CERVANTES v FAJARDO Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, offered their daughter, Angelie Anne Cervantes, born 14 Feb

1987, for adoption to Ginas sister and brother-in-law, Zenaida Carreon Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely two weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child was executed by Gina. The RTC granted the petition for adoption thereby freeing the child, the Angelie Anne Fajardo, from parental custody, and giving her the name Angelie Anne Cervantes. In March or April 1987, adoptive parents receiveP150k, otherwise they would get their child back. Adoptive parents refused. On 11 September 1987, Gina Carreon took the child from her yaya pretending that she was instructed by Zenaida. She brought the child to her home in Paranaque. She claimed that she never wanted to give up her child and that the affidavit of consent was not clearly explained to her. However, she said she will return the child if she is paid P150k. The social worker who conducted the case study for adoption testified that Gina manifested her desire to have the child adopted during the interview. WON biological mom should be awarded child custody NO. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. In this case, father is married to another woman. Mother is jobless and has previously given birth to another child by another married man. This is not a desirable atmosphere for a minor. Adoptive parents on the other hand appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor. Besides minor has been legally adopted with full knowledge and consent of mother. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. ESPIRITU v CA Reynaldo Espiritu, who was temporarily sent to the US by his employer, and Teresita Masauding, a US immigrant, maintained a common-law relationship in the US. Rosalind Therese was born in this relationship. The couple got married while they were in a brief vacation in the Philippines. They went back to the US, where Reginald Vince was born. They separated in 1990. Teresita went back to California and claims to have spent a lot on long distance calls to keep in touch with her children. Reynaldo brought the children to the Philippines

and left them with this sister as his US assignment was not yet completed. Teresita claims that she did not follow her children right away because she was afraid to be arrested for the bigamy case filed against her by husband. (Decision for this was actually rendered only in September 1994.) In December 1992, Teresita went home and filed for a writ of habeas corpus to gain child custody. RTC dismissed petition and suspended her parental authority, giving Reynaldo sole parental authority, but giving her visitation rights. CA, applying Art 213 of the Civil Code, reversed the decision. WON the mother should gain custody of her children NO. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the childs interests. In the case, both children are now over seven years of age and are both fairly intelligent. Their choice of parent must be taken into consideration. Rosalind, after seeing her mother hugging and kissing an employee of her father, had expressed negative feelings towards her mother and refused to go with her. Her mother was previously married to another man when she started living with Reynaldo. She claimed that Reynaldo raped her but Reynaldos version, that he did not know of the subsisting marriage until much later, is more believable. While married to Reynaldo, she also had an affair with another man, which was even witnessed by daughter, creating trauma. She was also convicted of bigamy. All these are compelling reasons not to grant her custody. Meanwhile, Reynaldo seems to be a fit person. His US assignment should not be taken against him esp. because the assignment has been completed. CELIS v CAIFUR Ileana Celis gave birth to a boy subsequently known as Joel Caifur. Because her father objected to having the son in the paternal home, Joel was given to the custody of Soledad Caifur, who took the child to her home and even employed a nurse to take care of him. Ileana herself spent several days in Soledads house to recuperate before returning to her fathers home. She visited her child every Saturday, bringing him condensed milk, food and a little money. Two years after, Ileana married Jose Simeon and together, they sought to gain custody of Joel. Soledad refused saying that Ileana had already denounced her custody, even showing two letters to support her claim.

WON the mother should be given child custody YES. The documents presented cannot be reasonably interpreted as having renounced her custody. She merely entrusted her son to Soledad because she did not have the means to bring him up. The other document merely designated Soledad as the guardian, guardianship being temporary in nature. The phrase no one has the right to claim for adoption except Mrs. Soledad Caifur envisages a future act; it doesnt mean she has already adopted him. Since Ileana never denounced custody, she should have her child back now that she has the means to provide for him. Respondents, however, should be indemnified for the amount spent to support the child. FELDMAN v FELDMAN Parties were married at a young age. Wife obtained divorce based upon husbands cruel and inhuman treatment and extramarital affairs, and was awarded custody of the 2 children. Former husband sought for custody alleging that on a visit to his former wifes home, he found a copy of Screw magazine on her night table, and letters (some with explicit photos attached) upon the dining room and kitchen tables. It was established that mothers sex life did not affected children. Children were both provided for, emotionally and physically. However, trial court still transferred custody to the father, who is getting married in six months and about to purchase a new home. Until then he intends to share with his kids his bedroom in his parents apartment WON the courts determination based on the childs best interests was based upon its subjective moral judgment rejecting and severely punishing this sexually-liberated divorced woman for her lifestyle and personal beliefs YES. The former wifes interest in sexually oriented literature was considered a determining factor militating against her continued custody of her children, which should not be the case. Amorality, immorality, sexual deviation, aberrant sexual practices, and even adulterous acts do not ipso facto constitute unfitness for custody. The person has a right to her privacy as long as it does not affect her children. Besides, if best interests are taken into consideration, a

change of custody should not be made unless there is a showing of unfitness. SANTOS , Sr. v CA Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant and petitioner in this case, and Julia Bedia, a nurse, begot a son, Leouel Santos, Jr. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. The couple agreed to place son under temporary custody of maternal grandparents. Julia paid for all hospital bills and subsequent support because husband cant afford to do so. Julia went to US but still provided for support. Husband claimed that he did not know of her whereabouts. In 1990, grandparents contend that petitioner abducted the boy and brought him to Negros Oriental. RTC and CA awarded the custody of the boy to the grandparents. WON father should be given custody instead of grandparents YES. Father has parental authority over child, which also gives him right of custody. When he entrusted the boy to respondents, what is given is merely temporary custody, and does not constitute renunciation of parental authority, which the law disallows. Moreover, in case of absence or death of either parent, the present parent shall continue exercising parental authority unless he is proven to be unfit. Respondents failed to show that father is an unsuitable and unfit parent. While it is true that grandparents are wealthier than the father, it was not shown that the latter is in no position to support the boy. His being a soldier should also not be taken against him because it is not just to discriminate against those who are merely doing their duties. Previous inattention and employment of trickery does not bar him from getting custody. DAVID v CA Daisie David worked as secretary to Ramon Villar, a married man and father of four. They developed an intimate relationship and had 3 children namely, Christopher J., Christine and Cathy Mae. Daisie introduced Christopher J. to Ramons wife and Daisies children were eventually accepted by Ramons legal family. In 1991, Ramon asked Daisie to allow the 6-year old son to go with his family to Boracay. She agreed but Villar later refused to give their son back. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus. RTC granted her custody but CA set the decision aside because this is not proper in a habeas

corpus as the couple is not married. Father should maintain custody until custody has been settled in a proper case. WON a petition for habeas corpus is a proper remedy WON mother should get custody of her children YES. The boy is an illegitimate child. Pursuant to Art 176 of the FC, he is under the parental authority of his mother, who is entitled to have custody of him. Since petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. YES. The child, being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mothers custody. Even now that the child is over seven years old, the mothers custody over him should be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother (Art 213, FC). Grant of support is justified by respondents willingness to support child. PEREZ v VASQUEZ -no copyGOLDSTEIN v GOLDSTEIN The Family Court granted the husbands cross-petition and denied wifes petition for divorce, and awarding custody of daughter Ann Robin to the husband and visitation rights to the wife. Shortly after, husband and child left Rhode Island to live in Israel. The wife asked the court to compel the return of the child. After 3 years, husband and child were made to return. At the hearing, it was established that both parties were fit to have custody of the child. Child chose to stay with her father and expressed no desire to visit with her father. Court then held that it would be in the best interests of the child to stay with father and to have her visit her mother 4 weeks during the summer. WON court abused its discretion in giving the said judgment NO. Preferences given to same-sex parent or to the resident parent are factors that would be weighed with other relevant considerations, such as the choice of the child, in determining child custody. In this case, factors were nearly

in a state of equipoise so that it does not seem that there is abuse in discretion on the part of the judge. LAXAMANA v LAXAMANA Reymond and Ma. Lourdes Laxamana were married in 1984 and had 3 children. Reymond became a drug dependent and was confined for rehabilitation. In 1997, he was declared drug-free. Despite this, wife claimed that he was not fully rehabilitated. She claimed that it was difficult living with him because he became violent and irritable, and even physically assaulted her. In 1999, she abandoned him and brought her children to the house of relatives. Reymond filed a petition for habeas corpus while Lourdes filed a petition for annulment a month later. Reymond filed a motion seeking for visitation rights, which was granted by RTC. RTC also directed parties to undergo psychiatric and psychological examination by a psychiatrist of common choice. It was determined that Reymond cannot be considered completely cured and that paternal visits would not be harmful to the kids. RTC thus gave custody to the mother and visitation rights to the father. WON trial court considered the paramount interest and welfare of the children in awarding their custody to the mother NO. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes, which involve the family and the youth. Although determined not to be completely cured of drug dependency, there was no evidence to show that father is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as moral and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the choice of the children, who were 14 and 15 years, were not ascertained. Thus, further proceedings must be conducted. GARSKA v McCOY Gwendolyn McCoy went to live with her mother in North Carolina. Michael Garska, with whom her mother shared her trailer with, got her pregnant. She later returned to her grandparents house and received no support besides the baby food and diapers that

Garska sent after she gave birth. In subsequent months, the baby developed a chronic respiratory infection, which required hospitalization and considerable medical attention. Unless legally adopted by her grandparents, baby cannot avail of their insurance. Because of this, she consented to the adoption of her son by her grandparents. Upon learning of the adoption, Garska visited the baby for the first time and began sending weekly money orders of $15. When the petition for adoption was filed, Garska filed for habeas corpus. Court dismissed adoption because the baby has not resided with the grandparents for the requisite 6 months, and instead granted custody to Garska. WON the trial court erred in awarding custody to the father The best interests of the child are best served in awarding them to the primary caretaker parent, regardless of sex. Where one parent can demonstrate with regard to a child of tender years that he or she is clearly the primary caretaker parent, then the court must further determine only whether the primary caretaker parent is a fit parent. There is no evidence to indicate that the mother was an unfit parent and, consequently no justification for the trial court to remove custody from the primary caretaker parent and vest it in a parent who had no previous emotional interaction with the child. CHILD CUSTODY ADJUDICATION Issues: (1) how much weight should be given to the interests of the natural parents in custody disputes involving third parties (2) degree to which the legal standards for the resolution of custody disputes should be discretionary (3) how the standards for the resolution of custody disputes can be simplified to avoid the complexities of existing law (4) who should decide custody disputes and by what process Functions of the court (1) Private-dispute-settlement: involved when the court must choose between two or more private individuals, each of whom claims an associational interest with the child. (2) Child-protection: involves the judicial enforcement of standards of parental behavior believed necessary to protect the child. Controlling legal standards have become less specific and more neutral

Four strands of law used to resolve custody disputes: (1) divorce law nearly always involve private dispute settlement winner usually has less than all the rights included in custody within the ongoing 2-parent family duty of support is often separated from the right to have the child live with the particular parent previous presumptions: father is entitled to have custody, innocent party should have custody, child of tender years should not be separated from mother, best-interests (2) guardianship law standards reveal considerable judicial discretion and less automatic deference paid to the claims of natural parents usually involves private dispute settlement best-interests principle of primary importance when both parents are dead last surviving spouse may nominate guardian still unusual to appoint a nonparent guardian over the objection of a parent who then has custody some have presumption in favor of natural parent (3) juvenile court child-neglect laws stages: first determine whether court has jurisdiction over the child, then determine the manner of intervention placement does not extinguish the parental duty to support the child financially although ordinarily federal government bear the cost because most affected families are very poor. Usually involves child protection function Use highly individualized, discretionary standards to decide whether a child should not be removed from parental custody Widespread use of best-interests standard and preference for strengthening the natural family (4) laws relating to termination of parental rights to free a child for adoption abandonment is the most common basis for allowing adoption without parents consent legal standard for abandonment is becoming more discretionary and more child-centered The best interests principle require person-oriented and not act-oriented determinations Adjudication usually requires the determination of past acts and facts, not a prediction of future events.

Applying the best-interests standard requires an individualized prediction. When courts are required to make predictions, they often attempt to develop subsidiary rules that relate certain ascertainable facts about the present or past in a systematic way to the future. They thus do not purport to make individualized predictions, rather than apply rules. Interdependence of outcome-affecting factors: best interests principle requires a prediction of what will happen in the future, which depends in part on the future behavior of the parties Prior reported cases now provide little basis for controlling or predicting the outcome of a particular case Decision-maker must be able to specify the probability of each possible outcome for a particular course of action. The utility of each possible outcome is then discounted by its probability. Decision-maker will be receptive and sensitive to informational requirements and will modify his outcome calculations as new information becomes available In many instances, judge lacks adequate information about aspects of childs life with parents and still less information available about what either parent plans in the future. Problem: What set of values should a judge use to determine what is in a childs best interests? Ask child? Short term or long term? The use of an indeterminate standard makes the outcome of litigation difficult to predict and gives greater incentive to litigate compared to previous presumptions The importance of who has authority to decide is highlighted Guide: family autonomy is given high value, continuity and stability in relationships are assumed to be important and desirable for children, especially the young children, legal rules should not contradict deeply held and widely shared social values Consequences of indeterminacy for child protection function: (1) inconsistent with the proper allocation of responsibility between the family and the state

(2)

allows a court to evaluate parental attitudes and behavior on the basis of the judges personal values (3) courts may underestimate the risks of removal (4) present legal standards fail to require judicial evaluation of alternatives to removal Children removed by the state from the home of their parents are often destined to remain in limbo until adulthood, wards of a largely indifferent state The use of indeterminate legal standards contributes substantially to this failure of the foster-care system because they fail to require the juvenile court and the social-welfare bureaucracy to account for the children who have been removed from parental custody Present indeterminate and discretionary standards for child protection (1) give government officials too much power to second-guess decisions ordinarily left to the family; (2) leave judges free to exaggerate the risks for children remaining in parental custody to underestimate the risks of foster-care placement; (3) allow removal under circumstances where child might be protected within the home; (4) fail to require that the social-welfare bureaucracy and the juvenile court make adequate plans for children who are in the foster care system Judicial discretion for the child-protection function should be made much more limited Critical question: how a legal framework might be developed to provide the maximum opportunity for continuity and stability for children who must be placed in foster care but who do not yet have psychological ties with their foster parents While the indeterminate standard may not be good, there is no available alternative that is plainly less detrimental Negotiation: may reflect parents best interests and not the childs Fundamental question: if what is best for an individual child is largely indeterminate, how should law distribute the power of decision among the child, the family and the state? MATUTE v MACADAEG AND MEDEL

whose house Rosario subsequently lived in order to be with her children. When Armando went back to the country in 1954, he was joined by his children in Cebu. With his permission, Rosario brought the children to Manila on the condition that she would return them in 2 weeks. She did not do so and instead filed a petition for custody based on her claim that the children do not want to go back to heir father because he is living with another woman. Armando sued for contempt. Rosario was absolved but was ordered to deliver the children to Armando. She instituted an action for certiorari claiming that 3 of the children are over 10 years, thus their wish to stay with her should be respected, that her previous infidelity does not involve moral depravity, that Armando is now unfit because he is living maritally with another woman, whom he married after securing a divorce in the US and this divorce is null and void. She claimed that there was an abuse in the judges discretion in rendering the decision WON petition for certiorari and for prohibition is the appropriate relief WON judge abused his discretion NO. The respondent judge had jurisdiction to pass upon issue raised by petitioner. Whatever mistakes he may have committed in determining the best solution to the said issue do not affect the legality or validity of the order complained of. They may be reviewed by appeal, not by writ or certiorari or prohibition. NO. Although custody is never final, unless and until reviewed and modified, said award must stand. No such modification having been made, Judge had the duty to execute and implement the award. Since petitioner has custody and only granted a 2-week permission, he can demand the return of his children any time. Although children over 10 can choose which parent they want to stay with, court decision cannot amount to abuse of discretion especially since mother has no means of livelihood. LAPERAL v REPUBLIC Elisea Laperal was legally separated from Enrique Santamaria and has ceased to live with him for many years now. During the marriage, she had been been using the name Elisea Santamaria but she is now asking the court permission to use Elisea Laperal. The court denied the petition citing Art 372 of the Civil Code, which requires the

wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using the name and surname she employed before legal separation. Upon reconsideration, court granted petition as one for change of name in order to prevent confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. WON a legally separated wife should be permitted to resume using her maiden name NO. Wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status, since married status is not affected by separation. The fact of legal separation alone, which is the only basis for the petition at bar, is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of name. The confusion that would arise in the liquidation of assets could not also be used as a ground since with the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and her husband had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. There can be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. VAN DORN v ROMILLO, Jr. Alice Reyes Vandorn is a resident of the Philippines while Richard Upton is a US citizen. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence in the Philippines where their 2 children were born. Parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982, where she also remarried Theodore Van Dorn. In 1983, Upton filed a suit saying that Alices business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of the business and that he be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Alice filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no community property. Court dismissed the motion on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. WON Nevada Courts divorce decree has an effect on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines

Armando Medel filed a legal separation case against Rosario Matute, upon the ground of adultery committed with his brother Ernesto Medel. Rosario was found guilty and awarded Armando the legal separation and custody of their 4 minor children. Thereafter, Armando went to the S, leaving the children in Davao under the care of his sister Pilar Medel, in

YES. The Nevada District had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, stating that he lives in California, and authorizing his attorneys to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. Thus, his marriage to Alice is effectively dissolved. As he is bound by the decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. QUITA v CA Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos were married in the Philippines in 1941. Fe sued Arturo for divorce is San Francisco, presenting their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. In 1954, she obtained a final judgment of divorce. 3 weeks after she married Felix Tupaz in the same locality, but also divorced later on. Still in the US, she married Werninont. Arturo died in 1972 without a will. Administration of the estate was fought over by Lino Javier Inciong (for the Philippine Trust Company) and Atty. Leonardo Cabasal (in behalf of Blandina Dandan, who is claiming to be the surviving spouse, and her 6 children with Arturo). It was resolved in favor of Cabasal, who was later replaced by Higino Castillon. In 1973, Blandina presented final judgment of divorce between Fe and Arturo. Later Ruperto Padlan, brother of Arturo, intervened. RTC required records of birth of the Padlan children but 10-day period lapsed without them being submitted. RTC held that petitioners marriage to Arturo subsisted until his death as a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code was not entitled to recognition as valid in the jurisdiction. RTC then declared that petitioner and Ruperto were the only heirs. On motion for reconsideration, 5 of the children were proven to be recognized by Arturo thus entitling them to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the petitioner to the other half. Blandina was not declared an heir since her marriage to Arturo was bigamous. WON the case should be remanded to the trial court

WON petitioner was entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the US and in fact had twice remarried YES. Sec 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court says that, If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. There is still a controversy as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. INDEFINITE. The court should still determine the citizenship of the petitioner at the time when divorce was decreed. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of the divorce, she would lose the right to inherit. LLORENTE v CA Lorenzo Llorente, US Navy serviceman, was married to Paula Llorente in Camarines Sur in 1937. Before outbreak of Pacific war, Lorenzo departed to the US while Paula stayed in Camarines. In 1943, Lorenzo became a naturalized American citizen. In 1945, he came back to the Philippines and discovered that his wife was living with his brother and was carrying his child, whom she delivered in December of that year. In 1946, the couple agreed that she would no longer get support, that they would dissolve their marriage in proper judicial proceedings, that they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property and that Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for adultery. In 1951, Lorenzo went back to US and filed for divorce. The decree became final in 1952. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia in Manila. She did not know of previous marriage. Their 25-year union produced 3 children. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a last will and testament and bequeathed all his properties to Alice and their children. In 1984, the will was admitted to probate but before proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate. Paula, however, also filed a petition. RTC held that divorce decree was not applicable in the Philippines and that subsequent marriage was void. Thus, Paula, as the surviving spouse, is entitled to one-half of the estate, and one-third should go to illegitimate children. Decision was amended, stating that only Beverly was the illegitimate child. The other two were not children legitimate or otherwiseof Lorenzo because they were not legally

adopted by him. CA affirmed decision but modified it, declaring Alicia to be co-owner of properties she and Lorenzo may have acquired during their cohabitation WON the divorce decree was valid WON the will was valid YES. The divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity since he became an American Citizen before the divorce was decreed. This also makes his marriage to Alice valid. TO BE DETERMINED. Whether the will in intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law, which must be pleaded and proved. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedents national law. GARCIA v RECIO Roderick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen in Malabon in 1987. They resided in Australia and got divorced from an Australian Family court in 1989. In 1992, Roecio became an Australian citizen as well. He married Garcia, a Filipina, in 1994, declaring that he was single and Filipino. In 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of marriage. Their conjugal assets were divided in 1996. In 1998, Garcia filed for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy. She alleged that she did not know of his marriage to Samson until November 1997. Recio claims Garcia knew about marriage and subsequent divorce was valid. RTC recognized the validity of the divorce. WON divorce was proven WON Recio was legally capacitated to marry Garcia NO. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. Rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

NOT DETERMINED. There is no evidence that proves his legal capacity to marry. Divorce obtained may be limited and not absolute. Even if absolute, it may have been restricted. A foreign divorce does not ipso facto restored capacity to remarry YASIN v JUDGE, SHARIA DISTRICT COURT Hatima Yasin was formerly married to Hajin Idris Yasin, in accordance with Muslim rites and customs. They were granted a decree of divorce, also in accordance with Islamic Law. Former husband has remarried and Hatima is now asking the Court to allow her to resume her maiden name. The Sharia District Court dismissed petition because the petition was deemed to be for a change of name and compliance with Rule 103 of the Rules of Court was necessary for the petition to be granted. WON a petition for resumption of maiden name is also a petition for change of name NO. The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register. This name is the subject of the petition for a change of name. Petitioner does not seek to change her registered maiden name, rather she prays that she be allowed to resume the use of this name in view of her divorce. When the marriage ties no longer exists as in the case of death of husband or Muslim divorce, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. PEREZ v CA Ray Perez and Nerissa Perez married in Cebu in 1986. After 6 miscarriages, she gave birth to Ray Perez II in 1992. Nerissa, a nurse, began working in the US, where she also sought medical attention for previous miscarriages, in 1998. Friom her earnings, she was able to build a modest house in Cebu. Ray only had a tourist visa and practiced medicine in Cebu. In 1993, the couple and their baby went to Cebu. Only Nerissa returned to the US. She claims that husband promised to follow. He claims however that they decided to reside permanently in the country and she was supposed to come back immediately. When she came back, she was no longer in good terms with husband. She filed a petition for custody and the court gave it to her using the tender years presumption (Art 213, FC) as basis. CA reversed the decision saying that granting custody to the father was for the childs best interests.

WON Art 213 applies for parents separated in fact YES. Since the Code does not qualify the word separation to mean legal separation couples who are separated in fact are covered within its terms. The provision used the word shall which promotes a mandatory characeter. Therefore, the child, who is under seven years old, shall not be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor. Since her work schedule cannot be taken as grounds for unfitness, custody must be awarded to her.