War Powers in a New Security Era: Restoring the Constitutional Balance

Will Marshall and Bert Brandenburg

October 1990

Introduction -- A New Security Era

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 abruptly ushered in the post-Cold War era in international politics. By attacking yet another neighboring country, Saddam Hussein has managed to unite East and West against wanton aggression for the first time since the heyday of allied cooperation during World War II. However it is resolved, the Persian Gulf crisis has already made obsolete the idea of a bipolar world managed by rival "superpowers." The principal task facing U.S. diplomacy today is to help erect a new framework for maintaining global peace and stability, and to decide what role America should play in the new order. President Bush's resolute response to the rape of Kuwait underscores the indispensable role of U.S. power and moral authority in orchestrating the world's response to aggression. In the near term, neither the United Nations nor any other nation or combination of nations seems capable of supplanting American global leadership. It is equally plain, however, that the U.S. cannot and should not serve as the world's fire brigade. America has neither the resources nor the inclination to police the entire globe, nor do our national interests require it. Instead, the United States needs to redefine its strategic interests in the new security environment, and shape its foreign and defense policies accordingly. The U.S. also needs a new set of rules for governing the discriminate use of its power abroad. In short, Americans must rethink not only what is worth fighting for, but also who should make the decision to fight. This Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) report explores the latter question. It advocates changes in the War Powers Resolution intended to reassert democratic control over the momentous decision to send U.S. troops on dangerous missions around the world. The Constitution vests Congress with the power to declare war, while designating the president as commander-in-chief of U.S. armed forces. James Madison said that "in no part of the Constitution is more wisdom to be found than in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the executive department."1 On this point, Alexander Hamilton agreed: "The Legislature can alone declare war, can alone actually transfer the nation from a state of Peace to a state of War."2 Yet throughout this century, the actual power to wage war and commit U.S. forces abroad has shifted to the executive branch. The erosion of congressional responsibility accelerated during the Cold War, when the forward deployment of large ground forces in Europe and the advent of nuclear warhead and missile technology compressed the time available for decision in a crisis. Congress obviously could not make the split-second decisions that might be required in an age of nuclear brinkmanship, so presidents assumed de facto authority to unleash unimaginable devastation on their own. Today we are pulling back from the brink, and normality -- with all its attendant perils -- is returning to international politics. In a plural world, the U.S. will face many threats to its interests and values, but none are likely to be as formidable as those posed by the combination of Soviet conventional and nuclear power and ideological antagonism. Saddam Hussein may be an implacable foe, but he cannot invade Europe or threaten the physical destruction of the United States. In short, the stakes in future conflicts are likely to be lower -- at least from the American perspective. This has enormous implications for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The waning of the Soviet threat will obviously weaken the consensus that sustained America's postwar policy of containment. The result is likely to be a more robust domestic debate over the wisdom of U.S. military interventions in situations where the threat to our national interests seems attenuated. A free society should not fear such debate. On the contrary, the advent of a more complicated and fractious world requires the U.S. to redefine its essential interests and set new rules for military engagement. It also presents an

opportunity to restore to U.S. foreign policy a measure of democratic accountability more appropriate for a nation at peace. Specifically, the Progressive Policy Institute believes the moment has come to restore the constitutional balance of war-making power between the legislative and executive branches of government. The 1973 War Powers Resolution was conceived for that purpose, but has plainly failed to accomplish it in practice. The Resolution today dwells in a political limbo, ignored by presidents, who regard it as an unconstitutional infringement on their powers, and championed only rhetorically by Congress, which has rarely dared to invoke the law.3 Its supporters claim the Resolution nonetheless subtly exercises a restraining hand on executive discretion, while advocates of untrammeled presidential power in foreign policy call for its abolition. We reject both views. Flawed though it is, the War Powers Resolution embodies a vital principle that must be preserved and strengthened -- that of the shared responsibility of Congress and the president for the conduct of wars and foreign policy. The recurrent debate over Congress' war powers role is hardly a "pointless diversion," as some conservatives claim.4 Like any other governmental actions, America's conduct in the world must be subjected to the test of democratic legitimacy. A republic does not treat presidents as enlightened despots simply for the sake of a more expedient foreign policy. Naturally, only presidents can make instant decisions in emergencies. But it is equally true that U.S. interventions abroad, and foreign policies generally, cannot long be sustained or successfully concluded without the assent of the American people acting through their elected representatives in Congress. On the other side, liberals who oppose changes in the Resolution risk reducing the law to a purely symbolic function. The perverse result is to underscore congressional impotence in foreign affairs without seriously restraining the executive branch, leaving lawmakers to carp about policies rather than assuming the responsibility either to promote or change them. The status quo is untenable. It gives U.S. presidents too much discretion in matters of war and peace, while allowing Congress to evade its responsibilities. The Persian Gulf crisis offers a vivid example. Few question that President Bush had the authority to respond swiftly to Iraqi aggression and intimidation by dispatching U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia. The massive buildup that ensued, however, is another story. Acting solely on his own authority, the President amassed a force of about 200,000 U.S. military personnel in and around Saudi Arabia, at an estimated cost of over $1 billion a month. The issue here is not whether the President's actions have been prudent, but whether the power to launch and sustain an operation of this scale, cost and indefinite duration should be concentrated in one person. The same question applies to America's policy aims in the Gulf. President Bush handed Congress a fait accompli by declaring, unilaterally, four key objectives for the U.S. Gulf operation. Though some of these goals are vague or controversial, Congress is reluctant to contradict the President for fear of exposing cracks in the nation's united stand against Saddam Hussein's depredations. The result has been to foreclose serious democratic deliberation on the purposes of U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf, and to place responsibility for the success or failure of the venture in the President's hands alone. Ineffective in constraining executive power or assuring Congress its proper role in questions of war, the War Powers Resolution also weakens American resolve abroad. Its "war powers clock" compels the automatic withdrawal of U.S. troops after 60 days, if Congress has failed to pass a resolution sanctioning the president's actions. That arbitrary deadline limits U.S. flexibility in a crisis and leads adversaries to believe that they can simply outwait America. Moreover, the Resolution provides the pretext for endless arguments over constitutional prerogatives at a moment when what our troops need most is a clear mission and strong backing at home. In this report, PPI recommends a progressive reform of the War Powers Resolution aimed at remedying these defects and rebuilding a constitutional framework of shared responsibility and democratic accountability in the conduct of foreign policy. We propose the following steps: Eliminating the arbitrary "war powers clock" that requires the automatic withdrawal of U.S. troops if Congress fails to authorize their deployment within 60 days. Providing for regular consultations between the president and a permanent congressional "war powers delegation," in order to engage lawmakers more fully in the shaping of policies that could lead to committing U.S. forces abroad. Directing Congress to exercise its constitutional "power of the purse" to cut off or curtail funding for operations it opposes. Relaxing the Resolution's unrealistic (and frequently ignored) restrictions on the president's power to introduce U.S.

forces abroad.

The War Powers Resolution

"The Constitution supposes...the executive is the branch of power most interested in war and most prone to it. It has accordingly, with studied care, vested the question of war in the legislature." -- James Madison5 As the Vietnam war wound down, a frustrated Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973 over President Richard Nixon's veto.6 Its stated purpose was to "insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities..." The late Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY) put it more bluntly: "It is a bill to end the practice of presidential war and thus to prevent future Vietnams." But he might as accurately have said the Resolution was intended to prevent a future Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the nearly unanimous 1964 Act by which Congress authorized President Lyndon Johnson's escalation of the conflict in Vietnam. In effect, the War Powers Resolution was the first of many subsequent attempts by Congress to codify the "lessons of Vietnam" in law.

The Resolution's main provisions are as follows:

Limits on Presidential Prerogative The Resolution seeks to circumscribe a president's authority to introduce U.S. forces into dangerous situations. In the absence of a declaration of war or specific congressional authorization, a president may commit U.S. forces abroad only in the case of a direct attack on U.S. forces or territory. Critics -- including every president since 1973 -- contend that the Resolution represents an effort by Congress to usurp by statute executive powers granted by the Constitution. Consultation The president must consult with Congress "in every possible instance" before deploying troops into hostilities or when imminent hostilities are "clearly indicated by the circumstances." "Regular" consultation is also required after the initial deployment. Reports Within 48 hours of deploying troops, the president must file a report with Congress detailing the justification and authority for the operation, and estimating the scope and duration of hostilities. Informational reports are required every six weeks thereafter, and upon congressional request.7 Automatic Troop Withdrawal If Congress has not voted its approval of the president's operation within 60 days, U.S. forces must be withdrawn.8 Congressionally-Mandated Troop Withdrawal Congress can vote to withdraw troops from hostilities at any time by concurrent resolution, which is not subject to a presidential veto.9 This provision may be unconstitutional under a 1983 Supreme Court ruling striking down legislative vetoes.10

Why the Resolution Has Not Worked

"It is dangerous to try to deal with the future by legislating against the past." --McGeorge Bundy Notwithstanding its laudable aim of reasserting congressional authority over the decision to wage war, nearly two decades of experience have revealed four fundamental flaws in the War Powers Resolution.

First, it puts unrealistic restraints -- which are routinely ignored -- on the president's power to commit U.S. forces abroad. The law has not prevented U.S. presidents from sending U.S. troops to topple unpopular regimes in Grenada and Panama, or bombing Libya in retaliation for terrorist attacks, or ordering the Navy to escort reflagged vessels in the Persian Gulf. Indeed, American presidents have committed U.S. forces abroad more than 200 times without a formal declaration of war. Clearly, the American people are willing to give their presidents wide latitude in responding quickly to situations deemed threatening to vital U.S. interests. Even after hostilities have occurred, however, the Resolution puts no effective check on presidential power. No president since 1973 has acknowledged an obligation to comply with the provisions of the War Powers Resolution. Congress shies from formally invoking the law, probably because it could not override a presidential veto. Thus, the president, plus one-third of either the House or the Senate, can conduct a war beyond the reach of the Resolution. Second, the 60- day "war powers clock" imposes an arbitrary deadline for completing military action, severely limiting U.S. flexibility in achieving its policy aims and leading adversaries to believe they can outlast American resolve. One notable example was the 1983 Lebanon compromise, in which Congress approved President Ronald Reagan's decision to deploy Marines in Beirut but only for a specified length of time. Moreover, even if presidents were to abide by it, the Resolution's ticking clock could encourage reckless action to finish a military operation "on time." Third, the deadline gives foreign governments and renegade groups too much leverage over U.S. policy discussions. Any potential foe wishing to trigger debate on the 60-day withdrawal clock need only make hostilities appear imminent, for example, by firing on American military personnel. By deflecting congressional attention from the purpose to the duration of U.S. military actions, the Resolution raises questions about U.S. staying power in the midst of a crisis, making it harder to secure the cooperation of our friends abroad. Fourth, the Resolution fosters confrontation rather than partnership between Congress and the president. It leads presidents to downplay the hazards of a deployment overseas; witness, for example, President Bush's recent statement to Congress that "I do not believe involvement in hostilities is imminent"11 in the Persian Gulf, or the extended semantic wrangle in 1987 over whether hostilities in the Gulf were imminent enough to set the 60-day clock ticking.12 The law mires our government in internecine struggles over constitutional prerogatives and procedural issues at the moment when U.S. leaders should be forging a common policy that wins respect abroad because it commands broad support at home.13 In a recent editorial, The New Republic summed up the Resolution's perverse effect: "The unintended result of the War Powers Resolution is to reverse the constitutional division of power. Congress, by timid inaction, can cause troops to be withdrawn over the commander in chief's objection. And the commander in chief, by extravagant word games, can commit troops without congressional authorization."14

War Powers: Repeal or Reform?

"A foreign policy crisis is no time to discover that the channels of communication don't work." --Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN) Disenchantment with the War Powers Resolution is growing across the political spectrum, though for different reasons. Many conservatives, chafing at the fetters supposedly imposed on executive power by an "Imperial Congress," favor outright repeal of the Resolution.15 They regard its provisions as onerous and as an unconstitutional infringement on the president's preeminent responsibility for conducting U.S. foreign policy and commanding U.S. forces in time of war. "Its implicit (and gloriously unconstitutional) assumption," wrote two commentators, is "that Congress, as opposed to the Constitution itself, is the fount of presidential power."16 Representative Robert Dornan (R-CA) has introduced a bill (H.R. 574) that would repeal the War Powers Resolution. Another bill (H.J.Res. 234) introduced by Representatives Gerald Solomon (R-NY) and Henry Hyde (R-IL) likewise would kill the 60-day clock and require a joint resolution (subject to presidential veto) to compel withdrawal. It would also limit the instances requiring a presidential report and make it more difficult to use expedited parliamentary procedures for a vote on mandated withdrawal. Eschewing the right's "monarchist" view of presidential power, some liberals who originally supported the measure now see the 60-day time limit as a grace period during which a president can conduct war freely, oblivious to the will of Congress. For example, former Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-MO) recently complained that the president's war powers approach those of "George III."17

Representative Peter DeFazio (D-OR) has introduced a bill (H.J.Res. 157) that would toughen the Resolution by further limiting the circumstances under which a president could commit U.S. forces abroad, and mandating more frequent consultations with Congress. His bill would also give legislators the standing to take the president to court over violations of the Resolution. It would retain the 60-day clock but drop the provision under which Congress could force a troop withdrawal by concurrent resolution. Moderates in both parties have proposed revisions in the War Powers Resolution intended to strike a better balance of constitutional responsibilities between Congress and the White House, while at the same time insuring flexibility in responding to crises abroad. Perhaps the leading proposal for reform is S. 2, introduced by Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA), John Warner (R- VA) and Robert Byrd (D-WV), with the backing of Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME). This measure would eliminate the 60-day countdown as well as the provision that allows Congress to force a troop withdrawal by concurrent resolution, a procedure widely regarded as unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's 1983 ruling against legislative vetoes.18 The Nunn- Byrd-Warner bill instead relies on the congressional power of the purse, creating expedited parliamentary procedures for a vote on a joint resolution to either authorize or cut off funds for overseas military operations. Despite leadership backing, the bill has languished in the Senate. Opposing both repeal and reform of the Resolution is a substantial body of Capitol Hill liberals. An influential supporter (and original sponsor) of the Resolution, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante Fascell (D-FL), argues that despite the law's shortcomings, the president "always thinks about it," which gives Congress a chance to "raise the issues." Yet in the Persian Gulf crisis, the Resolution has once again proved to be an ineffectual mechanism for involving Congress in decisions that could lead to hostilities and war. Declining to invoke the war powers law, the House and Senate in early October instead marked the 60-day deadline by passing separate non-binding resolutions supporting the President's conduct to date, without authorizing any future use of force. More recently, however, Iraqi intransigence and the prospect of a large-scale ground war with Iraq has made Congress more assertive. At an Oct. 17 hearing, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pressed Secretary of State James Baker for assurances that the Administration would seek congressional approval of any military action to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, as well as for regular consultations between the White House and a select group of lawmakers. Baker declined on both counts, although he did say that President Bush is committed to "extensive consultations" with Congress.19

War Powers Reform: A Progressive Approach

"It [a revised War Powers Resolution] would help us to build a foreign policy based on reflection rather than simple reflex." --Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) As the Cold War yields to a new epoch in international politics, Americans should rebuild the constitutional framework that governs and legitimizes the use of U.S. power to defend our national interests and values. Conflict in the modern era may be rendering formal declarations of war obsolete, yet the decision to introduce U.S. forces into volatile situations abroad ought to be taken as openly and democratically as possible. The collective judgment of Congress, the branch of government that is the most democratic barometer of public opinion, must be more than an afterthought in foreign policy. The genius of America's constitutional system lies in its separation of powers among the various branches of government. The Founders deliberately introduced checks and balances into their design in order to keep any single branch from dominating the others. In this way, they sought to limit government's reach and safeguard individual liberties. The healthy tension engendered by the separation of powers should be restored to, not removed from, the realm of foreign affairs. Yet many conservatives, otherwise acutely sensitive to the framers' original intent, would tilt the balance sharply in favor of the executive. In essence, they argue that the democratic deliberation and accountability that Congress embodies -- however untidily -- are luxuries America cannot afford in its dealings with an often hostile and volatile world. Superficially plausible during the Cold War, when the nation remained at an intense stage of military readiness, that claim is less valid today as East and West demobilize their vast military establishments and resume normal peacetime relations.

We believe it is undemocratic and dangerous to assert that foreign and military policy are exclusively the preserve of the executive. The folly of such a course is certainly one "lesson of Vietnam" worth remembering. Moreover, the conservative depiction of a presidency enfeebled by congressional jealousy and meddling is belied by recent experience: no Lilliputian restraints kept George Bush from swiftly dispatching a formidable U.S. force to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. But this is not to let Congress off the hook. Too often, Congress has complained loudly about being left out of crucial decisions regarding foreign policy, but has studiously avoiding taking responsibility for actions initiated by the president. Calling the Resolution the "political military equivalent of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act on budget reductions," former U.S. Army Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr. wrote: the War Powers Act was enacted...as an artificial backbone to stiffen congressional resolve and require members of Congress to stand up and be counted on matters of war and peace. But when it came down to it, that's the last thing most congressmen want.20 Thus, a principal reason for restoring the constitutional balance in war-making power is to force Congress to assume greater responsibility for winning solid backing for U.S. actions abroad, or for rallying legislative and public opposition to what they believe to be unwise or unprincipled action. As one analyst noted: "The substitution of lawmaking...for an automatic deadline of withdrawal is a significant change. It signals the transfer of the burden of persuasion from the Executive to the Legislative Branch."21 Today, with the U.S. facing difficult decisions that could affect the lives of tens of thousands of Americans, it is worth reminding ourselves that no effective policy can be sustained over time without the explicit support of Congress. Without trying to constrain the President's freedom of action, Congress should move to create a new process by the which the American people, through their elected representatives, can share in making the decisions ahead. To that end, the Progressive Policy Institute recommends these four steps for reforming the War Powers Resolution: Eliminate the 60-day "ticking clock" leading to an automatic withdrawal, as well as the veto-proof concurrent resolution. Establish regular consultations between the president or Secretary of State with a permanent congressional "war powers delegation" consisting of the majority and minority leaders of both chambers, and the chairmen of the congressional committees with jurisdiction over foreign and military policy. Provide for prompt congressional consideration of a joint resolution that either authorizes or denies funding for a military operation. Eliminate language that puts narrow and unrealistic constraints on the circumstances in which a president may commit U.S. forces abroad. By long custom, the American people have given their presidents broad leeway to carry out the duties of commander-in-chief. Regular consultation offers several advantages over empty legal prescriptions. Presidents will be more disposed to cooperate with congressional leaders if they do not risk triggering the Resolution's automatic withdrawal and concurrent resolution provisions. Moreover, presidents and their advisors are hardly infallible and would benefit from the experienced counsel of key Congressional leaders. Frequent, detailed consultations about foreign policy hot spots will give vital information to lawmakers and help foster wiser policy as well as bipartisan support for difficult operations. Such consultations would ensure congressional involvement at the most critical decision point, before troops are actually deployed. And, once they have been introduced, congressional leaders would be responsible for rallying lawmakers behind a policy that both branches have shaped. Finally, consultations would be self-enforcing. A president upset by leaks could curtail the exchange of information or even temporarily suspend the talks. Likewise, a neglected war powers delegation could likely muster formidable opposition to a president's policy, perhaps enough to cut off its funding. We believe the reforms offered here can restore the proper constitutional balance between the president's powers as commander-in-chief, and the congressional responsibility to declare war and control the purse. Such a reform would discourage both ill- conceived unilateral action by a president and congressional micromanagement of foreign policy. It would strengthen the mechanism for building a sturdy domestic consensus for a course of energetic U.S. engagement in the world.

About the Authors

Will Marshall is President of the Progressive Policy Institute. He was Policy Director of the Democratic Leadership Council from its inception in 1985 to April, 1989. Previously, Marshall served as press secretary and speech writer for the 1984 U.S. Senate campaign of former North Carolina Gov. Jim Hunt and policy analyst for the late U.S. Rep. Gillis Long of Louisiana. He is the author of several publications on public policy, including "Winning in the World Economy" in 1985, "Defending America" in 1986, and "Citizenship and National Service" in 1988. A former reporter for the Richmond Times-Dispatch, Mr. Marshall earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in English and history from the University of Virginia. Bert Brandenburg is a policy analyst at the Progressive Policy Institute, where he specializes in international and judicial affairs. A member of the Virginia Bar, he holds Juris Doctor and Bachelor of Arts in foreign affairs degrees from the University of Virginia. He was a consultant to the Commonwealth of Virginia's Commission on the Future of the Judicial System, has worked in many political campaigns, and served as Research and Projects Editor of the Virginia Journal of International Law. He is the author of several publications on judicial affairs and an article on international law.

Sources
1. "Universal Peace," National Gazette, February 2, 1792, reprinted in The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison, rev. ed. (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1981), p. 212. 2. Morton J. Frisch, ed. Selected Writings & Speeches of Alexander Hamilton (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1985), p. 403. 3. Congress has only once gone on record to declare that hostilities had triggered the Resolution. On October 12, 1983, it passed legislation (P.L. 98-119) authorizing President Ronald Reagan to keep U.S. forces in Lebanon up to 18 months, and finding that actual or imminent hostilities had occurred. Although the President signed the bill into law, he pointedly refused to invoke the Resolution. 4. Abraham D. Sofaer, "The War Powers Diversion," Wall Street Journal, September 7, 1990. 5. Cited in Robert W. Merry, "President, Congress and War Powers," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, August 25, 1990, p. 2754. 6. The override was passed by a four-vote margin in the House, and by 13 votes in the Senate. See 1973 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 905. 7. P.L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, sec. 4. Reports are also required when forces are introduced into foreign territory while equipped for combat (except for supply, replacement, repair or training missions) or simply to "substantially enlarge" an existing combat-equipped deployment in a foreign nation. 8. Ibid., sec. 5(b). The time limit commences when the President files (or is required to file) the first report. The President can extend the limit upon certifying that 30 more days are necessary for a safe troop withdrawal. Automatic withdrawal can be stopped only if Congress declares war, enacts a specific authorization, extends the 60-day period by law, or is physically unable to meet due to armed attack on the United States. The automatic withdrawal provisions do not apply, however, to the deployments into foreign territory or enlargements of existing force cited in note 6, even though reports must be filed. 9. Ibid., sec. 5(c). 10. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 11. President Bush, Letter to Speaker Foley, August 9, 1990, reprinted in Cong. Rec., 1 October 1990, p. H8446. 12. See George Mitchell's May 19, 1988 speech endorsing the Nunn-Byrd-Warner legislation. 13. Throughout the 1980s, debate over the Resolution spawned a series of unsuccessful attempts by members of Congress to enforce it in court. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987); Sanchez- Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983). 14. "Broken Clock," The New Republic, September 10 & 17, 1990, p. 12. 15. See Gordon S. Jones and John A. Marini, eds., The Imperial Congress: Crisis in the Separation of Powers (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation/Claremont Institute, 1989). 16. Douglas A. Jeffrey, "Executive Authority Under the Separation of Powers," in G. Jones and J. Marini, eds., The Imperial Congress, p. 53. 17. U.S. Cong., Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Special Subcommittee on War Powers, Hearings, 100th Congress, 2nd session.

(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1989), p. 6. 18. Almost identical to S. 2 is H.R. 1309, introduced by Representative Larry J. Hopkins (R-KY). 19. John M. Goshko, "Baker Urged to Ask Hill Before Moving on Iraq," Washington Post, October 18, 1990, p. A40. 20. Harry Summers, "Congress and the War Powers Act," Washington Times, Oct. 9, 1987, p. F3. 21. Raymond J. Celada, "The War Powers Resolution: Some Implications of S.J. Res. 323, `War Powers Resolution Amendments of 1988,'" Congressional Research Service, Rept. 88-464A, June 23, 1988, p. 9.