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The Squatter Settlement as Slum or Housing Solution: Evidence from Mexico City Author(s): Peter M. Ward Source: Land Economics, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Aug., 1976), pp. 330-346 Published by: University of Wisconsin Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3145530 . Accessed: 06/07/2011 09:56
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The

Squatter
Solution:

Settlement
Evidence from

as

Slum

or

Housing

Mexico

Cityt

Peter M.Ward*

RESIDENTIAL LOW-INCOME IN GROWTH LATIN AMERICA For the past two decades many studies of urbanization in Latin America and other "developing" areas have focused attention upon residential expansion. Low-income settlements,1 which often have an ambiguous legal status, go under a plethora of names: favelas in Brazil, ranchos or barrios in Venezuela, villas miserias in Argentina, barriadasor pueblos jbvenes in Peru, callampas in Chile and colonias proletarias in Mexico.2 Moreover, their relative importance is increasing. In Mexico City in 1952 colonias proletarias constituted 23.48% of the built-up area and 14.2% of the population. By 1970 they had extended to somewhere between 35% and 40% of a total population of 8.5 million [Turner et al. 1971-2; Harth Deneke 1966], and 41.5% of the urban area.3 Relative growth of colonias proletarias is estimated to have been on the order of 10-15% per annum since 1950, in contrast with an overall city growth rate of 5.7% per annum [Turner et al. 1971-2]. A similar pattern is observed in other Latin American cities. In 1970 the ranchos of Caracashoused 34.4% of the population [Banco Obrero 1973] and had a growth rate of 15% per annum.4 The role of such areas as a housing form

has been the subject of considerable debate. Do they constitute a slum universe, or form a viable housing solution? CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD SETTLEMENTS SQUATTER Many conflicting statements about squatter settlements in the 1950s and early 1960s were the result of a lack of detailed micro-level analyses and a tendency to evaluate them according to inappropriate middle-class values and standards. The classic stereotyped analo-

t I am indebted to Colin Clarkeof the University of Liverpoolfor his comments on an earlierdraft of this paper. *Lecturerin Latin AmericanGeography,University CollegeLondon. 1 Low income for the purposeof this paperis taken as earning the minimum wage or less. In 1974 the minimum wage was 52 pesos a day (1,248 pesos a month). According to the Buro de Investigacidnde Mercados, S.A., in 1970 45% of the economically active population earned less than 1,000 pesos a month, and 70%less than 1,500. (12.5 Mexicanpesos = $1 U.S., approximately.) 2Literally "proletarianneighborhoods,"they are themselvesmade up of both squattersand illegal subdivisions. 3Data extrapolated from the BNHUOPSAmap, "Estudio de la Habitaci6nen la Ciudadde MBxico," Depto. de Estudios y Proyectos [1952], and from a by plan constructed the author. contemporary 4 Oficina Municipal de Planeamiento Urbano

[1972].

Land Economics * 52 * 3 * August 1976

Ward:The Squatter Settlement: Mexico City gies to an urban cancer [Juppenlatz 1970], inhabited by ruralites who arrived in ever-increasing numbers and constructed houses according to a rural technology, gave credence to demands for their eradication and replacement by public sector housing (see also Bonilla [1962]; Pearse [1961]). These stereotypes were put into doubt by field research [Turner 1965, 1967; Mangin 1967; Mangin and Turner 1968; Leeds and Leeds 1970] describing the dynamic improvement processes in urban squatter settlements. Moreover, although squatter populations are in large part provincial in origin, they are not rural "hicks" [Leeds and Leeds 1970]. Some have lived in urban areas all their lives, others have had long periods of experience with urban or city life prior to the city in question [Balan 1969; Flinn 1968; Herrick 1965; Ward 1975]. In addition, their intra-urban residential histories do not correspond with a direct movement into squatter settlements but rather indicate varying periods of residence in rental or shared accommodation elsewhere in the city [Turner 1968; Mangin 1967; Ray 1969; Ward 1975]. In spite of these studies, conflict and confusion continue to exist in the popular literature [De Jesus 1970] and the press,5 as well as among research workers [Schulman 1968; Salmen 1970] and government institutions [INVI 1968]. This paper suggests that some of the contradictions regarding the role of squatter settlements in the urbanization process are the result of definitional misunderstandings. There is a lack of consensus as to what constitutes a squatter settlement, and terms such as ranchos, barriadas, favelas may cover very disparate ecological and social universes. Moreover, they
fail to reveal the heterogeneity of settlements at different levels of self improve-

331 ment. This paper seeks to identify discrete residential types for Mexico City and attempts to shed light on the improving and nonimproving sectors. Second, it discusses some of the factors that encourage slum growth, and finally, draws preliminary conclusions regarding planning responses. MEXICO CITY: THELOW-INCOME HOUSING SYSTEM In Mexico City the low-income housing stock is organized into a series of sub-systems (Table 1), each having distinctive properties of location, structure and tenure.6 Making a choice between each sub-system depends upon people's demands and priorities which are themselves highly variable [Turner and Fichter 1972]. Factors which may influence demand are marital status, stage in the life cycle, family size, urban residential history, ability to pay, employment type and stability, city-based contacts and their distribution, and so on. The degree to which the options listed in Table 1 accurately reflect the information upon which low-income residential decisions are made is not known. It is unlikely that all of the options will be
to sThe press is often most at fault with regard the perpetuationof middle-classvalues or inappropriate housing standards.In Mexico referenceis frequently made to the coloniasproletarias beingcinturones as de miseria("belts of misery"),in whichthe people live in housing conditionsbarely fit for animals.Whileenormous problems clearly exist such reporting is irresponsibleand counterproductive. 6I am indebted to J. F. C. Turnerfor clarification of the principalcomponentsof the Mexicansystemat an early stage of this study (see Turneret al. [19712]; Sudraand Turner[1973]). In his schemeciudades perdidas and colonias paracaidistasare "compensathat have developedin responseto tory" sub-systems demandsand changesin the efficiency of the system. In Table 1 they areportrayedas basicsub-systems.

332

Land Economics

TABLE 1-THE LOW-INCOME

Sub-System Classic Vecindad e Usual Location Central city (Primer cuadro) Central city and intermediate ring Intermediate ring and periphery. In the older colonias proletarias Periphery (often in the State of Mex.) Usual Tenure Rent (often controlled) Rent (libre) As above

i
n d a d e s

Vecindad

Vecindades Nuevas

C o P 1 r
o0

Fraccionamientos Clandestinos

"Owned" by occupiercontract often invalid or confused

nl i e a t s a Colonias Paracaidistas r

Intermediate ring and periphery As above

Held illegally by occupier Owner occupied Some renting and sharing Rent. Often confused

a Colonias Paracaidistas s (legalized) Ciudades Perdidas

Central city, intermediate ring and old pueblo cores Intermediate ring, periphery Periphery

Conjuntos Subsidiados (a) Soc. security affiliates (b) Resettlement schemes

Rent

Varies, usually owner-occupiers

Source:After Sudraand Turner[1973]. et *Turner al. [1972] to **Lowerestimateaccording data collectedby the author,upperestimatethat of Turneret al. [1972].

The Squatter Settlement: Mexico City Ward.-

333

HOUSINGSYSTEMOF MEXICO CITY

Structure Often colonial palaces, subdivided and deteriorating Large purpose-built, varying state of repair Small, 1-10 families, varying degree of permanency Services Access to all services but shared As above Usual Period of Expansion Varies 19001940 1930-1942 2 million* As above 1955 onwards Approx. Total Numbers

Varies, usually consolidating. Autoconstruction

Varies, may often lack one or all of the following: drainage, paving, water, refuse collection, etc. As above May lack any of the services listed above Usually access to water. Limited or lack of other facilities All services As above

1950 onwards

As above

1950 onwards 1950 onwards

3-3.5 millions

Consolidating

Shanty, unconsolidated

1940s 1950s

112,000200,000**

Multifamily Individual units, some multifamily

1960 onwards 1970 onwards Below 100,000

334
relevant to an individual at any one time so that once a decision on tenure type and optimum location has been formulated the sub-systems are condensed. Moreover,the common practice of securing accommodation via personal contacts (kin, friends, workmates) as well as the usual requirement of "key money" to obtain the transfer of the name on the lease, probably increases the available information used in search behavior. Portes, working in Chile, regarded decision making for low-income residential preference as highly rational and cognitive [Portes 1972]. For the purpose of this paper the attributes of two particular sub-systems didas) are discussed in an attempt to shed light on the fundamental differences between "consolidating" squatter settlements and "static" shantytowns. PARACAIDISTAS: COLONIAS UNIVERSE A DEVELOPING Table 1 indicates that colonias paracaidistas (literally "parachutists") are not the only residential type making up the largest single sub-system-colonias proletarias. The other component, frac-

LandEconomics
from the outset acutely aware of the illegality of their invasion, the dangers and struggles that they may have to confront, and the various means of maximizing their chances of successfully laying claim to the occupied territory.7 Squatter settlements are selected for further analysis as it is this particular sub-system that is most frequently viewed in derogative terms as though it were synonymous with "shantytowns" [INVI 1968]. Three squatter settlements were selected a priori according to their different ages, with a view to examining the process of consolidation that had occurred over an extended period of time. Fieldwork was undertaken over thirteen months in 1973-4 and data were collected from each settlement by means of participant observation, unstructured interviewing of leaders and a random sample survey drawn from a previously compiled household listing. Although data were gathered on a variety of topics, one of the principal aims of the study was an examination of the process of consolidation by comparing house structures between squatter settlements, as well as within each settlement. Earlier writings have suggested that an important advantage of self-help housing to low-income populations is its flexibility, leaving decision making and investment in the hands of the household [Mangin 1967; Turner 1967]. Households are able to improve the physical
7Thismay include such featuresas the cultivation of sympathetic publicity, rapidity of the invasion with an effective process to confront the government fait accompli, the power of large numbers, overt demonstrationof nationalismand adherenceto the incumbent regime. The latter is usually mediated through the display of flags, nationalistslogans and may even go so far as to namingthe incipientcolonia afterthe presidentor his wife.

and (coloniasparacaidistas ciudadesper-

cionamientos clandestinos (illegal sub-

divisions), differs in several ways. Most important is the manner in which each is established. Illegal subdivisions are those into which families purchase a lot, often receiving pseudo-legal land titles. The arrangement is illegal where either the vendor (subdivider) does not have legal title to the land, or alternatively, he defaults on the provision of services [Frieden 1965]. However, occupants do perceive themselves as having rights, thereby providing them with a degree of legitimacy. In contrast, squatters are

Ward: SquatterSettlement:Mexico City The

structure of the dwelling in accordance with various criteria-available investment surplus, family size, investment priorities, perceived security of tenure and so on. As a result, the internal structure of settlements is highly heterogeneous. In this study an attempt is made to discern the various levels of consolidation achieved by households. A score was compiled by the interviewer after a short tour of the dwelling on completion of the interview.8 This composite score, itself an amalgam of separate scores of structure and services of the house, material possessions and the function of each room, was later allocated to one of seven classes, the limits of which had been set after the pilot study. Table 2 displays consolidation indices for the three colonias, along with other data which help to demonstrate the degree to which these settlements have been upgraded. Below follows an overview of this process in the three settlements studied. Santo Domingo Los Reyes is the most recent. It was one of the most dramatic and successful invasions to have occurred in Mexico City, with hundreds of families invading comunero9 lands adjacent to the University City on September 1, 1971. Lots were laid out on a gridiron pattern and after only four days there were estimated to be between four and five thousand families (20,000 inhabitants) in occupation."1 Today the total is in the order of 60,000 inhabitants. The rapid influx was due not simply to the high degree of organization achieved by colonia leaders, but also to a large number of young nuclear households who came from surrounding "consolidating" squatter settlements where they had been living with kin. Table 2 indicates that levels of consolidation are low. Services are nonexistent in the colonia:

335
water is brought in by water trucks and electricity is stolen by illegal hook-ups. The majority of houses comprise one
SThequestionnaireconsists of four main sections covering migration, household attributes, dwelling attributes and patterns of social interactionfor the head of household, spouse and eldest child over 16 years of age (where relevant).Consolidationindices were compiledas follows: (a) Structureand servicesincludes scores for the building materials used in walls, roof and floors, degree of "decoration"-plastered,bare and so on. Servicesare those of water, drainageand electricity, scored for presence or absence, whether private or shared,and location vis-i-visthe dwellingunit. At the lower end of the scale would be a provisionalshack with an earth floor, makeshift doors and windows, entirely lacking services.At the other extreme is the brick-builthouse with plasteredwalls, concreteroof, parquetfloor, frameddoors and windows and all services. (b) Materialpossessions were included as many householdschoose to investin householdgoodsrather than continue in structuralconsolidation.The score comprisesan inventorywith low scores for common household items (electriciron, radio) and high scores for telephone,new car,color television. (c) Room function classifies rooms accordingto the degreeof specificityattained.Highscoresaregiven to rooms with a clear single function (diningroom), low scores where rooms consistently fulfill several functions. Calibration was made according to the numberof separate functions. The thresholds of "consolidation indices" 1-7 were assessedafter the pilot surveyand later checked againstthe distributionof scores obtainedin the final survey. Cut-off points remaineddiscrete with values falling into the categories rather than across them. Classes 6 and 7 are said to be "incipient"-that is, shacks without services and a minimumof personal possessions.In contrast,"consolidated" dwellingsare those with several rooms, brick-built,fully serviced and with a wide rangeof consumer goods. In between, "consolidating"consists of three classes, 3, 4 and 5 with household levels varying accordingto the interin play of investment a, b and c. 9Agriculturallands set up under the Agrarian after the MexicanRevolution.Unlike Reformprogram ejido landsthey arealienable. 'oNewspaperreports vary wildly. El Dia Nov. 12, 1971, put it at 10,000 families;El Dia Jan. 28, 1972, at 15,000 families;April21, 1972, at 7,000. The latter estimateis probablythe most accurateas it was based upon an enumeration by the leaders to establish It pseudo-ownership. now seemsthat thereareapproximately 10,000 families (60,000 people), many of whomarelivingen pendiente-sharingand awaitinglot allocation.

336

Land Economics

TABLE 2
COMPARISON THREEIMPROVING OF IN CITY SQUATTERSETTLEMENTS MEXICO
Santo Domingo Los Reyes (incipient) Age in 1974 Households renting Average households per lot Density, persons per hectare Range of different industrial, commercial and service enterprises Consolidation Index* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 3 yrs. 1.2 211 5 Isidro Fabela (consolidating) 14 yrs. 8.4% 1.8 415 34 Sector Popular (consolidated) 26 yrs. 46.6% 4.2 753 66

9.1% (6) 21.2% (14) 43.9% (29) 25.8% (17) 100% (66)

1.9% 17.8% 22.4% 29.0% 21.5% 7.5%

(2) (19) (24) (31) (23) (8)

8.7% 45.2% 25.2% 16.5% 3.5% .9%

(10) (52) (29) (19) (4) (1)

100.1% (107)

100% (116)

denote absolutenumbers. Note: Figuresin parentheses *See footnote 8.

room, usually made of provisional materials. In spite of the high insecurity, frequent threats of eradication from the government (practically impossible given the settlement's size), and prohibitions upon house improvement "quasienforced" by the police,11 a significant proportion of households have begun to improve their dwellings (Table 2). Singleroom shacks of pitched corrugated cardboard are substituted for one- or tworoom structures built of brick. Most households occupy an individual lot and only a small proportion share, usually awaiting allocation of a lot. A common criticism of squatter settlements is that their low densities are wasteful of valuable urban land. Table 2 indicates that densities can be substantial at the outset, and increase over time. Commercial development at this level reflects the

needs of squatters as well as their low purchasing power, so that enterprises are limited to grocery stores, tortillerias, pharmacy, a yard where building materials may be purchased and a cafe that serves as a bar and informal social center. On June 24, 1974, after three years of conflict, the government agreed to sell the lots to occupiers at a low price [El Dia June 24, 1974]. By that time INPI (Instituto Nacional para la Proteccidn de la Infancia) had built two large schools and social centers in the colonia, and the electricity company was about to legalize the power supply through the provision of individual metering. Given
" "Quasi-enforced" since the police can be bribed into turning a blind eye. This is prejudicialagainst those squatterswho cannot afford to pay a regular bribe.

Ward:The Squatter Settlement: Mexico City these combined stimuli, it is likely that consolidation will be increasingly rapid over the next two to three years. The colonia of Isidro Fabela began in 1960 after a small invasion and then grew accretively up to 1968 when the government expropriated the land and agreed to sell it to the squatters. Services were gradually installed (electricity in 1969, later standpipes at the corner of blocks and more recently the paving of the central thoroughfare). The explicit recognition of the colonia's status on the part of the government has stimulated house consolidation (Table 2), and dwellings have been improved to varying levels. 12 Demographic characteristics reflect an older cohort structure compared with Santo Domingo Los Reyes, so that families are considerably larger. Moreover, the proportion of households sharing lots rises, thereby increasing overall densities. Sharing evolves either through the construction of rental accommodation or by the subdivision of lots between kin, with related nuclear families living on the same lot in separate dwellings. Commercial development has diversified enormously to include services such as hairdressers,funeral parlors, repair shops of various types, drycleaners and so on. The participation of squatters in colonia improvements, high in the early stages of colonia formation, has recently atrophied as participant satisfaction and security increases and services still outstanding decrease. This is a trend frequently commented upon by observers in urban areas throughout Latin America [Mangin 1967]. Sector Popular was established in 1947 at what was then the city's periphery (it has since become part of the intermediate ring of the city). Shacks were constructed in the first instance and slowly replaced by permanent struc-

337

tures, particularly after expropriation in 1952. This colonia, like several surrounding it which began at approximately the same time, now enjoys all services: electricity, water and drainage are all connected to the interior of each lot. Viewed from the road, frontages are brick-built, and many houses are of two or more stories, which makes it unlikely that an uninformed observer would recognize the origins of the zone. Brown [1972] describes the tendency for older colonias proletarias to increase their population densities and for rental accommodation to become increasingly common. In Sector Popular over onehalf of households interviewed were found to be sharing lots or residential space; 47% were formally renting, which suggests that the colonia is no longer a typical squatter "owner-occupier" settlement but rather an important supplier of rental accommodation, particularly for recent migrants [Turner 1968; Brown 1972; Ward 1975]. This changing status has occurred in two ways. Originalsquatters may have chosen, or been forced through economic impoverishment, to sublet part of their lot. In this way a petty landlord-tenant system evolvesusually in physically insubstantial dwellings. Alternatively, speculators have constructed either self-contained apartments or vecindades nuevas (single-room dwellings in which services are shared; see Table 1). Speculators can be original squatters who obtained title to several lots, or late arrivalswho have bought out
12 The uppermostclassesarenot in all casesoriginal squatters. It is not unusualfor lower-middle-income householdsto "place"a family in a lot at the time of invasion as a caretaker.Once recognitionhas taken place possession of the lot is regainedand the household can either sell at a high profit or employ a contractorto constructa substantialhouse, complete with services.

338 the original squatter. The end result is a highly heterogeneous population of renters and owners of different socioeconomic levels. Densities at this stage are high and the neighborhood's commercial activity has diversified still further to include public baths, small workshops, private hospitals and so on. These three vignettes are not designed to suggest that the trajectory of squatter settlement improvement is unilinear, nor that recent invasions will necessarily come to resemble exactly the demographic and physical characteristics of Sector Popular. Rather, the intention is to demonstrate that squatter settlements do upgrade themselves over time and that certain processes are common to all. However, these will vary in rate and degree according to local conditions. This paper now turns its attention to a nondeveloping housing sub-system in Mexico City, ciudades perdidas. CIUDADES PERDIDAS: A STATIC SLUM UNIVERSE In the press and many research institutions ciudades perdidas13 are frequently considered synonymously with colonias proletarias, though they are a very different sub-system.14 Their nomenclature is significant. In spite of their implicit "city" size they are rarely as large as squatter settlements and are invariably "lost" to view, being located on vacant lots screened by high boundary walls. This contrasts with the very visible peripheral squatter settlements. Typically they are shackyards (occasionally referred to as jacales) 15 and occupy lots in the inner city and intermediate ring (Figure 1). They lack, or are parasitic upon, formal urban services. Electricity may be robbed, and if

Land Economics there are no standpipes on the site, or if they are inadequate, then water must be brought in from outside or purchased from an itinerant water seller [INVI 1968]. It forms a relatively small sub-system; Turner [1971-2] estimated that it totaled approximately 200,000 people or 20% of the very low-income population.16 According to data collected from Habitacidn Popular17 the total population is considerably less-in the order of 110,000 people-and the lower estimate is in part due to the eradication policy of the present administration. Ciudad perdida formation tends to predate that of colonias paracaidistas (which have mostly developed since 1950), with a mean age of 28.6 years: only 13%have originated since 1957 and 40% since 1947. Turner [1971-2] suggests that they have formed as a substitute type of cheap rental accommodation after the vecindades became saturated in the early 1950s. However,

13 Literally "lost cities."They are definedby Direcci6n de Promoci6n de la Habitaci6n Popular as "encapsulated spaceswithin the widerareaof the city whose inhabitantslack the minimumof servicesto be able to live comfortably"(El March2, 1972). D6a 14The INVI study [1968], titled Una Ciudad Perdida, while a very good descriptionof the attributes of a typical ciudad perdida, does regardit as coloniasprolesynonymouswith the largelyperipheral tarias.See also Arreola[1974]. I The name given to the traditionalruralhouse type. 16 Turner [1971/2] classifiedvery low income as being below the minimum wage in 1970, and suggested a figure of 625 pesos a month for a family of 5/6 personsas being typical for ciudadperdidadwellers. del IHabitacidnPopular Departamento Distrito del 1 Federal.It is currentlyresponsiblefor the eradication programof ciudadesperdidasand their resettlement. All of the materialcited in the abovetext for ciudades perdidas was extrapolatedfrom a handbook which includesa map of the site of each ciudadperdida,land tenure,how formed,size,age and so on.

Ward:The Squatter Settlement: Mexico City

339

N
\

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Pri*.e..0abe1do ro

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CdAtcdspotrilcdas 1973 SLeTnItcuba uAr1973 .Fe" t Distcric ....

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DISTRIBUTION OF CIUDADES PERDIDAS AND COLONIAS PROLETARIAS IN MEXICO CITY, 1973

FIGURE 1

340 the majority of ciudades perdidas were started before the effects of rent control in vecindades were felt, though it is likely that their densities have increased since the 1950s. Fifty-nine percent of ciudades perdidas were founded upon private property and only 18% began on lands belonging to the federal government (in contrast with the usual practice of squatter settlements). Ten percent developed on lands registered as belonging to the railway company, in areas adjacent to the tracks, and occasionally in disused rolling stock. Associated with the fact that the majority began on private property, the data indicate that 68% of ciudades perdidas had their origins as rental accommodation whereby the owner would either sublet lots or construct the shacks and install the minimum of services before subletting at an exhorbitant rent (often in the order of 25% of the total family income). Although this accommodation is relatively cheap, renting can yield returns equal to the total market value of the land annually [Sudra and Turner 1973]. Only 13% were recorded as having begun by invasion. In squatter settlements the usual lot size varies between 150 and 250 square meters which allows an effective organization of space so that a household can erect a provisional dwelling on one-half of the lot and at the same time construct a number of permanent rooms on the other. Once completed they move into the consolidated dwelling (which may only be one room), demolishing the original shack. This is not the case for ciudades perdidas where shacks are built cheek-by-jowl [INVI 1968] and rarely comprise more than a single room which functionally serves all purposes. However, the data provided by Habitacidn Popular are at first sight confusing since

Land Economics the average lot size is 131 square meters-a reasonable sized lot. This is probably due to the way in which the data were collected by social workers, who would almost certainly have estimated the total area of the shantytown, divided it by the total number of households, thereby including unoccupied land, thoroughfares and communal spaces. When the distribution of data is more closely analyzed it is apparent that 43% of lots are less than 80 square meters in area and 66% are less than 120 square meters. Figure 1 plots their distribution within the metropolitan areas, and it is clear that they are primarily a city center and intermediate ring housing subsystem, approximately coincident with the 1958 herradurade tugurios ("horseshoe of slums" [INVI 1958]). However, comparing them with the pattern of city growth suggests that this has not always been the case. Indeed, when one takes the position of the urban fringe by decades, it is found that prior to 1930 the formation of ciudades perdidas occurred at or beyond the fringe.18 During the decade 1930-1940, twenty-five of the currently existing settlements were formed, of which only two began more than a half kilometer inside the fringe. This trend continued until 1953 with five (21%) of the twenty-four that formed between 1940 and 1952 being inside the fringe. In contrast, of those that began during the period 1953-1960 the majority (81%) formed away from the fringe, primarily in areas that were in existence prior to 1950. This change was stimulated by the rapid areal growth of the city and, in particular, the expansion of the colonias proletarias which greatly
1" The edge of the built-up area. "Fringe" = a half a kilometer within that limit.

Ward:The Squatter Settlement: Mexico City increased the distance between the center and the periphery. This meant that peripheral locations no longer offered the same advantages of proximity or ease of access to the downtown area-the essence of this particularhousing sub-system. INFLUENCE THAT FACTORS SLUM FORMATION ANDPERPETUATION The first half of this paper has described the attributes of ciudades perdidas emphasizing their inherent differences from squatter settlements. Attention is now directed towards those factors that may stimulate the slumification process. This is done first with reference to past theories and second by examining the rationale underpinning ciudad perdida formation in Mexico City. It is clear that the low-income housing stock is a product of historical, economic and sociopolitical factors and can be expected to vary between different cities [Leeds 1969]. Moreover, the degree to which the self-help housing sector is a dynamic and successful one is likely to vary considerably. The rate of urbanization, the real benefits accruing to low-income groups controlling for the effects of inflation, and the attitudes adopted by governments vis-a-vis their squatter populations will be crucial in this respect. Nevertheless, several authors have attempted to conceptualize the problem of slum formation per se, and formulated operational typologies that categorize slum forms according to their different potentials for development. In an abstract form Stokes [1962] differentiates between "slums of hope" and "slums of despair" in which an individu-

341

al's mobility is a function of his psychological attitudes towards upward mobility and the structural barriers of society that he has to confront. A more penetrating analysis is provided by Delgado's [1971] in-depth study of the barriadas of Lima. He suggests a typology constructed upon the variables of density, location and level of improvement attained in the barriada. Clear differences are observed between the high-density barriadas of various locations, in which dwellings are highly congested, unhygienic shanty structures, and tenancy is a mixture of rental and illegal possession; and the non-slum settlements (now called pueblos j6venes), which are usually peripheral or pastperipheral and in various stages of the consolidation process. He proposes a model of two social universes. The first one is that of active slum formation in areas of spatial restriction, lack of property rights and proximity to highly diversified centers of employment with a high capacity to absorb unskilled labor. The second is a non-slum social universe which "represents a situation of great dynamism and high potential for self development" [Delgado 1971, p. 294]. The slum universe described by Delgado bears a marked resemblance to the ciudades perdidas of Mexico City. In Mexico slum formation predominates in areas where both the incentives and means whereby low-income populations might improve and upgrade their housing are either nonexistent or are subverted. This results in an overall decline of the residential environment. Two broad sets of factors contribute to the process. The first, as in ciudades perdidas, acts to encourage their formation. The second set of factors operates in both ciudades perdidas and some squatter invasions, intervening as barriers

342 at the colonia or household level, thereby reducing the opportunity and incentive for successful self-help solutions. Factors that Encourage Slum Formation The continuing high demand for relatively low rental accommodation in locationally advantageous parts of the city is a very important factor, and it is not recognized by government eradication and resettlement policies. Supply has decreased at the city center as a result of the declining number of vecindades and the growing stability of population attracted by increasing economies of rent control. They are no longer tempted to move to autoconstructive settlements at the periphery [Brown 1972]. At the same time the opportunities for upward economic mobility are no longer as great as they were in the 1950s, as access to industrial employment becomes more difficult [Mufioz et al. 1973]. Indicative of sustained demand is the high rental charged for dilapidated shanty dwellings and the "key money" paid to previous occupants. (Sudra and Turner report sums of 400 pesos ($32) as commonplace-approximately one week's wages at the minimum wage.) From the owner's point of view profits from ciudades perdidas rentals are high. At the same time, inflation of land prices makes it profitable not to develop inner-city lots. This helps to ensure their continued existence, as does the lack of effective regulatory or prohibitive control of speculation by the government. Barrierswhich Inhibit Self-Help Solutions intervene constraints Economic against the incentive to improve the

Land Economics

physical structure of the dwelling. It is likely that the head of the household will be earning at best the minimum wage, and probably considerably less [Turner 1971-2; INVI 1968]. However, this may not be substantially different from incomes of squatter heads of household who do exhibit patterns of successful consolidation. Other factors therefore usurp or subvert the investment surplus into other items. The payment of rents of 25% or more of the total household income, in addition to the normal day-to-day living costs, would make it practically impossible to create a surplus. Additionally, the common practice of sharing goods throughout low-income kinship networks [Lomnitz 1975] acts as an equalizing mechanism, inhibiting the accumulation of savings. is Second, self-help potential "stunted" where there is a high perceived risk or hazard. For example, in cases of rental tenure default or arrears of payments, combined with the high demand can easily result in the loss of the dwelling. There are other cases where tenure is confused and occupants regard themselves as "owner-occupiers." In these instances tenurial status must be resolved with householders securing full rights of ownership, or the threat of eviction or eradication operates as a continuous disincentive to invest in the physical structure of the house. In these cases investments are usually made in consumer durables such as radios, televisions and furniture. High insecurity also occurs where environmental hazards are high. Land slippage and flooding are common barriers throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. In Mexico City, settlements in the western mining districts are especially susceptible to land slips and house collapse, particularly in

Ward:The Squatter Settlement: Mexico City

343

the rainy season. Butterworth[1972, p. 222] describes five low-income settlements in Oaxaca,Mexico, and suggests that the large differences observed between relative levels of consolidation in two settlements are a product of environmentaland tenurial insecurities that exist in one and are absent in the other. An active alternative land use has much the same effect by making the chances of future ownership unlikely. This is best demonstrated the concesin sions made by Mexican Railways to house constructors alongside railway tracks and in sidings. The same barrier prevailsin residentialdevelopmentson motorway reservations, under bridges and even on roof tops in the inner city area. Third, variationin the organizational abilities of different communities is likely to affect the success of demand making. Cornelius [1973b] found that inhabitantsof low-incomeself-helpcommunities demonstrategreaterawareness of politicalprocessesand a propensityto participatemore fully than do populations of other housingsub-systems. Similarly, in all three squatter settlements studied by the author,an understanding of leadershipwas crucialin interpreting the relativesuccessesand failuresof each community.The role of leadersas political "brokers"and the active participation of colonos (squatters)in the petitioningfor the installationof servicesis a common feature of squattersettlement consolidation [Mangin 1967; Cornelius 1973a; Peattie 1969]. In contrast, the lack of bargaining power of a group of rentersand their inabilityto developthe same degree of internal organizationas their squatter counterpartsis a significant barrier to improvement. Indeed, successful petitioning in most ciudades perdidaswould probablyresult in eradi-

cation and resettlementrather than insitu improvement. Finally, spatial restrictionsof dwellings increasesthe problemof organizing renovation or house construction.Selfhelp house building in Mexico usually involvesthe constructionof a permanent dwelling on one-half of the lot while living in a provisionalstructureon the other. Wherelots are severelyrestricted this processis inhibited."9 GOVERNMENT POLICY This paper argues that shantytowns ments constitute different housing subsystems, offering a variety of solutions. Governmentpolicy regarding both subsystems shouldthereforebe cognizantof the value that each alternative offers to users. First, government attitudes towards the nonimprovingshantytown universe needs to be examined. Although the physical structureis similarin ciudades perdidas and squatter settlements in which consolidationis blocked, policy the makingshouldaccommodate varying needs of each type. In cases where the indisshantytownis a rental sub-system, criminate eradication resettlementat and the peripheryis unlikely to be a viable relocation of ciudad perdida residents, carriesout an economicfeasibilitystudy to determine total family income and the housing solution that is best suited to them. It estimatesthat a familyearning between 1,000 and 1,500 pesos a
9 This "problem" is not insuperable. Consolidators in Caracas, Venezeula, upgrade their dwellings by building a wall of permanent materials alongside the provisional wall.

(ciudades perdidas) and squatter settle-

solution. Habitacidn Popular, prior to

344

Land Economics

month can afford an amortization rate of 250 pesos monthly over a fifteen-year period. However, housing projects are located at the margins of the city, at least a one-and-a-half-hourbus ride from the city center, the usual place of work. (No changes are made in the distribution of employment opportunities.) Traveling results in huge losses of time and reduces the opportunities for spare time "odd jobbing." Similarly, the wife and child who previously had easy access to local employment opportunities (taking in washing, shoe cleaning, hawking) find that surrounding neighborhoods are less conducive to casual work. Both instances may result in an overall decline of family income. Little is known about the effect of the disruption of social networks, though there is some evidence to suggest that these relationships are crucial to the economic survival of populations [Lomnitz 1975]. These diseconomies can be minimized by the extension of in-situ rehousing schemes. This principle has been embodied in the remodelling of some vecindades in the old colonial center of the city as well as at a ciudad perdida site at Picos de Ixtacalco. Unfortunately, these proposals frequently run counter to the primary motive of eradication-the securing of valuable downtown land sites for redevelopment. Where slumification has evolved because the aspirations of would-be consolidators have been subverted, successful solutions rest with the removal of the barriers. Government intervention should aim to provide incentives without interfering in the autoconstructive process. For example, tenurial insecurity may be reduced through land appropriation and sale to occupants. Stimuli can also be provided through the installation of services, recognition of improvement associations and so on. If conditions prohibit in-situ improvement, as in areas lia-

ble to inundation or land slippage, then removal to serviced lots might offer the best solution. The second broad area of government policy that requires examination is the response to squatter settlements. The suggestion that self-help housing presents a viable solution is not so outrageous today as it was ten years ago. Indeed, several authors have argued that the Mexico City government might formally embody the process into its planning policies [Frieden 1965; Harth Deneke 1966]. The Oficina de Colonias Populares takes major responsibility for overseeing the installation of services, judicial procedures and complaints, and treats cases on their individual merits. It either acts directly through land expropriation and resale to the colonos, or indirectly by installing certain services-implying that eradication will not ensue.2" Absolute ownership of property is very important to squatters [Andrews and Phillips 1970], both for security as well as providing an inheritance for one's children. Greater weight should be put upon those approaches that encourage outright ownership. Access to credit facilities remains an important problem for a considerable proportion of the population, although in recent years it has become easier to obtain loans through one's place of work (e.g., INFONAVIT). Widerdissemination of technical assistance, cheap building materials and prefabricated items could be introduced at the colonia level, either at purpose-built centers or via the welfare centers that already exist in many
20 This proves attractive to governments as it allows them to play a two-way cooptation game whereby services are "sold" in exchange for political support. Leaders are the middlemen or "brokers" in this process (see Cornelius [1973a]).

Ward:The Squatter Settlement: Mexico City "incipient" and "consolidating" colonias. Credit facilities for minor house improvements could be administered and overseen at the same level. In all cases government policy should be designed to stimulate house improvement without directly interfering in the autoconstructive process. CONCLUSION This paper has sought to provide insights into the slum-housing solution debate on low-income settlements in Latin America. Many of the seemingly conflicting statements in the literature might usefully be reevaluated in terms of the different attributes and potential for self improvement that they offer. In this respect the application of a "systems" structure may help to order discrete housing types as well as allowing their consideration as part of an interdependent system. Data from other areas (e.g., [Leeds 1974]) indicate that rental shantytowns may coexist with consolidating squatter settlements, just as they do in Mexico City. The data presented for two housing sub-systems in Mexico City suggest that their dynamics are in large part related to tenure, environmental security of the local dwelling environment, government attitudes and the needs and aspirations of the population concerned. This paper has emphasized the differential capacities of settlements to consolidate themselves and has argued for various ways in which this process can be stimulated. In those settlements where consolidation is not a primary aim, as in rental shantytowns, it argues for a greater understanding of the opportunities that they offer. Only in so doing can the generation of policy accurately reflect the needs of low-income populations.

345

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