R.A.

9262 ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN & THEIR CHILDREN Violence any act or a series of acts committed by any person w/c will likely result to physical, sexual, psychological harm/suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such, battery (inflicting physical harm resulting to physical, psychological or emotional distress), assault, coercion, harassment, or arbitrary deprivation of lib. Types: 1. Physical bodily/physical harm 2. Sexual violence sexual in nature (rape, sexual harassment, making sexually suggestive remarks, forcing one to watch indecent shows, forcing wife & mistress to live under one roof; force/threaten one to engage in sexual act, prostituting) 3. Psychological acts/omissions that may cause mental/emotional suffering (intimidation, harassment, stalking {intentional, done knowingly & w/o lawful justification, follow woman/child or put them under surveillance), verbal abuse, allowing one to witness phys/sexual/psychl abuse of a member of ones family, unwanted deprivation of rt.to custody) 4. Economic Abuse make/attempt to make woman financially dependent (w/draw financial support, prevent victim from engaging in any legit profession/occupation/biz/activity, deprivation/threat of deprivation of financial resources, destroying household prop, controlling victims own money/prop) Woman 1. wife 2. former wife 3. one you had dating relations with live-in or romantically involved over time on a continuing basis 4. one you had sexual relations with single sexual act w/ or w/o bearing of common child 5. one you have common child with Children 1. below 18 y.o. 2. older than 18 but cant take care of themselves 3. biological, whether legit or illegit 4. all children under her care Acts of Violence against women & their children 1. causing physical harm 2. threatening to cause phys. Harm 3. attempting to cause phys.harm 4. placing them in fear of imminent phys.harm

compel/attempt to compel them to (a) do something they have right to desist from or (b) compel them to desist from doing something they have rt.to engage in or (c) attempt to restrict/restrict their freedom of movt by force, threat of force, phys or other harm, intimidation a. threaten to deprive/deprive her of custody to family b. deprive/threaten to deprive her/kids of financial support legally due them c. deprive/threaten to deprive of legal rt. d. prevent her from engaging in any legit profession, occupation, biz or activity or controlling her money /prop or solely controlling conjugal/common money/prop 6. inflicting/threatening to inflict phys. Harm on oneself to control her axns or decisions 7. causing/attempting to cause them to engage in sexual act not constituting rape by force, phys. Harm or intimidation of immediate family 8. engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct that alarms/causes substantial emotional/psychological distress to them a. stalking/following them in priv. places b. peering in window or lingering outside residence c. entering/remaining in dwelling/prop against owners will d. destroying prop & personal belongings or inflicting harm to their animals/pets e. harassment/violence 9. causing mental/emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation (repeated verbal & emotional abuse & denial of financial support/custody of minor kids & denial of access to womans kid/s) *PRESCRIPTION: 1-6: 20 yrs. And 5-9: 10 yrs. Remedy: Protection orders w/c can: 1. prohibit one from threatening to commit/committing above-mentioned acts 2. prohibit one from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting/communicating w/ petitioner 3. removal & exclusion of one from petitioners residence regardless of owner 4. direct one to stay away from petitioner/family mem w/in court prescribed distance, or from school, house, office, etc. 5. direct lawful possession & use by petitioner of car & other essential personal effects, regardless of ownership

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grant temporary/permanent custody of kids to petitioner 7. direct respondent to support woman &/or child if entitled to legal support. Can be automatically deducted from wage per court order 8. prohibit respondent from using/possessing firearm/deadly weapon 9. compensate victim for actual damages caused by violence 10. direct DSWD or other similar agencies to provide petitioner w/needs 11. other forms of relief, court can come up w/as long as approved by petitioner & designated family mem *even in the absence of decrees of leg.sep., annulment, absolute nullity Custody of children - if below 7 or older but has mental or physical disabilities, MOM, followed even if moms suffering from BWS Battered Woman syndrome scientifically defined pattern of psychl & behavioral symptoms of battered women due to cumulative abuse ; valid defense JULIETA NARAG VS. ATTY. DOMINADOR NARAG Dominador taught at St. Louis College of Tuguegarao, CAS & grad school 1984 he met Gina Espita, his first year 17-year old student Dominador & Gina had illicit relationship Dominador abandoned his family to live w/Gina Dominador used power as Sangguniang Panlalawigan to secure employment for Gina at the DTI 11/13/89 Julieta filed administrative complaint for his disbarment for violating Canons/Code of Ethics 12/18/89 SC referred case to IBP for investigation, report & recommendation 6/26/90 Julieta wanted to seek dismissal of other complaints & sent affidavit of desistance saying: 1. she fabricated allegations in complaint to humiliate & spite husband 2. love letters bet 2 guilty were forged 3. she suffered from emotional confusing due to extreme jealousy 4. denied Gina & Dominador ever had a rel. 5. Dominador never left the family 10/8/91 IBP dismissed complaint for failure to prosecute

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 11/25/91 Julieta sent another letter reviving appeal for Dominadors disbarment due to his continuous threats 7/6/92 Dominador requested that IBP decision be affirmed 1. he never threatened, harassed, or intimidated her 2. he never abandoned family, he loves them. He protected & preserved family. Julieta & 2 sons drove him out of their house. 3. Julieta is emotionally disturbed incurably jealous & possessive, violent, vindictive, scandalous. 4. Julietas rich & she abhors poor. He is poor 5. he was beaten, battered, brutalized, tortured, abused & humiliated by Julieta in public & at home physically, mentally & emotionally thus he filed for annulment coz they cant exist together 6. She has disgraced, shamed & humiliated him by telling everyone everywhere that hes worthless, good-for-nothing, evil & immoral 7. denied relationship w/ Gina. No kids either. 8. love letters: inadmissible as evidence 9. hes old thus, unfit to do things alleged by Julieta. Investigating officer: indefinite suspension from practice of law. He never denied love letters, didnt disprove adulterous relationship. Denying 2 kids ground for disciplinary action. IBP: affirmed investigating officers recommendation & granted disbarment ISSUE: WON Dominador should be disbarred HELD: Yes. Disbarred. RATIO: 1. Lawyer should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral (shameless showing indifference to opinion of good mems of society) or deceitful conduct (Code of Professional Responsibility Rule 1.01), should not behave in scandalous manner, in public or in private to the discredit of the legal profession (Rule 7.03). These are continuing requirements/qualification of all members of bar. This includes prohibition against adulterous relationships. 2. Burden of proof of gross immorality for abandoning his family: Julieta. She proved this by presenting witnesses who attested to adulterous relationship between Gina & Dominador. Even Ginas brother admitted that Gina & Dominador had 2 children. Even though Julieta has burden of proof, he needs to show that he is morally fit to remain a mem of bar. His denials without proof are insufficient. His accusations

against Julieta were not proven. Providing for his family, giving them a comfortable life, his being a successful lawyer & seasoned politician do not necessarily mean that hes morally fit. 3. He has duties to his children (support, educate, instruct accdg to rt. Precepts & good example, give love, companionship, understanding, moral & spiritual guidance) and to his wife (observe mutual love, respect & fidelity & render help & support). He failed to fulfill these duties. He was away most of the time because of his paramour not because of work as he alleges. Sons testimony proved that he abandoned his family which even affected his sons own family. Dominador did not merely contract a marriage, he should have been a partner who lived up to his promise to love & respect his wife & remain faithful to her until death. WARREN VS. STATE (nov. 85) Daniel Warren was convicted for rape & aggravated sodomy of his wife while they were living together as husband & wife. He appealed to dismiss the indictment. His grounds: 1. Rape statute implies marital exclusion thus husband cant be guilty of raping wife. 2. Aggravated sodomy statute provides for marital exclusion too. 3. Interpreting the above-mentioned laws otherwise would be tantamount to new interpretations & application of such would deny him of his due process rts. ISSUE: WON marital exclusion is implied in the rape & aggravated sodomy statutes HELD: No. Conviction affirmed. RATIO: 1. There has never been an express marital exemption in Georgia rape statute. Theories/bases for thinking that marital exclusion exists in rape statute: (a) Lord Hale by giving matrimonial consent, wife gave up herself in this kind unto husband & she cant take that back (b) subsequent marriage doctrine of English law - if marriage bet. A rapist & his victim extinguishes criminal liabilities then corollary, rape w/in marital relationship should be given that immunity (c) medieval time wife is husbands chattel or property thus rape = man using his own property (d) unity of person theory husband & wife become one, with wife incorporating her existence to that of the husband, thus husband cant be convicted of raping himself. Justifications: (a) prevent fabricated charges (b) prevent wives from using rape charges for revenge (c) prevent state intervention so as not to

thwart possible reconciliation. All of these theories & justifications are pass. Equal protection of the laws is being practiced now. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge w/a female forcibly & against her will. It violates the moral sense & personal integrity & autonomy of the female victim. Implied consent to such in marriage conflicts is absurd & against the constitution. During era of slavery, rape was seen negatively & not acceptable even to chattels. 2. Sodomy is the carnal knowledge & connection against the order of nature by man w/man or in same unnatural manner w/woman. There has been no implied marital exemption under this statute even in earlier times. Consent is not a defense unlike in rape. Anyone who voluntarily participates is guilty. 3. There is due process. Due process merely requires that law give sufficient warning so men may avoid what is forbidden. Statutes concerned are plain & broadly written. This may be the first application to this particular set of facts but its not an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of criminal statutes that are narrowly drawn. PEOPLE VS. LIBERTA (dec. 84) 1978 Mario & Denise Liberta were married. Had one son Oct. 1978 Mario began to beat Denise 1980 Denise sought a temporary order of protection from Mario. Granted on April 30, 1980 ordering (a) Mario to move out (b) remain away from family home (c) stay away from Denise (d) can visit kid once each weekend March 24, 1981 Mario wanted to visit son but Denise didnt allow him to go the house so they met instead in the motel where Mario was staying on the condition that they be accompanied by a friend. However, the friend left upon their arrival at the motel. Mario then attacked Denise, threatened to kill her & forced her to perform fellatio on him & to engage in sexual intercourse w/him. 2 y.o. son was there all the time & Mario even forced Denise to tell their son to watch what was happening. They were allowed to leave afterwards. Denise filed a felony complaint against Mario July 15, 1981 Mario was convicted for rape & sodomy both in their 1st degrees Mario says:

theyre married thus hes covered by marital exemption to rape & sodomy. 2. Rape & sodomy statutes are unconstil because it treats married & unmarried persons differently. ISSUES: WON Mario is covered by the marital exemption WON the statutes are unconstil for violating equal protection clause HELD: Conviction affirmed. RATIO: 1. NO. Male guilty of rape when he engages in sexual intercourse w/female by forcible compulsion. Female is any female person not married to actor. Sodomy means engaging in deviate sexual intercourse (sexual conduct bet.persons not married to each other consisting of contact bet.penis & anus, mouth & penis, or mouth & vulva. Not married phrase means there is marital exemption for both. But it has exemptions. One of which is when spouses are living apart pursuant to a valid & effective (a) order issued by court of competent jurisdiction requiring such living apart (b) decree of separation (c) written agreement of separation, they are considered to be not married. Thus, forcible rape or sodomy in this instance would be punishable. In this case, Denise & Mario were technically, not married, by virtue of the temporary order of protection. 2. Constitutionality of Marital Exemption - Married man ordinarily cant be convicted of forcibly raping/sodomizing his wife (marital exemption). State is allowed to make classifications as long as there is a rational basis for doing so & it does not arbitrarily burden a particular group. No rational basis for distinguishing bet.marital & non-marital rape. Rationales are archaic. (See P vs. Liberta explanations on theories). Imposing a marital exemption does not further the cause it purportedly protects which is marital privacy. (ex. Prevent state interference to protect privacy not justified by allowing husband to forcibly rape his wife; Disrupt marriage the act of rape/sodomy in itself would disrupt the marriage & reconciliation is quite impossible; wife will present fabricated info criml justice sys can take care of this). Marital rape is more violent & traumatic than non-marital one. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 3. Constitutionality of Exemption for Females Only males can be convicted of rape in the 1st degree. Reason: it aims to protect chastity of women & their prop value to father/husbands. Treating people differently based on gender can only be justified by its

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substantial relation to the achievement of an impt govtal obj. State defense (a) only females can become pregnant its not the main purpose (b) female faces probability of medical, sociological & psychl probs unique to her gender archaic & overbroad generalization (c) women cant actually rape men or if it happens, its rare not tenable either. They need to present an exceedingly persuasive justification for classification. Show that gender-based law serves the governments interest better than a gender-neutral one. As it is, only females who forcibly rape males benefit from the present statute. LIKEWISE, IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 4. Strike out only the unconstitutional parts since the statute is of major importance. Its not entirely void anyway. 5. Due process is observed. His act was already criminal when he attacked Denise. TRACEY THURMAN VS. CITY OF TORRINGTON (OCT. 84) Charles & Tracey Thurman were married but they became estranged after some time. They have one child Charles, Jr. They have separated already. Oct. 82 Charles attacked Tracey at the home of Judy Bentley & Richard St. Hilaire. Judy & Richard filed complaint & requested efforts to keep Charles off their prop Nov. 5, 82 Charles returned & forcefully took their son. Tracey & Richard filed complaint but was not accepted even on ground of trespassing Nov. 9, 82 Charles threatened Tracey while she was in her car & she even broke her windshield. He was arrested & convicted of breach of peace. Allowed conditional discharge w/conditions: 1) stay completely away from Tracey 2) from Judy & Richards house 3) no more crimes. Police were informed. Dec. 31, 82 Charles returned & threatened her. Tracey called police dept but they made no attempt to look for him/arrest him Jan. 1 May 4, 83 police dept. got several calls re threats of violence to Tracey & Charles, Jr. They requested for his arrest. He violated the probation terms. May 4 & 5, 83 Tracey requested for arrest warrant for her husband due to threats that he would shoot them. Complaint was refused. Told to return after 3 weeks for warrant.

May 6, 83 Tracey filed for restraining order against Charles. Court issued such forbidding Charles from assaulting, threatening & harassing Tracey. Police were informed. May 27, 83 Tracey returned to police dept. to secure warrant & requested for police protection. Asked to call back on may 31. May 31, 83 still no warrant. They were told that Charles would be arrested on June 8, 83, didnt happen. June 10, 83 Charles returned & Tracey called police dept. to pick him up. Tracey spoke to husband but she was stabbed repeatedly in the chest, neck & throat. Tracey called police once again. One police arrived yet he didnt arrest Charles immediately. He even let him kick Tracey in the head. Tracey alleges that: 1. Charles worked as a counterman in a diner where he served members of the police department & he bragged to them that he would get Tracey & kill her. 2. City of Torrington has a policy of indifference/affording lesser protection when the victim is assaulted by someone with whom she has close domestic relations such as a woman abused by a boyfriend/spouse and a kid abused by dad/stepdad. ISSUE: WON such policy violates equal protection of the laws HELD: YES. RATIO: 1. Equal protection of laws is not restricted to racial discriminations, it also involves alien-based classifications, discriminatory legislative actions & discriminatory administration & enforcement of law by the govt. Classifications/discriminations can only be justified by a compelling or overriding state interest. Thus, police action is subject to this. Police officers are expected to preserve the law & order & to protect the personal safety of everyone in the community including women assaulted by people w/whom they have a domestic relation. The inaction of the police during all those times that Tracey has complained is proof that this has been a pattern/practice and is tantamount to an administrative classification employing discriminatory application of law. State failed to present a compelling interest in applying such discrimination. 2. The reason advanced by the state, the notion that it is in the husbands prerogative to physically discipline

his wife is outdated. One is not allowed to physically abuse or endanger a woman simply because he is her husband. And thus, police cant refuse to interfere and automatically decline to make an arrest simply because involved parties are married. Refusal to interfere does not promote domestic harmony. 3. Charles Jr. cant claim that he was denied equal protection of the laws. He was rarely present during assaults thus he didnt suffer from police inaction unlike his mom. He was not part of the court orders. 4. Municipality/city can be sued along with the police dept. Traceys testimony shows a pattern/custom/policy on the part of the municipality. Actually, single brutal incident is sufficient to suggest a link bet. A violation of constil rts. & pattern of police misconduct. 5. Unidentified police officers can be sued even if they had not been properly served. Partial identification is sufficient. Tenchavez v. Escano (1966: Manila) 1st: Pastor Tenchavez & Vicenta Escao were married in 1948. In 1950, defendant Escao obtained a foreign divorce in Nevada. She further sought papal dispensation of the marriage but no document was presented. 2nd: Escaos marriage to American Rusell Leo Moran in the US in 1954, which was later blessed with 3 children. ISSUES: (1) WON divorce is valid (2) WON Court may then compel Escao to cohabit with Tenchavez RATIO: (1) Divorce is invalid for a foreign divorce decree cannot be recognized in the Phils especially if it was granted by court of the place which was not the parties bona fide domicile and on a ground not recognized by our law, which does not allow absolute divorce. Even in private international law, foreign decrees (esp those confirming or dissolving a marriage) cannot be enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy. (2) No. It is not within the province of courts to attempt to compel one of the sps to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to the other. However, a sp who unjustifiable deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support. Dadivas de Villanueva v. Villanueva Appeal from the judgement of the Four of First Instance in Manila Facts:

July 16, 1905 Aurelia Dadivas de Villanuevas married Rafael Villanueva and they had three children. (18, 10, 9) May 27, 1927 Aurelia filed a case for separate maintenance due to infidelity and cruelty. 10 years prior to the institution of the case, Rafael was guilty of repeated acts of infidelity with four different women. Even after the institution of the case it was shown that he have had an illicit relations with another woman. The incorrigible nature of the defendant in his relations with other women coupled with his lack of consideration and even brutality caused Aurelia to leave the conjugal home and for her to establish her own abode. Their final separation occurred on April 20, 1947. There was no sufficient evidence to establish the cruelty of the husband but there were sufficient evidence to establish the infidelity of the husband. Issue: WON the wife is entitled for separate support from her husband. Held: Yes Ratio: In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance from the husband it is not necessary that the husband should bring a concubine into the home. Perverse and illicit relations with women outside the conjugal home are sufficient grounds. Ruling in Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo is not applicable because in the Arroyo case the only grounds that were alleged was cruelty and that charge was not proven. In the present case the charge of cruelty was also not proven but the Aurelia also accused her husband of infidelity and that charge has been proven (repeated acts of conjugal infidelity) and the husband appears to be a recurrent, if not incurable offender. This fact gives the wife an undeniable right to relief. Goita vs. Campos Rueda husband cannot by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his wife. When he drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his duties. Issue: WON she is entitled to P750 monthly allowance Held: No

Court granted allowance of P500 a month. P750 would be excessive since the living quarters that she uses are part of the conjugal estate. Issue: WON the custody of the children should be transferred to the father Held: No Ratio: Custody of the 2 minor children shall remain with Aurelia. The children are currently living with her and her custody will not be disturbed. CIPRIANA GARCIA vs. ISABELO SANTIAGO AND ALEJO SANTIAGO Appeal from Nueva Ecija COFI dismissing complaint FACTS April 8, 1910 Cipriana Garcia & Isabelo Santiago were married Feb. 3, 1925 Cipriana compelled to leave the conjugal dwelling due to: 1. continued family dissensions 2. Alejo, Isabelos son by his first wife seduced Prisca Aurelio, Ciprianas daughter by her first husband. Prisca gave birth to a child. Isabelo, instead of requiring his son to marry Prisca, refused to interfere & he seemed to tolerate the illicit relationship. 3. Isabelo has conveyed/been conveying their conjugal properties to Alejo to foster latters whims & caprices and thus, damaging & prejudicing her rights. Some of these properties include lands acquired during their marriage with money belonging to the conjugal partnership. Land annually produces 4,500 cavanes of palay at P4.00/cavan. Other allegations of Cipriana/Prayers to the Court: 1. Their separation is necessary to avoid personal violence. She could not live in the conjugal dwelling due to the illicit relationship of Alejo & Prisca tolerated by Isabelo. 2. She is entitled to P500.00 pendente lite monthly pension from conjugal partnership. However, Isabelo refused to provide for her support despite her demands. 3. She should be in-charge of the administration of the property of their conjugal partnership because Isabelo is unfit to do so. He exhibits immoral conduct & acts by publicly maintaining an illicit relationship with Geronima Yap.

 Isabelo: answered with a general denial. COFI: dismissed petition. ISSUES & RATIO (as per Ciprianas appeal): 1. WON their separation is unjustified NO. They were having a stormy life prior to the separation due to the frequent fights. Isabelo ordered her to leave the house & threatened to ill-treat her if she returned. Priscas situation is embarrassing for her mother. Highly possible that Alejo caused Priscas pregnancy. Compelling them to cohabit could lead to further quarrels. 2. WON transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo are illegal NO. Failed to prove that property was community property. Documentary evidence even show that it was acquired by Isabelo before their marriage. 3. WON Cipriana is entitled to P500.00 monthly maintenance NO. Thats too much. P50.00 would be enough. 4. WON Isabelo is unfit to administer their conjugal property NO. No sufficient reason found to deprive him of this right. 5. WON Cipriana is entitled to an allowance of attorneys fees NO. HOLDING: Judgment modified. Separation is allowed. Isabelo ordered provide Cipriana with a P50.00 monthly allowance to be paid within the first 10 days of the month. No costs allowed. Atilano vs. Chua Ching Beng Facts: Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were married in Zamboanga after which they went to Manila and established their residence with Chuas parents. Afterwards, at Chuas initiative, they went to Zamboanga to visit Pilars parents. It seems that he was prevailed upon by the wifes parents to return to Manila leaving her behind, with the understanding that she would follow him later. She didnt. About two years later, Pilar filed with the Zamboanga CFI a complaint for support against her husband, alleging that theyve been living separately for two years, and that their marriage had been unharmonious. It appears that the wife is involved in a domestic controversy, being pitted against her husbands immediate relatives and making marital life difficult. She demanded for support. Defendant refuted the allegations

and prayed that the complaint be dismissed. Meanwhile, the plaintiff files a petition for alimony pendente lite which defendant opposed. Based on a stipulation of facts agreed upon by the parties, the court rendered judgment granting the wifes allowance. The defendant filed a petition electing to fulfill his obligation as thus fixed by the court by receiving and maintaining plaintiff at his residence in Pasay, and that if the plaintiff refuses, the defendant will not be compelled to remit allowance to her in Zamboanga. This petition was denied and therefore, the defendant brought the case to the CA who certified the case to the SC. Issue: WON a wife is entitled to receive support from her husband where she refused to live with him on account of some misunderstandings she had with the husbands immediate relatives. Held: Decision appealed from is modified by giving the defendant husband the option of supporting his wife at their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of the parents of the husband. Should the plaintiff refuse, then the defendant is relieved from the obligation of giving support. Ratio: The court found that while the wife strongly wanted to be separated from the husband, the husband was open to fix the problem, acknowledging his obligation to support her and even expressing his willingness to abide by her wishes to have a conjugal dwelling apart from his parents, although this might be financially taxing for him to sustain. The defendant acknowledges that the Art. 111, CC imposes on the husband the responsibility of maintaining and supporting his wide and family but he insists that under Art. 209, CC he is given the option to fulfill said duty either by paying the allowance as fixed by the Court or by receiving and maintaining the person entitled thereto in his house. He has thus elected to perform his obligation by the second means allowed by the law. The law affords moral and legal obstacle as a ground to compel husband to provide separate maintenance for the wife. However, misunderstanding with in-laws is not a valid moral and legal obstacle. Art. 110 does not preclude the husband from fixing the conjugal residence at the patriarchal home, nor is it against any recognized norm of morality. Although the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance, and that the wife is entitled to be supported, our laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live with her husband where even without legal justification she establishes her residence apart from that provided for by the former. But there is no reason why she should be allowed any support from the husband.

Del Rosario v. Del Rosario (1949: Manila) On May 9, 1940, plaintiff Genoveva D.R. (widow w/ 2 kids) and defendant Teoderico D.R. (mechanic, widower w/ a son) were married. They lived together in the house of defendant's mother. Because of petty quarrels, plaintiff left the conjugal home in 1942. ISSUE: WON plaintiff is justified in leaving and is entitled to support RATIO: Yes. As the marriage vow does not include making sacrifices for the in-laws, there is legal justification for Ws refusal to live with H, taking into account the traditional hatred between W and her mother-in-law (hahaha). It is true that W is obliged to follow her H wherever he wishes to establish the residence (Art 58 CC), but this right does not include compelling W to live with mo-in-law, if they cannot get along together. Alimony will be set according to Hs ability to pay. MC GUIRE vs. MC GUIRE Action in equity by wife to recover suitable maintenance and support money. Plaintiff (wife) and Defendant (husband) were married on August 11, 1919. The husband had a reputation for more than ordinary frugality and the wife was aware of this situation. The wife had been previously married but her first husband died. She and her 2 daughters inherited an 80 acre land of which she has 1 1/3 interest. The defendant would not tolerate any charge amounts and he would not inform her as to finances or business. There were several occasions wherein the plaintiff would ask for money but it would not be granted by the husband. During the marriage the plaintiff raised chickens and the she used the proceeds of the chickens and eggs to buy things that she wanted, clothing and groceries. During the last 3 or 4 years the defendant allowed her to buy groceries but we would pay for the items purchased via check. The house in not equipped with a bathroom, bathing facilities or inside toilet. Defendant owns 398 acres of land, bank deposits, and government bonds. The plaintiff owns a bank account which include the required $200 and

$100 deposits of the defendant during the pendency of the proceedings. During the trial the plaintiff continued to live with the defendant. District court ruled in favour of the plaintiff Errors assigned by the defendant o Decree was not supported by sufficient evidence o Decree is contrary to law o Decree is an unwarranted usurpation and invasion of the defendants fundamental and constitutional right o Court erred in allowing fees for the plaintiffs attorney Allegations of the plaintiff o Extreme cruelty Issue: WON the wife is entitled to Separate Maintenance Held: No Ratio: Precedent cases that were brought forward by the plaintiff o Earle v. Earle well established rule that it is the duty of the husband to provide his family with support and means of living. Style of support to be such as fit his means, position and station in life. Wife has generally the right to use his credit for the purchase of necessaries. If wife is abandoned by her husband without means for support a bill of equity will lie to compel the husband to support the wife without asking a decree for divorce o Cochran v. Cochran A court of equity will entertain an action brought for alimony alone, and will grant the same, although no divorce or other relief is sought, where the wife is separated from the husband without her fault o Chapman v. Chapman Action for separate maintenance only Defendant deserted his wife o Price v. Price Defendant abandoned his wife and refused and neglected to provide further for her support and maintenance

Held: it was the duty of the husband to provide for the reasonable support and maintenance of his wife during the continuance of the marriage relation and when the husband fails to provide for the support and maintenance of the wife, she may maintain an action against him for reasonable maintenance unless by her own act abandonment of the husbands domicile or some other act wholly inconsistent with her duty as a wife. Brewer v. Brewer Mother dominated the house and as result wife left Wife may bring a suit in equity to secure support and alimony without reference to whether the action is for divorce or not. Action of leaving did not forfeit her right to maintenance. Sinn v. Sinn Wife living apart from her husband generally becomes entitled to alimony or separate maintenance when she offers in good faith to return to him and he refuses to accept the offer. Scott v. Scott Right of wife to bring an action in equity for separate maintenance where the husband has violated his legal duty to support her. Buckman v. Buckman There was a statute which enumerated three classes of cases in which the court might make an order concerning the support of a wife. CURRENT CASE NO STATUTE IN EXISTENCE Wife was in great need of clothing, medicine and other thing which he refused to furnish. Smith v. Smith Wife left the home after a quarrel wherein the husband struck her. Wife returned but they never occupied the same bed. Court entertained the action for separate maintenance and support without divorce Polster v. Polster Husband was a drunkard, abused the wife and was enamored with another

woman wherein he spent money entertaining her. Court held that the conduct of the husband is as such as to render the condition of the wife as unbearable and that she may leave without forfeiting her right to maintain an action for maintenance against him Wife does not forfeit her right for separate maintenance merely because she lives under the same roof with her husband. o Randall v. Randall Husband brutally kicked, choked and otherwise assaulted the wife. Court held that a wife continuing to live in the same house as the husband but in separate quarters is still entitled for maintenance and support No cases cited by the plaintiff would sustain the action that she has instituted. Several cases in which separate maintenance was refused the wife, where the husband and wife were living in the same house. Indispensable requirements that the wife should be living separate and apart from her husband without her fault and therefore a wife living in the same house with her husband, occupying a different room and eating at a different time was not entitled to separate maintenance [Lowe v. Lowe] Marital relation has continued for 33 years and the wife has been supported in the same manner without and complaint on her part. The parties have not been separated or living apart. Action for support and maintenance parties must be separated or living apart from each other Living standards of a family are a matter pf concern to the household and not for the courts to determine. As long as the home is maintained and the parties are living as husband and wife it may be said that the husband is legally supporting his wife and the purpose of the marriage relation is being carried out. Dissent [Justice Yeager] If the right is to be extended only to one who is separated from the husband equity and effective justice would be denied where a wealthy husband refused proper support and maintenance to a wife physically or mentally incapable of putting herself in a position where the rule could be applicable to her.

 Within the power of every man, who, unrestrained by conscience, seeks to be freed from his obligations to his wife and family, by withholding the necessary comforts and support due them, to compel her to so that for hi which the law would not do upon his own application. PELAYO vs. LAURON (Cebu, 1909) Oct. 13, 1906, nighttime Arturo Pelayo, a physician based in Cebu, was called to the house of Marcelo Lauron & Juana Abella (defendants) in San Nicolas. Their daughter-in-law was about to give birth & they requested him to render medical assistance. Since it was a difficult birth, he had to perform a surgery to remove the fetus using forceps. He also removed the afterbirth. He finished all of these until the following morning. He visited the patient several times the following day. Just & equitable value for the services he rendered: P500.00. Without any good reason, defendants refused to pay said amount. Thus he filed a case praying for a judgment in his favor against defendants for the sum of P500.00 + costs along with other relief that may be deemed proper. Defendants alleged: 1. Their daughter-in-law died in consequence of the childbirth. 2. Their son & daughter-in-law lived independently & her giving birth in their house was only accidental. 3. Prayed that they be absolved. CFI: Defendants absolved due to lack of sufficient evidence to establish right of action. ISSUE: WON the defendants are bound to pay the bill for the services Pelayo has rendered. HELD: NO. CFI judgment affirmed. RATIO: Rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is among the mutual obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 & 143, CC) The party bound to give support should therefore be liable for all the expenses including the fees of the physician. Thus, it is the husbands obligation to pay Pelayo and not the defendants. The husband would still be liable even if his parents were the one who called & requested for Pelayos assistance. The defendants are not under any obligation to pay the fees claimed (An obligation according to CC Art. 1089 is created by law, contracts, quasi-contracts, & by illicit acts & omissions or

by those in which any kind of fault/negligence occurs.). There was no contract between Pelayo & the defendants thus they cant be compelled to pay him. BRADWELL vs. ILLINOIS Mrs. Myra Bradwell, residing in the State of Illinois, made application to the judges of the Supreme Court of the State for a license to practice law. She accompanied her petition with all the proper documents and requirements. However, the license was refused by the Supreme Court of Illinois because the statute of Illinois on the subject of admissions to the bar allows the Supreme Court to have discretion to refuse admission to any persons or class of persons who are not intended by the legislature to be admitted, even though their exclusion is not expressly required by the statute. The Court of Illinois was of the opinion that when the legislature gave to this court the power of granting licenses to practice law, it was with not the slightest expectation that this privilege would be extended to women. Issue: WON a female citizen, duly qualified in respect of age, character, and learning, can claim, under the fourteenth amendment, the privilege of earning a livelihood by practicing at the bar of a judicial court. Held: No. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied the application on the ground that, by the common law, which is the basis of the laws of Illinois, only men were admitted to the bar, and the legislature had not made any change in this respect. It could not be supposed that the legislature had intended to adopt any different rule. Counsel for the plaintiff in this court contends that there are certain privileges and immunities which belong to a citizen of the United States as such; and that admission to the bar of a State of a person who possesses the requisite learning and character is one of those which a State may not deny. The court agrees that there are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the US, and that it is these and these alone which a State is forbidden to abridge. However, it is of the opinion that the right to admission to practice in the courts of a State is not one of them. This right depends not on citizenship of the United States but on citizenship of the State. Ultimately, the court reaffirms its decision in the Slaughter-House Cases that the right to control and regulate the granting of license to practice law in the courts of a State is one of those powers which are not transferred for its protection to the Federal government, and its exercise is in no manner governed or controlled by citizenship of the United States

in the party seeking such license. The Judgment is thus affirmed. (In short, they cant overrule the legislative intent of the Illinois statute which they believe intended women to be barred from admission in the bar) (But more importantly, here is Bradleys super sexist opinion) Bradley, concurring: Justice Bradley believes that historically, the right of females to pursue any lawful employment for a livelihood (the practice of law included) is NOT one of the privileges and immunities of women as citizens to engage in any and every profession, occupation, or employment in civil life. Both civil law and nature have always differentiated men and womenmen as woman's protector and defender while women with natural and proper timidity and delicacy which is unfit if for many of the occupations of civil life. Even the constitution of the family organization indicates that the domestic sphere belongs to the woman. The constitution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband such that it was believed that a woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the social state. Some rules of law flow from this cardinal principle. One of these is, that a married woman is incapable, without her husband's consent, of making contracts which shall be binding on her or him. This very incapacity was one circumstance which the Supreme Court of Illinois deemed important in rendering a married woman incompetent fully to perform the duties and trusts that belong to the office of an attorney and counsellor. The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. It is not one of her fundamental rights and privileges to be admitted into every office and position, including those which require highly special qualifications and demanding special responsibilities. In the nature of things it is not every citizen of every age, sex, and condition that is qualified for every calling and position. It is the prerogative of the legislator to prescribe regulations founded on nature, reason, and experience for the due admission of qualified persons to professions and callings demanding special skill and confidence. This fairly belongs to the police power of the State; and, in my opinion, in view of the peculiar characteristics, destiny, and mission of woman, it is within the province of the legislature to ordain what offices, positions, and callings shall be filled and discharged by men, and shall receive the benefit of those

energies and responsibilities, and that decision and firmness which are presumed to predominate in the sterner sex. Art. 378. The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action to the latter. Silva v. Peralta (1961:Davao) In 1944, defendant Esther Peralta accompanied younger sister Florence in the latters arrest and investigation in Anibongan. There, defendant met plaintiff and appellant Saturnino Silva, a US citizen and officer of the US Army. Silva then started courting Esther and she later accepted his proposal of marriage having been made to believe that he was single. They started living together as commonlaw H & W in Dec 1944 and bore a son, Saturnino Silva, Jr. They were married on Jan 14, 1945. However, no documents of marriage were prepared nor executed. Only evidence offered was testimonies of the defendant and her counsel. Appellant Silva however, was married to one Priscilla Isabel of Australia during such time. It was only after May 1945, when he was sent back to US for medical treatments of his battle wounds, did he divorce Aussie. To add, on May 9, 1948, he contracted another marriage with co-plaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva. ISSUES: (1) WON appellants deception and fraud justified award of damages to defendant (2) WON defendant misrepresented herself as Mrs. Silva HELD: Judgment modified. Defendant appellee Esther Peralta is enjoined from representing herself, directly or indirectly, as wife of appellant Saturnino Silva; and appellant Silva is ordered to pay defendant PhP 30,000 by was of pecuniary and moral damages, plus PhP 5,000 as attys fees. RATIO: (1) Yes, if appellant revealed his true situation, appellee would never have agreed to be with appellant. Esthers loss of employment in the Girl Scouts Davao Council was ultimately a result of Silvas deception and she should be indemnified therefor. His concealment of his real status was not mere dolo but actual fraud. He should then stand solely liable for any & all damages arising therefrom. Moreover, Esther acted in good faith since Slva formerly introduced her as Mrs. Silva, sent her letters thus addressed which implied authority to use his name.

(2) Yes. In the face of evidence, it is safe to conclude that no marriage had really taken place. It is not proper for Esther to continue representing herself as the wife of Saturnino considering that at the time, he was still married to Priscilla Isabel. And as per Art 370 CC, a married woman is authorized to use husbands surname, impliedly, it also excludes others from doing likewise. TOLENTINO vs. CA Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals February 8, 1931 Respondent Consuelo David married Arturo Tolentino. September 15, 1943 Marriage was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by a decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion and abandonment by the wife for a t least 3 continuous years Arturo Tolentio married Pular Adorable but she died soon after the marriage Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945 and they have 3 children. Constancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time that the complaint was filed. Her usage of the surname Tolentino was authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino (brothers and sisters) Trial Court ruled that Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of the surname of Tolentino Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Trial Court. Issues: 1. WON the petitioners cause of action has already prescribed 2. WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced. Held/Ratio 1. Yes Art. 1150 (CC) The time for prescription of all kinds of actions, when there in no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought

Art. 1149 Period of prescription is 5 years from the right of action accrues. The action has long prescribed because she married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945; Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950; She acquired knowledge that Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino in 1951. She should have filed the case after she obtained knowledge that Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino. The case was filed on November 23, 1971 or 20 years after she obtained knowledge. 2. No Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced woman may continue to use the surname of her husband because there are no provisions for divorce under Philippine law. Commentary of Tolentino with regards to Art. 370 of the CC: the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husbands surname. She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain others from using it. Art 371 is not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present case refers to absolute divorce where there is severance of valid marriage ties. Effect of divorce more akin to death of the spouse where the deceased woman is continued to be referred to as Mrs. Of the husband even if he has remarried. If the appeal would be granted the respondent would encounter problems because she was able to prove that she entered into contracts with third persons, acquired properties and entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino. Petitioner failed to show the she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of right. There is no usurpation of the petitioners name and surname. Usurpation implies injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists with the possibility of confusion of identity Element of usurpation o Actual use of anothers name o Use is unauthorized o Use of anothers name is to designate personality or identity of a person None of these elements were present in the case Silva v. Peralta case was cited by the petitioner but the case is not applicable. In the Silva case it

was not mere use of the surname that was enjoined but the defendants representation that she was the wife of Saturnino Silva. Silva case there was usurpation of the status of the wife. YASIN vs. SHARIA DISTRICT COURT (see old digest) PEREZ vs. CA (Manila, 1960) Antonio Perez in his own representation and as guardian ad litem of his adoptive son Benigno Perez, filed a civil case against his wife Angela Tuason de Perez stating three causes of action: 1. Benigno prays that his mother, Angela be declared a prodigal & placed under guardianship since she has been squandering all of her estate on a young man, Jose Antonio Campos Boloix. He likewise prays for a writ of injunction pending trial to prevent her from continuing such acts. 2. Angela due to her acts of prodigality, has dissipated the conjugal partnership of gain to the prejudice of both spouses. Antonio prays for a writ of injunction to restrain his wife from doing such. 3. Angela has been telling him & other people that he intends to marry & have a child by Boloix or have a child by any other person despite her marriage to Antonio, just to put him in a ridiculous & embarrassing position. Antonio seeks to recover damages worth P185,000.00 + attorneys fees. CFI: issued preliminary injunction. Angela prayed for dismissal of case on the ground of res judicata, denied. Filed another second motion to dismiss on the ground that CFI has no jurisdiction because it falls under the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court. CFI dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Antonio & Benigno alleged that: CFI has jurisdiction & the Doctrine of Estoppel of Jurisdiction is applicable in this country thus should be applied. ISSUE: WON CFI has jurisdiction over this case. HELD: NO. CFI decision affirmed. RATIO: 1. RA No. 1401 created the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court of the City of Manila & assigning the following under its exclusive original jurisdiction: (Sec 38)

a. cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, paternity & acknowledgment; (Sec. 38-b) b. proceeding brought under provisions of Articles 116, 225, 250, 2 & 331 of CC (Sec 38-d). Art. 116 states that when one spouse neglects his/her duties to conjugal union/brings danger, dishonor or material injury upon the other, injured party may apply to the court for relief. The court may counsel the offended to comply w/his or her duties & take such measures as may be proper. 2. All causes of action are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court: a. first cause of action: since it involves guardianship, its under Sec. 38-b. b. third cause of action: since Angelas acts placed Antonio in an embarrassing & contemptible position causing him grave anxiety, wounded feeling, extreme humiliation, this is under Sec. 38-d & Art. 116 since it involves acts that bring dishonor upon the other spouse. c. second cause of action: under Art. 116 provision on matl injury according to CFI. But material injury is not economic but personal (physical/moral). This cause of action is dependent on & an incident of the first cause of action, demanding guardianship of Angela. It cant stand independently. Thus, it is also covered by Sec. 38-b. 3. Allegation re: estoppel of jurisdiction cant operate against Court. Court can inquire & determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action & can dismiss the case if it doesnt fall under its jurisdiction. ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo have been married for 10 years when Dolores decided to leave their domicile with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. Mariano thus initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of the husband and thus she filed a cross complaint that asks for a decree of separation, a liquidation of conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence, concluded that the continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with

him. Thus, the judge gave judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed Issues: (1) WON the abandonment by the wife of the marital home was with sufficient justification No. It has been held that the tales of cruelty on the part of the husband were not proven; (2) WON cross complaint conclusively proves that the plaintiff has forfeited his right to the marital society of his wife. The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143, CC. Accordingly, where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance; and he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorneys fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation. Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spousesa state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband. Facts of the case show that the plaintiff has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and she is under a moral and legal obligation to return to the common home and cohabit with him. (3) WON the husband is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction to compel the wife to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as his dutiful wife Although the husband is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return, the Court is disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. Thus, that the

plaintiff in this case is not entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint. Held: judgment appealed from in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. Plaintiff absolved from cross-complaint.