Euthyphros Dilemma

An attempt at formalized algebraic notation

Sao Kiselkov s December 5, 2011

Disclaimer: Im not a mathematician, so theres probably a boatload of mistakes. Please do not use this for anything important, and do excuse my bad English. Comments welcome at skiselkov@gmail.com. License: CC BY 3.0.

Initial Setup
Let A be the set of all actions: A = {x | x is an action} Let E be the set of all entities: E = {x | x is an entity} Let E A be the binary relation: x y x has the power to do y Let A E be the binary relation: x y x denes y
d d p p

Initial denition of used terms:

(1)

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Let p : E A be a function producing a set of actions a particular entity has the power to do: p(x) = {y | y A : x y} 1
p

(5)

 Let be an entity called God. Denition of morality: Let M be the set of all possible moral outcomes of an action (e.g. {moral, immoral, irrelevant}): M = {x | x is a moral outcome} Let any function m be a system of morals: m:AM Let S be the set of all possible systems of morals: S = {x | x : A M } Let mean objective system of morals. Let f be a function which selects from S: f : S {0, 1} : f (x) = 1 x = Let A be an action which denes (the graph of) f : A:f
d

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The Dilemma
The core idea of Euthyphros dilemma can be formulated as follows: p() Formally: Is there the action in s set of powers?. Informally: Is it in Gods power to dene absolute morality? First horn of the dilemma: p() : f
p d ?

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Therefore, has the power to dene an objective system of morals f . Moreover, given that f (x) = 1 x = without any further restrictions, the denition of f can be arbitrary on S. 2

 Second horn of the dilemma: p() : f

p d

(13)

Therefore, cannot be the sucient reason for the denition of f .

Christian Response

The response arms p(). However, since most Christians are uncomfortable with the possible arbitrarity of the denition of f , a modication of the denition of f is proposed in order to remove the possibility of f being dened arbitrarily: 1. Let E A be the relation of an entity to its nature: x y it is in xs nature to do y 2. Let N A be set of attributes of s nature: N = {x | x} 3. Redene f to be a function which selects from S: f : S {0, 1} : f (x) = 1 x = y x : y N (16) The underlined portion is the modication proposed to the denition of f in order to prevent it from being arbitrary.
n n n

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Conclusion

The above presented formal description of the modern adaptation of Euthyphros dilemma attempts to capture the core of the popular dispute over the dilemma: assumming there is a God and an objective moral standard, does said God dene what it is? The problem for Christianity is that it tries to have it, seemingly, both ways; that is morality is both dened by God and not arbitrary. In the classical Christian response, the problem is resolved by dening a mechanism by which objective morality must necessarily arise: by relating it to the nature of God. The subsequent question on the denition of Gods nature is simply sidestepped by including it in the axioms. While formally correct, this simply results in a meaningless tautology (morality is dened by Gods nature, which is axiomatic, i.e. assumed from the outset). 3