Serbia was to have as her neighbours independent Bulgaria and Croatia, as both of them could claim certain Serbias territories and work to dissolute Serbia. What is the most important, struggles to create separate united Serbia and separate united Croatia would unconditionally lead Serbs and Croats to the war among each other over the territories of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Krayina, Srem and Baka in which both of these nations lived mixed together for the centuries. Finally, in order to avoid a higher degree of Croatian threat to the Serbian national interests, the Serbian civil authorities, led by Serbias Regent Aleksandar I Karaorevi, estimated that the Croats would be better controlled and neutralised within a common Yugoslav (i.e., Serbo-CroatSlovenian) state then out of it.77 Both Serbian and Croatian politicians knew that without creation of Yugoslavia either Greater Serbia or small Croatia would not gain territorial possessions of all (Slavic) Dalmatia and Istria with the Adriatic islands. For the Slovenes, the Yugoslav state was only
75 The Serbian consul in Odessa, Marko Cemovi, informed Pai that the Slovenian and Croatian officers, who were the prisoners of war in Russia, have not been inspired by the idea of Yugoslavia. According to him, if plebiscite upon creation of Yugoslavia would be organized in the Austro-Hungarian lands the Croats and Slovenes would vote against the common Yugoslav state [Archives of Serbia, Beograd, Ministarstvo Inostranih Dela, Politiko Odeljenje, 1916, IX/415, Cemovis Memorandum to Pai]. 76 Branislav Gligorijevi, Kralj Aleksandar Karaorevi, vol. I, Beograd, 1996, p. 442. 77 , 18781917 (), , 1935, VII/2, , May 4th, 1915.
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way out from twelve centuries (from 745) of the Germanic lordship. The Slovenes have been afraid to create a federal Catholic state with the Croats as some of the 19th century influential Croatian ideologists of the Croat national identification and politicians understood the Slovenes (Kranjci) as nothing else then the (ethnolinguistic) Alpine Croats or the White Croats, i.e., as a part of the Croatian nationhood78 (that was the case with the Croatian Party of Rights, established in 1861). Theoretically, with a creation of a single South Slavic state both the Serbian and Croatian questions would be resolved by a unification of all their ethnic and historical lands into one state.79 The British public workers R. W. Seton Watson and George M. Trevelyan stressed this fact in January 1915 to the Serbian Regent during their conversation with him in Belgrade. Actually, these two British men were sent to Serbia to the diplomatic mission by the British Foreign Office with the task to convince the Serbian authority to cede the Serbian part of Macedonia (the Vardar Macedonia) to Bulgaria, as the Bulgarian condition to fight on the side of the Entente. As a territorial compensation to Serbia for lost Vardar Macedonia Belgrade would get the Entente support to occupy Bosnia, Herzegovina, the Southern Dalmatia and to unite Serbia with the Austrian-Hungarian South Slavs.80 R. W. Seton Watson expressed the same attitude towards the Yugoslav Question in the spring 1916 when the Serbian Regent visited London. On this occasion, R. W. Seton Watson delivered to him the Memorandum about creation of the Yugoslav state in which he proposed that Serbia would find a compromise with Italy concerning the question of Dalmatia. After that (i.e., ceding to Italy
78 The most ardent sponsors of the theory that the Slovenes are the Alpine Croats or the White Croats and that the Serbs who lived in Croatia are only the Orthodox Croats were political and ideological leaders of the Croatian Party of Rights: Ante Starevi and Eugen Kvaternik. About their ideology see in: Gross Mirjana, Szabo Agneza, Prema hrvatskome graanskom drutvu, Zagreb, 1992, pp. 257265. According to the Croatian idea of the triple federal re-arrangement of the Habsburg Monarchy, the Croatian federal unit, with Slovenia as a part of Croatia, has to be one of the three federal parts (together with the Austrian and the Hungarian once) of the Monarchy [Janko Prunk, Kratka zgodovina Slovenije, Ljubljana, 2002, p. 84]. 79 ore . Stankovi, Nikola Pai i jugoslovensko pitanje, vol. I, Beograd, 1985, p. 150; Dragovan epi, Italija, Saveznici i jugoslovensko pitanje, Zagreb, 1970, pp. 92120. 80 R. W. Seton Watson i Jugosloveni, Korespondencija 19061941, vol. I, Zagreb, 1976, p. 193; Ubavka Ostoji-Feji, Robert Vilijam Siton Vatson i Dord Makoli Treveljan u Srbiji 19141915, Istorijski asopis, Beograd, 19821983, pp. 496498.
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the main part of Dalmatia) Serbia would get support from the United Kingdom and France to create Yugoslavia, which would be under the Italian, British and French political protectorate. Otherwise, no one of those three states will support creation of a Greater Serbia; as such state would be in fact only the Russian vassal81 (likewise designed San Stefano Bulgaria in 1878). However, at the same time, the British policy favoured an idea that two equal federal units would compose Yugoslavia: one with the centre in Belgrade (representing Serbia and Montenegro), and one with the centre in Zagreb (representing the AustroHungarian South Slavs). This Memorandum influenced the Serbian Regent to incline towards the idea of unified Yugoslav state. It can be seen from his address and order to the Serbian soldiers in the Salonika Front immediately after his return from London in which it was said that they have to fight for creation of united Serbia and mighty Yugoslavia. However, only three months later he called the same soldiers to fight only for liberation of all Serbs and only their political unification, but not of all Yugoslavs. The Yugoslav Committee was established as a direct outcome of an external political events during the war. It was created on April 30th, 1915 in Paris, only several days after the signing of the Treaty of London, as an answer of the Austrian Yugoslavs to the Italian territorial aspirations toward the historical and ethnic territories of the South Slavs. The main task of the Committee (which was originally named as Croatian) was to oppose the Italian attempt to include South Slavic lands of the eastern Adriatic littoral (Istria and Dalmatia) and the Adriatic islands into the post-war Italy. From the very beginning of the war the Italian government demanded several territories from Austria-Hungary in return for its participation in the war on the side of the Central Powers. More precisely, the Italian government wanted to annex Alto Adige, Istria and Dalmatia as the terre irredente and in that way to accomplish the Italian historical dream which motto was Italia Irredenta.82 The Italian political fluctuation, with respect to its participation in the war, was finally over by the signing of the secret Treaty of London on
81 R. W. Seton Watson i Jugosloveni, Korespondencija 19061941, vol. I, Zagreb, 1976, pp. 265267. 82 With regard to this question one can find more information in: A. J. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 18481918, Oxford, 1957.
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April 26th, 1915 with the Great Britain, France and Russia. The following territories were granted to Italy by the Entente for the Italian entrance the war on their side: 1) Venezia Giulia (Gorizia, Trieste, Istria, part of the western Carniola (Krain), Monfalcone, Caporetto, Tarvisio, Postumia, and the islands of Cherso and Lussino); 2) Trentino (Sd Tyrol, Brenner Pass); and 3) a greater part of Dalmatia with its main islands and the city of Zadar (Zara).83 The rest of the Slavic Adriatic littoral would by shared between Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro while Albania will be divided between Serbia (the northern Albania), Greece (the southern Albania), Montenegro (the city of Scodra) and Italy (the sea-port of Valona). With this treaty the Italian Risorgimento gained a great political victory. The existence of this secret treaty was discovered by the member of the later formed Yugoslav Committee, a Croatian politician, Frano Supilo, who was from Dalmatia the land which should be given to Italy according to the treaty. That was a crucial reason for him to become one of the founders of the Yugoslav Committee. The Serbian government reacted immediately, only one day after the Treaty of London was signed. On the session of the Serbian parliament on April 27th, 1915, Nikola Pai officially once again repeated that Serbias war aim is a unification of the South Slavs, i.e., a unification of all their ethnic and historical lands. That was in fact Serbias rejection of the secret London Treaty. 84 However, the main concern of Serbias Yugoslav policy regarding the Italian intention to occupy and annex certain South Slavic territories from the Dual Monarchy was to protect on the first place the Serbian population and its ethnic lands in Dalmatia. It is visible, for instance, from Pais converstion with the Russian ambassador to Serbia, Count Trubecki when the Serbian Prime Minister required from the Russian authorities to protect the Serbian interest in Austria-
83 The whole text of the treaty is published in: J. Woodward and C. Woodward, Italy and the Yugoslavs, Boston, 1920. When the Slovene delegation approach the Russian authorities to protect the Slovenian provinces from Italian annexation and to support the Slovene territorial unification the delegation was refused. However, the Slovene soldiers in the AustroHungarian uniforms have been easily surrendering to the Russian army on the Eastern Front, but fighting bravely against the Italian soldiers on the River of Soa [Janko Prunk, Kratka zgodovina Slovenije, Ljubljana, 2002, 85]. 84 Ferdo ii, Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (19141919), Zagreb, 1920, p. 23.
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Hungary.85 This Pais requirement had an effect on the Russian authorities in St. Petersburg (Petrograd). Thus, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei D. Sazonov (18601927), promised to the Serbian delegation, led by scientists Ljubomir Stojanovi and Aleksandar Beli, on May 6th, 1915 that Serbia will be awarded after the war by Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and part of Dalmatia with the city of Split. Nevertheless, the Serbian delegation insisted that all South Slavs from Austria-Hungary had to be united with Serbia and Montenegro according to the principle one nation-one state, taking into account an idea that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are essentially the same ethnolinguistic nation. Basically, this requirement meant a dissolution of Austria-Hungary. Even in the case that Entente powers will sign a separate peace treaty with Austria-Hungary Serbia should get all AustroHungarian provinces settled by the Serbs. Nevertheless, the Serbian Question would not be fully resolved by creation of the Greater Serbia composed only by Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and part of Dalmatia because the Serbs in the rest of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia would stay out of the national state of the Serbs. At such a way, Beli and Stojanovi presented to the Russian authorities the Serbian Question basically as the Yugoslav Question.86 On the other hand, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov, who was for many years the Russian ambassador to Vatican, did not believe that the Orthodox Serbs and the Catholic Croats and Slovenes would live in peace within a single state for the reason that the Croats and Slovenes, as members of the universal Catholic Church-community, are depending on decisions made by the Roman Pope (whose headquarters is out of Yugoslavia) as the supreme head of all Catholics.87 That the Russian authority saw Croatian and Slovenian Catholicism as the main barrier for a long-lasting common
85 Pai especially mentioned the areas around the cities of ibenik, Knin and Krka River populated by the Serbian majority [ , 18781917 (), , 1935, VII/2, 642, , April 29th, 1915]. 86 , 18781917 (), , 1935, VII/2, 645, Note by Political Dept. of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Petrograd, April 30th, 1915. These Serbian demands were presented in the form of a Memorandum, under the headline Contemporary Serbian National Question, to the Russian Emperor. About the Memorandum see: Dragovan epi, O misiji Lj. Stojanovia i A. Belia u Petrogradu 1915 godine, Zbornik Historijskog instituta JAZU, 3, Zagreb, 1961, pp. 450472. 87 This opinion Sazonov told to Supilo in St. Petersburg in 1915.
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life of the Catholic Yugoslavs with the Orthodox Serbs was expressed by the Russian Count Jusipov to Supilo in St. Petersburg: All misfortune is in that that those 5 million of you are Catholics. Everything would be different if they would be Orthodox. But you are listening Pope, what means the head outside the state.88 However, Count Trubecki, the Russian ambassador to Serbia, was in opinion that an independent Catholic Croatia would be more dangerous for the Orthodox Serbia that to be a part of Yugoslavia.89 The founders of the Yugoslav Committee were the South Slavic politicians from Austria-Hungary who had been in exile from the very beginning of the war. The ethnic composition of the Committee was mainly Croatian one. That the Croats have been playing the most significant role in the Committee it can be seen from the fact that three the most important leaders and influential men in it were the Croats: Dr. Ante Trumbi as the President of the Committee, Ivan Metrovi and Dr. Frano Supilo.90 All three of them came from Dalmatia. A reason for the primarily Croatian character of the Yugoslav Committee is connected with the very aim of its establishment. Originally, the Committee was named as the Croatian Committee (formed in Rome), for the reason that primarily Croatian lands were in question with relations to the Italian territorial aspirations. The name was changed into the Yugoslav one fundamentally in order to attract Serbias diplomatic support as the Serbs were living in Dalmatia too. As we saw, the Yugoslav Committee was created only several days after signing the Treaty of London. The most important reason for its foundation, and at the same time, the most significant political aim of the Yugoslav Committee was to protect the South-Slavic lands in Austria-Hungary from Italian territorial aspirations and claims. In the other words, the Yugoslav Committee was formed as an organisation with the main political aim to show to the Entente powers that the South Slavs from the Monarchy are against the Treaty of London and to protect national interests of the Austrian Yugoslavs. The Committees
88 Ante Mandi, Fragmenti za historiju ujedinjenja, Zagreb, 1956, p. 155. 89 , 18781917 (), , 1935, VII/1, 354, Daily Report by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 12th, 1915. 90 Alongside with these three, the most important Committee's members were: Croat Hinko Hinkovi, the brothers Gazzari, Slovenes Niko upani and Franko Potonjak and Serbs Mihailo Pupin and Nikola Stojanovi.
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leadership emphasised that the Yugoslavs do not want to be included into Italy after the war. The Committee invoked in the last war year the right to self-determination of any nation that was officially recognised by the U.S.A. administration as a principle according to which the world should be re-organised after the WWI. It was proclaimed as the war aim of the U.S.A. in the W. Wilsons famous Fourteen Points Speech, given on January 8th, 1918. The second political aim of the Yugoslav Committee was to become a representative organisation of all South Slavic population in Austria-Hungary before the Entente powers and during and especially after the WWI with the aim to take an active diplomatic participation at the post-war peace conference for the sake to protect national interests of the Yugoslavs from the Dual Monarchy. The Yugoslav Committee very soon after its creation in Paris moved to London; i.e., to the city where a political agreement between the Entente powers and Italy was signed, in order to be in as better as better position to directly negotiate with the British government which was supposedly the pivotal inspirer of the treaty. The original initiative upon the political role of the Committee was only to inform the Entente, particularly the British, public upon a difficult position of the South Slavic population within AustriaHungary, and to inform them about the national claims of the Austrian Yugoslavs. In any case, the initial aim of the Yugoslav Committee was to revoke a validity of the Treaty of London.91 However, the question concerning the unification of the South Slavs into a single, politically independent state, was put in the later months on top of discussion agenda among the members of the Committee. The main part of the Committees members supported those Croatian politicians who shared opinion that Yugoslavia had to be created on the basis of national equality, with Serbia as a partner92 (but not as a leader). The leadership of the Yugoslav Committee comprehended it as an independent political organisation with equal negotiation power likiwese the Serbian government. Shortly, it was imagined as another equal political subject in the process of the Yugoslav unification. Requirements by Trumbi and Supilo for political equality between the Serbian government and the
91 Aleks N. Dragni, Srbija, Nikola Pai i Jugoslavija, Beograd, 1994, pp. 125126. 92 Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia. Origins, History, Politics, Ithaca and London, 1984, p. 117.
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Yugoslav Committee in the negotiations about a creation of Yugoslavia became especially strong from the spring of 1916 when the Serbian authorities with its army left occupied Serbia as from that time both the members of the Committee and the members of the Serbian government have been in the same position in exile without free motherland. In the other words, the Yugoslav Committee wanted to keep up relations with Serbia established on the basis of an equal political co-operation. For that reason, the Committees leadership demanded from the Serbian government to recognise the Yugoslav Committee as an independent political organisation, and also as a political representative of all Yugoslavs from Austria-Hungary. They also required that the unification would be accomplished through a process of political negotiations between the Yugoslav Committee and the Royal Serbian Government; but not that a creation of a single South Slavic state would be imposed by Belgrade as a unilateral political act. A question is what was beyond these Committees demands? We can conclude as an answer that it was in fact the aim of the Committee that Yugoslavia has to be created by three independent states as three federal units of a common national state of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes: Serbia, Montenegro and the territory of Austro Hungarian Yugoslavs. The Committees leadership, as it was the case particularly with Ante Trumbi and Frano Supilo, wanted to avoid a bad historical experience of the Yugoslavs living in the Austro Hungarian dual system. Actually, they feared that Serbia could become Prussia within Yugoslavia.93 What exactly they wanted it was that unification would be a real liberation of the South Slavs living in the Monarchy but not a new occupation and subordination, in this case by Serbia.94 They did not want that South Slavic lands in Austria-Hungary would be incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbia as one of its provinces as it was the case with the Vardar Macedonia after the Balkan Wars. The alleged Serbias imperialistic policy towards the western Yugoslavs was decisively rejected by Serbia after the Geneva Conference (in 1918) in a form of an official refutation
93 Dragoljub ivojinovi, Dnevnik admirala Ernesta Trubrida, Beograd, 1989, pp. 146147. The major Slovenian writer, Ivan Cankar, also supported the option of a Yugoslav federal state with Slovenia as the one of three federal lands, with the explanation that there was a deep cultural and civilizational gap between the Slovenes on the one hand and all other Yugoslavs on the other. In addition, in stead of the monarchy he preffered the republic [Janko Prunk, Kratka zgodovina Slovenije, Ljubljana, 2002, 8485]. 94 Dragoljub ivojinovi, Dnevnik admirala Ernesta Trubrida, Beograd, 1989 p. 119.
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printed in London The Times.95 However, Trumbi-Supilos design was also to establish the Croatian political and cultural hegemony over the Yugoslavs from the Dual Monarchy with Zagreb as their cultural-economic center and political capital what was unexeptable for Serbias government as a half of total Serbian population lived exactlly in Austria-Hungary. In addition, it has not be forgotten that the western Yugoslav lands have been parts of AustriaHungary; i.e. of the state whose government proclaimed a war against Serbia in 1914 and whose soldiers (especially the Croats and Bosnian Muslims) committeed crimes against Serbias Orthodox civilians in 1914 and later. Finally, the AustroHungarian commander of the invation troops against Serbia was Oscar Potjorek a General of Slovenian origin. These facts have been used at the beginning by Belgrade to treat the Yugoslav Committee as basically only Serbias propaganda agency in the west, but not as an equal political partner taking into consideration and the fact that the Committee was never recognised by the Entente as a legal political representative of the Austro Hungarian South Slavs. An attitude of the Serbian government, primarily created by its Prime MinisterNikola Pai, towards the role and political intent of the Yugoslav Committee was completely contrasted with the wishes and policy by the Committee itself. First of all, the idea to create a joint organisation of the Yugoslavs from the Dual Monarchy came from Nikola Pai several months before the London Treaty was signed. Namely, in October 1914 he launched an idea of creation of a united organisation of the South Slavic political emigrants from the lands of AustriaHungary who wanted to collaborate with the Serbian government with respect to the creation of a new single South Slavic state.96 However, the investigation shows that the real reason to establish such a committee was not the Italian threat. It was, in fact, the Hungarian threat to create a separate Hungarian state from Austria in which all of the St. Stephens (St. Istvans) crown-lands would be included into a new Hungarian independent state.97 In this case, the Yugoslav lands of Slavonia, Baka, Banat,
95 Archives of Yugoslavia, Beograd, Royal cabinet (Kabinet Kralja), 99/233. 96 Vojislav Vukovi, Iz odnosa Srbije i Jugoslovenskog odbora, Istorijski asopis, XII-XIII, Beograd 1963, pp. 345387. 97 This proposal was given to the Entente powers by the informal Hungarian delegation in London in October 1914.
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Croatia, Srem, the city of Rijeka, Prekomurje, Meumurje, Dalmatia, Baranja and Bosnia & Herzegovina should be incorporated into a Greater (historical) Hungary. Obviously, in order to make it impossible for Hungary to engulf the South Slavic lands, the Serbian Prime Minister proposed the creation of a single organisation of the AustroHungarian South Slavs, which initially was named by him as the London Committee of the South Slavs. According to his opinion, the members of this Committee should come from Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia, Banat, Baka and Srem. However, the Committee was not founded at that time because Dr. Ante Trumbi wanted that the act of an official creation of the Committee would be postponed for unspecified time.98 It is a fact that the initiative for an establishment of the committee of the South Slavic population from the Dual Monarchy was launched by the Serbian government, i.e., by its Prime Minister, but not by the South Slavic emigration from Austria-Hungary.99 Nevertheless, both the Serbian government and the Yugoslav emigrants participated in the creation of the Yugoslav Committee. Their first and one of the most important common sessions with regards to the creation of the Yugoslav Committee was held in Florence in November 1914. The Croatian side on the conference was represented by Dr. Ante Trumbi and Dr. Frano Supilo. Two Serbian politicians from Bosnia and Herzegovina represented the Royal Serbian Government Nikola Stojanovi and Duan Vasiljevi. A crucial consequence of these negotiations in Florence has been that both sides made an agreement concerning the foundation of the Committee. According to the Committees program, the Committee had as the most significant political aim to struggle for making a common state of all Yugoslavs. It was agreed about a creation of the Yugoslav or only Serbo-Croatian state without forming of any kind of a separate CroatoSlovenian state within the Habsburg Monarchy.100 Serbias attitude towards the role and functioning of the Yugoslav Committee was different in comparison with the intentions
98 Vojislav Vukovi, Iz odnosa Srbije i Jugoslovenskog odbora, Istorijski asopis, XIIXIII, Beograd 1963, pp. 350351. 99 ore . Stankovi, Nikola Pai i jugoslovensko pitanje, vol. II, Beograd, 1985, pp. 1819. 100 Jugoslovenski Odbor u Londonu, JAZU, Zagreb, 1966, p. 395.
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of the Committees members. Particularly Serbias attitude was in contrast to the wishes of two the most influential members of the Yugoslav Committee, actually its political leaders the Dalmatian Croats Dr. Ante Trumbi and Dr. Frano Supilo. That the Serbian government, exceptionally its Prime Minister, had the opposite opinion with regards to the Committees role can be seen from the very beginning of the Committees existence, even from the period before its own establishment. To be exact, in the city of Ni in October 1914 Pai had a meeting with the President of the Slavic South a Serb Boa Markovi. The principal conclusion of this meeting became that the Committee of the South Slavic population from the Dual Monarchy has to be created. The crucial outcome of the meeting concerning the future relations between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Royal Government became that the Committee will communicate with the Serbian government by the Serbian ambassadors, but with respect to its own internal action the Committee is free.101 This conclusion had two principal points. Firstly, Pai, it means the Serbian government, did not envisage the Yugoslav Committee as an independent political organisation. Secondly, the Serbian government did not recognise the Committee as the representative officialdom of the South Slavs from AustriaHungary.102 Instead, the Committee was recognised only as Serbias ally. In fact, the communication between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government by the Serbian ambassadors was only a proper tool for Pai to control the work of the Committee and, moreover to direct its political actions. What the Serbian government designed to do with the Yugoslav Committee was actually the plan to use it simply as Serbian propaganda agency.103 It means, the Committee was designed and envisaged by the Serbian government as the organisation with the assignment to spread pro-Yugoslav propaganda among the Entente states, but not as an independent political organisation that had to act as a real representative body of the AustroHungarian Yugoslavs. The role of political representation
101 Archives of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavija), Beograd, Zbirka Jovana M. Jovanovia, 80-4-514; Dragovan epi, Trumbiev Dnevnik, Historijski pregled, vol. II, Zagreb, 1959, pp. 178180. 102 ore . Stankovi, Nikola Pai i jugoslovensko pitanje, vol. II, Beograd, 1985, p. 25. 103 Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia; Origins, History, Politics, Ithaca and London, 1984, p. 117.
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of the AustroHungarian South Slavs Pai reserved exclusively for the Serbian Royal Government. The most significant propaganda task of the Yugoslav Committee, according to Pais opinion, was to induce the Entente states that: 1) a dismemberment of AustriaHungary should be one of their war aims; and 2) a united Yugoslavia would play after the war a role of the main barrier against the Austrian and the German penetration towards the Adriatic littoral.104 In the other words, the Yugoslav Committee had to express the wishes of the South Slavs from Austria-Hungary with regards to their rights to national self-determination, what means a dissolution of the Dual Monarchy. The attitudes towards the aims and function of the Yugoslav Committee between on the one hand its members, particularly its leadership Ante Trumbi and Frano Supilo, and the Serbian government, especially its Prime Minister, on the other hand were completely different. The Committees leadership envisaged its organisation as an independent representative political institution of the South Slavs from Austria-Hungary, which was fighting for their national liberation and political unification with Serbia and Montenegro into a single South Slavic state. The Committee, as well, should be one of equal political partners during the process of the South Slavic integration into a single state, alongside with the Serbian government.105 The Yugoslav Committee was functioning and had its representatives in all countries in which the South Slavs were living, including also and the North America and the South America. On the other hand, Serbia designed the Yugoslav Committee as its own propaganda agency before the Entente powers, without any political independence and representative role of the South Slavs from the Dual Monarchy. The Serbian government wanted to be only political representative of the whole South Slavic population before the Entente states and to play a leading role with regards to the creation of Yugoslavia at the post-war Peace Conference. That was the reason why the Serbian government never officially recognised the Yugoslav Committee as an equal political partner in the process of the
104 Archives of Serbia (Arhiv Srbije), Ministarstvo Inostranih Dela, Politiko Odeljenje, Paiev cirkular stranim poslanicima na strani, November 1915, 237. 105 , 1878-1917 (), , 1935, VII/1, 202, , February 15th, 1915.
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unification. For that reason, the Committee was never recognised by the Serbian government as official, politically independent representative organisation of the South Slavs from Austria Hungary. Some contemporary Serbian historians are in opinion that Trumbi and Supilo simply blackmailed Serbia to sacrifice itself for the Croatian national aims, i.e. for unification of all Croatian historical and ethnical territories within Yugoslavia, or othewise the Croats would create an independent Greater Croatia composed by all AustroHungarian South Slavic provinces including and (mainly Serb populated) Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to those historians, this Croatian strategy of blackmailing Serbia was clearly pointed out in Trumbis letter to Supilo on November 27th, 1914.106 Formally, the Yugoslav Committee was not a legal, internationally recognised and politically independent representative organisation of the Yugoslavs from the Monarchy at least because the Committee was not recognised as such organisation by the Entente states. However, practically, it played a representative role of the South Slavs from AustriaHungary before the Serbian government what was de facto, but not and de jure, recognised by the Royal Serbian Government during the Corfu negotiations in June and July 1917, when the both sides have been negotiating as equal political subjects. The most effective tool in the hands of Trumbi in his fight against Pai was his permanent threatening Serbian Prime Minister that Croats could establish with a support by some western countries an independent state that would embrace all Yugoslav provinces of AustriaHungary, what meant and those lands settled by the Serbs as well.107 Already in the spring of 1915 the Serbian ambassador in London, Mateja Bokovi, informed Pai that there are influential British and French diplomats who are supporting an idea of independent Croatia after the war.108 Similarly, at the same time, the Serbian diplomat Jovan Jovanovi-Pion informed the Supreme Staff of the Serbian army that the Entente powers had an option to establish autonomous Croatian state either within AustriaHungary
106 Vojislav Vukovi, Iz odnosa Srbije i Jugoslovenskog Odbora, Istorijski asopis, vol. XIIXIII, Beograd, 1963, pp. 352359; Branislav Gligorijevi, Kralj Aleksandar Karaorevi, vol. I, Beograd, 1996, p. 384. 107 Vojislav Vukovi, Iz odnosa Srbije i Jugoslovenskog Odbora, Istorijski asopis, vol. XIIXIII, Beograd, 1963, pp. 352359. 108 Archives of Serbia (Arhiv Srbije), Beograd, Ministarstvo Inostranih Dela, Politiko Odeljenje, 1915 V/234, Bokovi to Pai, April 28th, 1915.
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or Yugoslavia, or even fully independent Croatia, composed by Croatia proper, Slovenia, Slavonia, part of Dalmatia, and probably part of Bosnia. Pion concluded that Italy would be the most beneficial state if this idea concerning independent Croatia would be realised.109 Clearly, Trumbis policy towards the Serbian government was backed by Great Britain whose diplomats shared opinion that the Croats within Yugoslavia would be appropriate counter balance to the Russian influence on the Yugoslav policy through the Serbs. According to London, Yugoslavia had to be created as a federation between Serbia and Croatia. Moreover, the British diplomats and public workers believed that Yugoslavias Catholic west (Croats and Slovenes) would dominate over the Orthodox east (Serbs with Montenegrins) in Yugoslavia. For them, the triumph of Serbian idea would be the triumph of eastern over western culture what means that the Russian influence at the Balkans would be strengthened.110 There was and another reason for Pais attitude towards the role of the Yugoslav Committee: he, and his government, wanted that all South Slavs, either from AustriaHungary or from the independent states of Serbia and Montenegro, would appear before the Entente powers together. In the other words, the question of the South Slavs could be resolved easier and faster if Serbia, as the Entente associate state, would be a political representative of all South Slavs before the Entente powers. Besides, the Serbian Prime Minister shared opinion that the Yugoslav Committee was putting on the agenda some questions, which have not been of the crucial importance at that moment and at such a way neglecting the really most significant ones. The point was that the Serbian government, with its Prime Minister, did not want to allow the Yugoslav Committee (led by the Croats) to make political decisions in the name of the Serbs from the Dual Monarchy, what means, in fact, any kind of political decesions. This area of activity should be reserved only for the Serbian government. The real reason for such Pais opinion was his strong belief that in the current international situation the AustroHungarian Yugoslavs, especially the Croats and the Slovenes, more needed Serbian help then Serbia needed a co-operation with
109 Archives of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije), Beograd, Jovan Jovanovi-Pion to the Supreme Staff of the Serbian army, 804-147. 110 R. W. Seton Watson i Jugosloveni, Korespondencija 19061941, Zagreb, 1976, pp. 237240.
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them. Finally, the fact was that nobody from the Entente powers could delay Serbias right to struggle for liberation of Austro Hungarian Serbs, but somebody could delay Serbias right to fight for liberation of non-Serbian citizens of the Dual Monarchy. The question of the Yugoslav Committees propaganda work was one of the most important issues in its relations with Serbia. This is, in essence, the question of the financial dependence or independence of the Yugoslav Committee in its work of spreading national propaganda. The most influential members of the Yugoslav Committee, in the other words its leadership, were financially independent. They had their own financial sources for living and political work. It was exactly the case with Ante Trumbi, Frano Supilo and with the brothers Gazzari (Gullio and Remiggio). Frano Supilo was stressing several times in his correspondence with the Serbian Prime Minister that he was financially independent politician.111 Among all members of the Yugoslav Committee the brothers Gazzari were completely financially independent during the whole period of the war. Moreover, they gave to the Yugoslav emigrants in Rome the first financial support.112 However, many Yugoslav emigrants from AustriaHungary have been able to support financially themselves from their own sources only for a short interval of time. This was the case, for instance, with Hinko Hinkovi, who was financially independent only during the first two months in emigration. Nevertheless, mainly the Serbian government, especially in the point of the Committees propaganda activities, financially supported this organisation of the Yugoslav emigrants during the whole period of the war. The Serbian government was financing on the first place exactly the Committees national propaganda for the reason that this activity was the most important for Belgrade from all the rest Committees actions what was at the same time and the main reason for Committees creation from Serbias point of view. Serbia was financially supporting the propaganda work of the Yugoslav Committee mainly via the Serbian embassies in the Entente states
111 For example, in his letter to Nikola Pai written on October 21 st, 1914 [Dragovan epi, Pisma i memorandumi F. Supila, 19141917, Beograd, 1967, pp. 89, p. 150; Ivan Metrovi, Uspomene na politike ljude i dogaaje, Zagreb, 1969, p. 44]. 112 Archives of JAZU (Arhiv Jugoslavenske Akademije Znanosti i Umjetnosti), Zagreb, Fond Jugoslovenskog odbora, fasc. 17, doc. No. 1.
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and Switzerland.113 Some of the Committees members have been almost in a total financial dependence on the Serbian government during the whole war as it was, for instance, the case with the famous Croatian sculptor Ivan Metrovi. He was receiving the financial support by the Serbian government, alongside for the other purposes, and for his great exhibition in London. Some of the Committees members had the regular monthly financial donations by the Serbian government in exile (followed by extra ones) for their propaganda work.114 The Serbian government had a special budget for financing the Committees work. In October 1915 the Serbian government opened a special credit account for national propaganda spreading by the Yugoslav Committee.115 The Serbian government took also and a special financial loan from the foreign banks in order to obtain material provision to the Committee and its propaganda work.116 What concerns Serbias financial help given to the Yugoslav Committee the turning point occurred after the military collapse of Serbia in the autumn of 1915. Before this military defeat the Serbian government was giving greater amount of money to the Yugoslav Committee then it was after the collapse, when Serbian finances were in tremendous troubles as since the end of 1915 the Serbian government was in financial dependence on the Entente powers. However, the Serbian government in exile and after 1915 never stopped to finance propaganda work organised by the Yugoslav Committee. Financial expenditure by the Serbian government for the year of 1916 in relation to the national propaganda was 520.000 dinars, what was 80% more in comparison with the expenditure for the same purpose for the years of 1914 and 1915. From the beginning of 1917 the Serbian government allowed a special credit for the purpose of spreading the Yugoslav propaganda
113 For example, the Serbian embassy in Rome gave a great financial support for the purpose to gather the Yugoslav emigrants in September and October 1914. 114 This was the case with Pavle Popovi, Jovan Cviji, Bogdan Popovi, Nikolaj Velimirovi, Radoslav Jovanovi, Aleksandar Beli and Ljubomir (Ljuba) Stojanovi. 115 The summ was 300.000 Serbias dinars [Diplomatic Archives of Secretariate of Foreign Relations, Ministry of Foreign Relations, Krunoslav Spasi (Diplomatski arhiv sekretarijata inostranih poslova, Ministarstvo inostranih dela, Krunoslav Spasi DASIP, MID KS), Beograd, Politiko odeljenje 1915, fasc. XII, d IV, 9362]. 116 For instance, a new credit was taken (25.000 dinars) from the London Ottoman Bank on October 19th, 1915, (DASIP, MID KS, Beograd, Politiko odeljenje 1915, fasc. XXVII, d VIII, 492).
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in Salonika for the South Slavs who were living on the island of Corfu, as well as for the Yugoslav students from AustriaHungary.117 A total number of the Committees members who were supported by the Serbian government in financial point of view was 120 (at the time of the Corfu Conference). At the same time, the Serbian government was spending around 1.000.000 franks per year for all features of the Yugoslav propaganda. The revenue for the Yugoslav propaganda given by the Serbian government increased in 1917 in comparison with 1916 approximately for 26%. In 1918, the Serbian government was financing 300 persons who were working for the accomplishment of the national aims including and a great number of the Committees members. The Yugoslav Committee, even so, was not a totally depended on the financial support by the Serbian government because the Committee had and its own independent incomes too. In 1915 the main financial supporters of the Yugoslav Committee, alongside with the Serbian government, were the Mitrovich Brothers Company, the Croat Community in the U.S.A., as well as the immigrant organisations Velebit and the Narodna Odbrana.118 All in all, the independent incomes of the Yugoslav Committee during the whole period of the WWI were 1.312.500 franks. On the other hand, for the same period of time the Serbian government spent 2.810.000 franks for the assignment of the national propaganda.119 It can be concluded that the propaganda work of the Yugoslav Committee was mainly depended in financial point of view on the support offered by the Serbian government, who in fact understood the Committee only as the Serbian propaganda agency in the states of the Entente coalition. However, it must not be forgotten that the Yugoslav Committee had also and its own, independent income of money which was mainly received as grants from several patriotic organisations and business companies from abroad, whose members or owners were the South Slavic immigrants from the territory of AustriaHungary. For the future relations between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government the most important fact was
117 DASIP, MID KS, Jugoslovenski odsek 1917, Beograd, fasc. II, 801, 834, 891 and 933. 118 During the whole year, the Yugoslav Committee received from these organisations 142.000 franks [Archives of JAZU (Arhiv Jugoslavenske Akademije Znanosti Umetnosti), Fond Jugoslovenskog odbora, Zagreb, fasc. 17, doc. No. 1]. 119 ore . Stankovi, Nikola Pai i jugoslovensko pitanje, vol. II, Beograd, 1985, p. 75.
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that the crucial Committee leaders, as Frano Supilo, Ante Trumbi and others, were totally in material independence. In the other words, they were not financially depended on Serbias support what was always stressed by them in the correspondence with Pai. According to Pais opinion, the propaganda work of the Yugoslav Committee was to be concentrated on two the most significant fields: 1) to convince the Entente powers to accept the idea of dissolution of the Dual Monarchy and the creation of the South Slavic state; and 2) to work on the annulment of the Treaty of London, as well as to present the Bulgarian territorial aspirations to the Entente powers. That these two points really have been of the extreme importance with respect to the unification one can see from the following facts. Even in 1918 David Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson were in the opinion that for AustriaHungary can be the good solution to introduce autonomous status for subordinated nations within the Monarchy. In addition, it was known that the Habsburgs had the several plans to create Yugoslavia within the Monarchy. The British government during the whole war was trying to find a way to fulfil the London Pact; in the other words to accomplish the Italian justified supremacy in the Adriatic Sea.120 Finally, at the same time when the Entente powers made a great deal with Italy, they were forcing Serbia to cede a certain portions of Macedonia to Bulgaria in return for the Bulgarian participation in the war on the Entente side. What concerns the post-war destiny of the Balkan Peninsula, it has to be noticed that alongside with Italy in the spring of 1915 (MarchApril) France and Britain made a secret agreement and with Russia upon the political re-mapping of this part of Europe. It was done by a number of secret assurances within a scope of the so-called Constantinople Agreement in order to prevent Russia from concluding a separate peace treaty with Germany. Paris and London promised that Constantinople and the Dardanelles would be incorporated into the Russian Empire. A knowleadge of the Agreement, after the Bolsheviks published it in 1918, strengthened Mustafa Kemal Atatrks (18811938) determination to regain Constantinople for the new Republic of Turkey.
120 Wickham Steed in The Times, March 31st , 1916.
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The map of internal administrative division of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia into nine multi-ethnic banovinas from 1929
The Great coat of arms of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes composed by national amblms of all three recognised nations
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FOURTH CHAPTER: DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE YUGOSLAV COMMITTEE AND THE ROYAL SERBIAN GOVERNMENT UPON THE INTERNAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION OF THE NEW STATE AND THE CORFU DECLARATION
With regards to the issue about relations between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee concerning the creation of a single South Slavic state, a disagreement between them over the internal governmental organisation of the new state was the most important problem. As a final settlement, respecting this issue, the Corfu Declaration, signed in July 1917, became the principal document in relation to the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. There were three crucial questions upon the establishment of the new state debated between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government (and separately among the Committees members): 1) the question concerning the internal organisation of the state; 2) the question with regards to the process of unification; and 3) the question upon the name for the new state. First of them was the most important problem which had to be resolved between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee before an official proclamation of the state. This problem was solved in different ways by two declarations: the Corfu Declaration and the Geneva Declaration. However, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed in 1918 according to the agreement reached by the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee at Corfu, but not by the Serbian government, the Yugoslav Committee and the National Council in the next year in Geneva. On the one hand, the Yugoslav Committee wanted to resolve the question of internal state organisation before the end of the war; what means before the official proclamation of the new state. On the other hand, the Serbian government was in the opinion that resolving this question exactly
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during the war would be very harmful for the process of unification; what means that solving the problem of the internal state organisation should be done after the war.121 The question of an official name of the new state had historic and national significance to the both sides. Basically, there were two options (regardless on the internal state organisation): Yugoslavia or the State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The attitude of the Serbian government, in fact of its Prime Minister, was in favour of the second option because two reasons. Firstly, Pai wanted to preserve and incorporate the Serbian national name into the name of the state, for the very reason that the Serbs already had their own national state (named after their ethnic name), and for the reason that and Slovenes and Croats, alongside with the Serbs, would better protect their ethnic identities. Pai had as well a strong reservation to the terms Yugoslavia and Yugoslavs because the AustroHungarian propaganda connected both of them with the ideology of the Greater Serbia and the Serbian chauvinism.122 For Pai (and in fact), the name of Yugoslavia was artificial, created by the Austrian government and referred only to the South Slavic population within the borders of the Habsburg Monarchy. Moreover, he believed that Serbia and the Serbs deserved to preserve their own national name by its inclusion into the name of a common South Slavic state taking into consideration the Serbian national awareness, history, its political role in the process of unification, and the Serbian sacrifices during the war. Generally, the Yugoslav Committee insisted on the national unionism, but on the other hand, the Serbian government insisted on the national pluralism. A final agreement between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Royal Government with regards to the state name was that the new state would be named as the national state of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Thus, the name of the new state was agreed according to the theses that the Yugoslavs are the three-names nation. In effect, both sides recognised only three
121 Pais instructions sent to the Serbian ambassador in London, Historijski zbornik, Zagreb, 1965, pp. 215218. 122 Branko Petranovi, Istorija Jugoslavije 19181988, vol. I, Beograd, 1988, p. 17. Croatian historian Dragutin Pavlievi claims that all Serbias governments during the last hundred years (with the Pais war government on the first place) had for the ultimate national goal a creation of a Greater Serbia [Dragutin Pavlievi, Povijest Hrvatske. Drugo, izmijenjeno i proireno izdanje, Zagreb, 2000, p. 307]. The same approach is shared by his colleague Ivo Peri [Ivo Peri, Povijest Hrvata, Zagreb, 1997, pp. 209232].
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Yugoslav ethnic groups as nations (Slovenes, Croats and Serbs) whose ethnic (national) names became parts of offical state name.123 The crucial question, which should be resolved in appropriate way between Serbia and the Yugoslav Committee, before an official proclamation of the new state, was the question of the internal organisation of the new state. There were several members of the Yugoslav Committee who carried out strong policy of regionalism in their public work that also influenced their attitudes toward the question about the internal organisation of the new state. This fact can be understood if we know that the most significant leaders of the Yugoslav Committee were the Croats from Dalmatia, the land that was under a direct threat from the Italian territorial aspirations. Finally, the historical rights of Croatia (the Triune Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia), the country traditionally with a special (autonomous) status within both Hungary (from 1102 to 1526) and the Habsburg Monarchy (from 1527 to 1918), influenced them as well as. Frano Supilo was among all members of the Committee the strongest supporter of the idea that Croatia should have a special autonomous status within the new state. On the other hand, he was in a strong opinion that the Yugoslav state should be organised as a federal or confederate state. In contrast to the Serbian Prime Minister, who was a strong supporter of the centralist internal organisation of the new state stressing that any kind of the inner (con)federal arrangement would finally lead to destabilisation of the state structure,124 Supilo was a main leader and supporter of federalism. Really, his attitude towards the internal organisation of the state was anticipated by historical provincialism that he used as a basis for the creation of the following five federal units within the new state: 1) Serbia with Macedonia and Vojvodina; 2) Croatia with Slavonia and Dalmatia; 3) Slovenia; 4) Bosnia and Herzegovina; and 5) Montenegro. Consequently, Yugoslavia would have inner state organisation similar to AustriaHungary after the Aussgleich
123 Such attitude towards the national identity was adopted during the whole period of the inter-war Yugoslavia in which only the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs have been recognised as separate ethnic identities among the Yugoslav South Slavic. The newly formed the South Slavic nations (after 1945) the Montenegrins, Macedonians and Muslims have been treated as the Serbs before 1945. The state cultural policy between 1918 and 1941 was put within such identity frame (see [Ljubodrag Dimi, Kulturna politika u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 19181941, IIII, Beograd, 1997]). 124 Beleke sa sednice Krfske konferencije, Novi ivot, vol. IV, Beograd, 1921, June 5th, 1917.
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(settlement between Austrians and Hungarians) in 1867, with the leading role in Yugoslav politics played by the Serbs and Croats. A difference between F. Supilos and J. B. Titos arrangement of the inner administrative structure of the country was that the Communist leader (of the Croat and Slovene Roman Catholic origin) created the sixth federal unit Macedonia, according to the general attitude concerning the national identities at the Balkans by the Commintern.125 The most significant idea, and at the same time a requirement, by the Yugoslav Committee in connection to the internal organisation of the new state was that a new state should be organised as a republic but not as a monarchy; an attitude supported by the Serbian government. Pai particularly was insisting that the new state would have a form of monarchy with the Serb Karaorevi dynasty on a head of the state. The question of monarchy or republic was the crucial issue of the disputes during the negotiations between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government before and during the Corfu Conference. The third crucial question in relations between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government, which was debated among them during the war, was in connection with the process (the way) of unification. This question became urgent after the second half of 1915, and was one of the most important problems concerning the creation of the new state until its official proclamation on December 1st, 1918. The general attitude towards the problem of the way of unification by the Yugoslav Committee was that the Kingdom of Serbia, Kingdom of Montenegro and the lands populated by the South Slavs in AustriaHungary should be three equal subjects from a political-territorial point of view with regards to the unification. The Committees members have been in opinion that the Serbian government was a representative institution of the Kingdom of Serbia likewise the Montenegrin government in exile represented the Kingdom of Montenegro, and finally, that the Yugoslav Committee is a representative of all lands populated by all South Slavs in Austria Hungary including and those of the Serbian nationality (who have been in majority among all the South Slavs living in Austria
125 See [Jasper Ridley, Tito. Biografija, Zagreb, 2000].
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Hungary). These three (or two in the case of Montenegrin unification with Serbia) representative institutions should be an equal, in legal terms, during the process of unification; a fact which should be legally realised by an agreement signed between the Serbian government, the Montenegrin government (but in the case of Montenegrin unification with Serbia only by the Serbian government as a representative of united Serbia and Montenegro) and the Yugoslav Committee. However, from Serbias point of view, the main lack of such Committees approach was a fact that either the Committee or the Montenegrin Royal Government in exile (in Rome) did not have a single soldier of their own to fight for the unification in comparison with Serbias 150.000 soldiers at Salonika Front. In the other words, the Committee required an equal political position of all three mentioned subjects in the unification process but only one of them Serbia had to spill over the blood of its soldiers (and civilians in occupied Serbia). Anyway, the pivotal Serbias argument for the leading role of Serbia in the process of the unification was the fact that an alternative sulution of the Greater Serbia instead of Yugoslavia was still alive as it was supported, even and after the London Agreement of 1915, by the Russian Empire (until the February/March Revolution of 1917). The Serbian side even succeeded finally to beat back the Croatian requirement of the federal type of Yugoslavia by nominally accepting this idea during the negotiations but only under the condition that a great/united Serbian federal unit within Yugoslavia would be created, what means that the Croatian federal-territorial division is going to be composed by only one-third of the required lands by the Croats, who at any case have been well informed that Italy is willing to make an deal with Serbia concerning the territorial division of Dalmatia between Rome and Belgrade. The Committees standpoint towards the question connected with the process of unification had as the crucial aim to protect the Croatian national interest, as well as the interests of Croatia as a historical land with an autonomous rights. Frano Supilo was the most important defender of the Croatian national interests, with regards to the process of union. His main political conception was a unity of the Croats, or as he was saying the western part of our people (i.e. the South Slavs), what means that all South Slavic lands eastward from the Alps and westward from the Drina River have to be the parts of Croatia. For that reason Supilo requested a plebiscite about
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unification with Serbia and Montenegro not only in Croatia but in all AustroHungarian Yugoslav provinces for particular and political reasons.126 Supilo was sure that only Baka and the southern Banat would opt for Serbia, while the rest of the Yugoslav lands within the Dual Monarchy (Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Slavonia, Istria, Dalmatia) would choose Croatia. The Yugoslav Committee, in contrast to the Serbian Royal Government, launched the issue of a plebiscite as one of the most legitimate, justifiable and proper ways for unification of the South Slavs into a common state. This meant that the Yugoslav people had to be asked to decide upon their own fate.127 For Frano Supilo, an agreement about Croatian confederate status within the future common state with Serbia and Montenegro was a starting point for the making of Yugoslavia. He divided political subjects concerning the unification on two parts: 1) Croatia and 2) Serbia with Montenegro. According to him, Croatia had a leading political role among the Austro-Hungarian South Slavs, while Serbia had the same role among the Yugoslavs outside the Monarchy. His demand, which became as well as the main demand by the most of the committee's members, was that union had to be accomplished on the equal level between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee, because any other way would be a domination of SerboOrthodox exclusivity.128 The president of the Yugoslav Committee, Dr. Ante Trumbi, summarised the whole issue of the process (the way) of unification into two points: the unification could be realised either with a liberation of the Yugoslav lands in Austria-Hungary and their incorporation into Serbia, or it could be done with the union of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on the equal level. The Yugoslav Committee chose the second option. However, in both options the South Slavic lands within Austria-Hungary had to be liberated by great help of Serbian army. The standpoint towards the way of union of the Serbian government was different to committee's one. The Serbian
126 Dragovan epi, Italija, saveznici i jugoslovensko pitanje 19141918, Zagreb, 1970, pp. 141142, 170171; Dr. Nikola Stojanovi, Jugoslovenski Odbor. lanci i Dokumenti, Zagreb, 1927, pp. 15, 43. Supilo was also in a strong opinion that Serbia required Croatian and Slovenian territories as a compensation for its lost territories occupied by Bulgaria in 1915 (Macedonia, part of Kosovo and eastern Serbia). 127 H. Hanak, The Government, the Foreign office and Austria-Hungary 19141918, New York, 1979, pp. 165166. 128 Dragovan epic, Italija, saveznici i jugoslovensko pitanje 19141918, Zagreb, 1970, pp. 106107.
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government never officially recognised the Yugoslav Committee as a representative institution of the South Slavs within Austria-Hungary. This meant, the Serbian government played a role of representative institution of the whole South Slavic population before the Entente states. Moreover, especially for Pai, the Yugoslav Committee was not on the equal level with the Serbian government during the process of unification. The crucial request by the main members of the committee that a plebiscite about the unification and state inner organisation had to be organized was decisively rejected by the Serbian government likewise the internal federalist state organisation favoured by the committee. Particularly, Supilos idea of federal Croat province within Yugoslavia was never accepted by Pai who always was in the opinion that such a Croatia would be constantly a corpus separatum and a state within the state. All in all, the crucial aspect of Pai's attitude toward the question of the process of union was that Serbian politicians should be natural representatives of the whole South Slavic population before the Entente powers until the Peace Conference. He justified this requirement by three facts: 1) Serbia had a legally composed government, 2) Serbia was an internationally recognised state, and 3) Serbia was a member of the Entente block. The attitude of the Serbian government was that if Yugoslavia was to be created, territorial borders had to be clearly defined between Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia.129 This meant, Pai wanted firstly to unify all Serbian lands and people within one political unit and after that to unify such territory with other Yugoslav lands into common state. It is likely that, the Serbian government was not against the federal organisation of the new state. However, for the Serbian government it was unacceptable that if Yugoslavia was to be federation, the Serbian population would be divided into several federal units. In other words, only federal Yugoslavia with three federal units was possible: Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. The Serbian federal unit had to embrace all Serbian people and lands. 130 Nevertheless, at the Corfu Conference the federal organisation based
129 Serbian government had during the whole war much clear picture about the borders of united Serbia towards the Hungarians than towards the Croats. Thus, new Serbian-Hungarian post-war border should run northern from the line of Timisoara-Subotica-Maros-Baja-Pecs [Danilo Kalafatovi, Naa primirja u 1918, Srpski knjievni glasnik, vol. X, 7, 1. XII 1923, pp. 511525]. 130 Dragoljub ivojinovi, Dnevnik admirala Ernesta Trubrida, Beograd, 1989, p. 143.
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on this principle was given up, taking into account the fact that "... when we started to make borders we understood that it was impossible", as Pai explained to the Yugoslav parliament in 1923.131 Even Trumbi understood that in the case of the federal organisation of the new state on the national basis, a Greater Serbia (composed by all Serbs and Serbian lands) would dominate the country, which was finally the crucial reason for him to reject the federal project of Yugoslavia during the Corfu Conference and later. Many Yugoslav politicians agreed that all differences and disputes between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee, in relation to the unification of the South Slavs, should be finally resolved at one common conference by direct negotiations between them. The idea concerning organisation of such a conference was launched in May 1917 by the Serbian Prime Minister when, actually, the Committees President Ante Trumbi was invited by him to come to the Corfu island (where the Serbian government exiled after occupation of Serbia in autumn 1915), with other four members of the Committee in order to make a bilateral agreement upon the most urgent problems concerning the establishment of the new state. In fact, Pai by his decision to negotiate with the Yugoslav Committee recognised the Committee as a legal, as well as and an equal political subject and negotiator, in the process of the unification alongside with the Serbian government. Subsequently, Pai disclaimed the exclusive rights of the Serbian government to be the only representative institution of the whole South Slavic population (except the Bulgarians) before the Entente states, that was required by the Serbias Prime Minister from the very beginning of the war. The crucial question now became: why did the Serbian government change its attitude towards the role and function of the Yugoslav Committee and decided to negotiate with it, recognising the Yugoslav Committee as one of the competitive sides with the Serbian government in connection to the process of the Yugoslav unification? There are three most significant reasons which influenced both sides to negotiate to each other and to reach a common settlement concerning the unification at the Corfu Conference in June and July 1917: 1) the Russian February (March) Revolution; 2) a real possibilities for the preservation of AustriaHungary; and 3) the
131 Spomenica Nikole Paia 18451926, Beograd, 1926, p. 110.
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Italian diplomatic and military campaign in Albania and Epirus. While the first two of them are explained in the Yugoslav historiography, the third one is a new contribution to the solving of the problem of the Yugoslav unification in 1918. What it has to be noticed is that Pai did not envisage the creation of Yugoslavia as the best solution for resolving the Serbian Question. That was the reason why he found the crucial support by the Russian Empire to create a Greater, i.e. unified Serbia, instead of Yugoslavia.132 According to his opinion, the Serbs should create their own single national state in which the whole Serbian population would be included. Actually, the concept of a Greater Serbia was firstly promoted in Pais war aims of Serbia. The creation of a common South Slavic state was only a second option for him in the case that the first one could not be realised for some reason. He genuinely supported a Greater Serbia, instead of Yugoslavia, until the spring of 1917 when he decided to negotiate with the Yugoslav Committee upon Yugoslavia. This meant that he in fact rejected the establishment of a Greater Serbia and accepted the creation of Yugoslavia. The most significant reason for his changed disposition towards resolving of the Serbian Question was the Russian March Revolution (the new style) after which the idea of a Greater Serbia was gone with the wind forever. It became clear when the new, Temporary Russian government (led by Aleksandar F. Kerenski, 18811970), declared on March 24th, 1917 that Russia was interested in the creation of Yugoslavia in the Balkans, as a barrier against Germany, but not united Serbia. That the new Russian government will not give a support for the creation of a Greater Serbia became obvious even a day earlier when Kerenskis government issued an official proclamation of Russias war aims on March 23rd, 1917 supporting total Yugoslav unification, but not creation of the only
132 The general attitude of the Croatian nationalistic historiography is that Belgrade was carried on an antiCroat politics during the whole period of the modern history for the sake to establish the Serbian Orthodox dominance over the region and to exploit both the Roman-Catholic and Muslim Croats (ex. [Jere Jareb, Pola stoljea hrvatske politike, 18951945, Zagreb, 1995]). However, contrary to the idea of a Greater Serbia the Croatian dream during the last two centuries was nothing else than a creation of a Greater Croatia [Milan Marjanovi, Hrvatski Pokret. Opaanja i misli na pragu novoga narodnoga preporoda g. 1903, Dubrovnik, 1903, I, p. 48.]. According to the Russian Minister of the Foreign affairs, Sazonov, the Russian diplomacy saw a creation of the SerboCroatianSlovenian state as a political and military counterbalance against Italy, Hungary and Romania. However, Russia was aware that multi-confessional Yugoslavia would not survive for the longer period of time.
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united Serbian lands and people.133 Clearly, the Serbian Prime Minister had to modify his plan according to the new European political situation.134 Therefore, the convocation of the Corfu Conference resulted from a newly established relations in the international balance of powers made by the Russian March Revolution. Contrary to Kerenskis government in Russia, the Tsarist Russia favoured creation of a Greater Serbia but not Yugoslavia. The Tsarist Russian authorities were afraid that the Catholic-Orthodox Yugoslavia would have looser ties with Russia than only Orthodox Greater Serbia.135 The possibility for preservation of AustriaHungary was the second reason for convocation the Corfu Conference. This possibility had two features in the spring of 1917. The first of them was the May Declaration, or the Viennese Declaration, signed by 33 members of the Yugoslav Club on May 30th, 1917 in Vienna. They were the South Slavic deputies (the Roman Catholic Slovenes and Croats) from the Austrian part of the Monarchy (the so-called Cisleithania) in the Imperial Council in Vienna. They demanded the creation of a single
133 Ante Mandi, Fragmenti za historiju ujedinjenja, Zagreb, 1956, p. 77; Miodrag Zeevi, Jugoslavija 19181992. Junoslovenski dravni san i java, Beograd, 1994, p. 32. 134 Jugoslovenski Odbor u Londonu, Zagreb, 1966, p. 173; Archives of Serbia, Beograd, Ministarstvo Inostranih Poslova, Politiko Odeljenje, 1917, IX/98, Pais note March, 30th, 1917. The Serbian government knew that the new Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miljukov, favoured the Bulgarian territorial aspirations during the Balkan Wars 19121913. With the Bolshevik taking power in Russia all Serbias hopes into Russian support upon creation of a united and Greater Serbia instead of Yugoslavia were finally over particularly when the Bolshevik Russia signed the peace treaty with Germany in BrestLitovsk on March 3rd, 1918. Pai tried unsuccesfuly to attract the Bolshevik government for the Serbian policy through Leon Trotsky (18791940) who was living in Serbia during the Balkan Wars 19121913 as the war correspondent (see his book [Leon Trotsky, The Balkan Wars, 19121913. The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky, New York, 1993]). An espetially it was important for Pai to get the Bolshevik support for incorporation of the pure Serbian lands of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Kingdom of Serbia [Archives of Serbia, Beograd, Ministarstvo Inostranih Poslova, Politiko Odeljenje, 1917]. L. Trotsky at that moment supported the Serbian fight to liberate their country and the people and publicly revealed the text of the Treaty of London with Italy signed in 1915 from the Russian Imperial Archive [Archives of Serbia, Beograd, Ministarstvo Inostranih Poslova, Politiko Odeljenje, 1917, IX/194, Petrograd, December 17th, 1917]. The Bolshevik and later on the Soviet animosity towards the monarchical and bourgeois Serbia rooted in four reasons. Firstly, because Serbias ambassador to Russia, M. Spalajkovi, expectorated Vladimir I. Lenin to his face publicly during the reception for the foreign diplomats when he heard that the Bolsheviks executed whole imperial family in Ekaterinburg [Knez Grigorije Nikolajevi Trubecki, Rat na Balkanu 19141917 i ruska diplomatija, Beograd, 1994, p. 145]. Secondly, because 1200 Serbian soldiers participated in the western military intervention against the Bolsheviks 19191921. Thirdly, because 10.000 Russian emigrants after the civil war 19171921 in Russia exiled in Yugoslavia. Fourthly, because Karl Marx put a black label on the Serbs as they were fighting on the side of the Habsburg reaction against the Hungarians during the Revolution 18481849. 135 Slobodan Jovanovi, Moji savremenici, Beograd, 1935, p. 175179.
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South Slavic state (or autonomous province) under the sceptre of the Habsburg dynasty.136 The essence of the Declaration was an idea that instead of the dual internal organisation of the Monarchy (according to the Aussgleich signed in 1867 between Austrian and Hungarian political representatives) a tripartite formula of the internal political-administrative state organisation of the Danube Monarchy was launched. According to this idea, the third federal unit, alongside with Austria and Hungary, should be that of the South Slavs, but based on the principle of the Croatian state rights. A revival of the ideas to reorganise inner structure of AustriaHungary was giving the possibility for its survival as a state after the war. The May Declaration was based on two principles: 1) the right of the nations to the self-determination; and 2) the Croatian historical (state) rights.137 The Declaration was issued at the time when also the Czechs, Ukrainians and Poles issued the same requirements with respect to the re-organisation of AustriaHungary. An another encouragement for the AustroHungarian survival in the post-war period emerged after diplomatic mission of Sixte de Bourbon who was the brother-in-law of the last AustroHungarian emperor/king. Certainly, he proposed to the Entente states a separate peace treaty with the Monarchy, without great territorial losses for it. Consequently, a convocation and decisions of the Corfu Conference were political answer of Serbia and the South Slavic emigrants from the Dual Monarchy to the possibility either for preservation of AustriaHungary or for its inner re-organisation on a three-federal states basis.
136 Ferdo ii, Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (19141918), Zagreb, 1920, p. 94. The deputies have been coming from Istria, Slovenia and Dalmatia. The Declaration repeated old Croatian-Slovenian requirements for the political-administrative transformation of the Monarchy from the two- to the three-federal system of states. The South Slavic federal unit would be composed by Slovenia, Croatia, Slavonia, Istria, Dubrovnik, Vojvodina and Bosnia & Herzegovina. At such a way it would be established Yugoslavia but within the sceptre of the Habsburgs. However, no one single political authority either in Austria or Hungary supported such idea. The Yugoslav Club even sent the Memorandum with an appeal to the Brest-Litovsk peace conference but without the results [Janko Prunk, Kratka zgodovina Slovenije, Ljubljana, 2002, p. 8687]. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was concluded between Germany, AustriaHungary and the Bolshevik Russia. It was the first peace treaty of the WWI according to which Russia lost Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, west Belorussia (Belarus), Poland, Ukraine and parts of the Caucasus. Russia lost almost half of her European territories with 75% of its heavy industries. The Treaty in the name of Russia was signed by Leon Trotsky as the Minister for External Affairs [Jan Palmowski, A Dictionary of Contemporary World History from 1900 to the present day, Oxford, 2004, New York, p. 82, 645]. 137 Ljubo Boban, Hrvatske granice od 1918 do 1993, Zagreb, 1993.
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The Italian diplomatic and military campaign in Albania and Epirus in the spring of 1917 was the third reason for convocation of the Corfu Conference, which resulted in signing of the Corfu Pact. At that time, both the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee were under the menace by the Italian territorial aspirations in the western Balkans. As it was noticed earlier, the Yugoslav Committee was established in 1915 in order to protect one part of the Yugoslav lands from the Italian territorial demands. However, at that time territory of the Serbian Kingdom was not in a danger either from the Italian territorial aspirations or the Italian diplomatic and military influence in the central-southern Balkans. That was one of the reasons why the Serbian government was not in a hurry to make a final agreement concerning the creation of Yugoslavia with the Yugoslav Committee. Nevertheless, in the spring of 1917, alongside with the Yugoslav Committee, the Royal Serbian Government was as well as under strong Italian threat because the Italian diplomatic and military activities in Albania and Epirus the territories in the neighbourhood of the Kingdom of Serbia the Kingdom which was not existed de facto as a state after the autumn of 1915. This meant that the state territory and the borders of Serbia were in a question for the time after the war. The first statement about the Italian political activities in Albania and Epirus, as a threat for Serbia, was sent to the Serbian Heir of the throne, Prince-Regent Aleksandar Karaorevi, by the Serbian vice-consul in Salonika, Nikola Jovanovi, on March 3rd, 1917. According to him, the Italian plan was to unify Albania according to the Albanian claims on ethnic rights. At that moment some Albanian ethnic lands (claimed by the Albanian propaganda to be only Albanian) have been under the Italian military occupation, and under political protectorate of Rome. In fact, according to the report, a newly post-war Albania was to be a Greater Albania, enlarged at least with Kosovo and Metohia and the western Macedonia (and most probably with the Greek Southern Epirus); the territories included into Serbia and Montenegro after the Balkan Wars 19121913. The Serbian consul thought that Italy was making a Greater Albania as the basis for the Italian political-economic postwar influence at the area of the southern Balkans (basically as the Italian colony as a substitution for the lost Ethiopia in 1896). The Serbian authorities have been in a strong opinion that a Greater Albania under the Italian protectorate would be a totally hostile
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towards Serbia. In addition, and in connection, to the question of the post-war Albania, the north-western Greek province of the southern Epirus was for the Italians only the question of the Great Powers, but not the question of Greece.138 Only five days later, Nikola Pai sent a telegram to the Heir of the throne with information that one Italian general gave an anti-Serbian speech in Albanian town of Argirocastro criticising Esad-Pashas pro-Serbian policy.139 At that moment EsadPasha was only Albanian leader who co-operated with the Serbian government among all Albanian political leaders. The Serbian ambassador in Athens, ivojin Balugdi, informed the Serbian government on April 8th, 1917 that an agreement upon Albania between Italy and France was made in Paris. According to this agreement, Italy would get territorial concessions in the southern Albania and Epirus in return for the Italian support of the Entente policy towards Greece.140 That Italy was making a serious threat for Serbia in relation to Albania and Epirus in the first half of 1917 was finally approved on June 3rd, 1917 when the Italian general Ferraro, under instructions given by his government, proclaimed the Italian protectorate over Albania. According to Pais circular note sent to France, Great Brittany, Russia and the U.S.A., this proclamation was against the axioms adopted by the Entente states that this war was fought against the German imperialism and militarism for the principle of the selfdetermination of the nations. The Serbian Prime Minister on the same place proclaimed an axiom the Balkans for the Balkan peoples, as a principle under which the Albanian state was created at the London Conference of Ambassadors 19121913. Pai noticed that this Italian proclamation was against the vital interests of the Serbian people for their future, but also and against the vital interests of the Serbian state.141 In fact, Pai was afraid that Italy could at least close the Serbian exit to the sea via the Morava-Vardar valley. At the end of June 1917 Pai confirmed that Italy was working against Esad-Pasha, Serbia and Greece by making two Albanian
138 Archives of Yugoslavia, Beograd, Kancelarija Nj. V. Kralja, F-2. 139 Archives of Yugoslavia, Beograd, Zbirka Jovana Jovanovia Piona, 80-9-44. Esad-Pasha was an Albanian feudal lord and politician who sided on the Serbian side during the WWI. 140 Archives of Yugoslavia, Beograd, Kancelarija Nj. V. Kralja, F-2. 141 Archives of Serbia, MID KS, Beograd, Department of Policy, Naa nota povodom proklamacije talijanskog protektorata nad Albanijom Nikola Pai, p. 182, May 30th, 1917 (old style).
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governments the northern and the southern ones.142 Finally, for the Serbian government was totally clear that the Italian diplomacy was working against the interests of the South Slavs in July 1917, what was again confirmed in December 1917. Taking into account the information given by the Serbian ambassador in London, Jovan M. Jovanovi, to the Heir of the throne, only Italy was against the South Slavic unification among all Entente members. The Italians had three crucial principles of their Balkan policy: 1) Sacro egoismo Italiano; 2) not to allow a total dismemberment of Austria under the principle of the self-determination of the nations; and 3) not to allow a creation of a single South Slavic state.143 According to the information given by Jovan M. Jovanovi from December 1917, the Italian politicians around the Italian Premier Vittorio Emanuele Orlando (18601952) in the Italian government wanted to achieve Dalmatia for Italy, to create a small Serbia, and to thwart the South Slavic unification. This Orlandos political orientation was the pro-Germanic and naturally the anti-Serbian.144 The Italian territorial aspirations as well as its diplomatic and military threat in the Balkan Peninsula was for the both Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee one of the most important reasons to convoke the Corfu Conference. Both of them wanted to make publicly known that one single and vigorous South Slavic state would be created on the central and western parts of the Balkans which could defend itself from the Italian pressure. Consequently, the Yugoslav Committee would preserve the South Slavic Adriatic littoral, while the Serbian government would be in position to preserve the South Slavic continental territories at the south (the western Macedonia and Kosovo & Metohia). It is interesting to notice that the Island of Corfu, as a conference meeting place, was located just between Albania and Epirus two territories under a strongest Italian political-military pressure at that time.145
142 Archives of Yugoslavia, Beograd, Zbirka Jovana Jovanovia Piona, 80-9-44. 143 Archives of Yugoslavia, Beograd, Kancelarija Nj. V. Kralja, F-2. 144 ibid. 145 According to Ante Trumbi, there were four reasons to convoke the Corfu Conference: 1) a new international atmosphere made by the American joining the war and the Russian March Revolution; 2) it was impossible under such international situation to support any more the Serbian principles of unification; 3) to give an official program of the unification; and 4) to create a common program with the Serbian
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The most important conference during the process of the South Slavic state integration was held in the Corfu Island from June 15th to July 20th, 1917. The negotiations between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government were done on the basis of a discussion, which was prepared before the Conference by five members of the Close Board.146 The negotiations between the members of the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government were based on two principles: 1) the principle of the national unity of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; and 2) the principle of the self-determination of the peoples. The Corfu Declaration, as a result of this Conference and negotiations, was not a constitution of the new state. It was only the mutual statement and some fundamental principles upon the creation of the Yugoslav state .147 The negotiations started with Pais observation that by the time of the Russian March Revolution both the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee had to try to find a diplomatic support for their common policy in the office of the American President Woodrow Thomas Wilson (18561924, the 28th U.S. President 1913 1921).148 For that reason the Serbian diplomatic mission led by the Serbian ambassador to France, Milenko Vesni, went to Washington in January 1918. However, at that time Wilson in his Fourteen Points Speech given on January 8th, 1918 anticipated preservation of AustriaHungary as a state but reformed according to the principle of national right to self-determination. In fact, the Monarchy would be re-constructed concerning its inner administrative organisation according to the federal system of the autonomous national territories. One of its federal units would be and the South Slavic one with Zagreb as its political centre. The real reason of the American and later on the British and the French intentions to preserve a territorial integrity of the Danube Monarchy was that reformed AustriaHungary could play a decisive role of the Central European bulwark against the Bolshevik Russia. However, for Serbia, Wilson anticipated its state recovering within the borders which Serbia had
government in regard to the territorial unification and the internal state organisation [Ante Trumbi, Nekoliko rijei o Krfskoj deklaraciji, Bulletin Yougoslave, November 1st, 1917, No. 26]. 146 This draft was under the title: Provisional state until the constitutional organisation. 147 Dragoslav Jankovi, Jugoslovensko pitanje i Krfska deklaracija 1917, Beograd, 1967, pp. 228229. 148 Beleke sa Krfske konferencije, Novi ivot, vol. IV, Beograd, 1921.
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before the WWI (but without a territorial enlargement). At any case, such solution did not satisfy either the Yugoslavs in the Yugoslav Committee or the Serbs in the Serbian government what was pointed out by Milenko Vesni in the U.S. Congress immediately after Wilsons speech. Consequently, the first critique of Wilsons Forteen Points Speech came from a Serbian diplomat.149 It became obvious for both the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government that after the Russian March Revolution, and Wilsons Fourteen Points Speech in the U.S. Congress in January 1918 as well as, they have to work closer and to find a political compromise about resolving the South Slavic Question. Firstly, both sides understood that they have to negotiate with each other. Secondly, they became aware that they have to issue an official common statement about their bilateral agreement upon the creation of a common Yugoslav state as the best way to make a positive influence on the international public opinion. As a result of such international circumstances both sides tried to find a compromise on the Corfu Conference by the means of negotiation. During the negotiations both sides recognised de facto each other as the authorised representatives of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. This meant that they gave to themselves a right to negotiate in the name of all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (the Macedonians, Montenegrins and Bosnian Muslims are not still at that time recognised as the separate national identities as it was done from 1945 in the Communist Yugoslavia led by the Roman Catholic Slovene-Croat leader J. B. Tito). The main task of the Declaration was to protect all of these nations from every foreign domination by a creation of their own single national state. The Yugoslav unity, achieved during the Corfu Conference by signing the Corfu Pact, got its formal expression in the form of a formation at the Salonika Front of special military the Yugoslav Division. It was composed by the South Slavic volunteers and the prisoners of war from the AustroHungarian army (the
149 Milorad Zeevi and Miladin Miloevi, Diplomatska prepiska srpske vlade 1917 (Dokumenti), Beograd, w.y., pp. 149163. After the speech the U.S. President Wilson sent a letter to the Serbian Regent in which he supported the struggle of small nations for their legitimate rights [Archive of Yugoslavia, Beograd, Royal cabinet (Kabinet kralja), Wilsons letter to Aleksandar I, White House, January 21st, 1918].
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overwhelming majority of the Divisions soldiers have been the Serbs). There were several conclusions in the Declaration with regards to the internal organisation of the state. First of all, the new state would be a constitutional, democratic and parliamentary monarchy, led by the Karaorevi dynasty. At that moment the question connected with the crown (i.e, monarchy or republic) was resolved in favour of Serbias demand, as the republican form of the state, required by the Yugoslav Committee, was not accepted. Second of all, the local autonomies were guaranteed, based on the natural, social and economic principles, but not based on the historical or ethnic ones. The last two principles have not been taken into consideration in order to minimize a possibility for the internal struggles and final dismemberment of the country. Third of all, the Constituent Assembly would vote a constitution with a numerically qualified majority of the voting body.150 However, during the Corfu negotiations the Serbian Prime Minister proposed that the qualified majority should be composed by the three-fifths of the parliamentary deputies, but the President of the Yugoslav Committee did not accept thus unclear proposal.151 Trumbi wrote in the autumn of 1917 that the Constituent Assembly itself should make a decision concerning the nature of the qualified majority which has to accept (vote) the state constitution.152 Anyway, the Declaration (, a document written in Cyrillic), in a form in which it was publicly announced, was a great political victory of the Serbian government as it succeeded to impose its the most significant demand the monarchical type of the state with the Serbian dynasty on a head of it.153 However, the representatives of te Yugoslav Committee succeeded that Pais requirement that the Yugoslav monarch has unconditionally to be of
150 Aleks Dragni, Srbija, Nikola Pai i Jugoslavija, Beograd, 1994, p. 168. 151 Slobodan Jovanovi, Ustavno pravo Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, Beograd, 1924, p. 35. 152 Ferdo ii, Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (19141918), Zagreb, 1920, p. 309. The Croatian historiography from the time of an independent Croatia after 1991 is inclined to see in the Declaration a negation of the Croatian statehood and a political act of the Serbian hegemonism over the Croats as Pai did not want unification with, but annexation of, the AustroHungarian South Slavic lands by the Kingdom of Serbia [Dragutin Pavlievi, Povijest Hrvatske. Drugo, izmijenjeno i proireno izdanje, Zagreb, 2000, pp. 309311; Ivo Peri, Povijest Hrvata, Zagreb, 1997, p. 212] 153 ., O , , 1975, pp. 198, 206208.
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the Orthodox faith did not become a part of the Corfu Declaration.154 Pais standpoint in this matter was that a ruler can change the faith, but can not be any more the ruler. Finally this problem was solved by the Regents intervention who supported Trumbis standpoint.155 In addition, there were three possible options in connection with the coronation: 1) the royal crown would be composed as a single one by the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene crowns; 2) a single Yugoslav crown would be created only by the Serbian (Duans) and the Croatian (Tomislavs) crowns; and 3) the Yugoslav king would be crowned firstly by the Serbian and after that by the Croatian crown. While Pai was supporting the first option, Trumbi was defending the another two. The final solution of this ceremonial question was left to be decided by the Constituent Assembly. A proclaimed state name was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, but not Yugoslavia, because the negotiators accepted the idea of the three-names nation, which historically was promoted by the leading Croatian philologist Vatroslav Jagi at the second half of the 19th c.156 A single state-national emblem of the three recognised tribes of the same nation would be composed by the three historical coats of arms of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. By the words of the Declaration, the national designations were allowed to be freely used in the public life, and those three nations would be an equal before the law. Finally, two alphabets, Cyrillic and Latin would have the same legal rank, as well as it was the case with the three recognised creeds: the Orthodox, the Roman Catholic and the Muslim. The legislative institution of the state should be the National Parliament, elected by the universal, direct and a secret suffrage. The same rights before the law were guaranteed for all citizens of the
154 Pai explained this requirement by two points: 1) it was in accordance to Serbias Constitution; and 2) the Orthodox faith was the most national among the South Slavs (i.e., the begist part of the Yugoslavs have been the Orthodox Christians). Contrary to him, Trumbis arguments were that: 1) in the new state all denominations would be equal; and 2) the Catholic faith among the Slovenes and the Croats was also a national as those peoples sincerely confessed it. Trumbi, as well as, was against Pais demand that a prozelitism of the Catholic Church would be officially prohibited. 155 Beleke sa Krfske konferencije, Novi ivot, vol. IV, Beograd, 1921; Dragoslav Jankovi, Jugoslovensko pitanje i Krfska deklaracija 1917, Beograd, 1967, pp. 253254. 156 Petar Milosavljevi, Srpski filoloki program, Beograd, 2000, p. 213221.
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state. However, the crucial problems in relation to the internal state organisation have not been solved by the Corfu Declaration. They were left to be finally solved for the time after the war, by the Constituent Assembly, which should be elected by the universal suffrage. Nevertheless, all assemblys decisions should get the royal sanction in order to be verified. This meant that the monarch had the right of the veto. Obviously, for the both sides, the most urgent aim was to issue a common declaration concerning the creation of a single united South Slavic state, in order to try to protect the Yugoslav lands from the Italian territorial aspirations. In this case, some of the most significant questions with regards to the internal state organisation could wait to be resolved after the war and especially during the Peace Conference when the state borders would be finally established. That the Italian pressure was a real one, and probably the most important reason for a convocation of the Corfu Conference, can be seen from the text of a telegram sent by Jovan M. Jovanovi to the Heir of the throne, just after the publishing of the Declaration, in which Jovanovi noticed that the time for its issuing was chosen accurately when the Italians came to the conferences convoked in Paris and London.157
The tricolour flag (red-white-dark blue) with the coat of arms of the Triune Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia used from 1848 to 1867
157 Archives of Yugoslavia, Beograd, Kancelarija Nj. V. Kralja, F-2.
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FIFTH CHAPTER: CREATION OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF SLOVENES, CROATS AND SERBS IN ZAGREB AND A PROCLAMATION OF THE STATE OF SLOVENES, CROATS AND SERBS
The foundation of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in the autumn of 1918 marked the beginning of the final phase of the process of creation of almost a single South Slavic state (without the Bulgarians). It has to be said that at that time there were and examples of a requirements for a total South Slavic state unification (with the Bulgarians) as it was the case of the liberal Slovene emigrants in the U.S.A. who issued the Chicago Statement (ikako izjavo) in June 1917 in which they called for a creation of the federative Yugoslav republic of the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and Bulgarians.158 Nonetheless, with the establishment of the National Council the third political factor in the process of the Yugoslav unification emerged on the political scene, alongside with the previous two: the Serbian Royal Government and the Yugoslav Committee. The National Council replaced very soon the political role of the Yugoslav Committee in the process of negotiations with the Serbian government as a representative institution of the South Slavic population within AustriaHungary concerning the final way of the unification. Subsequently, the final step of the South Slavic integration was come true by the agreement reached by the Serbian government and the National Council, but not and by the Yugoslav Committee. That the year of 1918 was a crucial one for resolving the South Slavic Question, as well as for the existence of AustriaHungary as a state, was shown in the summer of the same year when in Ljubljana on August 16th the Slovenian political parties established the National Council (Narodni Svet), as the political representative institution and a government, for Slovenia and Istria after the Emperor Charles I
158 Peter Vodopivec, Od Pohlinove slovnice do samostalne drave. Slovenska zgodovina od konca 18. do konca 20. stoletja, Ljubljana, 2006, p. 157.
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(emperor from 1916 to 1918) rejected on May 25th, 1918 the Slovenian proposal to create united Slovenia within AustriaHungary.159 At the same time, the provincial councils were formed for the area of Trieste, Gorizia, Klagenfurt (Celovec), Styria (Steiermark), Carinthia (Krnten), the Littoral and Marburg (Maribor), as their local representative institutions and governments as parts of the Narodni Svet. The main task of the Council was to work in favour of the South Slavic integration into a single state. In the Communiqu, issued on August 17th, 1918 by the Narodni Svet, it was stressed that the Narodni Svet conceived itself as a part of the common Yugoslav national council, which should be established very soon in Zagreb.160 For the future destiny of the AustroHungarian South Slavs, the establishment of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in Zagreb on October 6th, 1918, as a representative political body of these nations within the Monarchy,161 was a turning point in the process of Yugoslavias creation. The Council was established as a prolongation of the political actions by the South Slavs within the Dual Monarchy, initiated by the establishment of the Narodni Svet. The National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was established on the meetings of the South Slavic politicians from the Dual Monarchy in Zagreb which were held from October 5th, to October 8th, 1918. On that occasion, the Regulations of the Council were issued (October 8th). The first two of them are the crucial ones. According to the first one, the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in Zagreb, is a political representative of all Slovenes, Croats and Serbs who live in Croatia, Slavonia with Rijeka, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Istria, Trieste, Kranjska, Goricka, tajerska, Koruka, Baka, Banat, Baranja, Meumurje and other parts of south-west Hungary.162 The second regulation expressed the Councils desire towards the South Slavic integration: the basic joint programme of the National Council is the following: unification of all Slovenes, Croats and Serbs into the peoples, free and independent state of
159 Janko Prunk, Kratka zgodovina Slovenije, Ljubljana, 2002, p. 8788; Peter Vodopivec, Od Pohlinove slovnice do samostalne drave. Slovenska zgodovina od konca 18. do konca 20. stoletja, Ljubljana, 2006, p. 160. 160 Janko Prunk, Kratka zgodovina Slovenije, Ljubljana, 2002, p. 88. 161 ibid. 162 Sneana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents From its creation to its dissolution, Catholic University Nijmegen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, p. 145.
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Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, based on democratic principles. All questions arising from this basic question will unconditionally be considered as a joint question of the National Council. Besides, the National Council takes decisions on all questions which in the National Council the deputies are consider jointly.163 Obviously, the Council was made up as a representative political institution of all Slovenes, Croats and Serbs from the following lands: Slovenia, Croatia, Fiume (Rijeka), Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Istria, Trieste, Gorizia, Carniola, Carinthia, Styria, Baka, Banat, Baranja and Meumurje. The National Council virtually was envisaged as a representative political institution, actually a government, of the South Slavs from AustriaHungary. The creation of both Narodni Svet and Narodno vijee (National Council) was a final expression of the dissolution of AustriaHungary. This process was unstopped from the summer of 1918, when the Entente states decided not longer to defend a territorial integrity of the Monarchy. Also, at the same time, the U.S. attitude towards AustriaHungary was considerably changed. In the other words, the Entente powers, alongside with the United States, favoured the dissolution of AustriaHungary and the establishment of the national states on the land of the Monarchy.164 That a territorial dismemberment of AustriaHungary was one of the crucial aims of the National Councils political activity can be seen from its political program. According to this program, the unification of all Slovenes, Croats and Serbs into a national, free and independent state of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, established on the democratic principles165 was proclaimed. Thus, the National Council in Zagreb adopted in October 1918 the same political program that was already proclaimed on December 7th, 1914 by the Serbian government in the city of Ni. The National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in Zagreb had as its own political leadership, the Croato-Serbian Coalition, which leader was Svetozar Pribievi, the leading Serbian politician from Croatia. The President of the council was the leading Slovenian
163 ibid. 164 Dragoljub ivojinovi, America, Italy and the birth of Yugoslavia (19171919), Columbia University Press, New York 1972, pp. 148149. 165 Branko Petranovi, Istorija Jugoslavije 19181988, vol. I, Beograd, 1988, p. 20.
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politician, Dr. Anton Koroec. The council had two vice-presidents: the Croat one Dr. Ante Paveli and the Serb one Svetozar Pribievi. Therefore, the political leadership of the Council was made up according to the ethnonational principle. The three Councils secretaries were also mixed in the ethnonational point of view: the Serb Sran Budisavljevi and the Croats Mate Drinkovi and Ivan Lorkovi. In order to preserve the Monarchy, the AustroHungarian Emperor and King, Charles I, issued the Manifesto on October 16th, 1918. The document proclaims re-organisation of the Austrian part of the Monarchy (Cisleithania) on the federal basis, with enlarged local autonomies. This proclamation did not refer to the Hungarian part of the Monarchy (Transleithania) because the Emperor did not have the Hungarian admittance to do it concerning the lands of the crown of St. Stephan (Istvan), i.e. historical Hungary. However, as a reply to the emperors Manifesto, the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in Zagreb required the union of all Slovenes, Croats and Serbs within the whole territory of their ethnographic dispersion, regardless on the current provincial and the state boundaries. It was declared by the Council in a form of an official requirement on October 19th, 1918. In addition, the Declaration required and two particular demands: 1) we demand that at the future international Peace Conference our people will be unitarily represented by its special envoys;166 and 2) accordingly, the National Council refuses to accept the Austrian Imperial Manifesto from the 16th of this month as a basis for settling national question, as well as any other future proposal, which would follow this, and which would partly solve our national question and undermine its international significance.167 Basically, the main Councils demand was in accordance with the Draft (Nacrt) upon the inner organisation of the united Yugoslav lands in the Monarchy issued by the Slovenian Narodni Svet in September 1918. The Draft anticipated three federal units: 1) Slovenia with Istria; 2) Croatia and Slavonia with Vojvodina; and 3) Bosnia & Herzegovina with Dalmatia. In the case of rejection of the Draft by the Emperor (what in reality and happened) the common Yugoslav state would be created with an additional fourth federal unit
166 Sneana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents From its creation to its dissolution, Catholic University Nijmegen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, pp. 146147. 167 ibid.
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of Serbia composed by the pre-war Serbia (with Kosovo, Metochia and the Vardar Macedonia) and Montenegro.168 The following step, which was done by the National Council, was the most significant for on-coming establishment of Yugoslavia. This step was the breaking up the state-legal and national-legal connections between the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia on the one hand, and the Kingdom of Hungary and the Austrian Empire on the other. This historical decision was done by the Croatian Parliament (Sabor) on October 29th, 1918 in Zagreb. This meant that the Croato-Hungarian Compromise, signed in 1868 (Nagodba), was declared null and void, as well as all latter annexes and revisions.169 According to the official proclamation, so that from today onwards Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia neither have legally nor actually any joint national intercourse.170 Nevertheless, at the same time, alongside with discharging relations with both Austria and Hungary, the Croatian Parliament proclaimed an independent state with respect to Hungary and Austria, which was in fact the state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs from AustriaHungary. Also, as it was in the previous case, the legal foundation for the proclamation of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was the basis of the modern peoples principle, as well as the foundation of the unity of the Slovene, Croat and Serb peoples. 171 Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia with Rijeka/Fiume, as an independent state, became the joint peoples sovereign state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs on the entire ethnographic territory of this people, without regard to any territorial or state boundaries.172 This meant that the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was to be transformed soon into a common national state of all Slovenes, Croats and Serbs as the most significant reason for its establishment. According to the Croatian historian Ljubo Boban, it was very important for concern of the Croatian historical rights that all conclusions, declarations, and proclamations issued by the National Council were done before the signed armistice between the Entente
168 Janko Prunk, Kratka zgodovina Slovenije, Ljubljana, 2002, p. 88. 169 ibid., pp. 147148. 170 ibid. 171 ibid. 172 ibid.
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and AustriaHungary (November 3rd, 1918), as well as before the Serbian soldiers entered the territory of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (the Serbian army entered Belgrade on November 1st, 1918 and after that crossed Drina, Danube and Sava Rivers).173 One of the most crucial points of the Proclamation was a decision that with regards to the form of the government and the internal national organisation the general national assembly would decide it with a qualified majority on a total basis of equality of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs.174 However, in consideration to the governmental type of the future single Yugoslav state, there was one significant point for disputes with the Serbian government in the upcoming negotiations. Namely, at the Corfu Island in 1917 the Yugoslav Committee made an agreement with the Serbian government that the governmental type of the state would be a monarchical one with the Serbian Karaorevi dynasty on a head of the state, what was a great political victory of the Serbian government at that time. Now, the National Council did not only remove the Yugoslav Committee as a representative political institution of the South Slavs from AustriaHungary, but also challenged the crucial article (for the Serbian government) of the Corfu Declaration. Practically, the Serbian government had to struggle again for the most significant point of the Corfu Declaration with regards to the organisation of the new state, but now not with the Yugoslav Committee, whose political influence was weakened, than with the National Council who had more profoundly roots in the national soil as its members have not been living in exile as it was a case with the members of the Yugoslav Committee,175 and moreover, virtually, who had the real state behind itself. Nevertheless, the Councils
173 Ljubo Boban, Hrvatske granice 19181993, Zagreb, 1993, p. 11. The Czechs proposed the right to self determination as a principle to solve different national questions within AustriaHungary even at the end of 1917 in the name of both the Czechs and the South Slavs. According to the same principle, and primarily in accordance to the Croatian historical rights, it was proclaimed an independent State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs on October 29th, 1918 [Dragutin Pavlievi, Povijest Hrvatske. Drugo, izmijenjeno i proireno izdanje, Zagreb, 2000, p. 312]. The National Council in Zagreb was proclaimed at the same time as the government of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs [Ivo Peri, Povijest Hrvata, Zagreb, 1997, p. 213]. 174 Sneana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents From its creation to its dissolution, Catholic University Nijmegen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, pp. 147148; Jugoslovenski Odbor u Londonu, JAZU, Zagreb, 1966, p. 366. 175 Sneana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents From its creation to its dissolution, Catholic University Nijmegen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, pp. 147148.
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decision that peoples Constitutive Assembly will vote states constitution with the qualified majority of the votes was in opposition to the Corfu Declaration. In addition, the royal sanction (veto), which was proclaimed by the Corfu Declaration, was not mentioned in the Councils Proclamation, what was another one a great challenge to the Serbian government in the future negotiations with the National Council. The role of the Yugoslav Committee was not finished yet with the establishment of the National Council. The Committees members during the whole 1918 year, even after the proclamation of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (in which a majority of population have been the Serbs), increasingly and in a different ways have been required by the Serbian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nikola Pai, to take participation in decision-making process as the members of the Serbian government.176 Furthermore, the President of the Yugoslav Committee, Dr. Ante Trumbi, required the establishment of the extraordinary Yugoslav Parliament, composed by the members of the Serbian Parliament, the representatives of the Yugoslav Committee, the Serbian army, the Yugoslav volunteers (who fought at the Salonika Front within the Serbian army) and the Central Montenegrin Council for the Peoples Union (established in Paris in February 1917).177 This extraordinary Yugoslav Parliament would have a right to make decisions with respect to all questions upon the national policy.178 The place of its convocation should be either London or Paris and the Serbian Regent Alaksandar I should open the sessions of this Yugoslav Parliament.179 According to Aleks Dragni, this requirement was equal with the coup d'tat, which
176 Milan orevi, Srbija i Jugosloveni za vreme rata 19141918, Beograd, 1922, pp. 143165. 177 The Central Montenegrin Council for the Peoples Union accepted all articles of the Corfu Declaration. When the Council was formed Pai required that the words Yugoslav and Yugoslavia would not be mentioned in its official Proclamation as the primal Serbian national aim was firstly to be united Serbia, Montenegro and other Serbian lands and only after that to think about the Yugoslav unification [Archives of Yugoslavia, Beograd, 8049, 855, Crnogorski odbor za narodno ujedinjenje, January 1st, 1918; Dragoslav Jankovi, Bogdan Krizman, Graa o stvaranju jugoslovenske drave, vol. II, Beograd, 1964, p. 502; Vojislav Vukovi, Diplomatska pozadina ujedinjenja Srbije i Crne Gore, Jugoslovenska revija za meunarodno pravo, 2, Beograd, 1959, p. 252]. 178 Milan orevi, Srbija i Jugosloveni za vreme rata 19141918, Beograd, 1922, pp. 147148. 179 Dragoslav Jankovi, Bogdan Krizman, Graa o stvaranju jugoslovenske drave, vol. I, Beograd, 1964, pp. 2235.
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should be accepted by the Serbian King.180 The Serbian government rejected this Trumbis idea because Serbias Constitution does not allow that non-elected persons either to take participation in the work of the Parliament (the Peoples Assembly) or to be present in the parliamentary sessions, what means that a work of the Yugoslav Parliament, i.e. an enlarged the Serbian Peoples Assembly, would be illegal. The work of such Parliament, according to Pais opinion, would not be supported by France and Brittain and finally it will lead to the revolutionary chaos likewise in Russia.181 Pai specified that it was possible only to enlarge Serbias government with two or three members of the National Council and the Yugoslav Committee but not to totally reconstruct the government.182 Above all, the Serbian authorities saw in Trumbis proposal upon a creation of an extraordinary Yugoslav Parliament only a way for the Yugoslav Committee to obtain an international recognition. Pai was strongly convinced that Trumbis main intention was to influence the Entente states to recognize Croatia and other Yugoslav territories from AustriaHungary as an independent state likewise they recognized Czechoslovakia. He pointed out at that moment that Serbia wants to liberate and unite all Yugoslavs but not to be drowned in the sea of Yugoslavia.183 Obviously, the Yugoslav Committee did not yet reconcile with the fact that the National Council replaced its political role. According to the Serbian Prime Minister, just before the Geneva Conference there was a strong demand by the Committee that exactly the Yugoslav Committee should represent all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on the up-coming Peace Conference.184 Finally, when the
180 Aleks Dragni, Srbija, Nikola Pai i Jugoslavija, Beograd, 1994, p. 130. 181 Dragoslav Jankovi, Bogdan Krizman, Graa o stvaranju jugoslovenske drave, vol. I, Beograd, 1964, pp. 6265; Archives of Serbia, Beograd, Ministarstvo Inostranih Dela, Politiko Odeljenje, 1918, VI/1, Salonika, January 13th, 1918. 182 Archives of Yugoslavia, Beograd, 80-54-329; Ivan Metrovi, Uspomene na politike ljude i dogaaje, Zagreb, 1969, p. 105. At that time, likewise later on, both the National Council in Zagreb and the Yugoslav Committee in London are not recognized by the Entente powers. It is quite wrong opinion by the Croatian historian Dragutin Pavlievi that the U.S.A. de facto recognized the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs [Dragutin Pavlievi, Povijest Hrvatske. Drugo, izmijenjeno i proireno izdanje, Zagreb, 2000, p. 312313] as such conclusion doesn not come from the sources. 183 Archives of Yugoslavia, Beograd, 80-54-313-315. 184 Pais telegram to the Regent Aleksandar on November 1st, 1918 [Milan orevi, Srbija i jugosloveni za vreme rata 19141918, Beograd, 1922, p. 199].
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Committees leading members understood that only the National Council could be a counterbalance, in political point of view, to the Serbian government they sharply required that this newly political factor had to be internationally recognised as a government of the newly created the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs.185 The members of the Yugoslav Committee, particularly those, who were from Dalmatia, had always a great fear that Serbia can make a deal with Italy at the expense to the South Slavs in Austria Hungary, especially the Croats. In particular, its president had a great extent of distrust towards the Serbian Prime Minister, concerning this matter. His suspicions culminated in 1916 when the Italian press issued information that Pai and the Italian government already made an agreement with regards to the Adriatic Question. According to this alleged agreement Serbia accepted the Treaty of London in return for the creation of a Greater Serbia after the war. According to the president of the Yugoslav Committee, Pai did not want to confront with Italy, and for that reason we may not allow him to lead our destiny.186 Nevertheless, Pai very soon refused these rumours declaring that the Adriatic Sea was not for Serbia the Italian Lake; it was the international sea. This episode is very good example how relations between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee were developed virtually on the edge of the confidence. According to Aleks Dragni and Jovan Dui, there is a good reason to believe that Trumbi was in fact a great Croatian nationalist who wanted to get for Croatia as wider as territory. However, Trumbi knew if he, or the Yugoslav Committee, would work in favour of the Croatian independence there was a great chance that Croatia would remain within AustriaHungary. In addition, Trumbi was totally convinced that if Croatia became an independent, Serbia would get a great portion of the disputable territories between the Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
185 These Yugoslav Committees demands were supported by the Bosnian Serbs Duan Vasiljevi and Nikola Stojanovi who were the members of the Committee from its creation. Pai noticed in November 1918 that the Serbian members of the Yugoslav Committee became more European and Yugoslav that Serbian after Russia left the war in March 1918 [Dragoslav Jankovi, Bogdan Krizman, Graa o stvaranju jugoslovenske drave, vol. II, Beograd, 1964, pp. 449451]. Nikola Stojanovi explained his support to the Yugoslav Committee by his opinion that the Committee was the South Slavic representative of the Western civilization and that the South Slavic Catholics were getting all the time symphaties from the West [Nikola Stojanovi, Jugoslovenski odbor. lanci i dokumenti, Zagreb, 1927, p. 58]. 186 Milan orevi, Srbija i jugosloveni za vreme rata 19141918, Beograd, 1922, p. 100.
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as well as the city of Dubrovnik with its hinterland and the other parts of the Dalmatian littoral. The final result would be a small Croatia and a Greater Serbia. These were the crucial reasons for him to create very tactical politics of the Yugoslav Committee towards Serbia and its government.187
The map of the Kingdom of Montenegro, the Kingdom of Serbia and the South Slavic provinces in AustriaHungary (claimed by Zagreb to be united into the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs) in November 1918 before the Yugoslav unification
187 Aleks Dragni, Srbija, Nikola Pai i Jugoslavija, Beograd, 1994, p. 132; Jovan Dui, Verujem u Boga i u Srpstvo, Jagodina, 2003, pp. 138150. About the problem of disputed lands between the Croats and the Serbs see [Dr. Lazo M. Kosti, Sporne teritorije Srba i Hrvata, Beograd, 1990].
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SIXTH CHAPTER: GENEVA CONFERENCE AND A PROCLAMATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES
With the establishment of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in Zagreb, as well as with the proclamation of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs at the end of October 1918, 188 a new political situation emerged with regards to the creation of almost a single South Slavic state. The Serbian government found itself in virtually new situation in which the creation of Yugoslavia had to be again negotiated at a new conference and with a new political factor. Now, instead of the Yugoslav Committee (created with a great influence and support by the Serbian government, and which was envisaged by it as its propaganda agency and mainly depended on Serbias financial support) the Serbian government should make a new political agreement with much stronger and more independent political institution, which was not at all dependent on the Serbian government, either from political or financial points of view. Moreover, the National Council was a real political representative institution of the South Slavs from AustriaHungary and a real government of newly proclaimed state. Actually, the up-coming political negotiations should be held between two states: the Kingdom of Serbia (internationally recognised) and the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (internationally not recognised and with the Serbs as majority of population). The main aim in the coming
The National Council in Zagreb rejected on October 19 th, 1918 the Manifesto issued by the EmperorKing Charles upon the restructuring of the Monarchy into the federation. On October 29 th, 1918 both the Croatian Parliament in Zagreb and the great peoples manifestation in Ljubljana proclaimed the independent State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. Slovenia by this political act became a political reality but not only a geographical term as it was before. However, a territorial integrity of Slovenian national lands was in a question by both a proclamation of Austrian German government of the province of Carniola upon a territorial unity of this province with a German Austrian Republic and by Italian military penetration into the core of Slovenia from October 5th, 1918 according to the London Pact of 1915. In order to save Maribor (Marburg) area for the Slovene people a major Rudolf Maister (18741934) took the city of Maribor and proclaimed its inclusion into the Yugoslav lands (getting a rank of the general by the Slovene National Council of Styria) [Janko Prunk, Kratka zgodovina Slovenije, Ljubljana, 2002, p. 8993; Peter Vodopivec, Od Pohlinove slovnice do samostojne drave. Slovenska zgodovina od konca 18. do konca 20. stoletja, Ljubljana, 2006, p. 162163].
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negotiations with the Serbian government from the side of the National Council was to modify the Corfu Declarations decesions with reference to the governmental type of the new state. On the opposite side, the crucial aim of the Serbian government was to retain all resolutions from the Corfu Declaration, negotiated with the Yugoslav Committee. The Geneva Conference, as a final stage of the negotiations, as well as the political agreements in regard to the creation of Yugoslavia, was held from November 6th to November 9th, 1918. Formally, the four different political groups negotiated at this conference: the Serbian government (represented by its Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikola Pai), the Zagreb National Council (3 representatives), the London Yugoslav Committee (3 representatives) and Serbias parliamentary opposition (3 representatives).189 In effect, it was mainly arbitration between the strongest political factors of them: the Serbian government, represented by Nikola Pai on the one hand, and the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, represented by its president the Slovene Roman Catholic priest Dr. Anton Koroec on the other hand. The Serbian parliamentary opposition parties supported during the whole war all demands by the Yugoslav Committee as well as and from October 1918 requirements by the National Council in Zagreb. They even openly threatened the Serbian authorities that in the case of a total discord between Pai and the Yugoslav Committee they will support the later and work against the Serbian government.190 That was a crucial reason why the National Council and the Yugoslav Committee required that Serbias opposition parties would take participation at the Conference of Geneva.191 From the legal point of view, neither the Yugoslav Committee nor the Serbian parliamentary opposition should be present at the Geneva Conference. However, the Serbian Prime Minister, as the only representative of the Serbian government, understood this Conference to be only a manifestation of the unity and solidarity of all South Slavs interested in unification
In fact, it was negotiation between one man (Pai) vs. nine men. 190 eneral Jaa Damjanovi, Iz mog ratnog dnevnika, zabeleke iz rata 19121918, Osijek, w. y., p. 75; Dragoslav Jankovi, Bogdan Krizman, Graa o stvaranju jugoslovenske drave, vol. II, Beograd, 1964, pp. 449451; Archives of Serbia (Arhiv Srbije), Beograd, Court office (Dvorska kancelarija), III, Raports. 191 Archives of Serbia, Beograd, Ministarstvo Inostranih Dela, Politiko Odeljenje, 1918, X/574; Archives of Yugoslavia, Beograd, Zbirka Ljube Davidovia, 58.
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before the Entente states, that was the most important at that time with respect to the up-coming Peace Conference after the war. In this point Pai was strongly encouraged by the French President, Raymond Poincare, just during the Geneva Conference who demanded that all Yugoslavs should be together and united. After the Geneva Conference Pai informed Serbias Regent that the British and French diplomats allowed him to sign the new Declaration in Geneva.192 It is interesting that the Yugoslav Committee convoked the Geneva Conference, actually its President Dr. Ante Trumbi under an initiative given by the Geneva section of the Yugoslav Committee. It was convoked by an organisation, which did not play one of the crucial political roles during the Geneva negotiations. Officially, according to the Trumbis proposal, the Conference was convoked for all actors who participated in the making of the Corfu Declaration, [in addition] the representatives of the Montenegrin Committee for the national union, as well as the Serbian opposition parties. Participants of the Conference, at that way, recognised in advance the legitimacy of the Corfu Declaration. This meant that decisions of the up-coming Geneva Conference should be based on the decisions already signed at the previous one. The Serbian government was represented at the Geneva Conference (only) by its Prime Minister, the Serbian parliamentary opposition by M. Drakovi, V. Marinkovi and M. Trifkovi, the Yugoslav Committee by A. Trumbi, G. Gregorin, D. Vasiljevi, N. Stojanovi and J. Banjanin and finally the National Council was represented by A. Koroec, G. erjav and M. ingrija. In comparison with the Corfu negotiations, where Pai had a supreme role, at the Geneva Conference he was faced with a strong united political front composed by all other delegates of the Conference.193 As the final result of the Geneva negotiations and the Conference a common (Geneva) declaration was issued, signed by all four groups of the participants. On the first place it was pointed in the Geneva Declaration that unification of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into one indivisible state entity, as a member of the community of free peoples should be declared to the whole world. This
192 Archives of SANU, Beograd, Anti, 10.420. 193 The national composition of the participants was: Serbs - 6, Croats - 3 and Slovenes - 3.
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announcement was completely in the spirit of the Corfu Declaration. It was stipulated that the joint Ministry of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes would be created as a temporal government until a convocation of the Constituent Assembly. One of the most important decisions was that both Serbian government and the National Council in Zagreb will continue to carry out their tasks, each in its internal legal and territorial domain applying current methods, until the definitive organisation of the State... Several conclusions arouse from the text of the Geneva Declaration. Firstly, the Serbian government officially recognised the National Council as one of the equal political factors in the process of unification alongside with itself. Secondly, the Serbian government acknowledged the fact that the National Council supplanted the Yugoslav Committee as a representative institution of the South Slavs in the Dual Monarchy. Thirdly, the Serbian government recognised the existence of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, and the National Council as its legal government. Finally, both the Serbian government and the National Council as equal political partners will govern the new state, until the mutual ministry would be organised.194 It could be understood that during the Geneva negotiations the Serbian government recognised the National Council in Zagreb as a legitimate representative institution of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from AustriaHungary.195 That the Yugoslav Committee was displaced by the National Council shows the fact that a role to represent the National Council to the Entente states was given to Ante Trumbi. Probably, the most significant point of the Geneva Declaration, for the both sides, was the conclusion that the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly should make a final decision with regard to the governmental type of the state the monarchy or the republic. This paragraph became greatest disagreement in comparison with the decision made on Corfu Island. A weakness of the Serbian Prime Minister during the Geneva negotiations can be seen by the fact that he could not succeed to impose the Serbian attitude towards the
194 The Serbian government and the National Council should commit the foreign and military affairs, the navy, maritime trade, maritime health care and a preparation of the sessions of the constitutional assembly to the mutual ministry. 195 Sneana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents From its creation to its dissolution, Catholic University Nijmegen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, pp. 148149.
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question with regards to the governmental type of the state, as it was the case during the Corfu negotiations, when it was decided that the new state would be the monarchy with the Serbian royal dynasty on a head of the state. The Geneva Declaration was in this point a revision of the Corfu decisions and a great political victory of the National Council. Shortly, the National Council in Zagreb supported by the Serbian parliamentary opposition parties succeeded to compel Pai to recognise an existence of a state of the South Slavs from Austria Hungary with its centre in Zagreb as a political representative of all Yugoslavs in the Dual Monarchy. The aim of the Council was that such Yugoslav state with Zagreb as its political centre would make a confederation with the Kingdom of Serbia till convocation of general Yugoslav Constituent Assembly. Consequently, the National Council in Zagreb would become a legal representative of the Austro Hungarian Serbs a possibility that was never accepted by the Serbian government. As we saw, during the Geneva negotiations, Nikola Pai was compelled to give certain political concessions to the National Council. Firstly, Pai recognised the so-called state provisorium, that would exist from the establishment of the mutual ministry to the proclamation of the new Yugoslav constitution.196 Secondly, he accepted a dual model of the government, during the period of the state provisorium. Finally and the most importantly, he left the question with regards to the governmental type of a state open a question which would be finally resolved by the new Yugoslav Constitution. In fact, the last point was the crucial reason for the Regent not to ratify the Geneva Declaration in order to preserve decisions made during the Corfu negotiations, which were in his favour. In sum, a dual formula of the Geneva declaration, especially uncertain position of the monarchy and the dynasty during the time of the state provisorium, was unacceptable for the Regent, because this problem had already been resolved on Corfu island.197 On the other hand, the National Council in Zagreb also refused to recognise the Geneva Declaration. The formal excuse for this was the fact that
196 This state provisorium lasted in fact from December 1st, 1918 till June 28th, 1921. 197 The Serbian government and the Regent refused to verify the text of the Geneva Declaration and because of the fact that common ministies of foreign affairs, traffic, army and finance for the whole country were not drafted and envisaged in the Declaration [Dragoslav Jankovi, Bogdan Krizman, Graa o stvaranju jugoslovenske drave, vol. II, Beograd, 1964, pp. 541553].
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the Councils delegation in Geneva was not authorised to negotiate about a governmental type of the new state. At such a way, decisions made on Corfu Island between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government were still valid for all sides. However, the Serbian government practically underwent a great political defeat in Geneva by the National Council, because the Serbian government was forced to recognise a dual sway of the new state which would last till the time of a convocation of the Constitutional Assembly. Shortly, two political sovereigns have been created, with two oaths and three governments (the common one in Paris, the other one in Zagreb and the third one in Belgrade). The Yugoslav Committee was pushed aside with Geneva negotiations and replaced by the National Council in Zagreb as a representative organisation of the South Slavic population in AustriaHungary.198 A political role of the Committee was already over before convocation of the Geneva meeting, when the Serbian Prime Minister refused a demand given by the Committees President about the international recognition of the Yugoslav Committee at the beginning of October 1918. According to Pais opinion, there were three main reasons for this refusal of Trumbis demand: 1) in the case of a recognition it would be two political centres of union, that would be more useful for Italy than for the Yugoslavs; 2) the Yugoslav Committee could not be equal with the Serbian government in the process of unification for the reason that the Committee was created by itself; and 3) it was impossible that at the Peace Conference the Serbs from AustriaHungary would be represented by the Yugoslav Committee but not by the Serbian government in consideration of the war efforts by Serbia. For Trumbi, such Pais attitude was antiliberal, anti-democratic and opposed to the principle of the nation.199 A question with regards to the numerical representation of the Yugoslav lands at the Yugoslav mutual ministry was one of the
198
By the Geneva negotiations the Serbian government unquestionably recodnised the National Council in Zagreb as a legal government of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs from the AustriaHungary. However, the Serbian government rejected an idea that the Kingdom of Serbia and the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs are an equal political partners in the process of the unification. From the Slovenian point of view, all three major Slovenian political parties fought for the unification of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with the Kingdom of Serbia with a common requirement that the Slovenes as a nation have to enjoy a broadest cultural autonomy within Yugoslavia [Peter Vodopivec, Od Pohlinove slovnice do samostalne drave. Slovenska zgodovina od konca 18. do konca 20. stoletja, Ljubljana, 2006, p. 164165]. 199 Dragoslav Jankovi, Bogdan Krizman, Graa o stvaranju jugoslovenske drave, vol. I, Beograd, 1964, pp. 333337.
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main sources for dispute between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee. Pai supported the simple state and a parity ratio of the mutual ministrys members. He also demanded that only the Serbian government and the National Council could delegate these members, but not and the Yugoslav Committee. Trumbi, contrary to Pai, interceded with the idea of equal rights and sharply challenged Pais principle of the parity.200 In sum, according to the Geneva agreement, new South Slavic state should be created as Serbo-Croatian Yugoslavia, based on dual formula of inner state organisation similarly to AustriaHungary. Shortly, what was Aussgleich in 1867 for the Habsburg Monarchy (Austria and Hungary) that should be the Geneva agreement for future Yugoslavia, which would be constituted by two confederate states (Serbia and Croatia).201 After the Geneva Conference it was apparent that the latest part of the process of unification would be concluded with an agreement between the Serbian government and the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. In the other words, these two political factors would create a single South Slavic state after negotiations only between themselves. From a legal point of view, the common Yugoslav state (of all South Slavs except the Bulgarians) was proclaimed in Zagreb by the National Council on November 23 rd, 1918 by the Proclamation by the National Council of the Unification of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro.202 The National Council immediately gave an initiative for the final arrangement upon a verification of its own Proclamation by Serbias Regent on November 24th, 1918, when a single Councils delegation was organised to be sent to Belgrade 203
200 ibid., vol. II, pp. 497506. 201 Pai resigned from the post of the Prime Minister after the Geneva negotiations. The Serbian Minister of Inner Affairs, Stojan Proti, pointed out that politicians from Zagreb wanted to separate Serbs from Bosnia, Herzegovina, Srem, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Vojvodina and Croatia from their brothers from Serbia. According to him, the monarchy and the dynasty of Karaorevi have been two fundamental and unquestionable requirements from the Serbian government concerning the creation of Yugoslavia [Dragoslav Jankovi, Bogdan Krizman, Graa o stvaranju jugoslovenske drave, vol. II, Beograd, 1964, p. 647]. 202 Sneana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents From its creation to its dissolution, Catholic University Nijmegen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, pp. 151153. 203 This decesion was speeded up by two reasons: 1) the Italian military penetration into the territory of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs; and 2) the fear of a restoration of the Habsburg Monarchy. The Slovenian members of the delegation did not arrive at the time in Belgrade [Peter Vodopivec, Od
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with a hope that the Regent would accept the unification in a form proclaimed in Zagreb. Basicaly, the main hope of the Council was that Belgrade will accept by the act of verification the borders of the State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes how they have been claimed to be by Zagreb: Slovenia, Istria, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Hercegovina, Srem, Banat, Baranja and Baka. This delegation came to Belgrade with only one aim: to make a final version of the verification of proclaimed South Slavic state with the Serbian government and the Serbian Regent Aleksandar I Karaorevi in a form of a new and final Proclamation of a single Yugoslav state in Belgrade. Nevertheless, Councils deputies brought the so-called Naputak, or the Councils conditions with regards to the union. The Councils principal requirement in this Naputak was that a National Assembly of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes would decide an ultimate version of the state organisation by a two-thirds majority of the votes (by the so-called qualified majority).204 According to the Naputak, the Constituent Assembly should vote stateconstitution, to determine a form of the state-rule, as well as a stategovernmental organisation. On the one hand, the Councils demand that the Constituent Assembly would vote the Yugoslav Constitution was in the spirit of the Corfu Declaration. However, on the other hand, the Councils requirement that a form of the state-rule would be settled also by the same assembly was totally contrary to the Corfu Declaration and was done in favour of the Geneva Declaration. According to the Naputak, the Constituent Assembly had to be established and to begin its work not later than six months after the peace covenant. During the interregnum period, the King would be an executive administrator, while the Governmental Council would be a legislative one. The Governmental Council would be made especially for this purpose and would be composed with the members of the National Council, the Yugoslav Committee as well as with a proportional number of the representatives from Serbia and Montenegro. Subsequently, the political role of the Yugoslav Committee was not abolished. The Committees members should participate in the work of the Governmental Council alongside with
Pohlinove slovnice do samostalne drave. Slovenska zgodovina od konca 18. do konca 20. stoletja, Ljubljana, 2006, p. 165]. 204 Branislav Gligorijevi, Demokratska stranka i politiki odnosi u Kraljevini SHS, Beograd, 1970, p. 204. Aleks Dragni is in opinion that Gligorijevi is wrong when he wrote that qualified majority is the twothirds of the votes [Aleks Dragni, Srbija, Nikola Pai i Jugoslavija, Beograd, 1994, pp. 123147].
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their colleagues from the National Council and the Serbian government. At that moment, the Yugoslav Committee was recognised as one meritorious political factor for the creation of a common Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian state. The final demand by the National Council was that the Governmental Council would carry out elections for the Constituent Assembly. Nevertheless, during the negotiations in Belgrade with the delegates of the National Council in Zagreb, the Serbian authorities made clear that the Croats and the Slovenes are free to establish their own independent national republican states after unification of all ethnical and historical territories of the Serbs. In this case, Croatia and Slovenia would exist as dwarfish states.205 However, two important events occurred, in the meantime between the Committees initiative for a final agreement (i.e., verification) with the Serbian government and final Proclamation of almost a single South Slavic state. They were the formal union between: 1) the province of Vojvodina (the southern Hungary settled by relative Serbian majority); and 2) the Kingdom of Montenegro (settled by absolute Serbian majority) with the Kingdom of Serbia. Firstly, on November 25th, 1918 the Great National Council of Serbs, Bunjevci, and other Slavs in Vojvodina, officially issued a Resolution and proclaimed firstly the break of state-juridical relations between Vojvodina and Hungary, and secondly an unification of Vojvodina (Baka, Banat, Baranja) with the Kingdom of Serbia on its session in Novi Sad.206 The principal outcome of this Resolution was the fact that the Great National Council (in fact the Serbian one),207
205 Archives of Military-Historical Institute (Arhiv Vojnoistorijskog instituta), Beograd, 16, 1, Memoars of Duan Simovi. 206 The Serbian politicians from Vojvodina decided to establish their own Serbian National Council for Vojvodina on October 27th, 1918 as a reaction against establishment of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in Zagreb on October 26th, 1918. The primal aim of Serbian National Council, as a principal governmental institution of Vojvodina, was to unite Vojvodina with Belgrade but not with Zagreb. Serbian National Council formed its own military detachments called (Serbian) National Guard. The Council invited the Serbian army to enter the territory of Vojvodina at the biginning of November 1918. The first military unites of the Serbian army crossed Danube and Sava Rivers on November 9 th and 10th, 1918. According to the armistice treaty between Hungary on the one hand and Serbia and Entente powers on the other signed on November 13th, 1918, the Serbian and Entente armies had to occupy the territory of the southern Hungary (the Serbian Vojvodina) till demarcation line drawn northern from Pecs and Timioara. 207 The composition of the Council was: Serbs-578, Croats-58, Slovaks-62, Ukrainians-21, Germans-6, Hungarians-1. The Croatian deputy Blako Raji explained later why the Croats voted for the union of Vojvodina with Belgrade but not with Zagreb: Serbia was ally of Entente while the State of Slovenes,
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under the leadership of Jaa Tomi, avoided the National Council in Zagreb and directly united Vojvodina with Serbia.208 On the same day, Serbian deputies from Srem, the members of the National Council in Zagreb, decided to unite Srem directly with the Kingdom of Serbia. According to their decision, only the Kingdom of Serbia could represent the Serbs from Srem on the upcoming Peace Conference.209 Secondly, one day later, the Podgorica Great National Assembly of the Serbian people in Montenegro dethroned the Montenegrin ruling Petrovi-Njego dynasty in favour of the Serbias Karaorevi royal family.210 At the same day, the Great National Assembly in Podgorica proclaimed the union of Montenegro with Serbia, under the sceptre of the Karaorevi dynasty by favouring the union of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into a single state. 211 The
Croats and Serbs proclaimed in Zagreb was recognised by no on. Furthermore, the Entente treated the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs as a hostile country. 208 Jaa Tomi, Naa nova drava u kolevci, Novi Sad, 1918, pp. 811; Spomenica osloboenja Vojvodine 1918. godine, Novi Sad, 1929; Petar Peki, Povijest osloboenja Vojvodine, Subotica, 1939; Kosta Milutinovi, Vojvodina izmeu Beograda i Zagreba, Zagreb, 1966. 209 Archives of Military-Historical Institute (Arhiv Vojnoistorijskog Instituta), Beograd, 3, box 25, IV, 31, The First Serbian army, November 25th, 1918. This decision by the Serbs from Srem to unite themselves with Serbia but not with historical Croatia was tremendously criticised by the Croatian politicians as a plot against the Croatian historical rights [Kosta Milutinovi, Vojvodina izmeu Beograda i Zagreba, Zagreb, 1966, p. 355]. 210 Archives of Serbia, Beograd, Ministarstvo Inostranih Dela, Politiko Odeljenje, 1918, X/456, X/438, 439, 447; Sneana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents From its creation to its dissolution, Catholic University Nijmegen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, pp. 153156. Serbias Karaorevi and Montenegrin Petrovi-Njego dynasties were in direct blood relations as Serbias Regent Aleksandar I Karaorevi married daughter (Zorka) of Montenegrin King Nikola I. Moreover, Alaksandar was born in Montenegrin capital Cetinje in 1888 where his father Petar I Karaorevi, Serbias King from 1903 to 1918, lived in exile. In October 1918 when the Serbian army entered Montenegro Aleksandar I stated that the Serbians (the Serbs from Serbia) did not come to Montenegro to rule the country but they came to liberate Montenegro and to unite it with Serbia. After the unification Montenegro has to have its own governmental organisation [Archives of Military-Historical Institute, Beograd, 3, box 25, 33, 21. X 1918]. The opponents of Serbia-Montenegro unification, the so called the Greens, claimed likewise dethroned the Montenegrin King that all decisions issued by the Great Podgorica National Assembly are not legal and not valid as they are in opposition to the Montenegrin Constitution. However, according to the Montenegrin Constitution (Articles 2 and 16) the King can be dethroned (he is loosing his legitimate rights) if he would live the country and the people. King Nikola I emigrated to Italy at the beginning of 1916. On January 7 th, 1919 it was organised armed rebellion in Montenegro (the Christmas Rebellion) by the Greens supported by the Italians in order to repose King Nikola I to the throne in Montenegro. The crucial political aim of the Greens was to achive the status of an autonomous state of Montenegro within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (like the Kingdom of Bayern was in the Second German Empire). However, the rebellion failed. 211 Sneana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents From its creation to its dissolution, Catholic University Nijmegen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, Resolution of the
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process of unification between Montenegro and Serbia was accomplished by the Central Montenegrin Council for the People Union, formed in February 1917 and lead by Andrija Radovi.212 Thus, just before the final negotiations with regards to the verification of the Zagreb Proclamation of the unification, between the National Council and the Serbian government, Vojvodina (Banat, Baka and Baranja) and the Kingdom of Montenegro became represented by an enlarged Kingdom of (Greater) Serbia. The principal essence of this fact was that the official attitude by the Serbian politicians after December 1st, 1918 was that the Kingdom of Serbia brought (i.e., incorporated): 1) the Serbia proper (Serbia after the Berlin Congress of 1878); 2) Kosovo and Metohia, 3) the northern Sandak (Sanjak or Raka), 4) the biggest part of Bosnia & Herzegovina (after the self-determination of the local Serbs), 5) the Vardar Macedonia (achieved after the Balkan Wars of 19121913), 6) Vojvodina, and 7) Montenegro with the southern Sandak into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia.213 While the National Council in Zagreb wanted to postpone the final negotiations concerning the verification with the Serbian government for the time after the Peace Conference, the Serbian government wanted to finish the process of unification by its verification of the Zagreb Proclamation before the Peace Conference in order to avoid the question concerning the borders of the new state on the Conference.214 Such Serbias policy was backed by the fact that several South Slavic lands expressed the wish to be united with Serbia. Alongside with Montenegro and Vojvodina it was the case and with 42 out of 52 regions in Bosnia & Herzegovina. Together with the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Orthodox Serbs many Muslims (who
Great National Assembly of the Serbian people in Montenegro concerning unification of Montenegro with Serbia, pp. 153156. 212 On the Podgorica National Assembly in fact the Whites won a great victory against the Greens. The first group was fighting for unification of Montenegro with Serbia by Monteneros incorporation into the state body of Serbia. Second one was fighting for the Montenegrin unification with Serbia but under condition that Montenegro would have a special (autonomous) status in a common state, like Bayern in the German Second Empire. Actually, the Whites had a great help by the Serbian army who entered Montenegro at the end of October 1918. 213 It is a question with regard to the legal competitions both of the Podgorica and the Novi Sad Assembles to make decisions concerning the unification with Serbia, which was actually incorporation of Montenegro and Vojvodina into the state body of the Kingdom of Serbia. 214 Memoirs of the Peace Conference, vol. II, New Haven, 1939, p. 252.
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identified themselves as the Islamic Serbs) from Bosnia & Herzegovina as well as supported Serbias dynasty of Karaorevi.215 According to the British expert for the Yugoslav affairs at that time, Wickham Steed, if plebiscite would be organised in Bosnia & Herzegovina the result of voting will go to the Serbian favour.216 Simultaneously, the Dalmatian Provincial Council gave five days to the National Council in Zagreb to make a decision with regards to the union with Serbia. It was obvious that the National Council was loosing its sway in several important areas of its own state. In addition, the National Council was completely helpless concerning the fact that the Italian military troops occupied subsequent parts of Dalmatia and Istria. These facts have been the crucial reasons for the Councils decision to negotiate with Serbia as soon as possible, primarily in order to save as left as of Dalmatia with the help of the Serbian army. Nevertheless, as it was pointed before, even before National Council sent an official delegation to Belgrade to negotiate with the Serbian authorities about an official proclamation of united Yugoslav state, the Council proclaimed its own unification of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro on November 23rd, 1918. However, even on November 4th, 1918 the Council accepted a proposal by the deputy in the Croatian Parliament (Sabor) in Zagreb, Vitomir Kora, to officially invite the Serbian army to cross Drina River and to help to the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs to survive. Consequently, the authorities of the National Council sent a letter to Aleksandar I Karaorevi, as Serbias Regent and the Commander-in-Chief of the Serbian army, asking him to give an order to the Serbian army to immediately enter Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Srem, Banat, Baranja and Baka.217 Valerijan Pribievi and Lazar Popovi (the members of the National Councils delegation later sent to Belgrade) as well as required from the Serbian Regent on November 9th, 1918 to send the Serbian army to protect the sea-port
215 Archives of Military-Historical Institute (Arhiv Vojnoistorijskog Instituta), Beograd, 3, box 25, 31, Terzis report to Pai. 216 Wickham Steed in New Europe, September 26th, 1918. 217 Archives of Military-Historical Institute (Arhiv Vojnoistorijskog instituta), Beograd, box 25, 31, The First Serbian army to the Supreme Stuff of the Serbian army, November 10th, 1918; ibid. 3, box 25, 31, November 8th, 1918.
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of Rijeka (Fiume), Meumurje (a region between Slovenia and Hungary), and to occupy Slavonia. The Serbian army entered these provinces till November 17th, 1918.218 Officially, the South Slavs (i.e., the Yugoslavs) were united into their own national single state on December 1st, 1918, when the Regent Aleksandar I Karaorevi read the Proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the Krsmanovi house in Belgrade Terazije square (that was in fact Serbias verification of Zagreb Proclamation of the unification with certain modifications). Legally, this Act of Union was composed by two parts. First of them was the Address written by the Serb from Croatia Svetozar Pribievi and the Croat from Croatia Dr. Ante Paveli and read by the delegation of the National Council in Zagreb. The second one was the Reply of the Crowned Prince Aleksandar I Karaorevi. Thus, the First-December Act was a result of the negotiations between the Serbian government and the National Council in Zagreb as their ultimate political agreement with regards to the proclamation of a new state. According to the Address, the National Councils numerous delegation came to Belgrade as the representatives of the peoples from the following South Slavic lands in AustriaHungary: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Banat and Baranja asking for unification of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro. It is necessary to note that from Serbias point of view, the Serbian government was a representative of the whole portion of Vojvodina and Montenegro in consideration of their union with the Kingdom of Serbia in November 1918, as well as and of the beggist parts of Bosnia & Herzegovina according to their wish from the same period of time. This meant virtually firstly that both the Serbian government and the National Council in Zagreb claimed that they are representing Vojvodina and Bosnia & Herzegovina during the last stage of the process of the unification, and secondly
218 Archives of Military-Historical Institute (Arhiv Vojnoistorijskog instituta), Beograd, 4, box 25, 31, The First Serbian army to the deputy of the National Council, major Perk. At that time according to the reports, the Serbs from Croatia (Lika, Banija, Kordun, Drni, Knin, Dalmatia) wanted to become a part of united and Greater Serbia but not to become a part of Yugoslavia. The Dalmatian Croats, likewise the Dalmatian Serbs, supported a monarchical type of the future Yugoslav state, contrary to the Croatian peasants and the citizens of Zagreb who opted for republican type of the state [Archives of MilitaryHistorical Institute (Arhiv Vojnoistorijskog instituta), Beograd, 3, box 25, 35, Report by command of the 14th infantry regiment from Split, December 6th, 1918; Hrvatska rije, 14, November 15th, 1918].
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that according to the Regents Reply the AustroHungarian South Slavic lands of the idependent State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, united themselves with the Kingdom of Serbia (enlarged by Vojvodina, Montenegro and the begest portions of Bosnia & Herzegovina?). Obviously, both sides did not make a clear agreement concerning a territorial representation during the ultimate round of the negotiations and the Proclamation of the common state. In its own address, the National Council labelled the Serbian army as a ...victorious national Army..., which was fighting ...side by side with the Armies of our mighty Allies...219 In this case, the National Council assembled itself with the Entente powers, as one of the members of the victorious side in the war. In the following part of the address a revolutionary secession from AustriaHungary of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was stressed, as well as the principal consequence of this fact the creation of their own independent national state. The Slovenes, Croats and Serbs from the former AustriaHungary declared that they wish and are determined to unite with Serbia and Montenegro in one joint national state of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, [...] to embrace all the continuous ethnographic territory of the Southern Slavs.220 This desire was rested on the peoples right to self-determination. Hypothetically, the most significant hidden point of this statement was that the National Councils Delegation did not recognise the unification of Montenegro and Serbia into a single state, proclaimed in Podgorica on November 26th, 1918. It was also emphasised in the next statement that the Council on ...its sitting of November 29th resolved to proclaim the union of the State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with Serbia and Montenegro in one single State...221 At the same place two additional points are stressed by the National Council. First of all, the National Council already proclaimed the union with Serbia. Second of all, in the personal opinion of the author of this book, for the Delegation the union of the South Slavs into a single state was made between three independent political entities, in the other words between three independent states: 1) the State of Slovenes, Croats
219 Sneana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents From its creation to its dissolution, Catholic University Nijmegen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, Proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, pp. 157160. 220 ibid. 221 ibid.
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and Serbs; 2) the Kingdom of Serbia; and 3) the Kingdom of Montenegro. The first part of the Address was finished with likely the most significant paragraph within the whole text of it. Precisely, the National Councils Delegation vested the Serbian King, the PrinceRegent respectively, to have ...the power of the Sovereign throughout the whole territory of the now united State...222 This meant that the Delegation recognised the monarchy as the state-form with the Serbian dynasty on a head of the state. Evidently, with regards to the question upon a type of the state, the Delegation of the National Council rejected decisions that were concluded in Geneva by itself, the Yugoslav Committee, the Serbian government and the Serbian parliamentary opposition parties. Moreover, the Delegation rejected the most important requirement for the unification written in the Naputak, the document that was a written direction for the Delegation for its negotiations with Belgrade. The Delegation hence accepted decisions signed at the Corfu Island by the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government. It is interesting that the Yugoslav Committee did not participate in the final negotiations concerning the creation of Yugoslavia in Belgrade and in creation of the text of official Proclamation of the unification. Nevertheless, the decisions created by the Yugoslav Committee at the Corfu Island were accepted and incorporated into the final act of the unification. In the other words, the National Councils Delegation did not accomplish in Belgrade the Councils requirements and finally signed the decisions agreed at the Corfu Island but not those agreed in Geneva. It means that the Delegation carried out the political attitude of the Yugoslav Committee, the organisation that even was not present in Belgrade during the final stage of the negotiations about a proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The Delegation of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was disrespectful towards directions in the Naputak likely because the Italian military advance into the territory of Dalmatia and Istria, but also at the same time and for the reason of a revolutionary fermentation in its own state. The Zagreb Delegation was in fact forced to make a concession to the Serbian government in view of the external as well as the internal threats to its own state. Finally, the State of Slovenes, Croats
222 ibid.
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and Serbs by joining Serbia and Montenegro into united Yugoslav state would join at the same time and victorious side in the First World War and will not be further treated by the Entente states as an enemy (because it was a part of the AustroHungarian state) which should pay war reparations after the Peace Conference.223 Anyway, these three reasons have been the most consequential for the Zagreb Delegation to recognise the monarchical form of the rule in the new state with the Karaorevi dynasty on the throne. According to the Delegations Address, ...a single parliamentary Government shall be formed for the whole territory of the Yugoslav state, with a single representative body224 in agreement with the Serbian government and the representatives of all national parties in Serbia and Montenegro. Such statement was on the line of the Naputak as the Governmental Council should be created as it was required by the National Council: ...constituted by a joint agreement between the National Council and the representatives of the people of the Kingdom of Serbia... and ...that this national representative body should remain in session until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly...225 In addition, the Address demanded to be established the autonomous representative bodies under the control of the central government. Both of these requirements were stipulated on the Corfu Island and Geneva. The Delegation was speaking in the favour of the Constituent Assembly, which, according to the proposal submitted by the National Council226 should be rested on the universal equal elections, as well as on the direct secret and proportional suffrage.
223 Ferdo ii, Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (19141918), Zagreb, 1920, pp. 246248; orevi Milan, Srbija i Jugosloveni za vreme rata 19141918, Beograd, 1922, p. 244; Peter Vodopivec, Od Pohlinove slovnice do samostalne drave. Slovenska zgodovina od konca 18. do konca 20. stoletja, Ljubljana, 2006, p. 166. According to Jovan Banjanin, a member of the Yugoslav Committee in London, Croatia at the moment had only one option that was to join Yugoslavia in order to avoid its own territorial division between Serbia, Italy, Austria and Hungary after the war (Luonoa, Londonski sporazum i hrvatsko pitanje, Zagreb, 1946, p. 7). Ultra right Croatian Party of Rights ideologically justified Croatian joining Yugoslavia under the rule of the Serbian royal dynasty by the explanation that the Serbian/Yugoslav King, is a Croat as all Serbs in ethnolinguistic point of view are just the Orthodox Croats [Hrvatska drava, November 16th, 1918]. 224 Sneana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents From its creation to its dissolution, Catholic University Nijmegen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, Proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, pp. 157160. 225 ibid. 226 ibid.
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The Constituent Assembly should be convoked within six months after the Peace treaty. Thus, voting a state-constitution by the Constituent Assembly was emphasised in the Corfu and Geneva Declarations and also in the Proclamation of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. However, if we compare the previous Declarations, Proclamations, the Naputak and the Address with each other we will notice that there are several agreements and disagreements between them with regards to the question of the Constituent Assembly. First of all, in the both declarations (Corfu and Geneva), as well as in the Proclamation of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, the Constituent Assembly was envisaged as an institution, which would issue a final version of the state-constitution. On one hand, in the Corfu Declaration a newly state was in advance labelled as a monarchical one with the Serbian dynasty on the throne. Contrary, according to the Geneva Declaration and the Proclamation of State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, the question about republic or monarchy should be resolved by the constitution; in the other words, the Constituent Assembly should make a final decision about it.227 Moreover, according to the Naputak the governmental type of the new state would be resolved by the constitution that would be voted by the Constituent Assembly. However, the Councils Delegation recognised in Belgrade in advance a monarchical type of the stategovernment and in fact avoided the Geneva Declaration and the Proclamation of State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, as well as instructions written in the Naputak. In addition, the Delegation avoided and the statement that the qualified majority in the Constituent Assembly would accept the state-constitution which was incorporated into the Geneva Declaration, the Proclamation of State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs as well as in the Naputak. The same (military-political) reasons influenced the Delegation to reject in Belgrade both crucial requirements by the National Council: 1) that question upon republic or monarchy would be resolved by the Constituent Assembly; and 2) that the Yugoslav Constitution would be accepted by the qualified majority of the
227 Many of Bosnian Muslims and Croats supported republican type of the state but not monarchical one. Thus, according to the reports, when the Serbian army entered Sarajevo in November 1918 some citizens shouted Viva Republica.
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votes.228 A certain evidence for this assertion was given by the Delegation itself in the last paragraph of its Address to the Serbian King. Namely, the text of the Address is finished with two assertions. The first one was that the National Councils delegates were ...representatives of the people from the whole of the Yugoslav territory of the former AustroHungarian Monarchy...229 The second one was ...that large and precious parts of our national territory are occupied by the troops of the Kingdom of Italy..., and finally we can not recognise, however, the justice of any agreement and still less of the Pact of London...230 Subsequently, the final conclusion is that the Councils Delegation, which was sent to Belgrade to make a final agreement with the Serbian government in regard to the Proclamation of a new state, disrespected two the most important Councils requirements written in the Naputak (1. the Constituent Assembly would vote the state-constitution by the qualified majority of the voting body; and 2. the question about monarchy or republic would be resolved by the Yugoslav Constitution) primarily taking into account the Italian territorial aspirations towards significant portions of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, which already have been given to Italy (the London Pact) by the Entente Powers. In the other words, the Serbian government made a good use of the hard position in which the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was, connected with the Italian military danger, to impose its own conditions for the unification (after Zagreb rejected an option proposed by Belgrade that a Greater Serbia and small Croatia and Slovenia would be created as independent states if the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was not going to be established according to the Serbian standards). Anyway, the Entente powers, the National Council in Zagreb and the Royal Serbian Government needed Yugoslavia at that moment as the best bulwark against the Germanic and the Italian domination over the central and the western Balkans. For the Croats, a creation of Yugoslavia was the
228 What does it mean qualified majority is not specified in any mentioned document concerning the creation of Yugoslavia. However, majority of our-days contemporary political scientists is sharing opinion that qualified majority is two-thirds but not half votes of the voting body. According to them, half votes of voting body is absolute majority while only majority of votes is simple majority. 229 Sneana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents From its creation to its dissolution, Catholic University Nijmegen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, Proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, pp. 157160. 230 ibid.
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optimal solution as it was only option to keep together all ethnical and historical Croatian lands within a single Slavic state body. For the Serbs, the Croats and Slovenes should play a role of a mediator with the Roman Catholic Church in the future. Shortly, the Croats saw Serbs as lesser enemies as the Austrians or Hungarians have been, while the Serbs thought that the Croats would be lesser dangerous for the Serbdom if Croatia would be included into Yugoslavia than to be an independent state (which could made an alliance with Bulgaria against Serbia). Finally, the Serbian government was aware that the main political problem in the new Yugoslav state (or a Greater Serbia in accordance to the Croatian perception)231 would be how to amortise the Croatian separatism and republicanism. The unification of almost all South Slavic peoples into their single state was virtually proclaimed by the Regent, Aleksandar I Karaorevi, as his reply to the Address (read by the Delegation of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs) on December 1st, 1918.232 On the first place in his own reply to the Address, his Royal Highness Crown Prince Aleksandar recognised the Delegation as a representative body of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in Zagreb. This really meant that the Kingdom of Serbia, in the final act of union, reaffirmed its own decision with respect to the acknowledgement of the National Council in Zagreb as the legal Government of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes who live on the territory of the AustroHungarian Empire in Geneva on November 8th, 1918.233 In the other words, the Royal Serbian Government recognised the National Council in Zagreb ... as the legal Government of the Yugoslav countries of the former Austro Hungarian Empire234 before the official Proclamation of the new state was made. A legal consequence of that was a fact that a newly state was proclaimed as the union of Serbia with the lands of the independent State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in the United
231
Ivo Goldstein, Croatia. A History, London, 1999, 108130; Dragutin Pavlievi, Povijest Hrvatske. Drugo, izmijenjeno i proireno izdanje, Zagreb, 2000, pp. 331344; Ivo Peri, Povijest Hrvata, Zagreb, 1997, pp. 218232. 232 The first great power who recognised the new state was the USA (in February 1919). 233 Ferdo ii, Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (19141918), Zagreb, 1920, p. 233. 234 ibid.
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Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.235 Consequently, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created officially and legally through the unification of two independent states the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro (including Vojvodina and the biggest part of Bosnia & Herzegovina) and the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, whose independence was recognised by each other. That a newly state of Yugoslavia was really created through the unification of two independent states, in legal point of view, can be seen in two official Proclamations, with respect to the union, issued by both of them. The first of them was a conclusion of the evening session of the National Council in Zagreb that was made on November 23rd, 1918, when Proclamation by the National Council of the unification of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro236 was issued. The second one was Official Proclamation of the union of the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro with the State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, 237 adopted by the Serbian parliament at its 98th ordinary sitting in Belgrade on December 29th, 1918. Finally, we can conclude that the Delegation did not respect, in its address to the Regent, the unification of Serbia and Montenegro into one centralised state, which was done on November 23rd, 1918 under the name of the Kingdom Serbia but preferred to understand the same unification on a federal basis (the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro). According to the text of final Proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, a new state would be established on the constitutional, parliamentary and broad democratic principles, based on universal suffrage,238 which was in concordance with all previous Proclamations and Declarations, as it was the case with the statement that the transitional and provisional period of the state would last until the Great Constitutional Assemblys convocation when the final state-constitution would be voted. However, in the Proclamation of the unification in Belgrade the following two crucial
235 Sneana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents From its creation to its dissolution, Catholic University Nijmegen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, pp. 157160. 236 Ferdo ii, Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (19141918), Zagreb, 1920, p. 274. 237 Sneana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents From its creation to its dissolution, Catholic University Nijmegen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, pp. 161163. 238 ibid.
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National Councils requirements, with respect to the Constituent Assembly, were avoided: 1) the inner state-form would be decided by the Constituent Assembly; and 2) the constitution would be accepted by the qualified (two-third?) majority of the voting body. Namely, in the Proclamation on December 1st, 1918 the last point even was not mentioned. The first point was resolved in advance in favour of a monarchical type of the state, as we can see in the following part of the Proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes: true to the example and advice given me [to Aleksandar Ist] by my august father [Petar Ist], I will be King only of the free citizens of the State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, ...239 In addition, the Proclamation was ended with mentioning the name of a new state: the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, what was in a contrast to the ending of the Address in which the new state was named as the united Yugoslavia. Obviously, in regard to the name of a state, the formula the three-names nation, promoted by the Serbian government, particularly by its Prime Minister, was accepted at the expense of the Councils attitude towards the state name as Yugoslavia. The name of Yugoslavia, as the state name, was rejected because two principal reasons: 1) the terms Yugoslavia and the Yugoslavs are originally created by the Habsburgs; and 2) the Serbian government wanted to preserve the Serbian national name in the name of the new state. Finally, the Proclamation of the Yugoslav unification was ended with two significant points. Firstly, the representatives of two sides would compose the government, which would rule the country during the provisional period: the Serbian government and the National Council (that was foreseen also in the previous Declarations and Proclamations). Nevertheless, in comparison with the Naputak, the representatives of the Yugoslav Committee (five members) were not anticipated to participate in this provisional government.240 Secondly, this Government will assume as its first duty that of securing that the frontiers of our State are drawn in accordance with the ethnographic boundaries of our entire race.241 This written statement in the ultimate legal act of the Proclamation of a new state was made as Serbias compensation to Zagreb for the reason that the
239 ibid. 240 It is interesting that only its President had a political post (the Minister of Foreign Affairs) in the new state among all main members of the Yugoslav Committee. 241 ibid.
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(Councils) Delegation accepted the monarchical type of the state in advance. Obviously, as it was presented in the last part of the Proclamation from December 1st, 1918, this statement was issued versus ... the realisation of the terms of the Treaty of London, signed without us and never recognised by us ...242 Shortly, the Kingdom of Serbia assumed to defend the territory of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs against the Italian territorial aspirations but also to try to include and Slovenian populated lands of the Austrian southern province of Carniola into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.243
Yugoslav lands from 1914 to 1992

242 ibid. On October 10th, 1920 a plebiscite was held in Carniola on which majority of the local Slovenes decided to live in Republic of Austria but not in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In the inter-war period out of all ethnic Slovenes did not live in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia [Janko Prunk, Kratka zgodovina Slovenije, Ljubljana, 2002, p. 94].
243
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The map of dismembered territories of historical Kingdom of Hungary according to the Trianon Peace Treaty signed on June 4th, 1920. The treaty was imposed upon Hungary by the victorious Allies after the WWI, as part of the Paris Peace Conference. Hungary had to accept the breakup of Austria-Hungary and to cede Slovakia and Ruthenia to Czechoslovakia, Burgerland to Austria (in 1922), Slavonia, Vojvodina and Croatia to Yugoslavia and Transylvania with East Banat to Romania. By the Treaty, Hungary lost 2/3 of its pre-war territory, and 3/5 of its prewar population.
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CONCLUSION
The creation of almost single South Slavic state was likely to be one of the most significant turning points in the South Slavic and Balkan history. Three specific political actors carried out the South Slavic political integration: the Yugoslav Committee in London, the National Council of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in Zagreb and the Royal Serbian Government in Belgrade and Corfu. All of them had the same final political task: the unification of the South Slavs into their own, independent, national state. However, in several significant points concerning the union these three political centres of the South Slavs had different opinions upon what was the main source for their disagreements.244 The process of union actually began when the Serbian parliament, according to the governmental proposal, issued a Declaration in the city of Ni on December 7th, 1914. According to this Declaration, the main war aim of Serbia during the First World War was a unification of the South Slavs. This meant that the Serbian government during the war officially directed its political activities towards the creation of the South Slavic state. The process of union was finished on December 1st, 1918, when the final Proclamation of the establishment of the South Slavic state was issued in Belgrade as a verification of the previous Proclamation of unification in Zagreb. The Yugoslav Committee, who played one of the crucial political roles with regards to the South Slavic political integration until the end of October 1918, was established on April 30th, 1915 only several days after the Treaty of London was signed. In fact, the Committee was founded in order to protect the Yugoslavs and their territories within AustriaHungary from the Italian irredentist
244
The religious and ethnic diversity of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia was expressed in two mutually contrasting ideas about the nature of the new state. Slovenia and Croatia had joined the union with Serbia largely for defensive reasons, to protect their territories against Austrian or Italian revisionist (irredentist) pretensions. They demanded a federal state, which would leave each component with extensive autonomy. By contrast, Serbia was a relatively homogeneous country which had gained increasing self-confidence since independence in 1878, so that it was interested mainly in increasing its power over other territories [settled by the Serbs V. B. S.] in a Greater Serbia [the United Serbian State V. B. S.] [Jan Palmowski, A Dictionary of Contemporary World History from 1900 to the present day, Oxford, 2004, New York, p. 706].
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aspirations. The initial intention of the Yugoslav Committee was to show to the Entente powers that the Yugoslavs from the Monarchy were completely against the Treaty of London. This meant, with respect to the right to the national self-determination that they did not want to be included after the war into Italy. The Yugoslav Committee was established under the directions given by the Serbian government. The Serbian government, particularly its Prime Minister, envisaged the Committee as its propaganda agency with the original task to inform the Entente, especially the British public, about the hard position of the South Slavs in AustriaHungary as well as about the national claims of the Austrian South Slavs upon the South Slavic political integration. In the other words, the Yugoslav Committee was designed by Serbia as an organisation with an assignment to spread pro-Yugoslav propaganda, but not as an independent political organisation. Nevertheless, the leaders of the Committee wanted to transform it into a representative organisation of the whole South Slavic population within AustriaHungary before the Entente powers. Actually, the Committees leadership understood it as an independent political organisation, which should be posed on an equal level with the Serbian government, as another one political subject in the process of unification. Shortly, the Committees leaders required that the Serbian government would recognise the Yugoslav Committee as a political representative of all Yugoslavs from the Monarchy as an independent political institution, and as one of two equal political partners with regard to the South Slavic state unification. One of the most important disagreements between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government was with respect to the way (process) of the political unification. Serbias attitude towards it was that she should be the only representative of all Yugoslavs (the South Slavs without Bulgarians) before the Entente and in fact to accomplish the union. In the other words, only Serbia should be the Yugoslav Piedmont. Contrary, the Committees leaders required that the unification should be the cause of negotiations between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government as two independent political institutions and representatives of different kind of the Yugoslavs: those who were living within the Dual Monarchy and those who were living in their independent states of Serbia and Montenegro. The Committees leadership wanted, in fact, to avoid the
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creation of the new state as a one-sided political act, imposed by Serbia. Generally, the Serbian government never officially recognised the Yugoslav Committee as an independent organisation that had the right to make political decisions. Moreover, the Serbian government never de jure gave the right to the Committee to represent the South Slavic population from AustriaHungary. However, at the Corfu Conference in 1917 the Serbian government de facto recognised the Yugoslav Committee as an independent political institution which made political decisions; an institution that was on equal level alongside with the Serbian government with regard to the process of unification, and finally as a representative political organisation of the South Slavs from AustriaHungary. The most important disagreements between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government concerned the internal organisation of the new state and the name of it. In addition, the Yugoslav Committee had the intention to resolve the problem upon the internal state organisation before the end of the war. On the other hand, for the Serbian government, to resolve such kind of problems during the war would be very harmful for the process of union itself. Subsequently, these problems should be solved after the war and after the official proclamation of the new state. The Yugoslav Committee was a supporter of Yugoslavia, as the name for the new state. On the opposite side was the Serbian government for whom the name of Yugoslavia was an expression of AustroSlavism, launched by the Viennese authorities in the mid-19th c. The Serbian government promoted theses of three-names nation (the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) and wanted desperately to incorporate the Serbian ethnic name into the name of the new state. Therefore, according to Serbias proposal, the name of the new state should be the state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. With respect to the internal state organisation, the Yugoslav Committee fought mainly for the federal one, or for the state with a high rank of autonomous rights and local self-governments of the ethnohistorical provinces. Its federal state organisation was anticipated mainly by historical provincialism as the basis for the internal governmental state organisation. An initial approach by the Yugoslav Committee was also that a new almost a single South Slavic state had to be republic but not monarchy; the latter was a crucial
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aim advocated by the Serbian government. In addition, Serbia was the supporter of a more centralised and united state in comparison with the Committees stadpoint. The most significant Committees requirement with regard to the question of the process of union was that the Kingdom of Serbia on one hand, and the lands populated by the Yugoslavs in the Danube Monarchy on another one, had to be equal political partners, represented by the Serbian government and the Committee itself in the process of the South Slavic integration. The final act of union should be made after the negotiations between these two political subjects. This meant that actually Croatia should be a political leader of the South Slavs from AustriaHungary. The Serbian and Montenegrin governments were considered as political leaders of the South Slavic people only from Yugoslav independent states of Kingdom of Serbia and Kingdom of Montenegro. Beside these requirements, the principle of a plebiscite was one of the crucial points in the Committees attitude towards the process of union. Serbias attitude in respect to this process was that she herself should be the only political representative of the whole Yugoslav population (i.e., the South Slavs without the Bulgarians) for the reasons that: 1) Serbia had a legally composed government; 2) she was internationally recognised; and 3) she was an associate member of the Entente military coalition. The crucial task of the Corfu Conference was that an agreement between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee upon the most urgent problems concerning the establishment of the new state would be reached and signed. The most important reasons for the Corfu Conference convocation are: 1) the Russian March Revolution; 2) the possibilities for preservation of AustriaHungary; and 3) the Italian diplomatic and military campaign in Albania and Epirus against the Yugoslav interests. The Corfu Conference was an expression of a newly established European political situation after the Russian March Revolution as 1) an answer to the possibility either to preserve AustriaHungary, or to re-organise it on a tripartite basis, and as 2) an answer to the Italian territorial pretension to the Yugoslav lands. In the other words, both the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee wanted to make officially known that a strong Yugoslav
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state would be created which would be able to defend itself from the Italian pressure from Dalmatia, Albania and Epirus. During the negotiations on the Island of Corfu, from June 15th to July 20th, 1917, both sides recognised each other as de facto authorised representatives of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The crucial aim of the issued declaration was creation of almost a single South Slavic state. According to the Declaration, this state should be the constitutional, democratic as well as the parliamentary monarchy, with the Serbian dynasty (Karaorevi) as a head of the state. The local autonomies were guaranteed, based on the natural, social and economic points of view, rather that on historical and ethnical ones. The constitution would be accepted by the Constituent Assembly with numerically qualified majority of the votes. The future state was named as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in which the legislative institution should be the National Parliament, elected by the universal, direct and secret suffrage. However, in the Corfu Declaration it was not mentioned how the state would be governed until the time of convocation of the Constituent Assembly. In the other words, a temporary parliament and government were not foreseen in the Corfu Declaration, as the institutions that would govern the country from from the time of its proclamation until the time of the constitution (interregnum period). The Corfu Declaration had its own advantages and disadvantages. The most important advantages are: 1) an almost a single South Slavic national state would be established; 2) its boundaries would be created on the ethnical principle; 3) its all citizens would have the same rights before the law; 4) a suffrage would be universal, direct and secret; 5) the state-constitution would be proclaimed by the Constituent Assembly; and 6) all recognised religions could be practised freely and publicly. On the other hand, the crucial disadvantages and omissions of the Corfu Declaration are: 1) the new state would be proclaimed without carrying out of a universal plebiscite; 2) the only three nationalities the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are recognised (a disadvantage only from the point of the present-day official national self-identification); 3) only three creeds Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim are conceived as official; 4) the state-constitution would be proclaimed by a numerical, but not by a qualified majority of the votes in the Constituent Assembly (a disadvantage according to the present-day standards); and finally 5) the type of the state a monarchy, was
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resolved in advance without a decision of the Constituent Assembly elected under the universal plebiscite. The final stage of almost total South Slavic integration began when the National Council of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was founded in Zagreb, on October 6th, 1918. The most important consequence of this event was that the Council replaced the political role of the Yugoslav Committee in negotiations with the Serbian government as a representative institution of the Yugoslavs within AustriaHungary. In the other words, the National Council envisaged itself as a representative political institution, actually as a government of the South Slavs from AustriaHungary. According to the Councils programme, the most significant task of it was the unification of all Slovenes, Croats and Serbs into a national, free and independent state, established on democratic principles. Moreover, the National Council in Zagreb required that all Yugoslav ethnographic territory, regardless on the current provincial as well as the state boundaries, would be included into the new state. In order to fulfil this aim, the Council abolished the state-legal and national-legal connections between the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia with the Kingdom of Hungary and the Austrian Empire on October 29th, 1918. Actually, the Croatian Parliament (Sabor) proclaimed an independent State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, within the territory of AustriaHungary, on the basis of the peoples self-determination proclaimed by the US President W. Wilson in January 1918. The crucial requirements demanded by the National Council in Zagreb for the up-coming negotiations with the Serbian government in Belgrade were in connection with the form of a government and the internal state-organisation. Both problems should be resolved within the universal National Assembly that should make a decision upon the issue by the qualified majority of the voting body and on a total basis of an equality between the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. Consequently, the Council did not recognise the principal decision agreed on the Corfu Island between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government, i.e. that the new state would be a monarchy and that the numerical majority of the votes in the Constituent Assembly would accept the state constitution. In effect, the Council did not only remove the Committee as a representative political institution of the South Slavs within the Dual Monarchy, than the Council challenged the principal point of the Corfu agreement. In addition, the royal
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sanction (veto), which was proclaimed by the Corfu Declaration, was not mentioned in the Councils requirements. The last conference in relation to the establishment of the Yugoslav state was held in Geneva (November 6th9th, 1918) between the five political subjects: the Yugoslav Committee, the National Council in Zagreb, the Serbian government, Montenegrin Council for National Unification and the Serbian parliamentary opposition parties. At issued Declaration it was firstly pointed out the unification of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into the one indivisible independent state. Contrary to the Corfu Declaration, the Geneva Declaration elaborated the problem how the new state would be governed until the time of a convocation of the Constituent Assembly. It was stipulated that a joint Ministry of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes would be created as a temporary government until a convocation of the Constituent Assembly. During the Geneva Conference, the Serbian government officially recognised the National Council as one of the equal political actors in the process of the Yugoslav integration that was clearly stated in the Declaration. The Serbian government also recognised the fact that the National Council replaced the Yugoslav Committee as a representative institution of the South Slavs in the Dual Monarchy. The Serbian government never recognised de jure the representative role of the Yugoslav Committee, but recognised this role to the National Committee that was in fact the principal evidence that the National Council and de facto and de jure replaced the Yugoslav Committee as the representative institution of the South Slavs from Austria Hungary. However, this was valid only for the Serbian government, but not and for the Entente coalition who de facto considered only Serbia as the legal representative of the whole South Slavic population. During the Geneva negotiations, the Serbian government also officially recognised the existence of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, and the National Council as its legal government. Finally, according to the Geneva Declaration, the future state would be governed by both the Serbian Government and the National Council, as equal political subjects until the time of creation of the mutual ministry. Surely, the principal point of the Geneva Declaration was its conclusion that the Constituent Assembly would make a final decision upon the governmental type of the state (i.e., to be a republic or a monarchy). In sum, the Geneva Declaration was a revision of the
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Corfu Declaration and at the same time a great political victory of the National Council over Serbias governmental policy. The leadership of the Yugoslav Committee for the first time did not want to reconcile with the fact that the National Council replaced the Committee in negotiations with Serbia. However, very soon, when, particularly its president, Dr. Ante Trumbi, understood that only the National Council could be a counterbalance to Serbia, openly gave a full support to the Councils political work. Dr. Ante Trumbi accepted a fact that the National Council would be a better representative political institution of the AustriaHungarian South Slavs before the Entente rather than the Yugoslav Committee. Generally, during the final stage of the process of unification, the Yugoslav Committee and the National Council were in agreement towards the policy of the Serbian government. It was evident in the Naputak, issued by the National Council, in which a provisional government in the future common Yugoslav state was designed to be created, composed by the members of the Serbian government, the National Council and the Yugoslav Committee. Only the National Council and the Serbian government legally carried out this final stage of the Yugoslav state unification. The Councils principal demands upon the unification have been included into the Naputak (or conditions), brought by a special Councils delegation to Belgrade at the end of November 1918. According to these conditions, the final inner state-organisation would be decided by a two-thirds majority of the votes of the National Assembly of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. This meant, the Council favoured Geneva Declarations qualified majority of the votes rather than the Corfu Declarations numerical one. The Constituent Assembly should accept the state-constitution, to determine a form of the inner staterule and a state-governmental organisation (to be either republic or monarchy). However, the Councils delegation in Belgrade did not respect the Naputak in its own Address to Serbias Regent. First of all, the delegation in advance recognised the monarchical rule of the state with the Serbian royal dynasty on its head what means that the delegation rejected the Councils principal requirement. Second of all, it was not stressed in the Address that the qualified majority would vote a state-constitution. In this case the delegation recognised the Corfu Declaration as a basis for the union and rejected the Geneva Declaration. It can be concluded that the Zagreb delegation did not
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respect the Naputak primarily because of the Italian military threats to the territory of Dalmatia and Istria, and a revolutionary fermentation within the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. Besides just mentioned one, the following three observations and explanations are the personal opinion of the author of this book as probably a new contribution to the better understanding of the final stage of the process of the Yugoslav integration. Firstly, both the Serbian government in Belgrade and the National Council in Zagreb claimed that they were representing territories of Vojvodina (Baka, Banat and Baranja) concerning the union. In the other words, the Kingdom of Serbia, as well as the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, claimed that they incorporated Vojvodina into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. According to the both attitudes, Vojvodina was a part of their states before the union. Secondly, the Councils Delegation de facto did not recognise the state unification between Montenegro and Serbia (proclaimed in Podgorica on November 26th, 1918) that was previously already recognised by the National Council in Zagreb. In fact, the National Council did not recognise the unification between Vojvodina and Serbia (on November 25th, 1918), but recognised the unification between Montenegro and Serbia. However, the Councils delegation did not recognise both of these unifications. Thirdly, for the Councils delegation the union of almost all South Slavs into a single national state was made by three independent states: 1) the Kingdom of Serbia; 2) the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs; and 3) the Kingdom of Montenegro. On the other hand, for both the Serbian government and the National Council, the union was made by territorial integration of: 1) the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro; and 2) the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. According to the official Proclamation of the union (that was in fact a verification of the Councils Proclamation of the union at its evening session on November 23rd, 1918), issued in Belgrade on December 1st, 1918, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created through the territorial unification of two independent states: 1) the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro; and 2) the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs.245 In the final Proclamation of the new
This Proclamation was adopted by the Narodna Skuptina (the Parliament) of Serbia at its 98th ordinary sitting in Belgrade on 16/29th, December 1918 with a poetic text: The bitter fight was over, the sharp sword were broken/The golden crown was shattered, and all was drowned in blood/Both Emperors lie
245
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state (on December 1st, 1918) two principal Councils demands were not taken into account: 1) the state-form would be decided by the Constituent Assembly; and 2) the state-constitution would be proclaimed by the qualified majority of the votes. The first point was resolved in the favour of the Serbian royal dynasty and the second one was not even mentioned in the Proclamation. In regard to the state-name, the three-names nation conception (The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), supported by the Serbian government, was accepted at the expense to the National Councils attitude towards the name of the state as Yugoslavia. According to the FirstDecember Proclamation, in comparison with the Naputak, the Yugoslav Committees representatives were not anticipated to participate in the provisional government of the new state. A political unification of almost all South Slavs was done through an agreement that was concluded by the National Councils Delegation and the Serbian Regent. For the reason of the Italian military threats, the Zagreb delegation disregarded two crucial Councils requirements in favour of the Serbian side. On the other hand, the Kingdom of Serbia (and Montenegro) assumed to try to defend the territory of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. Consequently, Serbia made a good use of the hard position in which has been the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in order to impose her own conditions for the unification (otherwise it will be created by Belgrade ethnolinguistically homogeneous Greater/United Serbia instead of a heterogeneous Yugoslavia). During the four war years, when the unification was carried on and finally done, several principal documents (declarations, proclamations, statements etc.) were issued by the most relevant political factors with respect to the South Slavic integration. Among those documents, the Corfu Declaration in effect was the crucial one, at least because the fact that the final act of the unification (the FirstDecember Proclamation) was completely based on the sense of this Declaration.246 Firstly, the state-name was exactly the same one that it was decided in the Corfu Declaration: The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Secondly, the principal problem with regards to
dead [Sneana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents From its creation to its dissolution, Catholic University Nijmegen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, pp. 161 163]. 246 Jan Palmowski, A Dictionary of Contemporary World History from 1900 to the present day, Oxford, 2004, New York, pp. 153, 706.
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the governmental type of the state was resolved in favour of the Corfu Declaration, rather than according to the demands from the Geneva Declaration, the Proclamation of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, as well as the Naputak. According to the First-December Act, the new state was proclaimed as the Kingdom with the Karaorevi dynasty on a head of it. Thirdly, two significant points incorporated into the Corfu Declaration were realised by the First-December Proclamation: 1) a dismemberment of AustriaHungary; and 2) an integration of the South Slavic population into a single independent state. In addition, according to the Proclamation, the stateboundaries would be drawn with respect to the ethnographic boundaries of our entire race, which was also in accordance with the Corfu Declaration. The monarch obliged himself to govern the country on the constitutional, parliamentary as well as democratic principles, based on universal suffrage that was also written in the Corfu Declaration. Finally, the decision that a Constituent Assembly would issue a state-constitution was in the spirit of the agreement made on Corfu. The principal requirement launched by the National Council in the Proclamation of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, the Geneva Declaration and the Naputak, that governmental type of the state would be decided by the qualified majority of the votes of the Constitutional Assembly, was avoided by the Proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on December 1st, 1918. It is the crucial evidence that the First-December Proclamation was based on the Corfu Declaration. Moreover, the first constitution of the new state, the Vidovdan Constitution, proclaimed on the St. Vitus day (June 28th, 1921), was adopted by the numerical majority of the votes, rather than by a qualified one, what was in Corfu Declarations sense, alongside with the fact that the state was the kingdom with the Karaorevi dynasty on a head of it.247 All in all, the Corfu Declaration was the principal document concerning the South Slavic integration, regardless on several significant demands and proposals given by the Yugoslav Committee and primarily by the
247 When the unification was officially proclaimed on December 1st, 1918 both sides did not mention anything precisely concerning this majority. Serbian Prime Minister, during the creation of the constitution, was in opinion that every majority, except a simple one, can satisfy demands from the Corfu declaration. In effect, the Vidovdan Constitution was issued by the absolute majority what was 210 votes in the Constituent Assembly. Many non-Serb authors from the ex-Yugoslavia are willing to see in creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes only the artificial construction based on the reaction of the Great Powers on the breakdown of imperialistic AustriaHungary, Russia and the Ottoman Empire [Jelena Guskova, Istorija jugoslovenske krize 19902000, I, Beograd, 2003, p. 51].
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National Council that were in the opposite sense to the Corfu Declaration.
Territorial aspirations of the Balkan states during the WWI
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APPENDIXES
I) THE DECLARATION OF CORFU
(CORFU, JULY 20TH, 1917) THE AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, RECOGNISING THAT IT IS THE DESIRE OF OUR PEOPLE TO FREE ITSELF FROM ALL FOREIGN DOMINATION, AND TO CONSTITUTE ITSELF AS AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE, AGREE IN DECLARING THAT THIS STATE MUST BE BASED UPON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES: 1) THE STATE OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, WHO ARE ALSO KNOWN BY THE NAME OF SOUTHERN SLAVS OR YUGOSLAVS, WILL BE A FREE AND INDEPENDENT KINGDOM, WITH AN INDIVISIBLE TERRITORY AND UNITY OF ALLEGIANCE. IT WILL BE A CONSTITUTIONAL, DEMOCRATIC, AND PARLIAMENTARY MONARCHY, UNDER THE KARAGEORGEVITCH DYNASTY, WHICH HAS ALWAYS SHARED THE FEELINGS OF THE NATION AND HAS PLACED THE NATIONAL WILL ABOVE ALL ELSE. 2) THIS STATE WILL BE NAMED "THE KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES", AND THE STYLE OF THE SOVEREIGN WILL BE "KING OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES". THIS STATE WILL HAVE ONE COAT-OF-ARMS, ONE FLAG AND ONE CROWN, ITS EMBLEMS BEING COMPOSED OF THE PRESENT EXISTING EMBLEMS. 3) THE SPECIAL SERB, CROAT AND SLOVENE COLOURS AND COATS-OF-ARMS MAY BE FREELY HOISTED AND USED. 4) THE THREE NATIONAL DESIGNATIONS WILL BE EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW, AND MAY BE FREELY USED IN PUBLIC LIFE.
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5) THE TWO ALPHABETS, CYRILLIC AND LATIN, WILL ALSO RANK EQUALLY THROUGHOUT THE KINGDOM. 6) ALL RECOGNISED RELIGIONS SHALL BE EXERCISED FREELY AND PUBLICLY, AND IN PARTICULAR THE ORTHODOX, ROMAN CATHOLIC, AND MUSSULMAN CREEDS, WHICH ARE CHIEFLY PROFESSED BY OUR PEOPLE, WILL BE EQUAL AND WILL HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS IN REGARD TO THE STATE. 7) THE CALENDAR SHALL BE UNIFIED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 8) THE TERRITORY OF THE KINGDOM WILL INCLUDE ALL TERRITORY IN WHICH OUR PEOPLE FORMS THE CONTINUOUS POPULATION, AND CAN NOT BE MUTILATED WITHOUT ENDANGERING THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE COMMUNITY. OUR NATION DEMANDS NOTHING THAT BELONGS TO OTHERS, BUT ONLY WHAT ITS OWN. IT DESIRES FREEDOM AND UNITY. THEREFORE IT CONSCIOUSLY AND FIRMLY REFUSES ALL PARTIAL SOLUTIONS OF THE PROPOSITIONS OF THE DELIVERANCE FROM AUSTROHUNGARIAN DOMINATION, AND ITS UNION WITH SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO IN ONE SOLE STATE FORMING AN INDIVISIBLE WHOLE. 9) IN THE INTERESTS OF FREEDOM AND OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS OF ALL NATIONS, THE ADRIATIC SEA SHALL BE FREE AND OPEN TO ALL. 10) ALL CITIZENS SHALL BE EQUAL AND ENJOY THE SAME RIGHTS TOWARDS THE STATE AND BEFORE THE LAW. 11) DEPUTIES TO THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT SHALL BE ELECTED BY UNIVERSAL, DIRECT AND SECRET SUFFRAGE. 12) THE CONSTITUTION TO BE ESTABLISHED AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE BY A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTED BY UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE, WILL BE THE BASIS OF THE LIFE OF THE STATE. IT WILL ESTABLISH THE POSSIBILITY OF ORGANISING LOCAL AUTONOMIES. IT WILL COME INTO FORCE AFTER RECEIVING THE ROYAL SANCTION. THE NATION THUS UNIFIED WILL FORM A STATE OF SOME 12.000.000 INHABITANTS, WHICH WILL BE A POWERFUL BULWARK
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AGAINST GERMAN AGGRESSION AND AN INSEPARABLE ALLY OF ALL CIVILISED STATES AND PEOPLES. NIKOLA PASIC SERBIAN PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS DR. ANTE TRUMBIC PRESIDENT OF THE SOUTHERN SLAV COMMITTEE
II) PROCLAMATION OF THE STATE OF SLOVENES, CROATS AND SERBS
(ZAGREB, OCTOBER 29TH, 1918) [. . . ] 1) TO THE HIGH SABOR IT IS PROPOSED TO CONCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: ON THE BASIS OF THE COMPLETE RIGHT OF PEOPLE'S SELF-DETERMINATION WHICH IS NOW RECOGNISED BY ALL WARRING PARTIES, THE CROATIAN STATE ASSEMBLY CONCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:
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ALL NATIONAL-LEGAL RELATIONS AND CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF CROATIA, SLAVONIA AND DALMATIA, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY AND THE EMPIRE OF AUSTRIA, ON THE OTHER, ARE DISCHARGED. THE CROATO-HUNGARIAN COMPROMISE IS DECLARED NULL AND VOID. THE CROATO-HUNGARIAN COMPROMISE (ARTICLE I) FROM 1868 IS DECLARED NULL AND VOID, AS WELL AS ALL LATTER ANNEXES AND REVISIONS, SO THAT FROM TODAY ONWARDS DALMATIA, CROATIA AND SLAVONIA NEITHER HAVE LEGALLY NOR ACTUALLY ANY JOINT NATIONAL INTERCOURSE. 2) ON THE BASIS OF THE MODERN PEOPLE'S PRINCIPLE, AND ON THE BASIS OF THE UNITY OF THE SLOVENE, CROAT AND SERB PEOPLES, DALMATIA, CROATIA, SLAVONIA WITH RIJEKA ARE PROCLAIMED AN INDEPENDENT STATE WITH RESPECT TO HUNGARY AND AUSTRIA AND BECOMES THE JOINT PEOPLE'S SOVEREIGN STATE OF SLOVENES, CROATS AND SERBS ON THE ENTIRE ETHNOGRAPHIC TERRITORY OF THIS PEOPLE, WITHOUT REGARD TO ANY TERRITORIAL OR STATE BOUNDARIES. THE PEOPLE'S CONSTITUTIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED SLOVENES, CROATS AND SERBS WILL DECIDE WITH A QUALIFIED MAJORITY [...] ON THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND ON THE INTERNAL NATIONAL ORGANISATION OF OUR STATE, BASED ON THE COMPLETE EQUALITY OF SLOVENES, CROATS AND SERBS. [. . . ]
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III) GENEVA DECLARATION
(GENEVA, NOVEMBER 9TH, 1918) WITH THE JOINT EFFORT OF THE ALLIED PEOPLE AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WITH THE POWER OF THE SERB, CROAT AND SLOVENE PEOPLES, ON THE BATTLE-FIELDS AND ON THE SEA ALL OBSTACLES TO ITS UNIFICATION ARE BROKEN. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA AND PARLIAMENTARY POLITICAL GROUPS, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL IN ZAGREB, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE YUGOSLAV COMMITTEE IN LONDON, GATHERED IN GENEVA, THE CITY OF FREEDOM, HAPPY THAT THEY CAN UNANIMOUSLY SOLEMNY STATE AND DECLARE TO ALL THE WORLD ITS UNIFICATION IN THE STATE OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES. THE PEOPLE OF MONTENEGRO, TO WHICH OUR BROTHERLY EMBRACE IS OPEN, WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HURRY TO GREET AND TO JOIN THIS ACT, WHICH HAS ALWAYS BEEN ITS IDEAL. WITH THIS DAY AND WITH THIS ACT A NEW STATE IS EMERGING AND PRESENTS ITSELF AS ONE INDIVISIBLE STATE ENTITY AND AS A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNITY OF FREE PEOPLES. THERE ARE NO LONGER ANY BORDERS TO DIVIDE US. IN ALL FOREIGN DEMONSTRATIONS OF LAW, POWER AND WILL, THE STATE ENTITY WILL BE REPRESENTED BY REGULAR ORGANS OF THE JOINT MINISTRY OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES CREATED FOR THAT PURPOSE IN THE SAME SPIRIT AS THIS ACT. THE COMPOSITION OF THAT GOVERNMENT IS MADE PUBLIC. ADDITIONALLY, THE PUBLIC WILL BE MADE THE FURTHER DOMAIN OF ITS COMPETENCE [. . . ] THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA AND THE NATIONAL COUNCIL IN ZAGREB WILL CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT THEIR TASKS, EACH IN ITS INTERNAL LEGAL AND TERRITORIAL DOMAIN APPLYING CURRENT METHODS, UNTIL THE
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DEFINITIVE ORGANISATION OF THE STATE PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IS NOT ADOPTED BY THE GREAT ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, ELECTED BY GENERAL, EQUAL, DIRECT AND SECRET BALLOT OF ALL CITIZENS. THAT CONSTITUTION WILL FORM A BASIS FOR ALL STATE LIFE, AND SOURCE AND HARBOUR OF ALL POWERS AND RIGHTS, AND THE WHOLE STATE LIFE WILL BE REGULATED ACCORDING TO IT. STATE BORDERS WITH NEIGHBOURING STATES WILL BE DRAWN ACCORDING TO PRINCIPLES OF NATIONALITY RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF EACH PEOPLE. A GUARANTEE OF THIS LIES IN THE UNBREAKABLE FAITH AND BELIEF OF OUR PEOPLE IN ITS RIGHT, IN PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE PROCLAIMED BY OUR ALLIANCES AND ACCEPTED BY THE PUBLIC CONSCIENCE OF ALL THE ENLIGHTENED WORLD. SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES! OUR AGE-LONG DREAM HAS BECOME REALITY. WE ARE UNITED IN FREEDOM. LET US CELEBRATE THIS GREAT DAY OF OUR HIGHEST NATIONAL BLESSEDNESS AND JOYFULNESS, AND LET US MAINTAIN ORDER. WITHOUT ORDER THERE IS NO STRONG STATE. ONLY A STRONG STATE CAN IN DUE TIME PROVIDE WELFARE FOR ITS CITIZENS AND FULFIL ALL ITS SOCIAL DUTIES AND ITS MISSION, ENSURING THE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIETY, ABOUT PROTECTION OF THE WEAK, FAMILIES WHO HAVE SUFFERED LOSS AND THE SICK. RESPECT THE MEMORY OF ALL SOLDIERS WHICH GAVE THEIR LIVES FOR OUR NATIONAL AND HUMAN IDEAL. LET ALL OF US [...] RESPECT ALL THE HISTORICAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF OUR ARMY AND LET US PASS ON TO OUR HAPPY FUTURE GENERATION OUR HAPPY GREATEFULNESS WHICH WE HAVE FOR THE NOBLE PEOPLES WITH WHOM WE GAINED VICTORY. YUGOSLAVS, LONG LIVE, IN HONOUR AND GLORY BETWEN PEOPLES, OUR BEAUTIFUL, DEAR YOUNG FATHERLAND. PRESIDENT OF THE MINISTERIAL MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS: COUNCIL AND
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NIKOLA PASIC PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL IN ZAGREB: DR. ANTUN KOROSEC PRESIDENT LONDON: OF THE YUGOSLAV COMMITTEE IN
DR. ANTE TRUMBIC REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AGREEING PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS: [...]
IV) PROCLAMATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES
(BELGRADE, DECEMBER 1ST, 1918) (THE DELEGATION OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ZAGREB, REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE OF SLOVENIA, CROATIA, BOSNIA, BANAT AND BARANJA HAVE PRESENTED TO
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HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS, CROWN PRINCE ALEXANDER THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS): YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS! WE ARE HAPPY IN BEING ABLE TO GREET YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS, IN THE NAME OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE SLOVENES, CROATS AND SERBS, IN THE CAPITAL OF LIBERATED SERBIA, AS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE VICTORIOUS NATIONAL ARMY, WHICH IN THE COMMON STRUGGLE SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE ARMIES OF OUR MIGHTY ALLIES HAS CREATED THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE GREAT IDEAL OF OUR NATIONAL UNION. THE SLOVENES, CROATS AND SERBS, WHO HAVE EFFECTED A REVOLUTION ON THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY, HAVE TEMPORARILY CONSTITUTED THEMSELVES AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE. IMBUED WITH THE IDEA OF NATIONAL UNITY AND ON THE STRENGTH OF THE GREAT PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY WHICH DEMAND THAT EVERY PEOPLE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE ITS OWN DESTINY, THEY HAVE DECLEARED ALREADY IN THE PROCLAMATION OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON OCTOBER 19, THAT THEY WISH AND ARE DETERMINED TO UNITE WITH SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO IN ONE JOINT NATIONAL STATE OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, [...] TO EMBRACE ALL THE CONTINUOUS ETHNOGRAPHIC TERRITORY OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS. IN ORDER TO REALISE THIS IDEA, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL AT ITS SITTING OF NOVEMBER 29 RESOLVED TO PROCLAIM THE UNION OF THE STATE OF THE SLOVENES, CROATS AND SERBS WITH SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO IN ONE SINGLE STATE, AND ELECTED A DELEGATION, WHICH NOW PRESENTS ITSELF BEFORE YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS TO COMMUNICATE TO YOU OFFICIALLY AND IN A SOLEMN MANNER THIS RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL HAS RESOLVED THAT THE POWER OF THE SOVEREIGN THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE TERRITORY OF THE NOW UNITED STATE SHALL BE VESTED IN HIS MAJESTY KING PETER, RESPECTIVELY IN YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS IN HIS STEAD AS PRINCE REGENT, AND THAT
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LIKEWISE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS' GOVERNMENT AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL NATIONAL PARTIES IN SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO A SINGLE PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT SHALL BE FORMED FOR THE WHOLE TERRITORY OF THE YUGOSLAV STATE, WITH A SINGLE NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE BODY. YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS! IN VIEW OF THIS PROVISIONAL STATE OF THINGS, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL DESIRES THAT THIS TEMPORARY NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE BODY BE CONSTITUTED BY A JOINT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL COUNCIL AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA, THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT TO THIS NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE BODY BE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MODERN PARLIAMENTARY PRINCIPLES, AND THAT THIS NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE BODY SHOULD REMAIN IN SESION UNTIL THE CONVOCATION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, IN ORDER TO THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THE PARLIAMENTARY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT MAY FIND FULL EXPRESSION. FOR THE SAME REASON THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTIONS OF HERETOFORE SHOULD BE RETAINED IN FORCE, UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT AND BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR DUTIES TO THE AUTONOMOUS REPRESENTATIVE BODIES. IN THIS PERIOD OF TRANSITION IT WILL BE NECESSARY IN OUR OPINION TO CREATE THE PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS FOR THE FINAL ORGANISATION OF OUR UNITARY STATE. TO THIS END OUR STATE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ABOVE ALL PREPARE THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL, OUGHT TO BE ELECTED ON THE BASIS OF UNIVERSAL EQUAL, DIRECT SECRET AND PROPORTIONAL SUFFRAGE, AND CONVOCED AT THE LATEST SIX MONTHS AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE. IN THIS HISTORIC HOUR IN WHICH WE PRESENT OURSELVES BEFORE YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE FROM THE WHOLE OF
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THE YUGOSLAV TERRITORY OF THE FORMER AUSTROHUNGARIAN MONARCHY, WE ARE PROFOUNDLY GRIEVED TO BE OBLIGED TO NOTE THAT LARGE AND PRECIOUS PARTS OF OUR NATIONALY TERRITORY ARE OCCUPIED BY THE TROOPS OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY, WHICH IS ALLIED TO THE ENTENTE POWERS, AND WITH WHICH WE DESIRE TO LIVE ON TERMS OF GOOD AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS. WE CANNOT RECOGNISE, HOWEVER, THE JUSTICE OF ANY AGREEMENT AND STILL LESS OF THE PACT OF LONDON - IN VIRTUE OF WHICH WE WOULD BE COMPELLED, IN VIOLATION IN THE PRINCIPLES OF NATIONALITY AND SELF - DETERMINATION, TO CEDE PART OF OUR TERRITORY TO AN ALIEN STATE. WE DRAW YOUR ROYAL HIGNESS' SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE EXTENT OF THE ITALIAN OCCUPATION EXCEEDS THE LIMITS AND POWERS DETERMINED BY THE ACTUAL CLAUSES OF THE ARMISTICE CONCLUDED WITH THE COMMANDER - IN CHIEF OF THE FORMER AUSTROHUNGARIAN ARMY, AFTER THESE TERRITORIES HAD ALREDY BEEN DECLARED INDEPENDENT AND AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE STATE OF THE SLOVENES, CROATS AND SERBS. THE NECESSARY PROOFS THEREOF WE SHALL SUBMIT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS. WITH COMPLETE CONFIDENCE WE CHERISH THE HOPE THAT YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS TOGETHER WITH OUR WHOLE NATION WILL STRIVE THAT IN THE END OF FRONTIERS OF OUR STATE BE DRAWN IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO AGREE WITH OUR ETHNOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AS PROCLAIMED BY PRESIDENT WILSON OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [...], AND BY ALL THE ENTENTE POWERS. LONG LIVE HIS MAJESTY KING PETER! LONG LIVE YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS! LONG LIVE OUR UNITED PEOPLE OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES! LONG LIVE FREE AND UNITED YUGOSLAVIA! (REPLY OF HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS CROWN PRINCE ALEXANDER, READ BY THE PRIME MINISTER):
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GENTLEMEN DELEGATES, YOUR ARRIVAL IN THE NAME OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE SLOVENS, CROATS AND SERBS, WORTHLY REPRESENTATIVE OF OUR GREAT NATIONAL IDEA, AND YUOR COMMUNICATION OF ITS HISTORIC DECISION OF NOVEMBER 29, WHEREBY IT PROCLAIMED THE UNION OF ALL OUR PEOPLE AND OF ALL PARTS OF OUR BELOVED,MARTYRED BUT GLORIOUS MOTHERLAND, HAS FILLED ME WITH PROFOUND JOY. IN ACCEPTING THIS COMMUNICATION I AM CONVINCED THAT BY THIS ACT I AM FULFILLING MY ROYAL DUTY AND THAT I AM THEREBY ONLY FINALLY REALISING WHAT THE BEST SONS OF OUR RACE - OF ALL CREEDS AND OF ALL THREE NAMES FROM BOTH SIDES THE DANUBE, THE SAVA AND THE DRINA - BEGAN TO PREPARE ALREADY UNDER THE REIGN OF MY GRAND - FATHER OF AUGUST MEMORY PRINCE ALEXANDER I, AND OF PRINCE MICHAEL, AND WHAT CORRESPONDS TO THE WISHES AND ASPIRATIONS OF MY PEOPLE. IN THE NAME OF HIS MAJESTY KING PETER I, I THEREFORE NOW PROCLAIMTHE UNION OF SERBIA WITH THE LANDS OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF THE SLOVENES, CROATS AND SERBS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES. MAY THIS GREAT HISTORIC FACT BE THE BEST REWARD OF YUOR EFFORTS, OF THOSE OF YUOR COLLEAGUES IN THE NATIONAL COUNCIL, AND OF ALL YOUR FELLOW - WORKERS, WHO HAVE FREED THEMSELVES FROM THE FOREIGN YOKE BY THEIR BOLD REVOLUTION; MAY IT BE THE REWARD OF THE LOFTY NATIONAL CONSCIENCE AND OF THE GREAT SACRIFICES MADE BY ALL BRANCHES OF OUR PEOPLE WHICH THE NATIONAL COUNCIL REPRESENTS. MAY ALSO THIS GREAT FACT OF TODAY BE THE FAIREST UPON THE GLORIOUS GRAVES OF MY OFFICERS AND MEN WHO DIED FOR LIBERTY AND THE FAIREST DECORATION UPON THE BREASTS OF THEIR MORE FORTUNATE COMRADES WHO HAVE LIVED WITH ME TO GAIN THE VICTORY OVER THE MIGHTY ENEMY, WITH THE GREAT AND GENEROUS HELP OF OUR POWERFUL ALLIES.
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THE GALLANT SOLDIERS OF THE YUGOSLAV UNITS IN MY ARMY SHARE THE GLORY OF THESE VICTORIES WITH MY OLD VARRIORS. THEY HASTENED TO YUOR SIDE, YOU RECEIVED THEM AS ONE RECEIVES BROTHERS. I THINK YOU FOR THIS WELCOME IN THE NAME OF MY TROOPS. THANKS FOR YOUR EAGERNESS TO EXPRESS CONFIDENCE IN THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA AND ITS PEOPLE, IN MY ANGUST FATHER HIS MAJESTY KING PETER, AND IN MYSELF. I ASSURE YOU AND THE NATIONAL COUNCIL WHOSE PLENIPOTENTIARIES YOU ARE - AND ALL YOUR BROTHERS AND MINE, THE SLOVENES, CROATS AND SERBS - WHOSEWILL AND THOUGHTS YOU REPRESENT - THAT I AND MY GOVERNMENT TOGETHER WITH ALL THAT REPRESENTS SERBIA AND HER PEOPLE WILL ALWAYS AND EVERYWHERE BE GUIDED SOLELY BY PROFOUND AND SINCERE BROTHERLY LOVE FOR THE INTERESTS AND EVERYTHING HELD SACRED IN THE SOULS OF THOSE IN WHOSE NAME YOU HAVE COME TO ME, IN CONFIRMITY WITH THE WISHES AND DESIRES YOU HAVE JUST EXPRESSED, AND WHICH I AND MY GOVERNMENT ACCEPT IN THEIR ENTIRETY. THE GOVERNMENT WILL AT ONCE ITS ATTENTION TO THE REALISATION OF ALL YOU HAVE REFFERED TO FOR THE TRANSITIONAL AND PROVISIONAL PERIOD UNTIL THE GREAT CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY SHALL HAVE MET AND FINISHED ITS LABOURS, LIKEWISE FOR THE ELECTIONS AND CONSTITUTION OF THE SAME. TRUE TO THE EXAMPLE AND ADVICE GIVEN ME BY MY AUGUST FATHER, I WILL BE KING ONLY OF THE FREE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, AND SHALL ALWAYS REMAIN FAITHFUL TO CONSTITUTIONAL, PARLIAMENTARY AND BROAD DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES, BASED ON UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE. FOR THIS REASON I SHALL CALL UPON YOUR COLLABORATION IN THE FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT WHICH SHALL REPRESENT ALL OUR UNITED MOTHERLAND, AND THIS GOVERNMENT SHALL ALWAYS BE IN TOUCH, FIRST OF ALL WITH YOU, AND THEN WITH THE NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE BODY, IT WILL WORK WITH THE LETTER AND BE RESPONSIBLE TO IT. JOINTLY WITH THE NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE BODY AND THE WHOLE NATION, THIS GOVERNMENT WILL ASSUME AS ITS FIRST DUTY THAT OF SECURING THAT THE FRONTIERS
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OF OUR STATE ARE DRAWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ETHNOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES OF OUR ENTIRE RACE. TOGETHER WITH YOU I HAVE THE RIGHT TO HOPE, AND I DO HOPE THAT OUR GREAT ALLIES AND FRIENDS AND WILL JUSTLY APPRECIATE OUR POINT OF VIEW, AS IT ACCORDS WITH THE PRINCIPLES THEY THEMSELVES HAVE PROCLAIMED, FOR THE VICTORY OF WHICH THEY HAVE SHED SO MUCH GENEROUS BLOOD. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE WORK OF WORLD LIBERATION WILL NOT BE STINTED BY THE SURRENDER OF SO MANY OF OUR GALLANT, PROGRESSIVE AND ENLIGHTENED BROTHERS TO A FOREIGN RULE. I ALSO HOPE THAT THIS POINT OF VIEW WILL FIND SIMILAR EXPRESSION IN THE DECISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY, BECAUSE ITALY OWES HER BIRTH TO THESE SAME PRINCIPLES, WHICH WERE SO BRILLIANTLY INTERPRETED BY PEN AND DEED BY HER GREAT SONS OF LAST CENTURY. WE CAN FREELY SAY THAT IN OUR RESPECT FOR THESE PRINCIPLES AND TRADITIONS, IN OUR SINCERE FRIENDSHIP AND GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS THE PEOPLE OF ITALY WILL FIND GREATER ADVANTAGE AND SECURITY THAN IN THE REALISATION OF THE TERMS OF THE TREATY OF LONDON, SIGNED WITHOUT US AND NEVER RECOGNISED BY US, AND CONCLUDED UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THE FALL OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY WAS NOT YET TO BE FORSEEN; SINCE WHICH TIME MANY FORMER CONSIDERATIONS HAVE DISAPPEARED. IN THIS DUTY AS IN ALL OTHERS, I HOPE THAT OUR PEOPLE WILL REMAIN UNITED AND POWERFUL UNTIL THE END, AND THAT IT WILL ENTER UPON ITS NEW LIFE PROUD AND WORTHY OF THE GREATNESS AND HAPPINESS THAT AWAIT IT. I BEG YOU, GENTLEMEN DELEGATES, TO CONVEY MY ROYAL WORD AND GREETING TO ALL MY DEAR BROTHERS THROUGHOUT THE LENGT AND BREADTH OF OUR FREE AND UNITED YUGOSLAVIA. LONG LIVE THE ENTIRE NATION OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES!
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MY OUR KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES BE EVER HAPPY AND GLORIOUS!248
Territorial modifications in the Balkans 1912/1913
248 All declarations and proclamations were taken from: Sneana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents From its creation to its dissolution, Catholic University Nijmegen, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, pp. 141160.
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VLADISLAV B.

C R E AT ION OF T HE K IN G D OM OF SE R B S, C R OA T S AN D SL OVE N E S, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

ASSOC. PROF. VLADISLAV B. SOTIROVI, PH.D.

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

Vilnius University Press Vilnius 2007

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

Assoc. Prof. Vladislav B. Sotirovi, Ph.D.

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

FIRST CHAPTER: THE IDEA OF THE YUGOSLAV UNIFICATION, 17941914

1 Jovan Raji, , , , vol. II,

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

The Balkan territories offered to Serbia by the Entente in 1915

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

The map of AustriaHungary in 1914

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918

120 Wickham Steed in The Times, March 31st , 1916.

CREATION OF THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, 19141918