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Republic oI the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26979 April 1, 1927
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiIIs,
vs.
MILTON E. SPINGER, DALAMACIO COSTAS, and ANSELMO HILARIO, deIendants.

Facts:
The National Coal Company is a corporation organized and existing by virtue oI Act No.
2705 oI the Philippine Legislature as amended by Act No. 2822, and oI the Corporation law. By
the terms oI the charter oI the corporation, the Governor-General was directed to subscribe on
behalI oI the Government oI the Philippine Islands Ior at least IiIty-one per cent oI the capital oI
the corporation. The government eventually became the owner oI more than ninety-nine per cent
oI the thirty thousand outstanding shares oI stocks oI the National Coal Company. Only nineteen
shares stand in the names oI private individuals.
The Government General made Executive Order No. 37, creating a voting committee or
board oI control. A special meeting was called Ior the purpose oI electing the directors. Prior to
the said meeting, the President oI the Senate and the Speaker oI the House oI Representatives as
members oI the voting committee, requested the Governor-General to convene the meeting thirty
minutes beIore the intended stockholders meeting. The Governor-General declined to participate
in said meeting, so the Senate President and Speaker oI the House meet at the time speciIied in
their letter. The two oI them resolved to cast votes in Iavour oI Iive persons Ior director oI the
company.
The Governor-General was not able to attend the stockholders meeting and instead sent a
representative. . The Governor-General, through his representative, asserted the sole power to vote the
stock oI the Government. The chair recognized the President oI the Senate and the Speaker oI the
House oI Representatives in their capacity as majority members oI the voting committee as the
persons lawIully entitled to represent and vote the Government stock. To this the representative
oI the Governor- General made protest and demanded that it be entered oI record in the minutes.
Thus this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the power to appoint lies solely in the Governor-General.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that:
'The Organic Act vests "the supreme executive power" in the Governor- General oI the
Philippine Islands. In addition to speciIied Iunctions,he is given "general supervision and control
oI all the departments and bureaus oI the government oI the Philippine Islands as Iar as is not
inconsistent with the provisions oI this act. "He is also made "responsible Ior the IaithIul
execution oI the laws oI the Philippine Islands and oI the United States operative within
Philippine Islands."
x x x
The Administrative Code provides the Iollowing: "In addition to his general supervisory
authority, the Governor-General shall have such speciIic powers and duties as are expressly
conIerred or imposed onhim by law and also, in particular, the powers and duties set Iorth,"
including th special powers and duties "(a To nominate and appointoIIicials, conIormably to
law, to positions in the service oI the Government oI the Philippine Islands. (b To remove
oIIicials Irom oIIice conIormably to law and to declare vacant the oIIices held by such removed
oIIicials. For disloyalty to the Government oI theUnited States, the Governor-General may at any
time remove a personIrom any position oI trust or authority under the Government oI the
Philippine Islands." (Sec. 64 |a|, |b|. The Administrative Code lists the oIIicers appointable by
the Governor-General. (Sec. 66.


Decision:
The Administrative Code provides the Iollowing: "In addition to his general supervisory
authority, the Governor-General shall have such speciIic powers and duties as are expressly
conIerred or imposed onhim by law and also, in particular, the powers and duties set Iorth,"
including th special powers and duties "(a To nominate and appointoIIicials, conIormably to
law, to positions in the service oI the Government oI the Philippine Islands. (b To remove
oIIicials Irom oIIice conIormably to law and to declare vacant the oIIices held by such removed
oIIicials. For disloyalty to the Government oI theUnited States, the Governor-General may at any
time remove a personIrom any position oI trust or authority under the Government oI the
Philippine Islands." (Sec. 64 |a|, |b|. The Administrative Code lists the oIIicers appointable by
the Governor-General. (Sec. 66.

Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 191002 March 17, 2010
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
1UDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (1BC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191032
1AIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
1UDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (1BC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191057
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), Petitioner,
vs.
1UDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (1BC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC
IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO THE 1UDICIARY,
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191149
1OHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner,
vs.
1UDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (1BC). Respondent.
PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ALFONSO V. TAN, 1R.; NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S
LAWYERS; MARLOU B. UBANO; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR CHAPTER, represented by its
Immediate Past President, ATTY. ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the latter in his own personal capacity as a MEMBER of the
PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELL 1OHN L. BOISER; BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P.
ARAULLO; BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, 1R.; CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND
ADVANCE-MENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN NG
DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG
KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN LEONARD RAMOS; TAYO ANG
PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN 1AMES MARK TERRY
LACUANAN RIDON; NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP) CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES;
COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN VI1AE ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT CHRISTIAN
MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA. CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES; WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by YOLANDA
QUISUMBING-1AVELLANA; BELLEZA ALO1ADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA GANDIONCO-OLEDAN; MA. VERENA KASILAG-
VILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA. ROMANA; LEONILA DE 1ESUS; and GUINEVERE DE LEON. Intervenors.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191342
ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, 1R., (IBP Governor-Southern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING (IBPGovernor-Eastern
Visayas, Petitioners,
vs.
1UDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (1BC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191420
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
1UDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondents.

Facts:
The compulsory retirement oI ChieI Justice Renato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just
days aIter the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. With this comes legal dilemmas
asked by the petitioners herein.

Issues:
Whether or not the President oI the Philippines can appoint the ChieI Justice during the
election ban.

Ruling:
The Court held that:
'Section 4(1 and Section 9 oI this Article are the provisions speciIically providing Ior
the appointment oI Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment oI
Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission oI a list oI at
least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1 oI the Article mandates the President to Iill the
vacancy within 90 days Irom the occurrence oI the vacancy.
Had the Iramers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to
the appointment oI Members oI the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering oI the provisions. They would have easily and
surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable
to the appointment oI Members oI the Supreme Court in Article VIII itselI, most likely in
Section 4 (1, Article VIII. That such speciIication was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months beIore the
next presidential elections and up to the end oI the President's or Acting President's term does not
reIer to the Members oI the Supreme Court.
x x x
The 90-day limitation Iixed in Section 4(1, Article VIII Ior the President to Iill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a deIinite
mandate Ior the President as the appointing power, and cannot be deIeated by mere judicial
interpretation in Valenzuela to the eIIect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was
"couched in stronger negative language." Such interpretation even turned out to be conjectural, in
light oI the records oI the Constitutional Commission's deliberations on Section 4 (1, Article
VIII.

Decision:
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions Ior certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No.
191149, and the petition Ior mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 Ior being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions Ior prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 Ior lack oI
merit; and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar
Council:
(a To resume its proceedings Ior the nomination oI candidates to Iill the vacancy to be created
by the compulsory retirement oI ChieI Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
(b To prepare the short list oI nominees Ior the position oI ChieI Justice;
(c To submit to the incumbent President the short list oI nominees Ior the position oI ChieI
Justice on or beIore May 17, 2010; and
(d To continue its proceedings Ior the nomination oI candidates to Iill other vacancies in the
Judiciary and submit to the President the short list oI nominees corresponding thereto in
accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.


Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21776 February 28, 1964
NICANOR G. 1ORGE, petitioner,
vs.
1OVENCIO Q. MAYOR, respondent

Facts:
Nicanor G. Jorge, is a career oIIicial in the Bureau oI Lands. He started working there as
a Junior Computer in the course oI 38 years service, Irom February 1, 1922 to October 31, 1960,
and attained the position oI Acting Director, through regular and successive promotions, in
accordance with civil service rules. On June 17, 1961, he was designated Acting Director oI the
same Bureau, and on December 13, 1961 was appointed by President Carlos Garcia ad
interim Director. He qualiIied by taking the oath oI oIIice on the 23rd December oI 1961. His
appointment was on December 26, 1961, transmitted to the Commission on Appointments, and
on May 14, 1962, petitioner's ad interim appointment as Director oI Lands was conIirmed by the
Commission.
Petitioner discharged the duties as Director until on November 14, 1962 he received a
letter Irom Benjamin Gozon, then Secretary oI Agriculture and Natural Resources oI the
Macapagal administration, inIorming him that pursuant to a letter Irom the Assistant Executive
Secretary Bernal, served on petitioner on November 13, his appointment was among those
revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 oI President Diosdado Macapagal; that the position oI
Director oI Lands was considered vacant; and that petitioner Jorge was designated Acting
Director oI Lands, eIIective November 13, 1962.
Thus this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 oI President Macapagal operated as a valid
revocation oI petitioner's ad interim appointment.

Ruling:
The Court held that:
'Petitioner Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but there is no
evidence on record that it was made and released aIter the joint session oI Congress that ended
on the same day. It is a matter oI contemporary history, oI which this Court may take judicial
cognizance, that the session ended late in the night oI December 13, 1961, and, thereIore, aIter
regular oIIice hours. In the absence oI competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed
that the appointment oI Jorge was made beIore the close oI oIIice hours, that being the regular
course oI business. The appointment, thereIore, was not included in, nor intended to be covered
by, Administrative Order No. 2, and the same stands unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly
conIirmed by the Commission on Appointments, and thereaIter, the oIIice never became vacant.

Decision:
WHEREFORE, the writs applied Ior are granted, the petitioner Nicanor G. Jorge is
declared to be the duly appointed, conIirmed, and qualiIied Director oI Lands, the respondent,
Jovencio Q. Mayor, is required to turn over said oIIice to the petitioner and to desist Irom
holding selI out as "Acting Director oI Lands". Respondents pay the costs.

Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989
SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner,
vs.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, 1R., respondent

Facts:
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner
Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer oI Calbayog City and three other accused, oI
the complex crime oI estaIa thru IalsiIication oI public documents and sentenced them to
imprisonment oI Iour (4 years, two (2 months and one (1 day oI5rision correccional as
minimum, to ten (10 years and one (1 day oI 5rision mayor as maximum, and to pay a Iine oI
P3,500. They were Iurther ordered to jointly and severally indemniIy the government in the sum
oI P4,892.50 representing the balance oI the amount deIrauded and to pay the costs
proportionately.
Petitioner herein appealed her conviction to the Supreme Court, and then Iiled a motion
Ior reconsideration. While her motion was pending, President Marcos granted petitioner absolute
pardon. By reason oI this pardon, she then wrote a letter request to be reinstated to her Iormer
work as the position was still vacant. Her letter was replied unIavourably. Seeking
reconsideration oI the ruling petitioner wrote again and this time was reIerred to the OIIice oI the
President which still denied her request. Thus this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can be reinstated in her work in public oIIice aIter being
granted absolute pardon by the President.

Ruling:
The Court held:
'Pardon is deIined as "an act oI grace, proceeding Irom the power entrusted with the
execution oI the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, Irom the
punishment the law inIlicts Ior a crime he has committed. It is the private, though oIIicial act oI
the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual Ior whose beneIit it is intended, and not
communicated oIIicially to the Court. ... A pardon is a deed, to the validity oI which delivery is
essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance."
x x x
Such generalities have not been universally accepted, recognized or approved. The
modern trend oI authorities now rejects the unduly broad language oI the arland case (reputed
to be perhaps the most extreme statement which has been made on the eIIects oI a pardon. To
our mind, this is the more realistic approach. While a pardon has generally been regarded as
blotting out the existence oI guilt so that in the eye oI the law the oIIender is as innocent as
though he never committed the oIIense, it does not operate Ior all purposes. The very essence oI
a pardon is Iorgiveness or remission oI guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the Iact oI
the commission oI the crime and the conviction thereoI. It does not wash out the moral stain. It
involves Iorgiveness and not IorgetIulness.
x x x
A pardon looks to the Iuture. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends Ior the past. It
aIIords no relieI Ior what has been suIIered by the oIIender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation Ior what has been suIIered. "Since the oIIense has
been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suIIered while they were
in Iorce is presumed to have been rightIully done and justly suIIered, and no satisIaction Ior it
can be required." This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to
receive backpay Ior lost earnings and beneIits.
x x x
The rationale is plainly evident Public oIIices are intended primarily Ior the collective
protection, saIety and beneIit oI the common good. They cannot be compromised to Iavor private
interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because oI a mistaken notion that the pardon
virtually acquitted one Irom the oIIense oI estaIa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit
Iull and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power Irom reIusing appointment to anyone
deemed to be oI bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason oI the pardoned
conviction.
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualiIication or
ineligibility Irom public oIIice Iorms part oI the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code Ior estaIa thru IalsiIication oI public documents. It is clear Irom the authorities reIerred to
that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was
likewise removed. HenceIorth, petitioner may apply Ior reappointment to the oIIice which was
IorIeited by reason oI her conviction. And in considering her qualiIications and suitability Ior the
public post, the Iacts constituting her oIIense must be and should be evaluated and taken into
account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public Iunds.
Stated diIIerently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualiIication
Irom holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her Iormer post as
assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required Ior a new
appointment.
x x x

Decision:
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution oI Iormer Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio
S. Factoran, Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 147780 May 10, 2001
PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O.
MANCAO, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR.
SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., respondents.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147799 May 10, 2001
RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA,
P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO
BERROYA, respondents.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 147810 May 10, 2001
THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF 1USTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO
MENDOZA, respondents.


Facts:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, Iaced by an "angry and violent mob
armed with explosives, Iirearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons"
assaulting and attempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that
there was a state oI rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order
No. 1 directing the Armed Forces oI the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to
suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests oI several alleged
leaders and promoters oI the "rebellion" were thereaIter eIIected.

Issue:
Whether or not Procalamation No. 38 was unconstitutional.

Ruling:
The Court held that:
'To be sure, Section 18, Article VII oI the Constitution expressly provides that "|t|he
President shall be the Commander-in-ChieI oI all armed Iorces oI the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed Iorces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion." Thus, we held in ntegrated Bar of the Phili55ines v. Hon. Zamora,
(G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000:
x x x The Iactual necessity oI calling out the armed Iorces is not easily quantiIiable and
cannot be objectively established since matters considered Ior satisIying the same is a
combination oI several Iactors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the
absence oI textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, inIormation
necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable Ior the courts.
Certain pertinent inIormation might be diIIicult to veriIy, or wholly unavailable to the
courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there
is a need to call out the armed Iorces may be oI a nature not constituting technical prooI.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-ChieI has a vast intelligence network
to gather inIormation, some oI which may be classiIied as highly conIidential or aIIecting
the security oI the state. In the exercise oI the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss oI human lives and
mass destruction oI property. x x x

Decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. However, in
G.R. No. 147780, 147781, and 147799, respondents, consistent and congruent with their
undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting
Ior and in their behalI, are hereby enjoined Irom arresting petitioners therein without the required
judicial warrant Ior all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the may 1, 2001 siege
oI Malacaang.
SO ORDERED.

Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, 1R., 1OEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL,
GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON.
AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171409 May 3, 2006
NIEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171485 May 3, 2006
FRANCIS 1OSEPH G. ESCUDERO, 1OSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, MARIO 1. AGU1A, SATUR C.
OCAMPO, MU1IV S. HATAMAN, 1UAN EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL 1OSEL 1. VILLANUEVA, LIZA L.
MAZA, IMEE R. MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, 1USTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO,
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, 1OSEL G. VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI 1AVIER COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED
CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO GAT INCIONG, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AVELINO 1. CRUZ, 1R., SECRETARY, DND RONALDO V. PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG,
GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF PNP, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171483 May 3, 2006
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG AND SECRETARY GENERAL 1OEL MAGLUNSOD,
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS - KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT,
1OSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, 1R., AND ROQUE
M. TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA, THE
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO
LOMIBAO, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171400 May 3, 2006
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO,Respondents.
G.R. No. 171489 May 3, 2006
1OSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, 1OSE AMOR M. AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON
C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, 1.B. 1OVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, AND
DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PNP CHIEF, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 171424 May 3, 2006
LOREN B. LEGARDA, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondents.

Facts:
Following certain events beIore the nation celebrated the 20th anniversary oI Edsa People
Power I, President Macapagal-Arroyo, issued PP1017 which basically declares a state oI
national emergency and G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017. Following these proclamation were
the prohibition oI people`s right to assembly, warrantless arrests and taking over oI some private
companies.
Days aIter, President Macapagal Arroyo issued PP1021, liIting PP1017.
Hence this petition Irom the aggrieved parties.

Issue:
Whether or not PP1017 and G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:
The Court held that:
'In sum, the liIting oI PP 1017 through the issuance oI PP 1021 a supervening event
would have normally rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still
operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereoI. Besides, there is no
guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been
media reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed "iI the May 1
rallies" become "unruly and violent." Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the
parties should not be "evaded;" they must now be resolved to prevent Iuture constitutional
aberration.
The Court Iinds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insoIar as it constitutes a call by the
President Ior the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by
Section 18, Article VII oI the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier.
However, PP 1017`s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1 to
issue decrees; (2 to direct the AFP to enIorce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3 to impose standards on
media or any Iorm oI prior restraint on the press, are :ltra vires and unconstitutional. The Court
also rules that under Section 17, Article XII oI the Constitution, the President, in the absence oI a
legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business aIIected with
public interest.
In the same vein, the Court Iinds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President acting
as Commander-in-ChieI addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions oI PP
1017. SigniIicantly, it also provides a valid standard that the military and the police should take
only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence."But the words "acts of terrorism" Iound in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally
deIined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted Irom the said G.O.
While "terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the
military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits oI the AFP`s authority in carrying out
this portion oI G.O. No. 5.
On the basis oI the relevant and uncontested Iacts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1
the warrantless arrest oI petitioners RandolI S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2 the dispersal oI the
rallies and warrantless arrest oI the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3 the imposition oI
standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4 the warrantless search oI
the %rib:ne oIIices and the whimsical seizures oI some articles Ior publication and other
materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the
valid provisions oI PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Other than this declaration oI invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or
administrative sanctions on the individual police oIIicers concerned. They have not been
individually identiIied and given their day in court. The civil complaints or causes oI action
and/or relevant criminal InIormations have not been presented beIore this Court. Elementary due
process bars this Court Irom making any speciIic pronouncement oI civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities.
It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights
are ends in themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic
without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a
democratic state.During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity
Irom normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our people`s liberty.
Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn Irom the theorists who studied the various competing
political philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises
without surrendering the two vital principles oI constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal
limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to the governed.

Decision:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017
is CONSTITUTIONAL insoIar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions oI PP 1017
commanding the AFP to enIorce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees
promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision
in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII oI the Constitution
is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over
privately-owned public utility or business aIIected with public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts oI lawless violence." Considering that "acts oI terrorism" have not yet
been deIined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion oI G.O. No. 5 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest oI RandolI S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest oI the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence oI
prooI that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition oI standards on media or any Iorm oI prior
restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search oI the %rib:ne oIIices and whimsical
seizure oI its articles Ior publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 175888 February 11, 2009
SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; RAUL GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary
of 1ustice; EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary
of the Interior and Local Government; SERGIO APOSTOL, in his capacity as Presidential Legal Counsel; and L/CPL.
DANIEL SMITH, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176051 February 11, 2009
1OVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, 1OSE DE LA RAMA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, H. HARRY L.
ROQUE, 1R., FLORIN HILBAY, and BEN1AMIN POZON, Petitioners,
vs.
DANIEL SMITH, SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL SERGIO APOSTOL,
SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, The Special 16th Division of the COURT OF
APPEALS, and all persons acting in their capacity, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176222 February 11, 2009
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), represented by Dr. Carol Araullo; GABRIELA, represented by
Emerenciana de 1esus; BAYAN MUNA, represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo; GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY,
represented by Rep. Liza Maza; KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by Elmer Labog; KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), represented by Willy Marbella; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS),
represented by Vencer Crisostomo; and THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER, represented by Atty. Rachel
Pastores, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as concurrent Defense Secretary, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, 1USTICE
SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, AND INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO
PUNO,Respondents.

Facts:
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL Daniel Smith is a member oI the United States Armed
Forces. He was charged with the crime oI rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime
on November 1, 2005.
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA between the Republic oI the Philippines and
the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, the United States, at its request, was granted custody
oI deIendant Smith pending the proceedings.
During the trial, which was transIerred Irom the Regional Trial Court (RTC oI Zambales to the RTC oI
Makati Ior security reasons, the United States Government IaithIully complied with its undertaking to
bring deIendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was required.
On December 4, 2006, the RTC oI Makati, Iollowing the end oI the trial, rendered its Decision,
Iinding deIendant Smith guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The Makati court order Smith detained at the Makati jail until Iurther orders. However, Smith
was taken out oI Makati jail and brought to a Iacility Ior detention under the control oI the US
government, under the new agreements made between the Philippines and the United States through their
representatives Alberto G. Romulo and Kristie A. Kelley, respectively.
Hence this petition.

Issues:
Whether or not the United States Government has the authority to detain L/CPL Daniel Smith
who was convicted oI rape here in the Philippines under the VFA agreement.

Ruling:
The Court held that:
'Applying, however, the provisions oI VFA, the Court Iinds that there is a diIIerent
treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. The moment the accused has to be
detained, e.g., aIter conviction, the rule that governs is the Iollowing provision oI the VFA:
Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
x x x
Sec. 10. The conIinement or detention by Philippine authorities oI United States personnel shall
be carried out in Iacilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities.
United States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and
material assistance.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the diIIerence between custody during the trial
and detention aIter conviction, because they provided Ior a speciIic arrangement to cover
detention. And this speciIic arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried
out in Iacilities agreed on by authorities oI both parties, but also that the detention shall be "by
Philippine authorities."
ThereIore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements oI December 19 and 22, 2006, which are
agreements on the detention oI the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with
the VFA itselI because such detention is not "by Philippine authorities."
Respondents should thereIore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives oI the
United States towards an agreement on detention Iacilities under Philippine authorities as
mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 oI the VFA. x x x

Decision:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED, and the Court oI Appeals`
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212 dated January 2, 2007 is MODIFIED. The Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA between the Republic oI the Philippines and the United States, entered into on
February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements oI
December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA, and respondent
Secretary oI Foreign AIIairs is hereby ordered to Iorthwith negotiate with the United States
representatives Ior the appropriate agreement on detention Iacilities under Philippine authorities
as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 oI the VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained until
Iurther orders by this Court.
The Court oI Appeals is hereby directed to resolve without delay the related matters pending
therein, namely, the petition Ior contempt and the appeal oI L/CPL Daniel Smith Irom the
judgment oI conviction.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic oI the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-23846 September 9, 1977
GO TEK petitioner-appelle,
vs.
DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent-appellant.

Facts:
On March 3, 1964 the chieI prosecutor oI the Deportation Board Iiled a complaint against
Go Tek a Chinaman residing at Ilagan, Isabela and 1208-B, Misericordia Street, Sta. Cruz
Manila.
It was alleged in the complaint that in December, 1963 certain agents oI the National
Bureau oI Investigation (NBI searched an oIIice located at 1439 O'Donnel Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila believed to be the headquarters oI a guerilla unit oI the "Emergency Intelligence Section,
Army oI the United States" and that among those arrested thereat was Go Tek an alleged sector
commander and intelligence and record oIIicer oI that guerilla unit.
It was Iurther alleged that Iake dollar checks were Iound in Go Tek's possession and that,
thereIore, he had violated article 168 oI the Revised Penal Code and rendered himselI an
undesirable alien.
The prosecutor prayed that aIter trial the Board should recommend to the President oI the
Philippines the . immediate deportation oI Go Tek as an undesirable alien, "his presence in this
country having been, and will always be and a menace to the peace , welIare, and security oI the
community". Case No. R1116.
Go Tek Iiled a motion to quash said recommendation and the decision made by the Court
oI First Instance was Iavourable to Go Tek. The Board appealed to this Court on the ground that
the decision is contrary to law. The Solicitor General contends that the trial court erred in
assuming that the President may deport undesirable aliens only to grounds enumerated by law; in
holding that mere possession oI Iorged dollar checks is not a ground Ior deportation and that a
criminal conviction is necessary, and in not Iinding that the Board has jurisdiction over Go Tek's
case.

Issue:
Whether or not the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a
ground which is not speciIied in section 37 oI the Immigration Law and although the aliens has
not yet been convicted oI the oIIense imputed to him.

Ruling:
The Court held that:
'The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes,
228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125. That power may be exercise by the ChieI
Executive "when he deems such action necessary Ior the peace and domestic tranquility oI the
nation Justice Johnson's is that there the ChieI Executive rinds that there are aliens whose
continued in the country is injurious to the public interest he may, even in the absence oI express
law, deport them (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and CrossIield 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; n
reMcCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41.
The right oI a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is rental to
public welIare is absolute and unqualiIied (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner oI
Immigration and the Director oI NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956.
The Deportation Board is composed oI the Undersecretary oI Justice as chairman , the solicitor
General, and a representative oI the Secretary oI National DeIense (Executive Order No. 455
dated June 25, 1951, 47 O.G. 28M.
SECTION 69 and Executive Order No. 398, the Deportation Board, do not speciIy the grounds
Ior deportation Paragraph l(a oI Executive Order No. 398 merely provides that "the Deportation
Board, mot: 5ro5rio or upon complaint oI any person is authorized to conduct investigations in
the manner prescribed in section 69 oI the Revised Administrative Code to determine whether a
subject oI a Ioreign power in the Philippines is an undesirable alien or not, and thereaIter to
recommend to the President oI the Philippines the deportation oI such alien."
As observed by Justice Labrador, there is no legal nor constitutes provision deIining the power to
deport aliens because the intention oI the law is to grant the ChieI Executive "Iull discretion to
determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so undesirable as to aIIect or injure the
security welIare or interest oI the state. The adjudication oI Iacts upon which deportation is
predicated also devolves on the ChieI Executive whose decision is Iinal and executory." (Tan
Tong vs. Deportation Board 96 Phil. 934, 936; Tan Sin vs. Deportation Board, 104 PhiL 868,
872.
It has been held that the ChieI Executive is the sole and exclusive judge oI the existence
oI Iacts which warrant the deportation oI aliens as disclosed in an investigation conducted in
accordance with 69. No other tribunal is at liberty to re-examine or to controvert the suIIiciency
oI the evidence on which he acted. . (Martin vs. Mott 12 Wheat., 19, 31, cited in In re McCulloch
Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 62.
In the ick case it was noted "that every alien IorIeits his right to asylum in the country
in which he resides, in the absence oI treaty provisions to the contrary when his conduct or his
mode oI liIe renders his prance there inimical to the public interests". "The reasons may be
summed up and co in a single word: the public interest oI the State ." (38 Phil. 41, 47, 100.
"It is Iundamental that an executive order Ior deportation is not dependent on a prior
judicial conviction in a case" (Ang Bong vs. Commissioner oI Immigration, 100 Phil. 801, 803.
Thus, it was held that the Iact that an alien has been acquitted in a oI the charge does not prevent
the deportation oI such alien based on the same charge. Such acquittal does not constitute res
f:dicata in the deportation proceedings. Conviction oI a crime is not n to warrant deportation. (3
C.J.S. 743, note 40, citing Lewis vs. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 58 L. Ed. 967 and U.S. ex.. Mastoras
vs. McCandless 61 F. 2nd 366; Tama Miyake vs. U.S. 257 F. 732.
And in the %an %ong case, s:5ra, it was ruled that the Deportation Board could take
cognizance oI the charge oI illegal importation against an alien as a ground Ior deportation, even
iI he oI the Deportation Board is merely recommendatory. The ChieI Executive has to approve
the board's recommendatory Abuses or rents committed by the prosecutor or by the Board should
Iirst be brought to his attention.

Decision:
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. The writ oI
preliminary injunction is dissolved. The case is to the Deportation Board Ior Iurther proceedings.
Costs against the petitioner-appellee.
SO ORDERED.