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Weavers, Traders and the State: Handloom Weaving in Bangladesh Author(s): Anjan Kumar Datta and Hein Streefkerk

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 20, No. 38 (Sep. 21, 1985), pp. 1620-1624 Published by: Economic and Political Weekly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4374845 . Accessed: 27/12/2010 05:10
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Weavers,

Traders

and

the

State

Handloom Weaving in Bangladesh


Anjan Kumar Datta Hein Streefkerk

Thispaper is about handloomweaversin Tantigram, villagenorthof Dacca in Bangladesh,and about those a who largelydetermnine fate of the weavers-the yarn merchantsand the governmentofficials. the Thefirst section of the paper discusseshandloom weavingin Bangladeshin generaland the situation in the researcharea. Then the downward mobility among the weaversof the researchvillage is described.A detailed analysis of the handloom way of productionfollows in Section III. The organisationsand politics among the weaversof Tantigram discussedin SectionIV Section V analysesthe natureof indigenousyarnproduction are and distributionof cotton yarn. The conclusionsof the study are set out in the final section.
[This is the concluding part of the paper which is being published in two parts. The first part appeared last week.]
v 1,021 households of Tangail thana were enrolledon the pilot project.At presentthe "Superfine Society" is trying to enroll another 695 households from outside Tangail thana. All Basaks from Tantigramare members of this co-operativepilot project.Earlierwe already discussed the poor functioning of this yarn distributingco-operative and the weavers' complaintsaboutits ineffectiveness. The Basaks of Tantigrambelong to the "Tangail Basak Shammilini Ltd" (henceforth "Shammilini"),started in 1945. It is a caste association aimed at improvingthe social and economic welfareof the Basaks. It coversalmost all the 37 Basak villages in Tangaildistrict. The "Shammilini"has its own buildingin Tangailtown, which accommodates the office and its paid staff. In the same building the "SuperfineSociety" also has its office. The vice-presidentof the "Shammilini" and a member of its committee are from Tantigram. They are also prominentin their own village. The former runs a cloth store in the town and six looms in Tantigram,all operatedby wage labourers.The latter is a watch merchant with a shop in Tangail. One wayin whichleadership manifested is among the Tantigram Basaks is throughthe organisation of collective religious Hindu festivals like Kali puja and also through maintenanceof temples and settling of disputes. Previouslythe leadershipwas centralised in the hands of one man, formerly a businessmanwith a shop in Tangail.He lost the shop and moved to weaving. He owns six looms, of which three are in operation, workedby his son and two wage labourers; he is now old and ill. His leadership iong was undisputed until he invited the leader of another village to participate in the Tantigram Basaks' affairs. Several Basaks including the "Shammilini's"vice-president and a committee member challenged their leader,mobilised other Basaks and tried to take control of village affairs. The power struggle manifested itself clearly during a conflict over managementand fixing a date for a collective religious festival in 1981. It was then that splits became more pronounced. The "Shammilini's" vice-president wanted
Economic and Political Weekly Vol XX, No 38, September 21, 1985

Organisations and Politics among Weavers of Tantigram


IN the former section we dealt with the organisational aspectsof handloomweaving in the context of production. We discussed how the preparatorywork and the actual weavingare arranged.Weexplainedthe way yarn supply is structuredand how the sale of cloth is organised.While discussingprocurementof yarn and sales of products we also mentionedan abortivecollectiveaction to againstthe paymentof brokerage middlemen. But in our analysis we have not dealt with the local and wider organisational aspects of weaving. In this section we fill this gap by paying attention to the structureand composition of weavers' organisations and the power structureamong the Basaks of Tantigram. The "Tangail Weavers Co-operative Welfare Society" (henceforth "Superfine Society")is one such weavers'organisation. It's head office is in the town of Tangail. About 2,950 weaving households from the Tangailarea are membersof the "Superfine in The societywas established 1948 Society". and its membersare those who producefine cloth by using high counts. Its aim was to act as a pressuregroup to secure a regular supply of dyes and yarn and to control the quality of the cotton fabrics.To uphold the famous tradition of the Tangailsaris-as a brand, the name is still known even in India-activities such as trainingin dyeing and washing the yarn were initiated. After the formation of the Handloom Board in 1974, the Board became active in Tangailthana and the "SuperfineSociety" tried to get its members enrolled in the HandloomBoard's pilot project co-operative (henceforthpilot project) in Tangailthana. Thus it was hoped that a more regular supply of yarn could be secured. The close associationbetweenthe "Superfine Society" and the Board'sco-operative society is evidentfrom the fact that a Basak businessmanfrom the town of Tangailis the secretaryof both organisations. During 1979-1980 1,020 households of Tlngail thana became members of the cooperativesociety and in the autumnof 1980
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to shift the date of the festival ahead, as he was planning to make a trip to India. He took over the leadershipof those opposing the old villageleaderand triedto consolidate his position by mobilisingthe youngergeneration. For this he used his educatedson, a BA-failed,who proclaimedthat the younger generation should have a voice in control over village affairs.This action was successful. The two men could mobilisea following from amon'ethe younger people and even some older people, like the aged son of a former leader. The committee member of "Shammilini" also joined the vicepresident's faction. He was an ambitious man who became a member of the then ruling BangladeshNationalist Party(BNP) and held an importantpositionin the central committee of the BNP weavers'front. The vice-president's adversaries appealed to the older generation. It was not the old village leaderbut anotherweaverwho came to lead this faction. He is the ownerof four looms, of which two are idle. His fatherwas also a trader.Becauseof the dependenceon their sons, the older generation's opposition could be easily dealt with by the vicepresident's faction.Theyshiftedthe dateand organised the festival. The availabledata on the powerstruggle leads to severalconclusions. First, the fight was startedat the top of the Basak community of Tantigram, those who are mainly by in traders. They form the higheststratum the community,followedby the big majorityof self-employedweaversand the wage labourers,who are at the bottom of the community's social pile. Among the major protagonistsonly one is solely dependenton weaving.The others have access to other resourcesin the cloth business, in watch trading or in transport. They are all eitherdirectlyor indirectlyconnected with organisationslike the "Superfine Society"' "Shammilini" or the cooperativepilot project.The only protagonist who was solely dependenton weavinghad of affinal links to the secretary this organisations through his daughter'smarriage. Second, the strugglewas fought out between "new" and "old" prominents. The latters' defeat is part of a more general downwardmobility of many Basaks during

the last few decades, as describedin one of the formersections.It symbolisestheirsocial fall within their own community and illustratesthe rise of those few Baskas who gave up weaving as the main source of income. the Furthermore, struggleexemplifiesthe curtailedinfluence of the older generation, giventhe importanceof male family labour as a cost-savingdevice.The older generation is dependent for survival on its children. Third, the power of the new prominents in their community partly seems to rest on key positions they occupy in organisations that transcend the village level. Thus they participatein wider administrativebodies such as the co-operativepilot projectof the Handloom Board, the "SuperfineSociety" and and "Shammilini" theyare able to share Given of in the resources theseorganisations. background non-weaving the predominantly it of the Basakleadersin Tantigram, is hardly surprisingthat little effective pressureis exertedto improvethe worseningcondition of the weavers. But the difficult position of the Basaks if cannotbe fully understood we confineour analysis to the local context. For a more complete insight the broader framework should be taken into account. The weavers arepartof a widersociety in which the state (or ratherstate officials) and the business elite play an importantrole.They determine to a largeextentthe conditionof the weavers. The way in which this happens will be the subject of the next section. V
Traders aid the State

It is almost a truism to say that Bangladeshis integratedinto the capitalist world system. Compared, however, with preother peripheral societies,Bangladesh's sent position in the worldsystemis of a spein cial kind. Measured termsof the contribution of external trade to GDP or in terms overthe of the controlof foreigninvestment domestic economy, its integrationinto the world economy is comparativelylow. The most importantlinks arethose basedon aid. Aid dependency and the concomitant foreigneconomic and politicalinfluenceare the external linkages that define Bangladesh's peripheralposition and influence its internalsocio-economicprocesses,which in turn have contributed,and still contribute, to Bangladesh's growing dependency on aid.4 Wecannot sufficientlyexplainthe decline of the handloom sector by referring to Bangladesh'speripheralposition alone. Of course, there are severalfactors externalto Bangladesh that do explain the contemof First, poraryimpoverishment the weavers. caused in the sociothereis the disequilibria economic structure of East-Bengal by Pakistan'sinternalcolonialism before 1971. Second, there is the rise in cotton and yarn pricesin the worldmarketsince 1974.Finally, thereis the influx of cloth from Indiaand Japan. But, important questions still remain unanswered.Why, for instance, is Bangla-

presenthe is one of largestyarn-merchants associaof and chairman a yarn-merchant tion. The fatherof one of the most important at yarn-importers the time of our research sufferedthe same fate. He too startedas a small trader,went over to importingyarn and in fromWestPakistan the mid-1950s was millsby thelate1960s. owner twospinning of of Afterthe nationalisation his twoconcerns YARN PRODUCTION and retired,made he becamedisillusioned In 1969,therewere46 cotton mills in East to of overwhatremained hisbusiness hisson Pakistan(as it then was). Of these mills, 24 and died a few yearslater. werethe propertyof Bengalientrepreneurs. In 1971yarn productioncame under the Throughthemthesepeoplecontrolled53 per responsibility the Bangladesh TextileMills of cent of the fixed assets in the cotton textile Corporation (BTMC). It is not clear how sector (Rao 1972, 172; Rehman Sobhan much industrialyarnwas being producedin 1974, 189). Cotton and jute were moreover 1971,MuzaffarAhmad (1974,288) mentions the only terrainson which Bengalientrepre- the figureof 43 mills in 1972.Ahmad (1976, neurswereactive.The rise of Bengal indus146) mentions 44 mills in 1972-1973. trialentrepreneurship startedin the earlysixIn 1981there were 55 mills, of which 30 ties, and was wholly dependent on govern- were spinning mills and 25 were composite ment support. With this support Pakistan's mills, i e, spinning and weaving mills comPresidentAyub tried to create a-dependent bined. In 1979-1980these mills produced Bengali bourgeoisie which would then give 112,873,000 pounds of cotton yarn, or his regimea social and political base in East 282,182 bales. This was 82 per cent of Pakistan(Sobhanand Ahmad 1980,65). The BTMC'sproductiontargetfor that yearand entrepreneurial class thus created was its highest production since 1972 (Sachitra characterised a lack of managerialquali- Swadesh 1981, 38). by ties and by a relaxedattitude towardsproAccording to the Handloom Census of duction, growth and improvementof capa- 1978 the amount of yarn (including imcity utilisation. Heavy subsidising ensured ported yarn) purchased in that year was good profits for even very inefficient pro- 48,000balesa month or 576,000balesa year. ducers (Q K Ahmad 1978). After 1971 all The requirementin that year was 53,000 largeindustrialconcernswerenationalised. bales a month or 636,000 bales a year The reasons for this wereboth practicaland (RBHC 1978, 53, 79). political.Sobhan(1974,187)arguesthat "the Thoughthe figuresare for differentyears, social forcessustainingthe liberationstrug- the fact that in 1979-1980BTMC produced gle and the underdevelopedcharacter of the biggestvolumeof yarnsince 1972allows Bengali bourgeoisie conspired to make an us to compare the demands and procureexpandedpublicsectoras much a functional ment by the weaversin 1978 with domestic as a social imperative". yarn production. The figures reveala huge The managementof all non-Bengaliconand gap betweendemand,procurement procerns had disappearedand the authorities duction, and from these figurestwo conclutook over their runningto get them off the sions can be drawn: ground again as quickly as possible. The 1 Weaversbought 576,000 bales of cotton Bengali concerns and especially the textile yarn in 1978. Given a BTMC production industry came under government control. of less than 282,182 bales in that year, a Many Bengali mill-ownerscarriedon worklargeamount of yarn must have been iming duringthe liberationstruggleout of fear ported or smuggled into the country. of the Pakistaniarmy,and to make profits. 2 Despite these large imports there was a It was the workerswho refused to support deficit of 60,000 bales, since accordingto the Pakistanis stoppedworking(Sobhan and the HandloomCensusthe demandin 1978 1974, 185). The workers' support, the inwas for 636,000 bales. fluence of student-workers militants in the These figuresdiffer from the official data Awami League and Mujib's populistic approvided by the Department of Textilesin all led to the nationalisationdf the proach, the dated9.1.1981 Dacca. In a memorandum Bengali-owned cotton mills. However, by annual BTMCproductionin 1978-1979 was to askingmill-owners act as managersin the statedto be 224,000 bales, and in 1979-1980 jute and cotton corporationsthat wereto be it was 242,000 bales. Accordingto the same set up, Mujib tried not to alienate these paper, 21,000 bales were imported in groupstoo much from his policies (Sobhan 1979-1980. and Ahmad, 1980, 134, 135). betweenproductionand The discrepancy The fathersof at presentveryinfluential demand and the need to import is linked to and wereamong the growingnumberof idle spindles.Though yarnimporters yarndealers One theseexpropriated mill-owners. of them started his career as a petty yarn trader there has been an increasein installedspinthe proportionof idle spindles his (feriwala). He worked wayup andby the ning capacity, late sixties he owned four spinningmills. has grown since 1972. Chowdhury (1977) Afterthesewerenationalised, fatherwas points out that a "sizeablepart of the spinthe offered a post as managing director. How- ning capacity is of uneconomic age" and ever,he did not survivethe shock and died indicates that between 1972 and 1976 the two years later. son wasa student-activist ratio of "operable spindles" to "installed His and fought againstthe Pakistaniarmy.At spindleage" fell to 75 per cent. According desh still dependenton such largequantities of imported highcount yarn, and why so little home-spun yarn reaches the cooperative societies? To answer these questions we must look at the internal socioeconomic structure: we must analyse the nature of indigenous yarn production and the distribution of cotton yarn.
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September 21, 1985

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

to him, the increasing proportion of idle is subordinated to officials' individual spindles is due-apart from age-to poor interests.This is a resultof the intertwining and the scarcityof spareparts. withinthe statesystemof the interestsof the maintenance The out-of-date technology also means governmentofficials who decide on the use that mainly low counts and yarn of inferior and distribution of scarce resources and those of the businesselite.This businesselite quality are produced. One of the biggestcompositemills is in rose rapidlyafter 1971,and owes its ascenThe dency to its mediation in the acquisition of Demra,a town near to Naraijanganj. mill was startedin 1955and is one of the aid-financedimports.Wewill exemplifythis The majorityof the below. oldest in Bangladesh. an has BecauseBangladesh predominantly in was machines installed thatperiod. present are Repairs difficultbecausesparepartsfor agriculturaleconomy, with rice and jute as its main products, almost all industrial the machinesare no longeravailable. work in goods and importantrawmaterialsmust be In the mill about 2,500 workers is threeshifts.Theatmosphere hot anddusty imported.These importsare mainly financis andthenoiseis so loudthattalking hardly ed by "aid".Officially recognisedimporters possible. or Bangladeshiagents(indentors)of foreign Several workers mentioned a monthly companies are the links between the state fromthe BTMC (i e, State Corporations, Departments or wageof Tk 500.Welearned that therearetwo scales.One startsfroma Boards) and the foreign companies. of basicsalary Tk 570plusTk 130permonth The acquisition of products by the state, for medicalexpenses,etc. The other starts in this case rawcotton, sparesand new spinfroma basic salaryof Tk 570 plus Tk 130. ning machinery, takes place through a Thescalescover15and 18yearsrespectively. systemof tenders.Importers indentors are or The first scale is increased yearly by invited to give quotations for the products 15 Tk 10-Tk a month and fhe second by a departmentwants,by advertigovernment Tk 23-Tk32 a month. When we asked committeesare by sing in the press.Scrutinising reached was the whether maximum ever the workers, officials' answerwas no. The set up to judge and advise on the tenders workingconditionsin the mills are so bad received. In these committees the various that many workersdisappearafter a few divisions of departments,such as technical, to closelyrelated the financial, or commercial sections, are years.One functionary it Despitetheseprocedures often that workingcondi- represented. Demramill remarked in murderous the hot happens that the tender that wins out is tions are particularly season;after a few hours the workersare neitherthe cheapestnor technicallythe most exhausted. but appropriate, was backedby the importer Bad working conditions, shortage of or indentor who has most influence within system. In many managerialand technical personnel, shor- the political-administrative tage of finance, of spares and of imported cases, those who respond to the advertiserawmaterialand powerfailuresexplainwhy ments are in any case too late, since the productionis insufficient and why the gap othersmay have knownof the official plans between the installed and the operable in advance and could therefore anticipate capacity of the mills is growing, in spite of them by asking their foreign principals for the expansion of installed capacity in post- price and quality specifications. To be informed or to have influence, one liberation years (Q K Ahmad 1978). These factorsarerelatedto acuteshortage needs "contacts"and money. For instance, in manyother spheresand are characteristic during our research we discovered that that of the periodof "reconstruction" many several ministers had their own importcountriesgo throughafter independenceor indentingfirms and other high officials too liberation. We have already indicated that spentpartof theirtime in theirfirms'offices duringthe Pakistaniperiod East Pakistan's in Motijheel and Dilkusha, the commercial agricultureearned the foreign exchangeto centresof Dacca. Such firms wereformally pay for West Pakistan'sindustrialdevelop- owned and actuallyrun by family members, the ment; that the Pakistanigovernment,for a e g, brothers.Usually,however, contacts long time, did virtuallynothingto stimulate are less direct and involve more distant the developmentof East Pakistanand that cognates, affines, friendsor acquaintances. controlwas Offering money to those who ultimately and the administrative industrial decide about tenders, or remitting an in West Pakistani hands. But the legacy from the Pakistaniperiod amount to the account of the BNP, the then is only part of the explanation for the ruling party, were other commonly used stagnation of yarn production after 1971. means of exerting influence. It is not only the top officers, i e, those The analysis of the way in which use has been made of the means of productionthen who finally take decisions, whose interests available,or made available by "aid" is as intertwinewith those of the business elite. importantin the explanation.Seen fromthis Lowerfunctionariesare also involved, e g, angle, it is clear that managerial and tech- the officials who make up the tendernical skillsarenot optimallyused. Moreover, scrutinisingcommittees. This is clear from it is clear that in decisions concerning the the exampleof a cotton importerwho sold purchaseof importedrawcotton, of spares a huge quantity of inferior raw cotton to a the and concerning expansionof the produc- governmentdepartment. It is said that he tion apparatus,the quality of the products managed to do this by having his tender
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scrutinised by specialists who were well disposed towardshim. Severalmembersof the committees were on the payroll of a advisers. technicaladvicebureauas part-time The importer was director of this same bureau. The methods are not based on primordial relations and financial arrangements alone-threat and intimidation are also used. Official proceduresdo not stop after the contractsare signed. The quality of the goods imported by the state has to be controlled to see whether they conform to the specifications agreed upon in the contract. A textile expert charged with quality control of imported rawcotton said that while he was doing his work, he was permanently troubled by his superiors and sometimes ofevenby people fromthe nationalsecurity fice, who forced him to write more favourablereports. The purchase of spares and textile machinerytakes place in the same fashion. The methods are identical with those just described. The consequence of this coalition, based on importand aid, betweenbusinesspeople and officials and the methods they use is that the quality of the goods procuredis poor, which is in turn detrimental to the quality and volume of yarn production.It furthermoreleads to a waste of technical skills, which are scarce anyway. low Till now we argued that thve level of yarnproductioncan be explainedby the inefficient use of technicalskills and financial by made available aid. The mainteresources nance and expansion of spinning capacity thus suffers from the way business people, officials and politicians, who quickly rose to powerafter 1971,havetriedto strengthen their economic and political position.
DISTRIBUTION OF YARN

Apart from insufficientyarn production, the way in which home spun yarn is distributed also affects the weavers'conditions. Officially 51 per cent of BTMCproduction goes to traders.The remaining49 per cent is distributed among institutional buyers. The most important are the Bangladesh National Co-operative Society, supervised by the Handloom Boardand the Handloom Association,whichareallotted29 Industries per cent and 24 per cent respectivelyof the remainingamount, or 14.5 per cent and 12 per cent of the total BTMC production. The distribution of mill production destined for tradershappens-on paper at least-through an allotmnentprocedure. who want to buy yarndirectlyfrom Traders the mill need government approval, after which they are attachedor tagged to a mill. The official name for such a traderis "tagdealer".How much yarn a tag-dealer gets i dependson his requirements, e, the number of weavers in his area and their yarn demand. The mill and retail prices are fixed by the government,with a profit marginfor the dealers. There are small and big tag-

dealers, most of whom live and work in becausethe largestnumberof Naraijanganj, weaversare in Dacca district. At first sight this system of allocation seemsreasonable, wereit not that the quality of yarn differs from mill to mill and that traders forcedto put up with yarnof bad are qualitybecausethe mills are in a poor state. The only wayof avoidingthis is to influence the allotment committees, composed of representatives the BTMC and the local of Chamber of Commerce. Many yarn merchants get by in this way, and thus dealers from Dacca buy their quotas from a new mill far away in Barisal and traders from Barisalmust use yarnfrom an old mill near Dacca. In realitythe waythe dealersare "tagged" to the mills is by no meansthe most striking deviation from the rules. In the first stage of our research whole distributionstructhe tureseemedinscrutable. wereconfronted We regularlywith contradictoryinformation. But soon the hierarchicalstructureof the yarn market,e g, from the way the market in Naraijanganjfunctioned became clear. This town is the centre of yarn trade in Bangladesh pricestheredetermine and prices for the whole country. In Section III we explainedhow local traders(paikars)travel twice a week to Naraijanganjto buy their yarn. Usually they do not go straightto the shops of the wholesale traders, but first enquire from dalals (brokers) what the wholesalers haveto offer and whatthe prices are. These dalals stand at the busiest spot, on a corner,in the main street where the dealers' shops are. The brokershave price and qualityspecifications 10to 15dealers. of Often they do the negotiations between dealersand paikars and receivea commission from the paikars for the transactions Thereareabout 200 yarndealersin Naraijanganj. In contrast to the production and importsof yarn, before 1971its local distributionwas mainlyin Bengalihands(Sobhan and Ahmad 1980,344). The spectacular rise to powerof Bengali yarn importersstarted after 1971. But the careersof many of the presentyarn dealersalso startedafter 1971, and they often combineactivitieslikeimporting business, indenting and landowning. A traderalso startedonly after 1971.He is about 40 years old and a very rich man. He owes his wealth partly to his tradingin home spunyarnof low counts(30s and 40s). This is a quality for which there is demand throughout the year. How is it possible that he has a monthly turnoverof 1,000bales of BTMCyarnwith a BTMCproductionof 5,483 bales in a certain month, which production is supposed to be available for 3,850 tag-dealers?First this trader managed to get more than his allotted quota, by bribing mill managers. Second, he buys out the smallertag-dealers. Those with smaller quotas often sell their allotment directly to the big dealers. Thus, this traderis able to control almost the total market for 30 and 40 counts. This traderis not the only one to operate

in this manner. Consequently the price of home spun yarn is kept artificially high. When the big tradersare able to get more yarn than is allotted to them, less is left for the institutionalbuyers,among which is the co-operative society that deliversyarndirect to the weavers.It is thereforenot surprising that officials in the IndustriesDepartment spontaneously and somewhat desparately told us that mill managersgave false information about their stock and sometimes reportedthat they did not have any stock at all, while in reality there was enough yarn in their godown, meant for black market. Neither is it surprisingthat official data on yarn production are so unreliable and incomprehensible. In the field of yarn distribution the interests of businessmen and officials also intertwine.Recapitulating,we can say that yarn dealers are able to evade the official allotmentprocedures throughtheir contacts with the managersof the state-ownedmills and the officials of the corporationrunning these mills. In this way yarnmerchantscapture large yarn stocks. This gives them the power to create artificial scarcities and manipulateyarn prices, which is obviously to the detriment of weavers.
GLIMPSES OF THE ELITE STRUCTURE

In the former section we analysed the productionand distributionof yarn, the involvementof businessmen officials, and and how these influencedthe way in which yarn is produced and distributed. These people are the economic and political elite of Bangladesh.In this final section we will try to say more about the elite structurethan we have till now. However,the description will be rather limited, because it is based mainly on informationobtained from business people and their families. Due to lack of time availablewe were unable to collect sufficient material on the background of high officials, politicians and armypersonnel. Furthermore,the chaotic structureof the elite itself, hindered a satisfactory analysis. Insiders themselves confirm the disorderly of character the elite.Thereseems to be a permanent going and comingof people who had been or became economically and politically influential. Nevertheless, some general features can be discerned. Dacca, beingthe politicaland administrative centre of Bangladesh, accommodates the most important economicpeople.Dacca's Chamber Commerce theirorganisation. of is It has about 5,000 members,of which70 per cent are merchants,contractors,importers and indentors. The remaining percent are 30 industrialists.The importersand indentors seem to be the most powerfulpeople in the Chamber.Their importanceand that of the Chamberin generalcan be inferredfromthe fact that a formerchairmanof the Chamber, who ownedamong otherthingsan indenting firm, was a cabinetministerduringthe time of our research. Thoughwe focusedin the previoussection on "cotton", importantbusinessmen the and officials in this field werenot influential in

this branchof industryalone. The economic activitiesof the traders, importers indenand tors cover a much wider field than cotton. The interests of high placed functionaries not only go far beyondtheir official duties, but cover a wide range of activities too. Cognaticand affinal relationsoften connect those who are prominentin business,administration,politics and the army.These relations cover a variety of economic interests. Wewerestruckby the youthfulnessof importantbusinessmen. instancethe owner For of one of the biggest indenting firms in Bangladesh was hardly thirty in 1981. He was also director of a cotton-import and cotton-trade firm. The fathersof this "youngergeneration" werelower governmentofficials during the Pakistani period; employees in Pakistaniownedcommercial industrial and enterprises merchants or, from the sixties onwards, owners of cotton mills, though these were nationalisedafter 1971.Many .4 them-the sons as well as the fathers-are absenteelandlordstoo, owning land, which is cultivated by sharecroppers or tenants, and supervised by some family member. This younger generationtook over what the Pakistanisleft in 1981or spranginto the commercial vacuumcreatedby the disappearanceof Pakistanisfrom East Bengal.Some succeededin doing so through the possibilities createdby their fathers.Othersdid so via political parties,or as studentleadersin the liberation movement. Of course there were others who during the chaotic post-war years got rich very quickly, starting as small contractors and investingtheir money in the Middle East or in real estate in the centre of Dacca and in a variety of commercial and industrial enterprises. It is clearthat the position of the business elite has to a largeextentbeen createdby and rests on the large amount of foreign aid made available to Bangladesh since 1971. The "reconstruction"of the country after the war had been largely financed by aid. Theseprojectscovered,and still cover,a wide rangeof activities, such as building of harbour facilities;broadeningof the industrial outlay; construction of government buildings; ruralelectrification;construction of irrigationfacilities;provisionof educational and scientific support; establishment of health projects; importing food, fertilisers and cotton yarn;settingup villageprogrammes aimed at the "poor"; and, indirectly, militaryexpenses. In all these projects and activities private contractors, importers, indentorsand merchantsare involved.They supply the goods and organisethe work. In this way they siphon off large amounts of the international funds flowing into the country. Bangladeshi businessmen-those from Dacca in particular-are able to do so not only because foreign firms are eager to deliver their products to Bangladesh, but also because they are materiallyor socially closely linked to those who take official decisions.
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Sfpterlnber 21, 198? k'1

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY of home spuin yarn--a scarcity created oy related botlh these tendenyarni traders. XVN cies to the intertwining of the interests of an aid-depenident and import-based business and administrative elite that quickly rose to pcmer after- 1971. T his coalition is responsible for the inetfficient use of technical skills and financil resources that hampered the yarn produiction capacity. improverrmenit-of Finally we must answer the question raised in the inti-oduction: can handloom weaving in Bangladesh bc seen as an alternative source of rural enployrment and inme? Our answer can be brief. The industry is hardly able to feed its {ovii workforce, let :l1onethose who are unable to earni a living Vi agricultu,re. This does not mnean that handloom weaving Is in principie unsuited tor this role. Its technroiogy is labouirintensive, its products ar'c of high standard aiid its producers sie we\l skilled; in short it can be seen as anl alternative sourc-e of rural employment and income. But basic changes are needed it the industry is to play this role. The coalition between traders and officers must be broken, aid-dependency and the need to import be reduced, and the intlux of cotton cloth must be stopped. Capital accumulated over the last decade through aid and trade should be redirected and employed in the expansion of yarn porduction capacity. Private entrepreneurship miglht be mcore effective to accomplish this than state owned enterprises managedi by bureaucratic capitalists. Finally, in order to break the monopoly of the private yarn traders home spun yarn rnust be distributed among the weavers through co-operative societies. In our opinion wvithout these changes Bangladesh's handloom weaving industry cannot be saved. Since 1982 the present military regime in Bangladesh has returned textile mills to private ownership. It is still unclear whether or not these measures are part of a broader policy to improve the country's productive structure. However, we doubt whether the economic and political base of the present regime evill allow for the changes we recommended. Development Studies, Vol VI, No 4, 1978. Merchantsand ComS Arasaratnam,'Weavers, pany: The Handloom Industry in Southern India 1750-1790',The Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol XVII, No 3, 1980. Jitendra G Borpujari, 'Indian Cottons and the Cotton Famine, 1860-1865', The Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol X, No 1, 1973. K N Chaudhuri, 'The Structure of Indian Textile Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', The Indian Economic and Social HistorY Review, Vol XI, Nos 2-3, 1974. Nuimuddin Chowdhury, .'Growth and Structural Change in Large-Scale Cotton Textile Banglalndustry of Ban-gladesh.1947-1976', desh Development Studies, Vol V, No ,1 1977. V M Dandekar, 'On Nleasurementof Poxerty', Economic and Political WeeklY,July 25, 1981. E J Hobsbawm, "Industry and Empire",Harmondsworth, 1969. Azizar Rahman Khan, "The Economy of Bangladesh", London 1972. Stephen R Lewis, "Pakistan, Industrialisation anid Trade Politics", London 1970. A NI M Nasiruddin, 'Weavers of Village Baghmara, A Study of Their Problems', Cota Bulletin, the bi-annual publication ot Cixil Officers' Training Acaderny, Vol 2, No 1. Julv-December 1979. Om Prakash, 'Bulllionfor Goods: International Tradeand the Economy of EarlyEighteenth Century Bengal, The IndialnEconomic and
Social Hlis-toryReviet', Vol XI II, No 2, 1976.

( 4)ncll Si() s
Onie of the rmain puroses of this study was to nmovide dclim'ed information on handloomi weaving and to analyse it in its proper historical anid present-day context. Our first concl usion is that the industry remained remarkablv persistent dtnring the colonial period. Though it was severely weakened durinlg the nineteenth century, it surviied, albeit as arn indstiry of the poor for ,he poor- which it still is even now. TIhe other conclusion3 pertain to the post colonial period. D)uring the last r-vwo decades at least, conditions in the industr-N and in the wveaving households deterior.ated. This vsas part of the general economic decline of East Bengal, wvhichwas subservient to \Vest Pakistan before 1971. After 1971 the weavers suffered fronmthe rise in the price of cottoni yarn oni the world market (starting in 1974) arid from the influx of cloth fromnIndia and Japani. Decreasing returns-hardly sufficient to provide a bare subsistence minimum-and growing indebtedness stand oUt as str-iking trends amonig the householdis studied. In order to keep the production going, the weaving hoLuselholds require yarinand other inputs for the next fabrics to lhewoven, even

the beforetheyhavecomplete(d productsthey


will sell at the coming hat. Because of decreasing returns, they becreree more and more dependent on the yarn merchants for credits to proctire sutt'ficient yarn and other inputs to prevent their looms remaining idle.

is Anothercause of indebtedness the susceptibility of handloom weaving to the weather.

During the rainy season production slows


down and weavers must borrow in order to subsist. By engaging as much household labour as possible the weavers try to save cash expenses to cope with their growing problems. Nevertheless, we found many idle

looms among the Basaks we studied. Downwardeconomic and social mobility and polarisation are the other trends we detected in Tantigram. Only those few among the Basakswho are not solely dependent on weavingareable to escapeimpoverishment. These few have access to otber resources outside the village: in the cloth
business, in watch trading or in transport.

IConcluded)
Note
4 See for a good analysis of this problem Sobhan (1981).

Their prominencerestson the key positions that they occupy in organisations and adthe bodies that transcend village ministrative
level. The co-operative pilot project of the

References
Muzaffar Ahmad, 'Planning for Industrialisation of Bangladesh' in E A G Robinson and K Griffin (eds), "The Economic Development of Bangladesh within a Socialist Framework", London 1974. Nafis Ahmed, "An EconomnicGeography of East Pakistan", London 1968. Morris David Morris, 'Trends and Tendencies in Indian Economic History', The Indian Economics and Social History Review, Vol V, No 4, 1968. Q K Ahmad, 'The Manufacturing Sector of Bangladesh, an Overview', Bangladesh

'European Trade and South Asian Economies: Some Regional Contrasts, 1600-1800' in Leonard Blusse and Femme Gaastr-a (eds), "Companies anid Trade", Leiden, 1980. V K R V Rao, "BangladeshEconomy, Problems and Prospects", Delhi 1972. "Report on Bangladesh Handroom Census 1978 (RBHC 1978)", prepared by M Alimullah Mliyan,Instituteof BusinessAdministraton, University of Dacca, 1979. Willem Van Schenidel, 'The Odds of Peasant Life, Processes of Social and Economic Mobility in Rural Bangladesh',Amsterdam 1980. 'PeasantMobility,the Odds of PeasantLife in Rural Bangladesh', Assam 1981. Rehman Sobhan, 'Nationalisation of Industries in Bangladesh: Background and Problems' in E A G Robinson and K Griffin (eds), "The Economic Development of Bangladesh, within a Socialist Framework", London 1974.
-,

Handloom Board is one such organisation. of One of the centralarguments the study is that the fate of the handloom industry and of the weavinghouseholds cannot adequatelv be explainedby simply referringto Bangladesh's peripheral position in the worldeconomy.To analysethe declineof the industry since 1971, internal social and economic processes must be taken into account. Twotendencies stand out: one is the low level of yarn production and the need to import;the other is the artificial scarcity
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'Bangladesh

and the World Economic

System: the Crisis of External Dependence', Development and Change, Vol 12, 1981. Rehman Sobhan and Musaffer Ahmad, "Public Enterprise in an Intermediate Regime, a Study in the Political Economy of Bangladesh", Dacca 1980. "Statistical Pocket Book of Bangladesh 1979, (SPB 1979)",Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1979. Eric R Wolf, "Europe and the People without History", Berkeley, 1982.

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