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Risk Aversion in Major League Baseball and its Impact on Winning Percentage

Devin Ensing ECON 385 Professor Treber December 4, 2011

Ensing 2 I. Introduction Payroll disparity in baseball is a widely discussed topic, and many attribute the disparity to differences in revenue between small and large market teams. The underlying cause for concern is competitive balance, as studies have shown that teams with higher payrolls typically enjoy greater success on the field. Another payroll related topic that has received little attention is how payrolls are actually spent. Teams differ not only in how much they spend on players but also how they distribute their payroll. For example, the wildly successful 2001 Seattle Mariners spent only 48.7% of their payroll on starting players while the 1998 New York Yankees enjoyed even greater on field success while spending almost 63% of their payroll on starting players. Moreover, the 2004 Detroit Tigers won only 72 games while spending over 79% of their payroll on starting players, and the 2003 Baltimore Orioles won only 71 games while spending just over 26% on starting players. Anecdotal evidence is inconclusive regarding whether there is a relationship between payroll allocation and winning. While these examples suggest payroll distribution may not influence team success, I believe that payroll distribution will in fact influence a teams winning percentage. If such a relationship does exist, then it is another issue to consider when addressing competitive balance. I am interested in determining whether risk aversion on the part of owners can explain variation in payroll distribution for Major League Baseball (MLB) teams, and as an extension, whether variation in payroll distribution contributes to differences in winning percentages. Although general managers complete all team transactions themselves, I contend that owners have the final say and thus teams are constructed to fit their preferences. Personal preferences and risk aversion are very difficult to measure,

Ensing 3 especially for owners in professional sports. However, risk averse individuals generally prefer to be insured rather than uninsured. I speculate that money spent on non-starters in MLB serves as insurance against poor performance or injury to starters. Consequently, I argue that the higher the percentage of payroll spent on non-starters, the more risk averse the owner. To test this conjecture I assume owners in small revenue markets would be more risk averse than owners in large revenue markets. This assumption begets the question of whether large market teams spend a greater proportion of their payroll on starting players. To address this question I estimate a simple model of payroll distribution. I then turn to address the question of whether spending a higher percent on starting players impacts winning percentage. The remainder of this paper is constructed as follows. Section II provides an overview and discussion of the relevant literature pertaining to the economics of Major League Baseball and past estimates of risk aversion and winning percentage. Section III lays out an economic model, the Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility model, to illustrate how risk aversion could impact the payroll distribution in MLB. Section IV develops empirical models to address the primary questions of interest and discusses the data used to estimate the regression equation. Section V interprets the results from the two regressions, first estimating risk aversion and then determining whether or not payroll distribution has an impact on winning percentage. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper by discussing implications of the regression results and wraps up by discussing possible improvements in the study and extensions for future research.

Ensing 4 II. Literature Review While there have been studies that focused on aspects of risk aversion in sports, this paper deviates from all previous studies by estimating risk aversion from the owners perspective. However, other papers have components that are valuable to study and learn from. Bishop et al (1990) examined risk aversion and free agency in the NFL. In the context of a median voter model, they use risk aversion to investigate player support of free agency. They find that a players attitude towards downside risk may be an important determinant of his willingness to support free agency. In addition, the restricted form of free agency may well be preferred by a majority of players to unconditional free agency (Bishop et al, 115). Bill and Linda Woodland (1991) focused on a different group in a study on the effects of risk aversion on sports wagering, notably the differences between betting on point spread versus odds. The authors use calculus to determine maximum likelihoods of risk aversion for bettors, finding that the amount of money wagered on point spread bets was greater than that generated by odds betting. They also found that the current market structure is a consequence of risk averse attitudes of bettors (Woodland, 638). The closest a paper has come to dealing with the topic of risk aversion in baseball from an owners perspective is Maxcys (2004) paper examining risk management for long-term contracts. The author found that firms have an incentive to reallocate risk with long-term labor contracts (Maxcy, 109). Although this paper is not concerned with how contracts are structured, they do play a part in payroll allocated to certain players. Owners

Ensing 5 usually have to pay a premium to keep their star players, either from a higher average annual value (AAV) contract or a longer contract. While there have not been many papers dealing with risk aversion, there have been papers trying to estimate winning percentage in baseball, which is the second topic this paper is concerned with. The most notable paper that attempts to estimate winning percentage is Scullys (1974) paper wherein he estimates players marginal revenue products (MRPs). Scully uses a two-equation model, first estimating a teams win-loss record from different team inputs, then estimating the team revenue function that relates team winning percentage among other statistics to revenues. He finds that a team raising their win-loss record by one point increases team revenue by $10,330 (Scully, 922). MacDonald and Reynolds (1994) build off of Scullys paper and argue that a players value is based on his contribution to team winning percentage, as team winning percentage is significantly correlated with team revenue. Owners want players that most increase the teams revenue, but the authors do not estimate whether owners prefer highrisk/high-reward players, or players who are more consistent. The regressions show that mean runs scored is arguably the best indicator of an offensive players production (MacDonald and Reynolds, 447), and thus is the statistic that should be used in determining whether or not a player should be acquired. Hakes and Sauer (2006) wrote their paper as an Economic Evaluation of the Moneyball Hypothesis, based on the book Moneyball by Michael Lewis. Before the book was published, there were certain offensive statistics that were overvalued, such as batting average and runs batted in, and some were undervalued, such as on-base

Ensing 6 percentage and slugging percentage. Hakes and Sauer show that the ability to get on base was undervalued and conclude that the Oakland Athletics strategy for winning games in the early 2000s was a successful exploitation of a profit opportunity (Hakes and Sauer, 183). The authors also argue that the market corrected itself within a year of the books publication, showing that owners adjusted their personal preferences for risk aversion based on the new information. III. Model I am interested in whether owners exhibit risk aversion in putting together a team each season. I argue that this would be observable in decisions regarding the proportion of payroll dedicated to backup players. A risk averse owner would sign more players with less overall talent. A risk preferring owner would focus their resources on securing high quality starters and dedicate a much smaller fraction of their payroll to backup players. This concept can be illustrated using the Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility model. Expected utility is defined as the expected value of utility over all possible outcomes (Frank, 180). I want to determine the risk aversion of owners that leads to their highest expected utility. Instead of using wealth to measure utility, I will be using the number of wins for a team in a season to measure the total utility generated by the team for the owner. In the expected utility model, a risk averse owner will have a concave expected utility function, as he experiences diminishing marginal utility of wins, as seen in Figure 1. This means that as the number of wins by the team increases, the owners marginal benefit from each additional win decreases. We cannot conclusively determine the risk

Ensing 7 aversion of an owner simply based on wealth or revenue, but I believe wins are a better measure to determine utility. I want to determine how risk averse they are, in the sense of how much they are willing to gamble in order to increase their odds of winning more games. Investing more into your starting players and less into your backup players can be seen as more of a gamble, as injuries and subpar performances can derail a season easier for teams with more invested in star players. Thus, a team with more invested in starting players is much less risk averse than a team with payroll distributed more evenly. While in most cases the expected utility function is concave, in some instances the function can be convex or linear. If the owner is risk preferring, then the expected utility function will be convex, as seen in Figure 2, where the owner will have increasing marginal utility of wins. If the owner is risk neutral, then he has a constant marginal utility of winning, which results in a linear expected utility function, as seen in Figure 3. I hypothesize that owners of teams in small revenue markets will be much more likely to be risk averse and thus have concave utility functions. As they have a lower payroll, an injury to a player taking up a large chunk of the payroll would diminish the number of wins, and thus the revenue that the team would generate. By the same reasoning, I believe that large market teams will have convex utility functions, as they are able to overcome injuries much easier by simply spending more money on replacement players. We can use this theoretical framework to show why a small market owner may choose to field a team with a balanced payroll, while a large market owner may choose to field a team with a less balanced payroll, with more money going to star players.

Ensing 8 Suppose an average team, with 81 wins per season, was considering signing two star free agents. The owner estimated that if these players produced as expected the team would win 90 games. However, if the stars underperformed or were injured, the team would win only 70 games. The owner assumes there is a 50% chance either could happen. If the owner did not sign the free agents and continued to have a more balanced payroll the team is virtually guaranteed to again win 81 games. Based on my assumption that an owner of a small market team would be risk averse, I use an expected utility model of E(U) = Wins. If the owner were to continue to have a more balanced payroll and get 81 wins, their expected utility would be exactly 9. Would it be worth it to spend the extra money and sign the two free agents? The owners expected utility from this gamble would be 8.93 ((0.5)*70 + (0.5)*90 = 8.93). Since the owners expected utility from the gamble would be less than the expected utility without signing the free agents, they would choose not to sign the star players and instead continue to employ a more balanced payroll, which can be seen in Figure 4. My assumption for large market teams is that they would be risk loving, so their expected utility model would be E(U) = Wins2. Signing the two free agents would give the team a 50% chance of winning 75 games and a 50% chance of winning 87 games. Keeping a balanced payroll and winning 81 games would result in an expected utility of 6,561 (this number is only important to view in the context of other risk loving utilities). The expected utility of the gamble of signing the two free agents would be 6,597 ((0.5)*752 + (0.5)*872 = 6,597). Since the owners expected utility from the gamble is higher than keeping a balanced payroll, they would choose to sign the star players, which can be seen in Figure 5. Their preference is for a top-heavy payroll, with stars making a

Ensing 9 lot of money. They can more easily afford to make mistakes or deal with injuries because their revenue is greater, so they can simply sign a free agent or trade for a good player on another team. These examples show that there is a higher probability of a large market team having higher risk preferences than a small market team. In the next section, I will run regressions that attempt to quantify whether or not small market teams really are likely to be more risk averse. IV. Empirical Model and Data This paper uses a panel data set covering each Major League Baseball team from 1998 through 2010. I chose this period because it captures all of the years after MLB expanded to 30 teams with the inclusion of the Arizona Diamondbacks and the Tampa Bay Devil Rays in 1998. For each team year, I collected payroll data for both teams and individual players, offensive statistics for teams, and the market size each team belonged to. The information was collected from several different baseball websites.1 Table 1 presents summary statistics on all of the variables used in my regressions. To answer my questions about risk aversion and whether it matters, I ran two different regressions involving risk aversion. The first regression is intended to test for the presence of risk aversion in payroll decisions. This regression should show why

Team salary data was collected from http://content.usatoday.com/sportsdata/baseball/mlb/salaries/team/, www.cbssports.com/mlb/salaries, www.baseball-reference.com, and www.mlbcontracts.blogspot.com/. Individual player salaries, used to calculate the percentage of total team payroll utilized for starting and backup payroll, was collected from www.baseballreference.com and www.baseball1.com. Market sizes were found using Forbes estimates for values of MLB teams at www.forbes.com/lists/2011/33/baseball-valuations-11_land.html.

Ensing 10 certain teams have a preference for spending a smaller proportion of their payroll on starters. The equation for the first regression model is as follows: PctStartingPayroll = 0 + 1*League + 2*LgMarket + 3*SmMarket + 4*Lag1WinPct In this regression, I am including an indicator variable for the league that the team is in, as well as the market indicators. The league indicator variable is used to control for the difference in offensive environments due to the designated hitter rule. The DH is used in the American League, but not the National League, which leads to more runs scored in the AL. This could lead to different preferences on spending money, as owners in the AL need to spend more money on an extra starting hitter. This means the league indicator variable, using a 1 for AL teams and a 0 for NL teams, should be positively correlated with risk aversion. The market indicator variables will control for the difference in total payrolls caused by the difference in revenue potentials from market size. There will be two different market indicator variables, one for large market teams (such as the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox), and one for small market teams (such as the Tampa Bay Rays and San Diego Padres). For both the first and second regressions, I collected total team payroll for the year, and manually calculated starting and backup payroll using individual player salaries for the eight or nine starting position players (depending on the league) and the starting pitcher on Opening Day. There is a wide range of starting payroll percentages, and I would like to discuss why some teams have certain values. The minimum percent of starting payroll was only 24.85% by the San Diego Padres in 2002. They had a payroll of just over $41 million and spent only $10,295,000 on starting players. Two players

Ensing 11 accounted for about half of the bench payroll: Trevor Hoffman, one of the greatest closers of all time ($6,600,000), and outfielder Ray Lankford, who was being paid over $8 million but only started half of the teams games. The Padres only won 66 games, and finished last in their division. The maximum percent of starting payroll was 82.14% by the 1998 Chicago White Sox. Their total payroll was $38,335,000, of which $31,490,000 was spent on starting players. They were incredibly risk loving, as a large majority of their payroll was spent on their nine starting hitters. Still, the White Sox won only 80 games in 1998, showing that such a strategy does not guarantee success. The worst team over the period was the 2003 Detroit Tigers who won only 26.5 percent of their games. Interestingly, they dedicated a nearly identical percentage of total payroll to starters (62.4 percent versus 62.9 percent) as the 1998 New York Yankees, the team with the second best record in the data set. This seems to indicate that the risk aversion factor might not be a good predictor of current winning percentage. Unfortunately, while the team statistics are entirely accurate, salary information is not. Some player salaries include earned bonuses while others do not, and some salaries depend on the team that the player is on. Many times, a player is not being paid what he is worth because he is either very young and in his first contract, or very old and getting paid for past production. So team payroll is not a direct representation of team skill. The only issue with payrolls is the few cases where team payroll did not match up to the sum of player salaries that played for the team. There are explanations for this, such as player bonuses being included or excluded, player trades, or teams paying a portion of salaries of players on different teams (usually from the dumping of mediocre players on to other teams, where the trading team agrees to cover a portion of the players salary in

Ensing 12 exchange for not having to play the player anymore). This affects the percentage of starting payroll variable slightly, but I found in most cases team payroll matched up and the difference is statistically negligible. While I am interested in determining whether or not I can measure risk aversion, I am also interested in whether this decision impacts team success. The second regression uses risk aversion as a predictor variable, along with other team statistics, to try and predict team-winning percentage. The coefficient on the risk aversion variable will tell us whether spending more on your starting players should help you win or lose more games. The equation for the second regression model is as follows: WinPct = 0 + 1* PctStartingPayroll + 2*BattingAge + 3*RpG + 4*OPS+ The individual level statistics I collected for each team are used in this second regression. They were the average age of their hitters, the number of players that had an at-bat in a year, and team offensive statistics, such as runs per game, hits, home runs, and on-base percentage. Like Scully, I collected these statistics to estimate winning percentage. The average age of a hitter should be positively correlated with team winning percentage as the older a hitter is, the more experience he should have. However, both the 1999 Florida Marlins, which had the youngest team in the sample, and the 2006 San Francisco Giants, who fielded the oldest team, had losing records. The number of players that batted for a team in a year should theoretically be negatively correlated with winning percentage, as it usually means there are injuries or players from the minor leagues that are getting at bats, signifying that the teams best players are not hitting as much or as

Ensing 13 well as they should. The team offensive statistics should all be positively correlated with winning percentage, as the better a team hits, the more games they should win. The one offensive statistic that I ended up using in my regression, on-base percentage plus (OPS+), needs explanation. On-base plus slugging percentage (OPS) is simply the sum of on-base percentage (OBP) and slugging percentage (SLG). OBP is calculated as the number of times a player reaches base divided by the total number of chances a player has of reaching base. SLG is calculated as the total number of bases divided by at-bats. OPS+ normalizes OPS by adjusting for park effects and league effects to get a better estimate of how each hitter (or team) performed. It is placed on an easy to understand scale, where 100 OPS+ is exactly league average, and every point above or below is one percentage point above or below league average hitting. OPS+ can be compared across teams and years because it is adjusted, unlike normal batting statistics such as average or OPS. The mean OPS+ for the sample was 96.6, meaning that the past thirteen years were worse offensively when compared to the rest of baseball history. The mean OPS+ for all time is 100, but since there has been an inflated hitting environment in the past decade, a hitter in 2011 will be considered worse than a hitter in 1971 with the same statistics. Many of the offensive measures for teams that I collected could not be used. Some cannot be used to compare across teams and years as the offensive environment has changed, but the bigger problem is confounding variables. There are some variables that cannot be included in regressions because it is impossible to increase one variable while holding another constant. Home runs provide a good example of this. Unfortunately, it is impossible to have an increase in home runs without an increase in OPS+, so I am not

Ensing 14 able to include both home runs and OPS+ in my regressions, as the coefficient on OPS+ would not accurately reflect the contribution of OPS+ to winning percentage. As a result, OPS+ is the only team offensive statistic that is included in either regression. The biggest issue I faced in attempting to measure risk aversion was determining what constituted a starting lineup. Was it only position players? Or position players, starting pitchers, and the closer? For simplicitys sake, as well as the belief that the starting lineup of a baseball team will be the players that take the field during the first inning of the first game of the season, I defined the starting roster to be the starting position players in game one of the season and the starting pitcher. For American League teams, this is the eight position players and the designated hitter, plus the starting pitcher, for a total of ten players. For National League teams, this is only the eight position players and the pitcher, for a total of nine players (there is no DH in the NL). The starting lineup qualification was used to determine percent of payroll spent on starting and reserve players. Baseball teams have a total of 25 players on the roster, so the other 15 or 16 players make up the payroll spent on reserve players. V. Results and Analysis The results from linear estimation of the first equation are provided in Table 2. The only coefficient that is statistically significant is the league indicator variable, with a p-value of 0.001. This shows that the only consistent variable that influences an owners choice of risk aversion is the league in which the team plays in. The league indicator coefficient suggests that if a team were to switch from the National League to the American League, the percentage of payroll dedicated to starters

Ensing 15 would increase by 3.67 percentage points. This shows the differences in payroll related to the number of starting players. The variable used to measure risk aversion depends mostly on hitter salaries, so having an extra hitter in the lineup (as the DH) means that a team will have to spend more money on hitters and will thus be less risk averse. Although the coefficients on the market size variables were statistically insignificant, they could still be economically significant. The coefficient on the large market variable shows that an increase of one in the market size from medium to large market size will lead to a 1.94 percentage point increase in percentage of payroll devoted to starting players. The coefficient on the small market variable shows that an increase of one in the market size from small to medium size will lead to 0.19 percentage point decrease in percentage of payroll devoted to starting players. Small market teams are expected to spend less on their starting players and more on their backups than large market teams, which is reflected in the magnitude of the coefficients. The last variable in the first regression was one-year lagged winning percentage. My hypothesis is that the higher a teams winning percentage in the previous year, the less risk averse the owner will be this year as they are more likely to go for broke, and try to win it all the next year. The statistic is not significant in the regression, but the coefficient suggests that a one percentage point increase in winning percentage last year actually leads to a 5.79 percentage point decrease in percentage of payroll devoted to starting players, suggesting a team that won more games the year before will be more risk averse. This is in direct opposition to the hypothesis that I claimed before running the regression. One potential reason for this is that teams spent above their normal capped

Ensing 16 payroll the year before and the owner wants to cut back on spending this season so they do not lose money. The results from running a linear estimation on the second equation can be found in Table 3. All statistics in this regression were found to be very significant with p-values of 0.000. An increase of one year in the average age of batters on a team leads to a 0.0117 percentage point increase in winning percentage. The older a team is, the more experience it has, and the better it performs. Obviously, this is not true by the time players are in their late 30s, but younger hitters will then replace them, so the cycle continues. Also, a one percentage point increase in OPS+ leads to a 0.0033 percentage point increase in winning percentage. An increase of one run per game leads to a 0.0399 percentage point increase in winning percentage. This is very significant. For example, a team with a .500 winning percentage would then have a winning percentage of .540 if they scored one more run per game, which is about 6.5 more games won per season, a large increase equivalent to an average team becoming a contender for the playoffs. This backs up MacDonald and Reynolds claim that runs scored is arguably the best indicator of a player or teams offensive production. Finally, a one percentage point increase in the percentage of player salaries devoted to starting players leads to a 0.102 percentage point decrease in the teams winning percentage. This regression shows that the more risk averse a team is (only to a certain extent as they have to have some percentage of payroll devoted to starting players), the more they will win. A team should spend more money on backup players

Ensing 17 and less on starting players. If a team were to decrease their spending on starting players by one standard deviation, they would spend 10.20% more of their payroll on backup players. This means a team would increase their winning percentage by 1.04 percentage points, or a .500 team would now have a winning percentage of .5104. Over an entire season, that is the equivalent of 1.68 more wins, which could easily be the difference between making the playoffs and staying home. Had the 2011 Atlanta Braves increased their win total by just 1.68, they would have made the playoffs and the St. Louis Cardinals would not have even made the playoffs, let alone won the World Series. VI. Conclusions One difficulty that I ran into while completing this paper was differentiating risk aversion of owners with different spending habits. As the definition of my starting lineup consists of almost all position players, a team that wants to spend more money on position players will be seen as less risk averse. Although, it is risk aversion in itself to spend more money on hitting as pitchers have a higher probability of getting injured than hitters. The real intention of the paper was to see how owners allocate their money, whether to a few star players or spreading it out more to role players. While the definition could be changed based on the researchers own beliefs, I believe that my definition of risk aversion was appropriate for the task at hand. Future research on this topic should use larger sample sizes to more accurately measure how teams have been spending money. Perhaps spending habits have fluctuated over time, and we are just now at the point where teams are valuing starting players higher than before. I also did not attempt to evaluate the impact of outliers (such as the

Ensing 18 Yankees) on the data set, so a further study should determine whether some team payrolls should be excluded. A final improvement would be to look at more team statistics, including pitching statistics, to determine whether that would impact the risk aversion coefficient and ultimately the impact on winning percentage. While the conclusions stemming from my regression may not be groundbreaking results, the idea behind this paper could be. Moneyball was a best-selling novel because it showed how one small-market team could exploit inefficiencies to become one of the best teams in baseball, regardless of payroll. The idea behind risk aversion could theoretically do the same thing. As Fangraphs notes, you can make a case that teams are currently being too risk-averse and that there is a possible inefficiency that could be exploited.2 If an MLB team could tweak this model and use it to determine the optimal amount and percentage of money they should spend constructing their roster, they could be gaining an advantage over other teams. My regressions showed that a team would benefit from spending a lesser percentage of their payroll on starting players and a greater percentage on backups. While this does not mean they should have starting players with lesser talent so that they do not have to pay them as much, it does mean that backups are more important than their current valuation.

Dave Cameron, Linear Dollars Per Win, Again. http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/index.php/linear-dollars-per-win-again/

Ensing 19 Figures and Tables

Figure 1: risk averse owner

Utility

U(W2) U(W1)

U = U(W)

W1

W2

Wins

Figure 2: risk loving owner

Utility U = U(W)

U(W2)

U(W1) W1 W2 Wins

Ensing 20 Figure 3: risk neutral owner

Utility U = U(W) U(W2)

U(W1)

W1

W2

Wins

Figure 4: risk averse owner example

Utility

9.49 9.00 8.92 8.37

U = U(W)

70

80 81

90

Wins

Ensing 21

Figure 5: risk loving owner example

Utility U = U(W)

7,569 6,597 6,561 5,625 Wins

75

81

87

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Variable Mean Total Payroll $70,699,056 Starting Payroll $39,833,950 Backup Payroll $30,865,107 Pct of Starting Payroll 55.89% Winning Percentage 50.00% League Indicator 0.467 Large Market Indicator 0.333 Small Market Indicator 0.333 Batting Age 29.05 Runs per Game 4.757 OPS+ 96.60 Std. Deviation $33,070,793 $21,264,617 $14,929,546 10.20% 7.28% 0.500 0.472 0.472 1.425 0.503 8.12 Minimum $9,202,000 $5,595,000 $3,607,000 24.85% 26.50% 0 0 0 25.2 3.17 77 Maximum $209,081,577 $142,574,714 $85,421,103 82.14% 71.60% 1 1 1 33.5 6.23 118

Ensing 22

Table 2: Risk Aversion of Owners N = 390, R2 = 0.0415 Variable League Indicator Large Market Indicator Small Market Indicator Lagged Win % Standard Errors in parentheses Coefficient .0367353 (.0109108) .0193987 (.0132494) -.0018552 (.013552) -.0578703 (.07701) p-value 0.001 0.144 0.891 0.453

Table 3: Impact on Winning Percentage N = 390, R2 = 0.4874 Variable Pct of Starting Payroll Batting Age Runs per Game OPS+ Standard Errors in parentheses Coefficient -.1020363 (.0264865) .0116631 (.0019613) .0399073 (.0083906) .0032768 (.0005238) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

Ensing 23 References

Bishop, J.A., Finch, J.H., and Formby, J.P. 1990. "Risk Aversion and Rent-Seeking Redistributions: Free Agency in the National Football League." Southern Economic Journal 57(July): 114-124. Cameron, Dave. "Linear Dollars Per Win, Again." Fangraphs. 4 Nov. 2011. Web. 5 Nov. 2011. <http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/index.php/linear-dollars-per-win-again/>. Frank, Robert H. Microeconomics and Behavior (7th ed). New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008. Hakes, Jahn K., and Sauer, Raymond D. "An Economic Evaluation of the Moneyball Hypothesis." Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 20 No. 3 (Summer 2006), pp. 173 186. MacDonald, Don N., and Reynolds, Morgan O. Are Baseball Players Paid their Marginal Products? Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 15, No. 5 (September October 1994), pp. 443-457. Maxcy, J. 2004. "Motivating Long-term Employment Contracts: Risk Management in Major League Baseball." Managerial and Decision Economics 25(March): 109-120. Scully, Gerald W. Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball. The American Economic Review, Vol. 64, No. 6 (December 1974), pp. 915-930. Slowinski, Steve. "OPS and OPS+." Fangraphs. 16 Feb. 2010. Web. 7 Nov. 2011. <http://www.fangraphs.com/library/index.php/offense/ops/>. Woodland, B.M., and Woodland, L.M. 1991. "The Effects of Risk Aversion on Wagering: Point Spread versus Odds." Journal of Political Economy 99(No. 3): 638-653.

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