On becoming better human beings

Stein Wivestad

1. Education as upbringing
To make oneself better, to cultivate oneself, and if one is evil, to bring forth morality
in oneself  that is something the human being should do. But reflecting thoroughly on
the task, one finds it to be very difficult. Upbringing (Erziehung) is therefore the
biggest problem and the most difficult task that human beings can be given. For
insight [needed to make oneself better?] hangs on the upbringing and upbringing
depends again upon the insight. And therefore ubringing can progress only little by
little, and only when one generation transfers its experiences and bits of knowledge to
the next … (Kant & Rink, 1803, p. 14, my transl.)1
The quotation above actualises two separate but intertwined problems: Can adults really make
themselves better? Can improvement be transferred from one generation to the next? This
paper is mostly about the first.
What is “better” depends on what is “a good human being” and what is a “bad human being”.
If we focus on the negative, we may ask what characterises a movement out of or up from a
bad or inferior condition. If we focus on the positive, we may ask what characterises a
movement towards a good condition. A simple expression of this is when a child no longer
wants to be small, it wants to “become big”. The Americans “raise”, the Germans “erziehen”,
the Norwegians “oppdrar” and the French “éleve” their children. A pioneer in English
educational theory, John Adams, refers to the Latin verb educare, which means “to bring up a
child physically and mentally” (Adams, 1912/1994, pp. 14-15).
The traditional words and metaphors of pedagogical practice presuppose a movement in a
good direction, out of something negative and into something positive. To educate may be
understood as to draw or lead (ducere) someone out of (e or ex) a present situation that is
seen as inferior, towards (pro) a positive possibility in the future. The e-duction starts with
embryogeny and birth, should continue in upbringing and hopefully in some way even
through physical decline and death. Earlier it was common to use the verb erudire, to lead out
of rawness, roughness or rudeness. This metaphor is biased to the inferior present condition,
and the outcome may be an old-fashioned “erudition”. Pro-duction is biased to specified
positive conditions in the future, and if the specified ends contradict with each other, the
outcome will be a confused effectivity. Education becomes one-sided if it is understood as
either e-duction or pro-duction. Both sides are necessary, both upbringing from and
upbringing to. The e-duction addresses our life a whole, and is therefore most important and
difficult. But in a world of global capitalism it is production metaphors that govern language,

1
"Sich selbst besser machen, sich selbst kultivieren, und wenn er böse ist, Moralität bei sich hervorbringen, das
soll der Mensch. Wenn man das aber reiflich überdenkt, so findet man, daß dieses sehr schwer sei. Daher ist die
Erziehung das größeste Problem und das schwerste, was dem Menschen kann aufgegeben werden. Denn Einsicht
hängt von der Erziehung und Erziehung hängt wieder von der Einsicht ab. Daher kann die Erziehung auch nur
nach und nach einen Schritt vorwärts tun, und nur dadurch, daß eine Generation ihre Erfahrungen und
Kenntnisse der folgenden überliefert …" This is taken from a version of Kant's lectures Über Pädagogik
published by one of his former students, F. T. Rink, in 1803, the year before Kant died. We cannot be sure that
the exact wording is Kant's, but the text "is a compact (albeit not always thoroughly consistent), authentic and
eminently graspable compendium of Kant's view on education" (Louden, 2000, p. 36). There is an English
translation of the text (Kant, 1899).

Wivestad.doc 15 pages 22/02/2006

thinking and actions. When everything seems to go smooth and fast forwards, we need to be
reminded about our fundamental vulnerability.

If you should go skating

On the thin ice of modern life
Dragging on behind you the silent reproach
Of a million tear stained eyes
Don’t be surprised, when a crack in the ice
Appears under your feet
You slip out of your depth and out of your mind
With your fear flowing out behind you
As you claw the thin ice
(Waters, 1982, p. 47)

The picture Angelus novus by Paul Klee (1920) interpreted

by Walter Benjamin questions progress. The angel is
staring on something it is moving away from, and “what
we call progress” is a storm “from Paradise” blowing the
“angel of history” backwards into the future. Where we
fancy a chain of Begebenheiten or “special events”, the
angel sees a “single catastrophe, which keeps piling
wreckage upon wreckage”2. The only possible results are
lifeless fragments that cannot be integrated to a living
whole. What is this catastrophe? The loss of the virtue
tradition? (Tubbs, 2004, p. 551) The history of the modern
intellectuals? The “angel” has a big head and almost no
body. Or is human history as a whole a catastrophe,
blowing all away from Paradise?

In Europe there seems to be stability in abortion rates and decline in birth rates. “There is no
longer a single country in Europe where people are having enough children to replace
themselves when they die” (Specter, 1998). This development can be seen in the light of
greater individual social security, egoism, experiences of bad relations, a bad society, etc. But
it actualises a basic question: Why do we want to have children? This is the first pedagogical
question (Mollenhauer, 1983/1994, p. 17). Prior to questions concerning the self-
understanding and vocation of the teacher (Tubbs, 2005) are questions concerning the self-
understanding and responsibility of the human being: Why do we want to have children?
There may be good things in our life: what do we want to share with new generations? There
are bad things in our life: what are the conditions for improving ourselves and becoming
better examples?

2. Conditions for becoming better: four stories

This section sketches four basic stories: the Aristotelian story about happiness (the A story),
2
Wo eine Kette von Begebenheiten vor uns erscheint, da sieht er eine einzige Katastrophe, die unablässig
Trümmer auf Trümmer häuft und sie ihm vor die Füße schleudert (Benjamin, 1940). Where we perceive a chain
of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet (Benjamin,
1940/2000).

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the Biblical story about salvation (the B story), the story about liberation from the Cave (the C
story) and the Modern story about freedom from all authorities and traditions (the M story). I
tell them in this order: C, A, B and M. B and A are the ones I favour and have used most time
studying. I tell two versions of the B story; one general and one related to Thomas Aquinas,
who integrates A in B. At the end of the section I compare the stories briefly.
Through our language and culture we (Europeans) are influenced by all these stories, either
we know them or not. They have different weight and are interpreted differently. Which story
or story-combination that a person is rooted in and lives by is from the beginning determined
by one’s upbringing and the persons close to oneself that one has chosen to admire and listen
to. Dialectics starts with doubt, but our learning does not. I suppose that also Tubbs’s
fascinating dialectical climbing acrobatics has a foundation in upbringing and persuasive
rhetoric. And if the basic stories or metanarratives are myths, they “cannot be refuted, but
only out-narrated” (Milbank, 1991, p. 260). A story about the dangers of all metanarratives,
however, may itself become a metanarrative, and as such it is not persuasive. Acceptance of
differences should be a part of any story. But if celebration of multiplicity and pluralism
implicitly functions as the basic story, suppressing alternative stories, then confusion, lack of
roots and lack of stable relations has to be accepted as conditions for “progress”.
The C story. The story about the liberation from the Cave is told by Tubbs (2005, p. 246-250
and 323-326). It portrays human beings as sitting in a dark cave where they are unfree and
living by illusions. But there is a “path out of” (p. 288) this condition − up into the upper
enlightened world of freedom and truth. As the sun gives light, which we depend on in order
to be able to use our ability to see, so the good gives all things their truth, which we depend
on in order to be able to use our ability to know. As light and vision are sun-like, so truth and
knowledge are good-like, but not the good itself. As the sun gives and sustains life, so the
good gives all known things their existence and their being, “though the good is not being but
something far surpassing being in rank and power” (Plato, 2005, 508a-509c). Progress
towards the divine, the good, makes a real change both in what we see and who we are. The
transition has to be made gradually, and when the source of the beautiful, true and good is
seen at last, it is tempting for the philosopher to stay in the upper world. This should be
resisted. The enlightened have a vocation to go down again in the Cave and help the fellow-
prisoners.
The story represents the conditions for improvement as a gradual and difficult and personal
learning process. Learning starts with the dim light that is reflected in our souls already, but
this needs to be redirected and refined by the perfect source of light. The philosopher is
handicapped when going from darkness to light or from light to darkness. It is easier to stay
with the illusions. Liberation and enlightenment may be very unpleasant and will evoke
resistance. The C story gives a strong metaphor of learning as a personal process − a process
of “askesis … not as asceticism, but as the practice of spiritual exercises”. It is a process
aiming at a complete turning of the person, “a transformation of our vision of the world and
… a metamorphosis of our personality” (Hadot, 1995, p. 83). This presupposes a good
instructor, tutor or leader, (Plato, 2005, 515c-d and 519c), a person who has already been
liberated and enlightened.
The A story. According to the Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle (later NE) we are all drawn
towards what we perceive as pleasant and beautiful. The pleasant and the fine “motivate
everything everyone does” (Aristotle, 2002, NE 1110b12 Rowe). This compulsion is not
something forced upon us from the outside without our contribution. We all seek happiness,
but not in the same things. Ordinary people identify happiness “with one of the obvious things
that anyone would recognize, like pleasure or wealth or honour” (1095a23), and “most people

3
are … not even having a conception of the fine and the truly pleasant, since they have had no
taste of it”3 (1179b11-15). We voluntarily seek the pleasant and beautiful, but are we also
responsible for what we perceive as pleasant and beautiful and as aversive and ugly things to
do? We ourselves are the origin of our actions, as we are of our children (1113b19). The
children are not the origin of themselves. Therefore “we need to have had the appropriate
upbringing − right from early youth, as Plato says − to make us find enjoyment or pain in the
right things; for this is the correct education (he orthe paideia)” (Aristotle, 1985, 1104b
Irwin).
The basic action of a child is to choose authorities: choose persons to admire, emulate, listen
to and obey more than others. Within the given limitations, the children will probably prefer
persons with some degree of moral virtue, wisdom (phronesis) and love. Children experience
who are doing well towards themselves and others, and who are not. From the beginning they
experience how they are being “fed, warmed, and washed” (Burnaby, 1938, p. 302), how
adults deal with their anger, and how adults distribute goods between themselves and others
around them. In play the children may reproduce these experiences. Both good actions and
bad actions we do voluntarily. Thereby we also become responsible for our own character.
We may wish to do good things, but it may not help us if we have a long story of choosing
wrongly and of doing bad things, and thereby have attained a weak or bad character. It is
impossible for a man “to retrieve a stone after it has left his hand, but … it depended on him
that it was thrown” (NE 1114a18 Rowe). Knowledge of general precepts (ethical theory) does
not help us if our passions make us blind for the connection between the abstract precepts and
the unique situation here and now, which demands action. Therefore Aristotle is sceptical as
to the possibility of moral progress through mere verbal teaching. Our character does not
become good merely by studying ethics. Only those who already are experienced and good
may benefit from such studies (1095a3-8 and 1179b5-10). “One’s sight of the beautiful and
pleasant is made clear by virtue, and clouded by its absence” (Sachs, 2002, p. 116, note 172).
Sachs gives reference to NE 1113a29-b1, 1143b13-14 and 1144a30. The basic problem of
freedom is how to avoid being blinded and enslaved by our passions. Howard J. Curzer
(2002) uses Aristotle’s descriptions of four groups of imperfect characters (NE 1179b7-16
and 1145b8-13), and proposes a possible progress for adults, moving through these character
types in order to achieve full virtue. The many (hoi polloi) need external punishment to avoid
the vicious. The generous-minded or civilized (eleutherios) have internalized the punishment
and are feeling shame by actual or possible vicious actions. Thereby they are open to learn by
themselves to find better alternatives. The incontinent (acrates) know what is virtuous to do,
but need support to do it in the actual situation, where their passions sometimes take
command. The continent or self-controlled (encrates) know what is virtuous and are able to
do it in practice, but they have to struggle with themselves. Finally the virtuous (aretai) do the
good out of their character. Their thinking and emotions play together. They find some
pleasure in doing virtuous actions, even when the action may be experienced as painful. A
virtuous person therefore “spontaneously desires and seeks what is in accordance with the
truly good life that he is trying to lead” (Porter, 1990, p. 103).
The B story starts with the condition prior to human misery. On the first page of the Bible it is
told that God creates everything from nothing; and all is good, time and change included!
(Bouwsma, 1976, p. 82) Human beings are created in the image of God. Therefore obedience
to God is not something externally imposed on us. God’s image (Bild) is the limit of our

3
Tubbs (2004, p. 556) confuses Aristotle's criticism of the many (hoi polloi) with criticism of "the men of
theory", and is thereby falsely widening the gap between the active condition for moral wisdom (phronesis) and
the active condition for theoretical wisdom (sophia). Phronesis is both about the universal and the particular (NE
1141b14 and 20).

4
Bildung (Gadamer, 1979, p. 11-12). Within this limit the human being is “a free agent and not
a mechanical instrument”; he/she is called to be “a fellow worker with God” (Burnaby, 1938,
p. 265). The unfree situation is the result of a revolt against God. We wanted to transcend the
limit, wanted to be gods ourselves; and trying to be above change we started to fear
experience (Bouwsma, 1976, p. 84). We became self-centered and egoistic, bound to seek our
own pride independent of God. This is the condition even for the best persons, also those who
seem to be “angels”. The enemy in moral life is “the fat, relentless ego” (Iris Murdoc, here
from Meilaender, 1984, p. 58). Is this the historic catastrophe that Benjamin describes, the
effect of the storm from Paradise? The head of the angel is relatively big compared with the
rest. Are the best persons in some ways like children, those who have had the least time to
study and imitate adult cunning, hypocrisy, hatred and war?
Progress in this story is dependent on God. God chooses a people descending from Abraham
and leads them out of slavery, leads them through the wilderness towards the Promised Land;
as an example to follow for all people. The followers are always tempted to regress to greater
security and wellbeing. The enlightening and correcting truth is God’s word, revealed by
God’s messengers. When Moses came down from Sinai, his face was shining with a light that
was too strong for the people (Exodus 34:29-30). Listening to the tradition is important for the
followers. They “make the story of the Bible their story” (George Lindbeck, here from Wells,
1998, p. 55), and understand their own life story as a participation in a great narrative, which
starts with creation and ends with the final judgement and the hope of a new heaven and a
new earth. The task is to identify and fulfil one’s own part in the common story. “One cannot
understand Scripture unless one is open to having one’s life changed by it” (Wells, 1998, p.
77). This demands time for listening and praying, worship and sacraments. In this time the
moral imagination is formed (p. 122). “The task of human creative differentiation is to be
charitable, and to give in ‘art’ (all human action) endlessly new allegorical depictions of
charity” (Milbank, 1991, p. 425-426). Rationality is not the main criterion of progress. God’s
people include “mentally handicapped, infants and the mentally ill” (Wells, 1998, p. 128).
They live in secular time and space, but the new time is constantly breaking in, giving another
perspective on their actions (pp. 150-162). Only in this new time there is peace, and thereby
the temptation to rest in common human illusions can be resisted. All things are good insofar
as they exists, but something may become evil “in terms of its failure to be related to God, to
infinite peace, and to other finite realities with which it should be connected to form a pattern
of true desire” (Milbank, 1991, p. 432).
Thomas Aquinas has given a Christian interpretation of the B story, integrating A in B.
Thomas thought that God works in every will and in every nature, also in those who do not
believe in God, thereby that “every creature is oriented toward an end proportionate to its own
determinate potentialities” (Porter, 1990, p. 64). We are determined to have full freedom as
rational beings, and we express ourselves in our acts. One’s single actions are like “individual
tones within the larger melody of one’s life” (Schockenhoff, 2002, p. 245), and “the final end
is present in everything one does” (p. 244). Therefore it “is necessary that all things which a
person desires, he desires on account of a final end”4 (Porter, 1990, p. 72). The “free human
being is one who has made the roles that she occupies into a part of herself by her conscious
choice to accept them, and who takes responsibility for the direction of her own life by fitting
those roles together into an orderly life-plan that is the goal of her life” (p. 82). The cardinal
virtues (temperance, courage, justice and moral wisdom) provide a “foundation for” this
unification of the personality (p. 167). Through moral wisdom (phronesis) I grasp “what the
good life requires” of me, both as a general sketch and in each particular case (p. 163).
However, this unification “will inevitably be partial and vulnerable to tensions and regrets”
4
necesse est quod omnia quae homo appetit appetat propter ultimum finem (Aquinas, 2005, I-II 1,6 co.).

5
(p. 169). The final end, perfect happiness, a personal union with God, is attained outside this
life. Perfect happiness depends on God’s grace alone. “The naturally just individual who lacks
grace is objectively as far from salvation … as the worst sinners” (p. 66). The listening to and
living in the message of the prophets and apostles opens the possibility for the Holy Spirit to
infuse faith, hope and charity (agape) into human hearts, which creates a determination to
stay in relation with Jesus Christ, the new Adam. Baptism represents the drowning
(annihilation) of the false human pride and the creation out of nothing (ex nihil) of a new
human being. Agape completes the unification of the person, and adds something to moral life
that the cardinal virtues in themselves do not attain: “a new motivation for moral behavior”,
“inner harmony” and “patience” (p. 66-67). The infusion of faith, hope and charity is caused
in us “without any action on our part, but not without our consent” (Aquinas, I-II 55,4 ad 6
Benziger). Justifying grace is infused into the human being by the Holy Spirit. This happens
over time and the Spirit becomes part of one’s character. Therefore every action is really my
action, also when “God acts immanently in my act” (Healy, 2003, p. 86). Also in Christ I am
responsible for all my actions and my character or habitus, the way I hold myself.
The M story. Kant “is one of the philosophers who shaped our modern understanding of the
concept of freedom.” A free action “must be un-coerced by anything external … grounded in
your own reasoning” (Tubbs, 2005, p. 259). The Modern story seems to presuppose that the
reasoning individual can be absolutely independent of authorities and traditions. And Kant’s
essay about liberation through enlightenment (1784) may be read in this way. It maintains like
the previous stories that our unfree condition is “self-incurred”. But unlike both A and B it
tells us that the condition is caused by “cowardice and laziness”, and it seems therefore that
we rather easily can “make our own minds up” (Tubbs, 2005, p. 259), become free from
tutelage and make ourself better. “Human beings bring themselves little by little out of
rudeness (Rohigkeit), if not one [i. e. the political leaders] intentionally take artificial
measures to hold them in it” (Kant, 1784, p. 492, my transl.)5. Progress happens when the
individual mobilises the courage to use her own reason. “Sapere aude!” (p. 481), dare to
think! However, do Kant’s disciples think independently when they follow this imperative?
(Tubbs, 2005, p. 405)
The M story seems to be reinforced by the three critiques that Kant wrote during the 1780s.
His questions orbit around the “I”: What can I know? What ought to determine my will? How
can I judge without concepts? The first critique can be seen as a program for seeking truth
independent of moral and political concerns, the second as a program for seeking the right
thing to do independent of tradition, and the third as a program for appreciating beautiful form
independent of both moral concerns and tradition. His third critique is the “keystone”, making
the bridge between epistemology and moral philosophy. He grounds his confidence in the “I”
on our experience of the beautiful in nature. The “I’s” interest in the beautiful nature gives the
“I” a hint that it is the best of all creatures. Nature “points to us as to the ultimate goal of
creation” (Gadamer, 1979, p. 47). The world exists for our sake. Therefore the “I” can give
itself (auto) the laws (nomoi) to follow. Human beings can confidently use their own reason
and autonomously determine criteria for what is true to think and what is right to do.
If this “I” is perfect, it can be trusted absolutely. If not, the production of Kant and his modern
successors is like a great image of exceeding brightness, standing on feet of clay. A work of
Kant from 1793-94 (written after the critiques) paint the human condition with darker colours:
Religion within the limits of mere reason 6 starts with a comprehensive discussion of the

5
Die Menschen arbeiten sich von selbst nach und nach aus der Rohigkeit heraus, wenn man nur nicht absichtlich
künstelt, um sie darin zu erhalten.
6
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft

6
problem of evil. Kant maintains that human beings have a propensity to evil. As one knows
the human being through experience, “he cannot be judged otherwise”. Therefore evil is
“subjectively necessary in every human being, even the best”7 (Kant, here from Louden,
2000, p. 133 and 136). The radicality of the problem requires more than a gradual reform. We
can become new human beings “only through some kind of rebirth, like through a new
creation (John 3:5, compared with Genesis 1:2) and change of heart”8 (Kant, 1794/1970, p.
698, my transl.). Though this view comes close to the B story, Kant’s story is different.
Kant’s religion is based on morality, and morality is based on human reason.
Can “the fat, relentless ego” pull itself up from the hole in “the thin ice” by its own thinking?
Kant asks a similar question, but his answer seems to me like an assertion. He presupposes
that duty demands that we become good, and that duty never demands something impossible.
“In spite of the fall [from the good to the evil] this commandment keeps sounding
undiminished in our soul: we ought to [sollen] become better human beings, consequently we
must be able to achieve it”, eventually by making ourselves receptive to some “for us
unexplorable higher assistance”9 (Kant, 1794/1970, p. 695 and 698, my transl.). Perhaps it is
possible to argue for the view that “ought to do” implies “can do”, but this view seems strange
to me. Sometimes we utter a word and think immediately that we ought to take it back. But it
can be too late. We ought to and can apologize, but the first word was said and may still hurt.
We ought to return a book that belongs to another, but if we wait too long we may forget who
it was. Paul’s experience is opposite to Kant: “to will [the good] is present with me; but how
to perform that which is good I find not" (Romans 7:18 King James). However, “Kant
believes that there is a kind of education that can (somehow) cut through natural causes and
temporal circumstances and ‘get to the bottom’ − that is, to the agent’s manner of thinking
and moral character” (Louden, 2000, p. 47). Is this belief well founded?
In the lectures on “pedagogic”10, Kant is concerned with the difficulties of improvement. To
overcome them it is necessary that “one generation transfers its experiences and bits of
knowledge to the next” (Kant & Rink, 1803). In other words: We can only learn to think for
ourselves within the tradition we already belong to before we have formed a single thought.
This gives upbringing the key function. And to warrant continuous progress, avoiding that
one generation brings down what the former has brought up, “the mechanics in pedagogy

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er [der Mensch] kann nach dem, wie man ihn durch Erfahrung kennt, nicht anders beurteilt werden, oder man
kann es [das der Mensch böse ist], als subjektiv notwendig, in jedem, auch dem besten, Menschen voraussetzen.
(Kant, 1794/1970, p. 680)
8
er [der Mensch] kann ein neuer Mensch, nur durch eine Art von Wiedergeburt, gleich als durch eine neue
Schöpfung (Ev. Joh. III,5; verglichen mit I. Mose I,2), und Änderung des Herzens werden.
9
Denn, ungeachtet jenes Abfalls, eschallt doch das Gebot: wir sollen bessere Menschen werden, unvermindert in
unserer Seele; folglich müssen wir es auch können, sollte auch das, was wir tun können, für sich allein
unzureichend sein, und wir uns dadurch nur eines für uns unerforschlichen höheren Beistandes empfänglich
machen.
10
The German concept "Pädagogik" is often translated with "pedagogy". This is misleading. The word
"pedagogic" may be compared with "rhetoric", in Greek rhetorike (namely techne), the skill and study of
pursuasive public speaking. Thus the construction of Pädagogik from about 1770 includes both the agogia (the
practical upbringing, guidance or "pedagogy") and the techne (the know-how and theoretical study) of paideia
(upbringing, human cultivation and culture). "P[ädagogik] ist und bleibt … bis heute Kollektivsingular für das
ganze Spektrum der praktischen und theoretischen Beschäftigung mit Erziehung" (Hügli, 1989, p. 4).
Aristotelians may understand Pädagogik as a type of phronesis. Phronesis can be translated as "moral or
practical wisdom … knowledge of what one should do" (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 59 and 190). Persons with
phronesis are morally virtuous persons (NE 1144b31) who combine slow theoretical reflection and immediate
intuitive judgement (Aubenque, 1963/1986, p. 148), and directs their eventual special technai towards the
attainment of their "wider concerns as a human being" (Dunne, 1993, p. 265) − the good life as a whole.
Phronesis is in principle the same active condition (hexis) as politike (NE 1141b24), the wisdom that is needed
in law-giving and in political action.

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(Erziehungskunst) has to be transformed to academic studies (Wissenschaft)” (p. 17, my
transl.). A reliable theory of education is necessary. Have we got such a theory? Kant sees
“coercion” (Zwang) as necessary in upbringing, and formulates the problem of upbringing in
this way: “How do I cultivate the freedom through the coercion?” (p. 32, my transl.)11 So after
all, also Kant sees positive possibilities in tradition and authority. This brings Kant close to
the Aristotelian story.
All the four stories insist on human freedom and responsibility as basic to progress. All have
conceptions of the difficulties of progress. All may be criticised. And all have interesting
nuances that may supply the others.
A, the Aristotelian story, contends that moral character goes before moral perception and
thinking. C, the Cave story, sees personal improvement and thinking together. M, the Modern
story, seems to put thinking in the leading position. B, the Biblical story, can be seen as
absurd, as it reduces the importance of human thinking and striving. These differences may
explain the strong position of C and M metaphors in formal education. Tubbs tells the C story
as the (?) answer to the question “what is education?” (Tubbs, 2005, p. 246)
B addresses directly why human beings started to choose the wrong things and to live in
bondage and untruth. The C story does neither tell why we became prisoners in the first place
nor how one prisoner could get loose from the bonds for the first time and become tutor for
the others. According to A it is many who seek the wrong things and are content with
illusions of the good, but A does not tell why so many emulate vices.
In A and B emotional conditions are seen as important for possible improvement. A is
systematic. B is rich on examples. Both A, B and C give a sketch of a good life that is the
same for all, but realised differently by the individuals. M is more focused on the individual.
In A the resources for finding and attaining the good life are given in our natural capacities. In
B we are dependent on God and in C we are dependent on the good. In B and C the divine
light that enlightens us comes from without and is reflected in human minds. In the M story
human beings seem to have the light in themselves. Thinking themselves to be independent of
anything divine, they rely on their own resources to find the right path and to bring or build
themselves up.
Tubbs gives a refined M story. He contends that teachers today have to rely on modern
abstract and aporetic thinking in the tradition of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. In
this tradition the “I” (the experiencing and thinking subject) stands in the center, and the main
condition for improvement or “upbuilding” seems to be the subject’s ability to stay patiently
in doubt, doubting also this main condition. The strength of this tradition is said to be its
awareness of the negative in our existence (Tubbs, 2005, p. 407).
C and M stories dominates in Tubbs’s texts; interpretations of A and B are criticized or are
only indirectly represented. I am thankful to Nigel Tubbs for leading myself and others to
Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (later SAK). It gave me an impulse to get a glimpse into SAK’s
own writing. In the next section I try to supply Tubbs’s rather abstract representation of SAK,
first of all with the example SAK gives us in being open for the B story.

3. Is upbuilding possible?
Nigel Tubbs (2003) discusses how teaching of truth (religion) and teaching for truth
(philosophy) can be combined in a church college context today, aiming at the upbuilding of

11
Wie kultiviere ich die Freiheit bei dem Zwange?

8
the individual. Later, in a special issue (2005), he addresses a more general educational
context as master and servant on a long dialectical journey, where in the end he turns to Søren
Aabye Kierkegaard (SAK) and his Upbuilding discourses, for “a philosophical, spiritual and
religious examination” of the philosophical character of the teacher (Tubbs, 2005, p. 409).
SAK’s eighteen Opbyggelige Taler, published in his own name in six small booklets12 during
1843-1844, were not addressed to teachers, but to “that single individual (hiin Enkelte) whom
I with joy and gratitude call my reader”. In the beginning this was his beloved Regine. Later
hiin Enkelte was generalised to anyone willing to let the speech (Talen) be transformed to
conversation (Samtale), like in the ideal situation of a church congregation when both the
preacher and the listener receives what is spoken as God’s Word, a gift of love from above.
SAK wrote not as a teacher but in order to enhance his own upbringing and upbuilding.
(Kierkegaard, 1990, historical introduction) These speeches may be of interest to all who want
to become better human beings, teachers included.
Leaning on SAK, Tubbs (2005, pp. 411-413) sketches stages in the upbuilding of the human
soul (in my interpretation): 1. the stage of being possessed, 2. the stage of impatience and
doubt, and 3. the stage of patience in the struggle with oneself. 1. Being possessed. The child
experience itself as God’s child, it has “an immediate relation to God” (p. 412). “God’s house
is right next to his father’s residence, and it is entirely natural for him to be there”
(Kierkegaard, 1990, p. 242). Growing older, the human soul desires the world and its
pleasures (the external, temporal and imperfect), we dream about being masters, being
capable of everything (Goethe, 1798). Possessing the world, the soul become possessed by it.
But our soul is the contradiction of the temporal and the eternal, and therefore we resist being
possessed by the temporal. The feeling of homelessness created by this contradiction is well
captured by Pink Floyd in “Nobody home” (The Wall): “I’ve got a strong urge to fly but I’ve
got nowhere to fly to” (Waters, 1982). 2. Impatience and doubt. The imperfect soul finds
itself in a situation of anxiety and doubt. The outcome may be an inpatient search for pleasure
and control or an inpatient movement of thinking to always new positions, a movement which
never brings truth. Therefore we should deny false doubt, deny the doubt that doubts
everything except the doubt itself. “For subjectivity to know itself in doubt is to know itself as
the need for God”. “God is present in all the ways that we do not understand ourselves and
the world ... He has given us the gift of doubt, and God in doubt offers a potentially stronger
relationship to God than one of professed belief.” (Tubbs, 2005, p. 410) 3. Patience in the
struggle with oneself. Perfection of the soul demands patience in the struggle with oneself.
The soul “belongs to the world as illegitimate possession, it belongs to God as legitimate
possession, it belongs to himself [the human being] as possession, that is as the possession,
which is to be gained. Therefore, if he really gains his soul, he gains his soul from the world,
of God, by himself “13 (Kierkegaard, 1962, p. 151, my transl.; cf 1990, p. 167). Gaining the
soul “by” oneself (ved sig selv) means struggling with oneself. The first struggle is a struggle
against being conquered by the external, surrounding world. The soul has to be gained back
“from the world” (fra Verden). The second struggle is an internal struggle with oneself against
inward temptations, for example the temptation of false pride, that occurs when the person

12
Although all these 18 short texts are rooted in the Christian Bible and sixteen have an explicit reference to "a
Word" from the Scripture in the heading, SAK (in the forewords to each booklet) tells that he did not publish
"semons", as he was not ordained to preach. Instead he issued Taler, which can be translated as "speeches". Edna
H. Hong and Howard V. Hong (Kierkegaard, 1990) have instead chosen the title "discourses", perhaps in order
to underline the philosophical character of the texts. All translations are interpretations. I have only read parts of
this translation, but some places I have felt the need for an alternative.
13
Den [sjelen] skal på eengang eies og erhverves, den tilhører Verden som ulovlig Eiendom, den tilhører Gud
som sand Eiendom, den tilhører ham selv som Eiendom, det er som den Eiendom, der skal erhverves. Han
erhverver da altsaa, hvis han virkelig erhverver, sin Sjel fra Verden, af Gud, ved sig selv.

9
“himself wants to be something” (1990, p. 226; Tubbs, 2005, p. 413), instead of gaining
everything “of God” (af Gud).
Reading Tubbs representation of SAK, I get the impression that the way to upbuilding, the
path up from the Cage to a good relation with God goes through abstraction, doubt, aporetic
doubt in doubt, increase in the importance learning and decrease of the teacher. Doubt is seen
as a gift that God “has given us” (Tubbs, 2005, p. 410), and other gifts (faith, love and
learning) seem to be a function of staying patiently in doubt. Teaching for truth becomes the
one thing needful. Professed belief is seen as irrelevant (ibid.), and therefore teaching of truth
seems not to be necessary. Tubbs lets SAK join the C and M stories. Reading SAK, however,
I get the alternative impression that doubt is a result of human action, that there is no way
from us to God, and that confrontation with the message of the Apostles is necessary for
upbuilding in faith and love. I contend that SAK primarily is rooted in the B story. In the
preface to Two upbuilding speeches from 1844, Kierkegaard (1990, p. 179) says that though
the book has “left out something” concerning the uncertain, “it nevertheless has forgotten
nothing”. The upbuilding speeches are concerned with the moral message of the New
Testament, but the understanding of Jesus as Christ is not forgotten. I interpret them as a
preparation for the revelation in Christ. They follow the example of John the Baptist, who was
a “messenger” (angelos) preparing the way before the Lord (Matthew 11:10 with reference to
Malachi 3:1).
In his second speech on James 1:17-22, “Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above
and comes down from the Father of lights”, SAK starts with the story about the fruits of
knowledge, which were forbidden to human beings. In the beginning they received all good
gifts without raising questions about the giver. The peace was broken when they ate of the
seemingly fine fruits of the tree of knowledge, and experienced the consequences as toil, fear
and doubt (Kierkegaard, 1962, p. 118). The cunning of doubt is to give the human being the
illusion that doubt can defeat itself by doubting14 (p. 119). It is possible to read the Scripture
without grasping its upbringing care, without letting the Word draw us up to itself. Thereby a
word of comfort may become the seed of doubt (pp. 120-122) and close our ears for “the
ineffable speeches sounding from above” (1990, p. 132). “Human thought knows the way to
much in the world ... but the way to the good, to the secret hiding place of the good, this it
does not know, since there is no way to it, but every good and every perfect gift comes down
from above” (1990, p. 134-135). There is no path up from the Cave! The way of the Apostle
is “the more perfect way, along which you die away from doubt, while the perfect comes to
you”15 (Kierkegaard 1962, p. 126, my transl.; cf 1990, p. 135). Without a firm relation with
God in faith, “doubt’s false friendship … will repeatedly change everything for you with its
shadows, confuse it with its variations, obscure it with the fogs of night” (1990, p. 136). Even
the condition that makes it possible for us to receive God’s gifts, is a gift from God. The
condition that we cannot give ourselves is like a new creation, a birth or e-duction: God has
“brought us forth by the word of truth, that we should be a first fruit of his creatures” (1990,
p. 137; cf James 1:18). There is a right use of doubt, based in faith. While the eye of faith
longs for the heavenly, the individual may “use doubt in the right way, not to doubt what
stands firm and will stand firm forever in its eternal clarity, but to doubt that … which will
more and more vanish, to doubt himself, his own capacity and competence” (1990, p. 137).
“For the false doubt doubts everything except itself, the saving doubt doubts only itself by

14
"er det ikke Tvivlens List, at den indbilder et Menneske, at den ved sig selv kan overvinde sig selv". Hong and
Hong (Kierkegaard, 1990, p. 128) gives this translation: "is it not doubt's stratagem to make a person believe
that he by himself can overcome himself". The impersonal pronoun "den" (masculine) points back to "Tvivlen",
not to "et Menneske" which is neuter.
15
den fuldkomnere Vei, ad hvilken Du afdøer fra Tvivlen, medens det Fuldkomne kommer til Dig

10
help of the faith”16 (1962, p. 128, my transl.) The condition in each person by which one can
receive God’s gifts, is itself a perfect gift (p. 126): “to need the Holy Spirit is a perfection in
[hos] the human being”17 (p. 129, my transl.; cf. 1990, p. 139). Both this need itself, the
prayer for having this need, and the communion (Meddelelsen) of this need is a good and
perfect gift from above (p. 129). Doubt as such is not a gift of God, but the doubt in one’s
own doubt is useful.
“The consideration, that to have need for God is a human being’s highest perfection, does
well make life more difficult, but considers it [life] as well after the perfection, and in this
consideration [of life after its perfection] the human being, by the piecemeal experiencing
[Opleven], that is the good understanding with God, comes to learn to know God”18
(Kierkegaard, 1962, p. 286, my transl.; cf 1990, p. 321). The acknowledgment of the need for
God opens for a piecemeal experiencing of God’s existence in all the small things that we do.
In the previous paragraph SAK discusses whether it is a sort of heavyminded pessimism
(Tungsindighed) to say that the human being is able to resist bad tendencies in oneself, but
unable to overcome oneself. He ends the paragraph with the twice repeated admonition:
“Rejoice in the Lord!” (Philippians 4:4), where he sees the pause between the two rejoicings
as a room for reflection on all the negative things that may be said about human beings. When
SAK considers the perfection of life, he contends that the highest that the human being is able
to will “is seldom achieved in the world, because the highest is this: that a human being
becomes fully convinced that one is capable of nothing at all, nothing at all”19 (1962, p. 274,
my transl; cf 1990, p. 307). This is not gloomy pessimism, because this truth about human
beings stands between the repeated rejoicing in the Lord, “the good understanding with God”.
Though this understanding is only a “piecemeal experiencing”, it is in this faith relation with
God that one gradually learns “to know God”. Grace is the word that changes everything (pp.
267-268; cf 1990, pp. 300-301). The desire “to be assured” of the grace of God helps the
human being to see that he needs God, and “the more he in his need presses forward to God,
the more perfect he is” (1990, p. 303). SAK builds on God’s message to Paul: “My grace is
sufficient for you, for my power is made perfect in weakness” (2 Corinthians 12:9 RSV). In
one’s struggle with oneself, the true outcome is the anihilation of oneself. “To be oneself is: to
slay oneself”, slay the self that is to oneself “enough” (Ibsen, 1867/1882 Act 5, scene 9 and
8). This truth is above human capacity; “at most he is capable of being willing to understand
that this smoldering brand [tørre Brand] only consumes until the fire of God’s love ignites the
blaze in what the smoldering brand could not consume. – Thus man is a helpless creature,
because all other understanding that makes him understand that he can help himself is but a
misunderstanding, even though in the eyes of the world he is regarded as courageous – by
having the courage to remain in a misunderstanding, that is, by not having the courage to
understand the truth.” (Kierkegaard, 1990, p. 309-310; cf 1962, p. 275-276)
“As to know oneself in one’s own nothingness is the condition for knowing God, so to know
God is the condition for [the process] that a human being by God’s help is sanctified after its

16
Thi den usande Tvivl tvivler om Alt, kun ikke om sig selv, den frelsende Tvivl tvivler kun om sig selv ved
Troens Bistand.
17
det at behøve den Hellig Aand er en Fuldkommenhed hos Mennesket
18
"Den Betragtning, at det at trænge til Gud er Menneskets høieste Fuldkommenhed, gjør vel Livet vanskeligere,
men betragter det tillige efter Fuldkommenheden, og i denne betragtning kommer Mennesket, ved den
stykkevise Opleven, hvilket er den gode Forståelse med Gud, til at lære at kjende Gud." The 1990-translation
translates the verbal noun Opleven, denoting an ongoing activity, as if it was the ordinary noun Oplevelse, a
terminated experience, and combines "experience" with an "of" (af), which is not at all in the text. Tubbs partly
corrects the translation in 2003 (p. 64), but not in 2005 (p. 410).
19
… vi dølge ikke, at det [Høieste] sjeldent blev naaet i Verden; thi det Høieste er: at et Menneske fuldelig
overbevises om, at han selv slet Intet formaaer, slet Intet.

11
destiny”20 (1962, p. 289, my transl.; cf 1990, p. 325). To need God is not the ultimate end, but
marks the beginning of a process of transforming the human being, a process of Bildung
approaching the Bild that is our destiny. The Button-moulder says to Peer Gynt:
To be oneself is: to slay oneself.
But on you that answer is doubtless lost;
and therefore we’ll say: to stand forth everywhere
with Master’s intention displayed like a signboard.21
(Ibsen, 1867/1882 Act 5, scene 9)
Before God all human beings are equal. In spite of the many differences, we are equal
stewards of God’s gifts. Both when we give and when we receive, we deal with God’s gift,
and these gifts should not create inequality between us. The steward of the gift should give
without conditions and always remember that he or she is less significant than the gift. The
receiver of the gift should receive with a free response of thankfulness both to the steward and
to God. Therefore, if you give money or outward goods, much or little (Kierkegaard, 1962,
pp. 134-137; cf 1990, pp. 144-149), if you give an admonition (p. 137), sympathy, truth (p.
138) or a simple word (p. 139) to another, remember that you are “yourself less significant
than your gift”22 (p. 139). And when you owe to another human being your insight, your
education, your thinking and your persuasive speech, your life – remember that “no human
being can give anything that is not given to himself” from above (p. 143, my transl.; cf 1990,
p. 156), and that also the receiver is less significant than the gift. “Owe no one anything,
except to love one another” (Romans 13:8).
The general philosophical and religious knowing of God is a knowing that God is (Tubbs,
2003, p. 60). By God’s grace we may also know what God is: love (agape), a love that gives
without looking for rewards, looks for the good sides of others and loves forth the good even
in morally bad persons. (1962, p. 62-63; 1990 p. 60-61). The “perfect one whom the Apostle
Paul describes ... ‘boast of his weakness’” (2 Corinthians 11:30 and 12:5-9), and is “jubilantly
throwing himself into God’s arms in unspeakable amazement at God, who is capable of all
things” (Kierkegaard, 1990, p. 318).
God is capable of all things, but the process of transformation of the human being will always
be imperfect in this life, as “the truly blessed relation” with God is finalised in heaven
(Kierkegaard, 1962, p. 291). A few years after the publication of Opbyggelige Taler, and nine
years before he died, SAK chose a hymn verse that he wanted on his gravestone.
Kierkegaard’s family grave is located in the Assistens Kirkegård (cemetry) in København23
and this hymn verse24 is engraved on it:

20
Som det at kjende sig selv i sin egen Intethed er Betingelsen for at kjende Gud, saaledes er det at kjende Gud
Betingelsen for, at et Menneske ved hans Bistand helliggjøres efter sin Bestemmelse.
21
"At være sig selv, er: sig selv at døde. | Dog, på dig er sagtens den forklaring spildt? | Og derfor, lad det
kaldes: overalt at møde | med Mesters mening til udhængsskilt." (Ibsen, 1886, p. 246) In a newer English
translation the meaning of the last two lines has got an interesting interpretation. To be oneself is "to show
unmistakably | The Master's intention whatever you're doing" (Ibsen, 1989, p. 158). There should be consistency
between our banner or signboard (udhængsskilt) and our everyday practice. But perhaps it could be possible to
mistake what is shown outwardly? Kierkegaard's "knight of faith" can be a quite ordinary person (Tubbs, 2005,
p. 408).
22
Du selv ringere end Din Gave.
23
There is map at http://www.assistens.dk/korta.htm
24
"Det er en liden Tid …" is verse 10 (of 12 verses) in the hymn "Halleluja, jeg har min Jesum funden",
published by Hans Adoph Brorson in 1739 and sung (probably also by Kierkegaard) on a melody by H. O. C.
Zink from 1796 to "Nu rinder solen op". You may get an impression of the melody from an ugly midi-file at
http://www.ugle.dk/nu_rinder_solen_op.html However, it should be sung slower. My translation can be sung to
the melody. It is this melody that dictates the repetition of the seventh line.

12
 There is a little time,
Then have I won,
Then will the entire strife
Be suddenly gone,
Then can I rest
In halls of roses
And ceaselessly
And ceaselessly [with]
My Jesus speak.
(Watkin, 1996)
A little while I wait
And then I’ll triumph.
Then the entire fight
will swiftly vanish.
Then I can rest in peace
in halls of roses.
Incessantly with ease
Incessantly with ease
commune with Jesus.
(my transl.)

Can human beings make themselves better? If we underline “themselves” and add “without
God”, SAK’s answer (and my answer) will be “no”. But upbuilding is possible; both when we
use the gifts that God gives to all human beings irrespective of faith, and when we do not
close the possibility for receiving the gifts of love that God wants to give everybody through
Jesus Christ.
All the four stories require leaders who exemplify good thinking and action. In the C story
this will be the best philosophers (sophoi), in the A story the morally wise (phronimoi) and in
the B story God’s messengers (angeloi). Believers in the M story may think that the
individual human being can start from scratch, but that is an illusion. Following A and C, the
leaders ought to give laws and administer rewards and punishments in order to regulate the
actions of all who belong to a society. Thereby also those who are possessed by illusions and
passions to some extent can be restrained from doing the worst actions, and conditions and
institutions for upbuilding may be planned. But attempts to control the selection and
education of good leaders will never succeed. All “new” starts are initiated by failing human
beings. This is clearly acknowledged in the B story and refined variants of the M story.
I would like to encourage and support groups of adults who want to become better examples
for children. How can the stories be applied to this project? Leading the planning of such
groups is a great challenge, and the stories can help me to be better prepared for failures.
Important tasks are selection, description and ordering of possible content: texts, pictures,
films. All the four stories ought to be represented in some way, also the B story, which in
some settings is excluded. Texts like Peer Gynt and pictures like Angelus novus represent a
meeting between M and B. Plato’s Cave story can probably be used directly in some groups,
and it could be possible to use texts from the New Testament like 1 Peter 4:7-12, “love covers
a multitude of sins”, perhaps supplied with Kierkegaard’s first speech on this text. Important
is also to give proposals to the groups concerning progression and dialogue. An interesting
challenge would be to discuss and order the content in relation to phases of improvement
described in A combined with phases described by Kierkegaard. I’ll develop these ideas in
another paper.
If life is a struggle between the worse and the better parts of ourselves, experiences tell us
that the good parts may resist, but are unable to overcome the worse parts. Sigrid Undset has
expressed this beautifully, explaining her selection of stories about King Arthur and the
knights of the round table: “For mores and customs change a lot, as times passes and the
belief of human beings changes and they think differently about many things. But the hearts

13
of the human beings change not at all in all days”25 (Undset, 1953, p. 256, my transl.). If we
admit that we are powerless and helpless, it is not we who can make ourselves better, but
God. We can only give to others the love that we have been given. “His goodness is the
fountain of thy worth. / Oh! live to love and set it forth” (Thomas Traherne, here from
Burnaby, 1938, p. 300).

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